Certification Report: 0223a

Certification Report: 0223a
Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
for
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048 / m1484a24,
m1484a27 and m1484b14
from
Infineon Technologies AG
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Telefon +49 228 9582-0, Infoline +49 228 9582-111, Telefax +49 228 9582-455
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048 / m1484a24,
m1484a27 and m1484b14
from
Infineon Technologies AG
SOGIS-MRA
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408: 1999).
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance:
Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality:
BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL5 augmented by:
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 07 October, 2003
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Telefon (0228) 9582-0 - Telefax (0228) 9582-455 - Infoline (0228) 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Certification Report
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
·
BSIG2
·
BSI Certification Ordinance3
·
BSI Schedule of Costs4
·
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
·
DIN EN 45011 standard
·
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
·
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.15
·
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
-
Part 1, Version 0.6
-
Part 2, Version 1.0
·
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
·
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSIKostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
A-1
Certification Report
2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2
CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003.
A-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
3
Certification Report
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The products Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX322P with
RSA 2048 / m1484a24, m1484a27 and m1484b14 and each with production
line indicator “2” (Dresden) have undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0169-2002.
The evaluation of the products Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048 / m1484a24, m1484a27 and m1484b14 were
conducted by the Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit of the TÜV Informationstechnik
GmbH. The Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit of the TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is
an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Infineon Technologies AG.
The certification is concluded with
·
the comparability check and
·
the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 07 October, 2003.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
·
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
·
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report
4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B -1 to B - 28.
The product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX322P with
RSA 2048 / m1484a24, m1484a27 and m1484b14 has been included in the BSI
list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
0228/9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor7 of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the abovementioned website.
7
A-4
Infineon Technologies AG, Postfach 80 09 49, 81609 München
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
B
Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
·
the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
·
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
·
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
B-1
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Contents of the certification results
1
Executive Summary
3
2
Identification of the TOE
11
3
Security Policy
13
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
14
5
Architectural Information
15
6
Documentation
15
7
IT Product Testing
16
8
Evaluated Configuration
17
9
Results of the Evaluation
17
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
21
11 Annexes
23
12 Security Target
23
13 Definitions
23
14 Bibliography
25
B-2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
1
Certification Report
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the Versions m1484a24, m1484a27 and
m1484b14 of the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX322P
with RSA 2048. All these versions provide a hardware platform for a smart card
to run smart card applications executed by a smart card operating system.
The evaluation was performed as a re-evaluation process based on Version
a23 of the Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048 /
m1484, certified under BSI-DSZ-CC-0169-2002. The Security Target of BSIDSZ-CC-0169-2002 is valid for the versions m1484a24, m1484a27 and
m1484b14, too.
The design changes of the versions m1484a24, m1484a27 and m1484b14 are
mostly modification for improvement of the chip production. Details of the
modifications can be found in the Impact Analysis Document [30].
The SLE66CX322P is a port of the SLE66CX320P architecture to a smaller
production technology, implemented in the 0,22 µm technology and
manufactured in Infineons IC fabrication in Dresden, Germany, indicated by the
production line indicator “2”.
The hardware part of the TOE is the complete chip, composed of a processing
unit (CPU) with a memory management unit (MMU), several different memories
(256 bytes of internal RAM (IRAM), 4 kBytes of extended RAM (XRAM), 136
kBytes of user ROM, 8 kByte of test ROM and 32 kBytes of EEPROM), a
security logic, an interrupt module, bus system, a timer, an interrupt-controlled
I/O interface, a Random Number Generator (RNG), a checksum module (CRC
module) and two modules for cryptographic operations: ACE (Advanced Crypto
Engine) and DDC (providing the DES algorithm and especially designed to
counter attacks like DPA or EMA).
The firmware part of the TOE consists of the RMS routines for EEPROM
programming and security function testing (Resource Management System, IC
Dedicated Support Software in Protection Profile [10]) and the STS which
consists of test and initialisation routines (Self Test Software, IC Dedicated Test
Software in Protection Profile [10]). The RMS routines are stored by the TOE
manufacturer in a reserved area of the normal user ROM. The STS routines are
stored in the protected test ROM, used for testing purposes during production
only and are not accessible for the user software.
The software part of the TOE consists of the RSA2048 library to provide a high
level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) cryptography implemented on
the hardware component ACE. The routines are used for the generation of RSA
Key Pairs, the RSA signature verification, the RSA signature generation and the
RSA modulus recalculation. The RSA2048 library is delivered as source code
and is to be integrated into the users embedded software.
The smart card operating system and the application stored in the User ROM
and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE.
B-3
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
The TOE is embedded into a micro-module or another sealed package. The
micro-modules are embedded into a credit card sized plastic card.
The TOE provides an ideal platform for applications requiring non-volatile data
storage. The TOE is intended for use in a range of high security applications,
including high speed security authentication, data encryption or electronic
signature. Several security features independently implemented in hardware or
controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper operations and integrity
and confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for
memory protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only
under specified conditions.
The Security Target is written using the Smartcard IC Platform Protection
Profile, Version 1.0 (BSI-PP-0002-2001) [10]. With reference to this Protection
Profile, the smart card product life cycle is described in 7 phases. The
development, production and operational user environment are described and
referenced to these phases. TOE delivery is defined at the end of phase 3 as
wafers or phase 4 as modules.
The assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile [10]
are used. To address additional security features of the TOE (e.g cryptographic
services), the security environment as outlined in the PP [10] is augmented by
an additional policy, an assumption and security objectives accordingly.
The TOE was evaluated against the claims of the Security Target [6] by the
Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit of the TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH as a reevaluation based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0169-2002.
The evaluation was completed on 1st August, 2003. The Prüfstelle für ITSicherheit of the TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)8 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Infineon Technologies AG.
1.1
Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1],
part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance
level EAL5+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 5 augmented). The following table
shows the augmented assurance components.
Requirement
8
B-4
Identifier
EAL5
TOE evaluation: Semiformally designed and tested
+: ALC_DVS.2
Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3
Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Certification Report
Requirement
+: AVA_VLA.4
Identifier
Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2
Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation
ST
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
ST
FDP
User data protection
FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control
ST
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based access control
ST
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow control
PP
FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer protection
PP
FMT
Security Management
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
ST
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialisation
ST
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
PP
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
PP
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
PP
FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain separation
PP
FRU
Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2
Limited fault tolerance
PP
Table 2: SFRs taken from CC Part 2
B-5
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FAU
Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
FMT
Security management
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
PP
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
PP
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_TST.2
Subset TOE testing
PP / ST
9
PP / ST
ST
Table 3: SFRs CC part 2 extended
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1.1 and 7.2.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security
Functions
Description
SF1
Operating state checking
SF2
Phase management with test mode lock-out
SF3
Protection against snooping
SF4
Data encryption and data disguising
SF5
Random number generation
SF6
TSF self test
SF7
Notification of physical attack
SF8
Memory Management Unit (MMU)
SF9
Cryptographic support
Table 4: TOE Security Functions
9
B-6
PP/ST: component is described in the PP but operations are performed in the ST.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Certification Report
SF1: Operating state checking
Correct function of the SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048 is only given in the
specified range. To prevent an attack exploiting that circumstance, it is
necessary to detect if the specified range is left.
All operating signals are filtered to prevent malfunction and the operation
state is monitored with sensors for the operating voltage, clock signal,
frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation.
SF2: Phase management with test mode lock-out
During start-up of the TOE the decision for the user mode or the test
mode is taken depending on several phase identifiers. If test mode is the
active phase, the TOE requests authentication before any action (test
mode lock-out).
The phase management is used to provide the separation between the
security enforcing functions and the user software. After TOE delivery the
TOE is set to user mode.
SF3: Protection against snooping
Several mechanisms, like topological design measures for disguise,
protect the TOE against snooping the design or the user data during
operation and even if it is out of operation (power down).
SF4: Data encryption and data disguising
The memory contents of the TOE is encrypted on chip to protect against
data analysis on stored data as well as on internally transmitted data.
Only the key owner has the possibility to read out data. To prevent
interpretation of leaked information, randomness is inserted in the
information. This function is specifically effective to prevent DPA during
DES calculations.
SF5: Random number generation
Random data are essential for cryptography as well as for physical
security mechanisms. The TOE is equipped with a true random generator
based on physical probabilistic effects. The random data can be used
from the user software as well as from the security enforcing functions.
SF6: TSF self test
The TSF of the SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048 has a hardware controlled
self-test which can be started from the user software or is started directly
to test SF1, SF5 and SF7. Any attempt to modify the sensor devices will
be detected from the test.
SF7: Notification of physical attack
The entire surface of the TOE is protected with the active shield. Attacks
over the surface are detected when the shield lines are cut or get
contacted.
B-7
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
SF8: Memory Management Unit (MMU)
The MMU in the TOE gives the user software the possibility to define
different access rights for memory areas. In case of an access violation
the MMU will generate a non maskable interrupt (NMI). Then an interrupt
service routine can react on the access violation. The policy of setting up
the MMU and specifying the memory ranges is defined by the user
software.
SF9: Cryptographic Support
Cryptographic operations are provided by the TOE. The TOE is equipped
with several hardware accelerators to support the standard cryptographic
operation. The components are a hardware DES encryption unit and a
combination of software and hardware unit to support RSA cryptography
and RSA key generation.
As the final transition from test mode to user mode is performed before TOE
delivery, all TOE Security Functions are applicable from TOE delivery at the end
of phase 3 or 4 (depending on when TOE delivery takes place in a specific
case) to phase 7. The RSA functionality as part of SF9 is only available, if the
embedded software developer implements the RSA2048 library into the
embedded software.
1.3
Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specifc
functions as indicated in the Security Target, chapter 6. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2) (see
Chapter 9 of this report).
1.4
Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the organisational security policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target [6] and can be summarized as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or a process acting on behalf
of him.
So called standard high-level security concerns defined in the Protection Profile
[10] were derived from considering the end-usage phase (Phase 7 of the life
cycle as described in the Security Target) as follows:
·
manipulation of User Data and of the smart card Embedded Software
(while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s
memories),
·
disclosure of User Data and of the smart card Embedded Software (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
B-8
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
·
Certification Report
deficiency of random numbers.
These high-level security concerns are refined in the Protection Profile [10] and
used by the Security Target [6] by defining threats on a more technical level for
·
Inherent Information Leakage,
·
Physical Probing,
·
Physical Manipulation,
·
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
·
Forced Information Leakage,
·
Abuse of Functionality and
·
Deficiency of Random Numbers.
Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
A specific additional security functionality for DES, Triple-DES and RSAencryption and decryption must be provided by the TOE according to an
additional security policy defined in the Security Target.
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional policy.
1.5
Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode. The
TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC manufacturing process
(Phase 3) or at the end of IC Packaging (Phase 4). At this point in time the
operating system software including the RSA2048 library (IC dedicated SW part
of the TOE) is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the chip and the
test mode is disabled.
Thus, there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are
important for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery
processes, like the Smart Card Finishing Process, Personalisation and the
delivery of the smart card to an end user, have to be organised in a way that
excludes all possibilities of physical manipulation of the TOE.
B-9
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
There are no special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the
requirement that the controller has to be used under the well-defined operating
conditions and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as
described in the user documentation and chapter 10 of this Report.
1.6
Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile [10], the
assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are valid for the
Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security
Target, Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6
are covered by these assumptions from the PP:
The developer of the smart card Embedded Software (Phase 1) must ensure:
·
the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while
developing this software in Phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that
the software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In
particular the assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop
software that fulfils the assumptions.
·
the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the
TOE (especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed
that the Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of
the environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE.
Only appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the
TOE have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to Phase 7.
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target:
·
Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the smart card
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function).
1.7
Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
B-10
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
2
Certification Report
Identification of the TOE
The following TOE deliverables are provided for a customer who purchases the
TOE:
For version m1484a24:
No
Type
Identifier
Release
Date
1
HW
SLE66CX322P Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1484a24 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
Wafer or packaged
module
2
SW
STS Self Test Software
(the IC Dedicated Test
Software)
V53.0E.10 or
Stored in Test ROM
on the IC
V53.0E.11
Form of Delivery
3
SW
RMS Resource
V07 or
Management System (the
V08
IC Dedicated Support
Software)
Stored in reserved
area of User ROM on
the IC
4
SW
RSA2048 library
Source code in
electronic form
V0.43 or
V0.44
Table 5: Delivered hardware and software of the TOE, version m1484a24
For version m1484a27:
No
Type
Identifier
Release
1
HW
SLE66CX322P Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1484a27 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
Wafer or packaged
module
2
SW
STS Self Test Software
(the IC Dedicated Test
Software)
V53.0E.10 or
Stored in Test ROM
on the IC
V53.0E.11
Date
Form of Delivery
3
SW
RMS Resource
V07 or
Management System (the
V08
IC Dedicated Support
Software)
Stored in reserved
area of User ROM on
the IC
4
SW
RSA2048 library
Source code in
electronic form
V0.43 or
V0.44
Table 6: Delivered hardware and software of the TOE, version m1484a27
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For version m1484b14:
No
Type
Identifier
Release
Date
1
HW
SLE66CX322P Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1484b14 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
Wafer or packaged
module
2
SW
STS Self Test Software
(the IC Dedicated Test
Software)
V53.0F.12 or
Stored in Test ROM
on the IC
V53.10.13
Form of Delivery
3
SW
RMS Resource
V1.1 or
Management System (the
V1.2 or
IC Dedicated Support
Software)
V1.3
Stored in reserved
area of User ROM on
the IC
4
SW
RSA2048 library
Source code in
electronic form
V0.43 or
V0.44
Table 7: Delivered hardware and software of the TOE, version m1484b14
For versions m1484a24, m1484a27 and m1484b14:
No
Type
Identifier
Release
Date
Form of Delivery
5
DOC
SLE66CxxxP
Security Controller
Family, Data Book [9]
09.02
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
6
DOC
SLE66CxxxP
Products and Bondout
Errata Sheet [11]
06.03
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
7
DOC
SLE66CxxxP
Security Controller
Family, Confidential
Instruction Set [12]
10.01
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
9
DOC
RSA 2048 bit Support,
RSA Interface
Specification [13]
02.02
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
10
DOC
RSA 2048 bit Support,
Arithmetic Library [14]
02.02
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
11
DOC
Application Notes
[15] – [26]
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
Table 8: Delivered documents of the TOE for version m1484a24, m1484a27 and m1484b14
The hardware part of the versions of the TOE is identified by SLE66CX322P
with RSA 2048 / m1484a24, m1484a27 or m1484b14 and their specific GDSfile. For identification of a specific chip, the Chip Identification Number stored in
the EEPROM can be used (see [9, chapter 7]):
·
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The chip type byte identifies the different versions in the following
manner: 6C hex for versions m1484a2(x); 7B hex for versions
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Certification Report
m1484b1(x). Using the additional detailed production parameter bytes,
one can reconstruct the last character (x) of the version number of a
specific chip via a data base system at Infineon Logistic Department.
·
The STS is identified by its unique version number which is stored in
three additional control bytes of the Chip Identification Number.
·
The RMS is identified by its unique version number. As the RMS is part
of the ROM mask, one can get the RMS version number for a specific
chip by using the ROM type bytes and asking the data base system at
Infineon Logistic Department.
·
The first nibble of the batch number gives the production line indicator
which is „2“ for all versions of the TOE, as the evaluated TOE is
produced in Dresden.
The RSA2048 library, as a separate software part of the TOE is identified by its
unique version number.
Each of the three versions m1484a24, m1484a27 and m1484b14 can include
different firmware and software (STS, RMS, RSA2048) versions as indicated in
tables 5, 6 and 7.
The delivery process from Infineon to their customers (to Phase 5 or Phase 6 of
the life- cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of
the different parts of the TOE as outlined above.
To ensure that the customer receives the evaluated version of the chip, he has
to personally pick up the TOE (IC on Wafers or as Modules) at the Infineon
Warehouse in Regensburg (see part D, annex A of this report).
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted)
according to defined mailing procedures. The TOE RSA2048 software is
delivered as softcopy (encrypted source code) to the embedded software
developer according to defined mailing procedures. After implementation of the
RSA2048 functionality into the embedded software, this is delivered back as
part of the customers deliverables (e.g. ROM-code) into the chip production of
Infineon.
Defined procedures at the development and production sites guarantee that the
right versions of the RMS and STS are implemented into a specific ROM mask
for a TOE IC.
3
Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and
it will provide a random number generator. Additionally, a combination of
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software and hardware parts of the TOE implement RSA cryptography and RSA
key generation.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during DES and Triple-DES cryptographic
functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against
malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality.
Hence the TOE shall:
·
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory
of the TOE and
·
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of
Security Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by the TOE
manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the Security Functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system, and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
Security Functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environmental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Infineon Technologies AG is the TOE developer and
manufacturer and responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded
smart card application software in its development and production environment.
For those aspects refer to part B, chapter 9.2 of this report.
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The full evaluation results are applicable for chips from the semiconductor
factory in Dresden, each labelled by the production line indicator „2“.
5
Architectural Information
The SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048 / m1484a24, m1484a27 and m1484b14 are
integrated circuits (IC) plus supporting software for RSA calculations providing a
platform to a smart card operating system and smart card application software.
A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE
description of the Security Target. The complete hardware description and the
complete instruction set of the SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048 / m1484a24,
m1484a27 and m1484b14 is to be found in the Data Book [9] and other
guidance documents delivered to the customer, e.g. Confidential Instruction Set
[12].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
processing unit (CPU) with memory management unit (MMU), RAM, ROM,
EEPROM, security logic, interrupt module, bus system, Random Number
Generator (RNG) and the two modules for cryptographic operations (ACE and
DDC) of the chip are used. Security measures for physical protection are
realized within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip
memories provide the interface to the software using the Security Functions of
the TOE. The TOE software for RSA calculations uses the defined TOE
hardware interfaces and is to be implemented by the embedded software
developer as outlined in the RSA Interface Specification [13]. It provides a high
level software interface to the users operating system and application.
The TOE IC Dedicated Test Software (STS), stored on the chip, is used for
testing purposes during production only and is completely separated from the
use of the embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
The TOE IC Dedicated Support Software (RMS), stored on the chip, is used for
EEPROM programming and Security Function testing. It is stored by the TOE
manufacturer in a reserved area of the normal user ROM and can be used by
the users embedded software.
6
Documentation
The documentation [9] and [11] – [26] is provided with the product by the
developer to the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the
Security Target.
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hardware computing platform to implement the software (operating system /
application software) which will use the TOE.
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7
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into four categories:
(i)
tests which are performed in a simulation environment for analogue and
for digital simulations;
(ii)
functional production tests, which are done as a last step of the
production process (phase 3) and, in case TOE delivery is at the end of
phase 4, additionally done as a last step of IC Packaging. These tests
are done for every chip to check its correct functionality;
(iii)
qualification
tests
to
release
the
TOE
to
production:
- used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different
operating conditions (often also referred to as characterization tests)
- special verification tests for Security Functions which were done with
samples of the TOE.
(iv)
Layout tests by testing the implementation by optical control, in order to
verify statements concerning the layout design.
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms
as identified in the functional specification, the high level design and the low
level design. Chips from the production site in Dresden (see part D, annex A of
this report) were used for tests.
The evaluators could repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs and tools delivered to the evaluator or at the developers site. They
performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer by sampling. Besides repeating exactly the
developers tests, test parameters were varied and additional analysis was
done. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout
measures were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the actual versions of the TOE
SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048 / m1484a24, m1484a27 and m1484b14 and
each with production line indicator “2” (Dresden) provides the Security
Functions as specified. The test results confirm the correct implementation of
the TOE Security Functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functions into consideration. Intensive penetration testing was performed to consider the physical
tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated equipment and expertised
know how.
For re-evaluation, as only specific parts of the chips were changed, only a
subset of the tests of BSI-DSZ-CC-0169-2002 had to be performed by the
evaluators.
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8
Certification Report
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by the versions SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048/
m1484a24, m1484a27 or m1484b14 and each with production line indicator “2”
(Dresden). Each version has only one fixed evaluated configuration at the time
of delivery.
All information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functions by the software
is provided within the user documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode.
Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user mode. For all evaluation
activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid
for the user mode, too.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
Evaluation of the TOE
The Evaluation Technical Reports (ETR), [7] for versions m1484a24 and
m1484a27 and [8] for versions m1484b14 were provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in coordination with the Certification Body. For smart card IC specific methodology
the CC supporting documents
(i)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii)
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(iii)
ETR-lite – for Composition and ETR-lite – for composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation: Recommended best practice
(see [4]: AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36) and AIS 31 (Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for physical random number generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL5
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
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Assurance classes and components
Security Target evaluation
CC Class ASE
PASS
TOE description
ASE_DES.1
PASS
Security environment
ASE_ENV.1
PASS
ST introduction
ASE_INT.1
PASS
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.1
PASS
PP claims
ASE_PPC.1
PASS
IT security requirements
ASE_REQ.1
PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
ASE_SRE.1
PASS
TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
Configuration management
CC Class ACM
PASS
Partial CM automation
ACM_AUT.1
PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_CAP.4
PASS
Development tools CM coverage
ACM_SCP.3
PASS
Delivery and operation
CC Class ADO
PASS
Detection of modification
ADO_DEL.2
PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADO_IGS.1
PASS
Development
CC Class ADV
PASS
Semiformal functional specification
ADV_FSP.3
PASS
Semiformal high-level design
ADV_HLD.3
PASS
Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2
PASS
Modularity
ADV_INT.1
PASS
Descriptive low-level design
ADV_LLD.1
PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration
ADV_RCR.2
PASS
Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_SPM.3
PASS
Guidance documents
CC Class AGD
PASS
Administrator guidance
AGD_ADM.1
PASS
User guidance
AGD_USR.1
PASS
Life cycle support
CC Class ALC
PASS
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2
PASS
Standardised life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2
PASS
Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2
PASS
Tests
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Verdict
CC Class ATE
PASS
Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2
PASS
Testing: low-level design
ATE_DPT.2
PASS
Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1
PASS
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Certification Report
Assurance classes and components
Independent testing – sample
Vulnerability assessment
Verdict
ATE_IND.2
CC Class AVA
PASS
PASS
Covert channel analysis
AVA_CCA.1
PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_MSU.3
PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_SOF.1
PASS
Highly resistant
AVA_VLA.4
PASS
Table 9: Verdicts for the assurance components
According to the analysis of the impact of the changes compared to BSI-DSZCC-0169-2002, the re-evaluation was concentrated on the classes ACM, AGD,
ATE, AVA and the family ADV_IMP.
The evaluation has shown that:
·
the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSIPP-0002-2001 [10]
·
Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
·
the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
·
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of
Function: SF 2 (Phase management with test mode lock-out), SF 3
(Protection against snooping) and SF 4 (Data encryption and data
disguising) including resistance of the DES co-processor against
Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Therefore the scheme interpretations
AIS 26 (see [4]) was used.
SPA/DPA analysis for RSA-Functionality is not part of this certification.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
(i)
the TOE Security Function SF9 -- which is
a) DES encryption and decryption by the hardware co-processor and
b) RSA encryption, decryption and key-generation by the combination
of hardware co-processor and RSA2048 Software -- and
(ii)
for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by
the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
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considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the SLE66CX322P with RSA
2048 / m1484a24, m1484a27 and m1484b14 produced in the semiconductor
factory in Dresden, each labelled by the production line indicator „2“ within the
chip identification number in the EEPROM, and the firmware and software
versions as indicated in tables 5, 6 and 7.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product or to
chips from other production and manufacturing sites, provided the sponsor
applies for re-certification of the modified product, in accordance with the
procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the modified product does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2
Additional Evaluation Results
·
The evaluation confirmed specific results of a previous smart card IC
evaluation regarding assurance aspects for the development and
production environment. This is outlined in part D of this report, annex A.
·
To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific
smart card embedded software additional evaluator actions were
performed during the TOE evaluation. The results are documented in
ETR-lite [27] according to AIS 36 [4]. Therefore, the interface between
the smart card embedded software developer and the developer of the
TOE was examined in detail. These composition related actions
comprised the following tasks:
-
Examination of the integration of the embedded software in the
configuration management system of the IC manufacturer for the
TOE.
This comprises the handling of the ROM-code, the related
acceptance and verification procedures with the customer and the
assignment to a unique commercial type identifier as well as the
handling of different ROM-code masks for the same smart card IC.
-
Examination of consistency of delivery and pre-personalisation
procedures.
This comprises the handling of specific delivery procedures and prepersonalisation data with respect to the physical, technical and
organisational measures to protect these data as well as the
procedures to ensure the correct configuration of the TOE. In
addition, the production test related to customer specific items
including the integrity check of the customer ROM-code and the
personalisation process, were checked.
-
B-20
Examination of the separation based on the unique commercial type
identifier and the related test and delivery procedures.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Certification Report
-
Examination, that Infineon has implemented procedures to provide a
customer product related configuration list based on the general
configuration list [28] or [29] provided for the evaluation of the TOE
supplemented by the customer specific items including ROM-mask
labelling, specific development tools for embedded software
development and related customer specific deliveries and the
corresponding verification data generated by Infineon to be sent to
customer. In the course of the TOE evaluation a specific customer
product related configuration list was checked.
-
Examination of aspects relevant for the user guidance documentation
of the TOE to use the TOE for a product composition.
10
Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
1.
The operational documents [9] and [11] - [26] contain necessary
information about the usage of the TOE and have to be considered. In
the following, specific items are listed:
-
It is possible to store data in the EEPROM without encryption, which
might constitute a risk in case an attacker is given the possibility to
read out this data. The operating system developer is responsible for
the use of all security functionality made available by the TOE and
controllable by him in such a way, that secure operation is
guaranteed. These are the parameters for memory encryption
determining areas for the encryption. In the data book [9] it is pointed
out to the operating system developer, which effects on the security
not proper use of this functionality might have, and it is described in
detail, how to use effectively the security mechanisms made available
by the TOE.
-
In case an alarm is triggered, the contents of the XRAM is not being
deleted. In order to prevent an attacker from reading out this data, the
embedded software has to delete explicitly the XRAM after each reset
(see [9], chapter 7).
-
The delivered MMU is set so, that SLE66CX322P / m1484a24,
m1484a27 and m1484b14 is compatible with SLECX160S, i.e. all
ROM areas are mapped. Since the movec blockade of the
SLE66CX160S is no longer implemented, in this setting reading out of
the ROM by a programme in the EEPROM is possible. In order to
avoid this, the operating system developer has to programme the
MMU in a way that reading out is impossible. This fact is pointed out
in the data book [9, chapter 19].
-
ROM contents of chips, being manufactured with the same user mask
are identically encrypted. This leads to the possibility to carry out
ROM read out attacks using as many samples as available and
combining all results. Therefore, it is recommended to store security
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critical data (e.g. identification and authentication data) not in the
ROM, but in the EEPROM (this is encrypted chip individually). This
fact is pointed out to the operating system developer in application
note [18].
-
In order to protect the TOE against attacks on power consumption
(e.g. DPA), the wait states functionality in connection with the random
number generator and additional features to modify the current profile
have to be used by the operating system developer, together with
additional software measures, as described in [9, chapter 19].
-
The TOE contains a random number generator (RNG). The
application software developer has to implement tests before the use
of the RNG. These tests and the generation process of random
numbers shall be connected in a way which ensures that the quality
of the random numbers cannot be affected even by a defect of the
RNG.
Random numbers used for the tests shall be kept confidential by the
application software, especially if some of those numbers are used as
data for key generation afterwards.
If tests fail, random numbers shall not be used by the application
software. In order to ensure that the RNG is not defect after the
random numbers for key generation were produced, tests should be
repeated after the key generation and keys shall only be used if tests
do not fail.
-
The TOE has an active shielding for the identification of attacks by
means of physical probing. It is possible for the operating system
developer to configure the active shielding (see application note [19]).
It is recommended to change the configuration of the active shielding
before any security critical operation and to compare the returned
values with the expected values accordingly.
2.
Additionally, for secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the
assumptions about the environment in the Security Target has to be
taken into account (see part B, chapter 1.6 of this report). For measures
important for A.Key-Function refer to [17].
3.
For evaluations of products or systems including the TOE as a part or
using the TOE as a platform (for example smart card operating systems
or complete smart cards), specific information resulting from this
evaluation is of importance and shall be given to the succeeding
evaluation. Therefore, the document ETR-lite [27] was generated
according to AIS 36 [4] for the version m1484b14 of the TOE.
4.
Depending on the security policy of the complete smart card product,
SPA/DPA analysis for RSA-Functionality should be part of the smart card
composite product evaluation.
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5.
As an outcome of this evaluation, the customer has to receive the
evaluated version of the chip (IC on Wafers or as Modules) personally at
the Infineon Warehouse in Regensburg. In case of differing delivery
procedures, these have to be evaluated in the course of the operating
system evaluation or the smart card composite product evaluation.
11
Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is the Security Target of BSIDSZ-CC-0169-2002 which is valid for the versions m1484a24, m1484a27 and
m1484b14, too.
13
Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
ACE
Advanced Crypto Engine
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA
Differential Power Analysis
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB
Electrical Code Block
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA
Electro magnetic analysis
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP
Protection Profile
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RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
Rivest, Shamir, Adelmann – a public key encryption algorithm
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
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Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125, Version 5.1, January
1998)
[4]
Applicaton Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS), Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Bonn, as relevant for the TOE,
specifically
B-25
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
-
AIS 25, Version 2, 29.07.2002 for: CC Supporting Document, The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
-
AIS 26, Version 2, 6.08.2002 for: CC Supporting Document, Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
-
AIS 31, Version 1, 25.09.2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators;
-
AIS 32, Version 1, 02.07.2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
-
AIS 36, Version 1, 29.07.2002 for: CC Supporting Document,
ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6]
Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs, SLE66CX322P
with RSA 2048 / m1484a23, Security Target, Version 1.0.5, 06 May 2002
[7]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, 21 July 2003, for the Product
Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX322P with RSA2048 /
m1484a24 and m1484a27 and SLE66CX165P with RSA2048 /
m1489a24 and m1489a27 (confidential document)
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, 21 July 2003, for the Product
Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX322P with RSA2048 /
m1484b14 and SLE66CX165P with RSA2048 / m1489b14 (confidential
document)
[9]
Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs, SLE66CxxxP,
Security Controller Family, Data Book Version 09.02, (confidential
document)
[10]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, Juli 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[11]
SLE66CxxxP, Products and Bondout Errata Sheet, Version 06.03,
(confidential document)
[12]
SLE66CxxxP, Security Controller Family, Confidential Instruction Set,
10.01, (confidential document)
[13]
RSA 2048 bit Support, SLE66CX322P, RSA Interface Specification,
Version 02.02, (confidential document)
[14]
RSA 2048 bit Support, SLE66CX322P, Arithmetic Library, Version 02.02
(confidential document)
B-26
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Certification Report
[15]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Transfer of a ROM Mask
from SLE66CxxS to SLE66CxxxP, Version 06.01
[16]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Testing the RNG, Version
09.00
[17]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66xxxP, DDES – EC2, Accellerator,
Version 07.01
[18]
Confidential Application Note,
Decryption, Version 07.00
[19]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Using the active shield
security feature, Version 01.02
[20]
Confidential Application
EEPROM, Version 08.00
[21]
Confidential Application Note, MMU-Memory Management Unit, Version
08.00
[22]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, Fast Switching of PLL,
Version 03.03
[23]
Confidential Application Note, Security Advice – SLE11/22/44/66CxxxS/
66CxxxP, Version 10.00
[24]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxS, Secure Hash Algorithm SHA1, Version 01.98
[25]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, UART, Version 03.00
[26]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxS, SLE66CxxxP, Using the
CRC, Version 03.01
[27]
Evaluation Technical Report Lite for Composition (ETR-lite), Version: 1.0,
Date: 18.07.2003, for the Product Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX322P with RSA2048 / m1484b14 and SLE66CX165P with
RSA2048 / m1489b14 (confidential document)
[28]
Infineon Technologies AG, Secure Mobile Solutions, SLE66CX322P with
RSA 2048 / m1484, Configuration Management Scope (ACM_SCP),
Version 1.a.1, 14.07.2003 (i.e. TOE Configuration List for versions a24
and a27, confidential document)
[29]
Infineon Technologies AG, Secure Mobile Solutions, SLE66CX322P with
RSA 2048 / m1484, Configuration Management Scope (ACM_SCP),
Version 1.b.1, 14.07.2003 (i.e. TOE Configuration List for version b14,
confidential document)
[30]
Infineon Technologies AG, Secure Mobile Solutions, SLE66CX322P /
m1484, Impact Analysis, Version 1.3, 21.05.2003 (confidential document)
Note,
SLE66CxxxP,
SLE66CxxxP,
Memory
Issues
Encryption
concerning
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B-28
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Class ADV:
Development
Assurance Family
CM automation
Abbreviated Name
ACM_AUT
CM capabilities
CM scope
Delivery
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up
Functional specification
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
High-level design
Implementation representation
TSF internals
Low-level design
Representation correspondence
Security policy modeling
Class AGD: Guidance Administrator guidance
documents
User guidance
Class ALC: Life cycle Development security
support
Flaw remediation
Life cycle definition
Tools and techniques
Class ATE: Tests
Coverage
Depth
Functional tests
Independent testing
Covert channel analysis
Class AVA:
Vulnerability
assessment
Misuse
Strength of TOE security functions
Vulnerability analysis
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT
EAL1
Delivery and
operation
Development
Guidance
documents
Life cycle
support
Tests
Vulnerability
assessment
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
1
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6
1
1
2
2
1
3
1
1
4
2
2
4
3
2
5
3
2
5
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
1
1
2
3
1
1
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
1
1
4
5
3
3
2
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
3
1
4
3
1
4
1
1
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF
Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA
Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0223-2003
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT products, Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX322P with RSA
2048 / m1484a24, m1484a27 and m1484b14 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) have been
evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2
Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 07 October, 2003, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements
·
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
·
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
·
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below ((a) – (d)):
(a) Infineon Technologies AG, Königsbrücker Str. 180, 01099 Dresden
(semiconductor factory)
(b) Infineon TechnologiesAG, St.-Martin-Straße 76, 81541 München
(development center)
(c) Infineon Technologies AG, Leibnizstraße 6, D-93055 Regensburg
(IC packaging into modules and warehouse and delivery center)
(d) Infineon Technologies, Microelectronic Design Centers Austria GmbH, Schloß
Metahof, Babenbergerstr. 10, A-8020 Graz (development center)
The hardware part of the TOE produced in the semiconductor factory in Dresden is labelled
by the production line indicator „2“.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats and
the security objective for the life cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of
phases 3 or 4 as stated in the TOE Security Target (Infineon Technologies AG,
Security and Chipcard ICs, SLE66CX322P with RSA 2048 / m1484a23, Security
Target, Version 1.0.5, 06 May 2002, [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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