Certification Report: 0703a_pdf

Certification Report: 0703a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
for
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081
from
MaskTech International GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
CC-Zert-327 V4.6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
Security IC with MRTD BAC Application
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081
from
MaskTech International GmbH
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application" Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25
March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009
Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 20 October 2011
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber
Head of Division
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................16
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................17
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................19
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................19
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................21
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 5 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the component ALC_DVS.2 that is not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4
components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081 was conducted by SRC
Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 18 October
2011. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is:
MaskTech International GmbH.
The product was developed by:
MaskTech International GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
4
Certification Report
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de/
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
MaskTech International GmbH
Nordostpark 16
90411 Nürnberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure (LDS) [20] and providing Basic Access Control, Active Authentication and
Extended Access Control according to the ICAO documents [21] [22] [23] and Chip
Authentication according to the technical report TR-03110 [24].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic
Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7]. Please note that
in consistency to this protection profile only the security mechanism Basic Access Control
was in the focus of the evaluation process. The further security mechanisms Active
Authentication and Extended Access Control as well as Chip Authentication are subjects of
BSI-DSZ-CC-0702-2011 [29].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality
Addressed issue
F.IC_CL
Security Functions of the Hardware (IC) and
Crypto Library
F.Access_Control
Regulates all access by external entities to
operations of the TOE which are only executed
after this TSF allowed access
F.Identification_Authentication
Provides identification/authentication of the user
roles
F.Management
Provides management
functionalities
F.Crypto
Provides a high level interface to the used
algorithms and implements the used hash
algorithms
F.Verification
TOE internal
operation
functions
and
to
administrative
ensure
correct
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
Certification Report
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE (for details refer to chapter
8 of this report):
●
the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
●
the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software,
●
the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
●
the MRTD application, and
●
the associated guidance documentation.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No
Type Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
1
HW/
SW
MTCOS Pro 2.2,
ROM Mask:
XRD0A1
SW completely contained in
ROM and EEPROM memory,
chip initialised and tested, but
without hardware for the
contactless interface (Delivery
Type: MOB4 and MOB6
modules)
2
DOC User Guidance MTCOS Pro 2.2
EAC/P5CD081VA1
Version 1.2,
28.09.2011 [11]
Document in electronic form
3
DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS
Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 1 Filesystem and Security
Architecture
Version 1.03,
27.10.2010 [12]
Document in electronic form
4
DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS
Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 2 Basic Access Control and Secure
Messaging
Version 1.01,
18.10.2010 [13]
Document in electronic form
5
DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS Pro
V2.1: Part 3 - Digital Signature
Version 1.00,
02.04.2008 [14]
Document in electronic form
8
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MTCOS Passport operating
system and a file-system in the
context of the ICAO application
with NXP Semiconductors
P5CD081V1A secure dualinterface controller and the
Secured Crypto Library V2.78
For details on the MRTD chip, the IC Dedicated Software and the Crypto Library see the evaluation
documentation under BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 [16] and BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010 [25].
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
No
Type Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
6
DOC MaskTech GmbH. MTCOS
Standard & Pro V2.1: Part 5 Advanced Security Mechanisms
Extended Access Control
Version 1.01,
20.06.2008 [15]
Document in electronic form
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The customer specific ROM mask is labelled by NXP Semiconductors as XRD0A1. The
name of the ROM file transferred from MaskTech to NXP Semiconductors is
mtcos_sp_v2.2_p5cd081.hex.
The commercial numbering of the IC embedded software by NXP Semiconductors is as
follows:
●
Commercial Product Type:
P5CD081A6/T1AA1780
●
Finished Good Type:
P5CD081A6/T1AA1780
The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the MRTD BAC PP [7]. Delivery is
performed from the initialization facility to the personalisation facility as a secured transport
to a specific person of contact at the personalization site. The TOE itself will be delivered
as an initialized module but without hardware for contactless interface. The inlay
production including the application of the antenna is not part of the TOE and takes part
after the delivery to the personalization site. Furthermore, the personalizer receives
information about the personalization commands and process requirements. To ensure
that the personalizer receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the
personalisation process as described in the User's Guide [11] have to be followed.
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD BAC PP [7] by the
Security Objectives and Requirements for the contactless chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). The Security Policy address the advanced security
methods Basic Access Control as well as Chip Authentication and Active Authentication.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Personalization of the MRTD’s chip, Inspection Systems for global
interoperability, PKI for Passive Authentication and PKI for Inspection Systems. Details can
be found in the Security Target [6] resp. [8], chapter 3.2.
5
Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit, IC Embedded
Software and Part Application Software. While the IC Embedded software contains the
operating system MTCOS Pro 2.2, the Part Application Software contains the MRTD
Application. As all these parts of software are running inside the IC, the external interface
of the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external interface of the IC, the NXP
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
Certification Report
Semiconductors P5CD081V1A secure dual-interface controller including the NXP Secured
Crypto Library V2.7. For details concerning the CC evaluation of the NXP IC and the
Crypto Library see the evaluation documentation under the Certification ID's BSI-DSZ-CC0555-2009 [16] and BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010 [25]. Please note that the hardware for the
contactless interface (i.e. antenna) is not part of the TOE. The inlay production including
the application of the antenna takes part after delivery.
The Security Functions of the TOE are:
●
F.Access_Control
●
F.Identification_Authentication
●
F.Management
●
F.Crypto
●
F.Verification
●
F.IC_CL
According to the TOE design these Security Functions are enforced by the following
subsystems:
●
Application data (supports the TSF F.Access_Control, F.Identification_Authentication)
●
Kernel (supports the TSF F.Access_Control, F.Identification_Authentication,
F.Management, F.Crypto, F.Verification)
●
HAL (supports the TSF F.Crypto, F.Identification_Authentication, F.Verification)
●
Hardware (supports the TSF F.IC_CL)
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
The developer tested all TOE Security Functions either on real cards or with emulator
tests. For all commands and functionality tests, test cases are specified in order to
demonstrate its expected behavior including error cases. Hereby a representative sample
including all boundary values of the parameter set, e.g. all command APDUs with valid and
invalid inputs were tested and all functions were tested with valid and invalid inputs.
Repetition of developer tests were performed during the independent evaluator tests.
Since many Security Functions can be tested by TR-03110 APDU command sequences,
the evaluators performed these tests with real cards. This is considered to be a reasonable
approach because the developer tests include a full coverage of all security functionality.
Furthermore penetration tests were chosen by the evaluators for those Security Functions
where internal secrets of the card could maybe be modified or observed during testing.
During their independent testing, the evaluators covered
●
testing APDU commands related to Access Control,
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●
testing APDU commands related to Identification and Authentication,
●
testing APDU commands related to the Secure Messaging Channel,
●
testing the commands which are used to execute the BAC protocol,
●
penetration testing related to verify the Reliability of the TOE,
●
source code analysis performed by the evaluators,
●
side channel analysis for SHA,
●
fault injection attacks (laser attacks),
●
testing APDU commands for the initialization, personalization and usage phase, and
●
testing APDU commands for the commands using cryptographic mechanisms.
The evaluators have tested the TOE systematically against enhanced-basic attack
potential during their penetration testing.
The achieved test results correspond to the expected test results.
8
Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081 consisting of
●
the NXP Semiconductors P5CD081V1A secure dual-interface controller with the
Secured Crypto Library V2.7,
●
the embedded software, and
●
a file system in the context of the ICAO application.
The IC embedded software consists of the operating system MTCOS 2.2 Pro EAC and an
application layer, consisting of the ICAO application.
The customer specific ROM mask is labelled by NXP Semiconductors as XRD0A1. The
name of the ROM file transferred from MaskTech to NXP Semiconductors is
mtcos_sp_v2.2_p5cd081.hex.
Since an MRTD may have different file structures here the certified configuration of the
TOE is addressed. The certified configuration of the TOE has 19 different variations due to
four different file system layouts and six different elliptic curve parameter sets (BP224r1,
BP256r1, BP320r1, NISTP224, NISTP256, NISTP384). Thus the TOE consists of the
hardware applied with the 19 different initialisation / pre-personalisation files:
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-BP224r1.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-BP256r1.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-BP320r1.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-NISTP224.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-NISTP256.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutA-NISTP384.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-BP224r1.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-BP256r1.txt
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Certification Report
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-BP320r1.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-NISTP224.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-NISTP256.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutB-NISTP384.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-BP224r1.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-BP256r1.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-BP320r1.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-NISTP224.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-NISTP256.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutC-NISTP384.txt
●
Dummy-patch0v4-FSP-initscript-LayoutD-NISTP256.txt
All files are maintained using the configuration management system Subversion. The
certified version numbers of the above mentioned scripts are
●
Layout A:
Version 7491
●
Layout B, C and D: Version 7569
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
●
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
●
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
●
Public Version of Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document and CC Supporting
Document and CCRA policies
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 35).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
●
The components ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a reevaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0702-2011, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the change of the PP
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conformance claim from BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009 [30] to BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [7]. The
TOE itself did not change.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"
Basic Access Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009,
BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009 [10]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
●
for the Assurance:
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for the
following TOE Security Functions:
●
F.Identification_Authentication
Identification / authentication of the user roles
●
F.Crypto
Interface to the DES functionality and
implementation of the used hash algorithms
●
F.IC_CL
Security Functions of the hardware (IC) as well
as of the cryptolibrary
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
Algorithm
Bit
Length
Purpose
Security
Function
Standard of
Implementation
Standard
of Usage
Validity
Period
SHA-1
-
Computing hash value
for key derivation (Basic
Access Control);
Signature verification of
ECDSA (Extended
Access Control –
Terminal Authentication)
F.Crypto
FIPS 180-2
TR-03110
[24]
-9
Triple-DES
112 bit
Secure Messaging
F.Crypto
F.IC_CL
F.Identification
_Authentication
FIPS 46-3
TR-03110
[24]
-
Retail-MAC
112 bit
Secure Messaging
F.Crypto
F.IC_CL
F.Identification
_Authentication
ISO 9797 (MAC
algorithm 3, block
cipher DES,
Sequence
Message Counter,
padding mode 2)
TR-03110
[24]
-
Table 3: Cryptografic Algorithms used by the TOE
9
The SHA-1 algorithm as well as the following cryptographic algorithms are implemented by the TOE
because of the standards building the TOE application (e.g. TR-03110 [24]). For that reason an explicit
validity period is not given for the SHA-1 and also not for the following cryptographic algorithms.
18 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
Certification Report
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). According to Technical Guideline BSI-TR-03110,
Version 1.11 [24], the algorithms are suitable for securing originality and confidentiality of
the stored data for machine readable travel documents (MRTDs).
10
Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
11
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC
Basic Access Control
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES
Embedded Software
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT
Information Technology
ITSEC
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
19 / 38
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ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDS
Logical Data Structure
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionalities
BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
20 / 38
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13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE10.
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011, Version 1.4, 26.08.2011, Security Target –
Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application” Basic Access Control
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081, MaskTech International GmbH (confidential
document)
[7]
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Basic Access Control,
Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0055-2009, BSI
[8]
Security Target lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011, Version 1.1, 28.09.2011, Security
Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application” Basic
Access Control MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081, MaskTech International GmbH
(sanitised public document)
[9]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.3, 17.10.2011, MaskTech MTCOS Pro 2.2
EAC / P5CD081, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH (confidential
document)
10
specifically
•
AIS 20, Version 2, 19. September 2011, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 7, 30 June 2011, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 8, 08 June 2011, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 2, 19. September 2011, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 7, 08 June 2011, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, 03 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
•
AIS 47, Version 1.0, 19 October 2010, Regelungen zu Site Certification
21 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
[10]
Configuration list for the TOE, Version 0.5, 28.09.2011, Configuration List of
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081, MaskTech International GmbH (confidential
document)
[11]
Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.2, 28.09.2011, User Guidance
MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081, MaskTech International GmbH
[12]
Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.03, 27.10.2010, MTCOS Standard
& Pro V2.1: Part 1 - Filesystem and Security Architecture, MaskTech International
GmbH
[13]
Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.01, 18.10.2010, MTCOS Standard
& Pro V2.1: Part 2 - Basic Access Control and Secure Messaging, MaskTech
International GmbH
[14]
Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.00, 02.04.2008, MTCOS Pro V2.1:
Part 3 - Digital Signature, MaskTech International GmbH
[15]
Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.01, 20.06.2008, MTCOS Standard
& Pro V2.1: Part 5 - Advanced Security Mechanisms Extended Access Control,
MaskTech International GmbH
[16]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009 - NXP Smart Card Controller
P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A,
P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software,
10.11.2009, BSI
[17]
ETR for composition according AIS36 – Product NXP P5CD081V1A Secure Smart
Card Controller, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Version 1.2, 17.12.2010
[18]
P5CD016/021/041/051V1A and P5Cx081V1A - Security Target Lite, BSI-DSZ-CC0555-2009, NXP, Version 1.4, 25.10.2010
[19]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0002-2009 for Inlay Production and Initialisation
of SMARTRAC Site Bangkok of SMARTRAC TECHNOLOGY Ltd. Thailand, BSI,
2009
[20]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical
Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –
1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization, LDS 1.7, 18.05.2004
[21]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable
Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October
01, 2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization
[22]
ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports.
International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006
[23]
ICAO, Machine Readable Travel Documents, Part 3 - Machine Readable Official
Travel Documents. International Civil Aviation Organization, 2006
[24]
Technical Guideline TR-03110: Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine
Readable Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, BSI,
2008
22 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
Certification Report
[25]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010 – NXP Crypto Library V2.7 on
P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A / P5CN081V1A /P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A /
P5CD016V1A, 19.11.2010, BSI
[26]
NXP Security Target Lite - Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A /
P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A, BSI-DSZ-CC-06332010, Rev. 1.2, 09.11.2010, NXP
[27]
ETR for composition - Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD081V1A / P5CC081V1A /
P5CN081V1A / P5CD041V1A / P5CD021V1A / P5CD016V1A, BSI-DSZ-CC-06332010, Version 2.0, 11.11.2010, Brightsight
[28]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0004-2010 for Assembly of Inlays and Similar
Products and Initialisation of HID Global Ireland Teoranta, BSI, 2010
[29]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0702-2011, MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081,
20.10.2011, BSI
[30]
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access
Control, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0056-2009, BSI
23 / 38
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.”
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
Assurance Class
Certification Report
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV: Development
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal highlevel design presentation
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Assurance Class
Assurance Components
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Certification Report
Assurance
Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0703-2011
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product MTCOS Pro 2.2 EAC / P5CD081 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 20 October 2011, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a)
MaskTech International GmbH, Nordostpark 16, 90411 Nuremberg, Germany
(Development and Initialisation / Pre-Personalisation)
b)
Smartrac Ltd., 142 Moo1, Hi-Tech Industrial Estate, Tambon Ban Laean,
Amphor Bang-pa-in, Phra Nakorn Si Ayutthaya, 13160 Thailand, Site
Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0002-2009 [19] (Initialisation / Pre-Personalisation)
c)
HID Global, Pairc Tionscail na Tulaigh, Baile na hAbhann, Co. Galway, Ireland,
Site Certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-S-0004-2010 [28] (Initialisation / PrePersonalisation)
For development and production sites regarding the NXP Semiconductors P5CD081V1A
secure dual-interface controller refer to the certification reports BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
[16] and BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010 [25].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] and [8]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security
objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the
Security Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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