Certification Report: 0498a_pdf

Certification Report: 0498a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
for
SOMA_80IFX
Version 1.1.0
from
Gep S.p.A.
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.01
ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.30
BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
Security IC chip with ePassport Application
SOMA_80IFX
Version 1.1.0
from
Gep S.p.A.
PP Conformance:
Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel
Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access
Control Version 1.0, BSI-PP-0017-2005
Functionality:
PP conformant; Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body
for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 16 November 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department/ Division
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
7.1 Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN .............................................................15
7.2 Evaluator Tests according to ATE_IND .................................................................16
7.3 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA ..........................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................18
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................19
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................20
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................20
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
●
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report
2.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2 that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product SOMA_80IFX Version 1.1.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product SOMA_80IFX Version 1.1.0 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 21. July 2009. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Gep S.p.A.
The product was developed by: Gep S.p.A.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
Certification Report
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a reassessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product SOMA_80IFX, Version 1.1.0 has been included in the BSI list of the certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5].
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Gep S.p.A.
Corso S. D'Amato n° 90
Edificio "U"
80022 Arzano (NA)
Italy
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the SOMA_80IFX e-Passport version 1.1.0. The
SOMA_80IFX is utilized by Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD) based on the
requirements and recommendations of the international Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).
The TOE provides the Basic Access Control according to the Technical Report: PKI for
MRTD offering ICC-Read only Access [11] and is supplied with a file system that contains
all the data that are used in the context of the ICAO application as described in the
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Basic
Access Control [10].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application", Basic Access Control Version 1.0, BSI-PP-0017-2005 [10].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2 und ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 7.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF1
Agents Identification and Authentication
SF2
Data exchange with Secure Messaging
SF3
Access Control of stored Data Objects
SF4
Life cycle management
SF5
Software integrity check of TOE’s assets
SF6
Security functions provided by the hardware
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.2.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 8.2 is confirmed. The rating of the
Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [9],
chapter 4.1.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [9], chapter 4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
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Certification Report
SOMA_80IFX 1.1.0 consisting of:
●
IFX Chip SLE66CLX800PE,
●
embedded software operation system SOMA_80IFX 1.1.0,
●
a file system in the context of the ICAO application.
After delivery the TOE only features one fixed configuration, which cannot be altered by
the user/administrator.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
SOMA_80IFX Version 1.1.0
The TOE consists of an integrated circuit inserted between two paper sheets, which also
embed an antenna for wireless communication. The resulting sandwich is called “inlay”
and can be bound to the cover of a passport booklet.
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
1
Identifier
HW + SW TOE: SOMA_80IFX, consisting of:
Release
Form of Delivery
1.1.0
Software contained in the
chip, chip mounted into an
inlay package and initialised.
• SW: SOMA_80IFX OS
• HW: SLE66CLX800PE
2
DOC
SOMA_80IFX e-Passport User
Guidance
1.1.1
Document in electronic form
as PDF
3
DOC
SOMA_80IFX e-Passport
Administrator Guide
1.1.1
Document in electronic form
as PDF
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is delivered after the initialisation. The following items are shipped to the
Personalisation Agent:
●
fully-functional and already initialized, but not operational SOMA_80IFX inlays
●
The master key required to derive the Personalization Keys at runtime.
●
Secure Access Module (SAM, if used for the delivery of the master key)
●
SAM activation codes (SAC, if a SAM is used to deliver the master key)
●
The Administrator Guidance
●
The User Guidance
The master key is delivered according to Custormer’s requirements. The use of a Secure
Access Module (SAM) is a possible solution. The SAM is a smart card and during
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the delivery the Personalization Keys generation is disabled and a SAM Activation
Code (SAC) must be used to enable that functionality.
Inlays, SAMs (if used) and CD-ROMs are shipped separately by means of a courier
trusted by Gep. The SAM Activation Codes (if required) are delivered to the
Personalisation Agent by means of PGP enciphered e-mail messages.
The TOE identification data (SOMA_80IFX 1.1.0) is located in the non-volatile memory of
the chip and can be read by means of the administrative command GET DATA. The TOE
is uniquely identified by a string of bytes as follows:
●
OS identifier:
53h 4Fh 4Dh 41h
●
IC identifier:
38h 30h 49h 46h 58h
●
OS version:
31h 2Eh 31h 2Eh 30h
3
Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD BAC PP [10] by the
security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International
Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Basic
Access Control in the technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
Development and Manufactoring Environment
●
Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environment
●
Control over MRTD Material
Issuing State or Organization
●
Personalization of logical MRTD
●
Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
●
Administration of logical MRTD
Receiving State or Organization
●
Examination of the MRTD passport book
●
Verification by Passive Authentication
●
Protection of data of the logical MRTD
MRTD Holder
●
Secure Handling of the MRTD holder
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [9] chapter 5.2.
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Certification Report
Architectural Information
The architecture of the Operating System embedded in the chip and the OS has
been designed following a layered approach. In a bottom to top view, i.e. from the physical
layer to the applicative layer, following layers are defined:
●
Layer 1: HL - Hardware Layer
The HL is the hardware chip. The interface to the HAL layer is constituted by
the processor instructions set (ISA) and a specific library file supplied by the
Infineon Technologies AG, i.e. the Resource Management System. It contains a
set of subroutines for programming the integrated EEPROM along with others
functions who offer a sophisticated interface to upper layer.
●
Layer 2: HAL - Hardware Abstraction Layer
The HAL is in charge to manage the functionality directly related with the chipdependent hardware. Therefore it performs actions on the hardware and provides
exposed services like APIs to the upper layer.
●
Layer 3: DOL - Data Objects Layer
The DOL attends to abstract the physical organization of the data structures
(objects) stored in EEPROM memory area. It provides to the upper layer the services
to manage the card objects and data stored within these.
●
Layer 4: SSML - Security Services Management Layer
This layer provides additional services necessary to support card applicative
features which are the security status of the card, authentication objects (i.e. keys), the
security environment and the secure messaging.
●
Layer 5: CML - Command Management Layer
The most external layer offers the externally visible interface by means of the
APDU commands.
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
7.1
Developer's Test according to ATE_FUN
The developer’s testing effort is summarized in the following 4 aspects:
TOE configurations tested:
●
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product SOMA_80IFX
1.1.0 consisting of the Infineon Chip SLE66CLX800PE, operational system
SOMA_80IFX and a file system in the context of the ICAO application.
Developer’s testing approach:
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●
The 5 testable TSF’s and related sub-functions and subsystems are tested (if
applicable) in Pre_Personalisation, Personalisation, Operational and Terminated life
cycle states.
●
Test suites are implemented in accordance with the functional specification and the
guidance documentation in order to verify the TOE’s compliance with its expected
behaviour.
●
All test cases in each test suite were run successfully on this TOE version.
Amount of developer testing performed:
●
The developer has tested all 5 testable TSF of the TOE within 67 test scenarios.
●
As demonstrated by the test coverage analysis the developer has tested the TOE
systematically at the level of TSF functionalities as given in the functional specification.
●
As demonstrated by test depth analysis the developer has tested the TOE
systematically at the level of the subsystems as given in the high level design.
Overall developer testing results:
●
All testing strategies of the TSF passed all tests of each individual test scenario so that
all testable TSF have been successfully tested against the functional specification and
the high level design.
●
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TSF perform as specified.
●
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE performs as expected.
7.2
Evaluator Tests according to ATE_IND
TOE configurations tested:
●
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product SOMA_80IFX
1.1.0 consisting of the Infineon Chip SLE66CLX800PE, operational system
SOMA_80IFX, and a file system in the context of the ICAO application.
Subset size chosen:
●
The evaluators have tested all 5 testable TSF.
TSF subset selection criteria:
●
The evaluators have chosen a subset of developer tests so that all testable TSF could
be covered by at least one test case in order to confirm that the TOE operates as
specified. Valid cases as well as invalid cases were considered.
Security functions tested:
●
The evaluators have covered all 5 testable TSF: SF1, SF2, SF3, SF4, and SF5 within
the independent testing.
Developer tests performed:
●
The evaluators have selected and tested a sample of 12 test cases from the developer
TSF tests.
Verdict for the activity:
●
During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified.
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●
Certification Report
The evaluators have verified the developer’s test results by executing a sample of tests
in the developer’s test documentation.
7.3
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA
Developer VLA:
In the following the evaluator’s penetration testing effort based on developer
vulnerability analysis is summarised:
Testing approach:
●
Examination of developer’s vulnerability analysis in the intended environment of
the TOE.
TOE test configurations:
●
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product SOMA_80IFX
1.1.0 consisting of the Infineon Chip SLE66CLX800PE, operational system
SOMA_80IFX OS and a file system in the context of the ICAO application.
Amount of penetration testing performed:
●
(2T)DES
●
Vulnerability of Access Control
●
TOE reliability
●
Life Cycle Model
Security functions penetration tested:
●
SF1, SF2, SF3, SF4, SF5
Verdict for the sub-activity:
●
The evaluator has performed penetration testing based on the developer’s vulnerability
analysis.
●
During the evaluator’s penetration testing the TOE operated still as specified.
●
All potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable with a low attack potential in the intended
environment for the TOE.
●
The TOE is resistant to attackers with low attack potential.
Evaluator VLA:
In the following the evaluator’s penetration testing effort based on his independent
vulnerability analysis is summarised:
Testing approach:
●
Examination of evaluator’s vulnerability analysis in the intended environment of the
TOE.
TOE test configurations:
●
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product SOMA_80IFX
1.1.0 consisting of the Infineon Chip SLE66CLX800PE, operational system
SOMA_80IFX 1.1.0 and a file system in the context of the ICAO application.
Amount of penetration testing performed:
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●
(2T)DES
●
Vulnerability of Access Control
●
TOE reliability
●
Life Cycle Model
●
Vulnerability of Secure Messaging und Access Control
●
TOE reliability behaviour after interruptions
BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
Security functions penetration tested:
●
SF1, SF2, SF3, SF4, SF5
Verdict for the sub-activity:
●
The evaluator has performed penetration testing based on the evaluator’s
vulnerability analysis.
●
During the evaluator’s penetration testing the TOE operated as specified.
●
In the intended environment of use the TOE does not feature any exploitable
vulnerabilities in the meaning of the security targets [ST] for typical attackers
possessing a low attack potential, if all the measures required are taken into
consideration.
●
The TOE is resistant to attackers with low attack potential.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The evaluated TOE is the SOMA_80IFX 1.1.0 consisting of:
●
IFX Chip SLE66CLX800PE,
●
embedded software operation system SOMA_80IFX 1.1.0,
●
a file system in the context of the ICAO application. The TOE was tested in the
evaluated configuration as described above.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology were used:
●
Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS), AIS 25, Anwendung der CC
auf integrierte Schaltungen, Version 5, 2009-05-07, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik [4],
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●
Certification Report
Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS), AIS 26, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen, Version 6, 2009-05-07,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik [4].
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the class ASE
●
All components of the EAL4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
●
The components ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Protection Profile for Machine Readable Travel Document with
"ICAO Application", Basic Access Control Version 1.0,
BSI-PP-0017-2005 [10]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant; Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2
ALC_DVS.2
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function : high
•
SF1: Agents Identification and Authentication
•
SF2: Data exchange with Secure Messaging
•
SF6: Security functions provided by the hardware
In order to assess the Strength of Function the scheme interpretation AIS 31 (see [4]) was
used.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
●
SF2: Data exchange with Secure Messaging (Triple-DES, Retail MAC)
10
Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
(2T)DES
2-key Tripple DES
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC
Basic Access Control
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MAC
Message Authentication Code
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
PP
Protection Profile
ROM
Read Only Memory
SAC
SAM activation codes
SAM
Secure Access Module
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
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TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
Certification Report
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
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TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0498, Version 1.6.2, dated 02/10/2008, Common
Criteria Security Target for SOMA_80IFX, Gep S.p.A. (confidential document)
[7]
Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0498 for SOMA_80IFX 1.1.0, Version 1,
Date: 2009-07-17, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8]
Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.2, Date: 16.04.2009, Configuration Item
List for SOMA_80IFX (confidential document)
[9]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0498, Version 1.0.0, Date: 07/12/2009, Security Target
SOMA_80IFX Electronic Passport, Gep S.p.A. (sanitised public document)
[10]
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”,
Basic Access Control, Version 1.0, BSI-PP-0017, 18 August 2005, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[11]
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Technical Report: PKI for MRTD offering
ICC-Read only Access, Version 1.1
[12]
ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product
SLE66CLXxxxPEx/m158x-e12 from Infineon Technologies AG, Version 2, Date
2008-08-21, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[13]
Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0399-2009, for Infineon Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) SLE66CLX800PE / m1581-e12, SLE66CLX800PEM / m1580-e12,
8
specifically
23 / 36
•
AIS 25, Version 6, 07.09.2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 6, 07.05.2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
•
AIS 34, Version 2, 24.10.2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+
•
AIS 35, Version 2, 12.11.2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including
JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document
and CC Supporting Document
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
SLE66CLX800PES
/
m1582-e12,
SLE66CLX360PE
/
m1587-e12,
SLE66CLX360PEM / m1588-e12 and SLE66CLX360PES / m1589-e12 with specific
IC Dedicated Software, Date: 29.01.2007, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik
[14]
SOMA_80IFX e-Passport Administrator Guidance, Version 1.1.1, Date: 7.11.2008,
Gep S.p.A.
[15]
SOMA_80IFX e-Passport User Guidance, Version 1.1.1, Date: 7.11.2008, Gep
S.p.A.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
–
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
–
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
–
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
–
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
–
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
–
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
–
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation
Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
ADV: Development
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Certification Report
Assurance
Family
Assurance
Components
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Configuration
management
EAL2
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
ACM_AUT
ACM_CAP
1
2
ACM_SCP
Delivery
operation
and ADO_DEL
Development
EAL3
ADO_IGS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADV_FSP
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
1
1
1
ADV_SPM
Guidance
documents
Life
support
AGD_ADM
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_USR
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
ALC_LCD
1
2
2
3
ALC_TAT
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
cycle ALC_DVS
Tests
ALC_FLR
ATE_COV
1
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
Vulnerability
assessment
1
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
1
2
2
3
3
AVA_SOF
1
1
1
1
1
1
AVA_VLA
1
1
2
3
4
4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0498-2009
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product SOMA_80IFX, Version 1.1.0 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 16 November 2009, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
Security Assurance Requirements
●
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
●
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
●
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
(a)
Gep S.p.A., Corso Salvatore D’Amato 90, 80022 Arzano (Naples), Italy (Gep
Arzano, Development site and production site)
(b)
For development and productions sites regarding the Infineon chip
SLE66CLX800PE refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0399-2007 [13]
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]). The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives
and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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