Assurance Activity Report for Brocade FastIron SX, ICX, and FCX

www.GossamerSec.com
Assurance Activity Report for
Brocade FastIron SX, ICX, and FCX
Series Switch/Router 08.0.10
Version 1.1
05/19/14
Prepared by:
Gossamer Security Solutions
Accredited Security Testing Laboratory – Common Criteria Testing
Catonsville, MD 21228
Prepared for:
National Information Assurance Partnership
Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme
Document: AAR-BrocadeFastIron8010
© 2014 Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
All rights reserved.
Version 1.1, 05/19/2014
REVISION HISTORY
Revision
Version 1.0
Version 1.1
Date
02/14/14
05/19/14
Authors
Arnold/Compton
Compton
Summary
Initial draft
Updated document versions
The TOE Evaluation was sponsored by:
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc.
130 Holger Way
San Jose, CA 95134
Evaluation Personnel:
• James Arnold
• Tammy Compton
Common Criteria Versions:
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction, Version 3.1,
Revision 4, September 2012
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components,
Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012
• Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version
3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
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TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
1.
Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................................5
2.
Protection Profile SFR Assurance Activities ...........................................................................................................6
2.1
Security audit (FAU) .....................................................................................................................................6
2.1.1
Audit Data Generation (FAU_GEN.1) ....................................................................................................6
2.1.2
User identity association (FAU_GEN.2)...............................................................................................14
2.1.3
External Audit Trail Storage (FAU_STG_EXT.1) ...................................................................................14
2.2
Cryptographic support (FCS) ......................................................................................................................16
2.2.1
Cryptographic Key Generation (for asymmetric keys) (FCS_CKM.1) ..................................................16
2.2.2
Cryptographic Key Zeroization (FCS_CKM_EXT.4) ..............................................................................17
2.2.3
Cryptographic Operation (for data encryption/decryption) (FCS_COP.1(1)) ......................................18
2.2.4
Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic signature) (FCS_COP.1(2)) ............................................19
2.2.5
Cryptographic Operation (for cryptographic hashing) (FCS_COP.1(3)) ..............................................19
2.2.6
Cryptographic Operation (for keyed-hash message authentication) (FCS_COP.1(4)) ........................20
2.2.7
Extended: Cryptographic Operation (Random Bit Generation) (FCS_RBG_EXT.1) .............................21
2.2.8
Explicit: SSH (FCS_SSH_EXT.1) .............................................................................................................23
2.2.9
Explicit: TLS (FCS_TLS_EXT.1) ..............................................................................................................27
2.3
2.3.1
2.4
User data protection (FDP) ........................................................................................................................28
Full Residual Information Protection (FDP_RIP.2) ..............................................................................28
Identification and authentication (FIA) ......................................................................................................28
2.4.1
Password Management (FIA_PMG_EXT.1) .........................................................................................28
2.4.2
Protected Authentication Feedback (FIA_UAU.7) ..............................................................................29
2.4.3
Extended: Password-based Authentication Mechanism (FIA_UAU_EXT.2) .......................................30
2.4.4
User Identification and Authentication (FIA_UIA_EXT.1) ...................................................................31
2.5
Security management (FMT) ......................................................................................................................32
2.5.1
Management of TSF Data (for general TSF data) (FMT_MTD.1) .........................................................32
2.5.2
Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1) ......................................................................34
2.5.3
Restrictions on Security Roles (FMT_SMR.2) ......................................................................................35
2.6
Protection of the TSF (FPT) ........................................................................................................................37
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2.6.1
Extended: Protection of Administrator Passwords (FPT_APW_EXT.1) ...............................................37
2.6.2
Extended: Protection of TSF Data (for reading of all symmetric keys) (FPT_SKP_EXT.1) ...................38
2.6.3
Reliable Time Stamps (FPT_STM.1).....................................................................................................38
2.6.4
TSF Testing (FPT_TST_EXT.1) ..............................................................................................................39
2.6.5
Extended: Trusted Update (FPT_TUD_EXT.1) .....................................................................................40
2.7
2.7.1
TSF-initiated Termination (FTA_SSL.3) ................................................................................................42
2.7.2
User-initiated Termination (FTA_SSL.4) ..............................................................................................42
2.7.3
TSF-initiated Session Locking (FTA_SSL_EXT.1)...................................................................................43
2.7.4
Default TOE Access Banners (FTA_TAB.1) ...........................................................................................43
2.8
3.
TOE access (FTA) ........................................................................................................................................42
Trusted path/channels (FTP) ......................................................................................................................44
2.8.1
Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1) ................................................................................................44
2.8.2
Trusted Path (FTP_TRP.1) ...................................................................................................................46
Protection Profile SAR Assurance Activities ........................................................................................................49
3.1
3.1.1
3.2
Development (ADV) ...................................................................................................................................49
Basic functional specification (ADV_FSP.1) .........................................................................................49
Guidance documents (AGD) .......................................................................................................................49
3.2.1
Operational user guidance (AGD_OPE.1)............................................................................................49
3.2.2
Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE.1) .................................................................................................50
3.3
Life-cycle support (ALC)..............................................................................................................................51
3.3.1
Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1) ......................................................................................................51
3.3.2
TOE CM coverage (ALC_CMS.1) ..........................................................................................................51
3.4
3.4.1
3.5
3.5.1
Tests (ATE) ..................................................................................................................................................51
Independent testing - conformance (ATE_IND.1) ...............................................................................51
Vulnerability assessment (AVA) .................................................................................................................52
Vulnerability survey (AVA_VAN.1) ......................................................................................................52
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1. INTRODUCTION
This document presents evaluations results of the Brocade FastIron SX, ICX, and FCX Series Switch/Router 08.0.10
Protection Profile for Network Devices (NDPP) evaluation. This document contains a description of the assurance
activities and associated results as performed by the evaluators.
Note that this report is based on the Protection Profile for Network Devices, version 1.1, 8 June 2012 with
Errata#2.
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2. PROTECTION PROFILE SFR ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES
This section of the ETR identifies each of the assurance activities included in the claimed Protection Profile and
describes the findings in each case.
The following evidence was used to complete the Assurance Activities:
AA report v1.1
•
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. FastIron SX, ICX, and FCX Series Switch/Router 8.0.10 Security
Target, Version 1.0, May 19, 2014.
•
Brocade FastIron FIPS Configuration Guide Supporting FastIron Software Release 08.0.10, 53-1003198-02,
9 May 2014 (FastIron_FIPS_08010_ConfigGuide.pdf)
•
Brocade FastIron Ethernet Switch Security Configuration Guide Supporting FastIron Software Release
08.0.10, 53-1003088-01, 8 January 2014 (FastIron_08010_SecurityGuide.pdf)
•
Brocade FastIron Ethernet Switch Administration Guide Supporting FastIron Software Release 08.0.10, 531003075-01, 8 January 2014 (FastIron_08010_AdminGuide.pdf)
2.1 SECURITY
AUDIT
(FAU)
2.1.1 AUDIT DATA GENERATION (FAU_GEN.1)
2.1.1.1 FAU_GEN.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: For protocol related audit events: The evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS
contains a list (possibly empty except for authentication failures for user-level connections) of the protocol failures
that are auditable.
Section 6.1 references the table of audit events in the SFR. The reference is a list of events, including protocol
failures, starting and stopping the audit function, administrator commands, and authentication events.
Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the administrative guide and ensure that it lists all of the
auditable events and provides a format for audit records. Each audit record format type must be covered, along
with a brief description of each field. The evaluator shall check to make sure that every audit event type mandated
by the PP is described and that the description of the fields contains the information required in FAU_GEN1.2, and
the additional information specified in Table 1 of the NDPP.
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The evaluator shall also make a determination of the administrative actions that are relevant in the context of this
PP. The evaluator shall examine the administrative guide and make a determination of which administrative
commands, including subcommands, scripts, and configuration files, are related to the configuration (including
enabling or disabling) of the mechanisms implemented in the TOE that are necessary to enforce the requirements
specified in the PP. The evaluator shall document the methodology or approach taken while determining which
actions in the administrative guide are security relevant with respect to this PP. The evaluator may perform this
activity as part of the activities associated with ensuring the AGD_OPE guidance satisfies the requirements.
Requirement
FAU_GEN.1
Auditable Events
Additional
Audit Record
Contents
Startup of audit
Guidance Location
FIPS Configuration Guide, Appendix B
Informational Message
Logging CLI_CMD operation enabled by user
from console session.
"logging cli-command" by user from console
FAU_GEN.1
Shutdown of audit
FIPS Configuration Guide, Appendix B
Informational Message
Logging CLI_CMD operation disabled by user
from console session
FCS_SSH_EXT.1
Failure to establish an SSH
session.
Establishment/Termination
1
of an SSH session.
Reason for
failure
Non-TOE
endpoint of
connection (IP
address) for
both successes
and failures.
Administration Guide, Appendix A
Informational Message
telnet | SSH| access [by username ] from src IP
source ip address , src MAC source MAC
address
rejected, n attempts
access attempts from the specified source
IP and MAC address.
• [by user username] does not appear if
telnet or SSH clients are specified.
• n is the number of times this SNMP
trap occurred in the last five minutes,
or other configured number of
minutes.
FCS_TLS_EXT.1
Failure to establish a TLS
Session.
Establishment/Termination
1
of a TLS session.
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Reason for
failure.
Non-TOE
endpoint of
connection (IP
address) for
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FIPS Configuration Guide, Appendix B
Informational Message
SSL Syslog server ip-address:portnum is now
disconnected
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Requirement
FIA_UIA_EXT.1
Auditable Events
All use of the identification
and authentication
mechanism.
Additional
Audit Record
Contents
both successes
and failures.
Provided user
identity, origin
of the attempt
(e.g., IP
address).
Guidance Location
Console:
Success
Administration Guide, Appendix A
Informational Message
Security: console login by username to USER
| PRIVILEGE EXEC mode
The specified user logged into the device
console into the specified EXEC mode.
Failure:
FIPS Configuration Guide, Appendix B
Informational Message
Error - Incorrect username or password in
console session
SSH:
Success
Administration Guide, Appendix A
Informational Message
Security: telnet | SSH login by username
from src IP ip-address, src MAC mac-address
to USER | PRIVILEGE EXEC mode
The specified user logged into the device
using Telnet or SSH from either or both the
specified IP address and MAC address. The
user logged into the specified EXEC mode
Failure
Administration Guide, Appendix A
Informational Message
telnet | SSH |
from src IP source ip address, src MAC
source MAC address rejected, n attempts
access attempts from the specified source
IP and MAC address.
• [by user username] does not appear if
telnet or SSH clients are specified.
• n is the number of times this SNMP
trap occurred in the last five minutes,
or other configured number of
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Requirement
Auditable Events
Additional
Audit Record
Contents
Guidance Location
minutes.
TLS:
FIPS Configuration Guide, Appendix B
Informational Message
SSL Syslog server ip-address:portnum is now
connected
Failure
FIPS Configuration Guide, Appendix B
Informational Message
SSL Syslog server ip-address:portnum is now
disconnected.
FIA_UAU_EXT.2
All use of the authentication
mechanism.
FPT_STM.1
Changes to the time.
FPT_TUD_EXT.1
Initiation of update.
Origin of the
attempt (e.g.,
IP address).
The old and
new values for
the time.
Origin of the
attempt (e.g.,
IP address).
See FIA_UIA_EXT.1
No additional
information.
Administration Guide, Appendix A
Informational Message
FIPS Configuration Guide, Appendix B
Alert Message
Time is updated by NTP server ip-address
from NO_CLOCK to <new time> GMT+00
<new date>
Clock Changed from old time <old time>
GMT+00 <old date> to new time <new
time> GMT+00 <new date>
startup-config was changed
or
startup-config was changed by user-name
A configuration change was saved to the
startup-config file.
The user-name is the user ID, if they
entered a user ID to log in.
FTA_SSL_EXT.1
Any attempts at unlocking
of an interactive session.
No additional
information.
Administration Guide, Appendix A
Informational Message
Security: console logout by username
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Requirement
Auditable Events
Additional
Audit Record
Contents
Guidance Location
The specified user logged out of the device
console
FTA_SSL.3
FTA_SSL.4
The termination of a
remote session by the
session locking mechanism.
No additional
information.
The termination of an
interactive session.
No additional
information.
FIPS Configuration Guide, Appendix B
Informational Message
SSH session for user from src IP ip-address,
MAC mac-address in PRIVILEGED EXEC
mode has timed out.
Administration Guide, Appendix A
Informational Message
Security: console logout by username
The specified user logged out of the device
console
FTP_ITC.1
Initiation of the trusted
channel.
Termination of the trusted
channel.
Failure of the trusted
channel functions.
Identification
of the initiator
and target of
failed trusted
channels
establishment
attempt.
See SSH and TLS event types.
FTP_TRP.1
Initiation of the trusted
channel.
Termination of the trusted
channel.
Failures of the trusted path
functions.
Identification
of the claimed
user identity.
See SSH event type
FMT_SMF.1
(Administrator
actions)
Changes to the audit
configuration
FIPS Configuration Guide, Appendix B
Informational Message
SSL Syslog server ip-address:portnum is now
connected.
OR
SSL Syslog server ip-address:portnum is now
disconnected
A user made Syslog configuration changes
to the specified Syslog server address, or
enabled or disabled a Syslog operation
through the Web, SNMP, console, SSH, or
Telnet session
FIPS Configuration Guide, Appendix B
Informational Message
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Requirement
Auditable Events
Additional
Audit Record
Contents
Guidance Location
Logging CLI_CMD operation enabled by user
from console session.
"logging cli-command" by user from console
Logging CLI_CMD operation disabled by user
from console session
Note: All CLI commands are recorded with
the CLI_CMD event type
User Account creation and
password management
Administration Guide, Appendix A
Informational Message
user username added | deleted | modified
from console | telnet | ssh | web | snmp
A user created, modified, or deleted a local
user account through the Web, SNMP,
console, SSH, or Telnet session
Security: Password has been changed for
user username from session-id
Password of the specified user has been
changed during the specified session ID or
type. session-id can be console, telnet, ssh,
web, or snmp.
Login policy management
(time restrictions, minimum
password length)
The CLI_CMD event type records all
administrator commands from the CLI
interface. All login policy changes are
recorded using this event type
Logging CLI_CMD operation enabled by user
from console session.
"logging cli-command" by user from console
ALC management
Administration Guide, Appendix A
Informational Message
ACL ACL id added | deleted | modified from
console | telnet | ssh | web | snmp session
A user created, modified, deleted, or
applied an ACL through a Web, SNMP,
console, SSH, or Telnet session
Enabling FIPS mode
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The CLI_CMD event type records all
administrator commands from the CLI
interface. Changes to the FIPS mode are
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Requirement
Auditable Events
Additional
Audit Record
Contents
Guidance Location
recorded using this event type
Logging CLI_CMD operation enabled by user
from console session.
"logging cli-command" by user from console
The following commands were identified by the evaluators as security-related. Each command is identified and a
brief purpose is provided. These commands were found in the user guidance and consist of all the commands
needed to configure or examine the security settings through the process of testing the security claims. This same
list is found in Section 6.5 of the ST. As such, they are all identified in the DTR, along with the results and
corresponding audit records. Note that every administrator command issued by the evaluators during testing was
found to be audited without exception.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
fips
o (no) fips enable common-criteria (turn fips and cc modes on or off)
o fips show (show the current fips configuration)
write memory (write the current configuration settings to persistent memory)
openssl s_server (set syslog port, key and cipher)
(no) logging host <ip-address> ssl-port <port> (configure or remove the secure logging host)
ip
o ip ssh pub-key-file (load a user’s public key for authentication)
o ip ssh idle-time <time> (set SSH idle timeout period)
aaa authentication (configure authentication settings)
enable
o enable aaa (enable login at console)
o enable password-min-length 15 (configure min password size)
o enable user password-masking (set as part of turning on FIPS mode)
username <user> password (set a user password)
clock set <time> (set time)
server <ntp server ip> minpoll <time> (configure NTP poll interval)
show
o show flash (show flash info)
o show ver (show version)
o show clock (query time)
o show ip client-pub-key (show the client public key used for SSH login)
o show ip ssl (show ssl connections)
o show logging (show current logging configuration and log buffer)
o show run | <options> (show running configuration details)
boot system flash <primary or secondary> (boot a loaded flash image)
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•
•
•
•
•
console timeout <time> (set console idle timeout period)
banner motd + (set the login banner – message of the day)
exit (logout or exit current shell)
ntp (switch to ntp configuration mode)
config t (switch to configuration mode)
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall test the TOE’s ability to correctly generate audit records by having
the TOE generate audit records for the events listed in table 1 of the NDPP and administrative actions. This should
include all instances of an event--for instance, if there are several different I&A mechanisms for a system, the
FIA_UIA_EXT.1 events must be generated for each mechanism. The evaluator shall test that audit records are
generated for the establishment and termination of a channel for each of the cryptographic protocols contained in
the ST. If HTTPS is implemented, the test demonstrating the establishment and termination of a TLS session can be
combined with the test for an HTTPS session. For administrative actions, the evaluator shall test that each action
determined by the evaluator above to be security relevant in the context of this PP is auditable. When verifying the
test results, the evaluator shall ensure the audit records generated during testing match the format specified in the
administrative guide, and that the fields in each audit record have the proper entries.
Note that the testing here can be accomplished in conjunction with the testing of the security mechanisms
directly. For example, testing performed to ensure that the administrative guidance provided is correct verifies
that AGD_OPE.1 is satisfied and should address the invocation of the administrative actions that are needed to
verify the audit records are generated as expected.
For protocol related audit events: The evaluator shall test all identified audit events during protocol testing/audit
testing.
The evaluator created a mapping for the required audit events to test cases where the associated function was
tested. The evaluator then collected the audit event when running the security functional tests. For example, the
required event for FCS_SSH.1 is Establishment/Termination of an SSH session. The evaluator collected these audit
records when establishing the SSH sessions to test password based authentication for SSH and recorded them in
the Detailed Test Report (DTR). The security management events are handled in a similar manner. When the
administrator was required to set a value for testing, the audit record associated with the administrator action was
collected and recorded in the DTR.
2.1.1.2 FAU_GEN.1.2
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
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Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.1.2 USER IDENTITY ASSOCIATION (FAU_GEN.2)
2.1.2.1 FAU_GEN.2.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.1.3 EXTERNAL AUDIT TRAIL STORAGE (FAU_STG_EXT.1)
2.1.3.1 FAU_STG_EXT.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: For both types of TOEs (those that act as an audit server and those that send data to an
external audit server), there is some amount of local storage. The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it
describes the amount of audit data that are stored locally; what happens when the local audit data store is full;
and how these records are protected against unauthorized access. The evaluator shall also examine the
operational guidance to determine that it describes the relationship between the local audit data and the audit
data that are sent to the audit log server (for TOEs that are not acting as an audit log server). For example, when
an audit event is generated, is it simultaneously sent to the external server and the local store, or is the local store
used as a buffer and “cleared” periodically by sending the data to the audit server.
TOE acts as audit server
The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it describes the connection supported from non-TOE entities to send
the audit data to the TOE, and how the trusted channel is provided.
TOE is not an audit server
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The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure it describes the means by which the audit data are transferred to
the external audit server, and how the trusted channel is provided.
Section 6.1 explains how the audit trail is protected. Only the TOE User role can access the audit trail and use of
that role requires a valid logon. Only administrators log onto the TOE. Section 6.1 also explains there is a local
audit log and the possibility of a remote audit log. The local log stores up to 50 entries after which the audit
entries will be overwritten, oldest first. The administrator (with Super User privilege) can choose to configure one
or more external syslog servers where the TOE will send a copy of the audit records if so desired. The TOE can be
configured to use TLS to protect audit logs exported to an external server.
Guidance Assurance Activities: TOE acts as audit server
The evaluator shall also examine the operational guidance to ensure it describes how to establish the trusted
channel with the TOE, as well as describe any requirements for other IT entities to connect and send audit data to
the TOE (particular audit server protocol, version of the protocol required, etc.), as well as configuration of the TOE
needed to communicate with other IT entities.
TOE is not an audit server
The evaluator shall also examine the operational guidance to ensure it describes how to establish the trusted
channel to the audit server, as well as describe any requirements on the audit server (particular audit server
protocol, version of the protocol required, etc.), as well as configuration of the TOE needed to communicate with
the audit server.
Appendix A of the FIPS Configuration Guide provides detailed instructions for configuring the SSL/TLS connection
between the TOE and the audit server. The commands provided are for the Ubuntu 10.4 audit server. The reader
is told that the TOE will work with Red Hat or Centos but the commands are slightly different (and left to the
reader). The steps provide are as follows. Each major step has several sub-steps explained.
•
Set up stunnel
•
Create a certificate with the openssl tool
•
Create a configuration file
•
Change the stunnel4 startup file
•
Restart the stunnel service
•
Configure rsyslog
•
Enable accepting remote logs
•
Restart rsyslog service
•
Print log messages
Testing Assurance Activities: TOE acts as audit server
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Testing of the trusted channel mechanism will be performed as specified in the associated assurance activities for
the particular trusted channel mechanism.
The evaluator shall perform the following test for this requirement:
Test 1: The evaluator shall establish a session between an external IT entity and the TOE according to the
configuration guidance provided. The evaluator shall then examine the traffic that passes between the IT entity
and the TOE during several activities of the evaluator’s choice designed to generate audit data to be transferred to
the TOE. The evaluator shall observe that these data are not able to be viewed in the clear during this transfer, and
that they are successfully received by the TOE. The evaluator shall perform this test for each protocol selected in
the second selection.
TOE is not an audit server
Testing of the trusted channel mechanism will be performed as specified in the associated assurance activities for
the particular trusted channel mechanism.
The evaluator shall perform the following test for this requirement:
Test 1: The evaluator shall establish a session between the TOE and the audit server according to the configuration
guidance provided. The evaluator shall then examine the traffic that passes between the audit server and the TOE
during several activities of the evaluator’s choice designed to generate audit data to be transferred to the audit
server. The evaluator shall observe that these data are not able to be viewed in the clear during this transfer, and
that they are successfully received by the audit server. The evaluator shall record the particular software (name,
version) used on the audit server during testing.
The evaluator followed the procedures in the FIPS Guide, Appendix A for setting up the syslog server connection.
The audit server tested was CentOS release 6.4 (Final) Kernel 2.6.32-358.11.1.el6.x86_64 on an x86_64. The
evaluator used Wireshark to observe the traffic between the TOE and the audit log server. The evaluator was able
to establish a connection with each of the claimed TLS ciphers while performing this test. The evaluator used the
syslog server to store audit as recommended by the Brocade for the duration of testing so many audit records
were recorded during the course of testing.
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SUPPORT
(FCS)
2.2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY GENERATION (FOR ASYMMETRIC KEYS)
(FCS_CKM.1)
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2.2.1.1 FCS_CKM.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS contains a description of how the In order to
show that the TSF complies with 800-56A and/or 800-56B, depending on the selections made. This description
shall indicate the sections in 800-56A and/or 800-56B that are implemented by the TSF, and the evaluator shall
ensure that key establishment is among those sections that the TSF claims to implement.
Any TOE-specific extensions, processing that is not included in the documents, or alternative implementations
allowed by the documents that may impact the security requirements the TOE is to enforce shall be described
FCS_CKM.1.1 selected NIST Special Publication 800-56B, so the evaluator expected to find only that publication
addressed in the TSS.
Section 6.2, Table 6, addresses SP 800-56B with section references, indications of whether identified features are
implemented and where the implementation disagrees with the recommendation a rationale is provided. Note
that no such deviations are identified.
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall use the key pair generation portions of "The FIPS 186-3 Digital
Signature Algorithm Validation System (DSA2VS)", "The FIPS 186-3 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Validation System (ECDSA2VS)", and either "The RSA Validation System (RSAVS)" (for FIPS 186-2) or “The 186-3
RSA Validation System (RSA2VS)” (for FIPS 186-3) as a guide in testing the requirement above, depending on the
selection performed by the ST author. This will require that the evaluator have a trusted reference
implementation of the algorithms that can produce test vectors that are verifiable during the test.
The TOE has been FIPS approved. The RSA certificate numbers are 1396, 1388, 1391, 1386, and 1387 covering all
evaluated models.
2.2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ZEROIZATION (FCS_CKM_EXT.4)
2.2.2.1 FCS_CKM_EXT.4.1
TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check to ensure the TSS describes each of the secret keys (keys used
for symmetric encryption), private keys, and CSPs used to generate key; when they are zeroized (for example,
immediately after use, on system shutdown, etc.); and the type of zeroization procedure that is performed
(overwrite with zeros, overwrite three times with random pattern, etc.). If different types of memory are used to
store the materials to be protected, the evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS describes the zeroization
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procedure in terms of the memory in which the data are stored (for example, "secret keys stored on flash are
zeroized by overwriting once with zeros, while secret keys stored on the internal hard drive are zeroized by
overwriting three times with a random pattern that is changed before each write").
Section 6.2, a list is presented (after Table 11) that identifies secret keys, private keys, and CSPs with a brief
summary of purpose. Following the list, is a description of where keys are stored and when and how they are
destroyed.
1.
2.
3.
Describe each secret key, private key, and CSP: The list identified above serves to describe each key to
some degree.
When they are zeroized: The paragraph following the list identified above indicates they are destroyed
when no longer needed and that is followed up with more detail in some cases.
Type of zeroization procedure: The paragraph following the list identified above indicates that in FLASH
values are either overwritten once with zeros or overwritten with a new value. In RAM values are
overwritten once with zeroes.
The TSS includes a table identifying whether keys and CSPs reside in FLASH or RAM. The description cited above
has been clarified to indicate that persistent values are stored in FLASH.
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.2.3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (FOR DATA ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION)
(FCS_COP.1(1))
2.2.3.1 FCS_COP.1(1).1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall use tests appropriate to the modes selected in the above
requirement from "The Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithm Validation Suite (AESAVS)", "The XTS-AES
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Validation System (XTSVS)", The CMAC Validation System (CMACVS)", "The Counter with Cipher Block ChainingMessage Authentication Code (CCM) Validation System (CCMVS)", and "The Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) and
GMAC Validation System (GCMVS)" (these documents are available from
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/index.html) as a guide in testing the requirement above. This will require
that the evaluator have a reference implementation of the algorithms known to be good that can produce test
vectors that are verifiable during the test.
The TOE has been FIPS approved. The AES certificate numbers are 2697, 2688, 2690, 2686, and 2687covering all
evaluated models.
2.2.4 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC SIGNATURE)
(FCS_COP.1(2))
2.2.4.1 FCS_COP.1(2).1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall use the signature generation and signature verification portions
of "The Digital Signature Algorithm Validation System” (DSA2VS), "The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
Validation System” (ECDSA2VS), and "The RSA Validation System” (RSAVS (for 186-2) or RSA2VS (for 186-3)) as a
guide in testing the requirement above. The Validation System used shall comply with the conformance standard
identified in the ST (i.e., FIPS PUB 186-2 or FIPS PUB 186-3). This will require that the evaluator have a reference
implementation of the algorithms known to be good that can produce test vectors that are verifiable during the
test.
The TOE has been FIPS approved. The RSA certificate numbers are 1396, 1388, 1391, 1386, and 1387 covering all
evaluated models.
2.2.5 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASHING)
(FCS_COP.1(3))
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2.2.5.1 FCS_COP.1(3).1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall use "The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS)" as a
guide in testing the requirement above. This will require that the evaluator have a reference implementation of
the algorithms known to be good that can produce test vectors that are verifiable during the test.
The TOE has been FIPS approved. The SHA certificate numbers are 2265, 2259, 2260, 2257, 2258 covering all
evaluated models.
2.2.6 CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (FOR KEYED-HASH MESSAGE
AUTHENTICATION) (FCS_COP.1(4))
2.2.6.1 FCS_COP.1(4).1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall use "The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
Validation System (HMACVS)" as a guide in testing the requirement above. This will require that the evaluator have
a reference implementation of the algorithms known to be good that can produce test vectors that are verifiable
during the test.
The TOE has been FIPS approved. The HMAC certificate numbers are 1679, 1675, 1676, and 1674 covering all
evaluated models.
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2.2.7 EXTENDED: CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (RANDOM BIT GENERATION)
(FCS_RBG_EXT.1)
2.2.7.1 FCS_RBG_EXT.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.2.7.2 FCS_RBG_EXT.1.2
TSS Assurance Activities: Documentation shall be produced—and the evaluator shall perform the activities—in
accordance with Annex D, Entropy Documentation and Assessment of the NDPP.
The Entropy description is provided in a separate (non-ST) document that has been delivered to CCEVS for
approval. Note that the entropy analysis has been accepted by CCEVS/NSA.
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also perform the following tests, depending on the standard to
which the RBG conforms.
Implementations Conforming to FIPS 140-2, Annex C
The reference for the tests contained in this section is The Random Number Generator Validation System (RNGVS)
[RNGVS]. The evaluator shall conduct the following two tests. Note that the 'expected values' are produced by a
reference implementation of the algorithm that is known to be correct. Proof of correctness is left to each Scheme.
The evaluator shall perform a Variable Seed Test. The evaluator shall provide a set of 128 (Seed, DT) pairs to the
TSF RBG function, each 128 bits. The evaluator shall also provide a key (of the length appropriate to the AES
algorithm) that is constant for all 128 (Seed, DT) pairs. The DT value is incremented by 1 for each set. The seed
values shall have no repeats within the set. The evaluator ensures that the values returned by the TSF match the
expected values.
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The evaluator shall perform a Monte Carlo Test. For this test, they supply an initial Seed and DT value to the TSF
RBG function; each of these is 128 bits. The evaluator shall also provide a key (of the length appropriate to the AES
algorithm) that is constant throughout the test. The evaluator then invokes the TSF RBG 10,000 times, with the DT
value being incremented by 1 on each iteration, and the new seed for the subsequent iteration produced as
specified in NIST-Recommended Random Number Generator Based on ANSI X9.31 Appendix A.2.4 Using the 3-Key
Triple DES and AES Algorithms, Section 3. The evaluator ensures that the 10,000th value produced matches the
expected value.
Implementations Conforming to NIST Special Publication 800-90
The evaluator shall perform 15 trials for the RBG implementation. If the RBG is configurable, the evaluator shall
perform 15 trials for each configuration. The evaluator shall also confirm that the operational guidance contains
appropriate instructions for configuring the RBG functionality.
If the RBG has prediction resistance enabled, each trial consists of (1) instantiate drbg, (2) generate the first block
of random bits (3) generate a second block of random bits (4) uninstantiate. The evaluator verifies that the second
block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator shall generate eight input values for each trial. The first is
a count (0 – 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the instantiate operation.
The next two are additional input and entropy input for the first call to generate. The final two are additional input
and entropy input for the second call to generate. These values are randomly generated. “generate one block of
random bits” means to generate random bits with number of returned bits equal to the Output Block Length (as
defined in NIST SP 800-90).
If the RBG does not have prediction resistance, each trial consists of (1) instantiate drbg, (2) generate the first
block of random bits (3) reseed, (4) generate a second block of random bits (5) uninstantiate. The evaluator verifies
that the second block of random bits is the expected value. The evaluator shall generate eight input values for
each trial. The first is a count (0 – 14). The next three are entropy input, nonce, and personalization string for the
instantiate operation. The fifth value is additional input to the first call to generate. The sixth and seventh are
additional input and entropy input to the call to reseed. The final value is additional input to the second generate
call.
The following paragraphs contain more information on some of the input values to be generated/selected by the
evaluator.
•
Entropy input: the length of the entropy input value must equal the seed length.
•
Nonce: If a nonce is supported (CTR_DRBG with no df does not use a nonce), the nonce bit length is one-half
the seed length.
•
Personalization string: The length of the personalization string must be <= seed length. If the implementation
only supports one personalization string length, then the same length can be used for both values. If more
than one string length is support, the evaluator shall use personalization strings of two different lengths. If the
implementation does not use a personalization string, no value needs to be supplied.
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•
Additional input: the additional input bit lengths have the same defaults and restrictions as the personalization
string lengths.
The Entropy description is provided in a separate (non-ST) document that has been delivered to CCEVS for
approval. Note that the entropy analysis has been accepted by CCEVS/NSA.
The TOE has been FIPS approved. The CTR_DRBG certificate numbers are 442, 438, 439, 436, 437 covering all
evaluated models.
2.2.8 EXPLICIT: SSH (FCS_SSH_EXT.1)
2.2.8.1 FCS_SSH_EXT.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.2.8.2 FCS_SSH_EXT.1.2
TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check to ensure that the TSS contains a description of the public key
algorithms that are acceptable for use for authentication, that this list conforms to FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5, and ensure
that password-based authentication methods are also allowed.
Section 6.2 indicates the SSH implementation supports AES CBC 128 and 256, HMAC-SHA-1, and RSA. These values
match the SFR. Section 6.2 also indicates that both public-key and password based authentication can be
configured.
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also perform the following tests:
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Test 1: The evaluator shall, for each public key algorithm supported, show that the TOE supports the use of that
public key algorithm to authenticate a user connection. Any configuration activities required to support this test
shall be performed according to instructions in the operational guidance.
Test 2: Using the operational guidance, the evaluator shall configure the TOE to accept password-based
authentication, and demonstrate that a user can be successfully authenticated to the TOE over SSH using a
password as an authenticator.
The evaluator used the Putty client to connect to the TOE using password authentication. The evaluator performed
this test using ASE 128 and ASE 256 encryption.
2.2.8.3 FCS_SSH_EXT.1.3
TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check that the TSS describes how 'large packets' in terms of RFC 4253
are detected and handled.
Section 6.2 explains that there is a 256K packet buffer and as SSH packets are received they are combined to form
a complete packet to be decrypted, but if the packet is not completed when the buffer becomes full the packet will
be dropped.
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also perform the following test:
Test 1: The evaluator shall demonstrate that if the TOE receives a packet larger than that specified in this
component, that packet is dropped.
The evaluator created a test program that sends a packet of length 257K to the SSH server on the TOE. When the
large packet was sent to the TOE, the SSH connection was closed.
2.2.8.4 FCS_SSH_EXT.1.4
TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the
TSS to ensure that optional characteristics are specified, and the encryption algorithms supported are specified as
well. The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that the encryption algorithms specified are identical to those
listed for this component.
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Section 6.2 indicates the SSH implementation supports AES CBC 128 and 256, HMAC-SHA-1, and RSA. These values
match the SFR. The description also indicates that a maximum packet size of 256K is supported and that is also
consistent with the SFR.
Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also check the operational guidance to ensure that it contains
instructions on configuring the TOE so that SSH conforms to the description in the TSS (for instance, the set of
algorithms advertised by the TOE may have to be restricted to meet the requirements).
The ST identifies the ciphers, hashes, and authentication methods as indicated in the TSS findings above.
The FIPS Configuration Guide in the “Supported algorithms for SSH Client “ section states that aes128-cbc and
aes256-cbc are the only permitted cipher suites. The TOE gets set in Common Criteria mode so the evaluator
assumes the algorithms are limited when the mode is set.
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also perform the following test:
Test 1: The evaluator shall establish a SSH connection using each of the encryption algorithms specified by the
requirement. It is sufficient to observe (on the wire) the successful negotiation of the algorithm to satisfy the
intent of the test.
The evaluator used the SecureCRT client to connect to the TOE using ASE 128 and ASE 256 encryption. The
evaluator captured the network traffic and verified the algorithms.
2.2.8.5 FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.2.8.6 FCS_SSH_EXT.1.6
TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it lists the supported data integrity
algorithms, and that that list corresponds to the list in this component.
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Section 6.2 indicates the SSH implementation supports AES CBC 128 and 256, HMAC-SHA-1, and RSA. These values
match the SFR. The description also indicates that a maximum packet size of 256K is supported and that is also
consistent with the SFR.
Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also check the operational guidance to ensure that it contains
instructions to the administrator on how to ensure that only the allowed data integrity algorithms are used in SSH
connections with the TOE (specifically, that the “none” MAC algorithm is not allowed).
The ST identifies the ciphers, hashes, and authentication methods as indicated in the TSS findings above.
Section 2 of the Security Configuration Guide in the SSH2 supported features section indicates that the following
hashes are supported: hmac-sha1. As such, it seems the only available hash matches that in the ST and no specific
instructions are necessary.
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also perform the following test:
Test 1: The evaluator shall establish a SSH connection using each of the integrity algorithms specified by the
requirement. It is sufficient to observe (on the wire) the successful negotiation of the algorithm to satisfy the
intent of the test.
This test was completed in conjunction with FCS_SSH_EXT.1.5. The evaluator used the SecureCRT client to connect
to the TOE using ASE 128 and ASE 256 encryption and hmac-sha1 (the only applicable integrity algorithm). The
evaluator captured the network traffic and verified the algorithm.
2.2.8.7 FCS_SSH_EXT.1.7
TSS Assurance Activities: If this capability is “hard-coded” into the TOE, the evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure
that this is stated in the discussion of the SSH protocol.
Section 6.2 indicates that DH14 is a supported key exchange method. It also states that other ciphers are
implemented but they are disabled while operating in CC and FIPS mode.
Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall ensure that operational guidance contains configuration
information that will allow the security administrator to configure the TOE so that all key exchanges for SSH are
performed using DH group 14.
The ST identifies the ciphers, hashes, and authentication methods as indicated in the TSS findings above.
The FIPS Configuration Guide in section Features unavailable in Common Criteria mode states that for SSH key
exchange method DiffieHellmanGroup1Sha1 is not supported. Only DiffieHellmanGroup14Sha1 is supported
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also perform the following test:
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Test 1: The evaluator shall attempt to perform a diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange, and observe that the
attempt fails. For each allowed key exchange method, The evaluator shall then attempt to perform a key
exchange using that method, and observe that the attempt succeeds.
The evaluator was able to observe from previous tests that diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 key exchange was used in
all negotiations. The evaluator attempted a diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange and the request was
rejected.
2.2.9 EXPLICIT: TLS (FCS_TLS_EXT.1)
2.2.9.1 FCS_TLS_EXT.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the description of the implementation of this protocol in the
TSS to ensure that optional characteristics (e.g., extensions supported, client authentication supported) are
specified, and the ciphersuites supported are specified as well. The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that the
ciphersuites specified are identical to those listed for this component.
The SFR claims only the required 4 ciphers and those are identified in section 6.2 of the TSS. Section 6.2 also
indicates that TLSv1.0 is supported, matching the SFR claim.
Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also check the operational guidance to ensure that it contains
instructions on configuring the TOE so that TLS conforms to the description in the TSS (for instance, the set of
ciphersuites advertised by the TOE may have to be restricted to meet the requirements).
The ST indicates that TLSv1.0 is supported and identifies the following required ciphersuites:
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, and TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA.
The FIPS Configuration Guide – How FIPS Works indicates that the fips enable instruction places the TOE into FIPS
mode. Once in FIPS mode, that section indicates that SSL3.0 is disabled and only TLSv1.0 or greater can be used
with the TOE.
The FIPS Configuration Guide in the “Supported cipher suites” section lists the TLS cipher suites as:
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, and TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA. This list matches those
provided in the ST.
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also perform the following test:
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Test 1: The evaluator shall establish a TLS connection using each of the ciphersuites specified by the requirement.
This connection may be established as part of the establishment of a higher-level protocol, e.g., as part of a HTTPS
session. It is sufficient to observe (on the wire) the successful negotiation of a ciphersuite to satisfy the intent of
the test; it is not necessary to examine the characteristics of the encrypted traffic in an attempt to discern the
ciphersuite being used (for example, that the cryptographic algorithm is 128-bit AES and not 256-bit AES).
The connection between the syslog server and the TOE is secured using TLS. The evaluator established a
connection between the two machines using each of the claimed ciphersuites.
2.3 USER
DATA PROTECTION
(FDP)
2.3.1 FULL RESIDUAL INFORMATION PROTECTION (FDP_RIP.2)
2.3.1.1 FDP_RIP.2.1
TSS Assurance Activities: 'Resources' in the context of this requirement are network packets being sent through
(as opposed to 'to', as is the case when a security administrator connects to the TOE) the TOE. The concern is that
once a network packet is sent, the buffer or memory area used by the packet still contains data from that packet,
and that if that buffer is re-used, those data might remain and make their way into a new packet. The evaluator
shall check to ensure that the TSS describes packet processing to the extent that they can determine that no data
will be reused when processing network packets. The evaluator shall ensure that this description at a minimum
describes how the previous data are zeroized/overwritten, and at what point in the buffer processing this occurs.
Section 6.3 indicates that when packets are sent they are placed in a buffer pool and subsequently overwritten. If a
packet exceeds the size of a buffer, the residual space is overwritten with zeros (i.e., padded).
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.4 IDENTIFICATION
AND AUTHENTICATION
(FIA)
2.4.1 PASSWORD MANAGEMENT (FIA_PMG_EXT.1)
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2.4.1.1 FIA_PMG_EXT.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to determine that it provides
guidance to security administrators on the composition of strong passwords, and that it provides instructions on
setting the minimum password length.
The Enabling enhanced user password combination requirements section of the Security Configuration Guide
describes how to turn on strict password enforcement. When strict-password-enforcement is on, passwords must
be eight characters and contain:
•
At least two upper case characters
•
At least two lower case characters
•
At least two numeric characters
•
At least two special characters
There is a section of the Security Configuration Guide called Specifying a minimum password length that explains
the command needed to set a minimum password length.
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also perform the following tests. Note that one or more of these
tests can be performed with a single test case.
Test 1: The evaluator shall compose passwords that either meet the requirements, or fail to meet the
requirements, in some way. For each password, the evaluator shall verify that the TOE supports the password.
While the evaluator is not required (nor is it feasible) to test all possible compositions of passwords, the evaluator
shall ensure that all characters, rule characteristics, and a minimum length listed in the requirement are
supported, and justify the subset of those characters chosen for testing.
The evaluator ran three tests to address this requirement. The first step had the administrator set the minimum
password length to 15. The first test has 14 characters including those to meet the strict enforcement and failed.
The second test had 15 characters including those to meet the strict enforcement and passed. The last test
included all the claimed special characters and passed. The evaluator felt this sample was adequate because the
minimum settable length was tested and the combination of password characters was included.
2.4.2 PROTECTED AUTHENTICATION FEEDBACK (FIA_UAU.7)
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2.4.2.1 FIA_UAU.7.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test for each method of local login allowed:
Test 1: The evaluator shall locally authenticate to the TOE. While making this attempt, the evaluator shall verify
that at most obscured feedback is provided while entering the authentication information.
The evaluator observed during testing that passwords are obscured on the console login.
2.4.3 EXTENDED: PASSWORD-BASED AUTHENTICATION MECHANISM
(FIA_UAU_EXT.2)
2.4.3.1 FIA_UAU_EXT.2.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
Component Assurance Activities: Assurance activities for this requirement are covered under those for
FIA_UIA_EXT.1. If other authentication mechanisms are specified, the evaluator shall include those methods in the
activities for FIA_UIA_EXT.1.
All authentication mechanisms are included in the testing for FIA_UIA_EXT.1.
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2.4.4 USER IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (FIA_UIA_EXT.1)
2.4.4.1 FIA_UIA_EXT.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.4.4.2 FIA_UIA_EXT.1.2
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
Component Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it describes the logon
process for each logon method (local, remote (HTTPS, SSH, etc.)) supported for the product. This description shall
contain information pertaining to the credentials allowed/used, any protocol transactions that take place, and
what constitutes a “successful logon”.
Section 6.4 describes that the TOE supports password authentication and can be configured on a per user basis to
support (i.e., by uploading the user’s public key) SSH public-key-based authentication mechanisms. Administrators
define and assign attributes to users and those determine the privileges the user will have once logged on. The ST
states that the TOE presents the user with a command prompt constitutes a successful login.
The evaluator shall examine the operational guidance to determine that any necessary preparatory steps (e.g.,
establishing credential material such as pre-shared keys, tunnels, certificates, etc.) to logging in are described. For
each supported the login method, the evaluator shall ensure the operational guidance provides clear instructions
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for successfully logging on. If configuration is necessary to ensure the services provided before login are limited,
the evaluator shall determine that the operational guidance provides sufficient instruction on limiting the allowed
services.
The Local user accounts section of the Security Configuration Guide discusses the different logon options. It
clearly describes that a username and password are required for logging into the machine. The SSH2
authentication types section of the Security Configuration Guide explains how to setup and use SSH
authentication. It describes the process for creating a public-private key pair and how to provide the public key to
the user. The Configuring DSA or RSA challenge-response authentication section provides a step by step process
of the authentication process with SSH.
The evaluator shall perform the following tests for each method by which administrators access the TOE (local and
remote), as well as for each type of credential supported by the login method:
Test 1: The evaluator shall use the operational guidance to configure the appropriate credential supported for the
login method. For that credential/login method, the evaluator shall show that providing correct I&A information
results in the ability to access the system, while providing incorrect information results in denial of access.
Test 2: The evaluator shall configure the services allowed (if any) according to the operational guidance, and then
determine the services available to an external remote entity. The evaluator shall determine that the list of
services available is limited to those specified in the requirement.
Test 3: For local access, the evaluator shall determine what services are available to a local administrator prior to
logging in, and make sure this list is consistent with the requirement.
The evaluator configured the TOE for local console access and for remote SSH access. The evaluator then
performed an unsuccessful and successful logon of each type using bad and good credentials respectively. The
evaluator was able to observe the TOE routed traffic on the traffic and it displayed a banner to the user before
login. No functions were available to the administrator accessing the console with the exception of acknowledging
the banner.
2.5 SECURITY
MANAGEMENT
(FMT)
2.5.1 MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (FOR GENERAL TSF DATA) (FMT_MTD.1)
2.5.1.1 FMT_MTD.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that, for each administrative function
identified in the operational guidance; those that are accessible through an interface prior to administrator log-in
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are identified. For each of these functions, the evaluator shall also confirm that the TSS details how the ability to
manipulate the TSF data through these interfaces is disallowed for non-administrative users.
Section 6.4 indicates that the TOE doesn’t offer any functions prior to logging in.
Section 6.5 explains that there are privilege levels and the Super User privilege is used to denote an Authorized
Administrator. The TSF data manipulation commands are restricted to that privilege level.
See FMT_SMF.1. The evaluator has found guidance for each of the identified management functions. All
management functions are available only after having logged in and if the user has the appropriate management
privilege level. The functions available prior to login – network traffic and warning banner – are configurable, but
otherwise the evaluator found no evidence that other function, particularly the management functions, would be
available without first logging in.
Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to determine that each of the
TSF-data-manipulating functions implemented in response to the requirements of this PP is identified, and that
configuration information is provided to ensure that only administrators have access to the functions.
The ST identifies the following as restricted: audit configuration data, information flow policy ACLs, user and
administrator security attributes (including passwords and privilege levels), authentication method lists, the logon
failure threshold, the remote access user list; and cryptographic support settings.
The following functions are identified in FMT_SMF.1 in the ST: remote and local administration, update the TOE,
Configure TOE-provided services available before authentication (routing and warning banner), configure
cryptographic functionality.
As such, instructions have been identified by the evaluators for the following list of functions suggested by the ST:
•
Audit configuration data
o The FIPS Configuration Guide includes instructions for “Configure an encrypted syslog server”.
o The Security Configuration Guide includes instructions for “ACL logging”.
o The Administration Guide includes instructions for “Syslog service configuration”.
•
Information flow policy ACLs
o The Security Configuration Guide includes instructions for “Rule-Based IP ACLs”, “IPv6 ACLs”,
“IPv6 RA Guard”, “802.1X Port Security”, “MAC Port Security”, “MAC-based VLANs”, “Defining
MAC Address Filters”, and “Multi-Device Port Authentication” that collectively provide
instructions for configuring information flow rules.
•
User and administrator security attributes (including passwords and privilege levels)
o The Security Configuration Guide includes instructions for “Local user accounts” that allows user
accounts to be defined and assigned password and management privilege levels.
•
Authentication method lists
o Passwords
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The Security Configuration Guide includes instructions for “Local user accounts” that can
be used to log into the configured interfaces with an assigned password.
SSH public-key based authentication
 The Security Configuration Guide includes instructions for “Configuring SSH2 client
public key authentication”.

o
•
Logon failure threshold
o The Security Configuration Guide includes instructions for “Setting the number of SSH
authentication retries” and “Limiting the number of web authentication attempts”.
•
Remote access user list/Remote and local administration
o The Security Configuration Guide, section 1, addresses local (CLI) and remote access restrictions.
Section 2 provides instructions for configuring SSHv2 and SCP.
•
Cryptographic support settings/Configure cryptographic functionality
o The FIPS Configuration Guide provides instructions to enable FIPS and Common Criteria modes.
•
Update the TOE
o The FIPS Configuration Guide includes instructions for “Software Upgrade for FIPS devices”.
o The Administration Guide includes instructions for “Software versions installed and running on a
device”.
o The Software Upgrade Guide provides comprehensive instructions for upgrading and
downgrading the TOE software.
•
Configure TOE-provided services available before authentication
o Network routing
 The Security Configuration Guide includes instructions for “Rule-Based IP ACLs”, “IPv6
ACLs”, “IPv6 RA Guard”, “802.1X Port Security”, “MAC Port Security”, “MAC-based
VLANs”, “Defining MAC Address Filters”, and “Multi-Device Port Authentication” that
collectively provide instructions for configuring information flow rules.
o Warning banner
 The Security Configuration Guide includes instructions for “Requirement to accept the
message of the day”
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.5.2 SPECIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (FMT_SMF.1)
2.5.2.1 FMT_SMF.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
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Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
Component Assurance Activities: The security management functions for FMT_SMF.1 are distributed throughout
the PP and are included as part of the requirements in FMT_MTD, FPT_TST_EXT, and any cryptographic
management functions specified in the reference standards. Compliance to these requirements satisfies
compliance with FMT_SMF.1.
The evaluator was able to use the guidance documentation to configure the TOE to perform the other tests
required by the NDPP. All administrator commands are recorded in the audit trail.
2.5.3 RESTRICTIONS ON SECURITY ROLES (FMT_SMR.2)
2.5.3.1 FMT_SMR.2.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.5.3.2 FMT_SMR.2.2
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
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Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.5.3.3 FMT_SMR.2.3
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
Component Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall review the operational guidance to ensure that it contains
instructions for administering the TOE both locally and remotely, including any configuration that needs to be
performed on the client for remote administration.
The FIPS Configuration Guide refers to instructions to configure SSHv2 It suggests that in FIPS mode telnet and
HTTP are disallowed. In CC mode, HTTPS is also disallowed. The CLI is the default initial interface and no
configuration is needed.
The Security Configuration Guide, section 1 Securing Access Methods, indicates that Serial CLI, telnet, SSH, SNMP,
and TFTP. Of these telnet and TFTP are disabled in FIPS mode and SNMP access to critical security parameters is
also disabled. Instructions are provided specifically to manage access to the available management interfaces
including CLI using a local connection and SSHv2.
Note that the local CI and remote SSH interfaces are identical in that the same commands can be issued in each
case.
In the course of performing the testing activities for the evaluation, the evaluator shall use all supported
interfaces, although it is not necessary to repeat each test involving an administrative action with each interface.
The evaluator shall ensure, however, that each supported method of administering the TOE that conforms to the
requirements of this PP be tested; for instance, if the TOE can be administered through a local hardware interface;
SSH; and TLS/HTTPS; then all three methods of administration must be exercised during the evaluation team’s test
activities.
The evaluator performed administration using the console as well as the SSH connection. Both resulted in a
command line interface so both were addressed thoroughly.
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2.6 PROTECTION
OF THE
TSF (FPT)
2.6.1 EXTENDED: PROTECTION OF ADMINISTRATOR PASSWORDS
(FPT_APW_EXT.1)
2.6.1.1 FPT_APW_EXT.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.6.1.2 FPT_APW_EXT.1.2
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
Component Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it details all
authentication data that are subject to this requirement, and the method used to obscure the plaintext password
data when stored. The TSS shall also detail passwords are stored in such a way that they are unable to be viewed
through an interface designed specifically for that purpose, as outlined in the application note in the NDPP.
Section 6.6 states that the TOE does not offer any interfaces that will disclose to any user a plain text password.
Additionally, locally defined passwords are not stored in plaintext form.
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2.6.2 EXTENDED: PROTECTION OF TSF DATA (FOR READING OF ALL SYMMETRIC
KEYS) (FPT_SKP_EXT.1)
2.6.2.1 FPT_SKP_EXT.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
Component Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that it details how any preshared keys, symmetric keys, and private keys are stored and that they are unable to be viewed through an
interface designed specifically for that purpose, as outlined in the application note in the NDPP. If these values are
not stored in plaintext, the TSS shall describe how they are protected/obscured.
Section 6.6 states that the TOE does not offer any interfaces that will disclose to any user cryptographic key.
2.6.3 RELIABLE TIME STAMPS (FPT_STM.1)
2.6.3.1 FPT_STM.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it lists each security function that
makes use of time. The TSS provides a description of how the time is maintained and considered reliable in the
context of each of the time related functions.
Section 6.6 states the TOE provides a hardware clock for reliable time stamps. The description explains the clock is
mainly used for timestamps in audit records but also supports the timing elements of cryptographic functions. By
virtue of being a real-time clock, the evaluator assumes it is reliable.
Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator examines the operational guidance to ensure it instructs the
administrator how to set the time. If the TOE supports the use of an NTP server, the operational guidance instructs
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how a communication path is established between the TOE and the NTP server, and any configuration of the NTP
client on the TOE to support this communication.
The Administration Guide in the Configuring NTP section discusses using the set clock command to set the local
clock. In the same section, there is an extensive discusses about how to establish communication with an NTP
server and how to configure the client. Commands are provided for each topic and examples are given.
Testing Assurance Activities: Test 1: The evaluator uses the operational guide to set the time. The evaluator shall
then use an available interface to observe that the time was set correctly.
Test2: [conditional] If the TOE supports the use of an NTP server; the evaluator shall use the operational guidance
to configure the NTP client on the TOE, and set up a communication path with the NTP server. The evaluator will
observe that the NTP server has set the time to what is expected. If the TOE supports multiple protocols for
establishing a connection with the NTP server, the evaluator shall perform this test using each supported protocol
claimed in the operational guidance.
The evaluator set the local clock from the console and observed the time change. The evaluator then configured a
NTP server and had the appliance connect to the NTP server and update the time. The evaluator observed the time
update from the NTP server.
2.6.4 TSF TESTING (FPT_TST_EXT.1)
2.6.4.1 FPT_TST_EXT.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to ensure that it details the self tests that are run by
the TSF on start-up; this description should include an outline of what the tests are actually doing (e.g., rather than
saying 'memory is tested', a description similar to 'memory is tested by writing a value to each memory location
and reading it back to ensure it is identical to what was written' shall be used). The evaluator shall ensure that the
TSS makes an argument that the tests are sufficient to demonstrate that the TSF is operating correctly.
Section 6.6 provides a discussion of the self-tests. When operating in FIPS mode, the power-on self-tests comply
with the FIPS 140-2 requirements for self-testing. The module performs Cryptographic algorithm known answer
tests, firmware integrity tests using DSA signature verification and conditional self-tests for DRBG, Hardware RNG,
Pair-wise consistency tests on generation of RSA keys, and a Firmware load test (DSA signature verification). Upon
failing any of its FIPS mode power-on self-tests, the TOE will refuse to boot.
Guidance Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also ensure that the operational guidance describes the
possible errors that may result from such tests, and actions the administrator should take in response; these
possible errors shall correspond to those described in the TSS.
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In the Reloading the device section of the FIPS Configuration Guide, there is a discussion of the FIPS self-tests. This
discussion also the possible errors that may arise such as:
•
•
•
Crypto module initialization and Known Answer Test (KAT) failed with reason:(Error
Code 0x80000000)’CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED’
FIPS: Primary image verification failed
FIPS: Secondary image verification failed
The TSS description about the self-tests focuses on the FIPS self-tests. As such, the discussion in the FIPS
Configuration Guide correctly discusses the possible errors that may arise and how to possibly address some of
the errors.
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.6.5 EXTENDED: TRUSTED UPDATE (FPT_TUD_EXT.1)
2.6.5.1 FPT_TUD_EXT.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.6.5.2 FPT_TUD_EXT.1.2
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
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2.6.5.3 FPT_TUD_EXT.1.3
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
Component Assurance Activities: Updates to the TOE either have a hash associated with them, or are signed by an
authorized source. If digital signatures are used, the definition of an authorized source is contained in the TSS,
along with a description of how the certificates used by the update verification mechanism are contained on the
device. The evaluator ensures this information is contained in the TSS. The evaluator also ensures that the TSS (or
the operational guidance) describes how the candidate updates are obtained; the processing associated with
verifying the digital signature or calculating the hash of the updates; and the actions that take place for successful
(hash or signature was verified) and unsuccessful (hash or signature could not be verified) cases.
Section 6.6 of the ST discusses TOE software updates. Updates can either be obtained automatically (when so
configured) or manually by the administrator using CLI commands. If automatic, the TOE checks for updates when
it boots. If manual, the administrator can check for updates using SCP or TFTP. In either case, prior to actually
installing and using the new software image, its digital certificate is verified by the TOE using the public key in the
certificate configured in the TOE. An unverified image cannot be installed. Note that the TOE comes preinstalled
with an applicable Brocade public certificate.
The FIPS Configuration Guide states in Table 2 that TFTP is disabled in FIPS mode. It provides commands for using
SCP in Table 3.
The evaluator shall perform the following tests:
Test 1: The evaluator performs the version verification activity to determine the current version of the product.
The evaluator obtains a legitimate update using procedures described in the operational guidance and verifies that
it is successfully installed on the TOE. Then, the evaluator performs a subset of other assurance activity tests to
demonstrate that the update functions as expected. After the update, the evaluator performs the version
verification activity again to verify the version correctly corresponds to that of the update.
Test 2: The evaluator performs the version verification activity to determine the current version of the product.
The evaluator obtains or produces an illegitimate update, and attempts to install it on the TOE. The evaluator
verifies that the TOE rejects the update.
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The Brocade products do not have an update available for testing. Brocade typically does not release small
updates or patches. Instead, new firmware versions are released. In order to perform this test, evaluator had to
roll back to an engineering version and then roll forward to the released product. The version did update properly.
For the improper update, the evaluator attempted to load an image that did not match the signature. The
signature verification failed.
2.7 TOE
ACCESS
(FTA)
2.7.1 TSF-INITIATED TERMINATION (FTA_SSL.3)
2.7.1.1 FTA_SSL.3.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test:
Test 1: The evaluator follows the operational guidance to configure several different values for the inactivity time
period referenced in the component. For each period configured, the evaluator establishes a remote interactive
session with the TOE. The evaluator then observes that the session is terminated after the configured time period.
The evaluator set the SSH time period to 2 minutes and observed a SSH timeout. The evaluator then set the SSH
timeout to 3 minutes and observed a SSH timeout. Note that when the session terminated, the screen was left asis and a new login prompt was presented.
2.7.2 USER-INITIATED TERMINATION (FTA_SSL.4)
2.7.2.1 FTA_SSL.4.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
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Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test:
Test 1: The evaluator initiates an interactive local session with the TOE. The evaluator then follows the operational
guidance to exit or log off the session and observes that the session has been terminated.
The evaluator established both local and remote (SSH) sessions and manually ‘exit’ed per the command identified
in the guidance. In each case the session was terminated and a logout audit record was logged.
2.7.3 TSF-INITIATED SESSION LOCKING (FTA_SSL_EXT.1)
2.7.3.1 FTA_SSL_EXT.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall perform the following test:
Test 1: The evaluator follows the operational guidance to configure several different values for the inactivity time
period referenced in the component. For each period configured, the evaluator establishes a remote interactive
session with the TOE. The evaluator then observes that the session is either locked or terminated after the
configured time period. If locking was selected from the component, the evaluator then ensures that reauthentication is needed when trying to unlock the session.
The evaluator set the console time period to 2 minutes and observed a console timeout. The evaluator then set
the console timeout to 3 minutes and observed a console timeout. Note that when the session terminated, the
screen was left as-is and a new login prompt was presented.
2.7.4 DEFAULT TOE ACCESS BANNERS (FTA_TAB.1)
2.7.4.1 FTA_TAB.1.1
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TSS Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the TSS to ensure that it details each method of access (local
and remote) available to the administrator (e.g., serial port, SSH, HTTPS).
Section 6.7 identifies that the administrator can access the TOE using any of the following methods: console or
SSH.
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall also perform the following test:
Test 1: The evaluator follows the operational guidance to configure a notice and consent warning message. The
evaluator shall then, for each method of access specified in the TSS, establish a session with the TOE. The evaluator
shall verify that the notice and consent warning message is displayed in each instance.
The evaluator set a login banner and then tested the banner is displayed from the console login as well as an SSH
login.
2.8 TRUSTED
PATH/CHANNELS
(FTP)
2.8.1 INTER-TSF TRUSTED CHANNEL (FTP_ITC.1)
2.8.1.1 FTP_ITC.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.8.1.2 FTP_ITC.1.2
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
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Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.8.1.3 FTP_ITC.1.3
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
Component Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that, for all communications
with authorized IT entities identified in the requirement, each communications mechanism is identified in terms of
the allowed protocols for that IT entity. The evaluator shall also confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS are
specified and included in the requirements in the ST.
Section 6.8 indicates that TLS is required to communicate with a SYSLOG server and SCP (based on SSH) is used to
communicate with an update server. This is consistent with the choices made in FPT_ITC.1.
The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the allowed
protocols with each authorized IT entity, and that it contains recovery instructions should a connection be
unintentionally broken.
The FIPS Configuration Guide – Configuring an encrypted syslog server and Appendix A with the same name offer
instructions and examples to set up a secure channel to a SYSLOG server.
The FIPS Configuration Guide states in Table 2 that TFTP is disabled in FIPS mode. It provides commands for using
SCP in Table 3.
The evaluator shall also perform the following tests:
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a. Test 1: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each protocol with each authorized IT entity is
tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the operational guidance
and ensuring that communication is successful.
b. Test 2: For each protocol that the TOE can initiate as defined in the requirement, the evaluator shall follow the
operational guidance to ensure that in fact the communication channel can be initiated from the TOE.
c. Test 3: The evaluator shall ensure, for each communication channel with an authorized IT entity, the channel
data are not sent in plaintext.
e. Test 4: The evaluators shall, for each protocol associated with each authorized IT entity tested during test 1, the
connection is physically interrupted. The evaluator shall ensure that when physical connectivity is restored,
communications are appropriately protected.
Further assurance activities are associated with the specific protocols.
Test 1 – The syslog server communication path was tested as part of setting up the syslog server connection. The
update server connection was tested as part of testing an update.
Test 2 - The syslog server communication path (TLS) was tested as part of setting up the syslog server connection.
The update server connection (SSH) was tested as part of testing an update.
Test 3 – The establishment of the syslog sever connection ensured the syslog path is encrypted. The evaluators
also captured a transfer of an image using scp to ensure the communication path is encrypted.
Test 4 – For both the syslog and update server connections, the evaluator interrupted the communications path.
In both case, the connection resumed in an encrypted form. This was verified using Wireshark.
2.8.2 TRUSTED PATH (FTP_TRP.1)
2.8.2.1 FTP_TRP.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
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2.8.2.2 FTP_TRP.1.2
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
2.8.2.3 FTP_TRP.1.3
TSS Assurance Activities: None Defined
Guidance Assurance Activities: None Defined
Testing Assurance Activities: None Defined
Component Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall examine the TSS to determine that the methods of remote
TOE administration are indicated, along with how those communications are protected. The evaluator shall also
confirm that all protocols listed in the TSS in support of TOE administration are consistent with those specified in
the requirement, and are included in the requirements in the ST.
Section 6.8 indicates that SSH is required for remote administration.
The evaluator shall confirm that the operational guidance contains instructions for establishing the remote
administrative sessions for each supported method.
The FIPS Configuration Guide refers to instructions to configure SSHv2. It states that in FIPS mode telnet and HTTP
are disallowed. In CC mode, HTTPS is also disallowed. The CLI is the default initial interface and no configuration is
needed.
The evaluator shall also perform the following tests:
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Test 1: The evaluators shall ensure that communications using each specified (in the operational guidance) remote
administration method is tested during the course of the evaluation, setting up the connections as described in the
operational guidance and ensuring that communication is successful.
Test 2: For each method of remote administration supported, the evaluator shall follow the operational guidance
to ensure that there is no available interface that can be used by a remote user to establish a remote
administrative sessions without invoking the trusted path.
Test 3: The evaluator shall ensure, for each method of remote administration, the channel data are not sent in
plaintext.
Further assurance activities are associated with the specific protocols.
Test 1 – The evaluator tested SSH when testing the FCS_SSH_EXT.1 requirement.
Test 2 – The evaluator was unable to find a method of using SSH without invoking the trusted path. The
communications path was always encrypted and used the servers key.
Test 3 – The evaluator tested the correctness of the SSH encryption when testing the FCS_SSH_EXT.1 requirement.
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3. PROTECTION PROFILE SAR ASSURANCE ACTIVITIES
The following sections address assurance activities specifically defined in the claimed Protection Profile that
correspond with Security Assurance Requirements.
3.1 DEVELOPMENT (ADV)
3.1.1 BASIC FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION (ADV_FSP.1)
Assurance Activities: There are no specific assurance activities associated with these SARs. The functional
specification documentation is provided to support the evaluation activities described in Section 4.2, and other
activities described for AGD, ATE, and AVA SARs. The requirements on the content of the functional specification
information is implicitly assessed by virtue of the other assurance activities being performed; if the evaluator is
unable to perform an activity because the there is insufficient interface information, then an adequate functional
specification has not been provided.
3.2 GUIDANCE
DOCUMENTS
(AGD)
3.2.1 OPERATIONAL USER GUIDANCE (AGD_OPE.1)
Assurance Activities: Some of the contents of the operational guidance will be verified by the assurance activities
in Section 4.2 of the NDPP and evaluation of the TOE according to the CEM. The following additional information is
also required.
The operational guidance shall at a minimum list the processes running (or that could run) on the TOE in its
evaluated configuration during its operation that are capable of processing data received on the network
interfaces (there are likely more than one of these, and this is not limited to the process that 'listens' on the
network interface). It is acceptable to list all processes running (or that could run) on the TOE in its evaluated
configuration instead of attempting to determine just those that process the network data. For each process listed,
the administrative guidance will contain a short (e.g., one- or two-line) description of the process' function, and
the privilege with which the service runs. 'Privilege' includes the hardware privilege level (e.g., ring 0, ring 1), any
software privileges specifically associated with the process, and the privileges associated with the user role the
process runs as or under.
The operational guidance shall contain instructions for configuring the cryptographic engine associated with the
evaluated configuration of the TOE. It shall provide a warning to the administrator that use of other cryptographic
engines was not evaluated nor tested during the CC evaluation of the TOE.
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The documentation must describe the process for verifying updates to the TOE, either by checking the hash or by
verifying a digital signature. The evaluator shall verify that this process includes the following steps:
1. For hashes, a description of where the hash for a given update can be obtained. For digital signatures,
instructions for obtaining the certificate that will be used by the FCS_COP.1(2) mechanism to ensure that a signed
update has been received from the certificate owner. This may be supplied with the product initially, or may be
obtained by some other means.
2. Instructions for obtaining the update itself. This should include instructions for making the update accessible to
the TOE (e.g., placement in a specific directory).
3. Instructions for initiating the update process, as well as discerning whether the process was successful or
unsuccessful. This includes generation of the hash/digital signature..
The TOE will likely contain security functionality that does not fall in the scope of evaluation under this PP. The
operational guidance shall make it clear to an administrator which security functionality is covered by the
evaluation activities.
The FIPS Configuration Guide has been updated in the Overview section to state that in FIPS mode, the network
processing occurs in the kernel and in privileged daemons. Note that the product goes into FIPS mode prior to
going into CC mode.
The FIPS Configuration Guide includes an Appendix C that provides tables that list the running tasks for the
different FastIron devices in FIPS mode. These tables list the task name, priority, and provide a brief description.
The product updates are digitally signed by Brocade. The appliance verifies each imagine when loaded. To obtain
an update, the user is instructed to download the required software images from the Downloads page in
MyBrocade web site. The FIPS Configuration Guide provides detailed instructions for copying the new signature
and new imagine onto the device and loading the new signature image. The steps discuss where to put the image
and the commands to install it. The steps also verify the signature. A list of potential error message is described
and some troubleshooting tips are included in case the upgrade fails.
3.2.2 PREPARATIVE PROCEDURES (AGD_PRE.1)
Assurance Activities: As indicated in the introduction above, there are significant expectations with respect to the
documentation—especially when configuring the operational environment to support TOE functional
requirements. The evaluator shall check to ensure that the guidance provided for the TOE adequately addresses all
platforms claimed for the TOE in the ST.
The evaluator can access Hardware Installation Manuals for all product families - SX, ICX, and FCX online at
www.brocade.com. The more general manuals like FIPS Configuration Guide and the Security Configuration
Guide apply to all models. The completeness of the manuals is addressed by their use in the AA’s carried out in
the evaluation.
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3.3 LIFE-CYCLE
SUPPORT
(ALC)
3.3.1 LABELLING OF THE TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall check the ST to ensure that it contains an identifier (such as a product
name/version number) that specifically identifies the version that meets the requirements of the ST. The evaluator
shall ensure that this identifier is sufficient for an acquisition entity to use in procuring the TOE (including the
appropriate administrative guidance) as specified in the STFurther, the evaluator shall check the AGD guidance and
TOE samples received for testing to ensure that the version number is consistent with that in the ST. If the vendor
maintains a web site advertising the TOE, the evaluator shall examine the information on the web site to ensure
that the information in the ST is sufficient to distinguish the product.
The evaluator verified that the ST, TOE and Guidance are all labeled with the same hardware versions and
software. The information is specific enough to procure the TOE and it includes hardware models and software
versions. The evaluator checked the TOE software version and hardware identifiers during testing by examining
the actual machines in the Brocade Lab used for testing.
3.3.2 TOE CM COVERAGE (ALC_CMS.1)
Assurance Activities: The 'evaluation evidence required by the SARs' in this PP is limited to the information in the
ST coupled with the guidance provided to administrators and users under the AGD requirements. By ensuring that
the TOE is specifically identified and that this identification is consistent in the ST and in the AGD guidance (as done
in the assurance activity for ALC_CMC.1), the evaluator implicitly confirms the information required by this
component.
See 3.3.1 for an explanation of how all CM items are addressed.
3.4 TESTS (ATE)
3.4.1 INDEPENDENT TESTING - CONFORMANCE (ATE_IND.1)
Assurance Activities: The evaluator shall prepare a test plan and report documenting the testing aspects of the
system. The test plan covers all of the testing actions contained in the CEM and the body of this PP’s Assurance
Activities. While it is not necessary to have one test case per test listed in an Assurance Activity, the evaluator must
document in the test plan that each applicable testing requirement in the ST is covered.
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The test plan identifies the platforms to be tested, and for those platforms not included in the test plan but
included in the ST, the test plan provides a justification for not testing the platforms. This justification must
address the differences between the tested platforms and the untested platforms, and make an argument that the
differences do not affect the testing to be performed. It is not sufficient to merely assert that the differences have
no affect; rationale must be provided. If all platforms claimed in the ST are tested, then no rationale is necessary.
The test plan describes the composition of each platform to be tested, and any setup that is necessary beyond
what is contained in the AGD documentation. It should be noted that the evaluator is expected to follow the AGD
documentation for installation and setup of each platform either as part of a test or as a standard pre-test
condition. This may include special test drivers or tools. For each driver or tool, an argument (not just an assertion)
should be provided that the driver or tool will not adversely affect the performance of the functionality by the TOE
and its platform. This also includes the configuration of the cryptographic engine to be used. The cryptographic
algorithms implemented by this engine are those specified by this PP and used by the cryptographic protocols
being evaluated (IPsec, TLS/HTTPS, SSH).
The test plan identifies high-level test objectives as well as the test procedures to be followed to achieve those
objectives. These procedures include expected results. The test report (which could just be an annotated version
of the test plan) details the activities that took place when the test procedures were executed, and includes the
actual results of the tests. This shall be a cumulative account, so if there was a test run that resulted in a failure; a
fix installed; and then a successful re-run of the test, the report would show a 'fail' and 'pass' result (and the
supporting details), and not just the 'pass' result.
The evaluator created a Detailed Test Report (DTR) to address all aspects of this requirement. The DTR discusses
the test configuration, test cases, expected results, and test results.
3.5 VULNERABILITY
ASSESSMENT
(AVA)
3.5.1 VULNERABILITY SURVEY (AVA_VAN.1)
Assurance Activities: As with ATE_IND, the evaluator shall generate a report to document their findings with
respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE_IND,
or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to determine the vulnerabilities
that have been found in network infrastructure devices and the implemented communication protocols in general,
as well as those that pertain to the particular TOE. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the
vulnerabilities found in the report. For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with
respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE_IND) to
confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take
advantage of the vulnerability. For example, if the vulnerability can be detected by pressing a key combination on
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boot-up, a test would be suitable at the assurance level of this PP. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert
skills and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification
would be formulated.
The vulnerability analysis is in the Detailed Test Report (DTR) prepared by the evaluator. The vulnerability analysis
includes a public search for vulnerabilities and a port scan. Nether the public search for vulnerabilities or the port
scan uncovered any residual vulnerability.
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