Certification Report: 0691a_pdf

Certification Report: 0691a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
for
STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
CC-Zert-327 V4.52
BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
PP Conformance:
Protection Profile for Security Module Card Type A
(PP-SMC-A), Version 1.2, 17 November 2009,
BSI-CC-PP-0019-V3-2009
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 21 July 2011
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................14
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
7.1 Developer Tests according to ATE_FUN...............................................................16
7.2 Evaluator Tests......................................................................................................16
7.2.1 Independent Testing according to ATE_IND ..................................................16
7.2.2 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN....................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................19
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................19
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................20
11 Security Target............................................................................................................21
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................21
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................21
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................23
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 5 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL 4 resp. E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
●
for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
●
for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.2
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the component AVA_VAN.5 that is not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL 4
components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1 has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI.
The evaluation of the product STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1 was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 17th June 2011. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 6 recognised by the certification
body of BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
Certification Report
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The product was developed by: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1 has been included in the BSI list of the
certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de
and [5]). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstraße 159
81677 München
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1, a contact based
smart card with applications for the German Health Care System according to the “Gesetz
zur Modernisierung der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung” (GKV-Modernisierungsgesetz
– GMG), the “Sozialgesetzbuch” (SGB) and the privacy legislation (“Datenschutzgesetze
des Bundes und der Länder”). The TOE is intended to be used as Security Module Card
Type A (SMC-A) within the German Health Care System and is therefore based on the
specification documents [17], [18] and [19].
The TOE comprises a Smart Card Integrated Circuit (IC with contacts) with Smart Card
Embedded Software, consisting of the STARCOS 3.4 Operating System platform and the
dedicated Security Module Card Type A applications (SMC-A applications). The TOE's
SMC-A applications are based on the STARCOS 3.4 Operating System platform. More
detailed: The TOE is set-up of the components
•
Integrated Circuit (IC) "Smart Card Controller P5CC052V0A with specific IC
Dedicated Software” provided by NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH and
•
Smart Card Embedded Software comprising the STARCOS 3.4 Operating System
platform (designed as native implementation) and the dedicated SMC-A applications
for the German Health Care System provided by Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The TOE's platform and its technical functionality and inherently integrated security
features are designed and developed under consideration of the specifications, standards
and requirements as stated in the specifications [17], [18] and [19] respective in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapters 2.1 and 2.2.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile for Security Module Card Type A (PP-SMC-A), Version 1.2, 17
November 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0019-V3-2009 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality
Addressed issue
SF_AccessControl
Access control mechanisms
SF_Administration
Administration mechanisms
SF_Crypto
Cryptographic functionality
SF_TrustedCommunication
Trusted communication mechanisms
SF_AssetProtection
Protection mechanisms for assets
SF_TSFProtection
Protection mechanisms for the TSF
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
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Certification Report
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 8.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 4.1.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapters 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: STARCOS 3.4 Health
SMC-A C1. For details refer to chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier
Release
1
HW/
SW
NXP P5CC052V0A Smart Card
Controller with specific IC Dedicated
Software
Mask Identifier: Smart card modules, ROM mask
V0A
of the TOE already mounted into
an ID-1 smart card
2
SW
Card Operating System STARCOS 3.4
01 07 01
Software on the smart card
3
SW
EEPROM image of STARCOS 3.4
Health SMC-A C1
Identifier of
valid images
published on
the G&D
website
Image on the smart card
4
DOC
Guidance Documentation STARCOS
3.4 Health HBA/SMC C1 – Main
Document
Version 1.3 /
2010-10-13
Document in paper / electronic
form
5
DOC
Guidance Documentation for the
Initialisation Phase STARCOS 3.4
Health HBA/SMC C1
Version 1.2 /
2010-11-10
Document in paper / electronic
form
6
DOC
Guidance Documentation for the
Personalisation Phase STARCOS 3.4
Health HBA/SMC C1
Version 1.2 /
2010-11-10
Document in paper / electronic
form
7
DOC
Guidance Documentation for the
Operational Usage Phase STARCOS
3.4 Health SMC-A/B C1
Version 1.4 /
2011-02-18
Document in paper / electronic
form
8
DOC
STARCOS 3.4 SmartCard Operating
System Reference Manual
Edition
09.2009
Document in paper / electronic
form
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Form of Delivery
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Basically the life-cycle of STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1 consists of the development
phase and the operational phase. The initialisation phase completely belongs to the
operational use. The TOE will be delivered as hardware, as initialisation data and as
documentation. No modifications by a third party are possible (e.g. by the party loading the
initialisation data into the hardware).
For the evaluation process the whole life-cycle of the TOE was considered during
evaluation as far as the developer/manufacturer of the TOE is directly involved. Any
delivery of the chip modules is done via a G&D security transport or a security transport
maintained by another initialiser to avoid the delivery of fake chips.
The user can identify the TOE by retrieving the following information from the TOE:
●
IC manufacturer data (Chipherstellerdaten)
●
OS version (Betriebssystemversion)
●
Completion state (Komplettierungsstand) and
●
Initialisation table (Initialisierungstabelle)
To verify the TOE's identification data and in particular the identification data of its
initialisation table (and therefore also of the composite TOE), the user executes the
command GET PROTOCOL DATA (see [15], chapter 3.1.2, [13], chapters 4.2.2 and
5.2.12, [14], chapter 5.2.4). The identification data of valid initialisation tables are
published on the Giesecke & Devrient GmbH website https://certificates.gi-de.com for
comparison.
3
Security Policy
The TOE is the composition of an IC and appropriate Smart Card Embedded Software and
will be used as Security Module Card Type A (SMC-A) within the German Health Care
System. The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements
and implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
●
Compromise of confidential user or TSF data including information leakage
●
Forgery of user or TSF data
●
Misuse of TOE functions
●
Interception of communication
●
Abuse of TOE functionality (including its SMC-A applications)
●
Malfunction due to environmental stress
●
Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
●
TOE flaw in a particular life-cycle stage
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
●
Secure personalisation and management
●
Adequate usage of the TOE and IT-systems
Certification Report
The Security Objectives related to the environment of the TOE's dedicated SMC-A
applications can be found in the Protection Profile [7], chapter 4.2. See also the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 5.2.
5
Architectural Information
The TOE STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1 is composed of the already certified NXP
P5CC052V0A Smart Card Controller, the STARCOS 3.4 Operating System platform and
the SMC-A applications from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, see also Figure 1 in [6] and [8].
The TOE is composed of the following subsystems:
●
System Library
●
Runtime System
●
Chip Card Commands
●
Security Management
●
Key Management
●
File System
●
Non-Volatile Memory Management
●
Transport Management (Protocols)
●
Secure Messaging
●
Crypto Functions
●
Hardware
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in Table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
The tests were performed with the composite smart card product STARCOS 3.4 Health
SMC-A C1. The physical format of the test configuration for TOE testing was either
●
a card which is usable for all automatic or non-recoverable test cases or
●
a simulator which is required for all interactive test cases.
Test target categories:
●
Operating system (contained in ROM code and EEPROM patch code)
●
Initialisation and personalisation process (PDI and ISO)
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Certification Report
●
Applications initialised respective loaded
●
Completion state:
7.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
●
Completed card: Card in usage phase (completion state “COMPLETED")
●
Uncompleted card: Card in uncompleted state (completion state "INITIAL")
Developer Tests according to ATE_FUN
Developer's testing approach:
●
Tests to cover all actions defined in the developer's functional specification
●
One good case test and one bad case for each command defined in the developer's
functional specification and executable on the TOE
●
Access Rules test as part of the requirements on TSF data
●
Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design
Verdict for the activity:
●
All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on this TOE version.
●
The developer’s testing results demonstrate that the TOE performs as expected.
7.2
7.2.1
Evaluator Tests
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND
Subset size chosen:
●
The evaluators have tested all TSFI.
TSFI subset selection criteria:
●
The evaluators have chosen a subset of interfaces so that all TSF could be covered by
at least one test case in order to confirm that the TOE operates as specified. The valid
cases as well as invalid cases were considered.
TSFI tested:
●
The evaluator tested all TSFI documented in the developer's functional specification.
Evaluator's testing approach:
●
The developer performed tests of all TSF with card based tests and simulator test cases.
●
The evaluator selected all tests of the developer's testing documentation for sampling
due to the fact that all developer tests are implemented in scripts that can run without
many manual interactions within days.
Verdict for the activity:
●
During the evaluator’s testing the TOE operated as specified.
●
The evaluators have verified the developer’s test results by executing a sample of tests
in the developer’s test documentation.
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7.2.2
Certification Report
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN
Penetration testing approach:
The evaluator used the information on potential vulnerabilities collected by the evaluator
during the evaluation that should be considered in the vulnerability analysis. Hereby, the
evaluator took into account the ST, guidance documentation, functional specification, TOE
design, security architecture description and implementation representation to identify
possible potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
The evaluator applied the following procedure while creating a list of potential
vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational environment: the raw list of
vulnerabilities was checked whether there are any measures in the operational
environment, either IT or non-IT, which prevent exploitation of the potential vulnerability in
that operational environment. The evaluator records any reasons for exclusion of potential
vulnerabilities from further consideration if the evaluator determines that the potential
vulnerability is not applicable in the operational environment. Otherwise the evaluator
records the potential vulnerability for further consideration.
Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the TOE in its operational
environment the evaluator devised the attack scenarios for penetration tests in the case
that those potential vulnerabilities could be exploited in the TOE’s operational environment.
While doing this, also the aspects of the security architecture description were considered
for penetration testing. All other evaluation input was used for the creation of the tests as
well. Specifically the test documentation provided by the developer was used to find out if
there are areas of concern that should be covered by tests of the evaluation body.
The source code reviews of the provided implementation representation accompanied the
development of test cases and were used to find test input. The code inspection also
supported the testing activity by enabling the evaluator to verify implementation aspects
that could hardly be covered by test cases.
In addition the evaluator applied tests and performed code reviews during the evaluation
activity of ADV_COMP.1 to verify the implementation of the requirements imposed by the
ETR and the guidance of the underlying platform. This ensured confidence in the security
of the TOE as a whole.
The primary focus for devising penetration tests was to cover all potential vulnerabilities
identified as applicable in the TOE’s operational environment for which an appropriate test
set was devised. As result of these activities, the evaluator defined a penetration test
framework and produced penetration tests to verify the vulnerabilities.
Verdict for the sub-activity:
●
During the evaluator's penetration testing based on the evaluator's vulnerability analysis
the TOE operated as specified.
●
The vulnerabilities discussed in the evaluator's vulnerability analysis are not exploitable
in the intended environment for the TOE. None of the penetration tests was successful.
●
The TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential in the intended environment
for the TOE.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: The TOE as a Security
Module Card Type A only features one fixed configuration, the composite smart card
product STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1 consisting of the NXP Chip P5CC052V0A, the
STARCOS 3.4 Operating System platform and the SMC-A applications. This configuration
cannot be altered by the user and the evaluation is therefore only valid for this
configuration of the TOE.
The TOE comprises the parts TOE_IC, TOE_ES, TOE_APP and TOE_GD as described in
the following:
●
TOE_IC: Consists of the Integrated Circuitry of the HPC's chip (IC), the P5CC052V0A
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, and the IC Dedicated Software with the
parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software (Certification ID:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008 with BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008-MA-01). The TOE_IC firmware
contains an RSA crypto library which is not used in this composite TOE.
●
TOE_ES: The IC Embedded Software, the STARCOS 3.4 Operating System platform.
●
TOE_APP: The SMC-A applications, i.e. their data structures and content.
●
TOE_GD: The guidance documentation delivered together with the TOE (refer to [12] to
[16]).
Beyond the files for the SMC-A applications there may be additional files for other
applications, e.g. for the Health Care System, which do not belong to the TOE. The file
system part of the TOE is represented by the Guidance Documentation [15].
The identification of the TOE is described in [15], chapter 3.1.2, [13], chapters 4.2.2 and
5.2.12, [14], chapter 5.2.4. Different versions of initialisation tables may lead to the same
TOE version. Therefore no fixed reference values can be provided. The valid initialisation
tables are published on the Giesecke & Devrient GmbH website https://certificates.gide.com for comparison.
As indicated in chapter 2 the identification data of the TOE consist of information on the
underlying chip, operating system, completion state and initialisation table. The following
table shows the TOE's identification data as relevant for the TOE's certification
(hexadecimal values):
Identification Data
Identifier
IC manufacturer data
04 11 05 39 00 30 30 35
Version of the operating system
47 44 00 B4 02
Completion state of the operating
system
01 07 xy (first 3 bytes of 12 bytes in total)
Initialisation table
Refer to G&D's website
Table 3: TOE identification data
Please note that the usage of the TOE within the scope of this certification is limited in
accordance with the validity of the used cryptographic algorithms, see chapters 10 and 9.2
of this report.
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9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
●
Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
●
Smart Card evaluation guidance
●
Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
●
Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices
●
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical and deterministic random
number generators
(See [4], AIS 1, AIS 14, AIS 19, AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 34, AIS 36, AIS 37, AIS 38.)
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretation AIS 20 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report).
●
The component AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Protection Profile for Security Module Card Type A (PP-SMC-A),
Version 1.2, 17 November 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0019-V3-2009 [10]
●
For the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
For the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
Annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
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Hash functionalities:
●
SHA-256 hash value calculation according to [20]
Algorithms for encryption and decryption:
●
TDES (168 bit) according to [20]
●
Retail-MAC (168 bit) according to [20]
Algorithms for signature generation and verification:
●
RSA 2048 bit according to [20]
This holds for the following security functions:
●
SF_CRYPTO (SHA, RSA, 3TDES, RNG)
Random number generation e.g. for key generation, padding mechanisms and
authentication protocols is performed by a deterministic random number generator
provided by the STARCOS 3.4 Operating System platform. The DRNG is rated as K4 with
resistance against attack potential ‘high’ according to AIS 20 (see [4]).
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). According to “Technische Richtlinie
für die eCard-Projekte der Bundesregierung” BSI TR-03116 [20] the algorithms are
suitable for encryption and decryption of SMC-A related data stored by the TOE or
exchanged with the TOE as well as for authentication protocols implemented by the TOE.
The validity period of each algorithm is mentioned in the official catalogue [20].
10
Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in Table 2 and the Security Target [6] and [8] contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered. In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and Policies as outlined in the
Security Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational
environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
If available, certified updates of the TOE shall be used. If non-certified updates or patches
are available he should request the sponsor for providing a re-certification. In the
meantime risk management process of the system using the TOE shall investigate and
decide on the usage of not yet certified updates and patches or to take additional
measures in order to maintain system security.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9.2 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE: Principally, the
user has to follow the instructions in the user guidance documents [12] to [16] and has to
ensure the fulfilment of the Assumptions about the environment in the Security Target [6]
and [8]. There are no further requirements for the usage of the TOE contained in [9].
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
11
Certification Report
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DES
Data Encryption Standard
DRNG
Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
eHC
electronic Health Card
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
HPC
Health Professional Card
IT
Information Technology
ITSEC
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP
Protection Profile
PRNG
Physical Random Number Generator
RNG
Random Number Generator
RSA
Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithm
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SHA
Secure Hash Algorithm
SMC
Security Module Card
SMC-A
Security Module Card Type A
SMC-B
Security Module Card Type B
ST
Security Target
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TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionalities
BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI website
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011, Version 1.8, 18th May 2011, Security Target
STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (confidential
document)
[7]
Protection Profile for Security Module Card Type A (PP-SMC-A), Version 1.2, 17
November 2009, BSI-CC-PP-0019-V3-2009
[8]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011, Version 1.8, 18th May 2011, Security Target
Lite STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (sanitised public
document)
[9]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 4, 3rd June 2011, Evaluation Technical Report
Summary STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH
(confidential document)
[10]
ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 for the Product NXP
P5CC052V0A Smart Card Controller, BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008 and amendment BSIDSZ-CC-0466-2008-MA-01, Version 1.3, 29th September 2010, T-Systems GEI
GmbH (confidential document)
8
specifically
•
AIS 20, Version 1, 2. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
23 / 38
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
[11]
Configuration list for the TOE, Version 1.2, 18th May 2011, Configuration List
STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1 (confidential document)
[12]
Guidance Documentation STARCOS 3.4 Health HBA/SMC C1 – Main Document,
Version 1.3, 13th October 2010, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[13]
Guidance Documentation for the Initialisation Phase STARCOS 3.4 Health
HBA/SMC C1, Version 1.2, 10th November 2010, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[14]
Guidance Documentation for the Personalisation Phase STARCOS 3.4 Health
HBA/SMC C1, Version 1.2, 10th November 2010, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[15]
Guidance Documentation for the Operational Usage Phase STARCOS 3.4 Health
SMC-A/B C1, Version 1.4, 18th February 2011, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[16]
STARCOS 3.4 SmartCard Operating System Reference Manual, Edition 09.2009,
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
[17]
Specification German Health Professional Card and Security Module Card - Part 1:
Commands, Algorithms and Functions of the COS Platform, Version 2.3.0,
04.07.2008, BundesÄrzteKammer, Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung,
BundesZahnÄrzteKammer, BundesPsychotherapeutenKammer,
Kassenzahnärztliche Bundesvereinigung, Bundesapothekerkammer, Deutsche
Krankenhaus-Gesellschaft
[18]
Specification German Health Professional Card and Security Module Card - Part 2:
HPC Applications and Functions, Version 2.3.0, 04.07.2008, BundesÄrzteKammer,
Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung, BundesZahnÄrzteKammer,
BundesPsychotherapeutenKammer, Kassenzahnärztliche Bundesvereinigung,
Bundesapothekerkammer, Deutsche Krankenhaus-Gesellschaft
[19]
Specification Related Questions Nr. 0001 bis 0003, 08.08.2008,
BundesÄrzteKammer, Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung,
BundesZahnÄrzteKammer, BundesPsychotherapeutenKammer,
Kassenzahnärztliche Bundesvereinigung, Bundesapothekerkammer, Deutsche
Krankenhaus-Gesellschaft
[20]
BSI TR-03116, Technische Richtlinie für die eCard-Projekte der Bundesregierung,
Version 3.04, 11.06.2010
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
Assurance Class
Certification Report
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal highlevel design presentation
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Assurance Class
Assurance Components
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target Lite provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development and production environment.
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0691-2011
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product STARCOS 3.4 Health SMC-A C1 (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 21 July 2011, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.1, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a)
Zamdorfer Straße 88, 81677 München (development)
b)
Prinzregentenstraße 159, 81677 München (system administration)
For the development and production sites regarding the "Smart Card Controller
P5CC052V0A with specific IC Dedicated Software” from NXP Semiconductors Germany
GmbH refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008 and the corresponding
amendment BSI-DSZ-CC-0466-2008-MA-01.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives
and requirements for the TOE life-cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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