ID One ePass V2.2 on NXP in EAC configuration with AA

ID One ePass V2.2 on NXP in EAC configuration with AA
ID One ePass V2.2 on NXP
in EAC configuration with AA
Public Security Target
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Table of contents
1
SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 6
1.1
1.2
2
SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION ....................................................................................... 6
OVERVIEW OF THE TOE..................................................................................................... 7
TOE DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................... 8
2.1
2.2
TOE USAGES................................................................................................................... 8
TOE ARCHITECTURE ......................................................................................................... 9
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.3
2.4
2.5
CHIP AND SOFTWARE COMPOSITION .....................................................................................12
TOE CONFIGURATIONS .....................................................................................................13
TOE LOGICAL STRUCTURE .................................................................................................13
2.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.6
2.7
3
Integrated Circuit (IC) ...........................................................................................10
Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) .........................................................................10
Cryptographic library .............................................................................................10
Resident application ..............................................................................................11
LDS application .....................................................................................................11
File structure of the TOE........................................................................................14
System files ..........................................................................................................14
Data files ..............................................................................................................15
NON EVALUATED FEATURES ................................................................................................15
TOE LIFE CYCLE..............................................................................................................16
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ..................................................................................... 18
3.1
3.2
3.3
4
COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE ......................................................................................18
PACKAGE CONFORMANCE ...................................................................................................18
PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE ...................................................................................18
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................... 19
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
5
ASSETS .........................................................................................................................19
THREATS .......................................................................................................................20
ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..................................................................................23
ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................23
SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................... 26
5.1
5.2
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ...................................................................................26
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .....................................................28
5.2.1
5.2.2
6
Issuing State or Organization.................................................................................28
Receiving State or Organization .............................................................................29
EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................... 31
6.1
EXTENDED FAMILIES .........................................................................................................31
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.3
6.1.4
6.1.5
7
Extended family
Extended family
Extended family
Extended family
Extended family
FAU_SAS - Audit data storage .......................................................31
FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers....................................31
FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability ...............................32
FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation ...........................................................33
FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity......................................34
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .......................................................... 36
7.1
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................36
7.1.1
7.1.2
7.2
PP EAC .................................................................................................................36
Active Authentication (AA) .....................................................................................45
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................46
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8
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION......................................................................... 47
8.1
9
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ...........................................................................................47
RATIONALES ....................................................................................................... 50
9.1
SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ......................................................50
9.1.1
9.1.2
9.1.3
9.1.4
9.2
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...............................................................58
9.2.1
9.2.2
9.3
10.1
10.2
SFRs dependencies ...............................................................................................65
SARs dependencies ...............................................................................................67
EAL RATIONALE ..............................................................................................................68
EAL AUGMENTATIONS RATIONALE ........................................................................................69
9.5.1
9.5.2
10
Objectives ............................................................................................................58
Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs.....................................................61
DEPENDENCIES ...............................................................................................................65
9.3.1
9.3.2
9.4
9.5
Threats ................................................................................................................50
Organisational Security Policies ..............................................................................52
Assumptions .........................................................................................................53
SPD and Security Objectives ..................................................................................53
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis ...........................................69
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures ...........................................................69
PP CLAIMS .......................................................................................................... 70
PP REFERENCE ................................................................................................................70
PP ADDITIONS.................................................................................................................70
11
COMPOSITION WITH IC SECURITY TARGET...................................................... 71
12
REFERENCES....................................................................................................... 75
13
ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................... 77
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List of figures
Figure 1 TOE architecture.............................................................................................................. 9
Figure 2 Memory mapping of the TOE ...........................................................................................13
Figure 3 : Structure of the file system ............................................................................................14
Figure 4 Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE ..........................................................................17
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List of tables
Tableau 1 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage..................................................................54
Tableau 2 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage..................................................................55
Tableau 3 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage ....................................................................56
Tableau 4 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage ....................................................................57
Tableau 5 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage..........58
Tableau 6 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage..........58
Tableau 7 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage.....................................................................62
Tableau 8 SFRs and Security Objectives ......................................................................................64
Tableau 9 SFRs dependencies ....................................................................................................66
Tableau 10 SARs dependencies ..................................................................................................68
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1 Security Target introduction
1.1 Security Target identification
General identification:
Title:
Bifröst Security Target EAC
Editor:
Oberthur Technologies
CC version:
3.1 revision 3
EAL:
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
PP(s):
BSI-CC-PP-056
TOE technical identification:
Name:
ePass v2.2 on ST in EAC configuration with Active Authentication
SAAAAR Rom
code:
075021
SAAAAR
Optional code:
076151
Chips identification:
IC Reference:
P5CD081 V1A of NXP
IC EAL:
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
IC Certificate:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
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1.2 Overview of the TOE
The current document aims at defining the functions and assurance security requirements which apply
to the Bifröst smartcard.
It is composed of both an Integrated Circuit (IC) and an embedded software providing secure data
management following ePassport specifications(BAC, EAC) and driving licence specifications (BAP,
EAP); this document is therefore a composite Security Target (ST).
In the following, the smartcard will be called “Target Of Evaluation” or TOE.
The TOE is a versatile device that can be easily configured in order to operate in different modes
including BAC ePassport, EAC ePassport, BAP driving licence and EAP driving licence. It possesses
a dual interface to perform contact and contactless communications to go beyond current ePassport
usages.
This device can be proposed as inlay to integrate in secure document booklet but can also be
provided in a regular credit card format especially in driving licence configurations.
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2 TOE Description
This part of the Security Target describes the TOE as an aid to the understanding of its security
requirements. It addresses the product type, the intended usage and the main features of the TOE.
2.1 TOE usages
State or organisation issues TOEs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming
associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an ePassport
configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the
holder or checking driving licence validity during a police control.
In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal TOE to the inspection
system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent
and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used
on the field.
The TOE in context of this security target contains:
• Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait
of the holder printed in the booklet
• A separate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for
visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the
Machine Readable Zone (MRZ or keydoc area)
• And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for
contact-less machine reading.
The authentication of the holder is based on:
• The possession of a valid TOE personalized for a
holder with the claimed identity as given on the
biographical data page and
• The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection
system using the reference data stored in the TOE.
When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or
Organization can performed extra authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to
some sensitive information such as “driving licence penalty points”, “visa information”…
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine TOEs. The receiving
State trusts a genuine TOE of an issuing State or Organization.
•
The TOE can be viewed as the combination:
• A physical TOE in form of paper or plastic with an embedded
chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the TOE holder
(1) The biographical data on the biographical data page
of the passport book,
(2) The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone
(MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies the device and
(3) The printed portrait.
A logical TOE as data of the TOE holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO and extended in [R6], [R7], [R8] on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents
contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the TOE holder
(4) The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1),
(5) The digitized portraits,
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(6) The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both
(7) The other data according to LDS (up to DG24) and
(8) The Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the TOE to maintain the authenticity
and integrity of the TOE and its data. The TOE as the physical device and the
MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical TOE is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on
paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the TOE’s chip) and
organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalisation
procedures). These security measures include the binding of the TOE’s chip to
the physical support.
The logical TOE is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the TOE’s
chip.
2.2 TOE architecture
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a smartcard composed of the following components:
• An underlying P5CD081 chip of NXP,
• A native “BIOS FAT full” allowing efficient access to chip functionalities,
• A dedicated highly secure cryptographic library,
• A personalisation application on top of the BIOS,
• An LDS application providing both the BAC/EAC and BAP/EAP features on top of the BIOS.
TOE
Perso
(OT)
EAC/EAP/BAC/BAP
LDS application (Oberthur Technologies)
Cryptography library
(Oberthur Technologies)
Non-evaluated
features
BIOS FAT full
(Oberthur Technologies)
P5CD081 (NXP)
Figure 1 TOE architecture1
1
OT is the acronym of Oberthur Technologies.
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2.2.1 Integrated Circuit (IC)
The TOE relies on the functional and security features of the P5CD081. This chip is designed to
embed the secure code of Oberthur Technologies for the production of smart cards.
This chip provides the following major features:
• Die integrity,
• Monitoring of environmental parameters,
• Protection mechanisms against faults,
• A FameXE Enhanced Pulbic key coprocessor especially for RSA and ECC,
• A 3DES coprocessor,
• An AES coprocessor,
• AIS-31 class P2 compliant Random Number Generator,
• A CRC calculation block.
For more details, see [R14].
2.2.2 Basic Input/Output System (BIOS)
The native BIOS of Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip features
from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi-layer design
which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip.
The main features of the OS are the following:
• EEPROM management including secure data processing,
• Other memories management,
• transaction management,
• APDU protocol management,
• Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management,
• error processing,
• advanced securities activation.
2.2.3 Cryptographic library
A dedicated cryptographic library is is designed and embedded on the TOE to provide the highest
security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms:
Feature
Embedded
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA 256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 bits
RSA CRT from 1024, to2048 bits
RSA SFM from 1024 to 2048 bits
ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521bits
3DES with 112 bits key size
AES with 128, 192, 256 key sizes
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2.2.4 Resident application
This application manages the TOE in pre-personalisation, personalisation and use phase in order to
configure the card in the expected way.
It implements and control access to the following services:
• MSK management,
• File management including data reading and writing,
• Key generation,
• Key injection,
• PIN management,
• Locks management.
The resident application can be addressed:
• in clear mode for secure environment or non-sensitive commands,
• using a 3DES or AES secure channel otherwise.
2.2.5 LDS application
The Logical Data Structure (LDS) application is a generic filesystem that can be configured to match
especially ICAO specifications for ePassports BAC and EAC and ISO specifications for IDL BAP and
EAP.
It also includes commands and protocol management specified in [R15] used to grant access to
sensitive data stored in the filesystem.
Here are the main features provided by the LDS application and present in the evaluation scope:
Feature
Embedded
BAC
In the ST scope2
3
EAC
Active Authentication
(RSA CRT/SFM and ECC)
Cryptosystem migration
(Algorithm change during
certificate verification
transaction)
BAP
References
[R1],[R2], [R3], [R5]
R1],[R2], [R3], [R4],
[R5]
[R1],[R2], [R3], [R5]
R1],[R2], [R3], [R4],
[R5]
[R6], [R7], [R8]
EAP
[R6], [R7], [R8]
2.2.5.1 Basic Access Control (BAC)
The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection
system
• reads the printed data in the MRZ (for ePassport),
2
Features not included in the present Security Target are covered in the context of other CC certificates of the
same product.
3
BAC is included in the scope through an objective on the environment.
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•
authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After
successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC
rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
2.2.5.2 Basic Access Protection (BAP)
The Basic Access Protection (BAP) is especially used in the context of IDL as an alternative to BAC.
Indeed it is actually a generalisation of BAC allowing usage of extra algorithms and key length. It
exists in 4 modes:
• BAP1 - 3DES with key length of 128 bits (equivalent to BAC),
• BAP2 - AES with key length of 128 bits,
• BAP3 - AES with key length of 192 bits,
• BAP4 - AES with key length of 256 bits.
Note that the term MRZ is specific to ICAO standard; [R8] uses the term “Keydoc” which refers to an
equivalent unique identifier printed on the physical TOE as a random number or barcode.
2.2.5.3 Active Authentication (AA)
The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that
the TOE has not been substituted, by means of a challenge-response protocol between the inspection
system and the TOE. For this purpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA or ECC
Key pair. A hash representation of Data Group 15 (DG15, see 2.5.1) Public Key is stored in the
Document Security Object (SOD, see 2.5.1) and therefore authenticated by the issuer’s digital
signature. The corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE’s secure memory.
The TOE supports the loading and generation of the Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair.
2.2.5.4 Extended Access Control (EAC)
The Extended Access Control (EAC) enhances the later security features and ensures a strong
and mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access
biometric data such as fingerprints and iris stored in DG3 and DG4. In particular, the authentication
steps ensures a strong secure channel able to provide confidentiality of the biometric data that are
read and authentication of the Inspection system retrieving the date to perform a Match on Terminal
comparison. The Extended Access Control authentication steps the TOE implements may be
performed either with elliptic curve cryptography, or with RSA cryptography.
2.2.5.5 Extended Access Protection (EAP)
The Extended Access Protection (EAP) extends EAC to allow a more flexible protocol. It can protect
up to 24 DGs (from 1 to 24) and is no more restricted to DG3 and 4. In addition, it is possible to send
more than 2 certificates to the TOE in order to gain extra access rights.
2.3 Chip and software composition
The TOE contains an auto-programmable microcomputer (IC) with non-volatile EEPROM memory,
permitting the storing of secret or confidential data, and with associated circuits that ensure its
protection. The IC also integrates a ROM memory which embeds the code software of the smartcard.
In order to ensure a secure composition between IC and software, the chip is configured and used
according to the security requirements specified in the datasheet and associated guides. This
especially specifies the secure way to manage IC memory.
The optional code or “codop” is an executable code that is stored in the EEPROM of the chip. This
code is called by the Resident Application when needed. These data are loaded during the prepersonalisation phase after the authentication of the manufacturer. Once an optional code is loaded, it
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is not possible to load any other optional code whether the TOE is in pre-personalisation phase or
personalisation phase. The TOE ensures the optional code’s integrity and that it can not be read from
the outside.
In order to configure the available features of the product a One-Time Programmable (OTP) area is
present (see 2.4). It can be written only once and cannot be erased afterward.
Memory adresses
Data (File system)
Executable code
software
ROM
Codop area
EEPROM
Figure 2 Memory mapping of the TOE
2.4 TOE Configurations
The application locks are within a particular area of the EEPROM memory. It is called OTP (One
Time Programmable). When the TOE is delivered, all the bits of this area are set to ‘0’. Theses
bits may be set (to “1”) in pre-personalisation phase or personalisation phase after the agent
authentication (Manufacturer or Personnalizer). Once a bit is set to “1” in this area, it can not be
reset anymore. This area is used to select the configuration of the TOE, in particular:
• If the BAC/BAP is enforced in used phase (‘0’ = not enforced/’1’ = enforced)
• If the EAC is enforced in used phase (‘0’ = not enforced/’1’ = enforced)
• If the EAP is enforced in used phase (‘0’ = not enforced/’1’ = enforced)
• If the Get Data command is disabled (‘0’ = enabled/’1’ = disabled)
• If the Active authentication is activated (‘0’ = not activated/’1’ = activated)
• To indicate the TOE was pre-personalised (‘1’ = pre-personalised)
• To indicate the TOE was personalised (‘1’ = personalized)
These OTP bytes are protected in integrity as they are copied in EEPROM too.
Final configuration of the product is set by activating one or several of the five first locks. The product
is in use phase when the two last locks are activated. Since BAC is a BAP configuration, the two ones
have been merged into a unique lock. Nevertheless, usage of AES keys identifies BAP configuration.
Note that in order to be functional, a correct and consistent personalisation of the TOE must be
performed.
2.5
TOE logical structure
Roughly, the embedded application, when powered, is seen as a master file, containing a Dedicated
file (DF) for the LDS.
This dedicated file is selected by means of the Application Identifier (AID) of the LDS application. Once
the LDS dedicated files are selected, the file structure it contains may be accessed, provided the
access conditions are fulfilled.
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2.5.1 File structure of the TOE
Figure 3 : Structure of the file system
The TOE distinguish between two types of files
• System files,
• Data files that store data that are visible from the outside.
Basically, system files and data files are files handled by the Resident Application. The Resident
Application handles their creation and management. Both types have the following characteristics:
• Size, size reserved within the EEPROM for the content of this file,
• EF ID, Elementary File Identifier of the file within the file structure,
• SFI, Short File Identifier used for an easy file selection. It is only used for data files,
• Access conditions, it specify under which conditions the file may be accessed (read never,
read always...).
2.5.2 System files
System files are dedicated to store sensitive data that are used by the application. These data are
protected in integrity by means of a checksum. Theses files may be created and updated in prepersonalisation or personalisation phase. Files containing keys are never readable.
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Once created, these files are used by the Dedicated File LDS to work properly. They have to be
created before any use of the application.
In particular, theses files are used to store:
• The active authentication public key needed to perform the active authentication,
• The active authentication private key needed to perform the active authentication,
• The keys needed to perform BAC, BAP, EAC and EAP,
• The list of the application present on the card.
2.5.3 Data files
Data files also called Elementary files (EF) or Data Groups (DG) are dedicated to store data that may
be retrieved. They are protected in integrity by means of a checksum and can be created or updated
either in pre-personalisation or in personalisation phase. They are also created in such a way they can
only be read or write in use phase, provided authentications specified in access rights are performed.
All personalisation configurations are possible including BAC and EAC. Nevertheless, Data Files
usually considered are the following:
• EF.COM which describes which DGs are present in the file structure,
• EF.SOD which contains a certificate computed over the whole DGs. It ensures their integrity &
authenticity,
• DG1 up to DG24 which contains information about the holder (picture, name…) and key
required to perform authentications.
2.6
Non evaluated features
Some features of the product are put out of the evaluation scope and are therefore not part
of the TOE. Here is the complete list of those functionalities:
• Supplemental Access Control,
• Standard and biometric PIN management (therefore PIN associated commands are
out of scope),
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2.7 TOE life cycle
The Smart card life-cycle considered hereby, is the one described in [R13]. This protection profile is
decomposed into 7 phases, described hereafter, whose only first three ones defined the TOE
evaluation scope.
This life cycle is related to the different phases the designer/manufacturer/issuer has to go through to
get a smart card ready to use. It starts from the design till the end of usage of the card.
Note that [R10] and [R11] define an anternative lifecycle almost equivalent (phases in [R13] are steps
in [R10] and [R11]) except this only difference:
•
Step 4 in [R10] and [R11], correspond to phase 4 of [R10] and [R11] and blocks
‘Micromodule”, “testing” and “Embedding” in phase 5 of [R10] and [R11],
•
Step 5 in [R10] and [R11] correspond to the only next blocks “Personnalisation” and “Testing”
in phase 5 of [R10] and [R11].
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It is depicted in the figure below:
Personalisation and PreTOE scope
TOE usage
phase 1
S o ftw a re d ev e lop m en t
of the m a sk
L ev a ll o i s
N a n te rr e
P es sa c
S o ftw a re d ev e lo pm en t
o f th e fu nc tio na l p a tch
phase 2
IC p ho to m a sk
fa b ric a tio n
IC d a ta b ase
c o n stru c tio n
phase 3
IC
m an u fa c tu rin g
IC te sting
TO E
D e li v e ry
phase 4
phase 5
C a rd p rin tin g
T e stin g
m ic ro m o du le
Em be d d ing
P a tch sec u re
lo ad i ng
P re -p e rso n a lisa tion
phase 6
phase 7
Te sting
T esting
Pe rso na lisatio n
S m a rtc a rd pro d uc t
E nd -usa g e
A p p lica tio n
E nd -usa g e
Sm a rtc a rd
En d o f life
A p p lica tio n
E n d o f life
Figure 4 Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE
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3 Conformance claims
3.1 Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target (ST) is CC Part 2 extended [R35] and CC Part 3 conformant [R36] and written
according to the Common Criteria version 3.1 Part 1 [R34].
3.2 Package conformance
This ST is conformant to the EAL5 package as defined in [R36].
The EAL5 have been augmented with the following requirements to fulfill the Oberthur Technologies
assurance level:
Requirement
Name
Type
ALC_DVS.2
Sufficiency of security measures
Higher hierarchical component
AVA_VAN.5
Advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis
Higher hierarchical component
3.3 Protection Profile conformance
The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 2:
• Machine Readable Travel Documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control
[R11].
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4 Security problem definition
4.1
Assets
Logical MRTD data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different
security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These
data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with
the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRTD
holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the inspection system
for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive
Authentication of the logical MRTD.
The current EAC Security Target is dedicated to the protection of both Active
Authentication EF.DG15 (see below) and sensitive biometric EF.DG3&4. The other one
(and associated keys) are described and managed in the related BAC Security Target.
The Active Authentication Public Key Info in EF.DG15 is used by the inspection system for
Active Authentication of the chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection
system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
All these data may be sorted out in two different categories.
o If they are specific to the user, they are User data,
o If they ensures the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data.
User data
CPLC Data
Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered
as user data as they enable to track the holder
Sensitive biometric reference
data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Contain the fingerprint and the iris picture
Chip Authentication Public Key in
EF.DG14
Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip
thanks to a chip authentication
Active Authentication Public Key
in EF.DG15
Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip
thanks to an active authentication
TSF data
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TOE_ID
Data enabling to identify the TOE
Personalisation Agent
reference authentication Data
Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation
agent (same as BAC ST)
Basic Access Control (BAC)
Key
Master keys used to established a trusted channel between
the Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document
(same as BAC ST)
Chip Authentication private
Key
Private key the chip uses to perform a chip authentication
Active Authentication private Private key the chip uses to perform an active authentication
key
Session keys for the secure
channel
Session keys used to protect the communication in
confidentiality and in integrity
Life Cycle State
Life Cycle state of the TOE
Public Key CVCA
Trust point of the travel document stored in persistent
memory
CVCA Certificate
All the data related to the CVCA key (expiration date,
name,..) stored in persistent memory
Current Date
Current date of the travel document
Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for
the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
4.2
Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication interface of the MRTD's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar
to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [R10]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface)
and the motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD's chip) but differs from those in the
asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait
and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and
therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data
are stored only on the MRTD's chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ
data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical MRTD as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys,
being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data
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T.Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any
part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by
means of the changed MRTD holder's identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter
the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed
MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter
the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the
inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face
recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated
biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine
data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker
writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the
logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD's chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged
to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete
unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T.Counterfeit
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This
violates the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveller by
possession of a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from
a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine
MRTD's chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in
"Operational Use" phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore,
bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose
or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during
its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be
inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
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Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements.
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely
related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from
measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by
contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to
the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic
Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may
try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault
Analysis).
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD's chip in order (i)
to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD's chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD's chip in order to (i) modify security features
or functions of the MRTD's chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD's chip
Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE
User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g.
authentication key of the MRTD"' chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD's
chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and
layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including
treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be
permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD's chip
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify
security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security
functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD's chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD"s chip Embedded Software or misusing
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information
about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
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4.3
Organisational Security Policies
P.BAC-PP
The issuing States or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic
Inspection Systems have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the
"ICAO Doc 9303" [R2] as well as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The
MRTD is successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic
Access Control" [R10] in order to ensure the confidentiality of standard user data and
preventing the traceability of the MRTD data.
P.Sensitive_Data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are
sensitive private personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference
data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the
time the MRTD is presented to the inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The
issuing State or Organization authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to
manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document
Verifier Certificate. The MRTD's chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the
sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection
System after Chip Authentication.
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the
logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the
holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection
All the sensitive data are at least protected in integrity. The keys are protected in both
integrity and confidentiality.
Application note:
DG3 and DG4 protection is managed by P.Sensitive_data.
P.Key_Function
All the cryptographic routines are designed in such a way that they are protected against
probing and do not cause any information leakage that may be used by an attacker.
4.4
Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
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A.MRTD_Manufact
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that
security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent
any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
o Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage,
o Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage,
o Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have
got the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRTD with respect to
the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication
Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD's chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public
Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD"s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the
Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent
Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic
mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
the Basic Access Control [R2]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD
under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical
MRTD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the
Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity
of the MRTD's chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys
established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in
addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document
Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
A.Signature_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely
generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country
Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA
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FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i)
generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public Key
to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses
securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of
the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer
Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
A.Auth_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for
card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold
authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control
rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or
Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document
Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving
States or Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations distribute the public keys of
their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD's chip.
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5 Security Objectives
5.1
Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met
by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF
data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The
Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in
the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
OT.Data_Int
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the
logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip
Authentication.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data
(EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection
Systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System
Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the
authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the
Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the
Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data
shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Identification
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its
nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the
IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The
storage of the Pre- Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent
Key(s).
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization
by means of the Chip Authentication as defined in [R2]. The authenticity proof provided by
MRTD’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
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OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test
and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii)
manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC
Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or
functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the
Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored
and/or processed in the MRTD's chip
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with high attack potential by means of
o measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
o measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
o manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include
external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency,
or temperature.
OT.Chip_Authenticity
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's
chip. The TOE stores a RSA or ECC private key to prove its identity, and that is used in
chip authentication. This mechanism is described in [R1] as "Active Authentication".
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5.2
5.2.1
Security objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its
manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including
the following objectives:
o non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
o identification of the element under delivery,
o meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
o physical protection to prevent external damage,
o secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE's),
o traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
origin and shipment details,
reception, reception acknowledgement,
location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality
convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge
to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above
expectations.
OE.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder
and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical
and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute
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FQR 110 5770 Ed1
the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations
maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i)
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the
Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a
secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document
Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the
Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in
the LDS according to [R2].
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the MRTD's Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the
Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14
and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the
authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip
Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD's holders to
authorized receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority
of the issuing State or Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier
Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
OE.BAC-PP
It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally
successfully evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection
Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access
Control" [R10]. This is necessary to cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality
of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data. Note that due to
the differences within the assumed attack potential the addressed evaluation and
certification is a technically separated process.
5.2.2
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements
the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2]. Additionally General Inspection
Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to
verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD's chip.
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OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the
traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the
signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical
MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the
Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their
authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent
eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is
successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended
Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive
biometric reference data of the logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System
authenticates themselves to the MRTD's chip for access to the sensitive biometric
reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System
Certificate.
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FQR 110 5770 Ed1
6 Extended requirements
6.1
6.1.1
Extended families
Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
6.1.1.1 Description
see [PP-0055].
6.1.1.2 Extended components
Extended component FAU_SAS.1
Description
see [PP-0055].
Definition
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to
store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale
see [PP-0055].
6.1.1.3 Rationale
see [PP-0055].
6.1.2
Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
6.1.2.1 Description
see [PP-0055].
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FQR 110 5770 Ed1
6.1.2.2 Extended components
Extended component FCS_RND.1
Description
See [PP-0055].
Definition
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale
See [PP-0055].
6.1.2.3 Rationale
see [PP-0055].
6.1.3
Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability
6.1.3.1 Description
See [PP-0055].
6.1.3.2 Extended components
Extended component FMT_LIM.1
Description
See [PP-0055].
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FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Definition
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Rationale
See [PP-0055].
Extended component FMT_LIM.2
Description
See [PP-0055].
Definition
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
Rationale
See [PP-0055].
6.1.3.3 Rationale
See [PP-0055].
6.1.4
Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
6.1.4.1 Description
See [PP-0055].
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6.1.4.2 Extended components
Extended component FPT_EMS.1
Description
See [PP-0055].
Definition
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale
See [PP-0055].
6.1.4.3 Rationale
See [PP-0055].
6.1.5
Extended family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity
6.1.5.1 Description
See [R11]§5.3 for more details.
6.1.5.2 Extended components
Extended component FIA_API.1
Description
See [R11]§5.3 for more details.
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FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Definition
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale
See [R11]§5.3 for more details.
6.1.5.3 Rationale
See [R11]§5.3 for more details.
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FQR 110 5770 Ed1
7 Security Functional Requirements
7.1
Security Functional Requirements
Definitions of security attributes, keys and certificated referred in this section can be foun din
[R11]§6.
7.1.1
PP EAC
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Diffie Hellman or Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellmann
and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that meet the following: [R4], Annex A.1.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 ans SHA-512 and
cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SYM The TSF shall perform secure messaging - encryption and
decryption
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES and cryptographic key
sizes 112 bits that meet the following: TR-03110 [R4].
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FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging - message authentication
code
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm MAC Algo 3 and cryptographic
key sizes 112 bits that meet the following: TR-03110 [R4].
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or RSASSAPSS or ECDSA with SHA algorithms as specified in FCS_COP.1/SHA and
cryptographic key sizes
o 1024 to 2048 bits (by steps of 256 bits) for RSA,
o 192 to 521 bits over characteristic p curves for ECDSA
that meet the following:
o [R24] and [R24] for RSASSA,
o [R17], [R18], [R19] for ECDSA.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
the requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following
AIS 31 [R31].
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o 1. to establish the communication channel,
o 2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
o 3. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol,
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o 1. to establish the communication channel,
o 2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
o 3. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key,
o 4. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol,
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
o 1. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
o 2. Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES.
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
o 1. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
o 2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
o 3. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
o 1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key,
o 2. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only
received commands with correct message authentication code sent by
means of secure messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of
the Chip Authentication Mechanism,
o 3. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented
during the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging
established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
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FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command
sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall be
verified as being sent by the GIS.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according to [R4] to
prove the identity of the TOE.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write,
read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
and Active Authentication private key of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects based on
the following:
o 1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Extended Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
o 2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD,
c. data in EF.COM,
d. data in EF.SOD,
e. Active Authentication public key,
o 3. Security attributes:
a. authentication status of terminals,
b. Terminal Authorization.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o 1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write
and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD, including the Active Authenticate public Key,
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o 2. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read
access to DG3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder
authorization encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 of the logical
MRTD.
o 3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read
access to DG4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization
encoding is allowed to read the data in EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
o 1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG3,
o 2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG4,
o 3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
o 4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
o 5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
o 6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection
System is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG3 to EF.DG4 of the logical
MRTD.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after
Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion,
insertion and replay errors after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user
data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip
Authentication.
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FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
o 1. Initialization,
o 2. Pre-personalization,
o 3. Personalization.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
o 1. Manufacturer,
o 2. Personalization Agent,
o 3. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
o 4. Document Verifier,
o 5. Domestic Extended Inspection System,
o 6. Foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o 1. User Data to be manipulated,
o 2. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
o 3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o 4. software to be reconstructed and,
o 5. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o 1. User Data to be manipulated,
o 2. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
o 3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o 4. software to be reconstructed and,
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o 5. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which
may enable other attacks.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the the Initialization Data
and Prepersonalization Data to the Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to
the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
o 1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o 2. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
o 3. initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
o 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o 2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current date to
o 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
o 2. Document Verifier,
o 3. domestic Extended Inspection System.
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FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic
Access Keys and Active Authentication private key to Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load the Chip
Authentication Private Key to respectively the Manufacturer Agent and the
Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
o 1. Document Basic Access keys,
o 2. Chip Authentication Private key,
o 3. Personalization Agent Keys,
o 4. Active Authentication private key
to none.
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the
certificate chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol
and the Access Control.
Refinement:
The certificate chain is valid if and only if
o (1) the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration
date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the
TOE,
o (2) the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before
the Current Date of the TOE,
o (3) the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate
of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the
TOE.
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The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a
valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the
Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a
valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful
authenticated Extended Inspection System.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during
command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
Personalization Agent Keys and Active Authentication private key.
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent
Keys and Active Authentication private key.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
o 1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a
malfunction could occur,
o 2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions
o At reset
o Before the first execution of the optional code,
o After the Active Authentication is computed,
o Before any cryptographic operation,
o When accessing a DG or any EF,
o Prior to any use of TSF data,
o Before execution of any command,
o When performing a BAC authentication,
o When using the CVCA Root key,
o When verifying a certificate with an extracted public key µ,
o When performing the Chip Authentication,
o When performing a Terminal authentication,
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
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FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity
of TSF executable code.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
7.1.2
Active Authentication (AA)
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used
as a guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of the
validity of the indicated information.
Refinement:
Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the Active Authentication protocol.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_MRTD The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA CRT or ECDSA with SHA1, SHA-224,
SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 and cryptographic key sizes
o 1024 to 2048 bits for RSA CRT (by steps of 256bits),
o 192, 256, 384 and 512 bits for ECDSA,
that meet the following:
o scheme 1 of [R20] for RSA CRT,
o [R17], [R18], [R19] for ECC.
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FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP when importing
user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data
when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions TSF
Active Authentication to Personalization Agent.
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/ASYM The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA & ECC and specified cryptographic
key sizes
o 1024, 1536 and 2048 for RSA,
o 192bits, 224bits, 256 bits, 384 bits and 512 bits over characteristic p curves
for ECC
that meet the following: [R20], [R21], [R22], [R23].
7.2
Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirement level is EAL5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and
ALC_DVS.2.
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8 TOE Summary Specification
8.1
TOE Summary Specification
Access Control in reading
This function controls access to read functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security
policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to
access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle
state.
It ensures that at any time, the keys are never readable:
o BAC keys,
o Chip authentication keys,
o CVCA keys,
o Active Authentication private key,
o Personalisation agent keys.
It controls access to the CPLC data as well:
o It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase,
o It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization
step.
Regarding the file structure:
In the operational use:
o The terminal can read user data (except DG3 & 4), the Document Security Object,
the EF.CVCA, EF.COM only after BAC authentication and throught a valid secure
channel,
o When the EAC was successfully performed, The terminal can only read the DG3 &
4 provided the access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channel.
In the personalisation phase:
o The personalisation agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is
authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
o The TOE is uniquely identified by a random number, generated at each reset. This
unique identifier is called (PUPI)
It ensures as well that no other part of the EEPROM can be accessed at anytime.
Access Control in writing
This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security
policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the
access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in
personalization phase to be set to "1".
It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is
personalized and that it is not possible to load an optional code or change the
personnaliser authentication keys in personalization phase.
Regarding the file structure
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In the operational use: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files).
Furthermore, it is not possible to update any system files. However
o the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs,
o the Root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the
application according to the authentication mechanism described in [R4].
In the personalisation phase
o The personalisation agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all
the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication
keys).
EAC mechanism
This security functionality ensures the EAC is correctly performed. In particular,
o it handles the certificate verification,
o the management of access rights to DG3 & DG4,
o the management of the current date (update and control towards the expiration
date of the incoming certificate),
o the signature verification (in the certificate or in the challenge/response
mechanism).
It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip authentication keys &
Root CVCA key(s) the Personnalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase.
Furthermore, this security functionalities ensures the authentication is performed as
described in [R4].
This security functionalities ensures the session keys for secure messaging are destroyed
at each successful Chip Authentication step.
The TOE handles an error counter; after several failure in attempting to strongly
authenticate the GIS (the error limit is reached). The TOE also implements
countermeasures to protect the TOE; it takes more and more time for the TOE to reply to
subsequent wrong GIS authentication attempts.
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality & integrity of the channel the TOE
and the IFD are using to communicate.
After a successful BAC authentication and successful Chip authentication, a secure
channel is (re)established based on Triple DES algorithms.
This security functionality ensures
o No commands were inserted nor deleted within the data flow,
o No commands were modified,
o The data exchanged remain confidential,
o The issuer of the incoming commands and the destinatory of the outgoing data is
the one that was authenticated (through BAC or EAC).
If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.
Personalisation Agent Authentication
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization Agent,
demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a
symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm.
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Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in
[R1] & [R2]. (if it is activated by the personnalizer). A self-test on the random generator is
performed priori to any Active authentication. Moreover, this security functionality is
protected against the DFA.
Self tests
The TOE performs self tests on the TSF data it stores to protect the TOE. In particular, it
is in charge of the:
o DFA detection for the Active authentication,
o Self tests of the random generator before the BAC and Active Authentication,
o Self tests of the DES before the BAC,
o Monitoring of the integrity of keys, files and TSF data,
o Monitoring the integrity of the optional code (at start up),
o Protecting the cryptographic operation.
The integrity of the files are monitored each time they are accessed and the integrity of
the optional code is checked each time the TOE is powered on.
The integrity of keys and sensitive data is checked each time they are used/accessed.
Safe state management
This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets bask to a secure state when
o an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS,
o a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM).
This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in
the state "kill card" or becomes mute.
Physical protection
This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.
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9 Rationales
9.1
9.1.1
Security objectives and Security Problem Definition
Threats
T.Read_Sensitive_Data The threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric
reference data” is countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf "Confidentiality of
sensitive biometric reference data" requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4
(containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection
systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s
confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the
issuing State or Organization as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data "Authorization for
use of sensitive biometric reference data". The Document Verifier of the receiving State
has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System
certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems".
T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery "Forgery of data on MRTD's chip" addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD" requires the TOE to
limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf.
OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering". The examination of the
presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the
MRTD passport book" shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive
contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE
environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature
which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign "Authentication of logical MRTD
by Signature" and verified by the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
"Verification by Passive Authentication".
T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit "MRTD's chip" addresses the attack of unauthorized
copy or reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an
identification and authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “"roof of MRTD’' chip
authentication" using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or
Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and
signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
"MRTD Authentication Key". According to OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD
passport book" the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication
Protocol to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip.
This attack is also thwarted by active authentication proving the authenticity of the chip as
required by OT.Chip_Authenticity "Protection against forgery" using a authentication key
pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public active Authentication
Key has to be written into EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects.
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T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func "Abuse of Functionality" addresses attacks using
the MRTD's chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to
manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
"Protection against Abuse of Functionality". Additionally this objective is supported by the
security objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization "Personalization of logical
MRTD" ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the
personalization are disabled and the security functions for the operational state after
delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing MRTD’s
functionality to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for the TOE
OT.Prot_Abuse- Func “Protection against abuse of functionality” ensures that the usage of
functions which may not be used in the “Operational Use” phase is effectively prevented.
Therefore attacks intending to abuse functionality in order to disclose or manipulate critical
(User) Data or to affect the TOE in such a way that security features or TOE’s functions
may be bypassed, deactivated, changed or explored shall be effectively countered.
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T.Information_Leakage The threat T.Information_Leakage "Information Leakage from
MRTD"s chip" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high
attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly
related security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information Leakage".
T.Phys-Tamper The threat T.Phys-Tamper "Physical Tampering" is typical for integrated
circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the
TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering".
T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction "Malfunction due to EnvironmentalStress" is typical
for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The
protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security
objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions".
9.1.2
Organisational Security Policies
P.BAC-PP The OSP P.BAC-PP is directly addressed by the OE.BAC-PP.
P.Sensitive_Data The OSP P.Sensitive_Data "Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data"
is fulfilled by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf "Confidentiality of sensitive biometric
reference data" requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the
sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems.
Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s
confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the
issuing State or Organization as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data "Authorization for
use of sensitive biometric reference data". The Document Verifier of the receiving State
has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System
certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems".
P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact "Manufacturing of the MRTD"s chip" requires a unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Prepersonalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
P.Personalization The OSP P.Personalization "Personalization of the MRTD by issuing
State or Organization only" addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization "Personalization of logical MRTD", and (ii) the access control for the
user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access
Control for Personalization of logical MRTD". Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with
the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification "Identification and
Authentication of the TOE". The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of
TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection The OSP P.Sensitive_data_Protection requires data to be
protected in integrity as fullfilled by OT.Data_Int. Concerning keys, they must be protected
in confidentiality in any cases as ensured by OT.Prot_Inf_Leak.
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P.Key_Function The OSP P.Key_function requires cryptographic algorithms to be protected
against tampering as it enforced for the whole TOE by OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper and also
designed in order to avoid data leakage as ensured by OT.Prot_Inf_Leak.
9.1.3
Assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact "MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to
6" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact
"Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing" that requires to use security procedures during
all manufacturing steps.
A.MRTD_Delivery The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery "MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6" is
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery
"Protection of the MRTD delivery" that requires to use security procedures during delivery
steps of the MRTD.
A.Pers_Agent The assumption A.Pers_Agent "Personalization of the MRTD"s chip" is
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization
"Personalization of logical MRTD" including the enrolment, the protection with digital
signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
A.Insp_Sys The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD passport
book". The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
"Protection of data from the logical MRTD" will require the Basic Inspection System to
implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the
transmission and the internal handling.
A.Signature_PKI The assumption A.Signature_PKI "PKI for Passive Authentication" is
directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
"Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature" covering the necessary procedures for the
Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of
the signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the
MRTD passport book".
A.Auth_PKI The assumption A.Auth_PKI "PKI for Inspection Systems" is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data "Authorization for use
of sensitive biometric reference data" requires the CVCA to limit the read access to
sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving
States or Organizations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems "Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems" to authorize
Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure.
9.1.4
SPD and Security Objectives
Threats
Security Objectives
53
Rationale
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Threats
Security Objectives
Rationale
T.Read_Sensitive_Data OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section 6.1.1
T.Forgery
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper, Section 6.1.1
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_MRTD,
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
T.Counterfeit
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof, OT.Chip_Authenticity,
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD, OE.Exam_MRTD
Section 6.1.1
T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Section 6.1.1
T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Section 6.1.1
T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Section 6.1.1
T.Malfunction
OT.Prot_Malfunction
Section 6.1.1
Tableau 1 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage
54
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Security Objectives
Threats
OT.AC_Pers
T.Forgery
OT.Data_Int
T.Forgery
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
T.Counterfeit
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.PhysTamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
T.Malfunction
OT.Chip_Authenticity
T.Counterfeit
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
T.Forgery
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
T.Counterfeit
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Dat T.Read_Sensitive_Data
a
OE.BAC-PP
OE.Exam_MRTD
T.Forgery, T.Counterfeit
OE.Passive_Auth_Veri T.Forgery
f
OE.Prot_Logical_MRT
D
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Tableau 2 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage
55
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Organisational Security
Policies
Security Objectives
P.BAC-PP
OE.BAC-PP
Section 6.1.2
P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data,
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section 6.1.2
P.Manufact
OT.Identification
Section 6.1.2
P.Personalization
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification,
OE.Personalization
Section 6.1.2
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection
OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Section 6.1.2
P.Key_Function
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Section 6.1.2
Rationale
Tableau 3 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage
56
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Security Objectives
Organisational Security Policies
OT.AC_Pers
P.Personalization
OT.Data_Int
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Identification
P.Manufact, P.Personalization
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection,
P.Key_Function
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper P.Key_Function
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Chip_Authenticity
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
OE.Personalization
P.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Dat P.Sensitive_Data
a
OE.BAC-PP
P.BAC-PP
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Veri
f
OE.Prot_Logical_MRT
D
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems P.Sensitive_Data
Tableau 4 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage
57
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Assumptions
Security objectives for the Operational Environment
Rationale
A.MRTD_Manufact OE.MRTD_Manufact
Section 6.1.3
A.MRTD_Delivery
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
Section 6.1.3
A.Pers_Agent
OE.Personalization
Section 6.1.3
A.Insp_Sys
OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
Section 6.1.3
A.Signature_PKI
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_MRTD
Section 6.1.3
A.Auth_PKI
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data, OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Section 6.1.3
Tableau 5 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage
Security objectives for the Operational
Environment
Assumptions
OE.MRTD_Manufact
A.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
A.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization
A.Pers_Agent
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
A.Signature_PKI
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
A.Auth_PKI
OE.BAC-PP
A.Insp_Sys,
A.Signature_PKI
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
A.Insp_Sys
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
A.Auth_PKI
Tableau 6 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage
9.2
9.2.1
Security requirements and security objectives
Objectives
9.2.1.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of
logical MRTD' addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write
access to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the successfully authenticated
Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD only once. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
58
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
(including Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic
Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference
data for Basic Access Control.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. If the Personalization Terminal want to
authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after
Chip Authentication) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according
to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA
(for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication), and
FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging),
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol) and FIA_UAU.6
(for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate itself to
the TOE by means of the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization
Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the
challenge) and FCS_COP.1/SYM (to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys
are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the
Personalization Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT_EMS.1 the
confidentially of these keys.
OT.Data_Int The security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" requires the TOE
to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is
defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the
Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The Personalization Agent
must identify and authenticate themselves according to FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 before
accessing these data. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists
the TSF management functions.
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical
MRTD data after Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as
Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6. The SFR FIA_UAU.6 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the integrity
protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging
implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1 (for the generation
of shared secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging.
The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf "Confidentiality of
sensitive biometric reference data" is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read
by successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a validly
verifiable certificate according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires the identification and authentication of the
inspection systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the successful Chip Authentication
(CA) before any authentication attempt as Extended Inspection System. During the
59
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
protected communication following the CA the reuse of authentication data is prevented
by FIA_UAU.4.The SFR FIA_UAU.6 and FDP_UCT.1 requires the confidentiality
protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging
implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the generation
of the terminal authentication challenge), FCS_CKM.1 (for the generation of shared
secret), FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging.
The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication
Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA's public key
and certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified
role as of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
OT.Identification The security objective OT.Identification "Identification and Authentication
of the TOE" address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the
MRTD's chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR
FAU_SAS.1.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data
and Pre-personalization Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their
usage in the phase 4 "Operational Use" violates the security objective OT.Identification.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof "Proof of MRTD's chip
authenticity" is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1
proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1
is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol [R4]
requires additional TSF according to FCS_COP.1/SHA (for the derivation of the session
keys), FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging).
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func "Protection against
Abuse of Functionality" is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE
Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information
Leakage" requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in
the MRTD's chip against disclosure
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1
and FPT_TST.1, and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_PHP.3.
60
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against
Physical Tampering" is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against
Malfunctions" is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to
demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of
TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in
case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.Chip_Authenticity The security objective OT.Chip_Authenticity "Protection against
forgery" is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA
and provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 proving the identity and
authenticity of the TOE. The Active Authentication relies on FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1. It is performed using a TOE internally stored
confidential
private
key
as
required
by
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, this key being loaded during personalization phase as required
by FDP_ITC.1/AA or generated on-card by FCS_CKM.1/ASYM.
9.2.2
Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs
Security Objectives
Security Functional Requirements
OT.AC_Pers
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FPT_EMS.1,
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER,
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1
OT.Data_Int
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/MAC, Section 6.2.1
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_ACC.1,
FDP_ACF.1, FDP_UIT.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SYM, FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UID.1,
FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6,
FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_UCT.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE,
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK, FMT_MTD.3
Section 6.2.1
OT.Identification
FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Section 6.2.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/SYM,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FIA_API.1, FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Section 6.2.1
61
Rationale
Section 6.2.1
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Security Objectives
Security Functional Requirements
Rationale
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
Section 6.2.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3
Section 6.2.1
OT.Prot_PhysTamper
FPT_PHP.3
Section 6.2.1
OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1
Section 6.2.1
OT.Chip_Authenticity FCS_CKM.1/ASYM, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1, Section 6.2.1
FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,
FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD,
FMT_MOF.1/AA
Tableau 7 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage
62
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Security Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
FAU_SAS.1
OT.Identification
FCS_CKM.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_CKM.4
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Data_Int
FCS_COP.1/SHA
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Authenticity,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/SYM
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/MAC
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FCS_RND.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Sens_Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FIA_UID.1
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.AC_Pers,
OT.Data_Int
FIA_UAU.1
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Data_Int,
OT.AC_Pers
FIA_UAU.4
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.5
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.6
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FIA_API.1
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FDP_ACC.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Authenticity
FDP_ACF.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Authenticity
FDP_UCT.1
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FDP_UIT.1
OT.Data_Int
FMT_SMF.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int
FMT_SMR.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int
FMT_LIM.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_LIM.2
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
OT.Identification
63
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Security Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Chip_Authenticity
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof,
OT.Data_Int
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int,
OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Authenticity,
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
FMT_MTD.3
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
FPT_EMS.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
FPT_FLS.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_TST.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_PHP.3
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
FDP_DAU.1/AA
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FDP_ITC.1/AA
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FMT_MOF.1/AA
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM
OT.Chip_Authenticity
Tableau 8 SFRs and Security Objectives
64
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
9.3
Dependencies
9.3.1
SFRs dependencies
Requirements
CC Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1
No dependencies
FCS_CKM.1
(FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_CKM.4
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SYM
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/MAC
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FCS_RND.1
No dependencies
FIA_UID.1
No dependencies
FIA_UAU.1
(FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UAU.4
No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5
No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6
No dependencies
FIA_API.1
No dependencies
FDP_ACC.1
(FDP_ACF.1)
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
(FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UCT.1
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
and (FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
and (FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1
No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1
(FIA_UID.1)
65
Satisfied Dependencies
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Requirements
CC Dependencies
Satisfied Dependencies
FMT_LIM.1
(FMT_LIM.2)
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2
(FMT_LIM.1)
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ (FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.3
(FMT_MTD.1)
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FPT_EMS.1
No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1
No dependencies
FPT_TST.1
No dependencies
FPT_PHP.3
No dependencies
FDP_DAU.1/AA
No dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1
or FDP_ITC.2) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1/AA,
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM
FDP_ITC.1/AA
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
and (FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MOF.1/AA
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM
(FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1) and
(FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
Tableau 9 SFRs dependencies
66
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
9.3.1.1 Rationale for the exclusion of dependencies
The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/SHA is
unsupported. The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need
any key material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import
(FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1 is unsupported. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1 is unsupported. The SFR
FDP_UCT.1 requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS.
There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be
logically distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel.
Since the TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by
FTP_TRP.1 is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1 is unsupported. The SFR
FDP_UIT.1 required the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There
is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically
distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the
TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1
is not applicable here.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ITC.1/AA is unsupported. FMT_MSA.3
dependency is not required since this import does not involve any specific security
attribute.
9.3.2
SARs dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies
Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1
(ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1
(ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_TAT.2
ADV_TDS.4
(ADV_FSP.5)
ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1
(ADV_FSP.1)
ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1
No dependencies
ALC_CMC.4
(ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and
(ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.5
No dependencies
67
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.1
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Requirements CC Dependencies
Satisfied Dependencies
ALC_DEL.1
No dependencies
ALC_DVS.2
No dependencies
ALC_LCD.1
No dependencies
ALC_TAT.2
(ADV_IMP.1)
ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1
(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1
No dependencies
ASE_INT.1
No dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2
(ASE_SPD.1)
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2
(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1
No dependencies
ASE_TSS.1
(ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2
(ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3
(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1
(ATE_COV.1)
ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2
(ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and
(AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5
(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.3
Tableau 10 SARs dependencies
9.4
EAL rationale
This Security Target chooses EAL5 because developers and users require a high level of
independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous
development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security
engineering techniques.
EAL5 represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL4 by requiring semiformal
design descriptions, a more structured (and hence analyzable) architecture, and improved
mechanisms and/or procedures that provide confidence that the TOE will not be tampered
during development.
The assurance components in an evaluation assurance level (EAL) are chosen in a way that
they build a mutually supportive and complete set of components. The requirements chosen
for augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the
68
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, these components add additional
assurance to EAL5, but the mutual support of the requirements and the internal consistency
is still guaranteed.
9.5
9.5.1
EAL augmentations rationale
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Due to the definition of the TOE, it must be shown to be highly resistant to penetration
attacks. This assurance requirement is achieved by the AVA_VAN.5 component.
Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information.
The attacker is assumed to be thoroughly familiar with the specific implementation of the
TOE. The attacker is presumed to have a high level of technical sophistication. AVA_VAN.5
has dependencies with ADV_ARC.1 "Security architecture description", ADV_FSP.4
"Complete functional specification", ADV_IMP.1 "Implementation representation of the TSF",
ADV_TDS.3 "Basic modular design", AGD_PRE.1 "Preparative procedures" and
AGD_OPE.1 "Operational user Guidance" and ATE_DPT.1 "Testing: basic design".
All these dependencies are satisfied by EAL5.
9.5.2
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
Development security is concerned with physical, procedural, personnel and other technical
measures that may be used in the development environment to protect the TOE. This
assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL5 (only ALC_DVS.1). Due to
the nature of the TOE, there is a need for any justification of the sufficiency of these
procedures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.
ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
69
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
10 PP Claims
10.1 PP reference
The PP EAC in CC3.1 [R11] is claimed.
10.2 PP additions
The additional functionalities are the Active Authentication (AA) based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the
related on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys. It implies some addition to the standard PP.
The following SFRs are added to the standard PP for the AA feature:
• FCS_COP.1 / SIG_MRTD
• FDP_DAU.1 / AA
• FDP_ITC / AA
• FMT_MOF.1 / AA
• FCS_CKM.1 / ASYM
The following Objective for the TOE is added to the standard PP for the AA feature:
• OT.Chip_authenticity “Protection against forgery”
Moreover, the composition with the IC mandates to introduce complementary OSPs:
• P.Sensitive_Data_Protection “Protection of sensitive data”
• P.Key_Function “Design of the cryptographic routines in order to protect the keys”
70
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
11 Composition with IC Security Target
71
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
IC Elements
Consistent in ST with
Justification
P.Manufact
Security procedures are used
during TOE packaging, finishing
and pre-personalisation (During
Phase 2)
No
n/a
This assumption deals with the
development process and is
therefore covered by the
evaluation
A.Resp-Appl
Yes
P.Sensitive_Data_Protectio The Composite TOE ensure the
n
confidentiality of the cryptographic
keys it stores
A.Check-Init
Yes
P.Manufact
ICs are actually identified
uniquely
The Cryptographic routines are
designed in such a way that they
do not compromise key by any
leak of information
A.Process-Sec-IC
A.Plat-Appl
Relevant
Yes
A.Key-Function
Yes
P.Key_Function
P.Add-Components
Yes
The TOE ensure protection of
P.Sensitive_Data_Protectio
data using especially the 3DES
n
and AES algorithms
T.Leak-Inherent
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.Phys-Probing
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.Malfunction
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.Phys-Manipulation
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.Leak-Forced
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.Abuse-Func
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.RND
Yes
(1)
(1)
No
n/a
This assumption deals with the
development process and is
therefore covered by the
evaluation
Yes
P.Sensitive_Data_Protectio The Composite TOE ensure the
confidentiality of the cryptographic
n
keys it stores as well as the
integrity of all the sensitive data.
OE.Plat-Appl
OE.Resp-Appl
OE.Process-Sec-IC
Yes
P.Manufact
72
This objective is ensured by the
security procedures and
manufacturing guidelines of NXP
manufacturing site
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
IC Elements
Relevant
Consistent in ST with
Justification
OE.Check-Init
Yes
P.Manufact
ICs are actually identified
uniquely
O.Leak-Inherent
Yes
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
O.Phys-Probing
Yes
OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper
O.Malfunction
Yes
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
O.Phys-Manipulation
Yes
OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
O.Leak-Forced
Yes
OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper
O.Abuse-Func
O.Identification
Yes
Yes
Yes
Software is designed to be
protected against leakage with
the hardware support
OT.Identification
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Int
OT_Data_Conf
The Cryptographic routines are
designed in such a way that they
do not compromise random
values in order to ensure
confidentially, integrity and proof
of origin.
3DES algorithm is used to
enforce data integrity, data
confidentiality and
authentications.
OT.Data_Int
AES algorithm is used to enforce
the authentication of the
personalization agent.
OT.AC_Pers
O.HW_AES
Manipulation of the memory and
the execution is controlled by the
software. This is achieved with
the hardware support
Identification is fully handled
during whole lifecycle of the TOE
from IC manufacturing to use
phase.
OT.AC_Pers
Yes
Correct operation of the TOE is
controlled and malfunctions are
detected
Improper usage of the TOE is
controlled
OT_Data_Conf
O.HW_DES3
Objective require that memory
and execution cannot be probed
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.AC_Pers
O.RND
Software is designed to be
protected against leakage with
the hardware support
Yes
O.MF_HW
No
n/a
Mifare is not supported
O.MEM_ACCESS
No
n/a
Not used.
O.SFR_ACCESS
No
n/a
Not used.
FRU_FLT.2
Yes
(2)
(2)
73
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
IC Elements
Relevant
Consistent in ST with
Justification
FPT_FLS.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_LIM.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_LIM.2
Yes
(2)
(2)
FAU_SAS.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FPT_PHP.3
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_ITT.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FPT_ITT.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_IFC.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FCS_RNG.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FCS_COP.1[DES]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FCS_COP.1[AES]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_ACC.1[MEM]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_ACC.1[SFR]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_ACF.1[MEM]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_ACF.1[SFR]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_MSA.3[MEM]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_MSA.3[SFR]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_MSA.1[MEM]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_MSA.1[SFR]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_SMF.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
(1) Since IC objectives are consistent with TOE objectives, IC Threats are also consistent with
TOE SPD
(2) Since IC SFRs are translations of IC objectives, IC SFRs are consistent with TOE SFRs
74
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
12 References
MRTD specifications
[R1]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable
Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01,
2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization
[R2]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable
Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R3]
Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion
technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a
Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –
1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[R4]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended
Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v1.11
[R5]
Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents
Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition –
2003
IDL specifications
[R6]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence —
Part 1:Physical characteristics and basic data set, ISO/IEC FDIS 18013-1:2005(E)
[R7]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence —
Part 2: Machine-readable technologies, ISO/IEC FDIS 18013-2:2007(E)
[R8]
Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part 3: Access control,
authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC FDIS 18013-3:2008(E)
Protection Profiles
[R9]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 - BSI-PP-0035 15/06/2007
[R10]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSIth
PP-0055 v1.10 25 march 2009
[R11]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control –
th
BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25 march 2009
[R12]
E-passport: adaptation and interpretation of e-passport Protection Profiles,
SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007
[R13]
Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations,
ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009
Security Target
[R14]
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cc081VIA Security
Target Lite, BSI-DSZ-0555, Rev. 1.3, 21 September 2009
Standards
[R15]
ISO7816-4 – Organization, security and commands for interchange
[R16]
Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TR-ECC, BSI
2006
75
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
[R17]
[R18]
[R19]
[R20]
[R21]
[R22]
[R23]
[R24]
[R25]
[R26]
[R27]
[R28]
[R29]
[R30]
Misc
[R31]
[R32]
CC
[R33]
[R34]
[R35]
ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002
ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
ISO/IEC 9796-2 (2002) - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature
schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+
Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998
Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003
RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories
Technical Note, 2002
ANSI X9.31 - Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998.
FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes
utilisant un cryptogramme bloc"
NIST SP 800-90 – Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators (Revised)
FIPS 197 – Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen
und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1,
25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
NOTE-10 - Interpretation with e-passport PP_courtesy translation-draft v0.1
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1 : Introduction and
general model, CCMB-2009-07-001, version 3.1 Revision 3 Final, July 2009
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2 : Security
Functional Components, CCMB-2009-07-002, version 3.1 Revision 3 Final, July 2009
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3 : Security
Assurance Components, CCMB-2009-07-003, version 3.1 Revision 3 Final, July 2009
76
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
13
AA
BAC
CC
CPLC
DF
DFA
DG
EAL
EF
EFID
DES
DH
I/0
IC
ICAO
ICC
IFD
LDS
MF
MRTD
MRZ
MSK
OS
PKI
PP
SFI
SHA
SOD
TOE
TSF
ACRONYMS
Active Authentication
Basic Access Control
Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 3
Card personalisation life cycle
Dedicated File
Differential Fault Analysis
Data Group
Evaluation Assurance Level
Elementary File
File Identifier
Digital encryption standard
Diffie Hellmann
Input/Output
Integrated Circuit
International Civil Aviation organization
Integrated Circuit Card
Interface device
Logical Data structure
Master File
Machine readable Travel Document
Machine readable Zone
Manufacturer Secret Key
Operating System
Public Key Infrastructure
Protection Profile
Short File identifier
Secure hashing Algorithm
Security object Data
Target of Evaluation
TOE Security function
77
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
Index
A
A.Auth_PKI ......................................................... 26
A.Insp_Sys ......................................................... 25
A.MRTD_Delivery.............................................. 25
A.MRTD_Manufact............................................ 25
A.Pers_Agent ..................................................... 25
A.Signature_PKI ................................................ 26
Access__Control__in__reading ...................... 49
Access__Control__in__writing ........................ 49
Active__Authentication ..................................... 51
Authenticity__of__the__MRTD's__chip ......... 21
E
EAC__mechanism............................................. 50
F
FAU_SAS.1 ........................................................ 37
FCS_CKM.1 ....................................................... 37
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM........................................... 47
FCS_CKM.4 ....................................................... 37
FCS_COP.1/MAC ............................................. 38
FCS_COP.1/SHA .............................................. 37
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD.................................. 46
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER ..................................... 38
FCS_COP.1/SYM.............................................. 37
FCS_RND.1 ....................................................... 38
FDP_ACC.1........................................................ 40
FDP_ACF.1 ........................................................ 40
FDP_DAU.1/AA ................................................. 46
FDP_ITC.1/AA ................................................... 47
FDP_UCT.1........................................................ 41
FDP_UIT.1.......................................................... 41
FIA_API.1 ........................................................... 40
FIA_UAU.1 ......................................................... 39
FIA_UAU.4 ......................................................... 39
FIA_UAU.5 ......................................................... 39
FIA_UAU.6 ......................................................... 40
FIA_UID.1 ........................................................... 38
FMT_LIM.1 ......................................................... 42
FMT_LIM.2 ......................................................... 43
FMT_MOF.1/AA................................................. 47
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK ........................................... 44
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI.................................... 43
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD ................................ 43
FMT_MTD.1/DATE ........................................... 44
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ........................................ 43
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA....................................... 43
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ ................................. 44
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE ............................... 44
FMT_MTD.3 ....................................................... 44
FMT_SMF.1 ....................................................... 42
FMT_SMR.1 ....................................................... 42
78
FPT_EMS.1........................................................ 45
FPT_FLS.1 ......................................................... 45
FPT_PHP.3 ........................................................ 46
FPT_TST.1......................................................... 45
L
Logical__MRTD__data..................................... 20
O
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD........................................ 30
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data .................................. 30
OE.BAC-PP........................................................ 30
OE.Exam_MRTD............................................... 31
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems...................................... 31
OE.MRTD___Delivery ...................................... 29
OE.MRTD_Manufact ........................................ 29
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign ......................................... 30
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif.................................... 31
OE.Personalization ........................................... 29
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD................................... 31
OT.AC_Pers....................................................... 27
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof ........................................ 27
OT.Chip_Authenticity........................................ 29
OT.Data_Int........................................................ 27
OT.Identification ................................................ 27
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func........................................ 28
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak .............................................. 28
OT.Prot_Malfunction ......................................... 28
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper ..................................... 28
OT.Sens_Data_Conf ........................................ 27
P
P.BAC-PP........................................................... 24
P.Key_Function ................................................. 24
P.Manufact ......................................................... 24
P.Personalization .............................................. 24
P.Sensitive_Data............................................... 24
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection........................... 24
Personalisation__Agent__Authentication...... 51
Physical__protection......................................... 51
S
Safe__state__management............................. 51
Secure__Messaging ......................................... 50
Self__tests.......................................................... 51
T
T.Abuse-Func .................................................... 22
T.Counterfeit ...................................................... 22
T.Forgery ............................................................ 22
T.Information_Leakage .................................... 22
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
T.Malfunction...................................................... 23
T.Phys-Tamper .................................................. 23
79
T.Read_Sensitive_Data ................................... 21
FQR 110 5770 Ed1
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