Certification Report: 0593a

Certification Report: 0593a
BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
for
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084-a11, SLE66CLX206PE / m2085-a11,
SLE66CLX206PES / m2086-a11, SLE66CDX206PEM / m2099-a11,
SLE66CLX203PEM / m2098-a11, SLE66CLX207PEM / m2980-a11,
SLE66CLX207PE / m2981-a11, SLE66CLX207PES / m2982-a11,
SLE66CLX126PEM / m2087-a11, SLE66CLX126PE / m2088-a11,
SLE66CLX126PES / m2089-a11, SLE66CLX127PEM / m2997-a11,
SLE66CLX127PE / m2998-a11, SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11,
all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1, SHA-2 V1.0 and all
with specific IC dedicated software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-327 V4.29
BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084-a11,
SLE66CLX206PE / m2085-a11, SLE66CLX206PES / m2086-a11,
SLE66CDX206PEM / m2099-a11, SLE66CLX203PEM / m2098-a11,
SLE66CLX207PEM / m2980-a11, SLE66CLX207PE / m2981-a11,
SLE66CLX207PES / m2982-a11, SLE66CLX126PEM / m2087-a11,
SLE66CLX126PE / m2088-a11, SLE66CLX126PES / m2089-a11,
SLE66CLX127PEM / m2997-a11, SLE66CLX127PE / m2998-a11,
SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11, all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1,
SHA-2 V1.0 and all with specific IC dedicated software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance:
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
July 2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice
of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the
product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 8 May 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
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Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
5 / 44
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................17
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................18
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................18
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................19
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................19
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................20
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................21
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................21
11 Security Target............................................................................................................22
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................22
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................22
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................24
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................25
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................29
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................39
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Certification Report
A Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, and AVA_VLA.4 that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084a11,
SLE66CLX206PE
/
m2085-a11,
SLE66CLX206PES
/
m2086-a11,
SLE66CDX206PEM / m2099-a11, SLE66CLX203PEM / m2098-a11, SLE66CLX207PEM /
m2980-a11, SLE66CLX207PE / m2981-a11, SLE66CLX207PES / m2982-a11,
SLE66CLX126PEM / m2087-a11, SLE66CLX126PE / m2088-a11, SLE66CLX126PES /
m2089-a11, SLE66CLX127PEM / m2997-a11, SLE66CLX127PE / m2998-a11,
SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11, all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1, SHA-2
V1.0 and all with specific IC dedicated software has undergone the certification procedure
at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0523-2008. Specific results from
the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0523-2008 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084-a11, SLE66CLX206PE / m2085-a11, SLE66CLX206PES /
m2086-a11, SLE66CDX206PEM / m2099-a11, SLE66CLX203PEM / m2098-a11,
SLE66CLX207PEM / m2980-a11, SLE66CLX207PE / m2981-a11, SLE66CLX207PES /
m2982-a11, SLE66CLX126PEM / m2087-a11, SLE66CLX126PE / m2088-a11,
SLE66CLX126PES / m2089-a11, SLE66CLX127PEM / m2997-a11, SLE66CLX127PE /
m2998-a11, SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11, all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC
V1.1, SHA-2 V1.0 and all with specific IC dedicated software was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 24 April 2009. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Certification Report
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a reassessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084a11,
SLE66CLX206PE
/
m2085-a11,
SLE66CLX206PES
/
m2086-a11,
SLE66CDX206PEM / m2099-a11, SLE66CLX203PEM / m2098-a11, SLE66CLX207PEM /
m2980-a11, SLE66CLX207PE / m2981-a11, SLE66CLX207PES / m2982-a11,
SLE66CLX126PEM / m2087-a11, SLE66CLX126PE / m2088-a11, SLE66CLX126PES /
m2089-a11, SLE66CLX127PEM / m2997-a11, SLE66CLX127PE / m2998-a11,
SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11, all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1, SHA-2
V1.0 and all with specific IC dedicated software has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Infineon Technologies AG
CCS M PS
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084-a11, SLE66CLX206PE / m2085-a11, SLE66CLX206PES /
m2086-a11, SLE66CDX206PEM / m2099-a11, SLE66CLX203PEM / m2098-a11,
SLE66CLX207PEM / m2980-a11, SLE66CLX207PE / m2981-a11, SLE66CLX207PES /
m2982-a11, SLE66CLX126PEM / m2087-a11, SLE66CLX126PE / m2088-a11,
SLE66CLX126PES / m2089-a11, SLE66CLX127PEM / m2997-a11, SLE66CLX127PE /
m2998-a11, SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11, all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC
V1.1, SHA-2 V1.0 and all with specific IC dedicated software. All products of this TOE were
already successfully CC EAL5+ certified in the different design version by the BSI. The
direct recertification reference for this TOE is the BSI process BSI-DSZ-CC-523-2008
including the library versions RSA Version 1.5 and EC Version 1.1. The main differences to
the forerunner (SLE66CLX1600PEx) are the different implemented memory sizes, the new
RSA library version and the SHA-2 library for computing hash values.
The ICs consists of a dedicated non standard microprocessor (CPU) with a MMU (Memory
Management Unit), several different memories, security logic, a timer, an interruptcontrolled I/O interface, an AIS31-compliant RNG (Random Number Generator), and a
checksum module (CRC module). Further components are integrated on the chip too. For
fast asymetric cryptographic operations performance the TOE has the Advanced
Cryptographic Engine (ACE) component implemented. The TOE’s block diagram is shown
in Figure 1 of the Security Target [6, chapter 2.1].
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards particularly for security relevant
applications, including high speed security authentication, data encryption or electronic
signature. The TOE offers a new, improved standard of integrated security features,
thereby meeting the requirements of all smart card applications with contact-based and
contactless interface such as information integrity, access control, mobile telephone, as
well as uses in electronic funds transfer and healthcare systems. Several security features
independently implemented in hardware or controlled by software will be provided to
ensure proper operations and integrity and confidentiality of stored data.
The crypto library RSA, the crypto library EC, the RMS library and the SHA-2 library
provide some functionality via an API to the Smartcard Embedded Software and STS
firmware for test purpose. The STS is implemented in a separated Test-ROM being part of
the TOE. The RSA library supports operation size from 512 bits to 2048 bits. Only key
sizes from 1024 bits up to 2048 bits are within the scope of this evaluation. The EC library
can perform EC operations on elliptic curve parameters with key lengths up to 533 bits.
Included in the evaluation are only operations with key length of 192 to 521 bits.
The user has the possibility to tailor the software part of the TOE during the manufacturing
process. Thus the TOE can be delivered including - in free combinations - or not including
any of the functionality of the EC crypto library, the RSA crypto library and the SHA-2
crypto library. Two modules for cryptographic operations are implemented on the TOE: The
well known Advanced Crypto Engine (ACE) for calculation of asymmetric algorithms like
RSA and elliptic curve (EC) and the Cryptographic Unit (DDES) for Dual Key DES
calculations. These modules are especially designed for Chipcard applications with
respect to the security and power consumption. The DDES module computes the
complete DES algorithm within a few clock cycles and is especially designed to counter
attacks like DPA or EMA. The TOE includes also functionality to calculate single DES
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Certification Report
operations, but part of the evaluation is the triple-DES operation only. For more detail
please refer to the Security Target [6, chapter 2.1].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 - Sufficiency of security measures, AVA_MSU.3 - Validation of
analysis and AVA_VLA.4 - Highly resistant.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6, chapter 5.1]. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6, chapter 5.2].
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SEF1
Operating state checking
SEF2
Phase management with test mode lock-out
SEF3
Protection against snooping
SEF4
Data encryption and data disguising
SEF5
Random number generation
SEF6
TSF self test
SEF7
Notification of physical attack
SEF8
Memory Management Unit (MMU)
SEF9
Cryptographic support
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6, chapter 6].
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6, chapter 3.1].
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6,
chapter 3.2 to 3.4].
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
●
SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2
(produced in Dresden),
●
SLE66CLX206PE / m2085-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2 (produced
in Dresden),
●
SLE66CLX206PES / m2086-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2
(produced in Dresden),
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
●
SLE66CDX206PEM / m2099-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2
(produced in Dresden),
●
SLE66CLX203PEM / m2098-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2
(produced in Dresden),
●
SLE66CLX207PEM / m2980-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2
(produced in Dresden),
●
SLE66CLX207PE / m2981-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2 (produced
in Dresden),
●
SLE66CLX207PES / m2982-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2
(produced in Dresden),
●
SLE66CLX126PEM / m2087-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2
(produced in Dresden),
●
SLE66CLX126PE / m2088-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2 (produced
in Dresden),
●
SLE66CLX126PES / m2089-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2
(produced in Dresden).
●
SLE66CLX127PEM / m2997-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2
(produced in Dresden).
●
SLE66CLX127PE / m2998-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2 (produced
in Dresden).
●
SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2
(produced in Dresden).
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084-a11,
SLE66CLX206PE / m2085-a11, SLE66CLX206PES / m2086-a11, SLE66CDX206PEM /
m2099-a11, SLE66CLX203PEM / m2098-a11, SLE66CLX207PEM / m2980-a11,
SLE66CLX207PE / m2981-a11, SLE66CLX207PES / m2982-a11, SLE66CLX126PEM /
m2087-a11, SLE66CLX126PE / m2088-a11, SLE66CLX126PES / m2089-a11,
SLE66CLX127PEM / m2997-a11, SLE66CLX127PE / m2998-a11, SLE66CLX127PES /
m2999-a11, all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1, SHA-2 V1.0 and all with
specific IC dedicated software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
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Certification Report
N Type
Identifier
o
1a HW SLE66CLX206PEM Smart Card IC
Release
1b
HW
1c
HW
1d
HW
1e
HW
1f
HW
1g
HW
1h
HW
1i
HW
1j
HW
1k
HW
1l
HW
1
m
HW
1n
HW
2
FW
3
FW
4
SW
GDS-file-ID:
m2084-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
SLE66CLX206PE Smart Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m2085-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
SLE66CLX206PES Smart Card IC GDS-file-ID:
m2086-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
SLE66CDX206PEM Smart Card IC
m2099-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
SLE66CLX203PEM Smart Card IC
m2098-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
SLE66CLX207PEM Smart Card IC
m2980-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
SLE66CLX207PE Smart Card IC
m2981-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
SLE66CLX207PES Smart Card IC
m2982-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
SLE66CLX126PEM Smart Card IC
m2087-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
SLE66CLX126PE Smart Card IC
m2088-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
SLE66CLX126PES Smart Card IC
m2089-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
SLE66CLX127PEM Smart Card IC
m2997-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
SLE66CLX127PE Smart Card IC
m2998-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
SLE66CLX127PES Smart Card IC
m2999-a11 with production line
indicator: “2” (Dresden)
STS Self Test Software (the IC
V57.09.08
Dedicated Test Software)
RMS-E Resource Management
RMS_E V07
System (the IC Dedicated Support
Software)
RSA library (optional)
V1.6
5
SW
EC library (optional)
V1.1
6
SW
SHA-2 library (optional)
V1.0
1
8
DOC Data Book – SLE66C(L)
2008-09-03
(X)xxxPE(M/S) Security Controller
Family
DOC Errata Sheet - SLE66CxxxPE
2009-02-04
Controllers - Product and Boundout
15 / 44
Form of delivery
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Stored in Test ROM
on the IC
Stored in reserved
area of User ROM
on the IC
Source code in
electronic form
Source code in
electronic form
Source code in
electronic form
Hardcopy and pdffile
Hardcopy and pdffile
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
N Type
Identifier
o
9 DOC Security Programmers’ Manual SLE66C(L)xxxP(E) Controllers
10 DOC Security & Chip Card ICs –
SLE66CxxxPE – Instruction Set
11 DOC Chip Card & Security ICs SLE66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) –
Instruction Set and Special
Function Registers – Quick
Reference
12 DOC RSA 2048 bit Support
SLE66C(L)XxxxPE RSA Interface
Specification for library V1.6
(optional)
13 DOC RSA 2048 bit Support
SLE66C(L)XxxxPE Arithmetic
Library for V1.6 (optional)
14 DOC Elliptic Curve GF(P) Support
SLE66C(L)XxxxPE Interface
Specification ECC-Library V 1.1
(optional)
15 DOC Application Notes [17]..[32]
Release
2009-03-27
07.04
11.06
Form of delivery
Hardcopy and pdffile
Hardcopy and pdffile
Hardcopy and pdffile
02.2009
Hardcopy and pdffile
09.2008
Hardcopy and pdffile
2009-03-03
Hardcopy and pdffile
see list in section 13
Hardcopy and pdffile
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084-a11,
SLE66CLX206PE / m2085-a11, SLE66CLX206PES / m2086-a11, SLE66CDX206PEM /
m2099-a11, SLE66CLX203PEM / m2098-a11, SLE66CLX207PEM / m2980-a11,
SLE66CLX207PE / m2981-a11, SLE66CLX207PES / m2982-a11, SLE66CLX126PEM /
m2087-a11, SLE66CLX126PE / m2088-a11, SLE66CLX126PES / m2089-a11,
SLE66CLX127PEM / m2997-a11 or SLE66CLX127PE / m2998-a11, SLE66CLX127PES /
m2999-a11. Another characteristic of the TOE is a serial number (chip identification
number). This serial number is chip specific as the chip type, lot number, wafer, chip
coordinates on the wafer, production date, production site (e.g. upper nibble of (08000AH)
“2” stands for Infineon’s IC fabrication in Dresden/Germany“a”) and design step (e.g. “0B”
at address (080009H) stands for design step “11”) are part of the number. The serial
number, which is accessible in the chip identification mode, is linked to the version
number. For the format of the serial number see [12, chapter 6.16.2.6] and [11, chapter
6.7].
The RSA library, the EC library and the SHA-2 library, as separate software parts of the
TOE, as well as RMS and STS, as firmware parts of the TOE, are identified by their unique
version numbers.
The chip type byte identifies the different versions in the following Table 3.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Type
Target of Evaluation
Certification Report
Name
Version number
Chip type
SLE66CLX206PEM
m2084-a11
D3h
SLE66CLX206PE
m2085-a11
D4h
SLE66CLX206PES
m2086-a11
D5h
SLE66CDX206PEM
m2099-a11
DFh
SLE66CLX203PEM
m2098-a11
D2h
SLE66CLX207PEM
m2980-a11
D6h
SLE66CLX207PE
m2981-a11
D7h
SLE66CLX207PES
m2982-a11
D8h
SLE66CLX126PEM
m2087-a11
D9h
SLE66CLX126PE
m2088-a11
DAh
SLE66CLX126PES
m2089-a11
DBh
SLE66CLX127PEM
m2997-a11
DCh
SLE66CLX127PE
m2998-a11
DDh
SLE66CLX127PES
m2999-a11
DEh
Hardware
Dresden
A11
Firmware
RMS-E library
RMS_E V07
STS
57.09.08
RSA library (optional)
V1.6
EC library (optional)
V1.1
SHA-2 library (optional)
V1.0
Software
Table 3: TOE identification
The RSA library, the EC library and the SHA-2 library, as separate software parts of the
TOE, as well as RMS and STS, as firmware parts of the TOE, are identified by their unique
version numbers. The TOE can be delivered with or without the RSA library and / or the
EC library and / or the SHA-2 library.
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of security functional requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement an algorithm to ensure the
confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication
protocols and it will provide a random number generator.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during Triple-DES cryptographic functions performed by the TOE),
against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against
abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of
data stored in the memory of the TOE and maintain the integrity, the correct operation and
the confidentiality of Security Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
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Certification Report
4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Usage of Hardware Platform, Treatment of User Data, Protection during TOE
Development and Production, Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6, chapter 4.2].
5
Architectural Information
The TOEs are integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating
system and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6, chapter
2.1]. The complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to
be found in the Data Book [12] and other guidance documents delivered to the customer,
see table 2.
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the central processing unit
(CPU) with memory management unit (MMU), RAM, ROM, EEPROM, security logic,
interrupt module, bus system, Random Number Generator (RNG) and the two modules for
cryptographic operations of the chip are used. The SHA-2 library consists of routines for
initialization, compression and finalisation of SHA-256 and SHA-512 hash computation.
Security measures for physical protection are realised within the layout of the whole
circuitry.
The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip memories
provide the interface to the software using the Security Functions of the TOE.
The TOE IC Dedicated Test Software (STS), stored on the chip, is used for testing
purposes during production only and is completely separated from the use of the
embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
The TOE IC Dedicated Support Software (RMS), stored on the chip, is used for EEPROM
programming and Security Function testing. It is stored by the TOE manufacturer in a
reserved area of the normal user ROM and can be used by the users embedded software.
The software part of the TOE consists of the RSA library, the EC library and the SHA-2
library. The RSA library and the EC library are delivered as source code and in this way
integrated in the user software. The SHA-library is delivered as source code and is in this
way available for the user software, too. The TOE includes also functionality to calculate
single DES operations, but part of the evaluation is the Triple-DES operation only.
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is provided together with the product.
This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in
accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
7
Certification Report
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
●
Simulation tests: These tests are performed before starting the production to develop
the technology for the production and to define the process parameters.
●
Qualification tests: These tests are performed after the first production of chips. The
tests are performed in test mode. With these tests the influence of temperature,
frequency and voltage on the security functions are tested in detail.
●
Verification tests: These tests are performed in normal mode and check the
functionality in the end user environment. The results of the qualification and
verification tests are the basis on which it is decided, whether the TOE is released to
production.
●
Security evaluation tests: These tests are performed in normal mode and check the
security mechanisms aiming on the security functionality and the effectiveness of the
mechanisms. The random numbers are tested as required by AIS 31 and fulfill the
criteria.
●
Production tests: These tests are performed at each TOE before delivery. The aim of
the production tests is to check whether each chip is functioning correctly.
●
Penetration Tests: Penetration Tests are performed to find security flaws in the product.
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms as identified
in the functional specification, the high level design and the low level design. Chips from
the production site Dresden (see part D, annex A of this report) were used for tests.
The evaluators testing effort can be summarised into the following classes of tests: Module
tests, Simulation tests, Emulation tests, Tests in user mode, Tests in test mode and
Hardware tests. The evaluators performed independent tests to supplement, augment and
to verify the tests performed by the developer by sampling. Besides repeating exactly the
developers tests, test parameters were varied and additional analysis was done. With
these kind of tests performed in the developer’s testing environment the entire security
functionality of the TOE was verified. Overall the evaluators have tested the TSF
systematically against the functional specification, the high-level design and the low-level
design.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the current version of the TOE with production line
indicator “2” for Dresden (Germany) provides the Security Functions as specified.
For this re-evaluation the evaluators re-assessed the penetration testing and confirmed the
results from the previous certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0523-2008 where they took
all Security Functions into consideration. Intensive penetration testing was performed at
that time to consider the physical tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated
equipment and expertised know-how. Specific additional penetration attacks were
performed in the course of this evaluation.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The SLE66CL/DX206PEx, the SLE66CLX207PEx, the SLE66CLX203PEM, the
SLE66CLX126PEx and the SLE66CLX127PEx are identically from hardware perspective.
The difference is that in the SLE66CLX126PEx and the SLE66CLX127PEx the memory is
blocked to a smaller size. All types can be distinguished by a different chip identification.
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The difference in the memory size does not influence the security of the TOE as neither an
asset nor a security enforcing function is affected. Therefore the products are evaluated
together.
Therefore the TOE is delivered in the fixed configurations listed chapter 1 of this report.
For more details please refer to chapter 1.
This certification covers the above mentioned configurations with the specific IC Dedicated
Software and with production line indicator “2” for Dresden (Germany). After delivery the
TOE only features one fixed configuration (user mode), which cannot be altered by the
user. The TOE was tested in this configuration. All the evaluation and certification results
therefore are only effective for this version of the TOE. For all evaluation activities
performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid for the user mode,
too.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
●
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
●
The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
●
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
●
The components ALC_DVS.2 - Sufficiency of security measures
AVA_MSU.3 - Validation of analysis
AVA_VLA.4 - Highly resistant augmented for this TOE evaluation.
●
All components claimed in the Security Target [6, chapter 6 and defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a reevaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0523-2008, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on implemented memory sizes, the
STS update and the new RSA library version.
The evaluation has confirmed:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Certification Report
●
PP Conformance:
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July
2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [7]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
●
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : high
SEF2 – Phase management with test mode lock-out,
SEF3 – Protection against snooping,
SEF4 – Data encryption and data disguising,
SEF5 – Random number generation
In order to assess the strength of function the scheme interpretations AIS 25, 26 and AIS
31 (see [4]) were used. For specific evaluation results regarding the development and
production environment see annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
●
algorithms for the encryption and decryption: RSA, EC, Triple-DES
●
This holds for the following security functions: SF9
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But cryptographic functions with a security level
of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks with high attack
potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these functions it shall
be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system.
Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR02102' (www.bsi.bund.de) [33]
The cryptographic functions 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) and RSA 1024 provided by the
TOE have got a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
The operational documents as outlined in Table 2, deliverables of the TOE, contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered. In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
All security hints described in the user guidance documentation [12]..[16] and the delivered
application notes [17]..[32] have to be considered. For secure usage of the TOE the
fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target [ST] and
especially the recommendations of the Security Programmers Manual [13] have to be
taken into account.
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The TOE does not implement a padding scheme for the RSA signature
creation/verification. This has to be implemented by the embedded software. To counter
known attacks against incorrect padding a complete check of padding regarding
correctness is mandatory.
If the key parameters of the signature generation are stored in the RAM, a Bellcore attack
is possible. Therefore the embedded software has to check the consistency of the key
parameters handed over by the RSA signature generation function after call of the
function, e.g. by means of a CRC.
As the bit length of the randomisation by the scalar multiplication and inversion is adjusted
to be 24 bit or 533 – “bit length of the curve” bit, it is strongly recommended for the EC
library that only curves with bit length up to 521 bit are used, because only for these
curves it is examined that the randomisation is sufficient to counter attacks.
Because of a possible fault injection attack on the ECDSA signature verification, the
operating system developer has to check the verify result by e.g. performing the verify
function twice, if the verification result is used for a security critical operation.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
ACE
Advanced Crypto Engine
API
Application Programming Interface
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CRC
Checksum module
CPU
Central Processing Unit
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DDC
DES accelerator
DPA
Differential Power Analysis
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB
Electrical Code Block
EC
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
22 / 44
BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
ECDH
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA
Electro magnetic analysis
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MED
Memory Encryption and Decryption unit
MMU
Memory Management Unit
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
Rivest, Shamir, Adleman – a public key encryption algorithm
RMS
Resource Management System
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SEF
Security Function
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
ST
Security Target
SOF
Strength of Function
SPA
Simple power analysis
ST
Security Target
STS
Self Test Software
SW
Software
TOE
Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
UCP
Unified Channel Programming
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of
the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Certification Report
13 Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2]
Common Methology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8.
[5]
German IT Security Certifcates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084-a11SLE66CLX206PE / m2085-a11,
SLE66CLX206PES
/
m2086-a11,
SLE66CDX206PEM
/
m2099-a11,
SLE66CLX203PEM
/
m2098-a11,
SLE66CLX207PEM
/
m2980-a11,
SLE66CLX207PE
/
m2981-a11,
SLE66CLX207PES
/
m2982-a11,
SLE66CLX126PEM
/
m2087-a11,
SLE66CLX126PE
/
m2088-a11,
SLE66CLX126PES
/
m2089-a11,
SLE66CLX127PEM
/
m2997a11SLE66CLX127PE / m2998-a11SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11 all with optional
libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1 and SHA-2 V1.0 from 2009-03-05, Infineon AG
[7]
Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration
ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs, Hitachi Ltd., Infineon
Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report – Summary (ETR SUMMARY), SLE66CLX206PEM /
m2084-a11SLE66CLX206PE / m2085-a11, SLE66CLX206PES / m2086-a11,
SLE66CDX206PEM
/
m2099-a11,
SLE66CLX203PEM
/
m2098-a11,
SLE66CLX207PEM
/
m2980-a11,
SLE66CLX207PE
/
m2981-a11,
SLE66CLX207PES
/
m2982-a11,
SLE66CLX126PEM
/
m2087-a11,
SLE66CLX126PE
/
m2088-a11,
SLE66CLX126PES
/
m2089-a11,
8
specifically
•
AIS 20, Version 1, 2. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins
deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
•
AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
SLE66CLX127PEM
/
m2997-a11SLE66CLX127PE
/
m2998a11SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11 all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1
and SHA-2 V1.0, Version 2 from 2009-04-09, Evaluation Body for IT Security of TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[9]
ETR for composition according to AIS 36 for the Products SLE66CLX206PEM /
m2084-a11SLE66CLX206PE / m2085-a11, SLE66CLX206PES / m2086-a11,
SLE66CDX206PEM
/
m2099-a11,
SLE66CLX203PEM
/
m2098-a11,
SLE66CLX207PEM
/
m2980-a11,
SLE66CLX207PE
/
m2981-a11,
SLE66CLX207PES
/
m2982-a11,
SLE66CLX126PEM
/
m2087-a11,
SLE66CLX126PE
/
m2088-a11,
SLE66CLX126PES
/
m2089-a11,
SLE66CLX127PEM
/
m2997-a11SLE66CLX127PE
/
m2998a11SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11 all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1
and SHA-2 V1.0, Version 1 from 2009-04-09, Evaluation Body for IT Security of TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[10]
Configuration Management Scope (ACM_SCP), SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084a11SLE66CLX206PE
/
m2085-a11,
SLE66CLX206PES
/
m2086-a11,
SLE66CDX206PEM
/
m2099-a11,
SLE66CLX203PEM
/
m2098-a11,
SLE66CLX207PEM
/
m2980-a11,
SLE66CLX207PE
/
m2981-a11,
SLE66CLX207PES
/
m2982-a11,
SLE66CLX126PEM
/
m2087-a11,
SLE66CLX126PE
/
m2088-a11,
SLE66CLX126PES
/
m2089-a11,
SLE66CLX127PEM
/
m2997-a11SLE66CLX127PE
/
m2998a11SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11 all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1
and SHA-2 V1.0, Version 1.0 from 2009-01-20, Infineon AG (confidential document)
[11]
Errata Sheet - SLE66CxxxPE Controllers - Product and Boundout, Version 2009-0204 from 2009-02-04, Infineon AG
[12]
Databook, Data Book – SLE66C(L)(X)xxxPE(M/S), Security Controller Family,
Version 2008.09 from 2008-09-03, Infineon AG
[13]
Security Programmers’ Manual - SLE66C(L)xxxP(E) Controllers, Version 2009.03
from 2009-03-27, Infineon AG
[14]
RSA 2048 bit Support SLE66C(L)XxxxPE Arithmetic Library for V1.6, Version
09.2008 from 2008-09, Infineon AG
[15]
RSA 2048 bit Support SLE66C(L)XxxxPE RSA Interface Specification for library
V1.6, Version 02.2009 from 2009-02, Infineon AG
[16]
Elliptic Curve GF(P) Support SLE66C(L)XxxxPE Interface Specification ECC-Library
V 1.1, 2009-03-03, Infineon AG
[17]
SLE66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) – Contactless Protocol Type A Type B (source v18092),
Version 2008-07 from 2008-07, Infineon AG
[18]
SLE 66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) - Contactless Card Coil Design Guide, Version 2008-10
from 2008-10-03, Infineon AG
[19]
SLE 66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) – Contactless Performance for Payment Applications,
Version 2008-10 from 2008-10-03, Infineon AG
[20]
SLE 66CL(X)xxxPE(M/S) – Optimized Contactless Energy Performance, Version
2008-12 from 2008-12-11, Infineon AG
[21]
SLE 66CLXxxxPE - Implementation of Transmission Protocol according to ISO/IEC
14443 Part 3 and 4, Version 2006-02 from 2006-02-23, Infineon AG
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[22]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, DDES - EC2 Accelerator, Version 04.02 from 200402 including complementary Application Note SLE 66CxxxPE DDES Accelerator,
Version 07.05 from 2005-07, Infineon AG
[23]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, Using MicroSlim NVM (cLib), Version 05.05 from
2005-05, Infineon AG (confidential document)
[24]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Memory Encryption Decryption, Version 11.04
from 2004-11, Infineon AG (confidential document)
[25]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, MMU-Memory Management Unit (PDF+SW),
Version 12.04 from 2004-12, Infineon AG (confidential document)
[26]
LE66C(L)xxxPE - Optimized Usage of Data NVM Above 64k, Version 08.05 from
2005-08, Infineon AG
[27]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Testing the RNG, Version 11.04 from 2004-11,
Infineon AG (confidential document)
[28]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Using RNG a.t. FIPS140 (PDF+SW), Version
02.04 from 2004-02, Infineon AG (confidential document)
[29]
SLE66C(L)xxxPE Family - Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224, SHA
512/384) Library Version V1.0, Version 04.2009 from 2009-04, Infineon AG
[30]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, Using the active shield, Version 12.04 From 200412, Infineon AG (confidential document)
[31]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE - UART basic (PDF), Version 02.07 from 2007-02,
Infineon AG
[32]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE - Static UART (PDF), Version 01.07 from 2007-01
[33]
BSI-Technische Richtlinie - Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und
Schlüssellängen (BSI TR-02102), Version: 1.0, 2008-06-20, Certification body of the
BSI.
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 9.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
●
–
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that PP
or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
–
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in that
PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
–
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that PP
or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
–
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in that
PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package (e.g.
EAL) if:
–
the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
–
the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package if:
–
the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least one
additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the package.
–
the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least one
additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in which
PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more information on
this Conformance Statement, see Annex A.
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class
Certification Report
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decompositon.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV: Development
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
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Assurance Class
Assurance Components
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“ The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
2
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CLX206PEM / m2084a11,
SLE66CLX206PE
/
m2085-a11,
SLE66CLX206PES
/
m2086-a11,
SLE66CDX206PEM / m2099-a11, SLE66CLX203PEM / m2098-a11, SLE66CLX207PEM /
m2980-a11, SLE66CLX207PE / m2981-a11, SLE66CLX207PES / m2982-a11,
SLE66CLX126PEM / m2087-a11, SLE66CLX126PE / m2088-a11, SLE66CLX126PES /
m2089-a11, SLE66CLX127PEM / m2997-a11, SLE66CLX127PE / m2998-a11,
SLE66CLX127PES / m2999-a11, all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1, SHA-2
V1.0 and all with specific IC dedicated software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the
product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version
2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 8 May 2009, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements
●
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
●
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
●
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site
Address
Function
Altis-Toppan
Toppan Photomask, Inc.
European Technology Center
Boulevard John Kennedy 224
91105 Corbeil Essonnes
France
Mask Center
Amkor
Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philipines
Module Mounting
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philipines
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Site
Address
Function
Augsburg
Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
Development
Bangkok
Smartrac Technology,
142 Moo 1
Hi-Tech industrial Estate,
Ban Laean, Bang,
Pa-In Phra na korn Si Ayatthaya,
13160 Thailand
Inlay Antenna Mounting
Bukarest
Infineon Technologies Romania
Blvd. Dimitrie Pompeiu Nr. 6, Sector 2
020335 Bucharest, Romania
Development
Chanhassen
Smartrac Technology US Inc.
1546 Lake Drive West
Chanhassen, MN 55317
USA
Inlay antenna mounting
Dresden-Toppan
Toppan Photomask, Inc
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden, Germany
Mask Center
Dresden
Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co. OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden
Germany
Production
Erfurt
Assa Abloy Identification Technologies GmbH
(former Sokymat GmbH)
In den Weiden 4b, 99099 Erfurt
Module Mounting with
Inlay Antenna Mounting
Graz / Villach / Klagenfurt
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
8020 Graz, Austria
Development
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach, Austria
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt, Austria
Großostheim
Infineon Technology AG, DCE, Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 - Building 8A
63762 Großostheim, Germany
Distribution Center
Hayward
Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
U.S.A.
Distribution Center
Lustenau
New Logic Technologies AG, - A Wipro Company,
Millenium Park 6,
6890 Lustenau, Austria
Development
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0593-2009
Site
Munich
Certification Report
Address
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg, Germany
Function
Development
Infineon Technologies AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 München (Perlach), Germany
Regensburg-West
Infineon Technologies AG
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg, Germany
Module Mounting Inlay
Antenna Mounting,
Distribution Center
Smartrac Technology GmbH,
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg, Germany
Singapore
Exel Singapore Pte Ltd
DHL Exel Supply Chian
81, ALPS Avenue
Singapore 498803
Distribution Center
Singapore Kallang
Infineon Technologies AG
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
Module Mounting
Tokyo
Kintetsu World Express, Inc.
Tokyo Import Logistics Center
Narita Terminal
Tokyo, Japan
Distribution Center
Wuxi
Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd.
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu, P.R. China
Module Mounting,
Distribution Center
Table 4: TOE identification
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] ). The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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