ECSS-Q-ST-40C Rev.1 - European Cooperation for Space

ECSS-Q-ST-40C Rev.1
15 February 2017
Space product
assurance
Safety
ECSS Secretariat
ESA-ESTEC
Requirements & Standards Division
Noordwijk, The Netherlands
ECSS-Q-ST-40C Rev.1
15 February 2017
Foreword
This Standard is one of the series of ECSS Standards intended to be applied together for the
management, engineering and product assurance in space projects and applications. ECSS is a
cooperative effort of the European Space Agency, national space agencies and European industry
associations for the purpose of developing and maintaining common standards. Requirements in this
Standard are defined in terms of what shall be accomplished, rather than in terms of how to organize
and perform the necessary work. This allows existing organizational structures and methods to be
applied where they are effective, and for the structures and methods to evolve as necessary without
rewriting the standards.
This Standard has been prepared by the ECSS-Q-ST-40C Rev.1 Working Group, reviewed by the ECSS
Executive Secretariat and approved by the ECSS Technical Authority.
Disclaimer
ECSS does not provide any warranty whatsoever, whether expressed, implied, or statutory, including,
but not limited to, any warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose or any warranty
that the contents of the item are error-free. In no respect shall ECSS incur any liability for any
damages, including, but not limited to, direct, indirect, special, or consequential damages arising out
of, resulting from, or in any way connected to the use of this Standard, whether or not based upon
warranty, business agreement, tort, or otherwise; whether or not injury was sustained by persons or
property or otherwise; and whether or not loss was sustained from, or arose out of, the results of, the
item, or any services that may be provided by ECSS.
Published by:
Copyright:
ESA Requirements and Standards Division
ESTEC, P.O. Box 299,
2200 AG Noordwijk
The Netherlands
2017 © by the European Space Agency for the members of ECSS
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Change log
ECSS-Q-40A
First issue
19 April 1996
ECSS-Q-40B
Second issue
17 May 2002
ECSS-Q-ST-40C
Third issue
6 March 2009
ECSS-Q-ST-40C Rev.1
Third issue, Revision 1
15 February 2017
Changes with respect to the previous version are identified with revision
tracking.
The main changes are:
•
Implementation of Change Requests
•
Updated of clause 3 "Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms"
o
Added terms: criticality,
o
Modified terms: fail-safe
o
Deleted terms: likelihood, system safety
•
Headers of clauses 6.4.1, 6.5.6.3 modified
•
Caption Table 6-1 modified
•
Table A-1 modified including caption
•
Bibliography updated
Added requirements:
6.4.1i to m, Table 6-2 added, 6.5.6.3b to g, Table 6-3 added.
Modified requirements:
5.3a NOTE added, 5.7.1.1b NOTE, 5.7.1.2c NOTE, 5.7.1.3c NOTE, 5.7.1.4d
NOTES, 5.7.1.5c NOTE, 5.7.1.6c NOTE, 5.11.4a, 6.3.3.4.4b (typo in word
"dependent" corrected); 6.3.7a, 6.3.8a, 6.4.1a NOTE added, 6.4.1c, Table 6-1,
6.5.1a, 6.5.6.1b, 6.5.6.2a, 6.5.6.3a, 6.5.6.4a and c, 7.5.3a NOTE2, 7.5.4.6b,
7.5.4.6c NOTE added, 8.6a (surplus quote sign removed).
And interleaved NOTES moved at the end of requirement without
changing the requirement itself: 5.9.1b.
Deleted requirements:
5.3.b, 6.3.3.4.4.c and d, 6.4.1d
Editorial modifications:
C.1.1, D.1.1, Table in Annex F updated, G.1 NOTE, G.5g.
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Table of contents
Change log ................................................................................................................. 3
1 Scope ....................................................................................................................... 9
2 Normative references ........................................................................................... 10
3 Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms.......................................................... 11
3.1
Terms from other standards....................................................................................11
3.2
Terms specific to the present standard ................................................................... 11
3.3
Abbreviated terms...................................................................................................13
3.4
Nomenclature .........................................................................................................14
4 Safety principles ................................................................................................... 15
4.1
Objective ................................................................................................................15
4.2
Policy ......................................................................................................................15
4.3
4.2.1
General .....................................................................................................15
4.2.2
Implementation .........................................................................................15
Safety programme ..................................................................................................16
5 Safety programme ................................................................................................ 17
5.1
Scope .....................................................................................................................17
5.2
Safety programme plan ..........................................................................................17
5.3
Conformance ..........................................................................................................18
5.4
Safety organization .................................................................................................18
5.4.1
Safety manager.........................................................................................18
5.4.2
Safety manager access and authority ....................................................... 18
5.4.3
Safety audits .............................................................................................19
5.4.4
Approval of documentation........................................................................ 19
5.4.5
Approval of hazardous operations ............................................................. 19
5.4.6
Representation on boards ......................................................................... 19
5.4.7
Safety approval authority........................................................................... 20
5.5
Safety risk assessment and control ........................................................................ 20
5.6
Safety critical items .................................................................................................20
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5.7
Project phases and safety review cycle .................................................................. 20
5.7.1
Safety program tasks and reviews ............................................................ 20
5.7.2
Progress meetings ....................................................................................24
5.7.3
Safety reviews ...........................................................................................24
5.8
Safety compliance demonstration ........................................................................... 25
5.9
Safety training.........................................................................................................25
5.9.1
General .....................................................................................................25
5.9.2
Product specific training ............................................................................ 25
5.9.3
General awareness briefings..................................................................... 26
5.9.4
Basic technical training .............................................................................26
5.9.5
Training records ........................................................................................26
5.10 Accident-incident reporting and investigation .......................................................... 26
5.11 Safety documentation .............................................................................................27
5.11.1
General .....................................................................................................27
5.11.2
Safety data package .................................................................................27
5.11.3
Safety deviations and waivers ................................................................... 28
5.11.4
Safety lessons learned ..............................................................................28
5.11.5
Documentation of safety critical items ....................................................... 29
6 Safety engineering ............................................................................................... 30
6.1
Overview ................................................................................................................30
6.2
Safety requirements identification and traceability .................................................. 30
6.3
Safety design objectives .........................................................................................30
6.4
6.3.1
Safety policy and principles ....................................................................... 30
6.3.2
Design selection ........................................................................................30
6.3.3
Hazard reduction precedence ................................................................... 31
6.3.4
Environmental compatibility....................................................................... 33
6.3.5
External services .......................................................................................33
6.3.6
Hazard detection - signalling and safing .................................................... 33
6.3.7
Space debris mitigation ............................................................................. 34
6.3.8
Atmospheric re-entry .................................................................................34
6.3.9
Safety of Earth return missions ................................................................. 34
6.3.10
Safety of human spaceflight missions ....................................................... 35
6.3.11
Access ......................................................................................................35
Safety risk reduction and control .............................................................................35
6.4.1
Severity of hazardous event and function criticality ................................... 35
6.4.2
Failure tolerance requirements .................................................................. 38
6.4.3
Design for minimum risk ............................................................................ 38
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6.4.4
6.5
6.6
Probabilistic safety targets ........................................................................ 39
Identification and control of safety-critical functions ................................................ 40
6.5.1
Identification ..............................................................................................40
6.5.2
Inadvertent operation ................................................................................40
6.5.3
Status information .....................................................................................40
6.5.4
Safe shutdown and failure tolerance requirements .................................... 41
6.5.5
Electronic, electrical, electromechanical components................................ 41
6.5.6
Software functions.....................................................................................41
Operational Safety ..................................................................................................43
6.6.1
Basic requirements ...................................................................................43
6.6.2
Flight operations and mission control ........................................................ 43
6.6.3
Ground operations ....................................................................................45
7 Safety analysis requirements and techniques ................................................... 47
7.1
Overview ................................................................................................................47
7.2
General...................................................................................................................47
7.3
Assessment and allocation of requirements ............................................................ 48
7.3.1
Safety requirements ..................................................................................48
7.3.2
Additional safety requirements .................................................................. 48
7.3.3
Define safety requirements - functions ...................................................... 48
7.3.4
Define safety requirements - subsystems.................................................. 48
7.3.5
Justification ...............................................................................................48
7.3.6
Functional and subsystem specification .................................................... 48
7.4
Safety analyses during the project life cycle............................................................ 48
7.5
Safety analyses ......................................................................................................49
7.5.1
General .....................................................................................................49
7.5.2
Hazard analysis ........................................................................................49
7.5.3
Safety risk assessment .............................................................................50
7.5.4
Supporting assessment and analysis ........................................................ 50
8 Safety verification ................................................................................................. 54
8.1
General...................................................................................................................54
8.2
Hazard reporting and review ...................................................................................54
8.3
8.2.1
Hazard reporting system ........................................................................... 54
8.2.2
Safety status review ..................................................................................54
8.2.3
Documentation ..........................................................................................54
Safety verification methods .....................................................................................55
8.3.1
Verification engineering and planning ....................................................... 55
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8.4
8.5
8.6
8.3.2
Methods and reports .................................................................................55
8.3.3
Analysis ....................................................................................................55
8.3.4
Inspections ................................................................................................55
8.3.5
Verification and approval ........................................................................... 56
Verification of safety-critical functions ..................................................................... 56
8.4.1
Validation ..................................................................................................56
8.4.2
Qualification ..............................................................................................56
8.4.3
Failure tests ..............................................................................................57
8.4.4
Verification of design or operational characteristics ................................... 57
8.4.5
Safety verification testing .......................................................................... 57
Hazard close-out ....................................................................................................57
8.5.1
Safety assurance verification .................................................................... 57
8.5.2
Hazard close-out verification ..................................................................... 58
Declaration of conformity of ground equipment ....................................................... 58
Annex A (informative) Analyses applicability matrix ........................................... 59
Annex B (normative) Safety programme plan - DRD ............................................ 61
B.1
B.2
DRD identification ...................................................................................................61
B.1.1
Requirement identification and source document ...................................... 61
B.1.2
Purpose and objective ...............................................................................61
Expected response .................................................................................................61
B.2.1
Contents ...................................................................................................61
B.2.2
Special remarks ........................................................................................62
Annex C (normative) Safety verification tracking log (SVTL) DRD ..................... 63
C.1
C.2
DRD identification ...................................................................................................63
C.1.1
Requirement identification and source document ...................................... 63
C.1.2
Purpose and objective ...............................................................................63
Expected response .................................................................................................63
C.2.1
Contents ...................................................................................................63
C.2.2
Special remarks ........................................................................................65
Annex D (normative) Safety analysis report including hazard reports DRD ...................................................................................................................... 67
D.1
D.2
DRD identification ...................................................................................................67
D.1.1
Requirement identification and source document ...................................... 67
D.1.2
Purpose and objective ...............................................................................67
Expected response .................................................................................................67
D.2.1
Contents ...................................................................................................67
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D.2.2
Special remarks ........................................................................................68
Annex E (informative) Criteria for probabilistic safety targets ............................ 69
E.1
Objectives of probabilistic safety targets ................................................................. 69
E.2
Criteria for probabilistic safety targets ..................................................................... 69
Annex F (informative) Applicability guidelines ..................................................... 70
Annex G (informative) European legislation and ‘CE’ marking ........................... 76
G.1 Overview ................................................................................................................76
G.2 CE mark .................................................................................................................76
G.3 Responsibility of the design authority ...................................................................... 76
G.4 Declaration of conformity ........................................................................................77
G.5 References .............................................................................................................77
Bibliography............................................................................................................. 79
Figures
Figure C-1 : Safety verification tracking log (SVTL) .............................................................. 66
Tables
Table 6-1: Severity categories ..............................................................................................37
Table 6-2: Criticality of functions...........................................................................................37
Table 6-3: Criticality category assignment for software products vs. function criticality ......... 42
Table A-1 : Safety deliverable documents ............................................................................ 60
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1
Scope
This Standard defines the safety programme and the safety technical
requirements aiming to protect flight and ground personnel, the launch vehicle,
associated payloads, ground support equipment, the general public, public and
private property, the space system and associated segments and the
environment from hazards associated with European space systems.
This Standard is applicable to all European space projects.
This standard may be tailored for the specific characteristic and constraints of a
space project in conformance with ECSS-S-ST-00.
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2
Normative references
The following normative documents contain provisions which, through
reference in this text, constitute provisions of this ECSS Standard. For dated
references, subsequent amendments to, or revision of any of these publications
do not apply. However, parties to agreements based on this ECSS Standard are
encouraged to investigate the possibility of applying the more recent editions of
the normative documents indicated below. For undated references, the latest
edition of the publication referred to applies.
ECSS-S-ST-00-01
ECSS system – Glossary of terms
ECSS-E-ST-10
Space engineering – System engineering general
requirements
ECSS-E-ST-32-01
Space engineering – Fracture control
ECSS-E-ST-32-10
Space engineering – Structural factors of safety for
spaceflight hardware
ECSS-E-ST-40
Space engineering – Software general requirements
ECSS-M-ST-10
Space project management – Project planning and
implementation
ECSS-M-ST-40
Space project management – Configuration and
information management
ECSS-M-ST-80
Space project management – Risk management
ECSS-Q-ST-10
Space product assurance – Product assurance
management
ECSS-Q-ST-10-04
Space product assurance – Critical-item control
ECSS-Q-ST-20
Space product assurance – Quality assurance
ECSS-Q-ST-30
Space product assurance – Dependability
ECSS-Q-ST-60
Space product assurance – Electrical, electronic and
electromechanical (EEE) components
ECSS-Q-ST-70
Space product assurance – Materials, mechanical parts
and processes
ECSS-Q-ST-80
Space product assurance – Software product assurance
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3
Terms, definitions and abbreviated terms
3.1
Terms from other standards
a.
3.2
For the purpose of this Standard, the terms and definitions from ECSS-SST-00-01 apply (see in clause 3.2 differences for "fail safe" and "system"),
in particular for the following terms:
1.
accident
2.
failure
3.
catastrophic
4.
critical <CONTEXT: safety>
5.
emergency
6.
ground segment
7.
hazard
8.
hazardous event
9.
inhibit
10.
risk
11.
safety
12.
safing
13.
severity
14.
safety-critical function
15.
space segment
16.
system
Terms specific to the present standard
3.2.1
cause
action or condition by which a hazardous event is initiated (an initiating event)
NOTE 1
The cause can arise as the result of failure,
human error, design inadequacy, induced or
natural environment, system configuration or
operational mode(s).
NOTE 2
This definition is specific to this Standard,
when used in the context of hazard analysis.
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3.2.2
criticality
classification of a function or of a software, hardware or operation according to
the severity of the consequences of its potential failures
3.2.3
NOTE 1
Refer to clauses 6.4.1 and 6.5.6.
NOTE 2
This notion of criticality, applied to a function
or a software, hardware or operation, considers
only severity, differently from the criticality of a
failure or failure mode (or a risk), which also
considers the likelihood or probability of
occurrence.
fail safe
property of a system (or part of it), which prevents its failures from resulting in
critical or catastrophic consequences
3.2.4
hazard control
preventive or mitigation measure, associated to a hazard scenario, which is
introduced into the system design and operation to avoid the events or to
interrupt their propagation to consequence
3.2.5
hazardous command
command that can remove an inhibit to a safety-critical function or activate a
hazardous subsystem
3.2.6
hazard reduction
process of elimination or minimization and control of hazards
3.2.7
hazard scenario
sequence of events leading from the initial cause to the unwanted safety
consequence
NOTE
3.2.8
The cause can be a single initiating event, or an
additional action or a change of condition
activating a dormant problem.
operator error
failure of an operator to perform an action as required or trained or the
inadvertent or incorrect action of an operator
[ISO 14620-1]
3.2.9
safety approval authority
entity that defines or makes applicable, for a given project, detailed technical
safety requirements, and reviews their implementation
3.2.10
safety audit
independent examination to determine whether the procedures specific to the
safety requirements are implemented effectively and are suitable to achieve the
specified objectives
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3.2.11
safety risk
measure of the threat to safety posed by the hazard scenarios and their
consequences
3.2.12
NOTE 1
Safety risk is always associated with a specific
hazard scenario or a particular set of scenarios.
The risk posed by a single scenario is called
individual scenario risk. The risk posed by a set
of scenarios with the same top consequence is
called overall risk.
NOTE 2
The magnitude of a safety risk is a combination
of the severity and the likelihood of the
consequence.
safety status parameter
parameter that makes it possible to assess the status of an implemented hazard
control
3.3
Abbreviated terms
For the purpose of this Standard, the abbreviated terms from ECSS-S-ST-00-01
and the following apply:
Abbreviation
Meaning
AR
acceptance review
CCB
configuration control board
CDR
critical design review
CE
Conformité Européenne
CRR
commissioning result review
EEE
electronic, electrical, electromechanical
ELR
end-of-life review
EMC
electro-magnetic compatibility
FMEA
failure modes and effects analysis
FMECA
failure modes, effects and criticality analysis
FSDP
flight safety data package
FRR
flight readiness review
FTA
fault tree analysis
GSDP
ground safety data package
GSE
ground support equipment
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission
LRR
launch readiness review
LVD
low voltage directive
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3.4
MIP
mandatory inspection point
NRB
nonconformance review board
NUREG-CR
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission contractor report
ORR
operational readiness review
PDR
preliminary design review
PED
pressure equipment directive
PGSE
pressure ground support equipment
PRR
preliminary requirements review
QR
qualification review
R&TTE
radio & telecommunications terminal equipment
RoHS
restriction of certain hazardous substances
SDP
safety data package
SRR
system requirements review
SVTL
safety verification tracking log
TRB
test review board
WEEE
waste electrical and electronic equipment
Nomenclature
The following nomenclature applies throughout this document:
a.
The word “shall” is used in this Standard to express requirements. All
the requirements are expressed with the word “shall”.
b.
The word “should” is used in this Standard to express recommendations.
All the recommendations are expressed with the word “should”.
NOTE
It is expected that, during tailoring,
recommendations in this document are either
converted into requirements or tailored out.
c.
The words “may” and “need not” are used in this Standard to express
positive and negative permissions, respectively. All the positive
permissions are expressed with the word “may”. All the negative
permissions are expressed with the words “need not”.
d.
The word “can” is used in this Standard to express capabilities or
possibilities, and therefore, if not accompanied by one of the previous
words, it implies descriptive text.
NOTE
e.
In ECSS “may” and “can” have completely
different meanings: “may” is normative
(permission), and “can” is descriptive.
The present and past tenses are used in this Standard to express
statements of fact, and therefore they imply descriptive text.
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4
Safety principles
4.1
Objective
The objective of safety assurance is to ensure that all safety risks associated with
the design, development, production and operations of space product are
adequately identified, assessed, minimized, controlled and finally accepted
through the implementation of a safety assurance programme.
4.2
Policy
4.2.1
General
The ECSS safety policy is to:
•
ensure that space systems do not cause a hazard to, in order of priority:

human life,

the environment,

public and private property (including launch facilities),

spacecraft and launcher,

ground support equipment and facilities,
•
determine and evaluate the safety risks associated with project activities,
•
minimize safety risks in a technically effective and cost effective manner,
•
ensure adequate verification of safety control measures.
4.2.2
Implementation
The ECSS safety policy is implemented by applying a safety programme which
ensures that:
•
safety is designed into the system,
•
safety controls are adequately implemented in the verification plan,
•
safety requirements including launch centre safety regulations are met,
•
hazards are identified, and eliminated or, where this is not possible,
minimized, ranked and controlled in accordance with project objectives
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in a manner acceptable to the customer and to the safety organisations
involved in the implementation of the mission.
4.3
Safety programme
The safety programme comprises the:
•
identification and control of all safety related risks with respect to the
design, development and operations of space products,
•
assessment of the risks based on qualitative and quantitative analysis as
appropriate,
•
application of a hazard reduction precedence and of control measures of
the residual risks.
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5
Safety programme
5.1
5.2
Scope
a.
The supplier shall establish and maintain a safety programme to assure
conformance with project safety policy and requirements.
b.
The safety programme shall establish a safety management system to
implement provisions of this Standard - commensurate with the
programme requirements and tailored by the customer
NOTE 1
For tailoring, refer to clause 1.
NOTE 2
The system safety programme requirements are
subject to tailoring, without diminishing the
intent to protect flight and ground personnel,
the launch vehicle, associated payloads, ground
support equipment, the general public, public
and private property, the space system and
associated segments and the environment from
hazards associated with space systems.
NOTE 3
As support to tailoring, informative Annex F
provides a guideline for determining the
applicability of this standard depending on the
type of project.
Safety programme plan
a.
The supplier shall establish and maintain a safety programme plan in
conformance with the DRD in Annex B.
NOTE
b.
The plan can either be included as part of an
overall project product assurance plan or as a
separate safety programme plan.
The supplier shall cover, in his safety programme plan, the safety tasks
for the project phases in conformance with 5.7.1.
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5.3
Conformance
a.
The supplier shall comply with all applicable national or international
safety regulations.
NOTE
b.
<<deleted>>
c.
The implementation of safety requirements shall not be compromised by
other requirements.
NOTE
5.4
This includes launch site safety regulations,
space debris mitigation and re-entry safety
regulations, etc.
For example: security requirements.
Safety organization
5.4.1
Safety manager
a.
Each supplier shall appoint a safety manager who has appropriate
training or experience.
b.
The safety manager
independence to:
shall
have
organisational
authority
1.
establish and maintain a safety programme in accordance with the
project safety requirements,
2.
manage all safety assurance aspects of the design of the system
(including software) and its operation in accordance with the
Safety Plan,
3.
coordinate the interfaces:
(a)
with the relevant bodies involved in the project in
accordance with the safety plan,
(b)
with the safety launcher authority.
NOTE
Depending on the project safety criticality, the
safety manager can be combined with other
functions (e.g. PA manager) when agreed with
the customer.
5.4.2
Safety manager access and authority
5.4.2.1
Access
a.
and
The safety manager shall:
1.
have the right of access to safety-related data relevant to project
safety in conformance with ECSS-M-ST-40,
2.
have unimpeded access to any management level without
organizational constraint on any aspect of project safety.
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5.4.2.2
a.
Authority
The safety manager or safety relevant authority shall have the authority
to:
1.
reject any project document, or to stop any project activity that
does not conform to approved safety requirements or procedures,
2.
interrupt hazardous operations when it becomes clear by the
Safety Manager that the operation does not conform to the agreed
measures defined in the corresponding hazard report and derived
approved hazard procedure.
5.4.3
Safety audits
a.
The supplier shall perform safety audits or reviews to verify compliance
to project safety policy and requirements.
b.
The safety audits shall be in accordance with ECSS-M-ST-10 and ECSS-QST-10.
NOTE
c.
The customer shall be informed of the audit schedule.
5.4.4
a.
Approval of documentation
Documentation related to safety shall be approved by the safety manager
upon his verification of completeness, compliance with stated safety
requirements and formal closeout of open safety verification items (as
defined and agreed during safety audits and reviews).
5.4.5
a.
The safety audits can be part of the project
audits.
Approval of hazardous operations
The safety manager (or a designated representative) shall have concluded
the review of, and approved, any hazardous operation before it is
executed.
5.4.6
Representation on boards
a.
The safety manager or designated delegate shall be represented at
configuration control boards (CCBs), nonconformance review boards
(NRBs), test review board (TRBs), and at qualification, and acceptance
reviews, where safety requirements and safety-critical functions are
involved.
b.
The safety function shall be further represented at all boards dealing with
health matters where exposure or endurance limits are defined for flight
and ground crews.
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5.4.7
a.
5.5
1.
review and disposes the safety data submittals,
2.
approve the close-out of hazards,
3.
decide on deviations and waivers, and finally
4.
accept the statement of safety compliance.
a.
The safety risk identification, reduction and control shall be part of the
project's risk management process as specified in ECSS-M-ST-80.
b.
Safety risk identification, reduction and control shall be a continuous and
iterative process throughout the project life cycle, encompassing
1.
allocation of safety requirements;
2.
hazard and safety risk identification;
3.
evaluation (including categorisation) of consequence severity;
4.
hazard and safety risk reduction and control;
5.
close out and acceptance of residual risk.
For the identification of hazards and associated safety risks,
consideration shall be given to past experience, studies, ground and
flight tests, reviews, the industrial process as well as the operational use.
Safety critical items
a.
5.7
The safety approval authority shall:
Safety risk assessment and control
c.
5.6
Safety approval authority
The safety critical items shall be part of the project's overall critical items
control programme as specified in ECSS-Q-ST-10-04.
Project phases and safety review cycle
5.7.1
Safety program tasks and reviews
5.7.1.1
Mission analysis/Needs identification - Phase 0
a.
Safety analysis shall support the identification of sources of safety risk as
well as the performance of preliminary trade-off analyses between
alternative system concepts.
b.
The following safety programme tasks shall apply for human spaceflight
programmes and safety critical systems:
1.
Analyse safety requirements and lessons-learnt associated with
similar previous missions;
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2.
Perform preliminary hazard analysis of the proposed system and
operations concept to support concept trade-offs;
3.
Perform comparative safety risk assessment of the concept options;
4.
Identify the relevant project safety requirements;
5.
Plan safety activities for the feasibility phase;
6.
Support the mission definition review.
NOTE
5.7.1.2
These tasks also serve as a guideline for other
space programmes.
Feasibility - Phase A
a.
Safety analysis shall support trade-off analyses in arriving at the concept
that has acceptable safety risk considering the project and mission
constraints.
b.
The design technology selected and the operational concept to be
implemented shall be selected based on the analysis data for the safest
system architecture to eliminate or reduce hazards to acceptable levels.
c.
The following safety programme tasks shall apply for human spaceflight
programmes and safety critical systems:
1.
Commence hazard analyses of the design and operations concepts
in order to identify applicable system level hazards, hazardous
conditions, and potential hazardous events and consequences;
2.
Support concept trades by identifying safety critical aspects of the
concept options;
3.
Apply hazard elimination and minimization and make safety
recommendations;
4.
Perform comparative safety risk assessments of the concept
options;
5.
Identify system level safety critical functions;
6.
Identify system level project specific safety requirements;
7.
Plan safety activities for the project definition phase;
8.
Support the preliminary requirements review.
NOTE
5.7.1.3
These tasks also serve as a guideline for other
space programmes.
Preliminary definition - Phase B
a.
The safety analysis shall support a continued and more detailed safety
optimization of the system design and operations and the identification
of technical safety requirements and their applicability.
b.
The analysis shall also provide inputs to safety risk assessment in
support of safety risk evaluation, the identification of risk contributors in
the design and in the operational concept.
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c.
The following safety programme tasks shall apply for human spaceflight
programmes and safety critical systems:
1.
Update hazard analysis in support of design and mission concept
definition activities; identify additional project specific safety
requirements;
2.
Update safety critical functions identification, and define the
failure tolerance requirements;
3.
Identify emergency, warning, and caution situations;
4.
Update the system safety risk assessment as part of the
contribution provided by the safety domain to the risk
management process;
5.
Identify project safety requirements;
6.
Ensure that project requirement documentation and activities
comply with project safety requirements;
7.
Support a system requirements review and preliminary design
review;
8.
Plan verification of safety requirements implementation;
9.
Prepare the safety plan for the detailed definition, production and
qualification phase.
NOTE
5.7.1.4
These tasks also serve as a guideline for other
space programmes.
Detailed definition, production and qualification
testing - Phase C/D
a.
Safety analysis shall support detailed design, production, qualification,
testing.
b.
Safety analysis shall also support operational safety optimization, safety
requirements implementation evaluation, risk reduction verification, and
hazard and risk acceptance.
c.
Analysis of operations shall also support the identification of emergency
and contingency response planning and training requirements, and the
development of procedures.
d.
The following safety programme tasks shall apply for human spaceflight
programmes and safety critical systems:
1.
Perform detailed system level hazard analysis;
2.
Perform supporting safety analysis;
3.
Update the project technical safety requirements to incorporate the
results of safety analyses;
4.
Ensure that the project implementation and verification
programme covers identified hazard control verification activities;
5.
Update safety critical functions identification, failure tolerance
requirements, and identify safety critical items;
6.
Implement control programme for safety critical items;
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7.
Perform safety risk assessment in support of design improvement,
project resource apportionment, control programme for safety
critical items and project reviews;
8.
Monitor verification of safety requirements implementation;
9.
Verify and document hazard control implementation;
10.
Check that all open verification items are recorded and agreed
procedures are in place;
11.
Support the critical design review, the qualification review and the
acceptance review;
12.
Perform project internal safety reviews and internal audits;
13.
Identify, monitor and control project assembly, integration, testing
and handling operations which are potentially hazardous to
personnel or hardware;
14.
Review and approve hazardous and safety critical operational
procedures;
15.
Perform accident-incident reporting and investigation;
16.
Support customer
milestones;
17.
Prepare a project safety “lessons-learned” report;
18.
Prepare operational phase safety plan.
5.7.1.5
safety
reviews
at
defined
programme
NOTE 1
These tasks also serve as a guideline for other
space programmes.
NOTE 2
Examples for item 4: reviews, inspections,
analyses and tests.
Utilization - Phase E
a.
Safety analysis shall evaluate design and operational changes for impact
to safety, assuring that safety margins are maintained and that operations
are conducted within accepted risk.
b.
The analysis shall also support the evaluation of operational anomalies
for impact to safety, and the continued evaluation of risk trends.
c.
The following safety programme tasks shall apply for human spaceflight
programmes and safety critical systems:
1.
Issue the operational phase safety plan;
2.
Review operational procedures;
3.
Approve safety critical operational procedures;
4.
Identify and monitor hazardous operations;
5.
Support the flight readiness review, operational readiness review,
launch readiness review and flight qualification reviews;
6.
Support ground and flight operations;
7.
Perform safety critical items control;
8.
Monitor and assess evolution of the system configuration and
operations resulting from design fixes and updates;
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9.
Update hazard analyses and implement additional hazard controls
as necessary;
10.
Investigate safety related flight anomalies and trends;
11.
Update safety risk assessment as necessary to support operational
decisions;
12.
Prepare disposal phase safety plan.
NOTE
5.7.1.6
These tasks also serve as a guideline for other
space programmes.
Disposal - Phase F
a.
Safety analysis shall evaluate all disposal operations and associated
hazards.
b.
Disposal solutions shall be identified which meet the project's safety
requirements.
c.
The following safety programme tasks shall apply for human spaceflight
programmes and safety critical systems:
1.
Perform hazard analysis with respect to the disposal operations;
2.
Check that the disposal operation conforms to international safety
regulations by performing the necessary safety analysis;
3.
Review the procedures of the disposal operations;
4.
Support the mission close-out review.
NOTE
5.7.2
These tasks also serve as a guideline for other
space programmes.
Progress meetings
a.
The supplier shall hold regular safety status and progress meetings with
the customer and his lower tier suppliers as part of the project progress
meetings as specified in ECSS-M-ST-10.
b.
The relevant customer and supplier specialists shall attend the meetings.
5.7.3
a.
Safety reviews
The customer shall define, conduct and chair the safety reviews to ensure
satisfactory implementation of safety programme and technical safety
requirements.
NOTE
b.
A supplier is considered as a customer vis-à-vis
its lower tier suppliers (as defined in ECSS-SST-00).
The supplier shall support safety reviews by the customer and the
relevant safety approval authority, as specified in the relevant review
plans.
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5.8
5.9
c.
Each supplier participating in a safety review shall prepare, and submit
for review, the safety data package.
d.
Safety reviews shall be performed, and the review objectives achieved, in
conformance with clause 5.7.1.
Safety compliance demonstration
a.
The supplier shall provide a statement of safety compliance to
demonstrate that the space system elements conform to stated safety
requirements.
b.
The supplier shall include in his statement of compliance a statement that
open verifications are followed up in the safety verification tracking log
(SVTL), as defined in clause 8.5.1, and do not affect further safe
processing.
c.
The project shall provide to the safety approval authority all safetyrelated information for their acceptance of the statement of safety
compliance.
Safety training
5.9.1
General
a.
Safety training shall be part of the overall training in accordance with
ECSS-Q-ST-20.
b.
All safety related training of any personnel working - permanently or
occasionally - with system elements that can have hazardous properties
shall have three major aspects:
1.
general awareness briefings on safety measures to be taken at a
given location or working environment;
2.
basic technical training in the required safety techniques and skills
which is a prerequisite to fulfil the job function under
consideration;
3.
product specific training that focuses on the hazards related to the
specific system element.
NOTE
5.9.2
Examples for item 2:
maintenance or integration.
inspection,
test,
Product specific training
a.
The supplier shall identify the need for product specific safety training
and implement the corresponding safety training programme for all
relevant parties.
b.
The supplier shall inform the customer of any safety training identified
by him as necessary for the flight operations crew or mission control
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personnel, together with a definition of the type of training required and
its scope.
c.
The supplier shall support the implementation of the customer's training
programme for the flight operations crew or mission control personnel.
5.9.3
a.
All personnel accessing the area where the product is processed shall
participate previously in the general safety awareness briefing.
5.9.4
a.
Basic technical training
The supplier shall provide basic technical training to all project
engineering and safety personnel working with hazardous products.
5.9.5
a.
General awareness briefings
Training records
The supplier shall maintain records of personnel having received safety
training in accordance with ECSS-Q-ST-20.
5.10 Accident-incident reporting and investigation
a.
The supplier shall report to the customer all accidents and incidents
occurred during project activities under the control of the supplier or his
lower tier suppliers that affect the system element.
b.
The supplier shall support - at request - project related accident and
incident investigations that occur outside of the supplier’s control or
facility.
c.
The supplier shall coordinate the investigation activities in cooperation
with other supplier functional departments and lower tier suppliers.
d.
The accident or incident investigation report shall be formally closed by
the supplier upon approval by the customer.
e.
If the conclusion of the assessment is that the accident-incident has had
an effect on the project, i.e. the safety of the product or its operation, the
organisations safety representative shall be informed.
f.
In case of 5.10e., the accident-incident report shall become part of the
project's safety data and is documented in the safety data package.
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5.11 Safety documentation
5.11.1
General
a.
The supplier shall maintain, as part of the project documentation, all
safety-related data to support reviews and safety compliance
demonstration.
b.
The customer shall be given access to this data on request during audits,
safety reviews and meetings held at the supplier’s premises in
accordance with ECSS-M-ST-40.
5.11.2
a.
Safety data package
The supplier shall submit a safety data package (SDP) to support
reviews.
NOTE
b.
This can be a stand-alone package or be
integrated into the overall data package if the
safety review is part of an overall project
review.
The safety data package shall contain at least the following safety related
documentation:
1.
Safety analysis report (in accordance with Annex D);
2.
Supporting analysis (if applicable);
3.
Safety risk assessment (if applicable);
4.
Hazardous ground operations list and procedures;
5.
Safety verification tracking log (SVTL, in accordance with Annex C).
c.
The contents of the safety data packages for the planned safety reviews of
a project or programme shall be specified by the Safety Approval
Authority to assure they support the objectives of the safety reviews for
which they are delivered (in conformance with clause 5.7.2).
d.
The supplier shall use the actual configuration baseline, as defined by
ECSS-M-ST-40, as the design and operational baseline that is the subject
of the safety data package.
e.
The supplier shall integrate safety data related to the various subsystems
or equipment that makes up the system into the safety data package that
is presented at the review.
f.
All safety data shall be traceable from the safety data package and
available for review.
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5.11.3
Safety deviations and waivers
5.11.3.1
Request for deviation or waiver
a.
Safety requirements that cannot be met shall be identified as specified in
ECSS-M-ST-40.
b.
A request for deviation or waiver shall be generated and tracked
according to the requirements of ECSS-M-ST-40.
5.11.3.2
Assessment of deviation or waiver
a.
All RFD/RFW shall be assessed in order to identify those which impact
safety.
b.
The accumulated deviations and waivers that affect safety shall be
assessed to ensure that the effects of individual deviations do not
invalidate the rationale used for the acceptance of other deviations.
5.11.3.3
a.
Safety deviations and waivers shall be subject to safety approval
authority acceptance.
5.11.3.4
a.
b.
Review and disposition
Deviations and waivers that affect project safety requirements or safetycritical functions which the supplier considers acceptable shall be subject
of review and disposition by the customer and the safety approval
authority.
5.11.4
a.
Acceptance by the safety approval authority
Safety lessons learned
Safety lessons learned shall be collected and used during the project, as
far as they are relevant, considering as a minimum:
1.
the impact of newly imposed requirements;
2.
assessment of all malfunctions, accidents, anomalies, deviations
and waivers;
3.
effectiveness of safety strategies of the project;
4.
new safety tools
demonstrated;
5.
effective versus ineffective verifications that were performed;
6.
changes proposed to safety
requirements with rationale.
and
methods
that
policy,
were
strategy
developed
or
or
technical
The safety lessons learned information shall be made available to the
customer and suppliers, particularly to project and safety managers as
well as design and safety engineers upon request for use on other
projects.
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5.11.5
a.
Documentation of safety critical items
The safety critical items identified by the safety analysis shall be
documented in accordance with ECSS-Q-ST-10-04.
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6
Safety engineering
6.1
Overview
Safety is an integral part of all project product assurance and engineering
activities. It is not a stand-alone activity. The quality of all safety engineering
related work is based on assurance that the system is designed, qualified,
manufactured, and operated in accordance with the ECSS product assurance
requirements.
Safety engineering consists of safety analysis, management of hazard and risk
reduction processes, hazard and risk potential assessment, design assurance,
and hazard and risk control activities.
Safety engineering makes use of lessons learned throughout the programme.
6.2
6.3
Safety requirements identification and traceability
a.
Safety requirements shall be identified and traced from the system level
into the design and then allocated to the lower levels.
b.
When specified by the project, the identified safety requirements shall be
justified in the design and presented in an appropriate document.
Safety design objectives
6.3.1
Safety policy and principles
The order of priority with respect to safety, which is part of ECSS policy, is
presented in clause 4.
6.3.2
a.
Design selection
Appropriate design features shall be selected to ensure inherent safety.
NOTE
Such features are fail safe design solutions,
damage control, containment and isolation of
potential hazards.
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6.3.3
Hazard reduction precedence
6.3.3.1
General
a.
The following sequence of activities shall be applied to identified
hazards, hazardous conditions, and functions whose failures have
hazardous consequences:
1.
Hazard elimination
2.
Hazard minimization
3.
Hazard control.
6.3.3.2
a.
Hazards and hazardous conditions shall, consistent with the project
constraints and mission objectives, be eliminated from the design and
operational concepts by the selection of design technology, architecture
and operational characteristics.
6.3.3.3
a.
Hazard elimination
Hazard minimization
Where hazards and hazardous conditions are not eliminated, the severity
of the associated hazardous events and consequences shall, consistent
with the project constraints and mission objectives, be reduced to an
accepted level through the change of the design architecture,
technologies, and operational characteristics allowing the substitution of
those hazards by other hazards with lower potential threat.
6.3.3.4
Hazard control
6.3.3.4.1
General
a.
Hazards that have not been eliminated and have been subjected to
hazard minimization (as defined in 6.3.3.3a) shall be controlled through
preventative or mitigation measures, associated to hazard scenarios,
which are introduced into the system design and operation to avoid the
events or to interrupt their propagation to consequences.
b.
The following measures shall be applied in order of precedence:
1.
Design selection
2.
Automatic safety devices
3.
Warning devices
4.
Special procedures.
6.3.3.4.2
Design selection - Failure tolerance design
a.
Failure tolerance is the basic safety requirement that shall be used to
control most hazards.
b.
The design shall tolerate a minimum number of credible failures and/or
operator errors determined by the hazard consequence.
c.
The supplier shall establish the list of failures to be considered as "non
credible" for customer approval as early as possible in development.
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6.3.3.4.3
a.
Design selection - Design for minimum risk
Hazard which cannot be controlled by compliance to failure tolerance
shall be reduced to an accepted level by compliance with specific safety
related properties and characteristics of the design.
NOTE
6.3.3.4.4
Examples are: structures, pressures vessels,
mechanisms,
material
compatibility,
flammability.
Automatic safety devices
a.
Hazards that are not eliminated through design selection shall be
reduced and made controllable through the use of automatic safety
devices as part of the system, subsystem or equipment.
b.
The safety devices, specified in 6.3.3.4.4a, shall not be dependent on
human performance.
c.
<<deleted>>
d.
<<deleted>>
6.3.3.4.5
Warning devices
a.
When it is not practical to preclude the existence or occurrence of known
hazards or to use automatic safety devices, devices shall be used for the
timely detection of the condition and the generation of a warning signal.
b.
This shall be coupled with emergency controls of corrective action for
operators to safe or shut down the affected subsystem.
6.3.3.4.6
Special procedures
a.
When it is not possible to reduce the magnitude of a hazard through the
design, the use of safety devices or the use of warning devices, special
procedures shall be developed to control the hazardous conditions for
the enhancement of safety.
b.
Special procedures shall be verified by test and appropriate training be
provided for personnel.
c.
Hazard detection shall be implemented if alternative means cannot be
used.
d.
To permit the use of real time monitoring, hazard detection and safing
systems for hazard control, the availability of sufficient response time
shall be verified and corresponding safing procedures be developed and
verified and the personnel trained.
NOTE
Special procedures are the least effective of the
hazard control and risk reduction measures
available. They can include emergency and
contingency
procedures,
procedural
constraints, or the application of a controlled
maintenance programme.
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6.3.4
Environmental compatibility
a.
The system design shall meet the safety requirements under the worstcase natural and induced environments defined for the project.
b.
Design and performance margins shall be established and applied for
worst-case combinations of induced and natural environments and
operating characteristics.
6.3.5
External services
a.
Loss, malfunctioning, and sudden restoration of external services shall be
defined as an input to the development phase.
b.
The system design shall be defined so that catastrophic or critical
consequences are not induced by loss, malfunctioning, and sudden
restoration of external services.
6.3.6
Hazard detection - signalling and safing
a.
Safety monitoring, display, alarm and safing capabilities shall be
incorporated for manned space systems.
b.
These capabilities shall provide the information to allow the crew and
system operators to take actions to protect personnel from the
consequences of failures within safety-critical functions and the failure of
hazard control measures.
c.
The system design shall provide the capability for detecting failures that
result in degradation of failure tolerance with respect to the hazard
detection, signalling and safing function.
d.
The performance of these functions shall be verifiable during flight and
ground operational phases.
e.
The emergency, caution and warning function shall detect and notify the
crew and system operators of emergency, warning and caution
situations.
f.
Safing functions and capabilities shall be included that provide for the
containment or control of emergency, warning and caution situations.
g.
Provisions shall be included for the monitoring of safing function
execution.
h.
Dedicated safing functions shall be provided for emergency situations.
i.
Control of warning and caution situations shall be acceptable by system
reconfiguration or by dedicated safing functions.
j.
A single failure shall not cause loss of the emergency and warning
function.
k.
Where the operation of a safing system introduces a new hazard,
inadvertent activation of the safing system shall be controlled in
accordance with the failure tolerance requirements.
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l.
A single failure shall not cause loss of the emergency and warning
functions together with the monitored functions.
m.
Emergency, warning and caution data, out of limit annunciation and
safing commands shall be given priority over other data processing and
command functions.
n.
When systems or elements are integrated into, or docked with the other
systems or elements, the emergency, warning, caution, and safing
function shall enable the areas of control responsibility to monitor and
display the applicable parameters, and to control the related safing
functions.
o.
Emergency, warning, and caution parameter status information shall be
available and displayed at the launch control and mission control centres
in “near real time” during the operational phases.
p.
It shall be possible for the crew to ascertain and monitor in “real time”
the status of emergency, warning and caution parameters of non-crewed
systems or elements prior to docking with crewed systems.
6.3.7
a.
The design and the operational characteristics of the space system shall
be such that the generation of space debris is minimized consistent with
the project constraints and mission objectives, and compliant with
applicable space debris mitigation regulation.
6.3.8
a.
Space debris mitigation
Atmospheric re-entry
The space vehicle shall be designed and operated (post-mission disposal
manoeuvres) such that, where applicable, the risk of a catastrophic event
does not exceed the level of acceptable risk specified by the applicable
regulation.
NOTE
6.3.9
Hardware of a space system that is returned
from orbit presents a potential threat to the
Earth's population due to the risk of debris
entering the atmosphere in an uncontrolled
manner.
Safety of Earth return missions
a.
Biological contamination (including organic-constituents) resulting from
the introduction of extraterrestrial matter shall be avoided.
b.
The introduction of extraterrestrial matter shall not affect the
environmental conditions on Earth.
c.
Extraterrestrial matter shall be treated as hazardous substances until
proven otherwise.
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d.
A containment function for hazardous substances of the spacecraft,
which prevents release in case of accidents until recovery or arrival at a
dedicated containment facility, shall be provided.
e.
If containment cannot be verified, the hazardous substances (and any
part of the space system that has potentially been exposed) shall not be
returned to Earth (unless sterilized in space).
6.3.10
Safety of human spaceflight missions
a.
A mission abort capability shall be provided.
b.
Safing and safe heaven functions shall be provided.
NOTE
c.
Escape and rescue functions shall be provided.
d.
The capability to reconfigure the system to restore the functional
capability of safety critical functions in case of failures or accidents shall
be provided.
e.
The capability to monitor, detect and assess hazards and effects of slow
insidious events with hazardous consequences shall be detailed
according to project constraints and mission objectives.
NOTE
f.
a.
Such hazards include fatigue, corrosion, microorganisms, aging, deterioration, contamination.
The space system shall provide an on-board medical facility and the
capability for handling a permanently impaired or deceased
crewmember.
6.3.11
6.4
These functions can be implemented through
measures such as resource conservation,
increased shielding (solar flares, meteoroids
and
radiation),
vehicle
or
systems
reconfiguration and trajectory changes.
Access
System shall be designed such that any required access to system
elements during flight or ground operations can be accomplished with an
accepted level of risk to personnel.
Safety risk reduction and control
6.4.1
a.
Severity of hazardous event and function
criticality
The severity of potential consequences of identified hazardous events
shall be categorized as shown in Table 6-1.
NOTE
The severity categories are common to
dependability and safety. The Table 6-1 is
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common to ECSS-Q-ST-30 (as Table 5-1) and
ECSS-Q-ST-40 which address respectively the
dependability and safety types of consequences
b.
An understanding of the criteria defined in Table 6-1 shall be agreed
between customer and supplier.
c.
The assessment of detrimental environmental effects as identified in
Table 6-1 shall not be limited to effects on Earth but also include effects
on for example outer space, including the Moon and the planets,
geostationary orbit (GEO), low Earth orbit (LEO) as well as the Earth’s
atmosphere.
d.
<<deleted>>
e.
For international programmes, a coherent set of consequence severity
shall be established for joint operational phases.
f.
These categories shall not violate the safety policy and principles as
defined in clause 4.2.1 for the protection of human life or the principles of
categorization in accordance with the definition of consequence severity
categories in Table 6-1.
g.
The expert assessment on determining limits for exposures that do not
create a hazard, those that create critical hazards and those that create
catastrophic hazards shall be performed by the responsible authority,
early in the design process.
NOTE
h.
Examples of responsible authority are medical
boards or radiation protection committees.
The detailed safety requirements and measures shall be derived from
allowed exposure levels.
NOTE
For example: maximum allowable concentrations,
maximum emission concentrations or radiation
doses.
i.
A comprehensive list of hazardous events shall be compiled for the space
system and mission.
j.
The comprehensive list of hazardous events specified in 6.4.1i shall be
completed and maintained along the design, development and operation
of the space system.
k.
The criticality of a function implemented in the space system shall be
assigned in accordance with the severity of identified hazardous events it
can cause, following the categories defined in Table 6-2.
NOTE
Hazardous events can result from a function not
executed or executed degraded, incorrectly,
untimely, out of the specified time interval, out of
sequence or inadvertently.
l.
The highest identified severity of hazardous events shall define the
criticality of the function.
m.
The function criticality shall be assigned without taking into account any
compensating provisions.
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NOTE
Continuing functional decomposition into lowerlevel functions, to distinguish between functions
that could lead to different hazardous events, is
not considered as creating compensating
provisions.
Table 6-1: Severity categories
Name
Level
Catastrophic
1
Type of consequences
Dependability
Failure propagation
(Only for lower than
system level analysis)
(Refer to ECSS-Q-ST-30
requirement 5.3.2.c)
Safety
• Loss of life, life-threatening or permanently
disabling injury or occupational illness
• Loss of system
• Loss of an interfacing manned flight system
• Loss of launch site facilities
• Severe detrimental environmental effects
Critical
2
Loss of mission
• Temporarily disabling but not lifethreatening injury, or temporary
occupational illness
• Major damage to an interfacing flight
system
• Major damage to ground facilities
• Major damage to public or private property
• Major detrimental environmental effects
Major
3
Major mission degradation ---
Minor or
Negligible
4
Minor mission degradation
--or any other effect
Table 6-2: Criticality of functions
Severity of
hazardous event
Catastrophic
(Level 1)
Function
criticality
I
Critical
(Level 2)
II
Criteria to assign criticality categories to functions
A function that if not or incorrectly performed, or whose
anomalous behaviour can cause one or more hazardous events
resulting in catastrophic consequences
A function that if not or incorrectly performed, or whose
anomalous behaviour can cause one or more hazardous events
resulting in critical consequences
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6.4.2
Failure tolerance requirements
6.4.2.1
Basic requirements
a.
Failure tolerance shall be the basic safety requirement used to control
hazards.
b.
No single system failure or single operator error shall have critical or
catastrophic consequences.
c.
No combination of two independent system failures or operator errors
shall have catastrophic consequences.
d.
Safety inhibits shall be independent, verifiable, stable and stay in a safe
position even in case of energy failure.
e.
Multiple failures, which result from common-cause or common-mode
failure mechanisms, shall be analysed as single failures for determining
failure tolerance.
6.4.2.2
a.
Redundancy separation
The system design shall:
1.
include the capability for on-board redundancy management of
safety-critical functions,
2.
provide failure tolerance and redundancy status information to the
flight and ground crews, including immediate crew notification in
the case of failure detection, redundancy switch-over, or loss of
operational redundancy,
3.
include failure detection, failure isolation and switching of
redundant items.
b.
The capability shall be provided to the flight crew and mission control to
override automatic safing and redundancy switch-over.
c.
Alternate or redundant safety-critical functions shall be physically and
functionally separated or protected in such a way that any event that
causes the loss of one path does not result in the loss of alternative or
redundant paths.
6.4.2.3
a.
Failure propagation
Hardware failures or software errors shall not cause additional failures
with hazardous effects or propagate to cause the hazardous operation of
interfacing hardware.
6.4.3
Design for minimum risk
6.4.3.1
General
a.
Technical requirements for areas of design for minimum risk shall be
identified and approved by the relevant safety approval authorities
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NOTE
6.4.3.2
“Design for minimum risk” is a safety
requirement used to control hazards by
specifying safety-related properties and
characteristics of the design.
Safety factors
a.
Structural safety factors shall be defined and applied in accordance with
ECSS-E-ST-32-10 or higher safety factor where applicable.
b.
Safety margins shall be based on worst credible combinations of
environmental conditions.
6.4.3.3
Fracture control
a.
For manned systems, where structural failure can have catastrophic or
critical consequences, structures, pressure vessels, fasteners and loadbearing paths within mechanisms shall be designed in accordance with
ECSS-E-ST-32-01.
b.
For unmanned systems, only pressure vessels shall be designed in
accordance with ECSS-E-ST-32-01, when required by launch site safety
authority.
6.4.3.4
Materials
a.
Materials shall be selected and controlled in accordance with ECSS-Q-ST-70.
b.
Material selection shall assure that hazards associated with material
characteristics are either eliminated or controlled.
NOTE
c.
If requirement 6.4.3.4b. is not feasible, the system design shall include the
necessary provisions to control hazardous events associated with
material characteristics in accordance with the requirements of this
Standard.
NOTE
6.4.4
a.
Examples of these material properties to be
characterized are: toxicity, flammability,
resistance to stress corrosion, outgassing,
offgassing, resistance to radiation, resistance to
thermal cycling, arc tracking, thermal
degradation, resistance to cleaning fluid and
microbiological growth.
An example of provisions to be included by the
system design is containment of hazardous
substances.
Probabilistic safety targets
When given, the probabilistic safety targets shall be used for
1.
identifying and ranking major risk contributors,
2.
making the acceptable risk decision for each identified hazard,
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3.
supporting the disposition making for those cases where
nonconformance to the qualitative requirements is identified.
NOTE
b.
Probabilistic safety targets shall conform to the requirements given by
launch safety authorities and national and international regulations.
NOTE
6.5
Probabilistic safety targets can be established
by the customer for hazardous consequences at
system level for each project or programme.
Informative Annex E provides criteria for the
establishing of probabilistic safety targets.
Identification and control of safety-critical functions
6.5.1
a.
Identification
A function that, if lost or degraded, or through incorrect or inadvertent
operation, can result in a catastrophic or critical hazardous consequence,
shall be identified as a safety-critical function.
NOTE
b.
Identification shall be done without taking into account hazards controls
to be or already implemented.
6.5.2
a.
As an example, a series of operational events
that can result in a hazard if they occur
inadvertently or are operated out of order.
Inadvertent operation
Inadvertent operation of a safety-critical function shall be prevented by
1.
two independent inhibits, if it induces critical consequences, or
2.
three independent inhibits, if it induces catastrophic consequences.
6.5.3
Status information
a.
The system shall provide failure tolerance and redundancy status
information of safety-critical functions.
b.
The system shall provide the status of at least two inhibits on functions
that, if inadvertently operated, can lead to catastrophic consequences,
including
1.
notification in real time in case of failure detection,
2.
announcement of any loss of operational redundancy,
3.
notification of redundancy switch-over, or
4.
changes of inhibit status.
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6.5.4
a.
The design shall either provide the capability for the safe shutdown of
safety-critical functions prior to in-flight maintenance operations or
conform to the failure tolerance requirements during maintenance
operations.
6.5.5
a.
Safe shutdown and failure tolerance
requirements
Electronic, electrical, electromechanical
components
Electronic, electrical, electromechanical (EEE) components used to
support safety-critical functions in flight standard hardware shall be
selected and procured in accordance with the applicable programme
requirements of ECSS-Q-ST-60.
6.5.6
Software functions
6.5.6.1
Software criticality
a.
Safety aspects associated with the software function shall be an integral
part of the overall system safety efforts and not be assessed in isolation.
b.
A software product shall be considered safety-critical if it implements or
affects one or more functions of which at least one has a criticality I or II,
as defined in clause 6.4.1.
6.5.6.2
a.
Analysis of safety-critical software
During the project life cycle, safety analysis shall be carried out to:
1.
identify safety-critical software and any common resources shared
between safety critical and non safety-critical software,
2.
determine where and under what conditions the system can
trigger hazardous events caused by the software,
3.
define verification methods for hazard controls involving software,
4.
provide verification evidence of hazard control implementation.
6.5.6.3
Assignment of software criticality category
a.
The criticality of a software product (A,B,C) shall be assigned, based on
the criticality assigned to the most critical function it implements, and
meeting the criteria defined in Table 6-3 and requirements 6.5.6.3b to
6.5.6.3g.
b.
The criticality of software products shall be assigned considering the
overall system design, and in particular whether hardware, software or
operational means as compensating provisions exist which can prevent
software-caused system failures or mitigate their consequences.
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NOTE 1
Compensating provision include in particular
inhibits; monitors; back-ups; operational
procedures.
NOTE 2
Compensating provisions can be implemented
with different objectives, e.g. just making the
system safe (fail safe) or keep the system
operational (fail operational).
c.
The effectiveness of the compensating provisions for the purpose of
reducing the software criticality category to a lower category than in
absence of compensating provisions shall be demonstrated in all
conditions excluding failures of the compensating provisions themselves.
d.
In all situations there shall be sufficient time for the compensating
provisions to intervene in order to prevent or mitigate the subject failure.
e.
In case the compensating provisions contain software, this software shall
be classified at the criticality category corresponding to the highest
severity of the failure consequences that they prevent or mitigate.
f.
Probabilistic assessment of software failures shall not be used as a
criterion for software criticality category assignment.
g.
Any common resources shared by software products of different
criticality shall be identified and software criticality allocation
confirmed/changed accordingly.
Table 6-3: Criticality category assignment for software products vs. function
criticality
Function
criticality
I
II
Criticality category to be assigned to a software product
Criticality category A if the software product is the sole means to implement the
function
Criticality category B if, in addition, at least one of the following compensating
provisions is available, meeting the requirements defined in clause 6.5.6.3:
- A hardware implementation
- A software implementation; this software implementation shall be classified as
criticality A
- An operational procedure
Criticality category B if the software product is the sole means to implement the
function
Criticality category C if, in addition, at least one of the following compensating
provisions is available, meeting the requirements defined in clause 6.5.6.3:
- A hardware implementation
- A software implementation; this software implementation shall be classified as
criticality B
- An operational procedure
NOTE: It should be noted that a too high level/incomplete functional decomposition, poorly accounting for
safety and dependability aspects, could lead to a unnecessarily conservative software category
classification.
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6.5.6.4
6.6
Software development
a.
A safety-critical software product shall be designed, implemented,
verified and operated according to the engineering and product
assurance requirements defined in ECSS-E-ST-40 and ECSS-Q-ST-80.
b.
Safety-critical software shall be analysed for the identification and
verification of adequate software controls and inhibits and validated
accordingly.
c.
The level of required software product assurance effort shall be
determined in accordance with the criticality of the software product.
Operational Safety
6.6.1
Basic requirements
a.
Safety involvement in the operational phase shall be planned.
b.
Responsibilities, rules and contingency procedures shall be established
prior to operation for hazardous “limit” conditions that can occur during
ground and in-flight operations.
c.
Operating ranges and performance limits for safe operation shall be
established and specified.
d.
The design shall not require continuous active control by personnel in
order to stay within the established operating ranges and performance
limits.
e.
Man-machine interfaces shall be designed and the personnel tasks shall
be scoped to reduce the potential for hazardous events resulting from
human error to an accepted level.
f.
Limits for crew exposure to natural and system-induced environments
shall be established and maintained by design features or operational
constraints that cover nominal, contingency, and emergency operational
modes, in order to preclude crew injury or inability to perform safetycritical functions.
6.6.2
Flight operations and mission control
6.6.2.1
Launcher operations
a.
Hazards to the humans, public and private property and the
environment, resulting from launcher system operation or malfunction
shall be precluded by compliance with the regulations of the launch
safety authority.
6.6.2.2
a.
Contamination
Normal or abort operations shall not result in contamination of the
Earth’s environment that endangers human health, crops or natural
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resources or that exceed limits set by national or international
regulations.
6.6.2.3
a.
Flight rules
Flight rules shall be prepared for each mission that outline pre-planned
decisions in case of off-nominal situations and consistent with safety
requirements.
6.6.2.4
Hazardous commanding control
a.
Hazardous commanding control shall ensure that all hazardous
commands are identified.
b.
Hazardous commanding control shall ensure that failure modes,
associated with flight and ground operation - including hardware,
software and procedures - used in commanding from control centres or
other ground equipment, are included in the safety assessment.
c.
Hazardous commanding control shall ensure that the system design
provides protection to avoid the erroneous acceptance of commands that
can result in catastrophic or critical consequences.
d.
.Hazardous commanding control shall ensure that commands, which can
result in catastrophic or critical hazardous consequences, are not
performed until they are authorized and verified.
6.6.2.5
Mission operation change control
a.
Mission operation change control shall ensure that all changes, which are
desired or become necessary during mission, are reviewed for safety
impact.
b.
Mission operation change control shall ensure that the responsible safety
approval authority approves all operational change requests with safety
impact.
6.6.2.6
Safety surveillance and anomaly control
a.
Safety status parameters shall be identified.
b.
Safety status parameters shall be monitored.
c.
Deviation from specified limits shall be managed.
6.6.2.7
Hazardous debris, fallout and impact control
a.
In the case of a deviation from the planned launch trajectory during
ascent, launch vehicle stages shall be remotely destroyed or have their
propulsion engines shut off to prevent stages or debris from falling
outside pre-defined safe areas.
b.
The launch vehicle and spent stage trajectories shall be monitored to
determine vehicle, stage or debris impact points.
c.
Residual propellants contained in spent or aborted suborbital stages shall
be safely dispersed.
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6.6.3
Ground operations
6.6.3.1
Applicability
a.
Safety requirements of the clause shall be applied during the following
ground operations:
1.
development, qualification or acceptance testing;
2.
assembly, integration or test operations;
3.
launch site operations;
4.
servicing or turn-around operations; and
5.
transportation or handling operations,
6.6.3.2
a.
The supplier shall establish procedures to perform safety readiness
reviews and inspections prior to the performance of any applicable
operation.
6.6.3.3
a.
Initiation
Review and inspection
To verify conformance to safety requirements, readiness reviews and
inspections shall include safety review and assessment of facilities,
equipment (incl. GSE), test articles, operating, test and contingency
procedures, access controls, and personnel capabilities to comply with
the safety requirements.
6.6.3.4
Hazardous operations
a.
Hazardous operations shall be monitored for conforming to safety
requirements and procedures, and for the possible development of
unforeseen hazardous situations.
b.
Where necessary, contingency and emergency plans or procedures shall
be established and verified prior to the commencement of the operation.
c.
The safety manager or safety relevant authority shall have the authority
to stop any operation that does not conform to safety requirements.
6.6.3.5
Launch and landing site
a.
Launch, landing, turn-around and mission operations shall be subject to
hazard analysis.
b.
For ground operations, the analysis shall address the:
1.
potential hazardous consequences of human error and procedural
deficiencies;
2.
adequacy and maintenance of operational margins;
3.
potential for human exposure to hazards and hazardous effects;
4.
requirements for operator and flight crew training;
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5.
6.6.3.6
adequacy of information and data provided by the flight
hardware, ground support equipment (GSE), or test equipment, as
appropriate, to support the performance of the operations in
accordance with all applicable safety requirements (including all
safety regulations).
Ground support equipment
a.
All Ground support equipment (GSE) shall be subjected to hazard
analysis.
b.
All GSE shall conform to the ‘Essential Health & Safety Requirements’ of
all applicable EU ‘New Approach directives’.
c.
Conformance to 6.6.3.6b. shall be shown by the addition of the ‘CE’ mark
to the product and the issuing of a ‘Declaration of Conformity’.
d.
Conformance to any other product related directives shall be
demonstrated.
NOTE
Further guidance is given in Annex G.
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7
Safety analysis requirements and
techniques
7.1
Overview
Safety risks are the result of the hazardous characteristics associated with the:
7.2
•
design, including the technology selected, the physical arrangement of
elements, subsystems and equipment, and software functions;
•
operating modes;
•
potential for operator error;
•
operating environment;
•
hazardous effects that result from the failure of functions (including
software).
General
a.
Safety analysis shall be performed in a systematic manner as a basis for
all applicable phases and to ensure that hazards are identified, eliminated
or minimized and controlled and safety risks are assessed and reduced.
b.
Safety analyses shall be initiated early in the design process and provide
concurrent support to project engineering in the selection of the least
hazardous design and operational options that are compatible with the
project mission and programme constraints and conform to the
requirements.
c.
The results of safety analyses shall also be used to support project
management in the assessment of the overall risks, verification of risk
reduction, ranking of risk sources, support to project resource allocation,
monitoring of risk trends, and residual risk acceptance.
d.
Analysis shall always be made with reference to a defined configuration
baseline as defined by ECSS-M-ST-40.
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7.3
Assessment and allocation of requirements
7.3.1
a.
The supplier shall respond to and comply with the applicable safety
requirements for the project.
7.3.2
a.
7.4
Justification
The supplier shall justify to the customer the proposed allocation of
safety requirements at the latest at the end of the detailed definition
phase.
7.3.6
a.
Define safety requirements - subsystems
The supplier shall define the safety requirements associated with the
various subsystems and lower levels.
7.3.5
a.
Define safety requirements - functions
The supplier shall define the safety requirements for the various
functions of the system.
7.3.4
a.
Additional safety requirements
The supplier shall identify additional safety requirements, where
applicable, through the use of lessons learned from previous projects and
the safety analyses performed during the project.
7.3.3
a.
Safety requirements
Functional and subsystem specification
The supplier shall ensure that the function and subsystem safety
requirements are included in the relevant functional and subsystem
specification.
Safety analyses during the project life cycle
a.
Safety analysis shall be refined and updated in an iterative manner as the
design process proceeds, to ensure that hazards and hazardous events
are assessed, and that the relevant detailed design and operational
requirements, hazard controls, and verification activities are defined and
implemented.
NOTE
Refer to 5.7 for detailed safety programme tasks
in the different project phases
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7.5
Safety analyses
7.5.1
a.
General
The safety analysis report shall be established in conformance with the
DRD in Annex D in order to gather results of safety analyses, which use
deterministic and probabilistic methods which are described in the
clauses 7.5.2 to 7.5.4.
7.5.2
Hazard analysis
a.
Hazard analysis shall be performed in a systematic manner, beginning in
the concept phase and continuing through the operational phase,
including end-of-life and disposal.
b.
Hazard analysis shall support the hazard reduction process.
c.
Hazard analysis shall identify and evaluate:
d.
e.
1.
hazards associated with system design, its operation (both on
ground and in flight) and the operation environment;
2.
the hazardous effects resulting from the physical and functional
propagation of initiator events;
3.
the hazardous events resulting from the failure of system functions
and functional components;
4.
time critical situations.
The following potential initiator events shall be considered:
1.
hardware failure (random or time dependent);
2.
latent software error;
3.
operator error;
4.
design inadequacies, including:
(a)
inadequate margins;
(b)
unintended operating modes caused by sneak-circuits;
(c)
material inadequacies and incompatibilities;
(d)
hardware-software interactions;
5.
natural and induced environmental effects;
6.
procedural deficiencies.
Hazard analysis includes a systematic analysis of the “system”
operations and operating procedures that shall be performed in the
detailed design and operational stages of a project.
NOTE
This analysis evaluates the capability of the
system to be operated safely, to determine the
safest operating modes, and to evaluate the
acceptability of the operating procedures.
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f.
The systematic analysis of system operation and operating procedures
shall be repeated as the design and operational detail evolves, including
the system’s operational modes and man-machine interfaces.
7.5.3
a.
Safety risk assessment
Safety risk assessment shall
1.
comprise the identification, classification and ranking of safety
risks and their contributors,
2.
be based on deterministic hazard analysis by combining the
consequence severity and the likelihood of occurrence of the
consequence,
3.
be used to facilitate effective and efficient safety risk reduction and
control,
4.
support project risk management as defined in ECSS-M-ST-80,
5.
assess compliance with probabilistic safety targets.
NOTE 1
The estimation of event likelihoods is based on
the use of different sources of data i.e.:
• previous experience on the particular
system (i.e. measured or observed directly
relevant test or experience data),
• data from other systems or projects (i.e.
extrapolation from generic data, similarity
data, or physical models), and
• expert judgment (i.e. direct estimation of
likelihoods by domain specialists).
NOTE 2
b.
The determination of likelihood is not a mean
to downgrade the criticality of function.
Safety risk assessment shall be started early in the design process and
performed in progressive steps during the implementation of the safety
programme.
7.5.4
Supporting assessment and analysis
7.5.4.1
General
a.
b.
Following supporting assessment and analysis methods shall be used as
necessary (tailored by project) to support hazards analysis and safety risk
assessment.
NOTE 1
Example of tailoring by project is when the
supporting assessment and analysis methods
are not applicable in e.g. unmanned missions.
NOTE 2
Assessments and analyses from ECSS-Q-ST-30
can be used to support safety assessment.
Supporting analyses shall be agreed with all relevant parties.
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7.5.4.2
Warning time analysis
a.
Warning time analysis shall be performed during the concept definition
phase and the design and development phase in order to evaluate timecritical situations identified in the hazard analysis and to support the
implementation of hazardous-situation detection and warning devices or
contingency procedures.
b.
The analysis shall determine the
c.
1.
time interval during which the event is detected and the response
action taken;
2.
detection capability of the proposed design with respect to
detection sensitivity and detection time;
3.
resultant time available for response;
4.
adequacy of the proposed design or contingency procedures,
including emergency evacuation, rescue, system reconfiguration,
redundancy switching, and maintenance.
The detection times shall be determined from the
1.
occurrence of the initiating event to the time when a hazardous
consequence occurs (propagation time);
2.
occurrence of the initiating event to the time of earliest detection or
annunciation; and
3.
time taken for corrective action to be implemented.
7.5.4.3
a.
b.
Caution and warning analysis
Caution and warning analysis shall be performed during the concept
definition phase and the design and development phase of human space
flight programmes in order to identify
1.
emergency, warning, and caution parameters;
2.
the required safing functions and capabilities;
3.
limit sensing requirements;
4.
the applicability of the individual “caution and warning” functions
to the different mission phases.
The caution and warning analysis shall utilize the results of the warning
time and hazards analyses as appropriate.
7.5.4.4
Common-cause and common-mode failure analysis
7.5.4.4.1
Multiple failures
a.
Multiple failures, which result from common-cause or common-mode
failure mechanisms, shall be analysed as single failures for determining
failure tolerance.
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7.5.4.4.2
a.
The supplier shall identify the requirement for and the scope of
dedicated common-cause and common-mode analyses by means of the
review of the results of the other safety analyses, such as FTA and hazard
analysis, and of the characteristic of the system and of its environment.
7.5.4.4.3
a.
Identification of requirements and scope
Identification of common-cause failures
The supplier shall identify potential common-cause failures by
assessment of the effects of common-causes.
NOTE
b.
For example: radiation, thermal environment
and fires.
The common-cause failure analysis shall be performed in coordination
with the FTA and the hazard analysis.
NOTE
7.5.4.4.4
The analysis of common-cause failures can
require that use be made of the result of
dedicated engineering analyses, e.g. thermal
analyses, meteorite or debris impact analysis.
Analysis of common-mode failures
a.
Common-mode failures shall be analysed by means of the use of checklists (to be established by the supplier) that list potential common-modes
for system components during the manufacturing, integration, test,
operation and maintenance phases.
b.
The common-mode
FMEA/FMECA.
7.5.4.4.5
a.
analysis
shall
be
coordinated
with
the
Integration of results
Results of common-cause and common-mode analysis shall be integrated
with the results of the system level safety analyses (fault tree analysis,
hazard analysis).
7.5.4.5
Fault tree analysis
a.
The fault tree analysis shall be used to establish the systematic link
between the system-level hazard and the contributing hazardous events
and subsystem, equipment or piece part failure.
b.
A fault tree analysis, or its equivalent, shall be performed to verify the
failure tolerance requirements.
NOTE
7.5.4.6
a.
Refer to ECSS-Q-ST-40-12 “Fault tree analysis Adoption notice ECSS/IEC 61025” for further
instructions on fault tree analyses.
Human error analysis
Whenever safety analyses identify operator errors as a cause of
catastrophic or critical hazards, a dedicated analysis shall be carried out.
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b.
The human error analysis shall be used to support the safety analysis for
the identification of human operator error types and their effects and for
the definition of adequate countermeasures to prevent or control human
operator errors.
c.
The human error analysis shall be developed from the early phases of the
project onwards in order to define recommendations for the hardware
and software design, procedure development and training preparation
programme.
NOTE
7.5.4.7
a.
ECSS-Q-HB-30-03 is a guideline for Human
Dependability Analysis.
Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis
The results of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) or failure
modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) shall be used to support
the hazard analysis in the evaluation of the effects of failures.
FMEA/FMECA and hazard analysis are complementary analyses.
NOTE
7.5.4.8
Refer
to
ECSS-Q-ST-30-02
instructions on FMEA/FMECA.
for
further
Zonal analysis
a.
Zonal analysis shall be performed where redundancy is used to reduce
the probability of losing a function or of inadvertently actuating a safetycritical function.
b.
The objectives of the zonal analysis shall ensure that equipment
installation meets the adequate safety requirements regarding:
1.
basic installation rules and space practices;
2.
interaction between subsystems;
3.
implication of operator errors;
4.
effects of external events.
NOTE
Zonal analysis is the systematic inspection of
the topology of a system, the evaluation of
potential component-to-component interactions
with and without failure, and the assessment of
the severity of potential hazards inherent in the
system installation.
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8
Safety verification
8.1
8.2
General
a.
A system shall be in place that tracks all hazards and related risks, to
relate all verifications of the corresponding hazard uniquely to
unambiguous causes and controls.
b.
For common techniques for verification of design features used to control
hazards, the requirements of ECSS-E-ST-10 shall apply.
c.
To successfully complete the safety process, positive feedback shall be
provided on completion results for all verification items associated with a
given hazard.
Hazard reporting and review
8.2.1
Hazard reporting system
a.
The supplier shall establish a hazard reporting system for tracking the
status of all identified hazards.
b.
The system shall be applied for all hazards with potentially catastrophic
or critical consequences.
c.
The supplier shall report, and provide evidence, that
d.
1.
controls are defined and agreed;
2.
verification methods are defined and agreed;
3.
verification is completed.
If verification cannot be completed, the supplier shall establish a Safety
Verification Tracking Log (SVTL) (refer to clause 8.5.1a.).
8.2.2
a.
Status of hazard control and risk reduction activities shall be reviewed at
safety progress meetings and project safety reviews for compliance with
decisions taken and achievement of intended results.
8.2.3
a.
Safety status review
Documentation
All hazard documentation shall be formally issued for each safety review
and major project review, as specified in clause 5.11).
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8.3
Safety verification methods
8.3.1
a.
b.
Verification engineering and planning
Verification engineering shall select the verification methods consistent:
1.
with the verification requirements documented in the hazard
report,
2.
with the launch base safety rules.
Verification planning shall commence in an integrated manner upon
selection of the control method.
8.3.2
Methods and reports
a.
Safety verification methods shall include alternatively or in combination
review of design, analysis, inspection and test.
b.
For all safety verifications traceability shall be provided.
8.3.3
Analysis
a.
All relevant technical safety and engineering analyses performed or
updated with analysis in respect to the as-built configuration shall be
used for verification.
b.
When similarity analysis is provided, for tracking purposes it shall
contain a copy of (or a unique reference to) the referenced previous
verification, verification procedure and requirement valid at the time of
the first verification.
8.3.4
Inspections
8.3.4.1
General
a.
Inspections which are considered as necessary in order to meet safety
requirements of the system shall be identified and included in user
manuals and procedures.
8.3.4.2
a.
Preflight inspections
All preflight safety inspections shall be assessed for inclusion in the MIP
list.
NOTE
b.
If preflight safety inspections are included on
the MIP list, closeout is feasible by MIP
reporting
or
individual
reporting
as
appropriate.
Launch preparation inspections shall be entered into the launch base
procedure.
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c.
The closeout shall be given by the approved launch authority procedure.
d.
Late access procedures shall be the subject of training and be performed
by qualified personnel.
e.
Training for flight crew and mission operation teams shall be performed,
including specific safety briefing, training and mission simulation.
f.
Close-out shall be by safety-approved procedure, documented training
session and simulations.
8.3.4.3
a.
Inflight inspections shall be entered into flight procedures and operation
manuals.
8.3.5
8.4
Inflight inspections
Verification and approval
a.
The supplier shall select, and propose to the safety approval authority,
the safety verification methods to be used in conformance to the
applicable safety requirements.
b.
The results of safety verification shall be submitted for approval to the
relevant safety approval authority.
Verification of safety-critical functions
8.4.1
Validation
a.
Safety-critical functions shall be verified by testing which include
application of the operating procedures, the “man-in-the-loop”, and the
verification of the effectiveness of applicable failure tolerance
requirements.
b.
The tests shall include the demonstration of nominal, contingency and
emergency operational modes.
8.4.2
Qualification
a.
The safety-critical characteristics of all safety-critical functions shall be
qualified by test.
b.
Safety-critical function qualification testing shall include the
determination of performance margins considering worst case
combinations of induced and natural environments and operating
conditions.
c.
Qualification “by similarity” shall not be applied except after customer
approval on a case-by-case basis.
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8.4.3
a.
Induced failure tests shall be performed when required by safety analysis
for evaluating failure effects, and for demonstrating failure tolerance
conformance in safety-critical functions.
8.4.4
a.
Verification of design or operational
characteristics
Verification of unique safety required design or operational
characteristics shall form part of the development, qualification or
acceptance testing programmes as appropriate.
8.4.5
8.5
Failure tests
Safety verification testing
a.
Where full-scale testing is not performed, equivalent safety verification
method based on technically representative hardware or models shall be
justified, approved and performed.
b.
For the verification of hazard controls in catastrophic hazards where nonflight equipment replaces part of the flight equipment to test a flight
function the verification shall be performed independently by a third
party which was not involved in the design and qualification of the flight
model (FM).
Hazard close-out
8.5.1
Safety assurance verification
a.
A safety verification tracking log (SVTL) shall be established, in
conformance with the DRD in Annex C, to collect all the open verification
items of the different hazard reports from the safety analysis.
b.
In time for acceptance by the customer, and in preparation of transfer to
the next stage of system integration, the safety manager shall verify that:
c.
1.
hazard close-outs performed so far by the responsible engineer are
still valid;
2.
the verifications reflect the as-built or as-modified status of the
hardware;
3.
all open verifications at this time are acceptable for transfer to the
next stage of system integration;
4.
all open verifications are entered into the verification tracking log
(SVTL);
5.
the verification tracking log is maintained to reflect the current
status.
If the safety verification constrains any ground operations, the safety
manager shall give notification to the safety review panel.
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8.5.2
a.
8.6
Hazard close-out verification
The safety manager shall assure that each hazard considered for closure
has the approval by the safety approval authority, verifying that
1.
hazards not eliminated are controlled in accordance with the
applicable requirements and associated verification activities are
successfully completed, or, when applicable,
2.
deviations from, or waivers of requirements, are granted by the
safety approval authority.
Declaration of conformity of ground equipment
a.
All ground equipment that falls into the scope of an applicable ‘New
Approach directive’ shall be ‘CE’ marked and supplied with a supporting
‘Declaration of Conformity’ and User Manual detailing all safety
warnings.
NOTE
Additional information
Informative Annex G.
is
provided
in
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Annex A (informative)
Analyses applicability matrix
Scope of the Table A-1 is to present relation of documents associated to safety
activities to support project review objectives as specified in ECSS-M-ST-10.
NOTE
This table constitutes a first indication for the
data package content at various reviews. The
full content of such data package is established
as part of the business agreement, which also
defines the delivery of the document between
reviews.
The table lists the documents necessary for the project reviews (identified by “X”).
The various crosses in a row indicate the increased levels of maturity
progressively expected versus reviews. The last cross in a row indicates that at
that review the document is expected to be completed and finalized.
NOTE
All documents, even when not marked as
deliverables in Table A-1, are expected to be
available and maintained under configuration
management as per ECSS-M-ST-40 (e.g. to
allow for backtracking in case of changes).
Documents listed in Table A-1 are either ECSS-Q-ST-40 DRDs, or DRDs to other
ECSS-Q-40-XX standards.
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Table A-1: Safety deliverable documents
Document or DRD title
Safety programme plan
PRR
SRR
PDR
CDR
QR
AR
ORR
FRR
LRR
CRR
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Safety verification tracking log
Safety analysis report
(including hazard reports)
Fault tree analysis
X
X
ELR
MCR
Document or
DRD reference
ECSS-Q-ST-40 Annex B
ECSS-Q-ST-40 Annex C
X
X
X
X
X
ECSS-Q-ST-40 Annex D
ECSS-Q-ST-40-12
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Annex B (normative)
Safety programme plan - DRD
B.1
DRD identification
B.1.1 Requirement identification and source document
This DRD is called from ECSS-Q-ST-40, requirement 5.2a.
B.1.2 Purpose and objective
The plan defines:
B.2
•
the safety programme tasks to be implemented;
•
the personnel or supplier responsible for the execution of the tasks;
•
the schedule of safety programme tasks related to project milestones;
•
safety programme activity interface with project engineering and with
other product assurance activities;
•
how the supplier accomplishes the tasks and verifies satisfactory
completion (by reference to internal procedures as appropriate).
Expected response
B.2.1 Contents
<1>
a.
Description
The safety programme plan shall include a description of the project
safety organization, responsibilities, and its working relationship and
interfaces with product assurance disciplines (reliability, maintainability,
software product assurance, parts, materials and processes and quality
assurance according to ECSS-Q-ST-10, -20, -30, -60, -70 and -80), with
configuration management according to ECSS-M-ST-40, system
engineering according to ECSS-E-ST-10, design and other project
functions and departments of organizations.
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b.
<2>
a.
<3>
a.
<4>
a.
The safety programme plan shall describe how the provisions of ECSS-QST-40 are implemented:
1.
Safety programme and organization;
2.
Safety engineering;
3.
Safety analysis requirements and techniques;
4.
Safety verification;
5.
Operational safety.
Safety and project engineering activities
The plan shall show how the project safety organization implements
concurrent safety and project engineering activities in continuous
support of the project design and development process.
Supplier and lower tier supplier premises
The plan shall describe how safety-related activities and requirements are
defined for and controlled at suppliers’ and lower tier suppliers’
premises.
Conformance
The plan shall make provisions for assuring conformance to safety
requirements and regulations that are applicable to any other facilities
and service that are utilized during the course of the project.
B.2.2 Special remarks
a.
The safety programme plan may be incorporated within the Product
Assurance Plan when agreed between the relevant parties.
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Annex C (normative)
Safety verification tracking log (SVTL) DRD
C.1
DRD identification
C.1.1 Requirement identification and source document
This DRD is called from ECSS-Q-ST-40, requirements 8.5.1a and 5.11.2b.5.
C.1.2 Purpose and objective
As part of the Safety Data Package (SDP), a SVTL log collects all the open safety
verification items from the different safety analysis/hazard reports of the SDP at
the end of the production and qualification phase of the project. It provides
information of the verification effort and gives reference to the close out
documents (e.g. test reports, analyses, and procedures). Depending on the
number and severity of the open verification items it can be the basis for the
decision to put the next processing steps (like acceptance or integration into the
next higher level) into hold.
The SVTL is based on:
•
inputs from the different safety verification tasks i.e. hardware and
software changes, tests, review of design activities, analyses, inspections
and development of procedures which are performed as agreed per
“hazard reports” of the Flight-SDP (FSDP) and the Ground-SDP (GSDP) or a combination thereof,
•
other information like constraints and schedule.
NOTE
C.2
An example of a format that can be used for the
SVTL is presented in Figure C-1.
Expected response
C.2.1 Contents
<1>
a.
General information
The SVTL shall identify the following general information:
1.
name of the project for which it has been established;
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<2>
2.
project documentation identification number;
3.
applicability for flight or ground safety verifications;
4.
indication of the specific page number followed by the total
number of pages;
5.
name of the equipment, payload or experiment for which the SVTL
has been established;
6.
mission or flight to which the equipment, payload or experiment
has been manifested;
7.
dates of issue and update.
Log number
a.
For each verification item to be tracked a unique identifier shall be used.
b.
The SVTL shall use the designations assigned by the safety manager.
<3>
a.
<4>
a.
<5>
Hazard report number
The identification number of the hazard report containing the verification
item shall be indicated.
Safety verification number
The verification method or the verification means shall be transferred
from the hazard report including the procedures by number and title.
Ground operations constrained
a.
The input of “yes” or “no” shall indicate whether this safety verification
constrains any ground operations.
b.
If “yes” for flight tracking log: an attachment shall be provided that
identifies which ground operation is constrained.
c.
If “yes” for ground tracking log: the ground operation constrained by
this verification shall be indicated specifically in the user manual and
included as a step in a procedure.
<6>
a.
<7>
a.
Independent verification required, "yes" or "no"
The input of "yes" or "no" shall indicate whether the verification has to be
performed independently (in accordance with 8.4.5b).
Scheduled completion date
The planned date for the completion of the verification shall be indicated.
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<8>
Method of closure/comments
a.
The SVTL log shall indicate the title and serial number of the tests,
review of designs, inspections and analyses by which this verification is
formally closed.
b.
Any appropriate information or remarks may be added.
C.2.2 Special remarks
The SVTL is part of the SDP at the end of the qualification phase.
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Safety verification tracking log
Flight 
Ground 
page ___ of ___
Project ID:
Equipment, payload, mission
Log
no.
Hazard
report
number
Safety
verification
number
Issue date
Safety verification
method
(Identify procedures
by number and title)
Ground
operations
constrained
Independent
verification
required
Scheduled
completion
date
Completion
date
updated
Method of closure/comments
(Provide reference ID)
Figure C-1: Safety verification tracking log (SVTL)
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Annex D (normative)
Safety analysis report including hazard
reports - DRD
D.1
DRD identification
D.1.1 Requirement identification and source document
This DRD is called from ECSS-Q-ST-40, requirements 7.5.1a and 5.11.2b.1.
D.1.2 Purpose and objective
The safety analysis report documents the results of safety analysis. The safety
analysis report contains a set of hazard reports, which documents the results of
the systematic identification, evaluation, reduction, verification and tracking of
hazards.
D.2
Expected response
D.2.1 Contents
<1>
Safety analysis report preliminary elements
a.
Title - The title of the safety analysis report shall identify the applicable
project.
b.
Title page - A title page shall be provided.
c.
Contents - A contents list shall be provided.
d.
Foreword - A foreword shall be provided.
e.
Introduction - An introduction shall be provided.
<2>
a.
Safety analysis report content
The safety analysis report shall identify the following general
information:
1.
the project documentation identification number, the title of the
safety analysis report, date of release and release authority;
2.
the project phase;
3.
identification of which organizational entity prepared the
document;
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b.
c.
4.
information regarding the approval of the document;
5.
a statement of effectivity identifying which other documents have
been cancelled and replaced in whole or in part.
The safety analysis report shall contain the following analysis specific
information:
1.
objective of safety analysis;
2.
applicable requirements relevant to the safety analysis;
3.
description of system design & operation from a safety point of
view;
4.
description of safety analysis process and methods;
5.
detailed results of safety analysis documented in form of a set of
hazard reports (see D.2.1<2>c.);
6.
list of safety critical functions;
7.
safety critical item list;
8.
safety input to risk management;
9.
support analyses used (e.g. FTA, FMEA/FMECA);
10.
overall conclusions from safety assessment.
Each hazard report shall contain as a minimum the following data:
1.
title;
2.
types of hazards and description of their manifestation in the
system design and operational configuration and environment;
3.
identified hazard scenario with description of causes (associated
with the hazard manifestation), hazardous events (physical and
functional propagation) and consequences;
4.
consequence severity category;
5.
propagation time from cause to consequence;
6.
likelihood of hazard scenario and magnitude of safety risk
(optional);
7.
applicable safety requirements;
8.
hazard reduction measures (implementation of safety
requirements, hazard elimination or minimization and control);
9.
verification measures;
10.
safety risk trend after hazard reduction (optional);
11.
status (safety verification
conformances and waivers);
12.
approval;
13.
acceptance of safety risk (optional).
NOTE
actions
open
or
closed,
non-
Example of formats that can be used for
“Hazard and safety risk register”, and “Ranked
hazard and safety risk log” are given in the
annexes of ECSS-Q-ST-40-02.
D.2.2 Special remarks
The safety analysis reports form part of the safety data package.
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Annex E (informative)
Criteria for probabilistic safety targets
E.1
E.2
Objectives of probabilistic safety targets
a.
Probabilistic safety targets can be established by the customer for
hazardous consequences at system level for each project or programme.
b.
When given, these probabilistic targets should be used for:
1.
identifying and ranking major risk contributors,
2.
making the acceptable risk decision for each identified hazard,
3.
supporting the disposition making for those cases where
nonconformance to the qualitative requirements is identified.
Criteria for probabilistic safety targets
a.
Probabilistic safety targets should conform to the requirements given by
launch safety authorities and national and international regulations.
b.
With respect to safety targets for the ground and flight personnel, the
individual risk should not exceed that accepted for other professionally
and comparably exposed personnel.
NOTE
c.
With respect to safety targets for the civil population, the total risk for the
exposed ground population should not exceed that caused by other
hazardous human activities.
NOTE
d.
E.g. risk for crew members should not exceed
that for test pilots, risk for ground personnel
should not exceed that for similarly exposed
industrial workers.
E.g. risk from overflight of commercial aircraft
or chemical plants.
The detailed project requirements on the acceptable level of risk should
be defined in the project risk management policy according to ECSS-MST-80 and considered in the tailoring of the project specific safety
requirements.
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Annex F (informative)
Applicability guidelines
This matrix determines the applicability of ECSS-Q-ST-40 to the different space
systems, i.e.:
•
Satellite: Un-manned payload on an expendable launch vehicle,
•
Un-manned safety-critical system: Un-manned space system (comprising
the flight segment and the ground segment) including or providing
functions which are safety critical,
•
Manned space system: Manned space system (comprising the flight
segment and the ground segment),
•
Launch vehicle: Vehicle designed to carry payloads into space.
Tailoring of the requirements identified as applicable (or partially applicable) is
necessary for taking into account the specific requirements for, or the peculiar
characteristics of, the system.
Un-manned space
system
Clause
5
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.4.1
5.4.2
5.4.2.1
5.4.2.2
5.4.3
5.4.4
5.4.5
5.4.6
5.4.7
Headline
Safety programme
Scope
Safety programme plan
Conformance
Safety organization
Safety manager
Safety manager access and
authority
Access
Authority
Safety audits
Approval of documentation
Approval of hazardous
operations
Representation on boards
Safety approval authority
Launch vehicle
Manned
space
system
for unmanned
spacecraft
for
manned
spacecraft
Satellite
Safety
critical
systems
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
P/A 1
Y
Y
Remarks
1)
according to safety
launcher authority
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Un-manned space
system
Clause
5.5
Headline
Safety risk assessment and
control
Satellite
Safety
critical
systems
P/A 3
Y2
Launch vehicle
Manned
space
system
Y2
for unmanned
spacecraft
for
manned
spacecraft
P/A 2
Y2
Remarks
Use of probabilistic
safety risk assessment
subject to specific
project requirements
2)
Use of probabilistic
safety risk assessment
if required by international rules (e.g.,
nuclear material
onboard)
3)
5.6
5.7
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
P/A4
Y
Y
P/A4
P/A4
4)As
P/A4
Y
Y
P/A4
P/A4
4)As
P/A4
Y
Y
P/A4
P/A4
4)As
P/A4
Y
Y
P/A4
P/A4
P/A4
Y
Y
P/A4
P/A4
4)As
5.7.1.5
Preliminary definition Phase B
Detailed definition,
production and qualification
testing - Phase C/D
Utilization - Phase E
P/A4
Y
Y
P/A4
P/A4
4)As
5.7.1.6
Disposal - Phase F
P/A4
Y
Y
P/A4
P/A4
5.7.2
5.7.3
Progress meeting
Safety reviews
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
5.8
Safety compliance
demonstration
Safety training
General
Product specific training
General awareness briefing
Basic technical training
Training records
Accident-incident reporting
and investigation
Safety documentation
General
Safety data package
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
P/A5
Y
Y
5)
Y
Y
Y
P/A6
Y
6)
5.7.1
5.7.1.1
5.7.1.2
5.7.1.3
5.7.1.4
5.9
5.9.1
5.9.2
5.9.3
5.9.4
5.9.5
5.10
5.11
5.11.1
5.11.2
5.11.3
5.11.3.1
Safety critical items
Project phases and safety
review cycle
Safety program tasks and
reviews
Mission analysis / Needs
identification - Phase 0
Feasibility - Phase A
Safety deviations and
waivers
Request for deviation or
waiver
appropriate for
the project
appropriate for
the project
appropriate for
the project
4)As appropriate for
the project
appropriate for
the project
appropriate for
the project
4)As appropriate for
the project
As appropriate for the
project
According to the
launch base safety
rules, if any
Following the
process defined by the
Safety launch base
rules, if any, and
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Un-manned space
system
Clause
Headline
Satellite
Safety
critical
systems
Launch vehicle
Manned
space
system
for unmanned
spacecraft
for
manned
spacecraft
Remarks
specific protocol
applicable. Only
waivers for launchers
5.11.3.2
5.11.3.3
5.11.3.4
5.11.4
5.11.5
6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.3.1
6.3.2
6.3.3
6.3.3.1
6.3.3.2
6.3.3.3
6.3.3.4
6.3.4
6.3.5
6.3.6
6.3.7
6.3.8
6.3.9
6.3.10
6.3.11
6.4
6.4.1
6.4.2
6.4.2.1
6.4.2.2
6.4.2.3
6.4.3
6.4.3.1
6.4.3.2
6.4.3.3
6.4.3.4
6.4.4
Assessment of deviation or
waiver
Acceptance by the safety
approval authority
Review and disposition
Safety lessons learned
Documentation of safety
critical items
Safety engineering
Overview
Safety requirements
identification and traceability
Safety design objectives
Safety policy and principles
Design selection
Hazard reduction precedence
General
Hazard elimination
Hazard minimization
Hazard control
Environmental compatibility
External services
Hazard detection - signalling
and safing
Space debris mitigation
Atmospheric re-entry
Safety of Earth return
missions
Safety of human spaceflight
missions
Access
Safety risks reduction and
control
Severity of hazardous event
and function criticality
Failure tolerance
requirements
Basic requirements
Redundancy separation
Failure propagation
Design for minimum risk
General
Safety factors
Fracture control
Materials
Probabilistic safety targets
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Non-normative
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
P/A 7
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
N/A
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
P/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
P/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
P/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
P/A
7)
as appropriate for
the project
Applicability of
probabilistic safety
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Un-manned space
system
Clause
Headline
Satellite
Safety
critical
systems
Launch vehicle
Manned
space
system
for unmanned
spacecraft
for
manned
spacecraft
Remarks
targets to be defined
by the project
6.5
6.5.1
6.5.2
6.5.3
6.5.4
6.5.5
6.5.6
6.5.6.1
6.5.6.2
6.5.6.3
6.5.6.4
6.6
6.6.1
6.6.2
6.6.2.1
6.6.2.2
6.6.2.3
6.6.2.4
6.6.2.5
6.6.2.6
6.6.2.7
6.6.3
6.6.3.1
6.6.3.2
6.6.3.3
6.6.3.4
6.6.3.5
6.6.3.6
7
7.1
7.2
7.3
Identification and control of
safety-critical functions
Identification
Inadvertent operation
Status information
Safe shutdown and failure
tolerance requirements
Electronic, electrical,
electromechanical
components
Software functions
Software criticality
Analysis of safety-critical
software
Assignment of software
criticality category
Software development
Operational safety
Basic requirements
Flight operations and mission
control
Launcher operations
Contamination
Flight rules
Hazardous commanding
control
Mission operation change
control
Safety surveillance and
anomaly control
Hazardous debris, fallout
and impact control
Ground operations
Applicability
Initiation
Review and inspection
Hazardous operations
Launch and landing site
Ground support equipment
Safety analysis requirements
and techniques
Overview
General
Assessment and allocation of
requirements
Y
Y
P/A8
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
P/A8
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
P/A
Y
N/A
Y
N/A
Y
N/A
P/A 9
N/A
Y
N/A
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
P/A 9
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
N/A
Y
N/A
Y
Y
N/A
Y
N/A
N/A
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Non-normative
Y
Y
Y
8)Only
bullet b4. is
applicable to
unmanned system
9)
Applicable to
unmanned system
before lift-off
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ECSS-Q-ST-40C Rev.1
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Un-manned space
system
Clause
7.3.1
7.3.2
7.3.3
7.3.4
7.3.5
7.3.6
7.4
7.5
7.5.1
7.5.2
7.5.3
7.5.4
7.5.4.1
7.5.4.2
7.5.4.3
7.5.4.4
7.5.4.5
7.5.4.6
7.5.4.7
7.5.4.8
8
8.1
8.2
8.2.1
8.2.2
8.2.3
8.3
8.3.1
Headline
Launch vehicle
Manned
space
system
for unmanned
spacecraft
for
manned
spacecraft
Satellite
Safety
critical
systems
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Remarks
Safety requirements
Additional safety
requirements
Define safety requirements functions
Define safety requirements subsystems
Justification
Functional and subsystem
specification
Safety analyses during the
project life cycle
Safety analyses
General
Hazard analysis
Safety risk assessment
P/A
Y
Y 10
P/A
Y6
10)
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y 11
Y
Y
Y 11
Y
Y
N/A
Y
Y
Y 11
11)
Supporting assessment and
analysis
General
N/A
P/A
P/A
N/A
P/A
N/A
N/A
P/A
P/A
P/A
P/A
N/A
N/A
P/A
P/A
N/A
P/A
P/A
N/A
P/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
P/A
P/A
P/A
P/A
P/A
P/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
P/A
P/A
P/A
N/A
P/A
P/A
N/A
P/A
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Warning time analysis
Caution and warning
analysis
Common-cause and
common-mode analysis
Fault tree analysis
Human error analysis
Failure modes, effects and
criticality analysis
Zonal analysis
8.3.2
8.3.3
8.3.4.3
8.3.4.1
8.3.4.2
Safety Verification
General
Hazard reporting and review
Hazard reporting system
Safety status review
Documentation
Safety verification methods
Verification engineering and
planning
Methods and reports
Analysis
Inspections
General
Preflight inspections
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
P/A12
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
P/A12
Y
Y
8.3.4.3
Inflight inspections
N/A
N/A
Y
N/A
N/A
As appropriate for
the project
Use of probabilistic
safety risk assessment
subject to specific
project requirements
As appropriate for the
project
12)Only
bullet c.
applicable to
unmanned system
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ECSS-Q-ST-40C Rev.1
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Un-manned space
system
Clause
8.3.5
8.4
8.4.1
8.4.2
8.4.3
8.4.4
8.4.5
8.5
8.5.1
8.5.2
8.6
Legend:
Headline
Verification and approval
Verification of safety-critical
functions
Validation
Qualification
Failure tests
Verification of design or
operational characteristics
Safety verification testing
Hazard close-out
Safety assurance verification
Hazard close-out verification
Declaration of conformity of
ground equipment
Launch vehicle
Manned
space
system
for unmanned
spacecraft
for
manned
spacecraft
Satellite
Safety
critical
systems
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y … YES (= applicable)
Remarks
Only ground
equipment
P/A … Partially applicable N/A … Not applicable
NOTE: GSE is part of the system considered here
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Annex G (informative)
European legislation and ‘CE’ marking
G.1
Overview
‘CE’ Marking is a requirement that is applicable to virtually all products which
are designed and intended for use on the Ground. This includes all Ground
products and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and in particular all EGSE and
most MGSE.
NOTE
G.2
The ‘CE’ marking in itself does not ensure that
a system is entirely safe and should be used in
the context of ‘additional safety analysis’ as
well as showing compliance to the minimum
legal requirements.
CE mark
The ‘CE’ is a mark by the producer/supplier to show he has satisfied all
applicable Directives for the safety of his product and is intended to allow the
‘Free movement of Goods’ within the European Community. This requires
compliance with European directives - generally through assessments to EN
standards.
It is an offence to:
a.
put a ‘CE’ mark on a product, without the supporting ‘Technical File’;
b.
not to CE mark a product, if there is an applicable directive(s);
c.
take a non-compliant product ‘into service’ anywhere within the
European Community.
CE Marking is applicable to all Ground products including GSE regardless of
whether it is being passed to a third party, a customer or designed and built for
internal Company use.
G.3
Responsibility of the design authority
It is the responsibility of the ‘Design Authority’ to identify all directives which
apply to the product design and to ensure assessment and compliance of the
product(s) to the most recent edition of all applicable directives, legislation and
relevant EN standards.
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The ‘Design Authority’ is required to:
G.4
a.
Identify all applicable directives;
b.
Demonstrate technical compliance;
c.
Hold a ‘Technical File’ for 10 years;
d.
Issue a ‘Declaration of Conformity’, a User Manual with safety warnings
and put the ‘CE’ mark on the product.
Declaration of conformity
The ‘Declaration of Conformity’ is a Legal statement by the Design Authority
that the ‘Essential Health & Safety Requirements’ of all applicable directives for
the product(s) have been satisfied and is issued only when documents showing
compliancy are in place and before dispatch of the product or ‘putting into
service’.
G.5
References
The references below are provided to assist with CE assessment. The list is not
exhaustive and is provided as general guidance for the directives which
typically apply to the majority of space related ground products. In the majority
of cases, ‘CE’ compliance can be declared by the ‘Self Declaration’ route, thus
avoiding the need to involve any third party Certification Bodies.
a.
All Electrical Ground Support Equipment (EGSE) and electrical systems
or equipment used in Ground stations conform to the Low Voltage
directive (LVD), (2006/95/EC) and the EMC directive (2004/108/EC). This
is usually demonstrated by evaluation and testing to the most
appropriate EN standards, typically EN 61010 (LVD) and EN 61326
(EMC).
b.
Most Mechanical Ground Support Equipment (MGSE) falls within the
scope of the Machinery directive (2006/42/EC), i.e. equipment with
hazards due to moving parts, mobility and/or lifting or a lifting
accessory. These are evaluated with respect to ‘The Essential Health &
Safety Requirements’, given in Annex 1 of Appendix 1 of the directive.
c.
GSE having pressure circuits and all Pressure Ground Equipment and
Ground Support Equipment (PGSE) needs to be evaluated for
applicability against the Pressure Equipment directive (PED) (97/23/EC)
for Ground systems working at a pressure in excess of 0,5 bar.
d.
Terminal Equipment needs to be evaluated for applicability of the Radio
& Telecommunications Terminal Equipment (R&TTE) directive
(1999/5/EC) for terminal equipment, often found in Ground Stations.
e.
Apparatus to be used in explosive atmosphere conform to directive
94/9/CE.
f.
Other European directives that need to be evaluated for applicability
include:
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ECSS-Q-ST-40C Rev.1
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g.
1.
Restriction of certain Hazardous Substances (RoHS) directive
(2002/95/EC), which applies to some ground equipment and has an
indirect impact on Flight Products, due to non-availability of some
banned substances.
2.
Waste Electrical & Electronic Equipment (WEEE) directive
(2002/96/EC) applies to electrical products such as modems and
EGSE.
All published EU legislation and directives should be evaluated and
applied if applicable to the product.
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ECSS-Q-ST-40C Rev.1
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Bibliography
ECSS-S-ST-00
ECSS system – Description and implementation
and general requirements
ECSS-Q-HB-30-03
Space product assurance – Human dependability
handbook
ECSS-Q-ST-30-02
Space product assurance — Failure modes, effects,
and criticality analysis (FMECA)
ECSS-Q-ST-40-02
Space product assurance – Hazard analysis
ECSS-Q-ST-40-12
Space product assurance — Fault tree analysis,
Adoption notice ECSS/IEC 61025
IEC 50:1992
Electricity, electronics and telecommunications
multilingual dictionary
ISO 14620-1:2002
Space systems — Safety requirements —
Part 1: System safety
79
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