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FIGHTER
Report
ATRCRAFT
of the
Defense Science Board Task Force
Volume II:
Basic Report
I May 1958
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This document contains information affecting
the national defense of the United States with_
!1the meaning of the EspionageLaws, Tiile
18,U. S. C. , Sections?93 and ?94. The transmission or the revelation of its contents in
any manner to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by taw.
Office
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of t h e D i r e c t o r o f D e f e n s e R e s e a r c h a n d E n g i n e e r i n g
Washington, D. C.
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S EE R . E T
MEMBERSHIP
of
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DEF'ENSE
SCIENCE
TASK
BOARD
FORCE
on
FIGHTER
Dr. Richard
Chairman
*.*"F
AIRCRAF'T
Garwin,
IBM Watson Laboratory
Dr.
Thomas
Amlie
U. S. Naval Weapons Center
Mr.
Terrell
E. Greene
The RAND Corporation
Dr.
Andrew
Longacre
Syracuse
Mr.
Homer
Tasker
Tasker
Mr.
Warren
\4rhite
Airborne
University
Instruments
Instruments
Corporation
Laboratory
Staff As sistants
- *- 3' ,-, t , : .
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Colonel P. H. Van Sickle,
USAF
Office of the Director of Defense
Research and Engineering
Major Jarnes S. Creedon,
USAF
Office of the Director of
Department
Operations,
Air Force
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single missile can perform both functions, at a somewhat
greater cost per missile but with increased effectiveness
and perhaps reduced overall cost because of the reduced
force-mix
t14pe of problems.
As the development program
proceeds, it should be possible to decide between a single
missile and two missiles for this task.
t#;'
3.
The report mentions the importance of ECM and other counterg
missile, and t.Le Board wishes especially
to the surface-to-air
In addition, the
to stress the critical nature of this problem.
air battle between a number of our fighters and a number of
enemy fighters cannot be effectively handled from individual
AWACS, other theater
and adequate cornmunications,
aircraft,
great
import.
control and tFF aie of
With these comments,
the DSB forwards
the attached report.
ilttlw
Robert L. Sproull
Chairman,
Defense Science Board
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14 May r968
MEMoRANDUM
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SUBJECT:
To
CHAIRMAN, DEFEN'E
scIENcE
B.ARD
Finar rReport of the DSB Task
Force on Fighter Aircraft
As chairman of the DSB Task
Force on Fighter Aircraft,
I have the
honor of submitting the Finar
i::!
Force i,uport (sEcRET), as
werl as
an Executive Summary (CONFIDENTIAL).
ifru report is concerned.
largely with the next generation
of fighter aircraft for the
Air Force
and the Navy. The report concludes
that aircraft with the recom_
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recommendations
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of t,.e Task Force,
as taken from
the re-
l ' That a development program,
foll0wing the basic approach
of prototype procurement
and tesiing, be irriri"r"a now
for a new
fighter aircraft.
An IOC for the u";i
l9Z0s_i. e., before t975_
should be sought. 'competitive
prot",yp;
demonstration flight programs should be pursued,
separately for avionics,
for airframes,
and for engines.
z. The fi.ghter should be
designed for both air-to_air
and air_
to-ground operations, with
the priml."y a""ig' emphasis
o
n
a
ir_toair capabirity.
The air-to-air
Lapability shourd include
c
r
o
s
e
_in
combat capab*ity.
The air-to-ground
capability should be for
primarily
visual weapon delivery
with homing or area ord.nance
insofar as autonomous aircraft
operations are concerned..
3' Guided (i. e., steerabre)
guns and highly-agile missiles
should be provided for forward-hemisphere
firing, unless flight
tests reveal basic flaws
in the concept. Missile seeker,
propulsion,
airframe
and target designati-or,
"hoota pro*riau for firing
missiles
at large angles off the
aifcraft nose. R"""_h.misphere
ordnance
should be investigated,
tested, a.ra irr"orp""",.a
in the design if
found desirable on grounds
of utility ".rJ;;;;""*"nce
tradeoffs.
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4. Head-coupled sights and display should be used to elim-.
inate tJre gunsight, radar display, TV display, heads-up display,
etc. and provide at the same time flexible all-angle TV viewing
and target designation.
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radar
5. The avionics should incorporate a pulse-doppler
electroneither
without
but
map,
mode for ground
with low-PRF
ic ally- s canned phas ed- ar ray or separ ate te rrain- following radar s.
A redundant central digital computer should couple the displays to
the weapons, manage stores and do the computations required for
flexible weapons deliverY.
6. DDR&E should review those development concept papers
for systerns which might be available before or about 1975 to prosystems rather than to
vide planning guidelines for synergistic
allow each 7-year advanced system to assume the environment as
it was at the beginning of the development cycle.
7.
.
Urgent
development
commitments
should be rnade to:
a. navigation systems providing terrain avoidance by
navigation
TV for remote target designation and
b. single-frarne
homing
cruise missiles
c. simple hitting surface-to-surface
ground and airborne target
d. artillery-emplaced,
designating schemes for horning bombs'
e. directed, unmanned reconnaissance and target
designation
ordnance, such
effective and flexible air-to-ground
f.
costair-opening dispenser munitions,
as proximity-fuzed
e
t
c
.
reduced bomblet land mines,
on a turbofan
8. Development should proceed immediately
ratio and
bypass
with
engine of the zo,000 pound thrust class,
other design features to be jointly determined by the Nawy and the
Air Force.
The key to this fi.ghter capability is the head-coupled avionics and
Detailed
flexible ordnance system discussed throughout the report.
exarnples of its use are found in Appendix c of the main report.
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I want to call to youq attention also the extent to which our capability
and the effectiveness of even these aircraft can be enhanced by the
provision of non-fighterborne
systems such as:
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.
adequate theater
.
theater-range
cheap surface-to-surface
cruise missiles,
.
navigation and communication
tems or I.ORAN,
.
adequate target-designating
systems, such as laser
designators or artillery-emplaced
beacons.
control
and IFF (via AWACS),
aids,
target-hitting
such as satellite
sys-
target
I personally wish to emphasize the critical threat that surface-to-air
missiles will pose and the necessity for an intensive and enlightened
Program on penetration aids and tactics in order to counter these
mis siles.
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The Task Force
its efforts.
is pleased to have had the opportunity
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to contribute
by
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Richard L. Garwin
Chairman,
DSB Task tr'orce on
Fighter Aircraft
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PREFACE
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This report of the Defense Science Boardrs Task Force on
Tactical Aircraft is written in response to a request (see AppendixA)
from the Director of Defense Research and Engineering for the Defense
Science Board to examine the tactical air-to-air
missions and air-toground missions for the Navy and the Air Force.
As a consequence of
problem should receive priority,
the indication that the air-to-air
the
Task Force initially submitted a draft report on this mission area
missions were the subject of a further
October L96t. Air-to-ground
draft added 3 February 1968. The present report supplants the previous drafts, without, for the most part, major changes in conclusions
or recommendations.
one note of caution-the
Task Force has not drawn any overall
judgment as to the attrition that soviet missiles of the rgTs-19g5 time
frame might cause to tactical aircraft nor as to the corresponding
tactics and hardware that must be adopted by tactical aircraft if they
are to survive in an environment of advanced surface:to-air
missiles.
Furthermore,
the Task Force has addressed only the characteristics
of and the program to obtain an optimum fighter aircraft for the I9?5+
period-the
necessary number of such aircraft may be affected by
strategic and even political considerations.
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A brief Executive Summary of this material is issued separately
as Volume I of this report.
Both the Executive Summary and this basic
report were accepted by the Defense science Board on 8 May 1969.
Since the effectiveness as a fighter is the most stringent condition
for the aircraft,
implications
of this role on system design and development programs are treated first.
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CONT ENTS
Page
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Membership of the Defense Science Board Task F o r c e on
Fighter Aircraft
Memoranda
of Transmittal
111
Preface
I.
1'<
Task Definition
1 . I Mission
of the United States T a c t i c a l
L . z Air-to-Air
Combat
t . 3 Multimi ssion Capability
l. 3. 1
L . 3. Z
1.3.3
L.3. 4
L.4
*,**zi:*{,,i
z.
Air
Roles .
Stated Service Requirements
Could One Aircraft Do the Job?
Crew Size
System Design Implications
II
Ordnance-Avionics
Ordnance Systems
Z. Z. 3
..-.-.--.-,;
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8
of the Air-to-Air
Implications
ll
TZ
Z.Z.L Guns
2.2. Z Missiles.
2.3
5
6
7
8
I s a N e w T a c t i c a l Fighter Needed by the Air Force
and/or Navy to be O p e r a t i o n a l i n t h e E a r l y 1 9 7 0 s ?
Fighter
Z.I
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2
5
Force
Mission
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Rearward-Firing
TZ
TZ
l3
Ordnance
Avionics
I3
2.3.L Display and Control
2. 3. Z Head-Coupled Electro-optical
2.3.3 Radar.
l3
L4
l6
2.3.4
r9
Techniques
Other Avionics
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(continued)
CONTENTS
Page
2.4
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2.5
Airframe
20
2.4. L Airframe and Propulsion Performances:
T lW,
w/S, Size, Hand1ing, Range/payload.
2.4.2 Airframe and Propulsion Performance: Vmzx
2.4.3 Other Airframe Characteristics.
2.4.4 Propulsion System .
2.4.5 General Design Philosophy.
zO
Zz
23
23
23
Command and Control
z4
3.
Structure
4.
The New Fighter
4.r
and Management
of the Development
in Air-to-Ground
The Spectrum of Targets
Program
Operations.
f o r Attack by Air
4 . 2 Other Urgent Developments
4 . 3 On-Board Equipment
t'
4 . 3 .I
4.3.2
4.3.3
4.3.4
5.
Summary.
6.
Overall
Radar.
Navigation for Air-to-Ground.
Weapons - Delivery Computer
DispIays.
z5
29
z9
30
3t
3I
33
33
34
37
Program
Recommendations.
4T
Appendic es:
A.
* * f
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I'Defense Science Board Task Force: Tactical Aircraft,"
memorandum from Director of Defense Research and
Engineering to Chairman, Defense Science Board,
L7 lp,day1967
43
B.
Meeting Schedules of DSB Task Force on Fighter Airc raft 45
C.
Descriptive Supplement: Illustrated Examples of Use of
Systems Proposed by DSB Task Force on Fighter
Aircraft,
29 March 1958.
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TASK
DEFINITTON
In his directive memorandum defining
the work of the Defense
science Board (DSB) Task Force
on tactical Aircraft,
the Director of
Defense Research and Engineering
put the primary question
for air_to_
air operations in tlee fo[":;;terms:
Fi!*
which is the route of greater promise
for achieving
superiority over the soviet
union in air-to-air
combat-a) emphasis on speed and
maneuverabirity
in the
aircraft,
or b) emphasis on maneuverability
and firepower in the missile?
consideration should also be
given to the identification problem,
type(s) of weapons
and awionics, development costs
and risks for artern_
ative approaches, and. the stability
of any solution
against Soviet growth.
In examining these questions and
in making its recommendations,
thereon, the Task Force has
also reviewed the principar missions
of
the tactical air forces of the
united. states and the extent to
which
these
differing missions make different
performance demand.s upon
the aircraft and upon the weapons.
It is possibre that the missions
are sufficiently different (and separable)
so that s.p"r"tu
aircraft
designs
should be optimized for each.
It w'r be of interest also to note
in what
particulars,
if any, the Task Force recommendations
differ from the
servicest proposars for FX and
vFAx aircraft (the next generation
fighter aircraft proposed for the
Air Force and the Navy respectivery).
l' l
Mission
of the united statesr Tacticar
Air
Forces
The missions of the Nawy and
Air Force tactical air forces
d.erive
from tJre u.s- commitment
to a policy of collective security
with
its
allies throughout the worrd.
These same missions would
be required
in any unilateral intervention as
we[.
To meet these grobar responsibilities,
there is reguired an abiril" for
quick deployment, followed by
sustained operations, anywhere
in the world.
lt is generally accepted that the principal
missions of the tactical
air forces in a theater of operations
""" "o.rr,terair operations,
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interdiction
and close air aupport, the objectives
usually being stated in terms such as these:
maintain air
air forces.
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of these missions
The objective of counterair operations is to attain and
superiority
by elirnination
of interference
by the opposing
. The obj,ective of interdiction is to reduce support for the
enemyrs military forces by destruction or disruption of lines of supply
and commurrication.
fire
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support
The objective of close air support operations is to provide
to friendly ground forces that are engaging tJre enemy.
Attainment of the second and third objectives-and
even the survival of our entire deployed force-may
depend on the prior and continuing attainment of air superiority.
By far the most efficient way to
destroy enemy aircraft is generally to strike them at the air base, but
we recognize the need for an air-to-air
combat capability superior to
that of the expected threat in order that the opposing air power may be
rapidly suPpressed even if political constraints prevent our striking
enerny air bases, or in case active and passive defenses make such
attacks unprofitable.
It should be evident that the possibility
of these
constraints requires us to build much larger air forces than would be
required for strikes at airfields; and it is important to note that the
enemy controls the rate of encounters and thus the rate of destruction
of his own air force, even if we have air superiority.
L. Z
Air-to-Air
Combat
A responsible reply to the air-to-air
question requires careful
assessment of the probability of success of existing and achievable U. S.
aircraft
and air-to-air
weapons for the time period of concern, narnely,
1975-80+. Air-to-air
combat tacticsr present and extrapolated, provide
the frame for this assessment, and the e>qperiences of Korea and
Southeast Asia provide useful data which any reasonable evaluation
procedure must consider.
combat may bertclose in'r or at relatively long range,
Air-to-air
depending upon the circumstances
of detection, identification
and the
characteristics
of the weapons. It is important to know whether closein combat could be ruled out for this time period, since a large fraction
of the program cost for a new fighter aircraft could be due to provisions
for close-in combat.
This is because combat with the medium-range
air-to-air
weapons at_aircraft separations of l0 to ?O miles does not
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require the same high degree of aircraft
by close-in air-to-air
combat.
r-,lrh:.!::.vr:]r:
and ordnance agility
demanded
The Task Forcers study of aircraft performance, weapons performance,
air-combat
tactics and experience data from the war in
Southeast Asia and from other wars has led to the conclusion that a
need for both a close-in and midrange (i. e., within visual and beyond
visual range) air fighting capability wilt exist during the foreseeable
future of tactical air combat.
Even though the preferred method of destroying enemy air power
may continue to be attacking aircraft on the ground, we cannot be confident that airfield attacks wi1l always be feasible or adequate. Airfields may enjoy poLitically established sanctuary in certain future wars,
as has been the case in current and past wars. . Furthermore,
it
apPears technologically
and economically feasible for a nation to protect its aircraft on the ground by various combinations of active and
passive def€nses and aircraft design (e. g., v/sToL)
to such an extent
that attacks against them would be less profitable.
Recent experience
in attacks against prepared enemy bases in North vietnam appears to
indicate a trend in this direction.
surface-based missiles and even guns will play an important and
perhaps dominant role in destroying aircraft in the air, but fighter aircraft will continue to retain such advantages as all-altitude
capability,
wide area coverage, rapidity of deployment, suitability for escort and
sweeps over enemy territory,
and protection of support aircraft-e.
g.,
tankers and large transports-that
are operating over sea or land
areas outside of surface-based weapon range.
A close-in fighting capability will be needed for several reasons.
Among them are the need (in some circumstances) for visual identification, the need to discriminate between closely spaced friendly and
enemy aircraft,
and the need to fight at times frorn an initial position
of disadvantage. In many possible battle situations it will be necessary
to identify aerial targets positively before attempting to destroy them.
It will be necessary to distinguish enemy aircraft from neutral as well
as from friendly aircraft.
This may be of critical importance in a
limited war in which commercial aircraft or military aircraft of nonbelligerent powers may be using the battle air space. The problem
may be complicated by large numbers of aircraft from all four air
services of the United States and, in some cases, aircraft from one or
more Services of one or rnore nations allied to the U. S. taking part in
operations in the battle area.
To date no fully satisfactory IFF equipment has been adopted to perform positive ide:rtification securely and
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effectiveness is much dimigand our overall air-superiority
reliably,
'system
should be difficult to jam, spoof,
The ideal
ished by this lack.
p
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e
to permit its use in situations
deceive or copy. It should be
where ernissions (such as radar transmissions) could be used by the
We believe that continued reenemy to detect and track our aircraft.
search on IFF systems, including such visual aids as stabilized optical
However, we stress that much
systems, must be pursued vigorously.
but still effective equipment.
less
than
ideal,
could be done to install
We also conclude that approach to within visual ranges,I for identification purposes, will be required in many cases throughout the operational
not a
(This is an observation,
life of the next generation of aircraft.
statement of predestination. )
Even though identification may be made at ranges beyond visual
range, it may sometimes be necessary to hold fire until close in to
avoid hitting friendly aircraft flying near the target.
,.,,,,it*.1i"{"{
A large fraction of tactical air engagernents begin witJr a surprise
attack from the rear.
If the attack is detected in time to avoid destruction, or if the attack fails for some other reason, the airplane that is
under attack is very likely to become involved in a hard-maneuvering
Surprise attacks
engagernent, parts of which may be at close quarters.
to environments
confined
no
means
combat
by
are
close-in
resutting
and
(ground-controlled
where one side has the advantage of warning and GCI
however, they are especially likely to occur in such environintercept),
Thus, when our fighters are operating over enemy territory,
ments.
their encounters with enemy fighters are likely to begin with the enemy
attack.
positioned for a closing, rear-hemisphere
For reasons such
miles of the target will
forced on our planes by
range has
identification
essential.
as those listed above, closure to within a few
be necessary to press an attack or it may be
the enemy.
Once closure to within visual
been made, a close-in air combat capability is
A capability for midrange combat2 will also be needed as an inThe midrange ordnance will
tegral part of the fighter system design.
identifie ation can be
satisfactory
where
situations
be essential in
ranges and where the enemy is
accomplished at radar line-of-sight
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speaking,
less than 5 miles.
ZCombat at gr
We are referring to
that of longer range
and Phoenix).
aI rraann g1es, out to, s&11'r20 miles.
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. IM-47 and AIM-54 (GAR-9
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equipped with medium - range ordnance.
The maximum range for
medium-range
ordnance should exceed. the enemyrs estimated tactical
air-to-air
missile range.
1. 3
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Multimission
Capability
l. 3. I Roles: In determining the appropriate role for a new
fighter "it."aSEl
main consid.eration should be to achieve a force
structure with sufficient air-to-ground
and air-to-air
capability to
meet the expected enerny threat.
on this basis, the major gap in the
approved force program for both the Navy and the Air Force appears
to be in the area of air-to-air
combat, although some skepticism may
be in order also as to the current effectiveness ofthe air-to-ground
operations.
The lp75 approved program for the U.S. Air Force shows
about 800 ground-attack aircraft (F-ltIA
and A-?) prus over 900 multipurpose aircraft (F-4ClD and F-4E).
The F-4Es are ercpected to constitute an excellent air-to-air
weapon by the standards of the late I960s.
They are likely to be outclassed by enemy fighters in the mid-lp?Os,
particularly
in close-in combat.
The approved Navy program f,or 1975
shows a total of over 700 attack aircraft (A-4, A-6, A-?) plus about
150 air-to-air
fighters (F-8 and F-rlIB).
Both of the latter two types
of fighters would probably betnoncompetitive
with Soviet fighters of
the mid-1970s in close-in tactical air combat.
The conclusion is inescapable that the new fighter aircraft
should
provide a capability for air-to-air
combat in quality and in quantity
sufficient to meet the enemy threat of the mid-19?0s.
The air-to-air
capability should include, but not be restricted to, close-in fighting
ability superior to that of the best enemy tactical fighters.
conceptually,
the air-to-air
combat task can be handled by an
aircraft designed as a multipurpose,
i. e., ground attack plus air
fighting, airplane.
In practice,
one mission or the otirer must dominate the design.
It is instructive to note that our most successful air
fighting machines have been designed primarily
for air combat, though
in some cases they later proved to have a useful air-to-ground
ability.
The F-51, f'-86 and F-4 exemplify this point.
The Task Force believes that the new airplane should be designed
primarily
for air-to-air
combat.
This will naturally result in a Iess
efficient air-to-ground
capability,
but proper attention to this point can
give a very good attack performance without impairment
of the primary
mission.
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The Navy and the Air Force
L.3.2
Stated Service Requirements:
The
ts for a new fi'ghter.
have stated s
mission,
ground-attack
on
the
placed more emphasis
Nevy has initially
combat.
The
the Air tr'orce more emphasis on close-in air-to-air
competitive
e
apability
air-to-air
close-in
for
a
Navy sees a necessity
WitJ: mid-1970s enemy fighters, .but argues that the need to exercise
They visualize an initial period of conthis ability is not continuous.
activity and
followed by decreasing air-to-air
te.sted. air superiority,
Because there is an absolute
activity.
increasing U. S. air-to-ground
the Navy
limit on the space available for aircraft aboard a carrier,
for
specialized
argues that it cannot afford. to allocate space to aircraft
fighters that can be
Instead, it must have multipurpose
air combat.
missions
a
n
d
i
n
a
i
r
t
o-ground
used in air combat on some occasions
on others, and the Navy comments that they will in any case so use
requireThe air-to-ground
machine.
even a specialized air-to-air
range-payload
rnent is stated not only in terms of a considerable
but in terms of a sophisticated avionics package that is
capability,
ground-attack capability.
all-weather
supposed to provide a first-class
radius requirement is stated to be 600 nautical miles
The ground-attack
on a survey of
{with a 4000-pound payload), this radius being based
positions.
standoff distances and land-target
required carrier
The Air tr'orce requirement has been stated in terrns of a primary
appear to be a Z0O-nautical
Range requirements
capability.
air-to-air
70-nautical mile dash
plus
a
cruise,
mile radius for high-altitude
=
0.85 and 3 minutes of combat at 10,000
radius at I0,000 feet at Mach
mission range/
The equivalent air-to-ground
feet and Mach = 1.0.
asked for by the
that
less
than
payload ability appears to be somewhat
also calls for an aIIHowever, the Air Force requirement
Navy.
weather air -to - ground capability.
it is difficult to see why there should be basic
On examination,
Both
of the Navy and the Air Force.
differences in the requirements
Services would like to have a multipurPose fighter, provided that it
Both would like to reduce the
task adequately.
would do the air-to-air
does not have an
Although the Air.Force
nurnber of aircraft types.
acute problem in providing parking space as does the Navy, srnaller
aircraft would help relieve congestion on some crowded Air Force
tactical bases and would be easier to shield in covered revetrnenf,s.
(The Task Force is unanimous in the opinion that shelters are needed
at forward tactical bases, but discussion of this subject lies beyond the
scope of this report. ) And, of course, the overall capability within a
given budget may be greater if every aircraft can be effective in both
even if fewer aircraft are purchased, than
and air-to-ground
air-to-air
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if a somewhat larger number of smaller
or only air-to-ground.
air-to-air
,.rirt*''.irfiS,nI$p
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aircraft
could be used only
ability is not clearly different
The Navyrs need for air-to-ground
aircraft is
purpose
of military
The basic
frorn that of the Air Force.
reto influence the ground battle; in tactical operations, the primary
aircraft is for weapon delivery against
quirement for fighter/attack
ground targets.
Bot\ Services would like to improve their all-weather
However, if a supplement to the programed allbombing.capability.
weather ground attack capability for the Air Force and Navy is needed,
it is hard to see why that capability should be met with an airframe
capable of Mach 2.3 ot higher speed and with a high maneuvering and
acceleration potential.
charwith air-to-air
aircraft,
The argument for a multipurpose
for the air-toacteristics
sornewhat degraded by the requirements
comground mission, on the basis of a time-phased need for air-to-air
bat is open to serious question.
One of the important questions is:
ability by demands
whether an aircraft compromised in its air-to-air
hold
its own against
mission, might be unable to
for the air-to-ground
so that the air-superiority
enemy fighters,
specialized high-performance
at best, might
airplane-or,
battle might go badly for the multipurpose
be prolonged?
Also, the timing and severity of the need for air-to-air
combat are quite dependent on the rtscenario.rr The air-superiority
battle may be fought briefly in the first days of the war, as in the case
Or it
of the German attack on Poland or the Israeli attack on Egypt.
the
defense
of
Britain,
the
Battle
battle
as
in
continuing
be
a
long,
may
of Malta, the Allied air offensive against Gerrnany, the Korean War,
or the war in Vietnam.
stated
I. 3. 3 Could One Aircraft
Do the Job? The requirements
ifferent that it does not
by the Navy
attempt to build one
perhaps even feasible-to
appear desirable-or
aircraft to meet both requirements.
Informal opinions exPressed by
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l
are that an aircraft possessing
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
o
r
government and
all the rnission capabilities asked for by both Services would weigh upwards of.65,000 pounds. An aircraft of this size would probably fail
to meet the Navyts expressed need for a small spotting factor and
would be undesirably large, i. e., too easy to see and to hit, for closein air combat.
It would surely be unnecessarily expensive. However,
of
if the Task Force argument stated above regarding the similarity
actual needs for Air Force and Navy forces is correct, then one aircraft could indeed do the job-the job being to provide a first-class
combat capability, including close-in comBat ability, plus
air-to-air
capability, which could, however,
a good visual U.ti;..r"I air-to-ground
1
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be very effective with modern homing and area weapons, e. g., Walleye
and cBU-24,
respectively.
If range capability adequate to provide
fighter escort and sweep operations out to the limit of ground attack3
operations is built into the fighters, there should be an excellent
rrfallout, capability for visual ground attack with
very little compromise
to the air fighting characteristics.of
the airplane.
section 4.3.2
suggests techniques for obtaining all-weather
delivery capability without dependence on a complex radar.
1.3.4 Crew Size: For the mission described above, a singleplace airplanEwouid=G
preferable to a two-place airplane, provided
that the best available techniques in controls,
switching and display are
incorporated
in the design.
The feasibility of a one-man aircraft should
be established by the program recommended in the next section, L.4,
one of our chief concerns being the desirability of training a single
crew-especially,
a single man to do both the air-to-air
and an air-tojob
ground
as contrasted with the better performance and survivability
which might be obtained from specialized air-to-air
and air-to-ground
crews.
L.4
l
, . . . . , , . - . .t.... .
I
Is a New Tactical Fighter Needed by the Air
to be Operational in the Early 1970s?
Force and/or
As of I975 the only aircraft programed to be in the Air Force or
Navy inventory (except f.or 24 F-8s) capable of maneuvering combat
within visua-I detection and identification
ranges will be the F-4.
The
F-4 appears to be competitive with the Fishbed and indeed, superior to
the Fishbed c/E models as judged on the basis of combat result
against aircraft flown by North Vietnamese pilots.
On the other hand,
approximate theoretical analyses of the acceleration and turning ability
of the F-4 indicate that it is inferior in those respects to both Fishbed
and Fitter throughout most of the flight envelope. However, it is clear
from recent data that the Fishbed CIE models suffer from major limitations in cockpit layout, switchology, engine power response, visibility
from the cockpit, and handling characteristics
during maneuvering
fLight. The F-4's capability against later models of the Fishbed flown
by more highty skilled pilots than the North Vietnamese is still open to
question.
The ordnance carried by the F-4-in
particular,
the F-4E
with an internal M-6I gun-appears
somewhat superior to that of the
Fishbed and Fitter, and might counberbalance whatever edge in airframe performance may be possessed by the latest versions of those
Soviet fighters.
-3t]si"g
external
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to combat.
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U. S. intelligence
organizations
have' estimated that the Soviets
wiII deploy considerably more advanced tactical fighters by the early
1970s. Their technical capability to do so was evidenced at the 196?
Domodedovo air show. It appears like1y tJrat the I'-4, an airplane
representing the technology of the mid-195Os-first
{Iight was in 1958will be seriously outclassed in maneuvering combat against the Soviet
Unionrs tactical fighters deployed as follow-ons to the current generation.
On this basis, we conclude that a new tactical fighter with
superior close-in air-to-air
performance to the to the F-4 is needed by
the U. S. Air Force\and U. S. Navy.
In addition, the effectiveness of
the F-4 even at medium and long range, combat is far less than can be
obtained with the avionics suit and ordnance proposed here.
,
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Z. T'IGHTER SYSTEM DESIGN IMPLICATIONS
AIR-TO-AIR MISSION
Z. L
:i:.1--r:i*it.
3-i
Ordnance-AJionics
OT' THE
Implications
Implicit in the air-superiority
role of the proposed fighter aircraft is the necessity of a forward-hemisphere
capability to detect,
identify and successfully attack hostile aircraft.
The identification
function must distinguish friend from nonfriend in a "guns-freetr environment and distinguish hostiles from other nonfriends in a 'tguns-not-freetr
environment.
The forward-firing
air-to-air
ordnance for these respective environments must include improved medium-range
missiles
(over 5 rniles) as well as improved short-range ordnance (under 5 miles)
of both missile and gun types.
SEA (Southeast Asia) e>rperience bears out the obvious deduction
that a fighter so formidably
equipped to cope with hostile aircraft
in the
forward hemisphere will itself most often be the object of surprise
attacks from the unprotected rear.
Therefore, these proposed aircraft must also have the ability to detect, identify and, if possible,
attack successfully such rear-hemisphere
hostile intruders.
t
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I
The route of greatest promise in achieving air superiority
over
the Soviet air-to-air
threat appears to be the provision of greater agility
of tJ:e ordnance and improved performance
of the associated avionics as
compared to the respective existing capabilities.
Because of the
intimate dependence of ordnance effectiveness upon the avionic and
human elements of the system, automation techniques should be exploited to the maximum feasible extent to gain the tactical advantage of
increased system agility.
The Task Force believes it technically feasible to provide the
same suit of awionics for Air Force and Navy fighters except that, if
one of those aircraft should be found to reguire more complex avionics
than the other, then the simpler avionics suit should be derived from
the more complex one by deletions
With respect to the ordnance suit and ordnance-related
portions
of avionics, the Task Force recommends that the elements and capabilities designated as Head-Coupled Avionics/Weapons System be investigated with sufficient intensity that they be available for incorporation into the new generation of fighters.
Examples of the use of these
systems are illustrated in detail in Appendix C.
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The ordnarrce systems
Z. Z
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Ordnance
will
be discussed
first.
Systems
Z. Z. L Guns: The aircraft should have an integral forward-firing
gun syste*.
6rask
Force feels that a major tactical advantage in
direcgun attack can be achieved if the gun is automatically
air-to-air
aiming signals based on input sensor data
ted !y computer-generated
range.
including radar-derived
It seems desirable to use an electroaccurate
target-angle inputs for the
very
to
assure
optical tracker
computation.
The gun guided by the computer aiming signals should be
trainable from about -2 degrees to *18 degrees in elevation and t2
degrees in yaw.
the aircraft
Whereas a fi.xed gun must be airned by maneuvering
to satisfy the computed lead-angle solution, the guided gun is aimed
anywhere within its trainable limits and thus will subautomatically
reduce the combat time required to bring the gun into firing
stantially
for gunfire that would be
rnany opportunities
position.
Consequently,
with the guided gun.
attacks
lost with a fixed gun can become effective
I
for an Air Force test
A guided gun is now undelconsideration
program.
The Task Force strongly recommends that sufficient reand utility of a guided
feasibility
sources be allocated. to establishihe
primarily
off-theyear,
using
calendar
this
gun by flight testing during
shelf components to provide a fully operating system for the test.
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The guided gun, directed by the head-coupled sight described in
against
section 2.3.2 should give these aircrafl clear superiority
that
imperative
but
it
is
aircraft,
similar modern high-performance
version of this system to be specified for the aircraft be
the particular
sysactual {light test of a fully operating demonstration
by
deterrnined
prescribe
we
3,
section
In
tem to establish its feasibility and utility.
a program which we hope will accornplish this.
Z.Z.Z Missiles: The'missiles being used by U.S. forces in
a L949 design and without exception were
SEA are e"silTffiT
subsonic
designed for attacks against nonmaneuvering
originally
The AIM-9 was first put in operational service in I955, and
bombers.
These missiles have
the same time.
the Sparrow III, at approximately
gone through various modifi.cations which greatly improved their
rtial
all'L y o(r b s ol e s c e n t o r d i . n c e , butt they a r ee er sSS e:nt
n d pp erlr f (o r rmTlan(
reli abil ,1I
ity anc
w INII lw a s bought as a
ipatf f lrow
e 51
.not
othe
l e r rpurrP(o si e . T hhe
n e d :fo) r an(
nan
anc: e di e s i lgne
that it has
i ssrsiI. I e . IT hhre faac:t tt
poi:
eeptor
l tor m ri
e d - ronr P
crintrt intt e rfc €
nger hhead
Ionl
)ngl - r a .n
i
:
ibu
nte
t
o
tthe aircrews
a
r
t
t
r
:
i
t
mbal
b a t i es a
i : ccoom
n e Ss S J L -Cc lloors e - nr aarir
iven,
so
orn
n l e e iffifec :tiv,
.
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using it.
The AIM-p was also designed as a bomber killer,
and the
limited success it has had against maneuvering targets is, again, a
result of the training and self-discipline
of the users und.er extreme
stress.
These two missiles, as well as the recently introduced AIM-4,
have severe limitations
when fired against strongly maneuvering targets.
They are simply not designed for this task.
-
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The Task Force feels strongly that a new missile is required to
cope with the short-""r.i",
highly maneuvering target.
(short range
will arbitrarily
be taken as less than 5 miles at altitude. ) The Task
Force is not doctrinaire
as to choice of guidance, which could be infrarad (IR), .le.t.o*pticJln-ot
or radatl tn" consensu" U"-in-gthat any
of these is feasible.
The short-range missile must be optimized for
quick-reaction
firing and for shooting at targets which are at large
angles off the nose of the fighter-these
specifications are at least as
important as any other characteristics
of the missile.
The most
capable system would seem to incorporate a short-range semiactive
radar-homing missile, together with either an E-o or IR missile in
case of countermeasures.
But we stress later the changes which must
be incorporated
in the weapons control system in order to laurrch
flexibly at short ranges.
The Sparrow has been designed and optimized
for the long-range head-on intercept role and could be retained for tJlat
mission.
It should also be modified with an adaptive control system so
that the transfer functions can be made variable to provide both long
range, which requires low induced drag, and also to take care of the
maneuvering or jinking target, which requires quick missile response
near the end of its intercept path.
Modification to incorporate
a closed.
hydraulic system also appears desirable, and. this missile,
too, should
benefit from our later recommendations
to improve the flexibility
of
launch.
z. z. 3 Rearward-Firing
ordnance:
Rearward-firing
ord.nance
would provide a great increase in capability against the now prevalent
enemy attacks from the unprotected rear.
The Task Force recommend,s
strongly that sufficient resources be allocated to ensure a wigorous investigation of the feasibility and design characteristics
of a rearwardfiring gun and/or a rearward-firing
missile.
The associated rearhemisphere detection, identification and weapons control are d.iscussed
in connection with avionics systems.
2.3
Avionics
2.3.I
Display and Control: The Air Force aircraft is envisioned
as a one-man air-superiority
fighter.
Because of the intimate dependence of ordnance effectiveness upon the avionic and human elements of
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and integrated
the system, the displays and controls must be simplified
in
particularly
to a very high degree to reduce the pilotts work load,
Autornation techniques should be e:cploited to the
times of combat.
maximum feasible extent to gain the tactical advantage of increased
It appears that incorporoverall agility during close-in air combat.
as discussed in section
techniques,
ation of the head-coupled. display
2.3.2, would make a major contribution to such a Program'
z. 3. Z Head-Coupled Electro-oPtical Techniques: The Task Force
status and prornise of
was very fav
the Army and other Programs
[n particular,
techniques.
electro-optical
sights and displays are impresor head-coupled,
on helmet-mounted.,
sive.
that these techniques could be applied in
The Task Force.believes
in that
the proposed fighter aircraft with important tactic'al advantages,
if
lost
be
that'would
rnany fleeting opportunities to acquire targets
acquisition techniques were used (in either
conventional treid-in-cockpit
gunfire
a one-man or two-rnan aircraft) could instead becorne effective
could
aircraft
It also seems clear that a one-man
or missile attacks.
design;
be effective for missions otherwise necessitating a two-man
radar
interrupting
without
missile attacks could be effected
short-range
search, and the pilot's work load could be greatly reduced'
of these techniques by means of a head-coupled
Incorporation
"head-coupled avionics and
display (HcD) would result in an integrated
envisions advanweapons system.rt For this systern, the Task'Force
operations, as described
and air-to-ground
tageous uses in air-to-air
examples are given in
(ttlustrated
below, all in a head-up manner.
Appendix
C. ):
For
.
The optical sight function of the head-coupted display
would be used to point the radar antenna for automatic
Iock onto a hostile aircraft seen visually by the pilot
but not yet seen bY the radar.
.
I
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guided-gun attacks:
S E ER ET
either the coupling signals of the HCD or
concurrently,
the autotrack output signals of the radar would direct a
video contrast tracker for automatic lock onto the aircraft to obtain very accurate angle data for the guided
gun aiming comPutation.
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.
The CRT display function of'the HCD would then be used
to present the pilotrs steering portion of the gun attack
solution.
For short-range
missile
attacks:
.
The optical sight function of the HCD would point the
radar antenna for automatic lock-on just as in the gun
attack case, whereupon the autotrack output signals
would point the missile seeker for lock onto the hostile
aircraft.
.
Alternatively,
the HGD coupling signals
directly to point the missile seeker.
.
Commands for the pilot, if any, for completion
missile attack solution would then be presented
CRT display function of the HCD.
r.qfi#r,]^r[
For
midrange
missile
would be applied
of the
via the
attacks:
.
The CRT display function of the HCD would be used for
viewing air-intercept-radar
video in a ilvertical situationtl
type of presentation stabilized relative to the aircraft and
for checking the IFF reply status of detected airborne
(For viewing all radar- and TV-type video, a
targets.
shutter would be positioned automb.tically,
or by a push
button, to preclude interference
by light coming through
the combining glass of the HCD. )
.
while viewing the stabilized
[,n a guns-free environment,
vertical-situation
display, the pilotrs head motion would
initiate radar autotrack lock-on by positioning a target-.
designation symbol on the radar target of a hostile aircraft as seen in the HCD. The autotrack output signals
of the radar would point the seeker of t.Le midrange antiaircraft missile (u. g., Sparrow) for lock onto the radar
illumination
reflected from the target aircraft.
.
environment (where visual recognition
In a guns-not-free
must be relied on to distinguish hostiles from otJrer nonfriends), upon initiating autotrack radar lock-on as
described above, the output signals would point a highmagnifi.cation forward-looking
TV unit toward the same
airgraft.
The CRT display function of the HCD would
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then be used to view the video output of the TV unit,
thereby distinguishing hostiles from other nonfriends at
ranges up to l0 times that possible by the unaided eye.
For
.rftF:d,+{1lfri
.
attack (e. g.,
Walleye):
The CRT display function of the HCD would be used to
weapon video, and the pilotrs
view the stabilized-TV-type
head motion would position the weapon tracking gate for
the HCD would
Thereafter,
lock onto a selected target.
required.
be used to monitor the weaPon video if
For
.
standoff air-to-ground
routine
and GCI flight
control:
The CRT display function of the HCD would give the pilot
the same HUD-type Presentation as is provided by conIt would display vectoring
ventional head-up displays.
from
AWACS or from other GCI
and warning information
facilities.
It seems clear that the HCD could becorne the prirnary display of
these fighter aircraft providing for all normal uses the head-up,
display preand multisensor
horizontal-situation,
vertical-situation,
unit might be retained as a
sentations.
Although one head-in-cockpit
display weighs only
helmet-mounted
the
backup
display,
multipurpose
a few ounces and operating spares could be carried in the cockpit.
r**r*a|*
The Task Force believes that the head-coupled system can contribute greatly in making possible an effective one-man air-superiority
aircraft.
It strongly recommends that the services allocate sufficient
initiate competitive contracts as soon as possible-to
resources-and
this head-coupled concept and to establish its
investigate
intensively
feasibility
and utility for the proposed new fighters by actual flight test
system.
in a fully operating demonstration
2.3.3 Radari to avoid very serious penalties in performance,
the rad,ar-as well as other avionics systemsweight ".rd .ffiEilily,
should represent a fresh start, not a modification of some existing
radar systern such as the APG-59 or the ASG-18. As such, the radar
should take advantage of the new components and techniques available,
of head-coupled CRT displays, to reduce
such as the availability
Lightprovide
more flexible aid to the human.
to
bulk
and
weight and
and
reliability
of operation, low maintenance cost
weight, simplicity
are important considerations in the tradeoffs that must be made in any
the radar must in all likelihood have
systern.
Given thes6gfesiderata,
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a 30-inch aperture, four-lobe monopulse, .at Ieast I kilowatt of average
radiated power, and a substantial look-down capabiriry (which implies
coherent processing).
The radar must have a high degree of automation
in'acquisition,
botl. in the long-range search mode and the close-in
mode, wherein the antenna is pointed in angle by the pilot using the
head-coupled sight system.
The radar must provide suitable illumination for use with the Sparrow III'missile
and for any other semiactive
radar-guided missile.
The Task Force feels that X band is a more
suitable frequency than Ku for this system and that, for the mission-of
this aircraft,
the increased weight, complexity and high cost of an
electronically
scanned antenna would make it an unwise choice (albeit
feasible and capable).
This question is discussed further in section
4.3.L, in connection with the air-to-ground
operations.
In connection with the vFAX program,
the Navy proposed a hybrid
radar which combined mechanical and electronic steering.
The antenna
provides two beams, one for the radar and one for the cw sparrow
illuminators.
The radar beam is scanned electronically
in elevation
mechanically
and
in azimuth and is horizontally
polarized.
The illuminator beam is scanned electronically
in azimuth and mechanically in
elevation and is vertically
polarized.
The concept is superficially
appealing, in that the number o,f phase shifters required is greatly reduced from the number required for a fulI-phased array.
On the other
hand, the system has limitations
and drawbacks that seriously impair
its us efulne s s .
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Although the radar and illuminator
beam can in principle
be
steered independently uf to 60 degrees from each other, this independence is severely restricted by the neces.sity for the radar to supply
steering information
for the illuminator.
Further,
the system requires
Iinear polarization in order to create two beams, which precludes the
use of circular polarization to combat precipitation
return.
When we
consider that the scanning motion of the radar beam is stitl limited by
mechanical effects, that it compounds the losses involved in the rotating
-joint hardware (4 channels) with the losses and power-handling
limitation of high-power phase shifters, the added benefit of the electronic
scan seems marginal at best. The Task Fo.rce is unanimous in the
opinion that the radar does not represent a desirable line of approach.
The Air tr-orce proposes a full-phased-array
radar.
This is a
K-band radar using a reflecting array with about 3800 elements.
Using
full phase-phase steering it is capable of quite versatile multimode
operation on a pulse-to-pulse sequential basis.
(The radar details are
outlined in a Raytheon document.)
The Task I'orce is convinced that a
radar of this tlpe can be made to perform approximately
as indicated.
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radar is the most
we believe that the full-phased-array
Further,
caPability
approach toward providing the full multipurpose
promising
as
such
diverse
missions
that
does
airplane
that would be needed in an
of fleeting targets, using radar terrain avoidance or
night interdiction
combat.
On the other hand, we are
and air-to-air
following,
terrain
in which
not convinced that it is the best solution for a fighter aircraft
combat and in which the air-to-ground
the prime mission is air-to-air
type
of
mission that can be efficiently
capability is limited to the
Performed by a single-man, crew.
It is not possible at tJre present time to provide an exact estimate
capability
of the weight and cost involved in providing true multipurPose
that they
we
believe
but
radar,
phased-array
by
the
of the type provided
role, this
In the pure air-to-air
would be of considerable proportions.
I0 to
order
of
of
the
times
fLight
not
needed.
Assuming
is
capability
penalty
involved
little
there is
l5 seconds for a Sparrow-type missile,
Consequently, we
the search scan for this period.
in interrupting
Furtirer,
quite
adequate.
would
be
radar
believe that a simple dish-type
missions for which
there is a substantial spectrum of air-to-ground
required.
These include
not
capability
is
radar
sophisticated
the more
well
as l*re
as
such things as daytime strafing, dive bombing, etc.,
delivery of weapons such as Walleye in which the sophistication is
For attack on fixed targets an accurate navigation
aboard the rnissile.
system and for attack on moving targets a simpler radar may do as well.
i
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We recommend that the radar for an aircraft optimized for the
role should not be required to provide terrain avoidance,
air-to-air
synthetic aperture, and other sophisticated air-toterrain following,
function
We do feel that a simple ground-mapping
ground modes.
radar
having
only
a highpreclude
a
would
which
should be provided,
No low-PRF radar equipped with airborne
PRF pulsed doppler mode.
proved
adequate.
Such a radar would also preclude
yet
to
be
has
MTI
signatures and may Provide less
the recognition of turbine-blade
At present, both
probability
of detection under certain conditions.
In either case, we feel that a simple
high and low PRF seem required.
role and for
dish-type antenna would be adequate for the air-to-air
missions such as strafing, dive bombing, and
these air-to-ground
delivery of Walleye-type missiles that do not put sophisticated demands
on the airplaners avionics.
problem shows that a
our investigation of tJre air-to-ground
flexible navigation systern and computer can perforrn many of the
functions normally considered as belonging to a radar.
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2.3.4 other Avionics:
The other subsystems incorporated in
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tion and maintenance.
The voice link should utilize spread-spectrum
techniques to make it secure and relatively immune to jamrning.
For
clear-weather
operation, it seems at first sight that the navigation system need only be adequate to bring the aircraft to within a couple of
miles of a point to be attacked and then to return it to the general direction of its base. However, it may Qe that clear-weather
operations can
be extended to a much larger portion of the day and night by improvements in navigation, and this is addressed in the air-to-ground
section 4 which follows.
Instrument landing capability is required.
The
Task Force does not feel that solution of the IFF problem is a part of
its charter,
but recognizes that the utility of the midrange missile depends heavily on the availability of an adequate system.
EcM equipment and penetration aids should be installed so that they can be easily
changed as the requirements change, and the present EcM programs
must be further intensified in order to handle the threat.
EGM: Surface-to-air
missiles are a determining fact of
Iife in Vietn6il]lt<orea
and most of the rest of the world.
With rrlon€)rr
hard experience, and luck, we have continued to fly (although in a
highly-constrained
manner) through sA-2 territory.
A home-on-jam
monopulse seeker could change all this, and both self-contained and
stand-off EcM must be given continuing high priority for the l9z5+
period, for air-to-air
as well as for air-to-ground
missions.
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The multiplicity
of antennas, knobs and black boxes in currertt aircraft
for these functions is a reflection of the gradual growth of these
functions as independent elements and subelements.
Clearly it is past
time for an intensive conceptual and system design effort, not limited
to the airborne equipment, to obtain a proper return on the investment
in frequency spectrum, cockpit space, and pilot work load represented.
by the CNI functions.
We are most concerned tl:at drive and resources
toward this end be made available now so that an informed decision may
be made sevlral years hence as to what form the ICNI and associated
nonaircraft systems should take. Among the latter, for instance are
communication- satellite facilities,
satellite navigation and air-traffic
control, AWACS data link, voice encryption, etc., and it is urgent to
have a broad plan, at least at the development concept paper (DCP),
stage to achieve this infrastructure
by the time the aircraft is operational.
Still, the cost of introducing these systems should not be borne
entirely by the new fighter, since the benefits wiII be widely shared
with other new and old aircraft.
on the other hand, if a new fighter is
committed without an ICNI and its infrastructure,
great difficulties will
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arise in deploying such an advanced system-which
benefit no important group of aircraft.
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at its inception
will
Navigation for Air-to-Air:
Although accurate navigation
may not seem important for air-to-air
combat, this is misleading in at
least one aspect. The aircraft that can maneuver in three dimensions
near the ground<ven
in partial cloud-without
fear of collision with the
terrain has a real advantage over his opponent. A digitally stored
terrain mapr together with a computer-directed
or computer-performed
pullout, can provide this advantage even during hard-maneuvering
combat.
Further,
the operational advantages offered by such a system,
which can bring the aircraft back all the way to the landing pattern without requiring a change to local navigation or control, simplify the pilotts
job.
2.4
Airframe
As discussed in section 3 on development strategy, it appears
desirable to defer decision on details of airframe design pending the
results of further study and prototype testing.
[t is particularly,
the
pilotrs reactions to various capabilities which are needed from such
tests; open questions being the utility of maneuvering flaps, the combat
effectiveness of a guided gun, the relative desirability
of various headcoupled displays.
The guided gun and the head-coupled avionics can be
tested in current aircraft,
but sizing of maneuvering flaps, sizing
engines vs. fuel flow, reduction of trim drag, and, most important,
a
choice between equally plausible configurations on the basis of demonstrated handling properties calls for a competitive prototype program.
The design characteristics
outlined in the present section are only
intended to indicate what are currently considered to be trends and
likely areas of choice for various portions of the system.
We have
tried to indicate where there may be important feedback from tests,
studies and subsystem development that have major effects on the total
system.
-'".,""*f
2.4.1 Airframe and Propulsion Performances:
T/W, W/S,
The airframe and propglsion system
Size, Handling, Range/Payload:
should produce a high acceleration and maneuvering capability and excellent handling characteristics.
For maximum maneuverability,
ratio (T/W) should be high, and wing loading (W/S),
thrust-to-weight
low.
The specific values of T/W and W/S should be the object of intensive study and testing prior to the final decision on airframe design.
In order to maintain equal maneuverability,
for each additional pound
of armamant the takeoff gross weight must increase by a factor that
may range from 5 to ll as the required maintained "specific excess
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power'r increases from 800 to 1000 feet per second.4 Tentatively,
an airframe/propulsion-system
combination with a T/W of the order of
0.9 (maximum thrust, sea-level static condition at design takeoff gross
weight) and a W/S of the order of 80 pounds per square foot appears
desirable for a platform launching ordnance like that currently available
(i. e. , fixed guns and missiles of the Sidewinder/ I.alcon/Sparrow
generation); but the optimum W/S maywell
be higher for the improved ord.nance discussed here. An aircraft in the 40,000- to 45,000-pound size
range would aPPear suitable to meet Navy and Air Force requirements
for radius, spotting factor and performance.
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Since the agility required of the airplane in combat maneuvering
is, to some extent, a function of the agility and field of Iire of the ordnance, and since beyond a certain point increased agility becomes very
costly, the study of aircraft performance
requirements
should take into
consideration the performance
attainable with advanced design guns,
missiles and fire-control
systems.
It is important to recognize that the
added system agility provided by flexible ordnance may be a supplement
to, rather than a replacement for, airframe agility.
considerable
agility is necessary to close on an enemy or to avoid dangerous positions
with respect to enemy fighters.
However, the flexible ord.nance and
fire-control
system we propose will create an aircraft whose tactical
superiority
is much more stable against the growth of Soviet air-to-air
capabilities than would be an aircraft using normal displays and armaments.
It will be difficult to match the maneuvering capability of a
short-range
Soviet fighter in a U. S. fighter that must fight at a distance
of hundreds of miles from home base. However, the maximum practical
degree of aircraft agility that can be achieved in an aircraft of the proposed size should be sought, both to provide a suitable launch platform
for offensive ordnance and to permit successful defensive maneuvering
when under attack by enemy weapons.
Final determination
of the
desired airframe and propulsion performance should be based on overall system performance in both offensive and defensive situations.
Among the most highly desired characteristic
of a close-in airto-air fighter is high turning rate at low speed. Since low wing loading
induces penalties in range and maximum speed, we feel that intensive
effort should be placed on maneuvering flaps, rapidly deployable during
combat, to permit the aircraft to benefit from high agility but not to
suffer, to the normal extent, a low wing-loading configuration at all
times.
reto,ooo
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I g, and Mach 0.9.
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The ability of a combat aircraft
to fully e:<ploit its acceleration
potential
in combat is critically
and maneuver
dependent on its handling
characteristics.
trying to ensure good handling characUnfortunately,
teristics
involves much more than selecting between features which can
be specified by thrust-to-weight
ratios or wing loadings or by the type
of data presented in preliminary, designs or proposals.
Importance
must be attached to tJ:e past performance
of design organizations in
this connection.
that the iterative
sequence
In addition, it is important
of design, wind.-tunnel testing, ftight testing, and final design fteezirrg
allow for maximum handling performance
to be achieved.
Range/payload performance
should be based on the required radius
for fighter sweep and escort mission in an air-to-air
combat configuration.S An unrefueled radius of 400 nautical miles on such missions is
a minimum;
a longer radius would be desirable.
The mission radius
required for air-to-ground
or
operations by other fighter-bombers
attack aircraft
should provide the basis for determining mission radius
for this fighter,
for any
but there should be no design requirement
specific air-to-ground
mission radius for the fighter itself.
The
thrust
time allowance for fuel consumption at maximum
. appropriate
during combat should be an object of detailed study, along with the
study of aircraft and ordnance. systern performance.
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2.4.2
and Propulsion Performance:
Vmax: A'V-"*
Airframe
capability
tactical air
of
combat situations.
Speeds higher than this in fighter aircraft can only
be achieved at altitudes greater than 35, 000 to 40,000 feet. Once combat is joined in a close-in encounter, speed and altitude tend to decrease
rapidly to transonic or high-subsonic
speed and altitude, below 20,000
feet.
However, a higher speed of, salr Mach 2.8, could be useful in
situations where it is desired either to force an engagement on, or to
true
This is particularly
disengage from, an enemy at high altitude.
if the enemy has a Vmax of Mach 2.7 or 2. 8, as has been forecast by
the Defense Intelligence Agency for advanced Soviet tactical fighters.
Starting with a design possessing high maneuvering and accelerap
o
tential at speeds between Mach I.5 and 2.0 the changes required
ting
to raise the top speed to Mach 2.5 to 3.0 might not represent a large
that only tJre aerorelative increase in the total system cost-provided
capability for sustained llight at the higher
dynarnic and propulsion
speed range were added. Of the total combat sorties flown, only a
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fuel is used prior
to combat.
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to Jesign th. "tr,r.iore
for a high limit load
factor at top speed,
nor to designlngirre
inie-ts
of
the
cation required for
sizJand sophistiefficiurrt cr,rise at top
speed.
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A high vmax shourd
not be sought at the
expense of features
sirable for close_in
d,ecombat at speeds around
Mach 1.0 and less.
features as cockpit.i"t;ilir"
S
uch
l"g:"rr.'rru"irg
potential at rower
for example, should
speed.s,
not be ""."ifi"ua.
No" "ohorrld the frontal
quired for adequate
area re_
radar antenna size
and
flexible gun installation
compromised'
be
on the other hand, it
wourd i"-".""orrable
cruise efficiency and
to
accept
poor
a lower limit load fact".
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useful to have a,study
It would be
of the p.a.ticability
ani iotar system costs_
including possible credits
roiii"..ased
c
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r
rosion and fatigue
of titanium structure
resistance
over arumlnrrm-"f
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;tghte, a.sig..ed for
air combat operation
efficient
up to Maci ' t'
2.3r but
DUEwith an emergency
for higher speed operation.
capability
2.4.3
ott
excerlent
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pacing items for the_orr""fU
system. ifruy also agree,
close range, as-to the
within a fairly
majo" Jrrgirr. "r.""".t".istics
desirabre, namery,
an engine with about 20,060
pounds of thrust ""a "
bypass ratio of about
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great deal of sophistication should be employed in the design of controls,
switching arrangements,
and displays to aid the pilot in his tasks of
flying and fighting; and all subsystems should be carefully engineered
for survivability
and for ease of maintenance, test, replacements,
and
repair in the field.
The Department of Defense would be making a
tragic mistake if it did not recognize that new weapons and a new type
of avionics integration are essentizl to the success of a new fighter.
A systems designer always has to balance the desire for some
residual weaPons effectiveness, when some damage or failure has been
suffered by the aircraft or its system, against the difficulty of training
the crew to operate in all kinds of degraded modes.
The Task Force
recommends that no provision be made for mission completion in the
case of failure of the total computer system, or.of other major damage,
but that great care be given to incorporate the ability to "get homerl
safely in case of almost any single (and most double) failures.
The aim
is for the aircraft functionally to appear the same to the pilot, so long
as he is expdcted to complete the mission, and for him to abort the
mission in case of failure, rather than to continue with diminished
effectivene s s .
2.5
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Command and Control
It is likely that no completely adequate IFF will be available for
these fighters at IOC. Experience in North Vietnam shows the tremendous advantage occurring to the side with adequate IFF and GcI.
If
AwAcs
is to be committed to full-scale
development, the new fighter
must be equipped with convenient, secure voice and data link in order
to make use of the new capability of theater control and to recover
some of the advantage which is provided to the enemy by his groundbased radars and GCI. It is difficult to overstate the increase in
capability which AWACS could provide in the absence of effective jamming, not only as a result of its own radar but also by virtue of its
serving as a tactical intelligence and communication center.
Granted
that the new fighters will sometimes operate independently of AWACS,
they should be equipped to make good use of its availability.
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3.
STRUCTURE AND N4ANAGEMENT
DEVEI.OPMENT
PROGRAM
OF
THE
ln order to minimize program costs and to have a high assurance
of meeting schedules and requirements,
the Task Force recommends a
considerable departure from recent aircraft development procedures.
In brief, we recommend the initiation of two or more competitive airframe demonstration programs,
each of which is intended to result,
after I8 to 24 months, in the existence of three demonstration aircraft.
The Task Force notes that these aircraft would have governrnentfurnishedpresent-generation
engines which could be heavier and larger
than VFAX/ FX production engines; the airframes
could be made with
trsofttr tooling and would thus have a heavier structure than a productiontooled airframe,
but aerodynamically
they could serve as a baseline
for small projections by the contractor as to the performance
of a fullproduction new-generation fighter.5
Engine/airframe
matching is a
considerable problem in new aircraft,
but the use of podded engine
designs can reduce this to manageable proportions.
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The Services should also fund three competitive full head-coupled
avionics and weapons demonstration programs using governmentfurnished present-generation
aircraft
so that a baseline of technology
and of contractor capability may be established.
After some 30 months,
the full development and procurement
selection may be made among the
airframe
and among the avionics contractors,
for separate Air Force
and Navy fighters or for a single aircraft in two variants; but this selection would be made on the basis of demonstrated performance
and slight
extrapolation,
not
and
on the basis of a paper proposal.
Assuming a reasonably competent selection mechanism,
cedure has the further advantage of:
this pro-
The contractors know that a full development and procurement contract is likely to be awarded on the basis of demonstrated
bPeople with extensive aircraft experience have objected to the
Task Force that an airframe prototype cannot usefully bi: flown with an
engine different from the one it eventually will carry.
We still do not
understand how, on the contrary, it is possible to design and produce
airframes
to work with only the specifications of the new engine and
also how such airframes then can accept much different, improved
engines.
On the other hand, equally experienced people have supported
the thesis that airframe prototype development and test can be done
very profitably witb _current- generation engines.
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and not on the basis of 'either radical
in air performance
prornises or extreme conservatism in the paper proposal.
Thus,
the contractors will make every effort to demonstrate their performance within schedule and to build the very best system they
can during the ?-year period.
They may understate tJreir costs;
but, even so, should themselves have a sound idea of the cost of
the futl-scale p:ogram on which they will then bid.
We emphasize thatwe do not believe that the usual 6- to 9-month
contract-definition
phases give the contractors tirne to demonstrate
with any confidence,
even to themselves,
what they will be able to do
and an honest contractor rvill bid an unduly conservative system because of this ignorance.
If this period is to require an airframe
contractor
as prime to obtain commitments
from avionics and weapons
contractors
to a level of assurance and detail sufficient for the prime
to commit himself to the government, then no improvement
in avionics
and ordnance capability can be e>rpected, although there is in fact much
feasible with high assurance on a L974-L975IOC time scale.
SUGGESTED STRUCTURE OF PROPOSED
FIGHTER
DEMONSTRATION
'
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July 1968
I
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-:.
June 1970 to
March I97t
PROGRAM
June l9?I
January 1974
Award
airframe
contracts.
Production
aircraft
available.
r
['
-*-
AND DEVE]fPMENT
I"-
Airframe
Let two or
rnore contracts,
each for three
flight demonstration
airc raft.
Engines
Let two
contracts for
cornmon engine.
Avionics
Let three
contracts for
full avionics
flight demonstration suits.
T
SEERE
Test demonstration aircraft.
Prepare specifications and
bids.
Full production engines
available.
Test-fly
avionic s .
Prepare specifications and
bids
Award
avionic s
contracts.
Early avionics
Full
available.
production in
twentieth aircraft, June
L974.
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The proposed "fly-before-buy.
program is economical,
because
it allows iteration,
modification
and improvement
of t;1e airframe
in
the .soft-tooled rather than in the high-production
phase. It combines
technical and management aggressiveness on the part of the contractors
with assurance for the government,
since the program is a failure
only if all three of the airframe or.all three of the avionics programs
miss their targets, e. g., an assurance of g9 percent if a single air_
frame-avionics-engine
contractor were chosen from the bejinning.Z
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Further,
we firmly
believe that in this type of competitive
demonstration program the contra'ctor will keep his best people on the job,
and the evaluation will be easier and more reliable than for a paper
proposal.
The airframe
demonstration programs could cost $60 million per
contractorr
?nd the avionics demonstration programs,
perhaps $30
million each, although these estimates are at best a guess.
The contractors not selected for production will in any case prove to be a re_
source for the future, but even if the effectiveness
of the aircraft
built
is- increased only 3 percent by this procedure,
or its cost red.uced.
3 percent, the demonstration
expenditures will have been fully recovered..
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.
Until CY I970, there seems to be no fund.amenbal reason to gequire
separate Air Force and Navy system project offi.ces (spos),
but we
frankly
cannot see a mechanism to enable the Navy and tJre Air Force
.
to work effectively together.
It will cost more but probably give better
results to have two airfralnes
and two avionics d,emonstration contracts
from each Service-with,
however, the possibility of production for any
Service by any contractor.
If the Program initiation must be delayed because either lack of
funds or lack of understanding of the place of new fighter aircraft in the
force structurer
w€ plead the urgency to begin the avionics/ordnahce
competitive demonstrations,
since this is the most critical item and
since improvements
here could also be available to existing aircraft
Programs.
There is a serious question regarding the integration of the airframe, avionics and engine full-scare development programs.
Three
possibilities
are evident: prime responsibility
for such integration
might vest with the government, with the airframe
or with the avionics
-;ming
ability
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Probably the government is not a realistic possibility,
and choice between giving integration responsibility
to airframe
contractor or avionics contractor could be made on the basis of their bids
on a separate integration contract.
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THE
NEW
FTGHTER IN AIR-TO.GROUND
The Spectrum of Targets
OPERATIONS
for Attack by Air
.
Experience shows that a new fighter, like most other types of aircraft in the past, will be used to deliveJ ordnance on ground targets.
The risks to aircraft in this role and the resulting attrition make it
worthwhile-if
only even just for the preservation
of our air-to-air
forces-to
invest as much money as is useful in air-to-ground. capability
for these aircraft,
provided that the overall air-to-air
effectiveness is
not significantly reduced. Still, there is no reason to waste a very
expensive fighter aircraft on a ground target which with some foresight
can better be attacked by.other means.
A surprisingly
large fraction
of the targets do fall in this categoryr for example:
I.
Fixed, prebriefed targets-these
can be attacked by a
low-altitude
cruise missile with accurate navigation and remote
optical terminal guidance.
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Z. CIose-support targets-where
the ground troops have
more accurate knowledge of enemy positions than does the pilot,
these can best be struck by a bomb or unguided rocket delivered
into a several-mile
acquisition rrbasket'r at high altitude; the
weapon then homes to hit either a laser-illuminated
spot or an
artillery-emplaced
mic rowave beacon.
A per sortie attrition rate of 1.7 percent-such as we are experiencing in attacks on Hanoi and Haiphong-on
a $3-million
aircraft,
including attrition on its perhaps $5 million l0 year o&M in case
attrition aircraJt are bought and maintained is some $130,000 per
sortie, so that an advanced weapon like Walleye could be well worth its
cost in reduced attrition even if it required as many sorties for target
d e s t r u c t i o n a s d - oi r o n b o m b s .
Thus, an important part of the air-toground effectiveness of a new fighter will come from the foresight to
include adequate displays, pylon wiring, etc., to use the most effective
existing ordnance and to provide flexibitity to incorporate new ordnance
as it is developed during the life of the aircraft.
The inaccuracy of
gravity bombs is a classical problem:
Level bombing from high altitude
requires good navigation and a knowledge of ballistic wind; low-altitude
Ievel bombing requires good target location (especially altitude), and is
limited by the need to remain\A2,000
feet above the target to avoid
bomb blast; the use of low-altitude retarded bombs reintroduces wind
errors and at present constrains the attack altitude; dive bombing is
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limited by the necessity to release at long slant Tanges in order that
the aircraft achieve\A 2,000-foot separation from the target (e. g., at
500 knots, 3-g pullout, a slant range of more than 41 500 feet is
necessary),
thus introducing dispersion due to angular misalignments,
etc. A missile guided to impact has no such long free-fau time to
magnify the initial errors,
and for this reason we put great stress on
such horned missiles or bombs.
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Other
Urgent
Developments
with regard to the FAX air-to-ground
performance it is most important to recognize (and act accordingly) that the z years or more
which are required to obtain this new aircraft are ad,equate at the same
time to develop and produce those missiles and marking techniques and
systems that would provide alternatives of lower cost and greater effectiveness than would be possible with conventional aircraft attack.
These items can also contribute to the capability of the fighter itself.
These systems should be committed now and includ.e:
I.
A general-purpose low-cost accurate navigation system
range-range satellite or rfRAN,
self-contained or retransmission
for external computation- suitable for high-accuracy
c ruise- mis sile attack.
-either
t
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Z. Single-frame long-range TV relay from missile to
directing craft or center to allow a further unique target designation within the few-hundred-foot
accuracy obtainable from a high
accuracy navigation approach.
with an accurate navigation system,
500 to 1000 lines of TV resolution is ample for target recognition
and designation.
3. A hitting, nonreusable cruise missile taking advantage
of (1) and (2) and with emphasis on low cost and simplicity of
use. The World War II V-Irs propulsion should be considered
among others.
4. A line of artillery-emplaced.
microwave beacons,
ground and airborne laser target designators should be committed
to development and production,
as well as a compatible set of
bomb-mounted
sensors, guidance fins and flexible proximity
fuzes to be attached to existing and new bomb bodies as they enter
the inventory.
tion:
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5. Directed, unmanned reconnaissance and target designaStarting with the present Navy SNOOpy ( D A S H c o n v e r s i o n ) ,
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a lighter and cheaper helicopter platform mounting TV, singleframe camera and laser target designator would immensely increase the security and effectiveness of our ground forces and
their aerial support.
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In addition, there will always be a demand for more kitl effectiveness per sortie, and expanded development effort will be r€c€ssarlr
e.9., on proximity-fuzed,
air-opening dispensers for use with beaconor laser-homed guidance; on cost-reduced bomblet land mines for interdiction
that effectively
convert the rnrlnerable area of a truck on a
road from a few square meters to a strip a few meters wide by a
hundred meters long; etc.
The Task Force urges that these developments be committed.
our recommendations
of the air-to-ground
capabilities for a new
fighter and for its employment are based on the assumption that such
alternative
systems will exist and be used by the U. S. in the 19?5 time
period.
Realistic,
and vigorous tactical testing to guide development
and improvement is necessary in all these programs.
particularly
when there must be interaction among different elements, as between
ground forces and air support inrtdirect air support" or between reconnaissance and strike in prebriefed target attack, this link must be
realistically
exercised and its performance
monitored from a higher
level if the capability is realty to exist in fact when it is needed..
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4.3
On-Board
Equipment
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Radar: At present it seems that a high- and low-pRF
rad.ar is nucJJif,for
good MTI in the air-to-air
role, but the cost,
weight and complexity of electronic scan hardly seems warranted for
air-to-air
alone, compared with a monopulse tin-dish,
mechanically
scanned radar.
However, if the aircraft is to survive in a SAM hostile
environrnent
and if it hopes to be undetected at night, it must be
equipped to fly at low, and ground-conforming
altitude.
Naturally,
MTI in Soviet ground radars will become much more common in lp75*,
and terrain masking may be the only benefit of low flight.
Terrain
following is now done with success by the ,{-6.{ and the F-rllA,
in the
latter by the use of two identical redundant radars.
we recommend.
that the new air-superiority
fighter not be equipped. with a terrainfollowing function.
the
new
If
fighter is even so, to have terrainfollowing radar, the Task Force agrees that this mode should be obtained, together with the air-to-air
and air-to-ground
modes, from a
single electronically scanned radar (probably phase-phase) which
might, however, still be mounted in gimbals to achieve a cheap bias or
,arger
look
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scanned flat-plate
with an electronically
array
fixed to the
However, terrain following radar is in our opinion neither the
only nor the best terrain following means, and we propose that the new
highaircraft programs consider the following systern-a-redundant,
navigation system (Loran C-D for one radio
accuracy radio-inertial
element and a satellite range-range systern for the other), together
At low
with i stored terrain map of the entire theater of operations.
readings, together with the
altitudes the sequence of radio-altimeter
terrain tTr?pr provides either confirrnation or a third high-accuracy
navigation system (like TERCOM), but the key point is that terrain
for the radio altimeter,
following can now be done passively-except
which itself is not necessary with a satellite navigation system giving
sPace'
without the weight,
accurate altitude as well as position-and
radars.
Considering
cost and ECM penalties of terrain-following
as
lirnitations
in terrain following,
reasonable (say, 2-gl acceleration
could
terrain
map
an
adequate
feet,
well as navigation accuracies r^ 200
well consist of the maximum altitude in every 1r 000 square feet, i. e.,
36 altitudes per square nautical mile, or on the order of 2 x 106
Such a system would lend
numbers for a country the size of Vietnam.
radars, and
a great deal more confidence than.the terrain-following
correctness
but, it
of
its
the pilot would have continuing verifi.cation
would, of course, have to be supplemented by an adequate capability
effort that
or airborne radar terrain-mapping-an
for satelliteborne
seems well worth the investment and could be completed on the same
(1975-) time scale.
In sum, we recommend for a new fighter a rnonopulse, Iowscanned tin-dish radar, with terrain-following
mechanically
high-PRF,
implemented via the combination of stored terrain rnapr redundant
If, on the connavigation system and radio altimeter.
radio-inertial
we
it would
then
believe
chosen,
is
by
radar
terrain following
trary,
scanned array without separate
be preferable to go to an electronically
terrain-
following
radars.
As for the choice of radar frequency between X and Kg bands,
there is much more to gain by appropriate pulse comPression and
doppler processing than by a simple drive toward shorter wavelength.
polarization is necessary to
In any case, cross- or reverse-circular
'W'e
note,
especially so in K-band.
return-and
combat precipitation
however, that the ground-map resolution usually desired is redundant
accuracy, and that these reto good navigation and target-location
sources can probably better be put into improved standoff (syntheticreconnaissance sensors' either
aperture, side-Io"ki?g
_radar)
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satelliteborne
or high-altitude airborne,
than into fighterborne
equipment that repeatedly verifies that the mountains or coastline have not
moved. we are further led to comment that, in the search for improved MTI against either ground or aerial targets, pulse compression
seems to have been somewhat neglected as a tool, yei pulse-compression ratios of I00 to 300 or so are easily and cheaply available and
.result in an improvement in subclutter visibility by some 20 db or more
in comparison with the uncompressed pulse. Naturally, this narrower
effective pulse width requires more storage in the MTI filter bank, but
such storage is less expensive now.
4. 3. Z llryfggli""lgl4ir-to-Ground:
As previously discussed
und.er Radar,
igation system allows
automatic terrain following of a quality previously unknown and at little
additional cost. The terrain-avoidance
feature, of courser permits
flying automatically
on a prebriefed flight plan and leaves the pilot free
and alert for reconnaissance, self-defense or emergencies.
Further,
the navigation computer-control
system Can begin a .pop-up, and even.,
complete a blind delivery against a prebriefed. target, or against one
designated on radar, or by a flexible, probably helmet- or-eyeglassmounted, sight allowing blind delivery accuracy of a few hundred fget,
with gravity bombs but, more importantly,
putting the aircraft
and the
pilot in a position to better define the target, to take precise navigation
'fixesr or to launch troming weapons upon it. It is no simple matter
in
combat to time a pull-up and descent so that there is any proper reIease point in the pullout; and a computer-directed
or -performed
maneuver wiII make more sorties count, and with less time in the
:
target area.
The radio-inertial
navigation system proposed for the terrain
following role would have the accuracy and flexibility
to do these jobs.
4.3.3 weapons-Delivery computer:
The functions to be performed by a @omputer
seem not to be sufficiently
different frorn those needed in the navigation control computer to require a separate computer or program.
In the air-to-air
case the
computer will have to guide the gun to an aim point calculated irom the
navigation system and the tracking radar or optical tracking data. Id
would store and use ballistics data for air-to-ground
attack, compute
missile firing envelopes and guide the pilot to a position within the
envelope if he finds himself outside it. There seems no requirement
for a separate stores-management system.
However, it would. be foolhardy, to rely entirely on a single, nonredundant compu[gr.- Mean iime before failure (MTBF) is surely not
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an adequate measure of probability
of. perfect performance in a single
mission,
since internal redundancy, on-line spares and other concepts
can give a single computer with an MTBF of I year much greater than
the sirnple 99.7-percent
probability of finishing its first day without
failure.
Still, a prudent course would be to plan to install two identical
cornputers,
one as a backup, with high reliability
in each, until such a
point in t.Le Program at which it is demonstrated that a single computer,
and its associated maintenance plan, will provide adequate assurance.
The computer will also be required to serve as a flexible exchange
between various tracking and slaving systems-else
n such systems will
require n2 interconnections,
rather than the rt n.ceslary
if a central
exchange is used. For instance, helmet- or-eyeglass-sight angles will
have to be accepted by the computer and used to aim guns, direct the
radar, aim a TV recognition system, or simply update a navigation
system.
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4.3.4
Displays: The Task Force notes the continual conflict between field of rnG" a-.ta resolution,
and observes that this con{lict is
eased if one has only a single such display, which can then be made
larger in subtended angle of the pilotrs vision.
This display must then
be switchable rapidly, with memory of preset adjustments among its
various sensors and functions.
Clearly, at least a scan converter is
required,
but a single display presents vulnerability
and reliability
problems and still does not provide the natural vision combination of
Iarge field of view (at least J60 degrees), good resolution (probably Ll Z
milliradian
in the fovea), and convenient scan. As discussed under the
air-to-air
mission, the head-mounted display and coupler-if
it can be
provide the resolution,
made sufficiently convenient-will
peripheral
vision and convenient target designation which are needed in a highperformance
aircraft.
Large display tubes can then be eliminated from
the cockpit, and spare helmet-mountable
displays carried in order to
eliminate the possibility of loss of display.
role, the display can be usedwith the highIn the air'-to-ground
accuracy navigation system, the computer, and the TV recognition
system slaved to tJre briefed target position to allow the pilot to see the
target at greater ranges and with more magnification and contrast than
would be possible with the eye. For night attack, a low-light-level
TV
can supplement the TV recognition system; the navigation-computer
drive allows compensation of aircraft forward speed in the expected
region of the target and so reduces image smear and loss of contrast.
fighter could be a very considerable
In general, this air-to-air
machine for day and night work.
air-to-ground
It could fall short of
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the ideal air-to-ground
aircraft because of the substantially greater
cost per pound of the highest performance
aircraft
and the penalty in
performance-hence,
weight growth at constant performance-that
would be caused by the addition of frontal armor,
etc., to reduce
attrition from small-arms
fire.
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5.
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SUMMARY
If the new fighters are designed with imagination and foresight,
the incorporation
of an excellent penetration and air-to-ground
delivery
capability will cost very little beyond what is required for what we regard as necessary for best air-to-air
effectiveness.
However, homing
missiles,
target-designation beacons, new area munitions, effective
land mines, etc., should compose the payload, since even an 0.S-percent attrition on the aircraft would be extremely painful, especially if
its average sortie did no effective damage.
Further,
serious commitment must be made to a head-coupled avionics system and display, if
it proves feasible, and to advanced weapons to go with it for the air-toair role, if we are to achieve real air superiority over enemy fighters.
A real problem we see in dual utility of the aircraft arises from
our feeling that air-to-air
training is a fult-time job for the crew; and
they either slight air-to-ground
or they are not so superior air-to-air
as they might be against an enerny who cannot afford to train as much
as we can. We regard this as a very serious problem, which would be
eased by the devices proposed here.
The elements of the avionics and weapons system that the Task
I-orce proposes fall into two categories:
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A. Programs that we regard as already demonstrated in
hardware or by analysis to such an extent that we believe that
firm planning can proceed to incorporate them into the fighter
system.
In this category fall:
A-I.
The head-coupled sight, to which can be slaved
both the radar illuminator
for the semi-active
missiles and
the missile seekers themselves, radar, infrared or electrooptical.
A-2.
Flexible missiles, locked-on at large off-angles
before launch and not so simple that they boost to maximum
speed before guiding.
Other systems and questions fall into Category B:
B.
Programs that have a less firm foundation in hardware demonstration
or analysis, but that we believe are feasible
on the new fighter-development
time scale and that will increase
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the system
Programs
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effectiveness
are:
by factors
of z or more,
S E E R ,TE
Among
these
B-I.
A forward-firing
guided gun, slaved via a
computer to the radar tracker or, as desired, to the headcoupled sight, or to thb electro-optically
tracking TV system.
This gun, guided in elevation to N +ZO degrees and in
azimuth perhaps tz degrees, could double the effective
maneuverability
of the fighter in offensive air-to-air
operations.
B-2.
A stabilized,
electro-optically
tracking Z- to
I0-power TV recognition system, initially slaved to the
radar tracker,
in order to do visual identification at longer
range and over a wider solid angle than is possible with the
unaided eye.
B-3.
The combat utility
than 2. 3 or l. 8.
of Vq1a3 = ?.8 Mach rather
B-4.
The tradeoffs involved
trans sonic maneuvering flaps.
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in the incorporation
of
B-5.
The optimum time allowance for combat at
military
power or in afterburner,
taking into account the
expected performance
of the avionics/weapons
system
proposed.
B-6.
Full head-coupled display, replacing head-up
display radar indicator,
TV display, horizontar and vertical
situation display and perhaps some Ilight-instrument
indicators.
B-7.
Rearward-firing
guided guns.
B-8.
Rearward-firing
self,defense missiles.
B-9.
Rearward-looking
warning and tracking
to allow antimissile
and antifighter action.
radar
B-10. A full investigation of the feasibility of highquality terrain following by precision LORAN-inertial
or
satellite radio-inertial
navigation, coupled with a digitally
stored terrain map of the theater of operations.
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In addition to these fighterborne
equipments,
the other urgent nonaircraft programs of section 4 must be funded on the same time scale.
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OVERALL
PROGRAM
RECOMMENDATIONS
l.
[t is recommended that a development program,
following the
basic approach of prototype procurement and testing, be initiated now
for a new fighter aircraft.
An IOC for-the early 1970s-i. e., before
L975-should
be sought. Competitive prototype flight programs
should
be pursued separately for avionics, for airframes
and for engines.
Z. The fighter should be designed for both air-to-air
and air-toground operations, with the primary design emphasis on air-to-air
capability.
The air-to-air
capability should include close-in combat
capability.
The air-to-g.round capability should be for primarily
visual
weaPon delivery with homing or area ordnance insofar as autonomous
aircraft operations are concerned.
3. Guided(i. e., steerable) guns and highly agile missiles should
be provided for forward-hemisphere
firing, unless flight tests reveal
basic flaws in the concept.
Missile seeker, propursion, airframe and
target designation should provide for firing missiles at large angles off
the aircraft nose. Rear-hemisphere
ordnance should be investigated,
tested, and incorporated in the design if found desirable on grounds of
utility and performance tradeoffs.
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4. Head-coupled sights and display should be used to eliminate
the gunsight, radar display, TV display, heads-up display, etc., and
to provide at the same time flexible all-angle TV viewing and target
designation.
5. The avionics should incorporate a pulse-doppler
radar with
low-PRF
mode for ground map, but without either electronically
scanned phased-array or separate terrain-following
radars.
A redundant centratr digitat computer should couple the displays to the
weapons, manage stores, and do the computations required for flexible
weapons delivery.
6. DDR&E should review those development concept papers for
systems that might be available before or about L975, to provide
planning guidelines for synergistic systems rather than to allow each
7 -yeat advanced system to assume the environment as it was at the
beginning of the development cycle.
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7.
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Urgent
commitments
development
providing
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should be made to:
terrain
avoidance by
a.
navigation systems
navigation,
b.
single-frame
homiqg,
c.
simple,
d.
ground and airborne targetartillery-emplaced
designating schemes for homing bombs,
TV for remote target
designation
and
l
hitting,
surface-to- surface cruise missiles,
reconnaissanceand target-
e'
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r'
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as
"-groundordnance'
on a turbofan
8. Development should proceed immediately
with
bypass
ratio and other
class,
engine of the 20,000-pound thrust
design features to be jointly determined by the Nalry and the Air Force.
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APPENDIX
A
D I R E C T OO
RF DEFENSE
RESEARCA
HN D E N G T N E E R I N G
'WASHINGTON.
D. C. 20301
:
l7 May It67
'iri4##f;-siffi
MEMORANDUM
suBJEcT:
FOR THE CHAIRMAN,
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD
Defense science Board Task Force:
Tactical
Aircraft
Both the Navy and the Air Force have expressed. a need for new tactical
aircraft to meet the postulated threat and to fill existing gaps in the
force structure relating to air superiority by air-to-air
combat an6 to
the air-to-ground
attack mission.
It would be of value for the Board to examine both the air-to-air
and
the air-to-ground
missions.
Some specilic questions and comments
are given below, but the Board should not feel limited by them.
The
air-to-air
problem should receive priority.
Irrr+r'rie
l.
Air-to-Air:
The air-to-air
question might be simply stated as
6110*":
."hich is the route of greater promise for achieving
superiority
over the soviet union in air-to-air
combata)
emphasis on speed and maneuverability
in the aircraft,
or b)
emphasis on maneuverability
and firepower in the missile?
Consideration should also be given to the identification
problem,
type(s) of weapons and awionics, development costs and risks
for alternative
approaches,
and the stability of any solution
against Soviet growth.
z.
Air-to-Ground:
Means of improving the air-to-ground
mission
ffiou1dbeconsid.ered'.ofparticularinterestis
the balance between use of a sophisticated delivery system for
conventional ordnance and use of guided weapons.
The study
should include analysis of the spectrum of ground targets to be
attacked and the most appropriate weapon to counter them.
In
this regard it will be useful to have a brief analysis of the
achievements of our air-to-ground
operations in viet Nam.
The
recommendations
should include a rough division of development
and procurement costs between avionics, airframe,
propulsion
and weapons.
I
I
,-+-tZ:f
,TT/{ -,
$.Sf,{t#
r.OR OFFICIAL
USE ONLY
l11{tlhsftf
Gonsideration
to accomplish
ttlt FoRor.FrcrAl
usEoNLy
should be given the requirements
both missions.
for one man or two men
These problems are urgent and I would appreciate as rapid a response
as practical.
To be most useful your report should be submitted by
l5 September 1957.
I have asked Mr. Fowler to be the cognizant deputy,
available whatever staff support is necessary.
and he will
lsl
John S. Foster,
FoR
oFFrcrAL
",#ff$&d.$.$/fjff?
Jr.
mak€
r
FoRoF*crAltmbN$bltttl!
APPENDIX
Meeting
schedules
B
of DSB Task Force
on Fighter
Aircraft
t3-I4 June 1967
.rc4i4#.. {i6,
Date
l3 June 1967
l4 June 1967
I
Time
Subject
0 9 0 0 -0 9 4 5 Executive
0945-1045 Air-to-Air
Session
and Groundto-Air Threat
1 0 4 5 - I t 4 5 Tactical Airc raft Force
Structure
L r 4 5 - 1 2 4 5 Lunch
L245-1345 A i r - t o - A i r
and Air-toGround Requirements
1345-1445 Advanced/ Engineering
Development Programs/
Test Programs
L445-1545 Study Subjects
I545-I645 Air-to-Air
and Ground-toAir Threat
0900-1000
I000-1100
,r,ll,.8t,rfie L:,
I
lI00-I200
I200-I300
1300-I400
t 400- 1600
Tactical Aircraft Force
Structure
and Air-toAir-to-Air
Ground Requirements
Advanced/ Engineering
Development Programs/
Test Programs
Lunch
Study Subjects
Executive Ses sion
l1-tZ
I I July 1967
0800-0900
0900-I000
1000-1100
I I00-1.200
IZ00-I300
I
I
.:='iiit
I
I
t
_..-.--.. &-
R esponsible
rt
t_a
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Navy
Air
Force
Air Force
Air Force
Air F o r c e
Air Force
JuIy 1957
Reference material
available
Executive Session
Tactical Aircraft
made
O n e - I \ r l a nv s . T w o - M e n
Concepts
Lunch
ODDR&E
Air Force,
Dr. Flax
Air Force
-
USE
-UNI;I
d t*.Er"r*a'rr 'oR oFFrcrAL
'..,&rtrJdff'/f"f,{
ONLY
h5strtEU.
OFFICIAL
USE ONLY
Meeting Schedules ( continued)
Date
I I July 1967
(continued)
.i*iryHift-illi&,'il
L Z July 1957
Time
Responsible
Subject
L4O0-L445
Performance of FX/
VFAX/ AX
Engine Performance
I445 -L530
Engine'Performance
I530- 1630
Tactical Missiles
1630-1?30
Air-to-Air
1300-1400
IFF Review
0800-'0900 Reference material
available
0 9 0 0 - r l 0 o RadarlAvionics
made
'
Review
and Air'-toGround Missiles
I 2 0 0 - I 3 0 0 Lunch
I 3 0 0 - 1 4 0 0 T actical Airc raft'
I r 0 0 - 1 2 0 0 Air-to-Air
and Air-toGround Missiles
I 5 0 0 - 1 6 0 0 Discussion of material
p re sented
1 6 0 0 - 1 7 0 0 Planning for next meeting
NASA
General
Electric
Pratt and
Whitney
Navy and
Air Force
DSB, Navy
.and Air Force
ODDR& E
Navy and
Air I'orce,
Mr. Longbrake
& Mr. Francis
Hughes Aircraft
Company
Navy,
Dr. Frosch
1 4 0 0 - I 5 0 0 Air-to-Air
Raytheon Co.
I ? - l8 August I967
17 Aug 1g5?
-' .*,f.'o
:'i '.'..:.1 j{
----. -',
1r.-.
Executive session to discuss
studY rePorls
OASD (Systems
090O-0930 NATO/Warsaw Pact StudY
Analysis ),
Mr. Sprey
S
y
racuse Univ.
f
r
o
m
L
e
a
r
n
e
d
Lesson
0930-f030
R
esearch CorP. ,
A- 64'
Mr. J. Rodens
"
R
e
d
W
SEG
Baronil
1030-1130 Project
The RAND Corp. ,
I I 30 - I ZI 5 Airc raft Vulnerability
Mr. R. Johnson
StudY
-
0800-0900
",, JftY#l
FoR
oFFrcrAL
/t6fftt#
tll}
FoRoFFr
crA
{N&U$Srtr
Meeting Schedules ( continued)
Date
Time
I7 Aug 1967
Subject
l2l5-I300
I300- I400
1 4 0 0 -I 5 0 0
"*-+f.tgt{ii6
Responsible
Lunch
VFAX/ FX Design Study
Re sults
VFAX/ FX Design Study
Results
l 5 0 0 -r 5 0 0 VFAX/ FX Design Study
Lockheed and
LTV
North American
Aviation,
Los
Angeles and
Columbus
Boeing
Results
r 5 0 0 - 1 ? 0 0 VI'AX/ FX Design Study
Results
I 7 0 0 - 1 8 0 0 VFAX/ FX Design Study
Re s ults
I 8 0 0 -I 8 3 0 Justification and Character
of the Fighter Airplane
18 Aug lt67
),
0 8 0 0 -0 9 0 0 Planning for next meeting
0 9 0 0 -r 0 0 0 F i g h t e r - P i l o t
Panel
Grumman
McDonnelI
Aerocouns el,
Mr. Myers
Navy
Air
and
Force
1 0 0 0 - I 0 3 0 Status Report on Project
trCombat Hassle"
1 0 3 0 - I l r 5 Electrooptical Systems
l l r 5 - r 2 0 0 El ectrooptical Systems
l z 0 0 - 1 2 4 5 Lunch
Lz45-1330 Electrooptical Systems
1 3 3 0 - 1 4 3 0 VFAX/ FX Avionics
I
-,,ttrr!::,LFlf
1 4 3 0 - 1 5 3 0 U. S. /F. R. G. V/STOL
I 5 3 0 - 1 5 0 0 One-Man vs. Two-Men
Air Force
Army
Navy
Air Force
Nary and
Air Force
Air Force
and Nawy
Air Force
Study
25-26 September 1967
25 Sept lt67
-
i
" '--t'
::+:.-:
j S.. ,
,
i
0800-1230
IZ30-I330
1330-1500
1500-I800
Review Draft Report
Lunch
Discussion with Dr. Laidlaw
RewiewDraft Report
{#WLA,,$$I,
l?
FOR OFFTCIAL USE ONLY
\${t'LhSrtr
Meeting
Date
26 Sept L967
,;rit1v-+:x*ffi
Time
0800-1200
tZ00-1300
1300-1400
1400-1530
1530- I800
ltil"o* oFFIctAL
usEoNLy
Schedules (continued)
Subj ect
Responsible
Review Draft Report
Lunch
Review Draft RePort
Discussion with Mr. Fowler,
Dr. Flax and Dr. Frosch
Review Draft RePort
24-25 October 1967
24 Oct 1967
25 Oct L967
Executive Session
Current/ Future Air -toGround WeaPons
1030-I200 Current/ Future Air-toGround WeaPons
1200-1300 Lunch
f 300- 1345 Current/ Future Navigation
Systerns
1345-I43O
Current / Future Navigation
Systems
Designation
Current/Future
1430-I515
Systems
Designation
1515-I500
Current/Future
Systerns
t 500- 1645 Current/ Future Aircraft
sensors
1645-1730 Executive Session
0800-0900
0900- f 030
Executive Session
Current/Future Aircraft
Sensors
09I5-1000
Current/ Future Displays
and ComPuters
Displays
1000-I045 Current/Future
and ComPuters
t045-1I30
VFAX Air-to-Ground
SYstems
tl30-I215
FX Air-to-Ground Systems
tZI5-I3I5
Lunch
I3I5-I345
Tactical Command and the
Hostile Environment
I 345 1600 Executive Session
Air
Force
NavY
Air
Force
NavY
Air
Force
NavY
0800-0830
0830-0915
'ii::"f:i FoR
rrlr&fr&d$$fiulm
oFFrcrAL
I"_
NavY
Air
Force
NavY
Air Force
Navy
Air
Force
NavY
tLtl
ceNFrDEqilsthhbrtr
Meeting Schedules ( continued)
?8-29 November L96Z
Date
,ra14e;p$+ii.{
28 Nov L967
Time
Subject
0 8 0 0- r 0 0 0 TAC Views on fX/AX/
U. S. .F. R. G. V/STOL
1 0 0 0 - 1 1 0 0 F'-IllA Mark I Results
t l 0 0 - t 2 t 5 Mark II Avionics
l z I 5 - t 3 1 5 Lunch
l 3 t 5 - I 4 3 0 AX Study Results
r 4 3 0 - r 5 1 5 U. S. -F. R. G. V/STOL
Phase I[ Results
29 Nov 1967
Responsible
TAC, Maj. Gen.
Graham
Air Force
Air Force
Air
Force
Air
Force
Air
Force
0 8 0 0 - 0 9 0 0 Executive
0 9 0 0 -r 0 3 0 Executive
Session
Session with
Mr. Fowler
I 0 3 0 - I 2 0 0 Executive Session
I 2 0 0 - I 3 0 0 Lunch
r 3 0 0 - I 6 0 0 Executive Session
5-6 January I968
5 Jan I958
,,r.r,'.,,,,t,L,
0 8 3 0 - I 1 0 0 Executive Session
1 1 0 0 - I 2 3 0 Research and Development
for Southeast Asia
I
I 2 3 0 - I 3 0 0 Lunch
I 3 0 0 -1 4 3 0 U s e o f D r o n e s
I 4 3 0 -I 5 3 0 D i s c u s s i o n o f S N O O p y
1 5 3 0 - 1 6 3 0 Executive Session
1630-1730 Defense of Europe
6 Jan 1968
0 8 3 0 -I 0 0 0
1000-1030
1030- I I30
Multisensor
Aircraft
Al1 Military
Services,
ODDR&E
N".y
oASD(sA)
All Military
Servic es,
ODDR&E
Executive Session
LIT program
Air
Force
UNtI/,$$,r$i[I?
E O N F "DI EN T I A [ "
\Ntlhfrtrttll
c c NF"rDENr rAr,
Meeting Schedules ( continued)
28-29 February
Date
Time
Subiect
Session to review
and revise report
I 2 3 0 - I 3 3 0 Lunch
1 3 3 0 - r 6 0 0 Executive Session to review
and revise report
28 Feb 1968
0 9 0 0 - r 2 3 0 Executive
29 Feb 1968
0 9 0 0 - I 2 3 0 Executive
rir48ry#Wi
Session to review
and revise report
r 2 3 0 - I 3 3 0 Lunch
I 3 3 0 - I 6 0 0 Executive Session to review
and revise report
I0 April
l0 Apr 1968
,*r*,**{,,
-:-:,f.
. .
: . .
I
L
f
. ; .
I968
I958
0 9 0 0 -1 2 3 0 Exec.utive Ses sion with
selected DSB members to
discuss Task Force rePort
I 2 3 0 - 1 4 0 0 Luncheon with mernbers of
ODDR&E staff
t 4 0 0 - t 6 0 0 Executive Session with
selected DSB members to
discuss Task Force report
coNFrDE*&{Vffi*
$$frr*t
Responsible
rnnu
eoNFrDENsbh
APPENDIX
xa;ng* *n*t
C'
t
DESGRIPTIVE SUPPLEMENT:
ILLUSTRATED
EXAMPLES
oF
usE oF
sysrElv{.s pRoposED
BY THE
DET'ENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK F1CRCE
ON
T.IGHTER AIRCRAFT
29 March 1958
:r^,,o"*rnit
f+
I'
Contributed by
Homer
*t-rk*
"'-'r'
.i:
&
Tasker
UNtLA,$$ffTf,?
eoNF'rDENr r^A
r"
coNFrDENN,hh:iiutLlI
CONTENTS
Page
Table I.
Guide to
Tactical
1"4{4*ggqdfft,
'Weapons
and System Elements
Parameters
of Examples
and the
54
Summary.
55
t.
Task Forcers observation of Head-coupled sights and
DispIays.
z.
T echnical Description
Weapon System
3.
Tactical Applications
'Weapon
System
3. I
3.2
3.3
3.4
of Head- Coupled Awionic s and
of Head-Coupled
Attack Designation of Visual Targets
Attack Designation of Radar Targets
Optically Augmented Visual Recognition
Attack Designation of Ground Targets for
Homing Weapon-e. g. , Walleye
"-.-t1
'
-
t.-
5l
64
64
66
4.
Navigation-Update
5.
Radar and TV Video Viewing
67
6.
Approach
67
Illustrated
,,
and
61
Designation
-,r,n,rr..,oa
[,.*
t
Avionics
and La.ndirg
Examples
Functions.
.
(Figures
I through l2)
67
68
ANUA
E O NF " [ D E N
TIA["
ssf{:ttrj
eo NFrEENr rAr,[Nlhfrntttl
Table I.
GUIDE TO WEAPONS AND SYSTEM ELEMENTS AND
THE TACTICAL PARAMETERS OT' EXAMPLES
System
Examole
Initial Target
Position Data*
Tactical
Environment
Fixed-gun
attack
Visual
Clos e -in ai r
combat
3
4
5
HCS
HCS
HCD
HCD
HCD
Guided-gun
attack
Visual
Close-in air
combat
6
7
HCS
HCD
HCD
Agile rnissile
attack
Visual
Vlsual
CIose-in air
combat
***
***
HCS
HCD
HCD
Radar target
attack designation
Radar
Long-range
air-to-air
guns'free
Optically
augmented
recognition
Radar
Fig.
No.
Applicable HeadCoupled Techniques**
F*llirl+?,{W
,,_...,
_*
Advanced
Radar/
homing air-to
Mi s sile
{, - g r o u n d
weapon T V
(..g., Walleye)
8
HCD
Long-range
air-to- air
not guns free
9
l0
II
HCD
HCD
HCD
Ground attack
T2
HCD
Notes:
*Visual:
Radar:
**HCS:
Aircraft position is seen visually, and target designation for
attack is effected visually, i. e., without reference to a radar
display.
Aircraft position is seen as a radar blip and target designation
for attack or recognition is effected by means of the radar
data, i. e., by reference to the radar display only.
Head-co upled sight, i. e.,
optt i c a l l y
projected
reticle
but no
C R T d i s PIay.
H C D : S a m e a s h e a d - c o u p l e d s i g h t p llus CRT display capability.
***Nfef ss p a r a t e l y i l l u s t r a t e d ;
a
. -=--='$:,
s i m i l a r ir:
n essence to Figures
6 and 7.
UWLA
rFJ6)J|NI
IF11
IDIEN T I A [.
$f,
i z . o -- - ,Y
d
C
r{,L
lHYiqi"u
uvr
tll!
noqNffilAli,blr
eo NF"
SUMN4ARY
than was
This appendix describes in somewhat greater-detail
systems,
as Profeasible in tJ:e main body of the repbrt the following
posed by the Task tr'orce:
i*i
*nffiftit
q
.
,
.
.
Guided gun and control sYstem
and launch sYstem
Agile missile
Optically augmented recognition system
Head-coupled sight and display system
The discussion deals with these systems in an integrated combin.tion cornprising the Task Force recommended head-coupled avionics
and weapon systern.
The wide range of applications envisioned by the Task Force for
of specific
Descriptions
these head-coupled techniques is discussed.
condensed
exarnples.
A
illustrated
of
form
in the
uses are primarily
parameters
guide to the weapons and system elernents and the tactical
of these examples aPPears in Table I.
i
,
a workable
we realize tJrat, in the process of implementing
.
is
e:cperience
more
as
be
modifi.ed
will
system, many of the details
exthe
aspects.
Nevertheless,
gained with the human-engineering
systems.
of
such
potential
the
given
witl
illustrate
amples
:+,;.*r.iir t."
I
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E O N F ' ID E N T [ ^ A [ ,
tll]
eo NF"rDEN[|H[hSitr
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Task
Forcers
Observation
of Head-Coupled
Sights and Displays
The Task Force was very favorably impressed by the progress
reported by the Army and others in the development of head-coupled
sights and displays and by the tactical advantages that appear to be
attainable by incorporating,such
techniques into a head-coupled avionics
and weapons system.
It seems clear that, with the head-coupled techniques, many
fleeting opportunities to acquire targets that would be lost if conventional head-in-cockpit
acquisition techniques were used could instead
become effective opportunities for gun or missile attack.
[t also seems
clear that head-coupled techniques would greatly reduce the pilotfs
work load.
Among the advantageous uses envisioned in air-to-air
and air-toground operations,
all in a head-up manner, would be the following:
.
Directing a video contrast tracker for automatic lock-onto
an aircraft seen visually by the pilot (whether or not seen
by the radar) for such functions as aiming a guided gun.
.
Directing the seeker of a short-range air-to-air
missile
(infrared or video contrast) for automatic lock-onto an
aircraft seen visually by the pilot whether or not seen by
the radar
.
Pointing
aircraft
radar.
*rit.,,af
*
the radar antenna for automatic lock-onto an
seen visually by the pilot but not yet seen by tJ:e
Viewing through high-magnification
forward-looking
( and
perhaps rearward-looking)
TV units to identify targets
visually.
Viewing air-intercept-radar'
video,
designation of a selected target.
video ground-mapping
Viewing
.
i
11'
l-,
t
",'
,-..-
. &..,
attack
presentations.
Viewing WaIIeye or other missile video presentations,
and directing the missile tracking gate for lock-onto a
selected tarset.
*Nr"
I"'IUULII
l.$$ffT4;#
eoNqF"rDENrrAr,
!
' .-=r.Lt
'
and making
l i
-
${$LhS
utll}e o NF'rDENr rAr.
identical to that of convenViewing in a manner virtually
tional head-up displays any of its usual presentations,
including gyro horizon, heading and other flight-control
data, during ground-controlled intercepts, air-to-air
gun or missile attacks, etc.
+.trt+tWtr
As the discussion proceeds, it should become apparent t.Lat headcoupled techniques offer very wide latitude to the system designer.
should
while not optimized,
embodiments illustrated,
The particular
both
techniques,
such
of
effectiveness
the
give a general indication of
reduced.
in tactical advantages gained and in reduced pilot work load
Z.
Technical
Descri
on of Head-Coupled
Avionics
a4q]ye
stem
avionics and weapon system" rneans the prowision
CRT display, plus devices to sense
helmet-mounted
of a lightweight,
Thus, the pilot's head movemerits are translated
helmet orientation.
into coupling signals suitable for radar antenna pointing, missile-seeker
positioning, etc.
aiming, designation-cursor
"Head-coupled
'''"*"r*f,'
These coupling signals may be applied to the helmet-mounted
presented by the CRT display may
CRT in such a way that information
pilotts head movements so as to
the
be positioned in accordance with
superimposed on his central field of vision as he looks
be realistically
in various directions through the combining glass and windshield'
Because of such coupling from head and helmet to avionics and back to
the helrnet-rnounted displaY, the latter is referred to as a head-coupled
display, or HCD, during most of this discussion'
To describe the operation of the proposed head-coupled display,
a comparison with the conventional head-up display (HUD) may be useFigures I and 2 illustrate the same presentation on a conventional
ful.
The
head-up display and. on the head-coupled display, respectively'I
data
ff
ight
basic
subject matter chosen for this comparison consists of
(i. u. , pitch, ro11, heading, speed and altitude) plus data-link command
intercept and computer-derived
higfrt data for a ground-controlled
Both HUD
rrsteering cursors" to facilitate flying the command data'
p
i
lot's fort
h
e
o
n
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
and HCD presentations are superimposed
but by
airframe
ward view, and both are held fixed with respect to the
quite different
techniques.
lA viewing distance of about 8 inches gives the proper
thes e illustrations.
-,-::.!.."
' l
!
E E NF I D E N
$$#gfft?
scale to
eoNF'rDEfltffihsrtrttll
r:*&gt*nW.f
The conventional head-up display (Figure IA) effects presentation
in the pilotrs forward line of sight by means of optical projection from
a very high-intensity
cathode-ray tube onto a combining glass.
This
latter is mounted just above the instrument panel in the pilotts central
field of vision as he looks directly forward through the windshield.
In
the F-llI
Mark II avionics, the combining glass is large enough to
subtend horizontal and vertical angles of approximately
I0 degrees at
the pilotrs viewing distance of approximately
26 inches, or roughly onehalf of that depicted in Figure IA.
For the most part, the display symbology of these and subsequent
illustrations
has been adapted from Autoneticsr report, One Man Crew
Effectiveness Study for F-X, Contract 833657 -68-C-0I6?.
The syrnnsidered representative
of fl.ight ciata displayed on a conventional head-up displayZ during a ground-controlled
intercept
The proposed head-coupled display, as illustrated in Figure
is capable of functioning in place of a conventional HUD presenting
,,,,-,,,,,.,
{-
- 'o'.i..u
"' '-l *
&,..-
2,
ZFor those unfamiliar
with this symbology,
Figure t B identifies
the principal elements.
The central W-shaped sfmbol is the aircraft
reference symbol.
It remains in a fixed position on the combining glass
independently of aircraft pitch or bank. The horizon bars, on the other
hand,'are alignedwith
the true horizon at all times and move relative
to the aircraft reference symbol to register pitch and bank. Thus, in
Figure IA the horizon bars indicate straight and Ievel flight, whereas
in Figure lB they indicate a moderate up-pitch and left-bank attitude.
Two computer-generated
steering cursor bars provide steering guidance for flying GCI flight commands received via data link.
At the
bottom of the display is an expanded heading scale. The present heading
(2I6 degrees) appears opposite a triangular heading reference symbol,
while command heading (209 degrees) is represented by a rectangular
rrbug'r positioned by the GCI data tink.
In like manner, calibrated airspeed and altitude data are presented on the scales at left and right.
The heading data require a left turn of ZL6-209 = 7 degrees from the
present heading. [n agreement, therewith, the vertical steering,cursor
bar in Figure IA calls for a left bank. similarly,
command. altitude
requires a climb of 800 feet and the horizontal steering cursor bar of
Figure IA corresponds by calling for a moderate up pitch.
[n Figure lB,
the aircraft now has approximately
the desired Ieft bank and up pitch.
when the resulting left turn and climb have brought the commandheading bug under the present-heading triangle and command-altitude
bug opposite the present-altitude triangle, the steering cursor bars will
be centered on t\q,aircraft
reference symbol.
{/lfiif;ll{.$$/f.6dt,3
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rDENr rAr,
t% oNFrDENr r"Ar,
l11\tlhsrtr
'irWif$iifi
In this case,
exactly the same flight data in exactly the same'position.
are
all of small
however, the combining glass, the optics and the GRT
The optics effecand are suPPorted by the helmet.
size and lightweight
far
field of vision
pilotts
in
ttre
of
the
screen
CRT
tively focus the view
as seen through the combining glass, and thus the flight data are suPerThe combining glass, being mounted at
imposed on his forward view.
an angle, may be made oval in shape so as to present to the pilotts eye
and the optics may be
a circular
aperture of the desired magnitude,
the CRT view-screen
closely
matches
designed so that this aperture
The large circle of Figure 2 represents an aperture on the order
area.
of.40 degrees.
The coupling signals corresponding to the pilotls head movements
of Figure 2, Iike that of Figure
are employed to make the presentation
I'stationaryrr
Therewith respect to the aircraft.
lA, appear fixed, or
circle
dashed
by
the
shown
as
that
such
movement
small
head
fore, a
in Figure Z makes no change in the Presentation.
,r,"r*,r.Uf
Assume now that the pilot turns his head still farther away--for
Part of the Preexample, to get a quick glance at another aircraft.
will reaPPear
view
but
his
from
disappear
will
momentarily
sentation
were a round
screen
when he looks back. It is as tJrough the CRT view
or
window through which the flight data are fully seen when centered,
farther
rnoves
window
as
tJ:e
partly
occluded
but are
nearly centered,
off center.
If we now imagine a small circle to be fixed in the center
and if, by head
of tl1e round window so as to move with the windo*',
movement, w€ superimpose the small circle on an aircraft as seen by
signals will provide
either eye (or both), the resulting helmet-coupling
a capability to initiate gun or close-in missile attacks on an aircraft
seen visually by the pilot, whether or not it is seen by the radar.
This concept, as implemented by the head-coupled avionics and
Several examples
weapon system, can have a great tactical advantage.
appendix.
this
In Figures 2
of its use are illustrated in section 3 of
through lZ, substitution of the HCD for the conventional HUD is assumed,
and the usuaL vertical situation display is shown uPPermost on the inActual flight experience with the HCD
strument panel in these figures.
situation display and
the vertical
whether
as
to
a
decision
allow
will
The HGD
certain other instrurnents might be replaced by the HCD.
itself is small enough that several can be carried for redundancy.
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3.
3. I
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Tactical
Attack
Applications
of Head-Goupled
Designation
of Visual
and Weapon System
Avionics
Targets
Situations of the type illustrated
in Figure 3 frequently
occur
during a dogfight type of air-to-air
combat, viz., wherein a hostile aircraft. is seen by the pilot, although it is not presently
seen by tJre radar.
Accurate aiming of an air-to-air
gun requires a director-type
solution
in which the computer inputs include very accurate range and angle
coordinates of the hostile aircraft.
While more accurate angle data
can be obtained by a video contrast tracker,
the range data mugt be
radar derived,
and radar angle data can be valuable for positioning
a
video contrast tracker prior to lock-on.
in existing tactical aircraft,
crucially
Unfortunately,
important
(on
time
tJre order of I0 to 20 seconds) can be lost by the head-in-cockpit
techniques of radar-antenna
scan switching and slewing to get a rrsearchrt
radar presentation
of the hostile target before attack designation can
be .made, acquisition
and tracking initiated,
and computing of the gunattack solution begun.
In fact, the hostile aircraft
may oflen be lost
in the process; tJre pilot may not be able to reacquire it visually,
and
thus the attack opportunity
may be lost.
In marked contrast, the pilot using the head-coupled display does
not lose tJre target aircraft because he keeps his eye glued on it; he
does not miss a maneuverr. because his head is out of the cockpit; and
he loses very little crucial time because his whole operation of attack
target designation and initiation
of automatic tracking (whether radar
or video contrast, or both) takes a second or two at most.
Exarnples
of HCD Attack
Case I-Designation
Designation
and. Computer
of Visual
Solution
for
Target
Fixed-Gun
Attack
(ri g u
just caught sight of the MIG at upper left in his peripheral vision field
but
he
the
the
the MIG.
Assume that
has not yet turned his head to look directly'at
panel because of
selects the gun attack mode on his weapons-control
evidently close range of the hostile aircraft.
The pilot then makes
attack target designation in two simple steps as follows:
l.
Looks Directly at the Hostile Aircraft.
Momentarily
The pilotrs gun mode selection has caused a dashed circle to
appear which remains centered in his head-coupled display regardless of head motion.
His natural head movement in looking
directlv
at the aircraft
enables him in a quick and almost effortless
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manner to superimpose the dashed circle on all or a portion of
the hostile aircraft,
as illustrated in Figure 4. The diameter
of the dashed circle corresponds to the acquisition area of the
video contrast or radar tracker,.as
the case may be. The
coupling signals from the pilotts helmet have slewed the radar
(and the video contrast tracker,
if provided) to the dashed-circle
position; hence, they are ready for automatic acquisition and
tracking as soon as step 2 has occurred.
Z. Presses the TRACK Rutton.
In response to this aciion
(which c"
the logic circuitry
initiates
automatic acquisition and tracking of the hostile aircraft.
Track
initiation
is confirmed to the pilot by a square designation symbol
surrounding
tl:e target, whictr.'rs also shown in Figure 4. Immediately thereafter,
the computer supplies a fixed-gun attack
solution in the head-coupled display.
The estimated time is:
Pilot
effort-less
Overall
,"",,,
*f"
than I second
time to appearance
of attack solution-l
to 3 seconds
A powerful new means of presenting a gun attack solution
vided by the head-coupled display.
Instead of having to glance
and forth between the synthetic target position on a conventional
(or VSD) and the real aircraft in space, the pilot can now keep
continuously
on the real aircraft
and the attack solution can be
conveniently to him.
is proback
HUD
his eye
brought
One form of such a presentation is illustrated in Figure 5. Radar
boresight has superimposed the synthetic target position (viz., the
small circle at the intersection of the two steering cursor bars) solidly
on the real aircraft as observed in space by the pilotrs eyes. The computer steering solution places the aircraft reference symbol in the
proper position relative to the steering cursor bars.
Thus, the correct
initial pilot response'in this Case I, as illustrated in tr'igure 5, is to
left bank and up pitch.
and Computer Solution for Guided-Gun
Case II-Designation
Attac
of
just
the fixed-gun attack solution (as
described in Case I), ,has a very
substantial remaining task -to maneuver his aircraft into the proper
position as directed by the displayed attack solution.
lead-firing
To
requires much maneuvering
achieve this firing pqligi_o5r typically
and
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rnany seconds at I000 pounds or more of fuel per minute.
Even with
pilot
firing
position
will
not
be
achieved
high
skills,
often
before
very
the guided gun, as
extraustion of the combat fuel reserve.
Therefore,
recommended by the Task Force, provides a major tactical advantage
operations as compared to fixed guns. In the particin air-superiority
ular combat situation of Case I, it would greatly reduce the excess fuel
consumed, the time elapsed and the test of pilot skills, as will be made
evident by this Case II example, which applies the guided gun to the
Case I situation.
The gun is assumed to be trainable through tZ degrees in azimuth
and from -2 degrees to +18 degrees in elevation.
The pilot effects
attack designation of the hostile aircraft exactly as in Case I. However,
the computer-generated
gun attack solution, as illustpated in Figute 6,
is much different.
Instead of the very small steering cursor circle of
Figure 5, there is now a large, rectangular allowable steering error
rrsymbol."
It is ohly necessary that ttre pilot bring the hostile aircraft, or its radar blip, within this rectangle.
The obvious maneuver
(shown also by the computer-generated
steering cursora in this figure)
is a bank to the left of about 45 degrees.
Completion of this maneuve!,
displayed to the pilot as in tr'igure 7, can bring the hostile aircraft
within the allowable-steering-error
symbol in an overall time of.2to 4
seconds.
The guided gun will fire automatically whenever it is on
target.
Case III-DesiiSnation
and Computer
Solution for Short-Range
Air-
to-eir
@
close-in
"dogfight"
compared to fixed guns, should be attained in
IR missiles as a result of planned improvement
Programs.
Whereas, Air Force launchings of Sidewinder in Southeast Asia
have required boresight steering of the aircraft almost as rigorous as
that for fixed guns, the future conligurations of short-range air-to-air
missiles will permit seeker lock-on at gimbal angles as high as 50
degrees off boresight.
The launching system must be capable of providing target-angle
signals to align the seeker.
If obtained from the radar with present
t
h
e
s
a
m
e
display techniques,
crucial time loss of l0 to 20 seconds of
head-in-cockpit
techniques is imposed upon the pilot.
The head-coupled
display employed as in Cases I and II, removes this limitation by quick
pointing of the radar.
It can go further and provide missile-seeker
example,
alignment on the target aircraft without use of the radar-for
sector
space.
while maintaining radar surveillance of another
of
For
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this purpose, the pilot's procedure would be unchanged, but t.Le helmetalignment
coupled signals would be applied directly for missile-seeker
of the radar.
without intervention
r'+!*r+tigtjiil
attack solution for these missiles will
The cornputer-generated
symbol than that of
include an even larger allowable-steering-error
6
and
7).
(shown
in
gun
Figures
the guided
3.2
Attack
Designation of Radar Targets
(Figure
8)
whose radar replies have sufficient amplitude may be
An aircraft
automatically
detected by the computer, be interrogated for IFF response, and, if selected criteria are met, can be called to the pilotrs
attention by an audible alert, t1ryically while still beyond visual range.
Its radar reply, or blip, may appear on the head-coupled display as
either synthetic or standardized radar video.
Assume that the solid dot at far right in Figure 8 is such a target,
determined to be hostile for lack of IFF response in a gunsfree environment.
The pilot may quickly make attack designation of this target
except
using the same procedure as in Case I, [I or III, respectively,
that now his head movement will superirnpose the dashed circle on the
radar blip of the hostile aircraft as seen in the HCD rather than on the
aircraft itself as seen visually in space in the previous examples.
I
rrliirr{iie F
I
In case the detected aircraft coordinates are beyond the angular
coverage of the HCD when the computer gives the audible alert, it can
provide a special symbol, such as the open circle and arrow seen near
the solid dot in Figure 8. This informs the pilot that' uPon swinging
his head to the right, the target in question will come into view.
3:3
Optically
Augmented
Visual
Recognition
gap
The Task Force has observed that a crucial identification
n
o
t exist.
d
o
e
s
a
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
w
h
e
n
g
u
n
s
f
r
e
e
operations
exists in air-to-air
Despite the values of existing IFF and the long-range detection capability
radars, hostiles cannot be distinguished from
of airborne-intercept
rtnonfriends"
range.
until they come within visual identification
other
of a hostile
of the unaided eye, visual identification
Due to limitations
advantage
of
that
potential
the
ranges
will usually occur at such short
missile attack is lost and the friendly aircraft is
Iong-range air-to-air
Therefore, the Task
seriously disadvantaged in the ensuing combat.
Force recommends incorporation of a system for visual recognition
that will increase the range of visual identification to 5 or l0 times
I
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beyond that of the unaided eye. One possible implementation
of such a
system rnight be based on ATARS.
The systern would then comprise:
.
.
r'ffittdd-rif
.
TV camera, plus gimbaled high-magnification
optics,
video contrast-tracking
circuitry
for on--target stability,
and
pilotts TV display.
'Whereas
the small field of view of the ATARS precludes its use
for general search and target acquisition,
the intercept radar readily
supplies the defici€nclr
and the head-mounted display readily provides
the pilotts TV display, plus coupling interface,
as may be seen in the
following illustrated
example:
Example of Augrnented Visual ldentification (Figures 9, 10, Il):
Assume that the radar blip shown high and to the right in Figure 9 is a
new nonfriend target that has been detected just as in the preceding
example, except that a gunsfree environment does not'exist.
Visual
identification
is then necessary to classify the target as neutral or
hostile.
Frequently the range of tJle target when first detected by radar
will be too great for unaided-eye identification,
or even detection.
In
all such cases, the pilot can activate the ATARS in two simple steps as
follows:
t
I
::X\iir:,11!;{ Fr.r!
I
l.
Momentarily
Looks Directly at One of the Targets.
As
radar
target,
in the attack designation of a
the pilotts natural
head movement in looking directly at the selected target enables
him quickly and easily to superimpose the dashed circle on all
or part of that target, as illustrated in Figure 10. As before, ttre
coupling signals from the pilotrs helmet concurrently
slew the
radar antenna boresight with the dashed circle in readiness for
automatic acquisition and tracking per step 2.
2. Presses the TRACK Button. In response to this action
(which "att
the logic circuitry
activates
automatic acquisition and tracking of the selected radar target.
As in prewious examples, track initiation is confirmed to the
pilot by the solid square surrounding the target, as shown in
Figur e I 0.
In this case, however, the logic circuitry
activates a videocontrast search-and-track
feature of the ATARS to scan the srnall
area representing radar coordinates uncertainty.
As soon as
Iock-on has occurred, the pilotrs display will automatically
switch
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To'prevent deterioration
to the ATARS video presentation.3
srnall
a
glass,
by light coming through the cornbining
irrr" "r;*
positioned'
shutter is autornatically
The estimated time is:
Pilot
effort-less
than I
.second
overalltimetoappearanceofATARSpicture-lto4
for the
seconds. (This assumes adequate slew rates
ATARS gimbats' )
by an example
is illustrated
The resulting ATARS presentation
approxiillustrates
which
in Figure lI showing a MIG at5.5 miles,
of the
12
lines
as few as
mately the quality oI image obtainable from
can be effected at
ny tiris means, visual identification
TV raster.
rangesuptol0timestheunaidedeye'srange.Meanwhiletheradar
since the video concan return to its previous search-scan condition'
of the ATARS will hold the TV camera optics
trast tracking circuitry
on target until released by the pilot'
Thehead.coupleddisplaycanfunctioninlikemannerwiththe
recomrnendedtail.warningradar,andarearward-lookingATARS.A
the amount of zoom
zoorrr feature should be evaluated for ATARS'
when available'
possibly being controlled by radar range'
I
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3.4
Attack Designation-9f
@e(rigutt12)
Gr.oirld Taf ggts for Advanced
Homing
Whereasalloftheradarpresentationsdiscussedaboveare
prod'ucedbyTVrastersobtainedfromscanconverters(suchasthose
Mark II avionics system), the target.viewing
employed in the F-r1l
signalsoftheWalleyemissile(likethoseofATARS)arealreadyinTV
rasterform.Hence,theymaybeapplieddirectlytothehead.couPl.qIn t}ris case, as with ATARS, a small
display without scan conversion.
by light
positioned to preclude interference
shutter is automatically
coming through the combining glass'
for rnissiles
of
As illustrated in Figure 12, target designation
gate symbol on the selected ' this type consists of placing a tracking
the symbol consists of
Essentially'
target as seen in the TV pi-ture.
with extensions of ttre
a square tracking gate, or designation cursor'
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sides of the square to aid the pilot in following its motion.
when the
pilot turns the selector switch to display Walleye-missile
vid.eo in the
HCD, the logic circuitry
will cause this cursor to follow ttre pilotrs
head motion as he views the picture and then looks directly ai a selected
target point.
when he has thus positioned the designation cursor, he
presses the TRACK button.
This activates the rrvalleye tracking
circuitry.
He may continue to monitor its operation by viewing the
Walleye TV presentation.
4.
Navigation-Update
Designation
Functions
In making a navigation update, the pilot must designate the coordinates of a checkpoint to the computer.
The rtslew stickrr or t'designation stick" function of positioning cursors on the checkpoint
in the
navigation display can be performed even more effectively by the
headcoupled display.
The techniques are essentially the same as those
described in connection with Figures 8, l0 and Iz.
The general
applicability
of these techniques is evident.
5.
i
I
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I
Radar and TV Video Viewing
ln connection with viewing ATARS and walleye presentations,
it
was noted that a small shutter could be automatically positioned to preclude interference
by light coming through the combining glass.
Alternately, the shutter could be push-button controlled by th1 puot.
W'hether activated automatically
or manually, it should also be beneficial during daylight operations when making attack-target
designation
in a vertical situation radar presentation such as Figure g, when
viewing ground map video and in 1ike applications.
6.
Approach
and Landing
There is evidence of much current interest in a head-up presen_
tation of flight data during approach and landing.
For this application
the head-coupled display is well suited.
on the other hand,, for
approaches during semidark conditions, it may be desirable not only
to turn off the flight-data presentation but even to remove the combining glass of the HcD, being much smaller than that of the conventional HUD, can easily be tilted out of the way und.er push-button control.
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