Certification Report: 0704a_pdf

Certification Report: 0704a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
for
Sagem Identification EAC ePassport
Version 1.2.1
from
Sagem Identification bv
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
CC-Zert-327 V4.36
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Security IC with MRTD EAC Application
Sagem Identification EAC ePassport
Version 1.2.1
from
Sagem Identification bv
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control,
BSI-PP-0026
Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 09 November 2010
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
7.1 Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN...............................................................15
7.2 Independent Testing according to ATE_IND..........................................................16
7.3 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN..........................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................18
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................19
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................20
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................21
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................21
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................23
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
●
for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom.
●
for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and United Kingdom.
In Addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.2
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Sagem Identification EAC ePassport, Version 1.2.1 has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0643-2010.
Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0643-2010 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Sagem Identification EAC ePassport, Version 1.2.1 was
conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed
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Certification Report
on 05. November 2010. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Sagem Identification bv.
The product was developed by: Sagem Identification bv.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product Sagem Identification EAC ePassport, Version 1.2.1 has been included in the
BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
7
Sagem Identification bv
P.O. Box 5300
2000 GH Haarlem
The Netherlands
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact-less integrated circuit of machine readable
travel documents (MRTD’s chip) supplied with a file system according to the Logical Data
Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to the ICAO document
[16], Active Authentication according to the ICAO document [16], and the Extended Access
Control (Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication) according to the technical report
[17].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Extended
Access Control, BSI-PP-0026 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.I&A
Identification and Authentication
SF.CF
Cryptographic functions support
SF.ILTB
Protection against interference, logical tampering
and bypass
SF.AC
Access control / Storage and protection of logical
MRTD data
SF.SM
Secure Messaging
SF.LCM
Security and life cycle management
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapters 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE (For details refer to chapter
8 of this report):
●
The NXP J3A080 Secure Smartcard Controller Revision 2 (also named JCOP v2.4.1),
comprising of (a) the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the NXP P5CD080V0B integrated
circuit) with hardware for the contact-less interface; (b) the IC Dedicated Software with
the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software; (c) the IC
Embedded Software (operating system) JCOP v2.4.1 Revision 2;
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Certification Report
●
the MRTD application: Sagem Identification EAC ePassport version 06.07.0198 loaded
in EEPROM;
●
the associated guidance documentation.
Only one application will be present on the IC, namely the MRTD Application. The TOE
utilises the evaluation of the underlying platform, which includes the NXP chip, the IC
Dedicated Software, and the JCOP v2.4.1 (Certification BSI-DSZ-CC-0597-2010 [15]).
The hardware platform NXP P5CD080V0B is certified by BSI (BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007,
[13]) and the crypto libraries in the hardware are certified by BSI (BSI-DSZ-CC-0417-2008,
[14]).
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Sagem Identification EAC ePassport version 1.2.1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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No Type
Description, Name
1
The NXP J3A080 Revision 2
chip with the embedded
software JCOP v2.4.1
HW /
SW
Version/Product Form of Delivery
ID (see also
[11],
chapter
2.1)
ROM mask Code
49
Patch level
6
Product Identification /
Applet CI-number and
version of the MRTD EAC
application loaded into the
EEPROM
1.2.1 /
Packed in sealed boxes, on
sealed pallets with security
transportation to the
Personalization Agent
8158-8100-0311
00.06.07.0198
2
KEY
The personalization key set, 8158-8118-605
consisting of three key parts,
8158-8119-605
delivered separated from the
TOE
8158-8120-605
Sent separately by registered
mail to the Personalization Agent
3
DOC
Preparative procedures [11]
Signed and encrypted (PGP) of
the electronic document by
email to the developer of the
personalization system.
2.0.7 /
8158-8103-504
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
No Type
Description, Name
Version/Product Form of Delivery
ID (see also
[11],
chapter
2.1)
4
Operational user guidance
[12]
2.0.3 /
8158-8101-503
DOC
Sent to the end customer
(typically the MRTD issuing
authority) by secured email
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the Protection Profile [7].
The delivery of the initialized and pre-personalized inlays is done in a secure way using
sealed boxes and pallets via a security transport from the MRTD Manufacturer (Sagem
Identification bv) to the Personalization Agent.
The TOE is protected by a personalization key. The Personalization Agent can only access
the MRTD using the securely delivered keys. The personalization keys are generated at
Sagem Identification bv in accordance with the key generation procedure. Each key is
split-up in three parts, which are printed on separate forms. The key forms are sent
separately by registered mail to the Personalization Agent. The Personalization Agent
loads the keys into the HSM of the personalization system, in accordance with the
Preparative Procedures [11]. For the delivery of the personalization key set and the
guidance documents confidentiality and integrity have to be ensured. The Preparative
Procedures [11] describe all procedures which have to be performed during
personalization by the Personalization Agent. The Personalization Agent can verify the
TOE identification using the GET INFO command.
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD EAC PP [7] by the
Security Objectives and Requirements for the contact-less chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy address the advanced security
methods Basic and Extended Access Control as well as Chip Authentication, and Active
Authentication.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
●
Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environment,
●
Control over MRTD Material,
●
Personalization of logical MRTD,
●
Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature,
●
MRTD Authentication Key,
●
Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
●
Examination of the MRTD passport book,
●
Verification by Passive Authentication,
●
Protection of data of the logical MRTD,
●
Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems.
Certification Report
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.2 and 4.3.
5
Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It consists of a secure Integrated Circuit (IC) with
hardware for the contact-less interface, the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC
Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software, the IC Embedded Software
(operating system) JCOP v2.4.1 Revision 2, and the MRTD application which is the
Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet, residing in the EEPROM of the chip.
The applet is implemented in Java Card compatible Java. It consists of several classes /
subsystems but most functionality of the TOE is part of a single class / subsystem, i.e. the
EacApplet class. This EacApplet class is divided into several modules. The modules cover
the implementation and handling of the authentication mechanisms, e.g. Chip
Authentication, Active Authentication or Terminal Authentication, the handling of APDU
commands of the phases before operational use phase, e.g. of Pre-Personalization and
Personalization, phase spanning mechanisms as Secure Messaging as well as overall
attack preventing modules, e.g. a perturbation module.
The EACApplet uses the provided functionality of the JCOP platform as defined by the
JavaCard specification and the JCOP design, i.e. the specified APIs and libraries. Insofar
the JCOP platform acts as a software layer.
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
The evaluated TOE configuration is identical with the delivered product. The TOE consists
of the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport application installed on NXP SmartMX J3A080
Revision 2 secure smartcard platform. For contact-less communication with the TOE over
the ISO14443A interface an Omnikey CardMan 5321 PC/SC RFID reader was used for the
tests. Two different automated test suites were used as test platforms for TOE functional
testing and TOE conformity testing to the official ePassport standards.
7.1
Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
Testing was performed on the final TOE, consisting of the platform and the EAC applet,
accessed through a contact-less card reader. All developer tests address the observable
behaviour of the TOE. Some tests were performed by design and source code analysis,
partially to verify fulfilment of the requirements of the underlying platform to the application.
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The scenarios for performing the functional tests with the test tools were structured
according to the TOE life cycle phases Manufacturing, Pre-Personalization,
Personalization and Operational and including the configurations of Basic Access Control,
Active Authentication, Chip Authentication, and Terminal Authentication, added by other
test cases, like destructive tests, negative tests, and conformity tests. The test scenarios
also include tests for the correct implementation of the e-Passport Chip Application
Protocol, the presence and validity of data in the chip, the correctness of cryptographic
certificates, and the consistency between data on the card and in the chip. The tests
related to Pre-Personalization, Personalization and Operational were subdivided into tests
of the according APDUs, file handling, authentication mechanisms, and access conditions.
Most test cases started at applet instantiation or selection. Therefore the tested
functionality includes successful execution of all necessary and preparative steps for the
TOE configuration. The approach makes the tests repeatable and include aspects of
regression tests.
The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test each TSFI. They
are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional specification.
The test plan includes all details about the set-up procedures, input parameters, the
privileges to run, the test procedures and the test execution and is suitable to test the TSF
mediated by the related interface adequately.
The internal interfaces are represented by and correspond to TSFI. All TSF subsystem and
SFR-enforcing module behaviour is covered. The analysis of the test procedures show
that all interfaces of SFR-enforcing modules are tested. All TSFI are covered and mapped
to the tests. The testing approach allowes to demonstrate that the interactions among
subsystems work as described in the TOE design.
The actual test results correspond to the expected test results. The developer test results
demonstrate that the TSF perform as specified.
7.2
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
The TOE and test configuration and the test tools are identical to the developer tests.
Most tests performed with the test tool start at applet instantiation or selection which
means that most tests include successful execution of all previously necessary and
preparative steps like personalization and configuration of the different authentication
types. Therefore the tests and their results were repeatable, the tests include aspects of
regression, integration testing, negative tests, code inspection, stress tests, APDU
interface based tests, and electrical interface tests.
The tests cover tests of the TSFI related to
●
Manufacturing (applet loading, installing and selection)
●
Identification and Authentication (interfaces of different authentication mechanisms),
●
Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface
execution),
●
Secure Messaging (test of interface commands using secure messaging),
●
Preparative procedures, performed by the evaluator according to the guidance,
The design of test cases and the choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has
been done including the repetition and augmentation of developer tests of interfaces and
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Certification Report
supplementation of the developer testing strategy for interfaces. The susceptibility to
vulnerabilities of interfaces and related functionality was also a criterion.
The rigour of the tested interfaces is sufficient and the evaluator found that all TSFI are
properly implemented.
The test prerequisites, test steps, and results are consistent with the descriptions of the
TSFI in the functional specification. The actual test results correspond to the expected test
results. The independent test results demonstrate that the TSF perform as specified.
7.3
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment attack scenarios for penetration tests were devised. Within these activities all
aspects of the security architecture which were not covered by functional testing were
considered.
The implementation of the requirements of the platform ETR and guidance as well as of
the security mechanisms of the applet in general was verified by the evaluators. Further
aspects were covered by additional tests. The penetration tests were devised with the
main focus on the potential vulnerabilities identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational
environment. An appropriate test set has been devised to cover these potential
vulnerabilities.
Among other tests, LFI and DFA, perturbation attacks, bypass authentication or access
control and exploitation of test features, changing predefined component invocation
sequences, using components in unexpected contexts or for unexpected purposes,
command execution without secure channel or with bad or missing MAC, resources limit
and value range tests, integrity fault and interception event tests, LFI Tests on the ECDSA
signature verification method, and time response tests for traceability attacks were
included in the penetration test effort. Some test results from the baseline evaluation could
be re-used. The evaluation concludes that no additional potential vulnerabilities arise from
loading the applet into EEPROM during pre-personalization. The evaluation also
concludes that the location of the runtime code in EEPROM instead of ROM does not
reduce the effectiveness of the countermeasures which are implemented against attacks.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential High was successful in the
TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target [6] and [8] when all
measures required by the developer are applied.
8
Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration (or components) of the TOE:
The NXP J3A080 Secure Smartcard Controller Revision 2 (also named JCOP v2.4.1),
comprising of (a) the circuitry of the MRTD chip (the NXP P5CD080V0B integrated circuit)
with hardware for the contact-less interface; (b) the IC Dedicated Software with the parts
IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software; (c) the IC Embedded
Software (operating system) JCOP v2.4.1 Revision 2;
The MRTD application: Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet version 06.07.0198
loaded in EEPROM;
The associated guidance documentation.
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Only the MRTD application is present on the IC.
During Personalization phase the TOE can be identified in two steps. The steps are
explained, and the necessary values are given in [11], chapter 2.1:
Step 1: Perform JCOP Product Identification. The JCOP Product Identification is a
mandatory step and shall be performed by issuing the IDENTIFY APDU command. In
order to identify the JCOP product in ROM the IDENTIFY response bytes must be verified
against the specified values in [11], chapter 2.1.
Step 2: Perform Sagem Applet Product Identification. The Sagem Applet Product
Identification is a mandatory step and is required to identify the correct version of the
Sagem EAC Applet instance. The applet instance identification is accomplished by
selecting the EAC ePassport Applet and sending a dedicated GET INFO VERSION APDU
to the applet instance. The GET INFO VERSION APDU is available in both plain and
secure messaging communication mode. The response bytes contain the Sagem unique
configuration item number and version of the EAC ePassport Applet. The values shall be
verified against the values specified in [11], chapter 2.1. The Sagem EAC Applet CInumber of the applet release in .cap file format for EEPROM loading is 8158-8100-0311.
The Sagem EAC Applet version number has the value 00.06.07.0198. For details see [11],
chapter 2.1.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following Scheme documents specific for the technology was used:
●
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
●
Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
●
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number
generators (for JCOP)
●
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number
generators (for the hardware platform)
●
Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices. According to this
concept the relevant documents ETR for Composition from the platform evaluations (i.e.
on hardware, crypto library and JCOP) has been provided to the composite evaluator
and used for the TOE evaluation.
(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31, AIS 34, AIS 35, AIS 36, AIS 38 were used.)
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the EAL 4+ package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
18 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
●
Certification Report
The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5, augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a reevaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0643-2010 [20] re-use of specific
evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was a different
manufacturing process whereby the EACApplet is not included in the ROM-mask but
loaded later onto the TOE-EEPROM by the MRTD manufacturer.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0026 [7]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant,
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant,
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for the TOE Security
Functionality SF.CF and is detailed in the following table.
The table also lists the cryptographic algorithms that are used by the TOE to enforce its
security policy.
Algorithm
Bit
Length
Purpose
Security Standard of
FuncImplementation
tion
Standard of
Application
Triple DES
in CBC
mode
112
key generation / key derivation
SF.CF.6
TR-03110 [17]
ECDH Key
Agreement
Algorithm
with EC over
GF(p) and
3DES
224 /
256 (for
EC)
Triple DES
in CBC
mode
112
SHA-1
-
-
ICAO Doc 9303
[16]
key generation / key derivation
SF.CF.4
ANSI X9.63 / ISO
15946-3
TR-03110 [17]
FIPS 46-3
TR-03110 [17]
TR-03111 [19]
112 (for
3DES)
encryption / decryption
SF.CF.1
ICAO Doc 9303
[16]
document basic access key
Derivation / RSA signature
generation / chip authentication
SF.CF.2
FIPS 180-2
TR-03110 [17]
ICAO Doc 9303
[16]
SHA-224
-
terminal authentication
SF.CF.2
FIPS 180-2
TR-03110 [17]
SHA-256
-
terminal authentication
SF.CF.2
FIPS 180-2
TR-03110 [17]
19 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Algorithm
Bit
Length
Purpose
Security Standard of
FuncImplementation
tion
Standard of
Application
ECDSA
Signature
verification
224 /
256
terminal authentication
SF.CF.3
TR-03110 [17]
Retail MAC
112
secure messaging - MAC used
by SF.SM.1 and SF.SM.2.
SF.CF.1
SF.CF.7
ISO 15946-2
ICAO Doc 9303
[16]
RSA Digital
signature
generation
1280 /
1536 /
1792
active authentication
Random
Number
Generation
according to
class K3, of
AIS 20 with
SOF-High
[4]
-
used for basic access control
authentication (SF.I&A.1),
ISO 9797
-
(MAC algorithm 3,
block cipher DES,
Sequence Message
Counter, padding
mode 2)
ISO 9796-2
TR-03110 [17]
ICAO Doc 9303
[16]
SF.CF.8
AIS 20
-
terminal authentication
(SF.I&A.3),
and personalization agent
authentication (SF.I&A.4)
Table 3: Cryptographic Algorithms used by the TOE
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to Technical Guideline BSI-TR-03110,
[17], the algorithms are suitable for securing originality and confidentiality of the stored
data for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs). All cryptographic algorithms listed
in table 3 are implemented by the TOE because of the standards building the TOE
application (e.g. TR-03110 [17]). A validity period of each algorithm is not mentioned in
BSI-TR-03110 [17]. For that reason an explicit validity period is not given.
10
Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all
aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered
by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he or she should define the period of time until a re-assessment
for the TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
11
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
20 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
12
Certification Report
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit
API
application programming interface
BAC
Basic Access Control
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CI-number Configuration Item number
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DOC
Document
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EC
Elliptic Curve
EEPROM
Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES
Embedded Software
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT
Information Technology
ITSEC
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDS
Logical Data Structure
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
ST
Security Target
21 / 38
Certification Report
TOE
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSF
TOE Security Functions
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
22 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Certification Report
13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8.
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target for the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport 1.2.1, Sagem
Identification bv, version 3.0.0, Date 2010-10-22, (confidential document)
[7]
Protection Profile: Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application",
Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0026 , version 1.2, Date 19.11.2007, BSI
[8]
Security Target Lite for the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport 1.2.1, Sagem
Identification bv, version 1.0.0, Date 2010-11-04
[9]
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), version 2, 05.11.2010, Sagem Identification
EAC ePassport 1.2.1 (confidential document)
[10]
Configuration List, Scope for the Sagem EAC ePassport, version 1.2.1, version
2.0.4, Date 2010-10-22, Sagem Identification bv (confidential document)
[11]
Preparative Procedures for the Sagem EAC, ePassport, version 1.2.1, document
version 2.0.7, Date 2010-10-22, Sagem Identification bv
8
specifically
•
AIS 20, Version 1, 02 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 6, 07 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 7, 03 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 September 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 6, 03 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, 03 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
23 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
[12]
Operational User Guidance for the Sagem EAC ePassport, version 1.2.1, document
version 2.0.3, Date 2010-10-22, Sagem Identification bv
[13]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller
P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated
Software from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH Business Line Identification,
05.07.2007, in conjunction with all Assurance Continuity Maintenance Reports,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik BSI
[14]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0417-2008 for NXP Smart Card Controller
P5CD080V0B with IC dedicated software: Secured Crypto Library Release 2.0 from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, BSI, 13. June 2008, in conjunction with all
Assurance Continuity Maintenance Reports, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik BSI
[15]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0597-2010 for NXP J3A080 and J2A080 Secure
Smart Card Controller Revision 2 (JCOP v2.4.1) from NXP Semiconductors,
29.10.2010, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik BSI (confidential
document)
[16]
ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1, “Machine Readable Passports”, sixth edition, 2006, Part. 2,
"Specifications for Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification
Capability", and Part 3, “Machine Readable Official Travel Documents”, third edition,
2008, ICAO
[17]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents –
Extended Access Control (EAC), TR-03110, version 1.11, Date 21.02.2008, BSI
[18]
ETR for Composition: NXP J3A080 and J2A080 Secure Smart Card Controller
Revision 2, version 8, 27.10.2010, TÜVIT GmbH (confidential document)
[19]
Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography TR-03111, version 1.11, Date
17.04.2009, BSI
[20]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0643-2010 for Sagem Identification EAC
ePassport Version 1.2.0 from Sagem Identification bv, Date 04.11.2010, Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik BSI
24 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim chapter 10.4
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
26 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Assurance Class
Certification Report
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV: Development
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
27 / 38
Certification Report
Assurance Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Assurance Components
level design presentation
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.”
29 / 38
Certification Report
Assurance
Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
D
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0704-2010
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Sagem Identification EAC ePassport, Version 1.2.1 (Target of Evaluation,
TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology
of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 09 November 2010, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
(a)
Sagem Identification, Oudeweg 32, 2031 CC Haarlem, The Netherlands
(development, manufacturing)
(b)
HID Aontec Teoranta, Pairc Tionscail na Tulaigh, Baile na Abhann, Co.,
Galway, Ireland (inlay manufacturing)
(c)
PAV Card, Hamburger Strasse 6, D-22952 Lütjensee, Germany (inlay
manufacturing)
For development and production sites regarding the platforms please refer to the
certification reports BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007, BSI-DSZ-CC-0417-2008, BSI-DSZ-CC-05972010 [13, 14, 15].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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