Certification Report: 0354a

Certification Report: 0354a
Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
for
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 and
SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14
with specific IC Dedicated Software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 and
SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14
with specific IC Dedicated Software
from
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
Infineon Technologies AG
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance:
Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality:
BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL5 augmented by:
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 28. April 2006
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
Certification Report
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
•
BSIG 2
•
BSI Certification Ordinance 3
•
BSI Schedule of Costs 4
•
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
•
DIN EN 45011 standard
•
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
•
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1 5
•
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
• Part 1, Version 0.6
• Part 2, Version 1.0
•
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
•
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
A-1
Certification Report
2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2
CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components ACM_SCP.3, ADV_FSP.3,
ADV_HLD.3, ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.1, ADV_RCR.2, ADV_SPM.3, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions
of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance
families are relevant.
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
3
Certification Report
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL80P/m1457a14 and SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14 with specific IC Dedicated Software has
undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0338-2005. Therefore, specific results from this evaluation
process were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 and SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14 with specific IC
Dedicated Software was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH,
Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle ITSicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 6 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is:
Infineon Technologies AG
Security & Chipcard ICs
AIM CC M PS
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg, Germany
The certification is concluded with
•
the comparability check and
•
the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 28. April 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
•
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
•
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report
4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-28 and D1 to D-4.
The product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL80P/m1457a14 and SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14 with specific IC Dedicated Software has
been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published
regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be
obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor 7 of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the abovementioned website.
7
A-4
Infineon Technologies AG
Security & Chipcard ICs
AIM CC M PS
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg, Germany
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
B
Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
•
the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
•
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
•
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
Contents of the certification results
1
Executive Summary
2
Identification of the TOE
11
3
Security Policy
13
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
14
5
Architectural Information
14
6
Documentation
15
7
IT Product Testing
15
8
Evaluated Configuration
17
9
Results of the Evaluation
17
10 Comments/Recommendations
20
11 Annexes
24
12 Security Target
24
13 Definitions
24
14 Bibliography
26
B-2
3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
1
Certification Report
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the products Infineon Smart Card IC
(Security Controller) SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 and SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14
with specific IC Dedicated Software. These products provide a hardware
platform for a smart card to run smart card applications executed by a smart
card operating system.
For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process based on BSIDSZ-CC-0338-2005 were re-used. The changes of the TOE are different
memory sizes, the component Advanced Crypto Engine (ACE) for long integer
modulo calculations is blocked and thus the RSA2048 library is omitted and
several modifications on module and implementation level. Beside the omission
of the RSA functionality, the security policy is unchanged. The Security Target
[6] was updated.
The TOE is manufactured in Infineons IC fabrication in Dresden, Germany,
indicated by the production line indicator “2” (see part D, Annex A of this report).
The Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 and
SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14 with specific IC Dedicated Software are identically
from hardware perspective.
The difference is in the mounting step only. Regarding the SLE66CL81P the
ISO7816 pads have not been contacted, thus this chip is for contactless use
only, whereas the SLE66CL80P provides both interface types and is for dual
use therefore. Both types can be distinguished by a different chip ident. The
difference in the mounting step does not influence the security of the TOE.
The hardware part of the TOE is the complete chip, composed of
•
Microcontroller type ECO 2000 (CPU) (including the sub-components
memory encryption and decryption unit (MED), memory management
unit (MMU) and 256 bytes of internal RAM (IRAM)),
•
External
memory
comprising
(SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14
/
SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14): 2 / 2 kBytes extended RAM (XRAM), 72 / 72
kBytes user ROM, including the routines for chip management (RMS), 8 /
8 KB test ROM containing the test routines (STS), and a total of 8 / 8
kBytes non-volatile memory (EEPROM) available for the user,
•
Security logic, Memory Management Unit (MMU), True random number
generator, Checksum module, Interrupt module, Input Logic, Timer,
Address and data busses, Advanced Crypto Engine (ACE) for long
integer modulo calculations (deactivated), DES accelerator.
•
The RF interface (radio frequency power and signal interface) enables
contactless communication between the chip and a reader/writer. The
power supply and data are received by an antenna which consists of a
coil with a few turns directly connected to the IC.
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
The firmware part of the TOE consists of the RMS (Resource Management
System) routines for EEPROM programming and security function testing and
the STS (Self Test Software) which consists of test and initialisation routines.
The RMS is part of the IC Dedicated Support Software and the STS is part of
the IC Dedicated Test Software as defined in Protection Profile [8]. The RMS
routines are stored by the TOE manufacturer in a reserved area of the normal
user ROM. The STS routines are stored in the protected test ROM, used for
testing purposes during production only and are not accessible for the user
software.
The smart card operating system and the application stored in the User ROM
and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE.
The TOE provides an ideal platform for applications requiring non-volatile data
storage. The TOE is intended for use in a range of high security applications,
including high speed security authentication, data encryption or electronic
signature. Several security features independently implemented in hardware or
controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper operations and integrity
and confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for
memory protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only
under specified conditions.
The Security Target is written using the Smartcard IC Platform Protection
Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001 [8]. With
reference to this Protection Profile, the smart card product life cycle is described
in 7 phases. The development, production and operational user environment
are described and referenced to these phases. TOE delivery is defined at the
end of phase 3 as wafers or phase 4 as modules (with or without inlay antenna).
Additional production steps for the inlay production were covered by the
evaluation.
The assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile [8] are
used. To address additional security features of the TOE (e.g cryptographic
services), the security environment as outlined in the PP [8] is augmented by an
additional policy, an assumption and security objectives accordingly.
The IT products Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 / SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14 with specific IC Dedicated
Software was evaluated against the claims of the Security Target [6] by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was
completed on 31.01.2006. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle ITSicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 8 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Infineon Technologies AG.
8
B-4
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
1.1
Certification Report
Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL 5 (Evaluation Assurance Level 5 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement
Identifier
EAL5
TOE evaluation: Semiformally designed and tested
+: ALC_DVS.2
Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3
Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
+: AVA_VLA.4
Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2
Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1 [3DES] Cryptographic operation
Source
from PP or
added in ST
ST
FDP
User data protection
FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control
ST
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based access control
ST
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow control
PP
FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer protection
PP
FDP_SDI.1
Stored data integrity monitoring
ST
FMT
Security Management
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
ST
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialisation
ST
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management functions
ST
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
PP
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
PP
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
PP
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain separation
PP
FRU
Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2
Limited fault tolerance
PP
Table 2: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FAU
Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
FMT
Security management
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
PP
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
PP
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_TST.2
Subset TOE testing
PP / ST
9
PP / ST
ST
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the Security Target [6],
chapter 5.1.1 and 7.2.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the ITEnvironment of the TOE as dependencies derive from the security functional
requirements for cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1).
Security
Requirement
Functional
Addressed issue
FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1
Import of user data without security attributes or
Import of user data with security attributes or
Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2
Secure security attributes
Table 4: SFRs for the IT-Environment
9
B-6
PP/ST: component is described in the PP but operations are performed in the ST.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
Certification Report
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the Security Target chapter
5.2.1.
Additionally security objectives for the TOE environment are outlined by only
Non-IT security requirements for the TOE environment, i.e. for (i) Design and
Implementation of the Smartcard Embedded Software, (ii) Protection during
Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation and (iii) Cipher Schemes. For details
refer to the Security Target, chapter 5.2.2.
The developers of Smartcard Embedded Software must take care of these
requirements for the environment of the TOE.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security
Functions
Description
SF1
Operating state checking
SF2
Phase management with test mode lock-out
SF3
Protection against snooping
SF4
Data encryption and data disguising
SF5
Random number generation
SF6
TSF self test
SF7
Notification of physical attack
SF8
Memory Management Unit (MMU)
SF9
Cryptographic support
Table 5: TOE Security Functions
SF1: Operating state checking
Correct function of the TOE is only given in the specified range. To prevent an
attack exploiting that circumstance, it is necessary to detect if the specified
range is left. All operating signals are filtered to prevent malfunction and the
operation state is monitored with sensors for the operating voltage, clock signal,
frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation. This function includes
also mechanisms to detect specific EEPROM memory errors.
SF2: Phase management with test mode lock-out
During start-up of the TOE the decision for the user mode or the test mode is
taken depending on several phase identifiers. If test mode is the active phase,
the TOE requests authentication before any action (test mode lock-out). The
phase management is used to provide the separation between the security
enforcing functions and the user software. The TOE is set to user mode before
TOE delivery.
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
SF3: Protection against snooping
Several mechanisms, like topological design measures for disguise, protect the
TOE against snooping the design or the user data during operation and even if
it is out of operation (power down).
SF4: Data encryption and data disguising
The memory contents of the TOE is encrypted on chip to protect against data
analysis on stored data as well as on internally transmitted data. Only the key
owner has the possibility to read out data. To prevent interpretation of leaked
information, randomness is inserted in the information. This function is
specifically effective to prevent DPA during Triple DES calculations.
SF5: Random number generation
Random data are essential for cryptography as well as for physical security
mechanisms. The TOE is equipped with a true random generator based on
physical probabilistic effects. The random data can be used from the user
software as well as from the security enforcing functions.
SF6: TSF self test
As part of the TSF, a hardware controlled self-test can be started from the user
software or is started directly to test SF1, SF5 and SF7. Any attempt to modify
the sensor devices will be detected from the test.
SF7: Notification of physical attack
The entire surface of the TOE is protected with the active shield. Attacks over
the surface are detected when the shield lines are cut or get contacted.
SF8: Memory Management Unit (MMU)
The MMU in the TOE gives the user software the possibility to define different
access rights for memory areas. In case of an access violation the MMU will
generate a non maskable interrupt (NMI). Then an interrupt service routine can
react on the access violation. The policy of setting up the MMU and specifying
the memory ranges is defined by the user software.
SF9: Cryptographic Support
Cryptographic operations are provided by the TOE. The TOE is equipped with a
hardware accelerator to support the standard cryptographic operation. This
component is a hardware DES encryption and decryption unit.
As the final transition from test mode to user mode is performed before TOE
delivery, all TOE Security Functions are applicable from TOE delivery at the end
of phase 3 or 4 (depending on when TOE delivery takes place in a specific
case) to phase 7.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
1.3
Certification Report
Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 6. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details
see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4
Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the organisational security policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target [6] and can be summarised as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or a process acting on behalf
of him.
So-called standard high-level security concerns defined in the Protection Profile
[8] were derived from considering the end-usage phase (Phase 7 of the life
cycle as described in the Security Target) as follows:
•
manipulation of User Data and of the smart card Embedded Software
(while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s
memories),
•
disclosure of User Data and of the smart card Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
•
deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined in the Protection Profile [8] and
used by the Security Target [6] by defining threats on a more technical level for
•
Inherent Information Leakage,
•
Physical Probing,
•
Physical Manipulation,
•
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
•
Forced Information Leakage,
•
Abuse of Functionality and
•
Deficiency of Random Numbers.
Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
A specific additional security functionality Triple-DES must be provided by the
TOE according to an additional security policy defined in the Security Target.
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional policy.
1.5
Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode. The
TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC manufacturing process
(Phase 3) or at the end of IC Packaging (Phase 4). At this point in time the
operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is disabled.
The Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 and
SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14 are identically from hardware perspective. Regarding
the SLE66CL81P the ISO7816 pads have not been contacted, thus this chip is
for contactless use only, whereas the SLE66CL80P provides both interface
types and is for dual use therefore. This configuration is done before TOE
delivery.
Thus, there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are
important for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery
processes, like the integration into a smart card or pass port book, Smart Card
Finishing Process, Personalisation and the delivery of the smart card to an end
user, have to be organised in a way that excludes all possibilities of physical
manipulation of the TOE.
There are no special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the
requirement that the controller has to be used under the well-defined operating
conditions and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as
described in the user documentation and chapter 10 of this Report.
1.6
Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile [8], the
assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are valid for the
Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security
Target, Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6
are covered by these assumptions from the PP:
The developer of the smart card Embedded Software (Phase 1) must ensure:
•
B-10
the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while
developing this software in Phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that
the software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In
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particular the assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop
software that fulfils the assumptions.
•
the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the
TOE (especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed
that the Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of
the environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE.
Only appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the
TOE have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to Phase 7.
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target:
•
Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the smart card
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function).
1.7
Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 and
SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14 with specific IC Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No
Type
Identifier
Release
1
HW
SLE66CL80P Smart Card Ddlapo-GDS-fileIC
Ids: m1457a14_..
and
_ddlapo.gds.gz
Date
Form of Delivery
Wafer or packaged
module (with or
without inlay antenna)
SLE66CL81P Smart Card and
IC
m1436a14_lapo_
04_05_04.gds.gz
with production
line indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
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No
Type
Identifier
Release
2
SW
STS Self Test Software
(the IC Dedicated Test
Software)
V53.36.31
3
SW
RMS-E Resource
V0.5
Management System (the
IC Dedicated Support
Software)
Date
Form of Delivery
Stored in Test ROM
on the IC
Stored in reserved
area of User ROM on
the IC
Table 6: Delivered hardware and software of the TOE
No
Type
Identifier
Release
Date
Form of Delivery
4
DOC
SLE66CxxxP
Security Controller
Family, Data Book [9]
08.04
August
2004
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
5
DOC
Confidential Errata and
Information SheetSLE66CxxxP Products
and Bondout [10]
05.05
May 2005 Hardcopy and
pdf-file
6
DOC
SLE66CxxxP
Security Controller
Family, Instruction Set
[11]
05.01
May 2001 Hardcopy and
pdf-file
7
DOC
SLE66CxxxP/PE Security Programmers
Manual [12]
03.05
March
2005
8
DOC
Application Notes
[13] – [32]
See chapter 14
below
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
Table 7: Delivered documents of the TOE
The hardware part of the version of the TOE is identified by Infineon Smart Card
IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 and SLE66CL81P/m1436a14 with specific IC Dedicated Software and the GDS-files. For identification of
a specific chip, the Chip Identification Number stored in the EEPROM can be
used (see [9, chapter 7 and table 2-33] and [10, Table 2-8]):
•
The chip type byte identifies the different versions in the following
manner:
75 hex for version m1457a1(x).
65 hex for version m1436a1(x).
Using the additional detailed production parameter bytes, one can
reconstruct the last character (x) of the version number of a specific chip
via a data base system at Infineon Logistic Department.
•
The STS is identified by its unique version number which is stored in
three additional control bytes of the Chip Identification Number.
•
The RMS is identified by its unique version number. As the RMS is part
of the ROM mask, one can get the RMS version number for a specific
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chip by using the ROM type bytes and asking the data base system at
Infineon Logistic Department.
•
The first nibble of the batch number gives the production line indicator
which is “2” for both chips manufactured in Infineons IC fabrication in
Dresden, Germany.
The delivery process from Infineon to their customers (to Phase 5 or Phase 6 of
the life cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of
the different parts of the TOE as outlined above.
To ensure that the customer receives the evaluated version of the chip, either
•
he has to personally pick up the TOE (IC on Wafers or Modules with or
without inlay antenna) at the Infineon Warehouse in Regensburg (VKLRgb) or Wuxi (see part D, annex A of this report) or
•
the TOE (IC on Wafers or Modules with or without inlay antenna) is sent
as a secured transport by specific haulage companies from the Infineon
Warehouse in Regensburg (VKL-Rgb) or from Wuxi directly or via one of
three distribution centers (DC E for Europe, DC A for Asia and DC U for
the United States) to the customer. The sender informs the receiver that
a delivery was started; after the delivery was received it has to be
checked according to the consignment notes and the sender is to be
informed immediately about result of the check.
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted)
according to defined mailing procedures.
Defined procedures at the development and production sites guarantee that the
right versions of the RMS and STS are implemented into a specific ROM mask
for a TOE IC.
3
Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus
providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will
implement a symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the
confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure
authentication protocols and it will provide a random number generator.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during Triple-DES functions performed by
the TOE), against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical
manipulations and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
•
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory
of the TOE and
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•
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of
Security Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by the TOE
manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
modules or inlays (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in
time the operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile
memories of the chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the Security Functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system, and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
Security Functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environmental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Infineon Technologies AG is the TOE developer and
manufacturer and responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded
smart card application software in its development and production environment.
For those aspects refer to part B, chapter 9.2 of this report.
The full evaluation results are applicable only for TOE chips from the
semiconductor factory in Dresden, labelled by the production line indicator „2“.
5
Architectural Information
The Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 and
SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14 with specific IC Dedicated Software are integrated
circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating system and smart
card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems
can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target. The complete
hardware description and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to be found
in the Data Book [9] and other guidance documents delivered to the customer,
see table 7.
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For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
processing unit (CPU) with memory management unit (MMU), RAM, ROM,
EEPROM, security logic, interrupt module, bus system, Random Number
Generator (RNG) and the module (DDC) for cryptographic operations of the
chip are used. Security measures for physical protection are realised within the
layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip
memories provide the interface to the software using the Security Functions of
the TOE.
The TOE IC Dedicated Test Software (STS), stored on the chip, is used for
testing purposes during production only and is completely separated from the
use of the embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
The TOE IC Dedicated Support Software (RMS), stored on the chip, is used for
EEPROM programming and Security Function testing. It is stored by the TOE
manufacturer in a reserved area of the normal user ROM and can be used by
the users embedded software.
The TOE inlay versions do not differ from architectural point of view.
6
Documentation
The documentation [9] – [32] is provided with the products by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target.
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hardware computing platform to implement the software (operating system /
application software) which will use the TOE.
To support a composite evaluation as defined in AIS 36 [4], the document ETRlite [34] is provided for the composite evaluator.
7
IT Product Testing
The tests are performed with the chips SLE66CL80P / m1457a14 and
SLE66CL81P / m1436a14. Chips from the production site in Dresden (see part
D, annex A of this report) were used for tests.
In the course of the development of the TOE simulation tests are carried out.
These simulation tests yield CRC sums, which are used in the further testing.
Layout tests are based on the fact that the layout has been used to review the
implementation, in order to verify statements concerning the layout design. The
result of the check is to give evidence, whether layout measures planned during
development actually can be identified in the finished layout.
For each mask version a qualification test is performed. Via the results of these
tests a qualification report is generated. The qualification report is completed
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after the verification testing and the security evaluation are performed
successfully. The tests performed and their results are listed in the qualification
report. The results of the tests are the basis on which it is decided, whether the
TOE is released to production.
As the qualification testing is performed in the test mode of the TOE an
additional testing in user mode is necessary to verify functionality of the final
TOE. For this purpose the so-called verification testing in user mode is
performed in order to check the functionality in the end user environment.
In the context of security evaluation testing the security mechanisms are tested
again in the user mode only focusing on security. Here is not only verified that
the security functionality is working as this was already tested on every single
TOE during production, but also it is tested how good the security functionality
is working and the effectiveness is calculated. This step is necessary as the
mechanisms work together and that must be evaluated in the user mode.
Before delivery on every chip production tests are performed. These tests use
the CRC checksums attained by the simulation tests. The aim of these tests is
to check whether each chip is functioning correctly.
All simulation, qualification, verification, production and layout tests were
repeated for this evaluation. The security evaluation tests were also repeated,
except DPA, EMA and DFA tests, because for these tests, the test results of the
former evaluation could be re-used. Since the corresponding hardware
measures including specifications are not changed for this TOE these tests are
still valid.
The tests are performed on component level and therefore can be mapped to
mechanisms and security function. The TSF have been tested systematically
against the functional specification, the high-level design and the low-level
design. The developer tests demonstrate that the security functions perform as
specified.
The evaluators independent testing was partly performed in the developer’s
testing environment and partly at TÜViT GmbH, information security
department. The same platforms and tools as for the developer tests were
used.
The evaluator's approach was to test the functionality of the TOE and to verify
the developer's test results by repeating developer's tests and additionally add
independent tests.
In the course of the evaluation of the TOE the following classes of tests were
carried out: Module tests, Simulation tests, Emulation tests, Tests in user mode,
Hardware tests.
The tests are performed with the chips SLE66CL80P / m1457a14. The chips of
type SLE66CL80P / m1457a14 are identical to the chips of type SLE66CL81P /
m1436a14 except for the missing bonding of the contacts. Therefore all tests
were performed with the chips SLE66CL80P / m1457a14.
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The tests are performed on component and mechanism level and therefore can
be mapped to the security functions. All security functions were tested.
The results of the developer tests, which have been repeated by the evaluator,
matched the results the developer. Additional evaluator tests confirmed correct
operation, too.
For this re-evaluation the evaluators re-assessed the penetration testing and
confirmed the results from the previous certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC0338-2005 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0266-2005 where they took all Security Functions
into consideration. Intensive penetration testing was performed at that time to
consider the physical tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated
equipment and expertised know-how. The approach was to systematically
search for potential vulnerabilities and known attacks in public domain sources
and use of actual information from international working group ISCI. Analysis
why these vulnerabilities are unexploitable in the intended environment of the
TOE were performed. To support and to verify the analysis specific additional
penetration attacks were performed in the course of this evaluation.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by the version Infineon Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 and SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14 with
specific IC Dedicated Software with production line indicator “2” (Dresden). The
TOE has only one fixed evaluated configuration at the time of delivery.
All information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functions by the software
is provided within the user documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode.
Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user mode. For all evaluation
activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid
for the user mode, too.
9
Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in coordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). For smart card IC specific
methodology the CC supporting documents
(i)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii)
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
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(iii)
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
ETR-lite – for Composition and
ETR-lite – for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation:
Recommended best practice
(see [4, AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36]) and [4, AIS 31] (Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for physical random number generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL 5
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components
Security Target evaluation
CC Class ASE
PASS
TOE description
ASE_DES.1
PASS
Security environment
ASE_ENV.1
PASS
ST introduction
ASE_INT.1
PASS
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.1
PASS
PP claims
ASE_PPC.1
PASS
IT security requirements
ASE_REQ.1
PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
ASE_SRE.1
PASS
TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
Configuration management
CC Class ACM
PASS
Partial CM automation
ACM_AUT.1
PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_CAP.4
PASS
Development tools CM coverage
ACM_SCP.3
PASS
Delivery and operation
CC Class ADO
PASS
Detection of modification
ADO_DEL.2
PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADO_IGS.1
PASS
Development
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Verdict
CC Class ADV
PASS
Semiformal functional specification
ADV_FSP.3
PASS
Semiformal high-level design
ADV_HLD.3
PASS
Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2
PASS
Modularity
ADV_INT.1
PASS
Descriptive low-level design
ADV_LLD.1
PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration
ADV_RCR.2
PASS
Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_SPM.3
PASS
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Assurance classes and components
Guidance documents
Verdict
CC Class AGD
PASS
Administrator guidance
AGD_ADM.1
PASS
User guidance
AGD_USR.1
PASS
Life cycle support
CC Class ALC
PASS
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2
PASS
Standardised life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2
PASS
Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2
PASS
Tests
CC Class ATE
PASS
Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2
PASS
Testing: low-level design
ATE_DPT.2
PASS
Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1
PASS
Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.2
PASS
Vulnerability assessment
CC Class AVA
PASS
Covert channel analysis
AVA_CCA.1
PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_MSU.3
PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_SOF.1
PASS
Highly resistant
AVA_VLA.4
PASS
Table 8: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
•
the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSIPP-0002-2001 [8]
•
Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
•
the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
•
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of
Function:
SF 2 (Phase management with test mode lock-out),
SF 3 (Protection against snooping),
SF 4 (Data encryption and data disguising) and
SF 5 (Random number generation)
The scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
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(i)
the TOE Security Function SF9 -- which is Triple DES encryption and
decryption by the hardware co-processor and
(ii)
for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by
the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as identified in table
6, produced in the semiconductor factory in Dresden, labelled by the production
line indicator „2“ within the chip identification number in the EEPROM, and the
firmware and software versions as indicated in table 6 and the documentation
listed in table 7.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product or to
chips from other production and manufacturing sites, provided the sponsor
applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the
modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific smart
card embedded software additional evaluator actions were performed during the
TOE evaluation. The results are documented in the ETR-lite [34] according to
[4, AIS 36]. Therefore, the interface between the smart card embedded software
developer and the developer of the TOE was examined in detail.
10
Comments/Recommendations
1.
The operational documents [9] - [32] contain necessary information about
the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered.
2.
In the following, specific items are listed:
•
In the operational environment of the TOE the following assumptions
about the environment as outlined in the Security Target have to be
fulfilled:
“Protection during packaging, finishing and personalisation” resulting
from the assumption A.Process-Card of the Security Target: It is
assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE
by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-user to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and
test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft
or unauthorised use). This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery
are assumed to be protected appropriately.
In addition the development environment of the operating system
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developer has to be protected adequately, in order to be able to
guarantee the security of the TOE on the whole.
The assumptions on the usage of the hardware platform (A.PlatAppl), treatment of user data (A.Resp-Appl) and on usage of keydependent functions (A.Key-Function) have to be fulfilled (see part B,
chapter 1.6 of this report). For measures important for A.Key-Function
refer to [15].
•
The functional requirements for the environment defined in the
Security Target [6, chapter 5.2] have to be taken into consideration by
the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer.
•
The Embedded Software:
-
has to activate Wait states and CURSE functionality for all
operations of the Embedded Software critical for side channel
attacks (e.g. SPA / DPA),
-
has to use parameters for memory encryption E0ADR, E2ADR
and XKEY which configure the ranges of encryption,
-
has to configure the MMU correctly,
-
has to call the self tests of the TSF implemented in the RMS
routines in order to detect failures of the sensors. The self test
shall be executed at least once during security relevant operation
(e.g. key generation). Depending on the application (e.g. time
between possible resets) the developer of the Smartcard
Embedded Software has to decide how often this function has to
be executed during normal operation to avoid attacks on the
composite product.
•
It is possible to store data in the EEPROM without encryption, which
might constitute a risk in case an attacker is given the possibility to
read out this data. The operating system developer is responsible for
the use of all security functionality made available by the TOE and
controllable by him in such a way, that secure operation is
guaranteed. These are the parameters for memory encryption
determining areas for the encryption. In the data book [9, chapter 19]
it is pointed out to the operating system developer, which effects on
the security not proper use of this functionality might have, and it is
described in detail, how to use effectively the security mechanisms
made available by the TOE.
•
In case an alarm is triggered, the content of the XRAM is not being
deleted. In order to prevent an attacker from reading out this data, the
embedded software has to delete explicitly the XRAM after each reset
(see [9, chapter 7]).
•
The delivered MMU is set thus, that the Infineon Smart Card IC
(Security
Controller)
SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14
and
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SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14 with specific IC Dedicated Software is
compatible with SLE66CX160S, i.e. all ROM areas are mapped.
Since the MOVC blockade of the SLE66CX160S is no longer
implemented, in this setting reading out of the ROM by a program in
the EEPROM is possible. In order to avoid this, the operating system
developer has to programme the MMU in a way that reading out is
impossible. This fact is pointed out in the data book [9, chapter 19].
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•
ROM contents of chips, being manufactured with the same user mask
are identically encrypted. This leads to the possibility to carry out
ROM read out attacks using as many samples as available and
combining all results. Therefore, it is recommended to store security
critical data (e.g. identification and authentication data) not in the
ROM, but in the EEPROM (this is encrypted chip individually). This
fact is pointed out to the operating system developer in application
note [16].
•
The TOE has implemented a hardware DES accelerator. In case the
keys necessary for the calculation of the DES are transferred into the
DES accelerator, these keys might be observable by means of a SPA
/ DPA. In order to prevent this, the transfer of the keys have to be
protected using the measures described in application note [15].
•
The TOE has an active shielding for the identification of attacks by
means of physical probing. It is possible for the operating system
developer to configure the active shielding (see application note [17]).
Moreover he has to change this current pattern before any security
critical operation and compare the returned values with the expected
values accordingly frequently with regard to the software.
•
The TOE is protected by light sensors against DFA light attacks (e.g.
with laser). Nevertheless the performed penetration tests show that it
is still possible to manipulate a running program with a focussed
laser. The Smartcard Embedded Software Developer has to
implement sufficient countermeasures in his software to counter such
attacks, too. An example of a possible implementation of such a
countermeasure is given in [12]. Furthermore the Smartcard
Embedded Software Developer has to calculate DES encryption and
decryption or decryption and encryption respectively and compare the
results as described in application note [15].
•
In order to protect the TOE against attacks on power consumption
(e.g. DPA), the wait states functionality in connection with the random
number generator and additional features to modify the current profile
have to be used by the operating system developer, together with
additional software measures, as described in [9, chapter 19].
•
For the fulfilment of the Strength of Function “medium” or "high" for
the Random Number Generator according to [4, AIS31] specific
guidance has to be followed by the Smartcard Embedded Software
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Developer:
In [9, chapter 16.3.5] the user of the TOE (the Smartcard Embedded
Software Developer) is recommended to perform the online test via
the RMS function SleRngAIS31AnalogTest at start-up or at least
before using the RNG for security relevant operation.
In [9, chapter 16.3.5] and [14, chapter 2.2] it is stated that the
operating system should generate one ore more keys and then
perform the online test via the RMS function SleRngAIS31AnalogTest
until the final test results are obtained (SLE_AIS31_PASS). This
online test is mandated and the keys can be used if the test has
passed, but must be discarded if the test fails.
In addition the evaluator came to the conclusion that a RNG live test
(one call of SleRngAIS31AnalogTest) shall be executed at least once
after power up and latest before usage of the RNG data for security
relevant operation (e.g. key generation).
Furthermore, it is strongly recommended to call the live test (one call
of SleRngAIS31AnalogTest) latest before any operation is executed
that shall be protected by chip internal randomisation mechanisms
(CURSE, Random Wait States, Bus Confusion).
Random numbers used for RNG tests performed by the Embedded
Software shall be kept confidential by the application software.
For further advice see data book [9, chapter 16 and 6.11.21] and
application note [14].
3.
As an outcome of this evaluation, the customer has to follow the
evaluated delivery procedures (see chapter 2 above). In case of differing
delivery procedures, these have to be evaluated in the course of the
operating system evaluation or the smart card composite product
evaluation.
In the following, specific items regarding delivery are listed:
-
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the chip
manufacturer can only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery
procedure. It is in the responsibility of the Smartcard Embedded
Software Developer to include mechanisms in the implemented
software which allows detection of modifications after the delivery.
-
The Smartcard Embedded Software Developer should not accept
deliverables from Infineon he had not requested. Deliverables send in
electronic form (i.e. guidance documents) have to be send and
accepted only in encrypted form.
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11
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13
Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ACE
Advanced Crypto Engine
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA
Differential Power Analysis
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB
Electrical Code Block
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA
Electro magnetic analysis
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
Rivest, Shamir, Adleman – a public key encryption algorithm
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SOF
Strength of Function
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Certification Report
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES
Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
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organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE. specifically
B-26
-
AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
-
AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
-
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
-
AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
-
AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
-
AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for:
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1,
July 2002 and
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
Certification Report
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6]
Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs, SLE66CL80P /
m1457-a14, SLE66CL81P / m1436-a14, Security Target Version 1.1, 5.
November 2005
[7]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 30 January 2006, for the Product
Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL80P / m1457-a14,
SLE66CL81P / m1436-a14, (confidential document)
[8]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[9]
Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs, SLE66CxxxP,
Security Controller Family, Data Book Version 08.04, (confidential
document)
[10]
Confidential Errata and Information Sheet- SLE66CxxxP Products and
Bondout, Version 05.05, (confidential document)
[11]
SLE66CxxxP, Security Controller Family, Confidential Instruction Set,
05.01, (confidential document)
[12]
SLE66CxxxP/PE - Security Programmers Manual, Version 03.05
[13]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Transfer of a ROM Mask
from SLE66CxxS to SLE66CxxxP, Version 06.01
[14]
Confidential Application Note, SLE 66CxxxP and SLE 66CxxxPE, Testing
the Random Number Generator, Version 11.04
[15]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66xxxP, DDES – EC2, Accellerator,
Version 02.04
[16]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/ SLE66CxxxPE, Memory
Encryption Decryption, Version 11.04
[17]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Using the active shield
security feature, Version 01.02
[18]
Confidential Application
EEPROM, Version 08.00
[19]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP MMU-Memory Management
Unit, Version 08.00
[20]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Fast Switching of PLL,
Version 03.03
[21]
Confidential Application Note, Security Advice concerning Program Flow
Manipulation – SLE11/22/44/66CxxxS/ 66CxxxP, Version 10.00
Note,
SLE66CxxxP,
Issues
concerning
B-27
Certification Report
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[22]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxS, Secure Hash Algorithm SHA1, Version 01.98
[23]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, UART, Version 10.03
[24]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxS, SLE66CxxxP, Using the
CRC, Version 03.01
[25]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, MMU Security Issues, Version 01,02
[26]
Application Note, SLE66CXxxP, Infineon Chipcard Crypto API, Version
05.02
[27]
Application Note, SLE66CLxxxP - Anticollision Type A, 03.03, 03.2003
Infineon
[28]
Application Note, SLE66CLxxxP - Anticollision Type B, 03.03, 03.2003
Infineon
[29]
Application Note, SLE66CLxxxP - Card Coil Design Guide, 05.05,
05.2005 Infineon
[30]
Application Note, SLE66CLxxxP – Contactless Protocol, 03.03, 03.2003
Infineon
[31]
Application Note, SLE66CLxxxP - Optimized CLEnergy performance,
10.05, 10.2005 Infineon
[32]
Application Note, SLE66CLxxxP SLE66CL160S 03.03 03.2003 Infineon
[33]
Infineon Technologies AG, Secure Mobile Solutions, SLE66CL80P /
m1457-a14, SLE66CL81P / m1436-a14, Configuration Management
Scope (ACM_SCP), Version 1.1, 25. January 2006 (i.e. TOE
Configuration List, confidential document)
[34]
ETR-lite for composition, according to AIS 36, Version 2, 30 January
2006, for the Product Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CL80P /
m1457-a14, SLE66CL81P / m1436-a14, (confidential document).
B-28
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Interface
Porting
from
BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class
Class ACM: Configuration
management
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Class ADV: Development
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Class ALC: Life cycle support
Class ATE: Tests
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Assurance Family
CM automation
Abbreviated Name
ACM_AUT
CM capabilities
CM scope
Delivery
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up
Functional specification
High-level design
Implementation representation
TSF internals
Low-level design
Representation correspondence
Security policy modeling
Administrator guidance
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
User guidance
Development security
Flaw remediation
Life cycle definition
Tools and techniques
Coverage
Depth
Functional tests
Independent testing
Covert channel analysis
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
Misuse
Strength of TOE security functions
Vulnerability analysis
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class
Assurance
Family
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT
EAL1
Delivery and
operation
Development
Guidance
documents
Life cycle
support
Tests
Vulnerability
assessment
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
1
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6
1
1
2
2
1
3
1
1
4
2
2
4
3
2
5
3
2
5
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
1
1
2
3
1
1
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
1
1
4
5
3
3
2
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
3
1
4
3
1
4
1
1
Table 2: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial reengineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional securityspecific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF
Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA
Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
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D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Certification Report
Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CL80P/m1457-a14 and SLE66CL81P/m1436-a14 with specific IC
Dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0,
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4 and
smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999) and including final
interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 28. April 2006, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements
•
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.X, ACM_CAP.X,
ACM_SCP.X),
•
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.X, ADO_IGS.X) and
•
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.X, ALC_LCD.X, ALC_TAT.X),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Infineon Technologies AG, Königsbrücker Str. 180, 01099 Dresden,
Germany (semiconductor factory)
b) Infineon TechnologiesAG, St.-Martin-Straße 76, 81541 München,
Germany (development center)
c) Infineon Technologies AG, Leibnizstraße 6, D-93055 Regensburg,
Germany (IC packaging into modules, warehouse and delivery center,
bumping and inlay embedding)
d) Infineon Technologies AG, Development Center Graz, Babenbergerstr.
10, A-8020 Graz, Austria (development center)
e) Infineon Technologies Asian Pacific, Exel Singapore Pte. Ltd., 81 ALPS
Avenue, Exel Supply Chain Hub, Singapore 498803 (warehouse and
delivery center)
f) Du Pont Photomasks France S.A., 224, bd John Kennedy, F-91105
Corbeil Essonnes, France (mask shop)
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0354-2006
g) Infineon Technologies AG, Alter Postweg 101, D-86159 Augsburg
(development center)
h) Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd., No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu,
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park, Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu P.R. China (IC
packaging into modules, warehouse and delivery center)
The hardware part of the TOE produced in the semiconductor factory in
Dresden is labelled by the production line indicator „2“.
For all sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied for
each site and in accordance with the Infineon Technologies AG, Security and
Chipcard ICs, SLE66CL80P / m1457-a14, SLE66CL81P / m1436-a14, Security
Target Version 1.1, 5. November 2005) [6]. The evaluators verified, that the
threats are countered and the security objectives for the life cycle phases 2, 3
and 4 up to delivery at the end of phase 3 or 4 as stated in the TOE Security
Target are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
D-4
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