Certification Report: AKiS Pasaport v1.4N CERTIFICATION REPORT

Certification Report: AKiS Pasaport v1.4N CERTIFICATION REPORT
COMMON CRITERIA RECOGNITION ARRANGEMENT
FOR COMPONENTS UP TO EAL4
Certification Report
EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2)
Evaluation of
TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE
SMART CARD OPERATING SYSTEM (AKiS) V 1.4N PASSPORT
AKILLI KART İŞLETİM SİSTEMİ (AKiS) V1.4N PASAPORT
issued by
Turkish Standards Institution
Common Criteria Certification Scheme
Date
: 13 July 2011
Pages
: 34
Certification Report
Number
:14.10.01/11-211
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TABLE OF CONTENTS:
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 5
2. GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................................... 6
3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY............................................................................................................ 7
4. IDENTIFICATION ..................................................................................................................... 17
5. SECURITY POLICY .................................................................................................................. 20
6. ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION ..................................................................................... 21
7. ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE .......................................................... 23
8. DOCUMENTATION ................................................................................................................... 25
9. IT PRODUCT TESTING ............................................................................................................ 26
10. EVALUATED CONFIGURATION ......................................................................................... 28
11. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION ....................................................................................... 30
12. EVALUATOR COMMENTS/ RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................... 32
13. CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY COMMENTS/ RECOMMENDATIONS ..................... 32
14. SECURITY TARGET ............................................................................................................... 32
15. BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................... 33
16. APPENDICES ............................................................................................................................ 34
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – Glossary ............................................................................................................................... 6
Table 2 – TOE Security Functions ..................................................................................................... 12
Table 3 – Threats................................................................................................................................ 15
Table 4 – Organizational Security Policies ........................................................................................ 20
Table 5 – Usage Assumptions ............................................................................................................ 23
Table 6 – Environmental Assumptions .............................................................................................. 24
Table 7 – Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ................................................................. 30
FIGURES
Figure 1 – Phases…………………………………………………………………………………....19
Figure 2 – AKiS v1.4N Operating System components and environment………………………….22
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CERTIFICATION REPORT
The Certification Report is drawn up to submit the Certification Committee the results and
evaluation information upon the completion of a Common Criteria evaluation service performed
under the Common Criteria Certification Scheme.
Certification Report covers all non-confidential security and technical information related with a
Common Criteria evaluation which is made under the PCC Common Criteria Certification Scheme.
This report is issued publicly to and made available to all relevant parties for reference and use.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Common Criteria Certification Scheme (CCCS) provides an evaluation and certification
service to ensure the reliability of Information Security (IS) products. Evaluation and tests are
conducted by a public or commercial Common Criteria Evaluation Facility (CCTL) under CCCS‟
supervision.
CCEF is a facility, licensed as a result of inspections carried out by CCCS for performing tests and
evaluations which will be the basis for Common Criteria certification. As a prerequisite for such
certification, the CCEF has to fulfill the requirements of the standard ISO/IEC 17025 and should be
accredited with respect to that standard by the Turkish Accreditation Agency (TÜRKAK), the
national accreditation body in Turkey. The evaluation and tests related with the concerned product
have been performed by TÜBİTAK-BİLGEM-UEKAE-OKTEM, which is a public CCTL.
A Common Criteria Certificate given to a product means that such product meets the security
requirements defined in its security target document that has been approved by the CCCS. The
Security Target document is where requirements defining the scope of evaluation and test activities
are set forth. Along with this certification report, the user of the IT product should also review the
security target document in order to understand any assumptions made in the course of evaluations,
the environment where the IT product will run, security requirements of the IT product and the level
of assurance provided by the product.
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This certification report is associated with the Common Criteria Certificate issued by the CCCS
for AKILLI KART İŞLETİM SİSTEMİ (AKiS) V1.4N PASAPORT - SMART CARD
OPERATING SYSTEM (AKiS) V1.4N PASSPORT whose evaluation was completed on
13.06.2011 and whose evaluation technical report was drawn up by OKTEM (as CCTL), and with
the Security Target document with version no 06 of the relevant product.
2. GLOSSARY
CCCS:
CCTL:
CCMB:
CEM:
AKiS:
ETR:
Common Criteria Certification Scheme
Common Criteria Test Laboratory
Common Criteria Management Board
Common Evaluation Methodology
Smart Card Operating System (Akıllı Kart İşletim Sistemi)
Evaluation Technical Report
IT:
OKTEM:
PCC:
ST:
TOE:
TSF:
TSFI:
SFR:
TÜBİTAK:
Information Technology
Common Criteria Test Center (as CCTL)
Product Certification Center
Security Target
Target of Evaluation
TOE Security Function
TSF Interface
Security Functional Requirement
Turkish Scientific and Technological Research Council
TÜRKAK:
BİLGEM:
Turkish Accreditation Agency
Center of Research For Advanced Technologies of Informatics and Information
Security
National Electronics and Cryptology Research Institute
Evaluation Assurance Level
Protection Profile
UEKAE:
EAL:
PP:
Table 1 - Glossary
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3. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Evaluated IT product name:
Smart Card Operating System (AKiS) v 1.4N Passport
Akıllı Kart İşletim Sistemi (AKiS) v1.4N Pasaport
IT Product version:
V 1.4N
Developer`s Name:
TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE AKIS Project Group
Name of CCTL :
TÜBİTAK BİLGEM UEKAE OKTEM Common Criteria Test Laboratory
Completion date of evaluation :
13.06.2011
Common Criteria Standard version :

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009

Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, Version 3.1, Revision 3, July 2009
Common Criteria Evaluation Method version :

Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation v3.1 rev3, July
2009
Other Mandatory Document version:

Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices v1.0 rev 1 Sep 2007
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Short summary of the Report:
1) Assurance Package :
EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2)
2) Functionality :
AKiS-Pasaport v1.4N is a smart card application which is designed to be used as Machine
Readable Travel Document (MRTD). The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated
circuit chip of machine readable travel document (AKiS-Pasaport) programmed according to the
Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to „ICAO Doc
9303‟.
The TOE is a composite product comprising an integrated circuit (IC) AKiS Pasaport v1.4N
application with a card operating system.
The TOE composes AKiS Pasaport v1.4N by combining NXP P5CD081. The integrated circuit
of the MRTD‟s chip is NXP P5CD081. NXP-P5CD081 has CC EAL 5+ (AVA_VAN.5) certificate.
AKiS-Pasaport v1.4N Operating System is loaded into the ROM of the NXP chip (P5CD081)
during the manufacturing of the IC.
The evaluation has been performed according to the composition scheme as defined in the guide
15.7 in order to assess that no weakness comes from the integration of the software in the integrated
circuit already certified.
Regarding Composite evaluation, smartcard specific prescription for evaluation and evaluation
approach for assurance components which are not prescribed in CEM, they are based on the
supporting documents.(15.7)
The TOE comprises

the circuitry of the MRTD‟s chip (the integrated circuit, IC): NXP P5CD081

the IC Embedded Software (AKiS-Pasaport v1.4N OS),

the MRTD application and

the MRTD User Manual.
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TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS
1. 3DES key generation according to Document Basic Access Control
Key Derivation Algorithm with key sizes of 112 bit.
2.
Hashing according to SHA-1 and SHA-256 that meets FIPS 180-2. For
Basic Access Control SHA-1 is used. For active authentication
manufacturer decides which algorithms will be used : SHA-1 or SHA256.
3. Secure messaging: encryption and decryption with 3DES algorithm in
CBC mode with key sizes of 112 bits. 8 bytes zero IV, padding mode 2
is used.
4. Secure messaging: message authentication with Retail MAC with key
sizes 112 bits according to ISO 9797. MAC Algorithm 3 is used with
block cipher 3DES.
Cryptographic
Operations
5. Active authentication signature generation according to ISO/IEC 97962 scheme 1 with RSA algorithm RFC 3447 RSASSA-PSS key sizes
1024 to 1848 bits.
6. After each active authentication, active authentication keys are
destroyed by writing 0.
7. After each BAC session both the 3DES encryption key and message
authentication key are destroyed by writing 0.
8. After each initialization authentication and personalization
authentication, initialization key and personalization key are destroyed
by writing 0.
9. Random number generation according to ANSI X9.17, AIS20 Class K4
for key generation, authentication operations.
1. Storage of IC Identification data by the Manufacturer (with PUT DATA
command)
2. The following data can be read before identification and authentication
a. Initialization data in Manufacturing phase
b. ATS (Answer to Select) in all phases
3. TSF mediated actions require successful
authentication, because BAC is activated.
Identification
and
Authentication
identification
and
4. Authentication data (random numbers) are prevented to be reused.
5. User authentication is provided through:
a. BAC authentication mechanism in Operation Phase through BAC
Authentication mechanism with Document Basic Access keys.
b. Symmetric
authentication
9
mechanism
based
on
3DES
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Manufacturing Phase with initialization key.
c. Symmetric authentication mechanism based
Personalization Phase with personalization key.
on
3DES
in
6. Active authentication of the TOE is provided through Active
authentication mechanism with active authentication keys.
1. Allowing only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent to
read and write data groups DG1 to DG16 of the LDS.
2. Allowing the terminals to read data groups DG1 to DG 16 of the LDS
after successful BAC authentication.
User Data
Protection
3. Not allowing anybody to modify any data groups DG1 to DG 16 of the
LDS in Operation phase.
4. Not allowing anybody to write/modify/erase any data (keys, LDS data)
in Operation phase.
5. Transmitted and received user data is protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors through secure messaging.
6. Determination on receipt of user data if modification, deletion, insertion
and replay have occurred through secure messaging.
Not allowing anybody to read DG3 and DG4.
1. Initialization, personalization and configuration of the TOE are only
allowed for the manufacturer and the personalization agent.
2. Initialization data and pre-personalization data can only be written by
the manufacturer.
3. Ability to enable attack counter and set its maximum value
restricted to the manufacturer and the personalization agent.
is
4. When attack counter exceeds the threshold, the TOE enters the Death
phase and can no longer be used.
5. Ability to set maximum value of the BAC error counter and wait time
for the BAC error is restricted to the manufacturer.
Security
Management
6. When BAC error counter exceeds the threshold, the TOE waits for a
pre-configured wait time without any action.
7. Ability to set the hash algorithm for the active authentication, SHA-1
or SHA-256, is restricted to the manufacturer and the personalization
agent.
8. Maintenance of the security roles: Manufacturer, personalization
agent, Basic Inspection System.
9. Personalization Agent is allowed to write the Document Basic Access
Keys.
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10. Manufacturer and Personalization Agent are allowed to write the
Active Authentication keys.
11. After unsuccessfull authentication in INITIALIZATION START,
INITIALIZATION END, and CHANGE KEY commands in
Manufacturing phase, the initialization key error counter is
incremented. When the counter reaches the threshold, the TOE enters
the Death phase and can no longer be used.
12. After unsuccessfull authentication in PERSONALIZATION START,
PERSONALIZATION END, CHANGE KEY commands in
Personalization phase, the personalization key error counter is
incremented. When the counter reaches the threshold, the TOE enters
the Death phase and can no longer be used.
13. After unsuccessfull authentication in ERASE FILES command in
Manufacturing and Personalization phase, the initialization key error
counter is incremented. When the counter reaches the threshold, the
TOE enters the Death phase and can no longer be used.
14. After unsuccessfull authentication in EXCHANGE CHALLENGE
command in Manufacturing phase, the EXCHANGE CHALLENGE
error counter is incremented. When the counter reaches the threshold,
the TOE enters the Death phase and can no longer be used which may
enable other attacks.
15. Nobody is allowed to read Document Basic Access keys and Active
Authentication keys.
16. Test features of the TOE are not available in Operation phase. If test
features are performed by the TOE, no user data, TSF data can be
disclosed or manipulated, no software can be reconstructed and no
substantial information about TSF can be gathered.
17. Ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data to the
Personalization Agent.
1. Hiding information about IC power consumption and command
execution time.
2. Detection of the physical tampering of the TSF with sensors for
operating voltage, clock frequency, temperature and electromagnetic
radiation. If the TOE detects with the mentioned sensors, that it is not
supplied within the specified limits, a security reset is initiated and the
TOE is not operable until the supply is back in the specified limits.
The hardware protects itself against analyzing and physical tampering.
Protection
3. Clock randomization
4. Not allowing any unauthorized users to use the following interface
smart card circuit contacts to gain access to initialization and
personalization authentication key and logical MRTD data.
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5. Preserve a secure state when a failure is detected by TSF according to
FPT_TST.1.
6. Runs random number generator tests during initial start-up, when any
command received, and at any cryptographic operation. Runs voltage
level control test during initial start-up.
7. Provide authorized manufacturer and personalization agent with the
capability to verify the integrity of ROM.
8. Verifies the integrity of the keys, header data of DFs, header and body
data of EFs. If the integrity check of keys, header data of EFs and DFs
fails, an error is returned to the user. If the integrity check of EF data
fails, a warning returns to the user. If an integrity check of interior file
system tables fails, the card enters the death phase and can no longer
be used.
Table 2 – TOE Security Functions
3) Summary of Threats and Organizational Security Policies (OSPs) addressed by the
evaluated IT product:
The TOE counter such threats presented in the table below and provides functions for
countermeasure to them.
T.Chip_ID
T.Skimming
Identification of MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by
identifying remotely the MRTD‟s chip by establishing or listening to
communications through the contactless communication interface.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the
optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: Anonymity of user,
Skimming the logical MRTD
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to
establish a communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the
optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
T.Eavesdropping Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication
between the MRTD‟s chip and an inspection system to gain the logical
MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on
the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know these data in advance.
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Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the
optically readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
T.Forgery
T.Abuse-Func
T.Information_
Leakage
Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical
MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to
deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder‟s
identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack
scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data
on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and
in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker
may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the
visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric
authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the
biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication
mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data
groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the
attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger
data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD‟s chip
leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this
MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical
MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession
of one or more
legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not
be used in the phase
“Operational Use” in order
(i) to manipulate User Data,
(ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security
features or functions of the TOE or
(iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and
the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession
of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF.
Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from
the TOE during its
usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage
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may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption,
I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time
requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel
transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating
parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the
contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the
chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to
the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis
(DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information
leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession
of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD‟s
chip in order
(i) to disclose TSF Data or
(ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD‟s chip Embedded Software.
T.Phys-Tamper
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD‟s chip in order to
(i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD‟s chip,
(ii) modify security functions of the MRTD‟s chip Embedded Software,
(iii) modify User Data or
(iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or
manipulation of TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the
inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD‟s
chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods
by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
through
power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the
MRTD‟s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure
analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the
hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be
identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and
TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the
deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be
permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession
of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF
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T.Malfunction
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Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the
MRTD‟s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to
(i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or
(ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD‟s
chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD‟s chip outside the
normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD‟s chip
Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit these
vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession
of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data,
correctness of TSF
Table 3 - Threats
4) Special Configuration Requirements:
The usage and security features are as defined in the MRTD with ICAO Application, Basic
Access Control protection profile:
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The
traveler presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in
context of this ST contains:
 visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder,
 a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods
in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and
 data elements on the MRTD‟s chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading.
The authentication of the traveler is based on
(i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given
on the biographical data page and
(ii) optional biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD‟s. The
receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
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5) Disclaimers:
This certification report and the IT product defined in the associated Common Criteria
document has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed evaluation facility conformance to
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, version 3.1 , revision 3, using Common
Methodology for IT Products Evaluation, version 3.1, revision 3. This certification report and the
associated Common Criteria document apply only to the identified version and release of the
product in its evaluated configuration. Evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the
provisions of the CCCS, and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation report
are consistent with the evidence adduced. This report and its associated Common Criteria
document are not an endorsement of the product by the Turkish Standardization Institution, or
any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report and its associated Common
Criteria document, and no warranty is given for the product by the Turkish Standardization
Institution, or any other organization that recognizes or gives effect to this report and its
associated Common Criteria document.
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4. IDENTIFICATION
AKiS-Pasaport v1.4N is a smart card which is designed to be used as Machine Readable Travel
Document (MRTD). The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of
machine readable travel document (AKiS-Pasaport) programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to „ICAO Doc 9303‟.
AKiS v1.4N Operating System Phases
AKiS v1.4N Operating System also consists of some phases which will be called as “AKiS
v1.4N Operating System Life cycle phases” (Figure 1) in order to obstruct a confusion. There are 5
different life cycle phases available on TOE. Relations and crossing between these life cycle phases
are shown in the Figure 1. Also there are some several keys available on TOE in order to be used
within the execution of the secure commands. Command interpreter of TOE is designed to execute
some special commands for the different life cycle phases.
These phases are;
Activation:
Main purposes of the activation phase is; to check if TOE is correct (not corrupted) and load the
initial values of the keys that will be used on the execution of the secure commands (initialization
and personalization key). MF (Master File) is created in this phase.
Initialization:
Main purpose of the initialization phase is to load the initialization data into the card. Therefore
the file system will begin to construct on the EEPROM on each command.
Personalization:
Main purpose of the personalization phase is to load the personalization data into the card.
Henceforth the card will include unique data belonging to the end user.
Operation:
In the operation phase, TOE is available for the end user.
Death:
When the security conditions listed below are not satisfied or it is noticed that security is trying
to be surpassed, TOE enters the death phase:
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 When 64 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to loading of the system keys
with Exchange Challenge command.
 When 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to changing of the
initialization key with Change Key command, erasing of EEPROM with Erase Files
command, Initialization Start and Initialization End commands.
 When 10 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to changing of the
personalization key with Change Key command, Personalization Start and Personalization
End commands.
 When 16 to 128 (configurable) unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to BAC
authentication protocol.
 When an integrity check of interior filesystem tables fails.
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CARD TEST
EXCHANGE CHALLENGE
Activation Phase
EXCHANGE CHALLENGE
ERASE FILES
Initialization Phase
CHANGE KEY
INITIALIZE
ERASE FILES
GET DATA
CREATE FILE
SELECT FILE
UPDATE BINARY
PUT DATA
DELETE_FILE
READ_BINARY
ERASE_BINARY
WRITE_DELETE_KEY
READ KEY
GET_RESPONSE
INITIALIZE
Death Phase
ERASE FILES
Personalization
Phase
GET_DATA
CHANGE KEY
PERSONALIZE
ERASE FILES
GET DATA
CREATE FILE
SELECT FILE
UPDATE BINARY
PUT DATA
DELETE_FILE
READ_BINARY
ERASE_BINARY
WRITE_DELETE_KEY
READ KEY
GET_RESPONSE
PERSONALIZE
GET DATA
File system commands:
SELECT FILE
READ BINARY
Operation Phase
Security Commands
GET CHALLANGE
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE
Figure 1 - Phases
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5. SECURITY POLICY
Organizational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations (see CC part 1,
sec. 3.2).
P.Manufact
P.Personalization
P.Personal
Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC
uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data
which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the
biographical data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the
biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with respect to
the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is
performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on
the MRTD‟s chip
(EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the
biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference
data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4) and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to
EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD‟s chip are personal data of the
MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with
agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD
is presented. The MRTD‟s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic
Access Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals
successfully authenticated based on knowledge of the Document Basic
Access Keys.
Table 4 – Organizational Security Policies
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6. ARCHITECTURAL INFORMATION
AKiS v1.4N algorithms and crypto specifications are;
Basic Access Control;
ISO/IEC11770-2 Key Establishment Mechanism 6
3DES CBC as block cipher
Cryptographic checksum ISO/IEC9797-1 MAC Algorithm 3
Active Authentication;
ISO/IEC9796-2 Digital Signature Scheme 1
MRTD Chip
The integrated circuit of the MRTD‟s chip is NXP P5CD081. NXP-P5CD081 has CC EAL
5+(AVA_VAN.5) certificate. AKiS-Pasaport v1.4N Operating System is loaded into the ROM of
the NXP chip (P5CD081) during the manufacturing of the IC.
Operating system components are shown in Figure2;

Memory Manager

File Manager

Command Interpreter

Communication Handler
Message is received by UART which is managed by communication handler in TOE. The message
comes in TPDU format which is mentioned above. Incoming TPDU packet is analysed and block
type decision is made by the communication handler. TPDU may include 3 different types of
blocks, named R, S and I block. R and S blocks are used to control the transmission protocol (ISO
7816-3). I block carries the command which is transmitted to the command interpreter and executed
in TOE. When command execution is finished, communication handler sends the answer to the
reader via UART. If the command is related with the file system, command interpreter calls the file
manager. File manager is responsible for the operations in the file field which is in the EEPROM.
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Memory manager is used to open new file, close file, delete page and attach new page.
MED
Memory Management
EEPROM
MMU
RAM
File Management
ACE
Command Interpreter
Random Number
Generator
Communication Handler
UART
CARD READER
Timer
Interrupt Module
OS
ROM
Figure 2 - AKiS v1.4N Operating System components and environment
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7. ASSUMPTIONS AND CLARIFICATION OF SCOPE
TOE consists of the components which are defined in section 6 (Architectural information).
Except these, Other components are not in the scope of Common Criteria Evaluation.
7.1 Usage Assumptions
MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is
used. It is assumed that security procedures are used during all
A.MRTD_Manufact manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and
integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to
prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or
unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
A.Pers_Agent
MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and
storage process and conformance to its objectives:
- Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information
under delivery and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of
improper operation in the delivery process and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for
delivery have got the required skill.
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of
(i)
the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder,
(ii)
the Document Basic Access Keys,
(iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on
the MRTD‟s chip, and
(iv)
the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on
the MRTD‟s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the
Document Security Object.
The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent
Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric
cryptographic mechanisms.
Table 5 – Usage Assumptions
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7.2 Environmental Assumptions
Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the
receiving State
(i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying
its authenticity and
(ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
A.Insp_Sys
A.BAC-Keys
The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability
(i)
includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document
Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and
(ii)
implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control.
The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic
Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD.
Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and
imported by the issuing State or Organization have to provide
sufficient cryptographic strength. As a consequence of the „ICAO
Doc 9303‟ , the Document Basic Access Control Keys are derived
from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to
be ensured that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any
attack based on the decision that the inspection system has to derive
Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ data with enhanced
basic attack potential.
Table 6 – Environmental Assumptions
7.3 Clarification of Scope
Under normal conditions; there are no threats which TOE must counter but did not; however
Operational Environment and Organizational Policies have countered. Information about threats
that are countered by TOE and Operational Environmental are stated in the Security Target
document.
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8. DOCUMENTATION
AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Security Target
Ver. Number and Date: 06 – 18.04.2011
AKiS v1.4N Pasaport User Guidance
Ver. Number and Date: 01 – 30.12.2011
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9. IT PRODUCT TESTING
During the evaluation, all evaluation evidences of TOE were delivered and transferred completely
to CCTL by the developers. All the delivered evaluation evidences which include software,
documents, etc are mapped to the assurance families of Common Criteria and Common
Methodology; so the connections between the assurance families and the evaluation evidences has
been established. The evaluation results are available in the Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) of
AKiS Pasaport v1.4N.
It is concluded that the TOE supports EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2) . There are 29 assurance families
which are all evaluated with the methods detailed in the ETR.
IT Product Testing is mainly realized in two parts:
1) Developer Testing :

TOE Test Coverage: Developer has prepared TOE System Test Document according to
the TOE Functional Specification documentation.

TOE Test Depth: Developer has prepared TOE System Test Document according to the
TOE Design documentation which include TSF subsystems and its interactions.

TOE Functional Testing: Developer has made functional tests according to the test
documentation. Test plans, test scenarios, expected test results and actual test results are in
the test documentation.
2) Evaluator Testing :

Independent Testing: Evaluator has done a total of 37 sample independent tests. 19 of
them are selected from developer`s test plans. The other 18 tests are evaluator`s
independent tests. All of them are related to TOE security functions.

Penetration Testing: Evaluator has done 17 penetration tests to find out if TOE`s
vulnerabilities can be used for malicious purposes. The potential vulnerabilities and the
penetration tests are in “TOE Security Functions Penetration Tests Scope” which is in
Annex-C of the ETR and the penetration tests and their results are available in detail in the
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ETR document as well.
The result of AVA_VAN.3 evaluation is given below:

It is determined that TOE, in its operational environment, is resistant to an attacker
possessing “Enhanced-Basic” attack potential.
For the product AKiS Pasaport v1.4N, there is no residual vulnerability (vulnerabilities can be
used as evil actions by the hostile entities who have MEDIUM or HIGH level attack potential),
that they do not affect the evaluation result, found by CCTL(OKTEM) laboratory under the
conditions defined by the evaluation evidences and developer claims.
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10. EVALUATED CONFIGURATION
During the evaluation; the configuration of evaluation evidences which are composed of Software
source code, Common Criteria documents, sustenance document and guides are shown below:
Evaluation Evidence: TOE – AKiS Pasaport Application and NXP P5CD081 Contactless IC
(AKiS Pasaport Uygulaması ve NXP P5CD081 Temazsız Yonga)
Version Number: 1.4N
Production Date : 05.11.2010
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Source Code (Kaynak Kodu)
Version Number and Date: 1.0 – 30.12.2010
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Design Specification Document (Tasarım Belirtim
Dökümanı)
Version Number and Date: 03 –30.05.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Functional Specification Document (Fonksiyonel
Belirtim Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 01 - 22.12.2010
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Security Architecture Document (Güvenlik Mimarisi
Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 01 – 27.12.2010
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Delivery and Usage Document (Teslim ve İşletim
Dokümanı )
Version Number and Date: 01 – 05.12.2010
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Configuration Management Plan (Konfigürasyon
Yönetim Planı)
Version Number and Date: 02 – 01.06.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Development Environment Security and Development
Tools (Geliştirme Ortam Güvenliği ve Geliştirme Aletleri Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 01 – 05.01.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Life Cycle Document (Kullanım Ömrü Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 01 – 22.12.2010
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Security Target Document (Güvenlik Hedefi)
Version Number and Date: 06 – 18.04.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport System and Test Document (Sistem ve Test
Dokümanı)
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Version Number and Date: 01 – 25.01.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport System Test Pre-usage Document (Sistem Test
Dokumani Isletim Oncesi)
Version Number and Date: 01 – 23.01.2011
Evaluation Evidence: AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Administrator and User Manual Document (Yönetici
ve Kullanıcı Kılavuzu Dokümanı)
Version Number and Date: 02 – 03.06.2011
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11. RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION
Table 7 below provides a complete listing of the Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE.
These requirements consists of the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL 4) components as
specified in Part 3 of the Common Criteria, augmented with ALC_DVS.2.
Component ID
ASE_INT.1
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_COMP.1
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_COMP.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_TDS.3
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMS.4
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DVS.2
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_TAT.1
ALC_COMP.1
ATE_COV.2
ATE_DPT.1
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_IND.2
ATE_COMP.1
AVA_VAN.3
AVA_COMP.1
Component Title
ST Introduction
Conformance Claims
Security Problem Definition
Security Objectives
Extended Components Definition
Security Requirements
TOE Summary Specifiation
Consistency of Security Target
Security Architecture
Composite Design Compliance
Functional Specification
Implementation Representation
TOE Design
Operational User Guidance
Preparative Procedures
Configuration Management Capabilities
Configuration Management Scope
Delivery
Development Security
Life-Cycle Definition
Tools and Techniques
Integration of composition parts and Consistency of delivery procedures
Coverage
Depth
Functional Tests
Independent Testing
Composite Testing
Vulnerability Analysis
Composite Vulnerability Analysis
Table 7 - Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The Evaluation Team assigned a Pass, Fail, or Inconclusive verdict to each work unit of each EAL
4 assurance component. For Fail or Inconclusive work unit verdicts, the Evaluation Team advised
the developer about the issues requiring resolution or clarification within the evaluation evidence.
In this way, the Evaluation Team assigned an overall Pass verdict to the assurance component only
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when all of the work units for that component had been assigned a Pass verdict. So for TOE AKiS
Pasaport v1.4N the result of the assessment of all evaluation tasks are “Pass”.
Results of the evaluation:
AKiS Pasaport v1.4N product was found to fulfill the Common Criteria requirements for each of
29 assurance families and provide the assurance level EAL 4+ (ALC_DVS.2) .This result shows
that TOE is resistant against the “ENHANCED-BASIC‟‟ level attack potential and it countervails
the claims of the functional and assurance requirements which are defined in ST document.
There is no residual vulnerability (vulnerabilities can be used as evil actions by the hostile
entities who have MEDIUM or HIGH level attack potential), that they do not affect the evaluation
result, found by CCTL(OKTEM) laboratory under the conditions defined by the evaluation
evidences and developer claims.
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12. EVALUATOR COMMENTS/ RECOMMENDATIONS
No recommendations or comments have been communicated to CCCS by the evaluators related to
the evaluation process of AKiS Pasaport v1.4N product, result of the evaluation, or the ETR.
13. CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY COMMENTS/ RECOMMENDATIONS
The certifier has no comments or recommendations related to the evaluation process of AKiS
Pasaport v1.4N product, result of the evaluation, or the ETR.
14.SECURITY TARGET
Information about the Security Target document associated with this certification report is as
follows:
Name of Document : AKiS-PASAPORT v1.4N Security Target
Version No.
: 06
Date of Document
: 18.04.2011
This Security Target describes the TOE, intended IT environment, security objectives, security
requirements (for the TOE and IT environment), TOE security functions and all necessary
rationale.
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15. BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 Revision 3,
July 2009
[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CEM, Version 3.1
Revision 3, July 2009
[3] AKiS v1.4N Pasaport Security Target Version: 06 Date: 18.04.2011
[4] Evaluation Technical Report (Document Code: DTR 16 TR 01), June 13, 2011
[5] Evaluation Technical Report (Document Code: DTR 16 TR 02), July 11, 2011
[6] Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices v1.0 rev 1 Sep 2007
(CCDB-2007-09-001)
[7] ETR for composition according to AIS36, as summary of ETR for NXP P5CD081V1A Secure
Smart Card Controller
[8] PCC-03-WI-04 CERTIFICATION REPORT PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS, Version 2.0
[9] CC Supporting Document Guidance, Mandatory Technical Document, Application of Attack
Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.7 Revision 1, March 2009, CCDB-2009-03-001
[10] CC Supporting Document Guidance, Mandatory Technical Document, Application of CC to
Integrated Circuits, Version 3.0 Revision 1, March 2009, CCDB-2009-03-002
[11] P5CD016/021/041/051 and P5Cx081 - Delivery and Optional Manual
[12] P5CD016/021/041/051 and P5Cx081 – Product Data Sheet
[13] Assurance Continuity Maintenance Report (BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009-MA-01)
[14] NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers - P5CD016/021/041/051V1A and P5Cx081V1A Security
Target Lite
[15] P5CD081 Order Entry Forms
[16] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009
[17] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with„ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0026, Version 1.2, 19 November 2007, BSI
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[18] Certification Report for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B
and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software, BSI-DSZ-CC-410-2007, 05 July
2007, BSI
[19] Joint Interpretation Library, Attack Methods for Smartcards and Similar Devices, confidential
Version 1.5, February 2009, BSI
16. APPENDICES
There is no additional information which is inappropriate for reference in other sections.
34
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