Certification Report: 0555a_pdf

Certification Report: 0555a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
for
NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its
major configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A,
P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A
each with IC dedicated Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-327 V4.30
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major
configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A,
P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Business Line Identification
PP Conformance:
Security IC Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
23 August 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and
ASE_TSS.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 10 November 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................12
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................12
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................12
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................12
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................12
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................13
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................13
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................13
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................13
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................14
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................15
11 Security Target............................................................................................................15
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................16
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................16
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................16
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................18
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................21
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................31
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.15 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE.TSS.2 that
are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations
P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with
IC dedicated Software has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major
configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and
P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH.
The evaluation was completed on 5 October 2009. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
6
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
●
Certification Report
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a reassessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations
P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with
IC dedicated Software has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: https:// www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Georg-Heyken-Str. 1
21147 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major
configurations P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and
P5CD016V1A each with IC dedicated Software. It provides a hardware platform for a
smartcard operating system. A specific block diagram for the TOE is depicted in figure 1.
The TOE consists of the IC hardware and the IC Dedicated Software as composed of IC
Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software. All other software is called
Security IC Embedded Software and is not part of the TOE.
The device is developed for most high-end safeguarded applications, and is designed for
embedding into chip cards according to ISO/IEC 7816 and for contactless applications.
Usually a Security IC (e.g. a smartcard) is assigned to a single individual only, but it may
also be used by multiple applications in a multi-provider environment. Therefore the TOE
might store and process secrets of several systems, which must be protected from each
other. The TOE then must meet security requirements for each single security module.
Secret data shall be used as input for calculation of authentication data, calculation of
signatures and encryption of data and keys.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 23 August 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [10].
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The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE_TSS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SS.RNG
Random Number Generator
SS.HW_DES
Triple-DES coprocessor
SS.HW_AES
AES coprocessor
SF.OPC
Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY
Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG
Logical Protection
SF.COMP
Protection of the Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC
Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC
Special Function Register Access Control
Table 1: TOE Security Functionality
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.1.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
Six major configuration options are present, which are denoted by product names
P5CD016V1A, P5CD021V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD081V1A, P5CC081V1A and
P5CN081V1A. All of them are equipped with an EEPROM of 80 kBytes and both, the
ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface and the ISO/IEC 14443 contactless interface. Their major
differences are related to availability of EEPROM space and the contactless interface. This
certification covers all configurations mentioned above.
Find more details in the Security Target [6] and [9], chapter 1.4 (in particular chapter
1.4.1.1 and 1.4.2.1)
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations P5CC081V1A,
P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with IC
dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type Identifier
1
Release
Date
Form of
Delivery
HW
NXP
P5Cx081V1A
Smart Card Controller
Secure V1A
T046B_200902 Wafer or
10.gds2
sawn Wafer
HW
NXP P5CD041V1A
Smart Card Controller
Secure V1A
T046B_200902 Wafer or
10.gds2
sawn Wafer
HW
NXP P5CD021V1A
Smart Card Controller
Secure V1A
T046B_200902 Wafer or
10.gds2
sawn Wafer
HW
NXP P5CD016V1A
Smart Card Controller
Secure V1A
T046B_200902 Wafer or
10.gds2
sawn Wafer
2
SW
Test ROM Software (the IC Version 87
Dedicated Test Software)
16.01.2009
Test ROM on
the chip
(tmfos_87.lst)
3
SW
Boot ROM Software (part of the Version 87
IC Dedicated Support Software)
16.01.2009
Test ROM on
the chip
(tmfos_87.lst)
4
SW
MIFARE Operating System Version 87
(part of the IC Dedicated
Support Software)
16.01.2009
Test ROM on
the chip
(tmfos_87.lst)
5
Doc
Data Sheet, P5CD016/021/041 Rev. 3.1
and P5Cx081
20.08.2009
Document
Number:
148931
6
Doc
Instruction
Family
04.07.2006
Document
Number:
084111
7
Doc
Guidance,
Delivery
Operation Manual for
P5CD016/021/041
P5Cx081
and Version 1.3 16.09.2009
the
and
Document
Number:
171613
Set,
SmartMX- Revision
1.1,
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by P5CD081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A
or P5CD016V1A. A so-called nameplate (on-chip identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto
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the chip during production and can be checked by the customer, too. The nameplate
T046B is specific for the SSMC (Singapore) production as outlined in the guidance
documentation [14]. This nameplate identifies Version V1A of the hardware, but does not
identify specifically the TOE configurations. For identification of a specific configuration, the
Device Coding Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be used (see [12], chapter 11.6):
●
The value 44 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CD081V1A
●
The value 43 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CC081V1A
●
The value 45 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CN081V1A
●
The value 42 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CD041V1A
●
The value 47 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CD021V1A
●
The value 41 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CD016V1A
Items 2, 3 and 4 in table 2 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the Test ROM
part of the chip. They are identified by their unique version numbers.
Items 2 and 3 in table 2 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the Test ROM
part of the chip. They are identified by their unique version numbers.
The delivery process from NXP to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of the life cycle)
guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of the different parts of the
TOE as outlined above.
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: Symmetric cryptographic block
cipher algorithms (Triple-DES and AES), to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by
encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random
number generation of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE provides
countermeasures against: leakage of information, physical probing, malfunctions, physical
manipulations, access to code, access to data memory, abuse of functionality.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization, Usage of Hardware Platform,
Treatment of User Data, Check of initialisation data by the Smart Card Embedded
Software, Usage of Key-dependent Functions. Details can be found in the Security Target
[6] chapter 3 and in the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [10].
5
Architectural Information
The NXP P5CD081V1A, P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and
P5CD016V1A Smart Card Controllers are integrated circuits (ICs) providing a hardware
platform to a Smart Card operating system and Smart Card Embedded Software. A top
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level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of
the Security Target [6] resp. [9]. The complete hardware description and the complete
instruction set of these Smart Card Controllers can be found in the “Data Sheet,
P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081”, [12] and “Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family”, [13].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functionalities basically the components 8-bit
CPU, Special Function Registers, Triple-DES Co-Processor, AES Co-Processor, FameXE
Co-Processor, Random Number Generator (RNG), Power Module with Security Sensors
and Filters are used. The CPU is equipped with a Memory Management Unit and provides
different CPU Modes in order to separate different applications running on the TOE.
Security measures for Physical Protection are realized within the layout of the whole
circuitry. The Special Function Registers provide the interface to the Security
Functionalities of the TOE.
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
1.
technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against
the specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the
circuitry (this testing is not strictly related to Security Functionalities);
2.
tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3.
regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4.
regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for the
IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a
software simulation of chip in special hardware;
5.
characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
6.
●
used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating
conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred to as
characterisation tests)
●
special verification tests for Security Functionalities which were done with
samples of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which
include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to
verify statements concerning the layout;
functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all Security Functionalities and all security mechanisms as
identified in the functional specification.
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The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer are repeated by sampling, by
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with evaluation operating system. For the developer
tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters are used and the test equipment
was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures
were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the
final product.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides the Security
Functionalities as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE Security Functionalities.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functionalities into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of Security Functionalities using bespoke equipment and
expert know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE
and attacks which do not modify the TOE physically.
8
Evaluated Configuration
There are six major configuration options, denoted by different product names.
P5CD016V1A, P5CD021V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD081V1A, P5CC081V1A and
P5CN081V1A. Their major differences are related to availability of EEPROM space and
the contactless interface
The major configurations of the TOE support further configuration options as outlined in
the Security Target [6] resp. [9], chapter 2.2. All TSF are active and usable. Information on
how to use the TOE and its Security Functionalities by the software is provided within the
user documentation.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii)
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 36 and AIS 31).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretations AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
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The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
●
The components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE_TSS.2 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Security IC Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
23 August 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [10]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE_TSS.2
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The following cryptoalgorithms were part of the rating:
●
the TOE Security Functionality SS.HW_DES implements Triple-DES encryption and
decryption
●
the TOE Security Functionality SS.HW_AES implements AES encryption and
decryption
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). This holds for:
●
the TOE Security Functionality SS.HW_DES for Triple-DES and
●
the TOE Security Functionality SS.HW_AES for AES
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this evaluation
(see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with a security
level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks with high
attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these
functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for
the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionalities: 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) provided by the TOE have
got a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
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10
Certification Report
Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The guidance documentation ([12], [14] and [13]) contains all necessary information about
the usage of the TOE. NXP will also provide either the Security Target [6] to customers or
a “Lite” version of the Security Target [9], which omits some technical details within the
rationale but contains the relevant information about the TOE itself. This includes the
assumptions about the environment and usage of the TOE and the Security Functionality
provided by the TOE. Note that this version of the ST conforms to AIS 35 [4].
The user of the TOE must abide by the following requirements:
●
to follow the instructions in the user guidance documents and
●
to ensure fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target
11
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [9] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Errichtungsgesetz
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CPU
Central Processing Unit
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA
Differential Power Analysis
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMU
Memory Management Unit
OTP
One Time Programmable (a certain part of the EEPROM)
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
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ROM
Read Only Memory
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SS
Security Services
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
UART
Universal Asynchronus Receiver and Transmitter
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of
the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 1, September 2006
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 2, September 2007
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 2, September 2007
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 2, September 2007
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8.
[5]
German IT Security Certifcates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-0555-2009, Version 1.3, September 21st, 2009, Security
Target P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A NXP Secure Smart Card, NXP
Semiconductors, Business Line Identification (confidential document)
[7]
Evaluation Technical Report, V. 1.2, 3th November 2009, NXP P5CD081V1A Secure
Smart Card Controller, T-Systems Gei GmbH (confidential document)
[8]
Configuration List for the P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081 family, Rev. 1.0, NXP
Semiconductors, 24.09.2009
[9]
Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-0555-2009, Version 1.3, 21 September 2009,
P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cx081V1A NXP Smart Card Controllers, NXP
Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
[10]
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15.06.2007, registered and
certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under
reference BSI-CC-PP-0035
8
specifically
•
AIS 20, Version 1, 2. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 6, 7 May 2009, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins
deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
•
AIS 34, Version 2, 24 October 2008, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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[11]
ETR for composition according to AIS 36 for the Product NXP P5CD081V1A Secure
Smart Card Controller, Version 1.0, 30.09.2009, BSI-DSZ-CC-0555, T-Systems GEI
GmbH (confidential document)
[12]
Data Sheet, P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081, Secure dual interface and contact
PKI Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors, Revision 3.1, Document, Number:
148931, August 20th, 2009
[13]
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006
[14]
Guidance documentation for the TOE, Version 1.3, 16.09.2009, Guidance, Delivery
and Operation Manual for the P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx081, Secure Smart Card
Controllers
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 9.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex A.
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Certification Report
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decompositon.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV: Development
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal high-
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
Assurance Components
level design presentation
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“ The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
2
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Smart Card Controller P5CD081V1A and its major configurations
P5CC081V1A, P5CN081V1A, P5CD041V1A, P5CD021V1A and P5CD016V1A each with
IC dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited
and approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 10 November 2009, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
1. NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, Business Line Identification, Georg-HeykenStr. 1, D-21147 Hamburg (Development Center)
2. NXP Semiconductors (Thailand), Assembly Plant Bangkok, Thailand (APB), 303
Moo 3 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi, Bangkok 10210 Thailand (Assembly, Test and
Delivery)
3. Document Control Office, Mikron-Weg 1, A-8101 Gratkorn (Documentation)
4. Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris Drive 1,
Singapore 519527, Singapore (Semiconductor Factory)
5. Toppan Photomasks Korea Ltd., 345-1, Sooha-Ri ShinDoon-Myon, 467-840 Ichon,
South Korea (Mask Shop)
6. Chipbond Technology Corporation, No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V, Science Based Industrial
Park, Hsin-Chu City, Taiwan R.O.C. (Wafer Bumping)
7. NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, IC Manufacturing Operations - Test Center
Hamburg (IMO TeCH), Stresemannallee 101, D-22529 Hamburg (Delivery, Test and
Assembly)
8. NedCard B.V., Bijsterhuizen 25-29, 6604 LM Wijchen, The Netherlands (Module
Assembly)
9. HID Global Galway, Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh, Balle na hAbhann, Co. Galway,
Ireland (Inlay Assembly)
10. Smartrac Technology GmbH, Wernerwerkstr. 2, 93049 Regensburg, Germany (Inlay
assembly)
11. HID Global Erfurt, In den Weiden 4 B, 99099 Erfurt, Germany (Inlay assembly)
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For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [9]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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