P T EAC

P T  EAC
EPASS V3 TD
TARANIS
EAC PASSPORT
PUBLIC SECURITY TARGET
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Table of contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS................................................................................................................ 2
LIST OF FIGURES ...................................................................................................................... 4
1
SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 5
1.1
1.2
2
SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION ................................................................................................ 5
OVERVIEW OF THE TOE .............................................................................................................. 5
TOE DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................................ 7
2.1 TOE USAGES ............................................................................................................................. 7
2.2 TOE ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................................................... 8
2.2.1
Integrated Circuit (IC) ..................................................................................................... 9
2.2.2
Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) ................................................................................. 9
2.2.3
Cryptographic library ..................................................................................................... 9
2.2.4
Resident application ..................................................................................................... 10
2.2.5
LDS application............................................................................................................. 10
2.3 CHIP AND SOFTWARE COMPOSITION ........................................................................................... 11
2.4 TOE CONFIGURATIONS ............................................................................................................. 12
2.5 TOE LOGICAL STRUCTURE.......................................................................................................... 13
2.5.1
File structure of the TOE ............................................................................................... 13
2.5.2
System files................................................................................................................... 14
2.5.3
Data files ...................................................................................................................... 14
2.6 NON EVALUATED FEATURES ....................................................................................................... 14
2.7 TOE LIFE CYCLE ....................................................................................................................... 15
3
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ............................................................................................ 17
3.1
3.2
3.3
4
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ................................................................................ 18
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
5
COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE ........................................................................................... 17
PACKAGE CONFORMANCE.......................................................................................................... 17
PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE ......................................................................................... 17
ASSETS ................................................................................................................................... 18
THREATS ................................................................................................................................ 19
ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES.......................................................................................... 21
ASSUMPTIONS ......................................................................................................................... 22
SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................ 24
5.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ........................................................................................... 24
5.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ......................................................... 25
5.2.1
Issuing State or Organization ....................................................................................... 25
5.2.2
Receiving State or Organization................................................................................... 27
6
EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS........................................................................................ 28
6.1 EXTENDED FAMILIES ................................................................................................................. 28
6.1.1
Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage ........................................................... 28
6.1.2
Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers ...................................... 28
6.1.3
Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability ................................ 29
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6.1.4
6.1.5
7
Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation ................................................................ 30
Extended family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity ........................................ 31
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS..................................................................... 32
7.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................................... 32
7.1.1
PP EAC .......................................................................................................................... 32
7.1.2
Active Authentication (AA) ........................................................................................... 41
7.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................ 42
8
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .................................................................................. 43
8.1
8.2
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION .................................................................................................. 43
LINK BETWEEN THE SFR AND THE TSF ......................................................................................... 45
9
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................. 48
10
ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................... 50
INDEX 51
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List of figures
Figure 1: TOE architecture....................................................................................................................... 8
Figure 2: Memory mapping of the TOE ................................................................................................. 12
Figure 3: Structure of the file system .................................................................................................... 13
Figure 4: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE ............................................................................... 16
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1 Security Target introduction
1.1
Security Target identification
General identification:
Title:
Editor:
TARANIS Security Target EAC
Oberthur Technologies
CC version:
3.1 revision 4
EAL:
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
PP(s):
BSI-CC-PP-056
ITSEF:
Serma Technologies
Certification
Body:
ANSSI
Evaluation
scheme:
FR
TOE technical identification:
Name:
ID-One ePass V3 TD in EAC configuration with AA
SAAAAR Rom
code:
079161
SAAAAR
Optional code:
079223
Chips identification:
IC Reference:
P5CD081/P5CC081/P5CD041 V1A
IC EAL:
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
IC Certificate:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
Chip
Manufacturer:
NXP Semiconductors
1.2
Overview of the TOE
The current document aims at defining the functions and assurance security requirements which
apply to the TARANIS smartcard.
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It is composed of both an Integrated Circuit (IC) and an embedded software providing secure data
management following ePassport specifications (BAC, EAC); this document is therefore a composite
Security Target (ST).
In the following, the smartcard will be called “Target Of Evaluation” or TOE.
The TOE is a versatile device that can be easily configured in order to operate in different modes
including BAC ePassport and EAC ePassport. It possesses a dual interface to perform contact and
contactless communications to go beyond current ePassport usages.
This device can be proposed as inlay to integrate in secure document booklet but can also be
provided in a regular ID1 format.
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2 TOE Description
This part of the Security Target describes the TOE as an aid to the understanding of its security
requirements. It addresses the product type, the intended usage and the main features of the TOE.
2.1
TOE usages
State or organisation issues TOEs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming
associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an ePassport
configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with
the holder.
In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal TOE to the inspection
system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent
and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used
on the field.
The TOE in context of this security target contains:
• Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet
• A separate data summary (MRZ or keydoc data) for visual and machine reading using
OCR methods in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ or keydoc area)
• And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for contact-less machine reading.
The authentication of the holder is based on:
• The possession of a valid TOE personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given
on the biographical data page and
• The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection system using the reference data
stored in the TOE.
When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can performed extra
authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as
“visa information”…
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine TOEs. The receiving
State trusts a genuine TOE of an issuing State or Organization.
The TOE can be viewed as the combination:
• A physical TOE in form of paper or plastic with an embedded
chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the TOE holder
(1) The biographical data on the biographical data page
of the passport book,
(2) The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone
(MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies the device and
•
(3) The printed portrait.
A logical TOE as data of the TOE holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified
by ICAO and extended in [R6], [R7], [R8] on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact
or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the TOE holder
(4) The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1),
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(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
The digitized portraits,
The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both
The other data according to LDS (up to DG24) and
The Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the TOE to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the TOE and its data. The TOE as the physical device
and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical TOE is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on
paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the TOE’s chip) and
organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalisation
procedures). These security measures include the binding of the TOE’s chip to
the physical support.
The logical TOE is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the TOE’s
chip.
2.2
TOE architecture
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a smartcard composed of the following components:
• An underlying P5CD081, P5CC081 or P5CD041 chip of NXP,
• A native “BIOS FAT full” allowing efficient access to chip functionalities,
• A dedicated highly secure cryptographic library,
• A personalisation application on top of the BIOS,
• An LDS application providing both the BAC/EAC features on top of the BIOS.
TOE
Perso
(OT)
EAC/BAC
LDS application (Oberthur Technologies)
Cryptography library
(Oberthur Technologies)
Non-evaluated
features
BIOS FAT full
(Oberthur Technologies)
P5Cx081 / P5CD041 (NXP)
Figure 1: TOE architecture1
1
OT is the acronym of Oberthur Technologies.
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2.2.1
Integrated Circuit (IC)
The TOE relies on the functional and security features of the P5CD081. This chip is designed to embed the
secure code of Oberthur Technologies for the production of smart cards.
This chip provides the following major features:
• Die integrity,
• Monitoring of environmental parameters,
• Protection mechanisms against faults,
• A FameXE Enhanced Pulbic key coprocessor especially for RSA and ECC,
• A 3DES coprocessor,
• An AES coprocessor,
• AIS-31 class P2 compliant Random Number Generator,
• A CRC calculation block.
For more details, see [R14].
2.2.2
Basic Input/Output System (BIOS)
The native BIOS of Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip features from the
applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi-layer design which allows
applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip.
The main features of the OS are the following:
• EEPROM management including secure data processing,
• Other memories management,
• transaction management,
• APDU protocol management,
• Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management,
• error processing,
• advanced securities activation.
2.2.3
Cryptographic library
A dedicated cryptographic library is designed and embedded on the TOE to provide the highest
security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms:
Feature
Embedded
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA 256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 bits
RSA CRT from 1024, to2048 bits
RSA SFM from 1024 to 2048 bits
ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521bits
3DES with 112 bits key size
AES with 128, 192, 256 key sizes
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2.2.4
Resident application
This application manages the TOE in pre-personalisation, personalisation and use phase in order to
configure the card in the expected way.
It implements and control access to the following services:
• MSK management,
• File management including data reading and writing,
• Key generation,
• Key injection,
• PIN management,
• Locks management.
The resident application can be addressed:
• in clear mode for secure environment or non-sensitive commands,
• using a 3DES or AES secure channel otherwise.
2.2.5
LDS application
The Logical Data Structure (LDS) application is a generic filesystem that can be configured to match
especially ICAO specifications for ePassports BAC and EAC.
ISO specifications for IDL BAP and EAP are also matched, but not in the TOE scope.
It also includes commands and protocol management specified in [R15] used to grant access to
sensitive data stored in the filesystem.
Here are the main features provided by the LDS application and present in the evaluation scope:
Feature
Embedded
In the ST scope2
BAC
EAC
Active Authentication
(RSA CRT/SFM and ECC)
Cryptosystem migration
(Algorithm change during
certificate verification
transaction)
BAP
EAP
2.2.5.1
3
References
[R2], [R3]
[R2], [R3], [R4]
[R2], [R3]
[R2], [R3], [R4]
[R6], [R7], [R8]
[R6], [R7], [R8]
Basic Access Control (BAC)
The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection
system
• reads the printed data in the MRZ (for ePassport),
2
Features not included in the present Security Target are covered in the context of other CC certificates of the
same product.
3
BAC is included in the scope through an objective on the environment.
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•
2.2.5.2
authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After
successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC
rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
Basic Access Protection (BAP)
The Basic Access Protection (BAP) is especially used in the context of IDL as an alternative to BAC.
Indeed it is actually a generalisation of BAC allowing usage of extra algorithms and key length. It
exists in 4 modes:
• BAP1 - 3DES with key length of 128 bits (equivalent to BAC),
• BAP2 - AES with key length of 128 bits,
• BAP3 - AES with key length of 192 bits,
• BAP4 - AES with key length of 256 bits.
Note that the term MRZ is specific to ICAO standard; [R8] uses the term “Keydoc” which refers to an
equivalent unique identifier printed on the physical TOE as a random number or barcode.
This feature is not in the TOE scope.
2.2.5.3
Active Authentication (AA)
The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that
the TOE has not been substituted, by means of a challenge-response protocol between the
inspection system and the TOE. For this purpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA
or ECC Key pair. A hash representation of Data Group 15 (DG15, see 2.5.1) Public Key is stored in the
Document Security Object (SOD, see 2.5.1) and therefore authenticated by the issuer’s digital
signature. The corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE’s secure memory.
The TOE supports the loading and generation of the Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair.
2.2.5.4
Extended Access Control (EAC)
The Extended Access Control (EAC) enhances the later security features and ensures a strong
and mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access
biometric data such as fingerprints and iris stored in DG3 and DG4. In particular, the authentication
steps ensures a strong secure channel able to provide confidentiality of the biometric data that are
read and authentication of the Inspection system retrieving the date to perform a Match on Terminal
comparison. The Extended Access Control authentication steps the TOE implements may be
performed either with elliptic curve cryptography, or with RSA cryptography.
2.2.5.5
Extended Access Protection (EAP)
The Extended Access Protection (EAP) extends EAC to allow a more flexible protocol. It can protect
up to 24 DGs (from 1 to 24) and is no more restricted to DG3 and 4. In addition, it is possible to send
more than 2 certificates to the TOE in order to gain extra access rights.
This feature is not in the TOE scope.
2.3
Chip and software composition
The TOE contains an auto-programmable microcomputer (IC) with non-volatile EEPROM memory,
permitting the storing of secret or confidential data, and with associated circuits that ensure its
protection. The IC also integrates a ROM memory which embeds the code software of the smartcard.
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In order to ensure a secure composition between IC and software, the chip is configured and used
according to the security requirements specified in the datasheet and associated guides. This
especially specifies the secure way to manage IC memory.
The optional code or “codop” is an executable code that is stored in the EEPROM of the chip. This
code is called by the Resident Application when needed. These data are loaded during the prepersonalisation phase after the authentication of the manufacturer. Once an optional code is loaded,
it is not possible to load any other optional code whether the TOE is in pre-personalisation phase or
personalisation phase. The TOE ensures the optional code’s integrity and that it can not be read from
the outside.
In order to configure the available features of the product a One-Time Programmable (OTP) area is
present (see 2.4). It can be written only once and cannot be erased afterward.
Memory adresses
Executable code
software
Data (File system)
ROM
Codop area
EEPROM
Figure 2: Memory mapping of the TOE
2.4
TOE Configurations
The application locks are within a particular area of the EEPROM memory. It is called OTP (One
Time Programmable). When the TOE is delivered, all the bits of this area are set to ‘0’. Theses
bits may be set (to “1”) in pre-personalisation phase or personalisation phase after the agent
authentication (Manufacturer or Personnalizer). Once a bit is set to “1” in this area, it can not be
reset anymore. This area is used to select the configuration of the TOE, in particular:
• If the BAC is enforced in used phase (‘0’ = not enforced/’1’ = enforced)
• If the EAC is enforced in used phase (‘0’ = not enforced/’1’ = enforced)
• If the Get Data command is disabled (‘0’ = enabled/’1’ = disabled)
• If the Active authentication is activated (‘0’ = not activated/’1’ = activated)
• To indicate the TOE was pre-personalised (‘1’ = pre-personalised)
• To indicate the TOE was personalised (‘1’ = personalized)
These OTP bytes are protected in integrity as they are copied in EEPROM too.
Final configuration of the product is set by activating one or several of the five first locks. The product
is in use phase when the two last locks are activated. Since BAC is a configuration, the two ones have
been merged into a unique lock.
Note that in order to be functional, a correct and consistent personalisation of the TOE must be
performed.
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2.5
TOE logical structure
Roughly, the embedded application, when powered, is seen as a master file, containing a Dedicated
file (DF) for the LDS.
This dedicated file is selected by means of the Application Identifier (AID) of the LDS application.
Once the LDS dedicated files are selected, the file structure it contains may be accessed, provided the
access conditions are fulfilled.
2.5.1
File structure of the TOE
Figure 3: Structure of the file system
The TOE distinguish between two types of files
• System files,
• Data files that store data that are visible from the outside.
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Basically, system files and data files are files handled by the Resident Application. The Resident
Application handles their creation and management. Both types have the following characteristics:
• Size, size reserved within the EEPROM for the content of this file,
• EF ID, Elementary File Identifier of the file within the file structure,
• SFI, Short File Identifier used for an easy file selection. It is only used for data files,
• Access conditions, it specify under which conditions the file may be accessed (read never,
read always...).
2.5.2
System files
System files are dedicated to store sensitive data that are used by the application. These data are
protected in integrity by means of a checksum. Theses files may be created and updated in prepersonalisation or personalisation phase. Files containing keys are never readable.
Once created, these files are used by the Dedicated File LDS to work properly. They have to be
created before any use of the application.
In particular, theses files are used to store:
• The active authentication public key needed to perform the active authentication,
• The active authentication private key needed to perform the active authentication,
• The keys needed to perform BAC and EAC,
• The list of the application present on the card.
2.5.3
Data files
Data files also called Elementary files (EF) or Data Groups (DG) are dedicated to store data that may
be retrieved. They are protected in integrity by means of a checksum and can be created or updated
either in pre-personalisation or in personalisation phase. They are also created in such a way they
can only be read or write in use phase, provided authentications specified in access rights are
performed.
All personalisation configurations are possible including BAC and EAC. Nevertheless, Data Files
usually considered are the following:
• EF.COM which describes which DGs are present in the file structure,
• EF.SOD which contains a certificate computed over the whole DGs. It ensures their integrity
& authenticity,
• DG1 up to DG24 which contains information about the holder (picture, name…) and key
required to perform authentications.
2.6
Non evaluated features
Some features of the product are put out of the evaluation scope and are therefore not
part of the TOE. Here is the complete list of those functionalities:
• Supplemental Access Control
• Standard and biometric PIN management (therefore PIN associated commands are
out of scope)
• BAP and EAP applications
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2.7
TOE life cycle
The Smart card life-cycle considered hereby, is the one described in [R13]. This protection profile is
decomposed into 7 phases, described hereafter, whose only first three ones defined the TOE
evaluation scope.
This life cycle is related to the different phases the designer/manufacturer/issuer has to go through
to get a smart card ready to use. It starts from the design till the end of usage of the card.
Note that [R10] and [R11] define an anternative lifecycle almost equivalent (phases in [R13] are steps
in [R10] and [R11]) except this only difference:
Step 4 in [R10] and [R11], correspond to phase 4 of [R10] and [R11] and blocks ‘Micromodule”,
“testing” and “Embedding” in phase 5 of [R10] and [R11],
Step 5 in [R10] and [R11] correspond to the only next blocks “Personnalisation” and “Testing” in
phase 5 of [R10] and [R11].
It is depicted in the figure below:
Personalisation and Pre-personnalisation
TOE scope
TOE usage
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p ha se 1
L e v a llo is
N a nt e r r e
P essac
S o ftw a r e de v e lo p m e nt
of t he T O E
p ha se 2
IC p h oto m a sk
f a bri c a tio n
IC d a t a ba se
c o ns tr uc t ion
p ha se 3
IC
m an u fa c tur i ng
I C t e sti n g
TOE
D e liv e r y
p ha se 4
p ha se 5
C a rd p ri nt i ng
T e sti n g
m i c r om o d ul e
E m b e dd i ng
P r e -p e rso n ali sa tio n
p ha se 6
p ha se 7
T e stin g
T e sti n g
P e r son a lisa t i on
S m a r t ca r d pr od u c t
E n d- usa g e
A p p lic a t io n
E n d -us ag e
S m a rt c a rd
E nd o f li f e
A pp lic a t io n
E n d of l if e
Figure 4: Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE
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3 Conformance claims
3.1
Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target (ST) is CC Part 2 extended [R35] and CC Part 3 conformant [R36] and written
according to the Common Criteria version 3.1 Part 1 [R34].
3.2
Package conformance
This ST is conformant to the EAL5 package as defined in [R36].
The EAL5 have been augmented with the following requirements to fulfill the Oberthur Technologies
assurance level:
3.3
Requirement
Name
Type
ALC_DVS.2
Sufficiency of security measures
Higher hierarchical component
AVA_VAN.5
Advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis
Higher hierarchical component
Protection Profile conformance
The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 2:
• Machine Readable Travel Documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control [R11].
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4 Security problem definition
4.1
Assets
Logical MRTD data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs)
and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These data are user data of the
TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to
EF.DG13 and EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used
by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
The current EAC Security Target is dedicated to the protection of both Active Authentication
EF.DG15 (see below) and sensitive biometric EF.DG3&4. The other one (and associated keys) are
described and managed in the related BAC Security Target.
The Active Authentication Public Key Info in EF.DG15 is used by the inspection system for Active
Authentication of the chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection system for
Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
All these data may be sorted out in two different categories.
o If they are specific to the user, they are User data,
o If they ensure the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data.
User data
CPLC Data
Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as
user data as they enable to track the holder
Sensitive biometric reference data
(EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Contain the fingerprint and the iris picture
Chip Authentication Public Key in
EF.DG14
Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks
to a chip authentication
Active Authentication Public Key in
EF.DG15
Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip thanks
to an active authentication
TSF data
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TOE_ID
Data enabling to identify the TOE
Personalisation Agent reference
authentication Data
Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation agent
(same as BAC ST)
Basic Access Control (BAC) Key
Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the
Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document (same as BAC
ST)
Chip Authentication private Key
Private key the chip uses to perform a chip authentication
Active Authentication private
key
Private key the chip uses to perform an active authentication
Session keys for the secure
channel
Session keys used to protect the communication in confidentiality
and in integrity
Life Cycle State
Life Cycle state of the TOE
Public Key CVCA
Trust point of the travel document stored in persistent memory
CVCA Certificate
All the data related to the CVCA key (expiration date, name,..)
stored in persistent memory
Current Date
Current date of the travel document
Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the
MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
4.2
Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its
IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment
and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication interface of the MRTD's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the
threat T.Skimming (cf. [R10]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the
motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the
attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the
opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack
methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the MRTD's chip as
private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on
the physical MRTD as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in
possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data
T.Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the
changed MRTD holder's identity or biometric reference data.
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This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in
the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and
the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter
the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the
inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a
new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference
finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD's chip leaving their digital
MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the
complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T.Counterfeit
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the
authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a
genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's
chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data,
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in "Operational
Use" phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or
change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in
the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage
in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal
operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics,
clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements.
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to
measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the
contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available
even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed.
Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power
Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault
injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
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FQR 110 6668 Ed1
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD's chip in order (i) to
disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. An attacker
may physically modify the MRTD's chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the
MRTD's chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD's chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify
User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User
Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication
key of the MRTD"' chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by
modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis).
Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD's chip internals. Techniques
commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before
that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a
pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of
circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD's chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or
functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD's chip
Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD's chip outside the normal operating conditions,
exploiting errors in the MRTD"s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To
exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
4.3
Organisational Security Policies
P.BAC-PP
The issuing States or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection
Systems have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the "ICAO Doc 9303" [R2]
as well as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is successfully evaluated and
certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control" [R10] in order to ensure the
confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data.
P.Sensitive_Data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private
personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by
inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the
inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the
Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems
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within the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRTD's chip shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the
Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization
Agent Key.
P.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical
MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is
performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection
All the sensitive data are at least protected in integrity. The keys are protected in both integrity
and confidentiality.
Application note:
DG3 and DG4 protection is managed by P.Sensitive_data.
P.Key_Function
All the cryptographic routines are designed in such a way that they are protected against probing
and do not cause any information leakage that may be used by an attacker.
4.4
Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
A.MRTD_Manufact
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that
security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any
possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance
to its objectives:
o Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage,
o Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process and storage,
o Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill.
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A.Pers_Agent
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRTD with respect to the
MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD's chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if
stored on the MRTD"s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The
Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to
the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as
MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization,
and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2]. The Basic Inspection
System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive
Authentication to verify the logical MRTD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD's
chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection
System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State
or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive
biometric reference data.
A.Signature_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing
State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses
the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is
recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States
maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii)
hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document
Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the
Document Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for
the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
A.Auth_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification
Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key
pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country
Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organizations are signing the certificates
of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended
Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations
distribute the public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD's chip.
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5 Security Objectives
5.1
Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats
to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security
object according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents
only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during
and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by
authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
OT.Data_Int
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD
data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The
authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for
the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the
Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority
of the issuing State or Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD
data during their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the
sensitive biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Identification
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its
nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC
during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the
Pre- Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication as defined in [R2]. The authenticity proof provided by MRTD’s chip shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and
support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate
critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software
or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
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FQR 110 6668 Ed1
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test
Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD's chip
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption,
clock, or I/O lines and
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF
Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with high
attack potential by means of
o measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
o measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
o manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the
normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or
tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp.
electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
OT.Chip_Authenticity
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip. The
TOE stores a RSA or ECC private key to prove its identity, and that is used in chip authentication.
This mechanism is described in as "Active Authentication".
5.2
5.2.1
Security objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4,
5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
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OE.MRTD_ Delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the
following objectives:
o non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
o identification of the element under delivery,
o meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
o physical protection to prevent external damage,
o secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE's),
o traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
origin and shipment details,
reception, reception acknowledgement,
location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention)
and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing
with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the
procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
OE.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of
the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create
biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e.
the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the
MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect
the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key
Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer
Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country
Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and
integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document
Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document
Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the
Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital
signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if
stored in the LDS according to [R2].
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order
to (i) generate the MRTD's Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication
Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection
systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for
genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document
Security Object.
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FQR 110 6668 Ed1
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order
to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD's holders to authorized receiving
States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized
Document Verifier only.
OE.BAC-PP
It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally successfully
evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control" [R10]. This is necessary
to cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing
the traceability of the MRTD data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack
potential the addressed evaluation and certification is a technically separated process.
5.2.2
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented
by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect
any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i)
includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing
State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2].
Additionally General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD's chip.
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler
as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of
Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are
used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing CA Public Key and
the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection
systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent
eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully
established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection
Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference
data of the logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the
MRTD's chip for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal
Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.
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FQR 110 6668 Ed1
6 Extended requirements
6.1
Extended families
6.1.1
Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
6.1.1.1
Description
see [PP-0055].
6.1.1.2
Extended components
6.1.1.2.1 Extended component FAU_SAS.1
Description
see [PP-0055].
Definition
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale
see [PP-0055].
6.1.1.3
Rationale
see [PP-0055].
6.1.2
Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
6.1.2.1
Description
see [PP-0055].
6.1.2.2
Extended components
6.1.2.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1
Description
See [PP-0055].
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FQR 110 6668 Ed1
Definition
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale
See [PP-0055].
6.1.2.3
Rationale
see [PP-0055].
6.1.3
Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability
6.1.3.1
Description
See [PP-0055].
6.1.3.2
Extended components
6.1.3.2.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1
Description
See [PP-0055].
Definition
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Rationale
See [PP-0055].
6.1.3.2.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2
Description
See [PP-0055].
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FQR 110 6668 Ed1
Definition
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
Rationale
See [PP-0055].
6.1.3.3
Rationale
See [PP-0055].
6.1.4
Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
6.1.4.1
Description
See [PP-0055].
6.1.4.2
Extended components
6.1.4.2.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1
Description
See [PP-0055].
Definition
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment:
specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale
See [PP-0055].
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6.1.4.3
Rationale
See [PP-0055].
6.1.5
Extended family FIA_API - Authentication Proof of Identity
6.1.5.1
Description
See [R11]§5.3 for more details.
6.1.5.2
Extended components
6.1.5.2.1 Extended component FIA_API.1
Description
See [R11]§5.3 for more details.
Definition
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of
the [assignment: authorized user or role].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale
See [R11]§5.3 for more details.
6.1.5.3
Rationale
See [R11]§5.3 for more details.
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7 Security Functional Requirements
7.1
Security Functional Requirements
Definitions of security attributes, keys and certificated referred in this section can be foun din
[R11]§6.
7.1.1
PP EAC
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm Diffie Hellman or Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellmann and specified
cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that meet the following: [R4], Annex A.1.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 ans SHA-512 and cryptographic key sizes none that
meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SYM The TSF shall perform secure messaging - encryption and decryption
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES and cryptographic key sizes 112
bits that meet the following: TR-03110 [R4].
Application note: For DG3 (Fingerprint) and DG4 (Iris), the Personalization Agent can restrict the
Secure Messaging associated, in compliance with FMT_MOF.1/SM.
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FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging - message authentication code
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm MAC Algo 3 and cryptographic key sizes
112 bits that meet the following: TR-03110 [R4].
Application note: For DG3 (Fingerprint) and DG4 (Iris), the Personalization Agent can restrict the
Secure Messaging associated, in compliance with FMT_MOF.1/SM.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_VER The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or RSASSA-PSS or ECDSA with SHA
algorithms as specified in FCS_COP.1/SHA and cryptographic key sizes
o 1024 to 2048 bits (by steps of 256 bits) for RSA,
o 192 to 521 bits over characteristic p curves for ECDSA
that meet the following:
o [R24] and [R24] for RSASSA,
o [R17], [R18], [R19] for ECDSA.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet the
requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following AIS 31 [R31].
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o 1. to establish the communication channel,
o 2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
o 3. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol,
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o 1. to establish the communication channel,
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FQR 110 6668 Ed1
o 2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
o 3. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key,
o 4. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol,
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
o 1. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
o 2. Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES.
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
o 1. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
o 2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
o 3. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
o 1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key,
o 2. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received
commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication
Mechanism,
o 3. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip
Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the
TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent by
the GIS.
34
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according to [R4] to prove the
identity of the TOE.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read and
modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and Active
Authentication private key of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:
o 1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Extended Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
o 2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD,
c. data in EF.COM,
d. data in EF.SOD,
e. Active Authentication public key,
o 3. Security attributes:
a. authentication status of terminals,
b. Terminal Authorization.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o 1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read
the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD, including the
Active Authenticate public Key,
o 2. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read access to
DG3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is
allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD.
o 3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read access to
DG4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to
read the data in EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.
35
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
o 1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
o 2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
o 3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
o 4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
o 5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
o 6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System is
not allowed to read any of the EF.DG3 to EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.
Application note: the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read access to
DG3 and DG4 must be in accordance with FMT_MOF.1/SM.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors
after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
o 1. Initialization,
o 2. Pre-personalization,
o 3. Personalization.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
o 1. Manufacturer,
36
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
o
o
o
o
o
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
4. Document Verifier,
5. Domestic Extended Inspection System,
6. Foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o 1. User Data to be manipulated,
o 2. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
o 3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o 4. software to be reconstructed and,
o 5. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o 1. User Data to be manipulated,
o 2. sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
o 3. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o 4. software to be reconstructed and,
o 5. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable
other attacks.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the the Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data to the Manufacturer.
37
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the
Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
o 1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o 2. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
o 3. initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
o 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
o 2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current date to
o 1. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
o 2. Document Verifier,
o 3. domestic Extended Inspection System.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic Access Keys
and Active Authentication private key to Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load the Chip Authentication
Private Key to respectively the Manufacturer Agent and the Personalization Agent.
38
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
o 1. Document Basic Access keys,
o 2. Chip Authentication Private key,
o 3. Personalization Agent Keys,
o 4. Active Authentication private key
to none.
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate
chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control.
Refinement:
The certificate chain is valid if and only if
o (1) the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with
the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the
Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
o (2) the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and
the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of
the TOE,
o (3) the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country
Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection
System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated
Extended Inspection System.
FMT_MOF.1/SM Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/SM The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the mode of Secure
Messaging described in FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC
Application note: During phase 5 and 6, the Personalization Agent shall make a PUT DATA to restrict
the Secure Messaging available to read DG3 and DG4 in phase 7. This restriction cannot be
modified in phase 7.
39
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution
in excess of non useful information enabling access to Personalization Agent Keys and Active
Authentication private key.
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the following interface
smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Keys and Active
Authentication private key.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
o 1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could
occur,
o 2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions
o At reset
o Before the first execution of the optional code,
o After the Active Authentication is computed,
o Before any cryptographic operation,
o When accessing a DG or any EF,
o Prior to any use of TSF data,
o Before execution of any command,
o When performing a BAC authentication,
o When using the CVCA Root key,
o When verifying a certificate with an extracted public key µ,
o When performing the Chip Authentication,
o When performing a Terminal authentication,
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
executable code.
40
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
7.1.2
Active Authentication (AA)
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a
guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of
the indicated information.
Refinement:
Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the Active Authentication protocol.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_MRTD The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm RSA CRT, RSA SFM or ECDSA with SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256,
SHA-384 or SHA-512 and cryptographic key sizes
o 1024 to 2048 bits for RSA CRT (by steps of 256bits),
o 192, 256, 384 and 512 bits for ECDSA,
that meet the following:
o scheme 1 of [R20] for RSA CRT,
o [R17], [R18], [R19] for ECC,
o RSA SFM.
FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP when importing user data,
controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when
imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under
the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
41
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions TSF Active
Authentication to Personalization Agent.
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/ASYM The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA & ECC and specified cryptographic key sizes
o 1024, 1536 and 2048 for RSA,
o 192bits, 224bits, 256 bits, 384 bits and 512 bits over characteristic p curves for ECC
that meet the following: [R20], [R21], [R22], [R23].
7.2
Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirement level is EAL5 augmented with AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2.
42
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
8 TOE Summary Specification
8.1
TOE Summary Specification
Access Control in reading
This function controls access to read functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for
data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and
checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
It ensures that at any time, the keys are never readable:
o BAC keys,
o Chip authentication keys,
o CVCA keys,
o Active Authentication private key,
o Personalisation agent keys.
It controls access to the CPLC data as well:
o It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase,
o It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step.
Regarding the file structure:
In the operational use:
o The terminal can read user data (except DG3 & 4), the Document Security Object, the
EF.CVCA, EF.COM only after BAC authentication and throught a valid secure channel,
o When the EAC was successfully performed, The terminal can only read the DG3 & 4
provided the access rights are sufficient throught a valid secure channel.
In the personalisation phase:
o The personalisation agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated
by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
o The TOE is uniquely identified by a random number, generated at each reset. This unique
identifier is called (PUPI)
It ensures as well that no other part of the EEPROM can be accessed at anytime.
Access Control in writing
This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security policy for
data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the access conditions
are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in
personalization phase to be set to "1".
It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is personalized and
that it is not possible to load an optional code or change the personnaliser authentication keys in
personalization phase.
Regarding the file structure
In the operational use: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is
not possible to update any system files. However
o the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs,
43
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
o the Root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application
according to the authentication mechanism described in [R4].
In the personalisation phase
o The personalisation agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the data
files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
EAC mechanism
This security functionality ensures the EAC is correctly performed. In particular,
o it handles the certificate verification,
o the management of access rights to DG3 & DG4,
o the management of the current date (update and control towards the expiration date of
the incoming certificate),
o the signature verification (in the certificate or in the challenge/response mechanism).
It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip authentication keys & Root
CVCA key(s) the Personnalization Agent loaded during the personalization phase. Furthermore,
this security functionalities ensures the authentication is performed as described in [R4].
This security functionalities ensures the session keys for secure messaging are destroyed at each
successful Chip Authentication step.
The TOE handles an error counter; after several failure in attempting to strongly authenticate the
GIS (the error limit is reached). The TOE also implements countermeasures to protect the TOE; it
takes more and more time for the TOE to reply to subsequent wrong GIS authentication attempts.
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality & integrity of the channel the TOE and the
IFD are using to communicate.
After a successful BAC authentication and successful Chip authentication, a secure channel is
(re)established based on Symetric algorithms (Triple-DES, AES128, AES192 and AES256).
This security functionality ensures
o No commands were inserted nor deleted within the data flow,
o No commands were modified,
o The data exchanged remain confidential,
o The issuer of the incoming commands and the destinatory of the outgoing data is the one
that was authenticated (through BAC or EAC).
If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.
Personalisation Agent Authentication
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization Agent,
demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a
symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple-DES or AES algorithm.
Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in & [R2].
(if it is activated by the personnalizer). A self-test on the random generator is performed priori to
any Active authentication. Moreover, this security functionality is protected against the DFA.
44
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
Self tests
The TOE performs self tests on the TSF data it stores to protect the TOE. In particular, it is in
charge of the:
o DFA detection for the Active authentication,
o Self tests of the random generator before the BAC and Active Authentication,
o Self tests of the DES before the BAC,
o Monitoring of the integrity of keys, files and TSF data,
o Monitoring the integrity of the optional code (at start up),
o Protecting the cryptographic operation.
The integrity of the files are monitored each time they are accessed and the integrity of the
optional code is checked each time the TOE is powered on.
The integrity of keys and sensitive data is checked each time they are used/accessed.
Safe state management
This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets bask to a secure state when
o an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS,
o a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM).
This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state
"kill card" or becomes mute.
Physical protection
This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.
Prepersonalisation
This function is in charge of pre-initializing the product and loading patch code if needed.
8.2
Link between the SFR and the TSF
Prepersonalisation
FCS_COP.1/SHA
Physical protection
FCS_CKM.4
Safe state management
FCS_CKM.1
Self tests
Active Authentication
PA Authentication
Secure Messaging
EAC mechanism
Access Control in writing
Access Control in reading
FAU_SAS.1
X X
X X
X X
X
X X
45
X
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
FIA_API.1
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.3
FMT_MOF.1/SM
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_TST.1
Prepersonalisation
FIA_UAU.6
Physical protection
FIA_UAU.5
Safe state management
FIA_UAU.4
X
Self tests
FIA_UAU.1
X
X
Active Authentication
FIA_UID.1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
PA Authentication
FCS_RND.1
Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
EAC mechanism
FCS_COP.1/MAC
Access Control in writing
Access Control in reading
FCS_COP.1/SYM
X
X
X X X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X X
X
X
46
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
Prepersonalisation
Physical protection
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
47
Safe state management
X
FPT_PHP.3
Self tests
Active Authentication
PA Authentication
X
Secure Messaging
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM
X
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD
EAC mechanism
FMT_MOF.1/AA
Access Control in writing
Access Control in reading
FDP_DAU.1/AA
X
X
X
X
X
FDP_ITC.1/AA
X
FPT_FLS.1*
9 References
MRTD specifications
[R1]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R2]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable
Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R3]
Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion
technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a
Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –
1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[R4]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended
Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v1.11
[R5]
Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts
from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
IDL specifications
[R6]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence —
Part 1:Physical characteristics and basic data set, ISO/IEC FDIS 18013-1:2005(E)
[R7]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence —
Part 2: Machine-readable technologies, ISO/IEC FDIS 18013-2:2007(E)
[R8]
Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part 3: Access control,
authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC FDIS 18013-3:2008(E)
Protection Profiles
[R9]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 - BSI-PP-0035 15/06/2007
[R10]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSIPP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009
[R11]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control –
BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009
[R12]
E-passport: adaptation and interpretation of e-passport Protection Profiles,
SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007
[R13]
Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations,
ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009
Security Target
[R14]
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cc081VIA Security
Target Lite, BSI-DSZ-0555, Rev. 1.3, 21 September 2009
Standards
[R15]
ISO7816-4 – Organization, security and commands for interchange
48
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
[R16]
[R17]
[R18]
[R19]
[R20]
[R21]
[R22]
[R23]
[R24]
[R25]
[R26]
[R27]
[R28]
[R29]
[R30]
Misc
[R31]
[R32]
CC
[R33]
[R34]
[R35]
Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TR-ECC, BSI
2006
ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002
ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
ISO/IEC 9796-2 (2002) - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature
schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+
Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The Financial
Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998
Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003
RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical
Note, 2002
ANSI X9.31 - Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998.
FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes
utilisant un cryptogramme bloc"
NIST SP 800-90 – Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators (Revised)
FIPS 197 – Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen
und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1,
25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
NOTE-10 - Interpretation with e-passport PP_courtesy translation-draft v0.1
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1 : Introduction
and general model, CCMB-2012-09-001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2 : Security
Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September
2012
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3 : Security
Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September
2012
49
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
10 Acronyms
AA
BAC
CC
CPLC
DF
DFA
DG
EAL
EF
EFID
DES
DH
I/0
IC
ICAO
ICC
IFD
LDS
MF
MRTD
MRZ
MSK
OS
PKI
PP
SFI
SHA
SOD
TOE
TSF
Active Authentication
Basic Access Control
Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 3
Card personalisation life cycle
Dedicated File
Differential Fault Analysis
Data Group
Evaluation Assurance Level
Elementary File
File Identifier
Digital encryption standard
Diffie Hellmann
Input/Output
Integrated Circuit
International Civil Aviation organization
Integrated Circuit Card
Interface device
Logical Data structure
Master File
Machine readable Travel Document
Machine readable Zone
Manufacturer Secret Key
Operating System
Public Key Infrastructure
Protection Profile
Short File identifier
Secure hashing Algorithm
Security object Data
Target of Evaluation
TOE Security function
50
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
Index
FMT_SMF.1 ................................................. 37
FMT_SMR.1................................................. 37
FPT_EMS.1 .................................................. 40
FPT_FLS.1 ................................................... 41
FPT_PHP.3 ................................................... 41
FPT_TST.1 ................................................... 41
A
A.Auth_PKI................................................... 24
A.Insp_Sys .................................................... 24
A.MRTD_Delivery........................................ 23
A.MRTD_Manufact ...................................... 23
A.Pers_Agent ................................................ 24
A.Signature_PKI ........................................... 24
Access__Control__in__reading .................... 44
Access__Control__in__writing ..................... 44
Active__Authentication................................. 45
Authenticity__of__the__MRTD's__chip ...... 20
L
Logical__MRTD__data ................................ 19
O
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD .................................. 27
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data............................... 28
OE.BAC-PP .................................................. 28
OE.Exam_MRTD ......................................... 28
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems .................................. 28
OE.MRTD___Delivery ................................ 27
OE.MRTD_Manufact ................................... 26
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign...................................... 27
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif................................ 28
OE.Personalization ....................................... 27
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD.............................. 28
OT.AC_Pers ................................................. 25
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof ................................... 25
OT.Chip_Authenticity .................................. 26
OT.Data_Int .................................................. 25
OT.Identification .......................................... 25
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func .................................... 25
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak......................................... 26
OT.Prot_Malfunction.................................... 26
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper .................................. 26
OT.Sens_Data_Conf ..................................... 25
E
EAC__mechanism ......................................... 45
F
FAU_SAS.1................................................... 33
FCS_CKM.1 .................................................. 33
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM ..................................... 43
FCS_CKM.4 .................................................. 33
FCS_COP.1/MAC ................................... 33, 34
FCS_COP.1/SHA .......................................... 33
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD .............................. 42
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.................................. 34
FCS_COP.1/SYM ......................................... 33
FCS_RND.1 .................................................. 34
FDP_ACC.1 .................................................. 36
FDP_ACF.1 ................................................... 36
FDP_DAU.1/AA ........................................... 42
FDP_ITC.1/AA ............................................. 42
FDP_UCT.1................................................... 37
FDP_UIT.1 .................................................... 37
FIA_API.1 ..................................................... 35
FIA_UAU.1 ................................................... 34
FIA_UAU.4 ................................................... 35
FIA_UAU.5 ................................................... 35
FIA_UAU.6 ................................................... 35
FIA_UID.1 .................................................... 34
FMT_LIM.1 .................................................. 38
FMT_LIM.2 .................................................. 38
FMT_MOF.1/AA .......................................... 42
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK ..................................... 39
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI ............................. 39
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD........................... 39
FMT_MTD.1/DATE ..................................... 39
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS .................................. 38
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA ................................ 38
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ ........................... 39
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE ......................... 39
FMT_MTD.3 ................................................. 40
P
P.BAC-PP ..................................................... 22
P.Key_Function ............................................ 23
P.Manufact .................................................... 23
P.Personalization .......................................... 23
P.Sensitive_Data ........................................... 22
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection ........................ 23
Personalisation__Agent__Authentication .... 45
Physical__protection..................................... 46
S
Safe__state__management ........................... 46
Secure__Messaging ...................................... 45
Self__tests ..................................................... 46
T
T.Abuse-Func ............................................... 21
51
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
T.Counterfeit ................................................. 21
T.Forgery ....................................................... 20
T.Information_Leakage ................................. 21
T.Malfunction ............................................... 22
T.Phys-Tamper ............................................. 22
T.Read_Sensitive_Data ................................ 20
52
FQR 110 6668 Ed1
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