Certification Report: 0522a

Certification Report: 0522a
BSI-DSZ-CC-0522-2008
for
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition
Version 2.0b
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.25
BSI-DSZ-CC-0522-2008
Security IC with MRTD BAC Application
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition
Version 2.0b
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application", Basic Access Control,
BSI-PP-0017-2005
Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of
the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 10 October 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0522-2008
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Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16
7.1 Description of the Test Configuration....................................................................16
7.2 Developer Tests according to ATE_FUN..............................................................16
7.3 Evaluator Tests according to ATE_IND.................................................................17
7.4 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA..........................................................18
7.4.1 Developer Vulnerability Analysis.....................................................................18
7.4.2 Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis......................................................................18
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................19
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................20
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................20
11 Security Target...........................................................................................................20
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................20
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................23
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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A Certification
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
●
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2 Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17
December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became effective on 03 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was
extended to include certificates based on the CC for all Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL
1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises
certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom
within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of
America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be
seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF) and
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of Security Measures) that are not mutually recognised in
accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4components of these assurance families are relevant.
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008. Specific
results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b was conducted
by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on
06 October 2008. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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The product was developed by: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4 Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security
Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance
of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if
required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to
perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5 Publication
The product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b has been included in the BSI list
of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228
9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstraße 159
81607 München
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B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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1 Executive Summary
Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] resp. [7] is the
Security IC with a Machine Readable Travel Document, Basic Access Control Application.
The Security Target is based on the Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application", Basic Access Control [9].
The TOE is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents
(MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [10]. It provides
the Basic Access Control and the Active Authentication mechanism described in [11]. The
TOE will be embedded as an inlay chip module into a passport booklet.
The Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) of the TOE are based entirely on the
assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3
for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance
Level EAL 4 augmented by ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 5.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.ACCESS
Access Control
Before the TSF performs an operation
requested by a user, this Security
Function checks if the operation specific
requirements on user authorisation and
protection of communication data are
fulfilled.
SF.ADMIN
Administration of the TOE
The administration of the TOE is
managed by this Security Function. The
TOE administration is mainly done in
the initialisation and personalisation
phase.
SF.AUTH
Authentication of the authorized TOE
user
The authentication of the authorized user
is managed by this Security Function.
SF.CRYPTO
Cryptographic Support
This Security Function provides the
cryptographic support for the other
Security Functions.
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TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.PROTECTION
Protection of TSC
This Security Function protects the TSF
functionality, TSF data and user data.
SF.IC
Security Functions of the IC
This Security Function covers the
Security Functions of the IC
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 6.1 is confirmed. The rating of the
Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] resp. [7],
chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 3.2 to chapter 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
●
the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the
contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors,
●
the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software,
●
the associated guidance documentation,
●
the Generic MRTD Application Verifier Tool, Version 2.0 (GMA-Verifier Tool) and
●
the Reference Initialisation Table for the GMA-Verifier Tool8 containing the IC
Embedded Software (operating system STARCOS 3.3) and the MRTD application
(dedicated file for the ICAO application in a file system on the chip).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
8
The GMA-Verifier Tool and the Reference Initialisation Table are part of the TOE but not part of the
deliverables. Since the TOE may be initialised with different initialisation tables that have to be
compliant to the Reference Initialisation Table without exceeding the CC certificate, the developer has to
ensure this compliance by checking the initialisation table with the GMA-Verifier Tool.
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2 Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No
Type
Identifier
Release
1
HW /
SW
Chip modules with NXP
P5CD080V0B including
STARCOS 3.3 PE Version
2.0b
Form of Delivery
SW completely
contained in ROM and
EEPROM memory,
chip mounted into an
inlay package (MOB4
module), initialised and
tested
- ROM mask of the TOE
already Implemented
STARCOS_CPDI0S
CSR33-1AV100
- EEPROM part of the TOE
loaded before TOE delivery:
Initialisation Table compliant
to STARCOS33PEV20_
Referenz.hex
Possible values:
CPDI0SCSI33A-1100V001 to
CPDI0SCSI33A-1100V0FF
2
DOC
Administrator Guidance
STARCOS 3.3 Passport
Edition [15]
Version 1.1,
13 August 2008
Document in electronic
form (encrypted /
signed)
3
DOC
User guidance STARCOS
3.3 Passport Edition [16]
Version 1.2,
13 August 2008
Document in electronic
form (encrypted /
signed)
4
DOC
STARCOS 3.3 Passport
Edition TABLES [17]
(STARCOS33PETABLES)
Version 1,
19 August 2008
Document in electronic
form (encrypted /
signed)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the Protection Profile MRTD BAC
PP [9].
Delivery is performed from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH in Munich to the personalisation
facility. Any delivery of the initialised inlays is done via a security transport of the MRTD
Manufacturer (G&D) or a security transport maintained by the Personalization Agent. This
delivery process has therefore to be regarded as 'personal pickup'. In addition, the correct
inlay modules for the TOE are secured by cryptographic means. Furthermore, the
personalizer receives information about the personalisation commands and process
requirements. To ensure that the personalizer receives this evaluated version, the
procedures to start the personalisation process as described in the administrator manual
for personalisation [15] have to be followed.
3 Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD BAC PP [9] by the
Security Objectives and Requirements for the contactless chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International
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Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Basic
Access Control in the Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE- Environment. The following topics
are of relevance:
●
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip,
●
Inspection Systems for global interoperability.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 3.2.
5 Architectural Information
The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit (IC), IC
Embedded Software, IC Embedded Software / Part Application Software (containing the
ICAO Application) and the Generic MRTD Application Verifier Tool (GMA-Verifier). While
the IC Embedded Software contains the operating system STARCOS 3.3 PE Version 2.0b
and key, the part Application Software contains the ICAO application (also referred as
MRTD application). As all these parts of software are running inside the IC, the external
interface of the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC,
the EAL 5+ certified NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart Card Controller (for details
concerning the CC evaluation of the NXP IC see the evaluation documentation under the
registration ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007).
The GMA-Verifier is not running inside the IC, but on a standard PC. It checks the MRTD
application (in form of a hex file) that is designed to be loaded onto the IC whether it
contains only allowed modifications in comparison with the reference application hexfile
"STARCOS33PEV20_Referenz.hex".
The following table gives an mapping of the subsystems of the TOE´s Embedded Software
and the corresponding TSF which were objects of the evaluation:
Subsystem
Enforced TOE Security Function
Access control
SF.ACCESS, SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH,
SF.CRYPTO, SF.PROTECTION
Setup
SF.ADMIN, SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC.
Commands
SF.ACESS, SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH,
SF.CRYPTO, SF.PROTECTION
Application Data and Basic
Functions
SF.ACCESS, SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH,
SF.CRYPTO, SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC
Crypto Functions
SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH, SF.CRYPTO,
SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC
Secure Messaging
SF.AUTH, SF.CRYPTO,
SF.PROTECTION
Hardware
SF.AUTH, SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC
Table 3: Subsystems and corresponding TSF
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6 Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7 IT Product Testing
7.1 Description of the Test Configuration
The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product STARCOS 3.3 Passport
Edition Version 2.0b consisting of the NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B,
operating system STARCOS 3.3 PE Version 2.0b and a file system (called MRTD
application) in the context of the ICAO application.
7.2 Developer Tests according to ATE_FUN
In the following the developer’s testing effort is summarised:
TOE test configurations
For the description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this report.
Developer’s testing approach
●
The developer performed functional tests in the Initialisation-, Personalisation- and
Usage phase of the TOE and covered all the TSF and related subfunctions.
●
Test suites were implemented in accordance with the functional specification of the
TOE in order to verify the TOE’s compliance with its expected behaviour.
●
The tests were performed on a smartcard emulator and on the test samples with the
MRTD Application.
Amount of developer testing performed
The developer has tested the 6 TSF of the TOE with a total of 1244 test cases. As
demonstrated by the documentation of the test coverage the developer has tested the
TOE systematically at the level of TSF functionalities as given in the functional
specification. As demonstrated by the documentation of the test depth the developer has
tested the TOE systematically at the level of the subsystems as given in the high level
design of the TOE.
GMA-Verifier
For the GMA Verifier, the developer provided a test case set which includes several good
case tests and several bad case tests. For the good case tests, only allowed modifications
were applied to the test hex file (which represents an MRTD application), while for the bad
case tests several unallowed modifications were applied to the test file.
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Overall developer testing results
All test of the TSF in the Initialisation-, Personalisation- and Usage phases of the TOE
passed all test cases so that all TSF have been successfully tested against the functional
specification and the high level design of the TOE.
7.3 Evaluator Tests according to ATE_IND
In the following the evaluator’s independent testing effort is summarised:
TOE test configurations
The tests were performed in the phases Initialisation, Personalisation and Usage. For the
description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this report.
Evaluator’s testing approach
The evaluator’s independent tests covered the security functionality of the TOE in the
Initialisation-, Personalisation- and Usage phase.
Subset size chosen
The evaluators have tested all 6 TSF.
TSF subset selection criteria
The evaluators have chosen a subset of developer tests so that all TSF could be covered
by at least one test case in order to confirm that the TOE operates as specified. The valid
cases as well as invalid cases were considered. For the simulator tests as well as for the
GMA-Verifier tests, all tests were reproduced by the evaluators.
Security functions tested
The evaluators have covered all 6 TSF within the independent testing.
Developer tests performed
The evaluators have selected and tested a sample of 595 test cases from the developer
TSF tests. The evaluator’s sample of developer tests covers all TSF and was performed
on a smartcard emulator as well as on the test samples with the MRTD Application.
GMA-Verifier
All developer tests for the GMA-Verifier were reproduced by the evaluators. For the
independent tests, two testcases (one good-case test and one bad-case test) were
performed by the evaluators.
Verdict for the activity
During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified. The evaluators
have verified the developer’s test results by executing a sample of tests in the developer’s
test documentation.
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7.4 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA
7.4.1 Developer Vulnerability Analysis
In the following the evaluator’s penetration testing effort based on developer vulnerability
analysis is summarised:
Testing approach
Examination of developer’s vulnerability analysis in the intended environment of the TOE.
TOE test configurations
For the description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this report.
Security functions penetration tested
The evaluators have covered all the TSF within the penetration testing.
Verdict for the sub-activity
The evaluator has performed penetration testing based on the developer vulnerability
analysis. During the evaluator’s penetration testing the TOE operated as specified. The
vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended environment for the TOE. The TOE is
resistant to attackers with high attack potential.
7.4.2 Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis
In the following the evaluator’s penetration testing effort based on his independent
vulnerability analysis is summarised:
Testing approach
Examination of evaluator’s vulnerability analysis in the intended environment of the TOE.
TOE test configurations
For the description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this report.
Security functions penetration tested
The evaluators have covered all the TSF within the penetration testing.
Verdict for the sub-activity
The evaluator has performed penetration testing based on his independent vulnerability
analysis. During the evaluator’s penetration testing the TOE operated as specified. The
vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended environment for the TOE. The TOE is
resistant to attackers with high attack potential.
8 Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b consisting of
●
the NXP Chip P5CD080V0B,
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●
the embedded software operation system STARCOS 3.3 PE Version 2.0b,
●
a file system (called MRTD application) in the context of the ICAO application,
●
the GMA-Verifier Version 2.0 (Build 1.1, 26 June 2008) and
●
the Reference Initialisation Table "STARCOS33PEV20_Referenz.hex".
9 Results of the Evaluation
9.1 CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the class ASE
●
All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
●
The components
ADV_IMP.2 – Implementation of the TSF
ALC_DVS.2 – Sufficiency of security measures
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a reevaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was the claim of the Common Criteria
Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application", Basic
Access Control [9] without changing the TOE itself.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",
Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0017-2005 [9]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2
●
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: high
SF.ADMIN – Administration of the TOE
SF.AUTH – Authentication of the authorized TOE user
SF.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
SF.IC - Security Functions of the IC
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For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for:
●
SF.ADMIN – Administration of the TOE
●
SF.AUTH – Authentication of the authorized TOE user
●
SF.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support
●
SF.IC - Security Functions of the IC
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
The TOEs implemented security functions meet the claimed Strength of Function SOFhigh from design and construction point of view. The strength of function available in a
specific system context where the TOE is used depends on the selection of the data used
to set up the communication to the TOE. Therefore, the issuing state or organisation is
responsible for the strength of function that can be achieved in a specific system context.
This has to be assessed in the specific system context. Then, the administrator
(personalizer) is in collaboration with the issuing state or organisation responsible to
provide keys with sufficient entropy, as required by the specific system context.
The Personalization Agent has to verify that the correct version of the TOE was delivered.
Defect chips and invalid passports including a chip must be destroyed in a way that the
chip itself is destructed.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC
Basic Access Control
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security
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CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DOC
Document
EAC
Extended Access Control
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES
Embedded Software
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDS
Logical Data Structure
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
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12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the
basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected
and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE9
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b, BSI-DSZCC-0522-2008, Version 0.6, 23 June 2008, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
(confidential document)
[7]
Security Target Lite STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b, BSI-DSZCC-0522-2008, Version 1.0, 19 August 2008, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (sanitized
public document)
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.2, 01 October 2008, STARCOS 3.3
Passport Edition Version 2.0b, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH
(confidential document)
[9]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0017-2005, Version 1.0, 18 August
2005, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[10]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical
Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision
1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organisation, LDS 1.7, 18 May 2004
9
specifically
23 / 36
•
AIS 25, Version 3, 06 August 2007, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 3, 06 August 2007, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
•
AIS 34, Version 1.00, 01 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for
EAL5+
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document
resp. CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0522-2008
[11]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable
Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version 1.1, 01 October 2004,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organisation
[12]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration ID:
BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs, Hitachi Ltd., Infineon
Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[13]
Certification Report for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B,
P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software, BSIDSZ-CC-410-2007, 05 July 2007, BSI
[14]
ETR for composition for NXP P5CD080V0B, BSI-DSZ-CC-0410, T-Systems GEI
GmbH, Version 1.1, 23 April 2008
[15]
Administrator Guidance STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH, Version 1.1, 13 August 2008
[16]
User guidance STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Version 1.2, 13 August 2008
[17]
STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition TABLES, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Version 1.0,
19 August 2008
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
–
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
–
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
–
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
–
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
–
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
–
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions
or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
–
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly
stated
(APE_SRE)
IT
security
requirements
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation
Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/
or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance
Components
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Configuration
management
EAL2
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
ACM_AUT
ACM_CAP
1
2
ACM_SCP
Delivery
operation
and ADO_DEL
Development
EAL3
ADO_IGS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADV_FSP
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
1
1
1
ADV_SPM
Guidance
documents
Life
support
by
AGD_ADM
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_USR
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
ALC_LCD
1
2
2
3
ALC_TAT
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
cycle ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
Tests
ATE_COV
1
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
Vulnerability
assessment
1
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
1
2
2
3
3
AVA_SOF
1
1
1
1
1
1
AVA_VLA
1
1
2
3
4
4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter
11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter
11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for
AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately
resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0522-2008
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology
of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 10 October 2008, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria Security
Assurance Requirements
●
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),
●
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
●
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a)
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Prinzregentenstrasse 159, 81677 Munich, Germany
(Development Center)
b)
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Dienstleistungscenter DLC, Prinzregentenstr. 159,
81677 Munich, Germany (Initialisation)
c)
Smartrac Technology, 142 Moo 1 Hi-Tech industrial Estate, Ban Laean Bang, Pa-In
Phra nakorn Si Ayatthaya, 13160 Thailand (TOE Completion)
d)
Giesecke & Devrient Slovakia (GDSK), s.r.o., Dolné Hony 11, 949 01 Nitra (TOE
Completion)
For development and production sites regarding the NXP chip P5CD080V0B refer to the
certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 [13].
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0b, BSI-DSZCC-0522-2008, Version 1.0, 19 August 2008, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH [6] resp. [7]. The
evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives and Requirements for the TOE
life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] resp. [7]) are fulfilled by
the procedures of these sites.
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