Certification Report: 0227a

Certification Report: 0227a
Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004
for
Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M
Secure Smart Card Controller
from
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification
- Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004
Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M
Secure Smart Card Controller
from
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification
SOGIS-MRA
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance:
Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality:
BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL5 / augmented by:
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 16 September 2004
The President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Dr. Helmbrecht
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004
BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004
Certification Report
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
•
BSIG 2
•
BSI Certification Ordinance 3
•
BSI Schedule of Costs 4
•
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
•
DIN EN 45011 standard
•
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
•
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1 5
•
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
-
Part 1, Version 0.6
-
Part 2, Version 1.0
•
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme
(AIS)
•
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Federal Office for Information Security (BSIKostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 29th October 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1838
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22nd September 2000 in the
Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
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2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2
CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States. Israel
joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February 2002, Austria
in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003, Japan in
November 2003.
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3
Certification Report
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The products Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card
Controller have undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the products Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure
Smart Card Controller was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für
IT-Sicherheit. The T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, and vendor and distributor is:
Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification
P.O. Box 54 02 40
D-22502 Hamburg, Germany
The certification is concluded with
•
the comparability check and
•
the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 16 September 2004.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
•
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as
given in the following report, are observed,
•
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in
the following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004
Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-28 and D1 to D4.
The products Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card
Controller have been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is
published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor 7 of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the abovementioned website.
7
A-4
Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, P.O. Box 54 02 40, D-22502
Hamburg, Germany
BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004
B
Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
•
the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
•
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
•
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Contents of the certification results
1
Executive Summary
3
2
Identification of the TOE
12
3
Security Policy
14
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
14
5
Architectural Information
15
6
Documentation
16
7
IT Product Testing
16
8
Evaluated Configuration
17
9
Results of the Evaluation
18
10 Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
22
11 Annexes
23
12 Security Target
23
13 Definitions
23
14 Bibliography
25
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1
Certification Report
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the Philips P5CT072V0M and
P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller. They provide a hardware platform
for a smart card to run smart card applications executed by a smart card
operating system.
The TOE is manufactured in the IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore (see part D,
Annex A) indicated by the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T023M.
The TOE is the Philips chip P5CT072V0M resp. P5CC072V0M composed of a
processing unit, security components, I/O ports, volatile and non-volatile
memories (4608 Bytes RAM, 160 KBytes Application-ROM, 72 KBytes
EEPROM), a Triple-DES, an AES and a FameXE co-processor and a Random
number generator. Also two 16-bit Timers, an Interrupt Module, a Memory
Management Unit, an UART for ISO 7816 Interface, a USB interface and an
ISO 14443 contactless interface are implemented.
The USB interface and the ISO 14443 contactless interface can be deactivated
before TOE delivery if requested by the customer. In this configuration the TOE
has the product name P5CC072V0M.
The TOE also includes Philips proprietary IC Dedicated Software stored on the
chip and used for testing purposes during production only. It does not provide
additional services in the operational phase of the TOE. The smart card
operating system and the application stored in the Application-ROM and in the
EEPROM are not part of the TOE.
The IC Dedicated Support Software consists of two parts: the Boot ROM
Software being executed after each reset of the TOE and the Mifare Operating
System. The Mifare Operating System software is disabled if the TOE is
configured as P5CC072V0M.
The EEPROM part of the TOE provides a platform for applications requiring
non-volatile data storage, including smart cards and portable data banks.
Several security features independently implemented in hardware or controlled
by software will be provided to ensure proper operations and integrity and
confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for memory
protection and sensors to allow operations only under specified conditions.
The Security Target is written using the Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
[9]. With reference to this Protection Profile, the smart card product life cycle is
described in seven phases and the development, production and operational
user environment are described and referenced to these phases. The
assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile are used.
The IT products Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card
Controller were evaluated against the claims of the Security Target [6 ] by TSystems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was completed
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on 6 August 2004. The T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)8 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Philips Semiconductors GmbH
Business Line Identification.
1.1
Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Part C or [1], part 3
for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL5+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 5 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement
Identifier
EAL5
TOE evaluation: Semiformally designed and tested
+: ALC_DVS.2
Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3
Vulnerability assessment – Analysis and testing of insecure
states
+: AVA_VLA.4
Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
The level of assurance is chosen in order to allow the confirmation that the TOE
is suitable for use within devices compliant with the German Digital Signature
Law [14].
1.2
Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC Part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source from
PP or added
in ST
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_COP.1
[DES]
Cryptographic operation
ST
FCS_COP.1
[AES]
Cryptographic operation
ST
FDP
User data protection
FDP_ACC.1
[MEM]
Subset access control
8
B-4
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
ST
BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004
Security
Functional
Requirement
Certification Report
Source from
PP or added
in ST
Identifier
FDP_ACC.1
9
[SFR]
Subset access control
ST
FDP_ACF.1
[MEM]
Security Attribute based access control
ST
FDP_ACF.1
[SFR]
Security Attribute based access control
ST
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow control
PP
FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer protection
PP
FMT
Security Management
FMT_MSA.1
[MEM]
Management of security attributes
ST
FMT_MSA.1
[SFR]
Management of security attributes
ST
FMT_MSA.3
[MEM]
Static attribute initialisation
ST
FMT_MSA.3
[SFR]
Static attribute initialisation
ST
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management functions (see also [4, AIS ST
32, Int065])
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
PP
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
PP
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
PP
FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain separation
PP
FRU
Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2
Limited fault tolerance
PP
Table 2: SFRs taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined.
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FAU
Security audit
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
9
Source
from
PP or added in
ST
PP
PP
[SFR] here means Special Function Register
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Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from
PP or added in
ST
FMT
Security management
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
PP
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
PP
Table 3: SFRs CC part 2 extended.
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [7], chapter 5.1.1.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security
Functions
Description
F.RNG
Random Number Generator
F.HW_DES
Triple-DES Co-Processor
F.HW_AES
AES Co-Processor
F.OPC
Control of Operating Conditions
F.PHY
Protection against Physical Manipulation
F.LOG
Logical Protection
F.COMP
Protection of Mode Control
F.MEM_ACC
Memory Access Control
F.SFR_ACC
Special Function Register Access Control
Table 4: TOE Security Functions
F.RNG: Random Number Generator
The random number generator continuously produces random numbers
with a length of one byte. The TOE implements the F.RNG by means of a
physical hardware random number generator working stable within the
limits guaranteed by F.OPC (operational conditions). The TSF provides a
hardware test functionality that can be used by the Smart Card
Embedded Software to detect faults in the hardware implementing the
random number generator.
F.HW_DES: Triple-DES Co-Processor
The TOE provides the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) of the
Data Encryption Standard (DES). F.HW_DES is a modular basic
cryptographic function which provides the TDEA algorithm as defined by
FIPS PUB 46-3 [13] by means of a hardware co-processor and supports
the 2-key Triple DEA algorithm according to keying option 2 in FIPS PUB
46-3.
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F.HW_AES: AES Co-processor
The TOE provides the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) algorithm of
the Advanced Encryption Standard. F.HW_AES is a modular basic
cryptographic function which provides the AES algorithm as defined by
FIPS PUB 197 [18] by means of a hardware co-processor and supports
the AES algorithm with three different key lengths of 128, 192 or 256 bit.
F.OPC: Control of Operating Conditions
The function F.OPC ensures the correct operation of the TOE (functions
offered by the micro controller including the standard CPU as well as the
Triple-DES co-processor, AES co-processor, the arithmetic co-processor,
the memories, registers, I/O interface and the other system peripherals)
during the execution of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Smart
Card Embedded Software. This includes all specific security features of
the TOE which are able to provide an active response.
F.OPC filters the power supply and the clock input. It also monitors the
power supply, the frequency of the clock, the temperature of the chip and
the high voltage for the write process to the EEPROM by means of
sensors. In addition, light sensors are provided to detect specific attacks
and the specific range of the stack pointer is controlled.
Before TOE delivery the Test Mode is disabled. In all other modes except
the Test Mode the TOE enables the sensors automatically when
operated. Furthermore the TOE prevents that the Smart Card Embedded
Software disables the sensors.
F.PHY: Protection against Physical Manipulation
The function F.PHY protects the TOE against manipulation of (i) the
hardware, (ii) the IC Dedicated Software in the ROM, (iii) the Smart Card
Embedded Software in the ROM and the EEPROM, (iv) the application
data in the EEPROM and RAM including the configuration data in the
security row. It also protects User Data or TSF data against disclosure by
physical probing when stored or while being processed by the TOE.
F.LOG: Logical Protection
The function F.LOG implements measures to limit or eliminate the
information that might be contained in the shape and amplitude of signals
or in the time between events found by measuring such signals. This
comprises the power consumption and signals on the other pads that are
not intended by the terminal or the Smart Card Embedded Software.
Thereby this security function prevents the disclosure of User Data or
TSF data stored and/or processed in the smart card IC through the
measurement of the power consumption and subsequent complex signal
processing. The protection of the TOE comprises different features within
the design that support the other security functions.
The Triple-DES co-processor includes special features to prevent
SPA/DPA analysis of shape and amplitude of the power consumption
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and ensures that the calculation time is independent from any key and
plain/cipher text.
The AES co-processor includes special features to prevent SPA/DPA
analysis of shape and amplitude of the power consumption and ensures
that the calculation time is with respect to the key length independent
from any plain/cipher text.
The FameXE co-processor provides measures to prevent timing attacks
on basic modular function. In addition special features are included to
provide limitations of the capability for the analysis of shape and
amplitude of the power consumption. Of course the FameXE does not
realise an algorithm on its own and algorithm-specific leakage
countermeasures have to be added for the FameXE.
Additional features that can be configured by the Smartcard Embedded
Software comprise (i) the FameXE HIGHSEC mode and (ii) several clock
configurations to support resistance against leakage attacks.
The behaviour of F.LOG is supported by different features realised in the
functions F.OPC and F.PHY.
F.COMP: Protection of Mode Control
The function F.COMP provides a control of the CPU mode for (i) Boot
Mode, (ii) Test Mode and (iii) Mifare Mode. This includes the protection of
electronic fuses stored in a protected memory area, the so-called
“Security Row”, and the possibility to store initialisation or prepersonalisation data in the so-called “FabKey Area”.
The control of the CPU mode according to Boot Mode, Test Mode and
Mifare Mode prevents the abuse of test functions after TOE delivery.
Additionally it also ensures that features used at boot time to configure
the TOE can not be abused.
F.COMP limits the capabilities of the test functions and provides test
personnel during phase 3 with the capability to store the identification
and/or pre-personalisation data and/or supplements of the Smart Card
Embedded Software in the EEPROM. The security function F.COMP
maintains the security domain for its own execution that protects it from
interference and tampering by untrusted subjects both in the Test Mode
and in the other modes. It also enforces the separation between the
security domains of subjects regarding the IC Dedicated Software and
the Smart Card Embedded Software.
F.MEM_ACC: Access control for code and data memory
F.MEM_ACC controls access of any subject (program code comprising
processor instructions) to the memories of the TOE through the Memory
Management Unit (MMU). Memory access is based on virtual addresses
that are mapped to physical addresses. The CPU always uses virtual
addresses. The Memory Management Unit performs the translation from
virtual to physical addresses and the physical addresses are provided
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from the MMU to the memory interfaces to access the memories. The
access control is performed in two ways (i) Partition of the memories and
(ii) Segmentation of the memory in the User Mode.
In addition F.MEM_ACC permanently checks whether the selected
addresses are within the boundary of the physical implemented memory
range. Access violations (i.e. access to forbidden memory addresses in
User Mode) and accesses outside the boundary of the physical
implemented memory range are notified by raising an exception.
F.SFR_ACC: Access control for Special Function Registers (SFRs)
The function F.SFR_ACC controls access to the Special Function
Registers and the switch between the CPU modes.
The TSF implements the access control to the Special Function
Registers as specified in the Access Control Policy and the Security
Functional Requirements FDP_ACC.1[SFR] and FDP_ACF.1[SFR].
F.SFR_ACC used information provided by F.MEM_ACC in order to
determine access to the Special Function Registers related to hardware
components. Access to all other Special Function Registers is predefined and cannot be changed.
Only two modes are available to the Smart Card Embedded Software,
the System Mode and the User Mode. The combination of F.SFR_ACC
and F.COMP ensures that the other CPU modes are not available for the
Smart Card Embedded Software, but reserved for specific purposes
fulfilled by the IC Dedicated Software. In addition F.MEM_ACC provides
separation of the memories and access control information.
As the Test Mode is disabled before TOE delivery, all TOE Security Functions
are applicable from TOE delivery at the end of phase 3 or 4 (depending on
when TOE delivery takes place in a specific case) to phase 7.
1.3
Strength of Function
The TOE‘s strength of functions is rated ‘high’ (SOF-high) for those functions,
identified in the Security Target, chapter 6.1, SOF Claim. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2) (see
Chapter 9 of this report).
1.4
Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE are
specified in the BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9 ] and mentioned in the Security Target.
Considering the Application Notes 10 and 11 of [9] there are no additional highlevel security concerns or additional new threats defined in the Security Target.
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Phase 1 and the phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
developer / manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
Because there is a specific security component which is not derived from
threats the developer must apply the Policy P.Add-Components (Additional
Specific Security Components) for Triple-DES encryption and decryption, AES
encryption and decryption, Area based Memory Access Control, Memory
separation for different software parts (including IC Dedicated Software and
Smart Card Embedded Software) and Special Function Register Access
Control.
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional policy.
1.5
Special configuration requirements
The Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller
distinguish between five different CPU modes: Boot Mode, Test Mode, Mifare
Mode, System Mode and User Mode.
As the TOE comprises the Mifare Operating System belonging to the Mifare
Mode, this mode is disabled and is not accessible if the TOE is configured as
P5CC072V0M. Nevertheless, the Mifare Mode is existent and security
functionality with regard to the Mifare Mode is present in the TOE in this
configuration, but in this case the TOE prevents that the Mifare Mode is
activated and the related software is executed. Available for the developer of
the Smart Card Embedded Software are the System Mode, the User Mode and
in case of P5CT072V0M the Mifare Mode, too.
The application software being executed on the TOE can not use the Test
Mode. The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip
manufacturing process. At this point in time the operating system software is
already stored in the non-volatile memories of the chip and the Test Mode is
disabled.
Thus, there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are
important for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery
processes, like the integration into a smart card, personalisation and the
delivery of the smart card to an end user, have to be organised in a way that
excludes all possibilities of physical manipulation of the TOE. There are no
special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the requirement
that the controller has to be used under the well-defined operating conditions
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and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as described in
the user documentation [11] and chapter 10 of this report.
1.6
Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile BSI-PP0002-2001 [9], the assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile
are valid for the Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle
defined in the Security Target, phase 1 and the phases from TOE Delivery up to
the end of phase 6 are covered by these assumptions from the PP:
The developer of the smart card Embedded Software (phase 1) must ensure:
•
the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while
developing this software in phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that
the software fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In
particular the assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop
software that fulfils the assumptions.
•
the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the
TOE (especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed
that the Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of
the environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE.
Only appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the
TOE have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation.
Protection during packaging, finishing and personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to phase 7.
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target:
•
Key-dependent functions shall be implemented (if applicable) in the
smart card Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to
leakage attacks (A.Key-Function).
•
The Smart Card Embedded Software must provide a function to check
initialisation data. The data is defined by the customer and injected by
the TOE Manufacturer into the non-volatile memory to provide the
possibility for TOE identification and for traceability (A.Check-Init)
1.7
Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) or any other
organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of
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the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to
this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The following TOE deliverables are provided for a customer who purchases the
TOE version Philips P5CT072V0M or P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card
Controller:
No Type Identifier
Release
1
HW
V0M
Form of
Delivery
T023M_plus.g Sawn Wafer or
ds2_2004051 embedded in a
4 (GDS2 File) chip card module
2
SW
46
30 Jan. 2004
3
SW
1.9
28 Jan. 2004
4
SW
1.16
30 Jan. 2004
5
DOC
2.3
20 Feb. 2004
2.3
8 April 2004
Electronic
document [20]
1.0
9 May 2003
1.3
28 March
2004
Electronic
document [16]
Electronic
document [11]
1.2
July 2004
6
DOC
7
DOC
8
DOC
Philips P5CT072V0M and
P5CC072V0M Secure
Smart Card Controller
(dice include reference
T023M and specific
EEPROM coding, see
below)
Test ROM Software (the
IC dedicated test
software)
Boot ROM Software (part
of the IC Dedicated
Support Software)
Mifare Operating System
(part of the IC Dedicated
Support Software)
Data Sheet, P5CT072,
SmartMX, Secure Triple
Interface Smart Card
Controller
resp.
Data Sheet, P5CC072,
SmartMX, Secure Smart
Card Controller
Instruction Set SmartMXFamily
Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual for the
P5CT072
Anomaly Sheet for
P5CT072 V0M Product
Behaviour
Date
Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_46.lst)
Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_46.lst)
Included in Test
ROM on the chip
(tmfos_46.lst)10
Electronic
document [12]
Electronic
document [17]
Table 5: Deliverables of the TOE for both, Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure
Smart Card Controller
10
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The hardware part of the TOE is identified by Philips P5CT072V0M resp.
P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller and their specific GDS-file. A socalled nameplate (on-chip identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto the chip
during production and can be checked by the customer, too. The nameplate
T023M is specific for the SSMC (Singapore) production site as outlined in the
guidance documentation [11]. This nameplate identifies Version V0M of the
hardware, but does not identify specifically the TOE Philips P5CT072V0M resp.
P5CC072V0M. For identification of a specific Philips P5CT072V0M or
P5CC072V0M chip, the Device Coding Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be
used (see [12, chapter 6.9.8] resp. [20, chapter 6.9.8):
•
The value 11 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip
P5CT072
•
The value 10 hex in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip
P5CC072
Items 2, 3 and 4 in table 5 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the
Test ROM part of the chip. They are identified by their unique version numbers.
The delivery process from Philips to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of
the life cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of
the different parts of the TOE as outlined above.
To ensure that the customer receives the evaluated version of the chip, either
•
the customer collects the TOE himself at the Philips site Philips
Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, Stresemannallee
101, 22529 Hamburg – Germany (see part D, annex A of this report) as a
wafer or
•
the customer collects the TOE himself at the Philips site, Philips
Semiconductors (Thailand), 303 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi Bangkok
10210, Thailand (see part D, annex A of this report) as a module or
•
the TOE is sent by Philips to the customer protected by special ordering,
secured transport and tracking measures. Additionally, a FabKey
according to the defined FabKey-procedures has to be used to support
the secure delivery and the identification of the TOE
as described [11].
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted)
according to defined mailing procedures.
To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery procedures described in [11] have to be followed.
Defined procedures at the development and production sites guarantee that the
right versions of the Test ROM Software, Boot ROM Software and Mifare
Operating System are implemented into a specific ROM mask for a TOE IC.
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Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic security functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithms (Triple-DES and AES) to
ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure
authentication protocols and it will provide a random number generation of
appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during cryptographic functions performed
by the TOE), protection against physical probing, malfunctions, physical
manipulations, against access for code and data memory and against abuse of
functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
•
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory
of the TOE and
•
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of
security functions (security mechanisms and associated functions)
provided by the TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC dedicated software) is used by the manufacturer of the
smart card to check the functionality of the chips before TOE Delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
ROM part of the operating system software is already stored in the ROM of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the security functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition, the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
security functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environmental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
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Within this evaluation of the TOE, several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This
was
necessary
as
Philips
Semiconductors
GmbH
Business Line Identification is the TOE developer and manufacturer and
responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded smart card
application software in its development and production environment. For those
aspects refer to chapter 9.2 of this report.
The full evaluation results are applicable for chips from the IC fabrication SSMC
in Singapore indicated by the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T023M.
5
Architectural Information
The Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller are
integrated circuits (IC) providing a hardware platform to a smart card operating
system and Smart Card Embedded Software. A top level block diagram
including an overview of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of
the Security Target. The complete hardware description and the complete
instruction set of the Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure Smart
Card Controller can be found in the Data Sheet, P5CT072, SmartMX, Secure
Triple Interface Smart Card Controller [12] resp. Data Sheet, P5CC072,
SmartMX, Secure Smart Card Controller [20] and Instruction Set SmartMXFamily [16].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
8-bit CPU, Special Function Registers, Triple-DES Co-Processor, AES CoProcessor, FameXE Co-Processor, Random Number Generator (RNG), Power
Module with Security Sensors and Filters are used. The CPU is equipped with a
Memory Management Unit and provides different CPU modes in order to
separate different applications running on the TOE. Security measures for
physical protection are realised within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers provide the interface to the security functions of
the TOE.
The Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller
provide different levels of access control to the SFR with the different CPU
modes and additional – configurable – access control to Special Function
Registers in the least-privileged CPU Mode, the User Mode.
The FameXE does not provide a cryptographic algorithm itself. The modular
arithmetic functions are suitable to implement different asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms.
The TOE executes the IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot Software) during
the start up to configure and initialise the hardware. This software is executed in
the Boot Mode that is not accessible after the start up is finished.
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For the P5CT072V0M, the Mifare Operating System supports the functions to
exchange data in the contactless mode with other Mifare components. The
Mifare Operating System is executed in the Mifare Mode to ensure a strict
separation between IC Dedicated Support Software and Smart Card Embedded
Software. Based on the partitioning of the memories the Mifare Operating
System is not able to access the Smart Card Embedded Software and the data
stored in the EEPROM area that is not reserved for the Mifare Operating
System. In the same way the access to the program and the data of the Mifare
Operating System is denied for the Smart Card Embedded Software. A limited
memory area for the data exchange (between Smart Card Embedded Software
and Mifare Operating System) and the access to components of the hardware
(by the Mifare Operating System) must be configured by the Smart Card
Embedded Software.
6
Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target:
For both, Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card
Controller
•
The Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual [11],
•
Instruction set [16]
•
The ETR-lite [10] and
•
Anomaly Sheet [17]
For Philips P5CT072V0M resp. P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller
•
The Data Sheet [12] for the P5CT072V0M
•
The Data Sheet [20] for the P5CC072V0M
Additional guidance as outlined in chapter 10 of this report has to be followed.
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hardware computing platform to implement the software (operating system /
application software) which will use the TOE.
The ETR-lite is intended to provide the results of the platform evaluation for the
TOE in a way that meets the requirements for a composite evaluation as
defined in AIS 36 [4].
7
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into the following
categories:
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1.
technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the
technology against the specification and to get the technology
parameters used in simulations of the circuitry;
2.
tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools
for the analogue parts and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3.
regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software
and for the IC Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the
TOE and within a software simulation of chip in special hardware;
4.
characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
- used to determine the behaviour of the chip with respect to different
operating conditions and varied process parameters
- special verification tests for Security Functions which were done with
samples of the TOE and which include also layout tests by automatic
means and optical control, in order to verify statements concerning the
layout;
5.
functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its
correct functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3 or
phase 4 depending on the TOE delivery form).
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms
as identified in the functional specification and in the high and low level designs.
Chips from IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore were used for tests.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the
library of programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator
or at the developers site. They performed independent tests to supplement,
augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer. Security features of
the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures were checked by the
evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the final
product.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides
the Security Functions as specified by the developer. The test results confirm
the correct implementation of the TOE Security Functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functions into
consideration. Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis
results and performed for the underlying mechanisms of Security Functions
using bespoke equipment and expert know-how. The penetration tests
considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not
modify the TOE physically (i.e. side channel testing).
8
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M both with the
nameplates T023M and specific EEPROM coding as outlined above .
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There are two major configuration options, denoted by different product names.
The product with the name P5CT072V0M is equipped with all three interfaces
(ISO 7816, USB and contact-less). The product with the name P5CC072V0M is
equipped only with the ISO 7816 interface. The USB and the contact-less
interface are deactivated in this configuration.
Both major configurations of the TOE support further configuration options as
outlined in the Security Target [6] chapter 2.2. All TSF are active and usable.
Information on how to use the TOE and its security functions by the software is
provided within the user documentation.
The Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller
distinguish between five different CPU modes: Boot Mode, Test Mode, Mifare
Mode, System Mode and User Mode.
As the TOE comprises the Mifare Operating System belonging to the Mifare
Mode, this mode is disabled in the Philips P5CC072V0M and is not accessible.
As the TOE operates after delivery in System Mode or User Mode and the
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the Test Mode, the
evaluation was mainly performed in the System Mode and User Mode. For all
evaluation activities performed in Test Mode, there was a rationale why the
results are valid for the System Mode and User Mode, too.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
Evaluation of the TOE
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8], was provided by the ITSEF
T-Systems GEI GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit, according to the Common
Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in coordination with the Certification Body (see [4 , AIS 34]). For smart card IC
specific methodology the CC supporting documents
(i)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii)
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(iii)
ETR-lite – for Composition and
ETR-lite – for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation:
Recommended best practice
(see [4, AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36]) and [4, AIS 31] (Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for physical random number generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
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The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL5
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components
Security Target evaluation
Verdict
CC Class ASE
PASS
TOE description
ASE_DES.1
PASS
Security environment
ASE_ENV.1
PASS
ST introduction
ASE_INT.1
PASS
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.1
PASS
PP claims
ASE_PPC.1
PASS
IT security requirements
ASE_REQ.1
PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
ASE_SRE.1
PASS
TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
Configuration management
CC Class ACM
PASS
Partial CM automation
ACM_AUT.1
PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_CAP.4
PASS
Development tools CM coverage
ACM_SCP.3
PASS
Delivery and operation
CC Class ADO
PASS
Detection of modification
ADO_DEL.2
PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADO_IGS.1
PASS
Development
CC Class ADV
PASS
Semiformal functional specification
ADV_FSP.3
PASS
Semiformal high-level design
ADV_HLD.3
PASS
Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2
PASS
Modularity
ADV_INT.1
PASS
Descriptive low-level design
ADV_LLD.1
PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration
ADV_RCR.2
PASS
Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_SPM.3
PASS
Guidance documents
CC Class AGD
PASS
Administrator guidance
AGD_ADM.1
PASS
User guidance
AGD_USR.1
PASS
Life cycle support
CC Class ALC
PASS
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2
PASS
Standardised life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2
PASS
Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2
PASS
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Assurance classes and components
Tests
Verdict
CC Class ATE
PASS
Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2
PASS
Testing: low-level design
ATE_DPT.2
PASS
Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1
PASS
Independent testing - sample
ATE_IND.2
PASS
Vulnerability assessment
CC Class AVA
PASS
Covert channel analysis
AVA_CCA.1
PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_MSU.3
PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_SOF.1
PASS
Highly resistant
AVA_VLA.4
PASS
Table 6: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
•
the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSIPP-0002-2001 [9]
•
Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
•
the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
•
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of
Function:
- F.RNG (random number generator), according to AIS 31 Functionality
class P2 High,
- F.LOG (Logical Protection) contributing to the leakage attacks
especially for F.HW_DES (Triple-DES Co-processor) by SPA/DPA
countermeasures.
- F.LOG (Logical Protection) contributing to the leakage attacks
especially for F.HW_AES (AES Co-processor) by SPA/DPA
countermeasures together with the guidance given in Guidance, Delivery
and Operation Manual [11].
The scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for the TOE Security Function F.HW_DES (Triple-DES Coprocessor) used for Triple-DES encryption and decryption and the TOE Security
Function F.HW_AES (AES Co-processor) used for AES encryption and
decryption.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
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The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by
the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The full evaluation results are applicable for chips from the IC fabrication SSMC
in Singapore (see part D, Annex A) indicated by the nameplate (on-chip
identifier) T023M and the firmware and software versions as indicated in table
5.
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product or to
chips from other production and manufacturing sites, provided the sponsor
applies for re-certification of the modified product, in accordance with the
procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the modified product does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2
Additional Evaluation Results
•
To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific
smart card embedded software additional evaluator actions were
performed during the TOE evaluation. The results are documented in the
ETR-lite [10] according to [4, AIS 36]. Therefore, the interface between
the smart card embedded software developer and the developer of the
TOE was examined in detail. These composition related actions
comprised the following tasks:
- Examination of the integration of the embedded software in the
configuration management system of the IC manufacturer for the TOE.
This comprises the handling of the ROM code, the related acceptance
and verification procedures with the customer and the assignment to a
unique commercial type identifier as well as the handling of different
ROM-code masks for the same smart card IC.
- Examination of consistency of delivery and pre-personalisation
procedures.
This comprises the handling of the FabKey and pre-personalisation
data with respect to the physical, technical and organisational
measures to protect these data as well as the procedures to ensure
the correct configuration of the TOE. In addition, the production test
related to customer specific items including the integrity check of the
customer ROM-code and the personalisation process were checked.
- Examination of the separation based on the unique commercial type
identifier and the related test and delivery procedures.
- Examination that Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line
Identification has implemented procedures to provide a customer
product related configuration list based on the configuration list [15]
provided for the evaluation of the TOE supplemented by the customer
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specific items including ROM-mask labelling, specific development
tools for embedded software development and related customer
specific deliveries and the corresponding verification data generated
by Philips to be sent to customer. In the course of the TOE evaluation
a specific customer product related configuration list was checked.
- Examination of aspects relevant for the user guidance documentation
of the TOE to use the TOE for a product composition.
10
Evaluator Comments/Recommendations
1.
The operational documentation guidance [11], Data Sheet [12] resp. Data
Sheet [20], Instruction set [16] and Anomaly Sheet [17] contain
necessary information about the usage of the TOE. Additionally, for
secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the
environment in the Security Target has to be taken into account.
2.
For evaluations of products or systems including the TOE as a part or
using the TOE as a platform (for example smart card operating systems
or complete smart cards), the ETR-lite for composition [10] resulting from
this evaluation is of importance and shall be given to the succeeding
evaluation according to AIS 36.
3.
For the fulfilment of the Strength of Function "high" for the Random
Number Generator according to [4, AIS31] the following guidance is to be
followed in addition:
The defined online tests of the random number generator must detect all
possible defects of the random number generator that lead to a
significantly reduced quality of the random numbers. Due to physical
defects within the random number generator the quality of the random
numbers can be reduced. The requirements are not associated with any
attack since the components of the random number generator are
sufficiently protected and controlled by the design. The attack potential
for the manipulation of the random number generator is assessed with
“High”.
In case that the physical defect exists before the start-up of the chip it is
always detected by the two test procedures described in the User
Guidance (refer to section 4.1.3 in [11]).
If the physical defect occurs during the operation of the chip a defect can
detected by the FIPS PUB 140-2 tests (refer to section 4.1.3 in [11]) if
this test method is implemented for the statistical tests by the Smart Card
Embedded Software. This is independent from the considered failure and
the internal status of the random number generator.
If the physical defect occurs during the operation, there are
circumstances where it is not detected by a "chi-squared test of
goodness" (refer to section 4.1.3 in [11]) if this test method is
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implemented for the statistical tests by the Smart Card Embedded
Software. This is based on the asynchronous operation of the random
number generator and depends on the kind of failure and the internal
status of the random number generator.
The "chi-squared test of goodness" can be extended to detect all
considered defects. In addition to the result of the "chi-squared test of
goodness" it must be checked whether two or more of the possible
sixteen 4 bit tuples do not occur in the tested sequence. In other words, if
at least two of the f[i] values in the formula given in section 4.1.3 of [11]
are zero, the test fails. If this check detects at least two missing 4 bit
tuples the test must be considered as fail and a repetition is required.
The repetition of the tests is described in section 4.1.4 of [11].
4.
For guidance and limitations on how to use the Triple-DES co-processor
resp. AES co-processor in the context of high resistance against
SPA/DPA for both, Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure
Smart Card Controller, see Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for
the P5CT072 [11, section 4.2.3 for Triple-DES resp. section 4.3.2 for
AES].
11
Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitised version of the
complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13
Definitions
13.1
Acronyms
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (see [1])
CPU
Central Processing Unit
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA
Differential Power Analysis
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
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EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMU
Memory Management Unit
OTP
One Time Programmable (a certain part of the EEPROM)
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
UART
Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter
13.2
Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
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Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
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[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS), Bundesamt
für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Bonn, as relevant for the TOE,
specifically
-
AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
-
AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
-
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
-
AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
-
AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
-
AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document,
ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web site
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0227, Version 1.2, 28 April 2004,
Evaluation of Philips P5CT072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller,
Philips Semiconductors (confidential document)
[7]
Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0227, Version 1.0, 14 May 2004,
Evaluation of Philips P5CT072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller,
Philips Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report, Philips P5CT072V0M Secure Smart Card
Controller, Version 1.0, 5 Aug. 2004 (confidential document)
[9]
Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
registered at the German Certification Body under number BSI-PP-00022001
[10]
ETR-lite for Composition, according to AIS 36, Version 1.0, 5 Aug. 2004
for Philips P5CT072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller (confidential
document)
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[11]
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5CT072, BSI-DSZCC-0227, Version 1.3, Philips Semiconductors, 28 March 2004
(confidential document)
[12]
Data Sheet, P5CT072, SmartMX, Secure Triple Interface Smart Card
Controller, Preliminary Specification, Philips Semiconductors, Revision
2.3, 20 Feb. 2004 (confidential document)
[13]
FIPS PUB 46-3 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES) Reaffirmed 25
Oct. 1999
[14]
Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische Signaturen und zur
Änderung weiterer Vorschriften vom 16. Mai 2001, BGBl. I, S. 876);
veröffentlicht am 21. Mai 2001
[15]
Configuration List, BSI-DSZ-CC-0227, Version 1.2, 24 June 2004,
Evaluation of the Philips P5CT072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller,
Philips Semiconductors, Business Line Identification (confidential
document)
[16]
Instruction Set SmartMX-Family, Secure Smart Card Controller,
Objective Specification, Philips Semiconductors, Revision 1.0, 9 May
2003
[17]
Anomaly Sheet for P5CT072 V0M Product
Semiconductors, Revision 1.2, Date July 2004
[18]
FIPS PUB 197 FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS
PUBLICATION, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION STANDARD (AES),
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 26 Nov. 2001
[19]
Order Entry Form, P5CC072, Release 1.8, 2004-04-06, Philips
Semiconductors Hamburg
[20]
Data Sheet, P5CC072, SmartMX, Secure Smart Card Controller,
Preliminary Specification, Philips Semiconductors, Revision 2.3, 8 April
2004 (confidential document)
Behaviour,
Philips
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is
met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented
with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements
are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements
include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements
are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements
include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets
of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
„The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in
Table 2.1.
Assurance Class
Class ACM:
Configuration
management
Class ADO: Delivery
and operation
Class ADV:
Development
Assurance Family
CM automation
Abbreviated Name
ACM_AUT
CM capabilities
CM scope
Delivery
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up
Functional specification
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
High-level design
Implementation representation
TSF internals
Low-level design
Representation correspondence
Security policy modeling
Class AGD: Guidance Administrator guidance
documents
User guidance
Class ALC: Life cycle Development security
support
Flaw remediation
Life cycle definition
Tools and techniques
Class ATE: Tests
Coverage
Depth
Functional tests
Independent testing
Class AVA:
Covert channel analysis
Vulnerability
assessment
Misuse
Strength of TOE security functions
Vulnerability analysis
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Table 2.1 -Assurance family breakdown and mapping“
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
„The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances
the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE
at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the
operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be
considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide
utility.
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance
levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically
ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The
increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a
hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e.
increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components
from other assurance families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than
one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every
component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the
substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance
component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs
defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a
constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim.
Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility
and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be
extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Assurance
Family
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT
EAL1
Delivery and
operation
Development
Guidance
documents
Life cycle
support
Tests
Vulnerability
assessment
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
1
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6
1
1
2
2
1
3
1
1
4
2
2
4
3
2
5
3
2
5
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
1
1
2
3
1
1
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
1
1
4
5
3
3
2
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
3
1
4
3
1
4
1
1
Table 6.1 - Evaluation assurance level summary“
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
„Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the
threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent
assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with
respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against
identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
„Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not
require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when
securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
„Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation
of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.“
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
„Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous,
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do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the
highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
„Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering
based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate
application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be
designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that
the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous
development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
„Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a
premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional
costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
„Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely
high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs.
Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security
functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF
Strength of TOE security functions
„Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may
still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its
underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security
behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The
qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA
Vulnerability analysis
„Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by
other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“
„Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the
TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The
developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow
the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the
evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
„Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“
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Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0227-2004
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT products, Philips P5CT072V0M and P5CC072V0M Secure Smart Card
Controller (Target of Evaluation, TOE) have been evaluated at an accredited and
licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security
Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0, extended by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1
(ISO/IEC15408: 1999) and including final interpretations for compliance with Common
Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 16 September 2004, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements
•
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
•
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1),
•
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below ((a) – (g)):
(a) Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification
(BU ID), Georg-Heyken-Strasse 1, 21147 Hamburg, Germany, (development
center)
(b) Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Assembly and Test Organisation Hamburg
Stresemannallee 101, 22529 Hamburg, Germany
(c) Philips Semiconductors (Thailand), 303 Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi Bangkok
10210, Thailand (assembly)
(d) Philips Semiconductors GmbH, Business Line Identification, Document Control
Office, Mikron-Weg 1, 8101 Gratkorn, Austria
(e) Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. 8 (SSMC), 70 Pasir Ris Drive 1,
Singapore 519527, Singapore (semiconductor factory)
(f) Photronics Singapore Pte. Ltd., 6 Loyang Way 2, Loyang Industrial Park,
Singapore 507099, Singapore (mask shop)
(g) Photronics Semiconductors Mask Corp. (PSMC), 1F, No.2, Li-Hsin Rd., ScienceBased Industrial Park, Hsin-Chu City Taiwan R.O.C. (mask shop)
The TOE is manufactured in the IC fabrication SSMC in Singapore indicated by the
nameplate (on-chip identifier) T023M.
For all sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied for each site
and in accordance with the Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0227, Version 1.2, 28 April
2004, Evaluation of Philips P5CT072V0M Secure Smart Card Controller [6]. The
evaluators verified, that the threats are countered and the security objectives for the life
cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end of phase 3 or 4 as stated in the TOE
Security Target are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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