Certification Report: 0628a_pdf

Certification Report: 0628a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
for
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX680PE / M1534-a14,
SLE66CX360PE / M1536-a14,
SLE66CX182PE / M1564-a14,
SLE66CX480PE / M1565-a14
and SLE66CX482PE / M1577-a14
all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1,
SHA-2 V1.0 and each with specific IC dedicated
software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX680PE / M1534a14, SLE66CX360PE / M1536-a14, SLE66CX182PE / M1564-a14,
SLE66CX480PE / M1565-a14 and SLE66CX482PE / M1577-a14 all with
optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1, SHA-2 V1.0 and each with
specific IC dedicated software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
PP Conformance:
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
July 2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body
for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 3 December 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................16
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................16
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................17
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................17
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................19
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................20
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................20
11 Security Target............................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................20
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................22
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................24
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................27
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Certification Report
A Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
●
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report
2.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, and AVA_VLA.4 that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX680PE / M1534-a14,
SLE66CX360PE / M1536-a14, SLE66CX182PE / M1564-a14, SLE66CX480PE / M1565a14 and SLE66CX482PE / M1577-a14 all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1, SHA2 V1.0 and each with specific IC dedicated software has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0437-2008. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0437-2008 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX680PE / M1534-a14, SLE66CX360PE / M1536-a14, SLE66CX182PE / M1564a14, SLE66CX480PE / M1565-a14 and SLE66CX482PE / M1577-a14 all with optional
libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1, SHA-2 V1.0 and each with specific IC dedicated software
was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 27
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Certification Report
November 2009. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)6
recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Infineon Technologies AG
The product was developed by: Infineon Technologies AG
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a reassessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX680PE / M1534-a14,
SLE66CX360PE / M1536-a14, SLE66CX182PE / M1564-a14, SLE66CX480PE / M1565a14 and SLE66CX482PE / M1577-a14 all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1, SHA2 V1.0 and each with specific IC dedicated software has been included in the BSI list of
the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
https://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
7
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1 - 12
85579 Neubiberg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX680PE / M1534-a14, SLE66CX360PE / M1536-a14, SLE66CX182PE / M1564a14, SLE66CX480PE / M1565-a14 and SLE66CX482PE / M1577-a14 all with optional
libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1, SHA-2 V1.0 and each with specific IC dedicated software .
Compared to the successfully certified forerunner procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0437-2008 this
TOE comprises the same hardware design as no changes have been introduced. This
recertification is processed due to new RSA, EC and SHA-2 libraries.
The ICs consist of a dedicated non standard microprocessor (CPU) with a MMU (Memory
Management Unit), several different memories, security logic, a timer, an interruptcontrolled I/O interface, an AIS31 compatible RNG (Random Number Generator), and a
checksum module (CRC module) and further components are integrated on the chip, too.
For fast asymmetric cryptographic calculation performance the TOE has the Advanced
Cryptographic Engine (ACE) component implemented. The block diagram of the TOE is
shown in [6], Figure 1.
This TOE is intended to be used in smart cards particularly for security relevant
applications, including high speed security authentication, data encryption or electronic
signature. The TOE offers a new, improved standard of integrated security features,
thereby meeting the requirements of all smart card applications with contact-based
interface such as information integrity, access control, mobile telephone, as well as uses in
electronic funds transfer and healthcare systems. Several security features independently
implemented in hardware or controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper
operations and integrity and confidentiality of stored data.
The TOE consists of the hardware part as described in [6] chapter 2.2.1, the firmware
parts and the software parts as listed in [6] Table 3: Firmware and Library Versions. The
RSA, EC, SHA-2 cryptographic and the RMS libraries provide functionality via an API to
the Smartcard Embedded Software. The STS firmware for test purposes has an API to the
Smartcard Embedded Software as well. The STS is implemented in a separated Test-ROM
being part of the TOE. The Smartcard Embedded Software is not part of the TOE.
The user has the possibility to tailor the software part of the TOE during the manufacturing
process. Thus the TOE can be delivered including - in free combinations - or not including
any of the functionality of the EC crypto library, the RSA crypto library and the SHA-2
crypto library. If the user decides not to use one or all of the crypto library(s) the specific
library(s) is (are) not delivered to the user and the accompanying “Additional Specific
Security Functionality” Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and/ or EC and/or SHA-2 is/are not
provided by the TOE. Deselecting one of the libraries does not include the code
implementing functionality, which the user decided not to use. Not including the code of the
deselected functionality has no impact of any other security policy of the TOE; it is exactly
equivalent to the situation where the user decides just not to use the functionality. The
RSA, EC and SHA-2 libraries can be implemented together with the Smartcard Embedded
Software in the User-ROM mask. All other Smartcard Embedded Software does not
belong to the TOE and is not subject of the evaluation. The well known Advanced Crypto
Engine (ACE) (Advanced Crypto Engine) for calculation of asymmetric algorithms like RSA
and elliptic curve (EC) and the Cryptographic Unit (DDES) for Dual Key DES calculations.
These modules are especially designed for Chipcard applications with respect to the
security and power consumption. The DDES module computes the complete DES
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Certification Report
algorithm within a few clock cycles and is especially designed to counter attacks like DPA
or EMA.
The TOE includes also functionality to calculate single DES operations, but part of the
evaluation is the triple-DES operation only. For more details and used key lengths please
refer to [6], chapter 2.2.2.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are all selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and
some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Enforcing Function
Addressed issue
SEF1
Operating state checking
SEF2
Phase management with test mode lock-out
SEF3
Protection against snooping
SEF4
Data encryption and data disguising
SEF5
Random number generation
SEF6
TSF self test
SEF7
Notification of physical attack
SEF8
Memory Management Unit (MMU)
SEF9
Cryptographic support
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 6 is confirmed. The rating of the Strength of
Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption
(see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
●
SLE66CX680PE/m1534-a14 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2 (produced
in Dresden),
●
SLE66CX360PE/m1536-a14 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2 (produced in
Dresden),
●
SLE66CX480PE/m1565-a14 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2 (produced in
Dresden),
●
SLE66CX482PE/m1577-a14 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2 (produced in
Dresden),
●
SLE66CX182PE/m1564-a14 with/or without RSA and/or EC and/or SHA-2 (produced in
Dresden).
For more details please refer to chapter 8.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX680PE / M1534-a14,
SLE66CX360PE / M1536-a14, SLE66CX182PE / M1564-a14, SLE66CX480PE / M1565a14 and SLE66CX482PE / M1577-a14 all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1,
SHA-2 V1.0 and each with specific IC dedicated software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No
1a
Type
Identifier
HW SLE66CX680PE Smart Card IC
1b
HW SLE66CX360PE Smart Card IC
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Release
GDS-file-ID:
m1534-a14 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
m1536-a14 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
Form of delivery
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Certification Report
No
1c
Type
Identifier
HW SLE66CX480PE Smart Card IC
1d
HW SLE66CX482PE Smart Card IC
1e
HW SLE66CX182PE Smart Card IC
Form of delivery
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
Wafer or packaged
module
2
FW
3
FW
4
SW
RSA library (optional)
V1.6
5
SW
EC library (optional)
V1.1
6
SW
SHA-2 library (optional)
V1.0
7
DOC
05.07
8
DOC
Data Book – SLE66CxxxPE /MicroSlim
Security Controller Family
Errata Sheet - SLE66CxxxPE Controllers Product and Boundout
Security Programmers’ Manual SLE66C(L)xxxP(E) Controllers
Security & Chip Card ICs – SLE 66CxxxPE –
Instruction Set
Chip Card & Security ICs - SLE66CxxxP –
Instruction Set and Special Function Registers
– Quick Reference
RSA 2048 bit Support SLE66C(L)XxxxPE RSA
Interface Specification for library V1.6
(optional)
RSA 2048 bit Support SLE66C(L)XxxxPE –
Arithmetic Library for V1.6 (optional)
Elliptic Curve GF(P) Support
SLE66C(L)XxxxPE Interface Specification
ECC-Library V 1.1
Application Notes [11]...[21]
Stored in Test ROM
on the IC
Stored in reserved
area of User ROM on
the IC
Source code in
electronic form
Source code in
electronic form
Source code in
electronic form
Hardcopy and pdf-file
2009-07-15
Hardcopy and pdf-file
2009-03-27
Hardcopy and pdf-file
07.2004
Hardcopy and pdf-file
05.2004
Hardcopy and pdf-file
12.2009
Hardcopy and pdf-file
09.2008
Hardcopy and pdf-file
2009-12
Hardcopy and pdf-file
see list in section 13
Hardcopy and pdf-file
9
DOC
10
DOC
11
DOC
12
DOC
13
DOC
14
DOC
15
DOC
STS Self Test Software (the IC Dedicated Test
Software)
RMS Resource Management System (the IC
Dedicated Support Software)
Release
GDS-file-ID:
m1565-a14 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
m1577-a14 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
GDS-file-ID:
m1564-a14 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
V55.0B.07
2.5
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by SLE66CX680PE/m1534-a14,
SLE66CX360PE/m1536-a14, SLE66CX480PE/m1565-a14, SLE66CX482PE/m1577-a14,
or SLE66CX182PE/m1564-a14. Another characteristic of the TOE is a serial number (chip
identification number). This serial number is chip specific as the chip type, lot number,
wafer, chip coordinates on the wafer, production date, production site (e.g. upper nibble of
(08000AH) “2” stands for Infineon’s IC fabrication in Dresden/Germany) and design step
(e.g. “0E” at address (080009H) stands for design step “14”) are part of the number. The
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serial number, which is accessible in the chip identification mode, is linked to the version
number. For the format of the serial number see [22, 7.3.5] and [23, 6.7].
Type
Name
Version number
Chip type
Target of
Evaluation
SLE66CX680PE
m1534-a14
91
SLE66CX360PE
m1536-a14
93
SLE66CX480PE
m1565-a14
AE
SLE66CX482PE
m1577-a14
AD
SLE66CX182PE
m1564-a14
A1
Hardware
Dresden
a14
Firmware
RMS library
2.5
STS
55.0B.07
RSA library (optional)
V1.6
EC library (optional)
V1.1
SHA-2 library (optional)
V1.0
Software
The RSA library, the EC library and the SHA-2 library, as separate software parts of the
TOE, as well as RMS and STS, as firmware parts of the TOE, are identified by their unique
version numbers.
The TOE can be delivered with or without the RSA library and / or the EC library and / or
the SHA-2 library.
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues:
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the
smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall
smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement an algorithm to ensure the
confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication
protocols and it will provide a random number generator.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to
provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of
cryptographic keys during Triple-DES cryptographic functions performed by the TOE),
against physical probing, against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against
abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of
data stored in the memory of the TOE and maintain the integrity, the correct operation and
the confidentiality of Security Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats and
organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance: Usage of Hardware Platform, Treatment of User Data, Protection during TOE
Development and Production, Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
5
Certification Report
Architectural Information
The TOEs are integrated circuits (IC) providing a platform to a smart card operating
system and smart card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of
subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target [6], chapter
2.1. The complete hardware description and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to
be found in the Data Book [22] and other guidance documents delivered to the customer,
see table 2.
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the central processing unit
(CPU) with memory management unit (MMU), RAM, ROM, EEPROM, security logic,
interrupt module, bus system, Random Number Generator (RNG) and the RSA, EC, and
SHA-2 for cryptographic operations of the chip are used. Security measures for physical
protection are realised within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip memories
provide the interface to the software using the Security Functions of the TOE.
The TOE IC Dedicated Test Software (STS), stored on the chip, is used for testing
purposes during production only and is completely separated from the use of the
embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
The TOE IC Dedicated Support Software (RMS), stored on the chip, is used for EEPROM
programming and Security Function testing. It is stored by the TOE manufacturer in a
reserved area of the normal user ROM and can be used by the users embedded software.
The cryptographic libraries RSA, EC and SHA-2 are delivery options. Therefore the TOE
may come with free combinations of or without these libraries. In the case of coming
without one or any combination of these libraries the TOE does not provide the Additional
Specific Security Functionality Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Cryptography (RSA) and/or Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (EC) and/or SHA-2.
The TOE includes also functionality to calculate single DES operations, but part of the
evaluation is the Triple-DES operation only.
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
●
Simulation tests: These tests are performed before starting the production to develop
the technology for the production and to define the process parameters.
●
Qualification tests: These tests are performed after the first production of chips. The
tests are performed in test mode. With these tests the influence of temperature,
frequency, and voltage on the security functions are tested in detail.
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●
Verification tests: These tests are performed in normal mode and check the
functionality in the end user environment. The results of the qualification and
verification tests are the basis on which it is decided, whether the TOE is released to
production.
●
Security evaluation tests: These tests are performed in normal mode and check the
security mechanisms aiming on the security functionality and the effectiveness of the
mechanisms. The random numbers are tested as required by AIS 31 and fulfill the
criteria.
●
Production tests: These tests are performed at each TOE before delivery. The aim of
the production tests is to check whether each chip is functioning correctly.
●
Penetration Tests: Penetration Tests are performed to find security flaws in the product.
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms as identified
in the functional specification, the high level design and the low level design. Chips from
the production site Dresden (see part D, annex A of this report) were used for tests.
The evaluators testing effort can be summarised into the following classes of tests: Module
tests, Simulation tests, Emulation tests, Tests in user mode, Tests in test mode and
Hardware tests. The evaluators performed independent tests to supplement, augment and
to verify the tests performed by the developer by sampling. Besides repeating exactly the
developers tests, test parameters were varied and additional analysis was done. With
these kind of tests performed in the developer’s testing environment the entire security
functionality of the TOE was verified. Overall the evaluators have tested the TSF
systematically against the functional specification, the high-level design and the low-level
design.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the current version of the TOE with production line
indicator “2” for Dresden (Germany) provides the Security Functions as specified.
For this re-evaluation the evaluators re-assessed the penetration testing and confirmed the
results from the previous certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0437-2008 where they took
all Security Functions into consideration. Intensive penetration testing was performed at
that time to consider the physical tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated
equipment and expertised know-how. Specific additional penetration attacks were
performed in the course of this evaluation.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The SLE66CX680PE, the SLE66CX360PE, the SLE66CX480PE, the SLE66CX482PE,
and the SLE66CX182PE are identically from the hardware perspective. The difference is
that in the SLE66CX360PE, the SLE66CX480PE, the SLE66CX482PE, and the
SLE66CX182PE the memory is blocked to smaller size. All types can be distinguished by
a different chip identification The difference in the memory size does not influence the
security of the TOE as neither an asset nor a security enforcing function is affected.
Therefore the products are certified together.
This certification covers the above mentioned configurations (see chapter 1) with the
specific IC Dedicated Software and with production line indicator “2” for Dresden
(Germany). After delivery the TOE only features one fixed configuration (user mode),
which cannot be altered by the user. The TOE was tested in this configuration. All the
evaluation and certification results therefore are only effective for this version of the TOE.
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For all evaluation activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results
are valid for the user mode, too.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
●
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
●
The Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
●
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31) were used.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the class ASE
●
All components of the EAL 5 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
●
The components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a reevaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0437-2005, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July
2001, Eurosmart, BSI-PP-0002-2001 [10]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
●
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
●
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: high
SEF2 – Phase management with test mode lock-out,
SEF3 – Protection against snooping,
SEF4 – Data encryption and data disguising,
SEF5 – Random number generation
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In order to assess the strength of function the scheme interpretations AIS 25, 26 and AIS
31 (see [4]) were used.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptographic algorithms are used by the TOE to enforce its security policy:
●
hash functions: SHA-2
●
algorithms for the encryption and decryption: RSA, EC, Triple-DES
This holds for the following security enforcing functions: SEF9
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). But Cryptographic functions with a security level
of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks with high attack
potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these functions it shall
be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the intended system.
Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).
The cryptographic functions 2-key Triple DES (2TDES), RSA 1024, provided by the TOE
achieve a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in Table 2, deliverables of the TOE, contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered. In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
All security hints described in the user guidance documentation [22], [27], [28], [29], [24]
and the delivered application notes [11]...[21] have to be considered. For secure usage of
the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target
[ST] and especially the recommendations of the Security Programmers Manual [27] have
to be taken into account.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
ACE
Advanced Crypto Engine
API
Application Programming Interface
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
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BSIG
BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CRC
Cyclic Redundancy Check
CPU
Central Processing Unit
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DDC
DES accelerator
DPA
Differential Power Analysis
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB
Electronic Code Book
EC
Elliptic Curve Cryptography
ECDH
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
ECDSA
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA
Electro Magnetic Analysis
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MED
Memory Encryption and Decryption unit
MMU
Memory Management Unit
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
Rivest, Shamir, Adleman – a public key encryption algorithm
RMS
Resource Management System
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SEF
Security Enforcing Function
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
ST
Security Target
21 / 40
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SOF
Strength of Function
SPA
Simple power analysis
ST
Security Target
STS
Self Test Software
SW
Software
TOE
Target of Evaluation
BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
UCP
Unified Channel Programming
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
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SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target, SLE66CX680PE/m1534-a14, SLE66CX360PE/m1536-a14,
SLE66CX480PE/m1565-a14, SLE66CX482PE/m1577-a14,
SLE66CX182PE/m1564-a14 all with optional libraries RSA V1.6 and EC V1.1 and
SHA-2 V1.0 Version 1.1 from 2009-11-10, Infineon Technologies AG (Public
document)
[7]
Evaluation Technical Report – Summary (ETR summary ), BSI-DSZ-CC-0628,
SLE66CX680PE/m1534-a14, SLE66CX360PE/m1536-a14,
SLE66CX480PE/m1565-a14, SLE66CX482PE/m1577-a14,
SLE66CX182PE/m1564-a14 all with optional libraries RSA V1.6 and EC V1.1 and
SHA-2 V1.0, Version 1.0 from 2009-11-13, Evaluation Body for IT Security of TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8]
Configuration Management Scope (ACM_SCP), SLE66CX680PE/m1534-a14,
SLE66CX360PE/m1536-a14, SLE66CX480PE/m1565-a14,
SLE66CX482PE/m1577-a14, SLE66CX182PE/m1564-a14 all with optional libraries
RSA V1.6 and EC V1.1 and SHA-2 V1.0, Version 1.1 from 2009-11-10, Infineon
Technologies AG (confidential document)
8
specifically
24 / 40
•
AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 6, 7 May 2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 September 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
•
AIS 34, Version 2, 24 October 2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document
and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Certification Report
[9]
Smart card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration
ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs, Hitachi Ltd., Infineon
Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[10]
ETR for composition according to AIS 36 for the Product SLE66CX680PE/m1534a14, SLE66CX360PE/m1536-a14, SLE66CX480PE/m1565-a14, SLE66CX482PE/
m1577-a14, SLE66CX182PE/m1564-a14 all with optional libraries RSA V1.6 and
EC V1.1 and SHA-2 V1.0, Version 1.0 from 2009-11-13, Evaluation Body for IT
Security of TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[11]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, DDES - EC2 Accelerator including complementary
Application Note SLE 66CxxxPE DDES Accelerator, 04.02/07.05, 2004-02/2005-07
[12]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, Using MicroSlim NVM (cLib), confidential, 05.05,
2005-05
[13]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Memory Encryption Decryption confidential,
11.04, 2004-11
[14]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, MMU-Memory Management Unit (PDF+SW)
confidential, 12.04, 2004-12
[15]
SLE66C(L)xxxPE - Optimized Usage of Data NVM Above 64k, 08.05, 2005-08
[16]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Testing the RNG, confidential, 11.04, 2004-11
[17]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Using RNG a.t. FIPS140 (PDF+SW),
confidential, 02.04, 2004-02
[18]
SLE66C(L)xxxPE Family - Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-2 (SHA 256/224, SHA
512/384) Library Version V1.0, 04.2009, 2009-04
[19]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, Using the active shield, confidential, 12.04, 200412
[20]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE - UART basic (PDF), 02.07, 2007-02
[21]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE - Static UART (PDF), 01.07, 2007-01
[22]
Data Book – SLE66CxxxPE /MicroSlim Security Controller Family incl. the errata
sheet [23], 05.07, 2005-07-01
[23]
Errata Sheet - SLE66CxxxPE Controllers - Product and Boundout, 2009-07-15,
2009-07-15
[24]
Elliptic Curve GF(P) Support SLE66C(L)XxxxPE Interface Specification ECCLibrary V 1.1, 12.2009, 2009-12
[25]
Security & Chip Card ICs – SLE 66CxxxPE – Instruction Set, 07.04, 2004-07
[26]
Chip Card & Security ICs - SLE66CxxxP – Instruction Set and Special Function
Registers – Quick Reference, 05-2004, 2004-05
[27]
Security Programmers’ Manual - SLE66C(L)xxxP(E) Controllers, 2009.03, 2009-0327
[28]
RSA 2048 bit Support SLE66C(L)XxxxPE Arithmetic Library for V1.6, 09.2008,
2008-09
[29]
RSA 2048 bit Support SLE66C(L)XxxxPE RSA Interface Specification for library
V1.6, 12.2009, 2009-12
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
–
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
–
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
–
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
–
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
–
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
–
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
–
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation
Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
ADV: Development
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Certification Report
Assurance
Family
Assurance
Components
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Configuration
management
EAL2
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
ACM_AUT
ACM_CAP
1
2
ACM_SCP
Delivery
operation
and ADO_DEL
Development
EAL3
ADO_IGS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADV_FSP
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
1
1
1
ADV_SPM
Guidance
documents
Life
support
AGD_ADM
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_USR
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
ALC_LCD
1
2
2
3
ALC_TAT
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
cycle ALC_DVS
Tests
ALC_FLR
ATE_COV
1
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
Vulnerability
assessment
1
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
1
2
2
3
3
AVA_SOF
1
1
1
1
1
1
AVA_VLA
1
1
2
3
4
4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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Certification Report
D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX680PE / M1534-a14,
SLE66CX360PE / M1536-a14, SLE66CX182PE / M1564-a14, SLE66CX480PE / M1565a14 and SLE66CX482PE / M1577-a14 all with optional libraries RSA V1.6, EC V1.1, SHA2 V1.0 and each with specific IC dedicated software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 3 December 2009, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
Security Assurance Requirements
●
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
●
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
●
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site
Address
Function
Altis-Toppan
Toppan Photomask, Inc.
European Technology Center
Boulevard John Kennedy 224
91105 Corbeil Essonnes
France
Mask Center
Amkor
Amkor Technology Philippines
Km. 22 East Service Rd.
South Superhighway
Muntinlupa City 1702
Philipines
Module Mounting
Amkor Technology Philippines
119 North Science Avenue
Laguna Technopark, Binan
Laguna 4024
Philipines
Augsburg
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Infineon Technologies AG
Alter Postweg 101
86159 Augsburg
Germany
Development
Certification Report
Site
BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Address
Function
Bangalore
Infineon Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.
13th Floor, Discoverer Building
International Technology Park
Whitefield Road
Bangalore, India - 560066
Software development and testing
Bukarest
Infineon Technologies Romania
Blvd. Dimitrie Pompeiu Nr. 6
Sector 2
020335 Bucharest,
Romania
Development
Dresden
Infineon Technologies Dresden GmbH & Co. OHG
Königsbrücker Str. 180
01099 Dresden
Germany
Production
Dresden-Toppan
Toppan Photomask, Inc
Rähnitzer Allee 9
01109 Dresden
Germany
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Development Center Graz
Babenbergerstr. 10
8020 Graz
Austria
Mask Center
Graz / Villach /
Klagenfurt
Development
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Siemensstr. 2
9500 Villach
Austria
Großostheim
Hayward
Lustenau
Munich
Infineon Technologies Austria AG
Lakeside B05
9020 Klagenfurt
Austria
Infineon Technology AG
DCE
Kühne & Nagel
Stockstädter Strasse 10 - Building 8A
63762 Großostheim
Germany
Kuehne & Nagel
30805 Santana Street
Hayward, CA 94544
U.S.A.
New Logic Technologies AG
- A Wipro Company,
Millenium Park 6,
6890 Lustenau,
Austria
Distribution Center
Infineon Technologies AG
Am Campeon 1-12
85579 Neubiberg
Development
Infineon Technologies AG
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6
81739 München (Perlach)
Germany
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Distribution Center
Development
BSI-DSZ-CC-0628-2009
Site
Address
Infineon Technologies AG
Regensburg-West
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Smartrac Technology GmbH,
Wernerwerkstraße 2
93049 Regensburg
Germany
Singapore
Exel Singapore Pte Ltd
DHL Exel Supply Chian
81, ALPS Avenue
Singapore 498803
Certification Report
Function
Module Mounting
Inlay antenna mounting
Distribution Center
Distribution Center
Singapore Kallang Infineon Technologies AG
168 Kallang Way
Singapore 349253
Module Mounting
Tokyo
Kintetsu World Express, Inc.
Tokyo Import Logistics Center
Narita Terminal
Tokyo
Japan
Distribution Center
Wuxi
Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd.
No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu
Wuxi-Singapore Industrial Park
Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu
P.R. China
Module Mounting
Distribution Center
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]). The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives
and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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