SerkanSaltikPhDDissertation

SerkanSaltikPhDDissertation
Europeanisation of
national immigration policies
A dissertation submitted to
the Institute of Political Science at
the University of Heidelberg
by
Serkan Saltik
under the supervision of
Prof. Dr. Frank R. Pfetsch
for the degree of
Doctor rerum politicarum
December 2014
This page has been left blank intentionally.
i
Declaration of authorship
By signing this declaration, I certify that the doctoral dissertation I am submitting is entirely
my own work except where otherwise indicated and that it has previously not been submitted,
either wholly or in part, for a degree at this or any other institution.
__________________
____________________
Signature of candidate
Date
ii
“We moderns have a source of interest at our disposal, which no Greek or Roman was
acquainted with, and which the patriotic interest does not nearly equal. This last, in general, is
chiefly of importance for unripe nations; for the youth of the world. But we may excite a very
different sort of interest if we represent each remarkable occurrence that happened to men as
of importance to man.” (Schiller, 1824, p. 17).
iii
Abstract
The ‘ever closer union’ motto of the 1957 Rome Treaty was indeed one of the most assertive
‘superordinate goals’ in the history of the EU. Symbolic as it may sound, a formulation of this
sort was in the aftermath of a war-stricken Europe intending to promote the initial cooperation
between a number of formerly hostile states to a broader audience. For immigration issues, as
part of a diverse range of policy areas in the Community’s course of action to that effect, the
Schengen Treaties in the 1980s served well by abolishing the traditional border controls and
setting about a deeper and wider ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. The 1997 Amsterdam
Treaty was quite seminal in this latter respect. Accordingly, decision-making in immigration
matters was to follow progressively supranationalist principles, with the competences of the
Council to be going halves with the Parliament incrementally. Aside from a certain level of
harmonisation in cross-border police and judicial affairs, nevertheless, the prevailing tendency
in the EU Member States’ patterns of immigration policy-making has since then been more to
the precedence of intergovernmentalism than to that of supranationalism.
Perceiving this ‘back-pedalling’ to be a serious damper on the tenability of the Rome Treaty’s
slogan in today’s far more crowded Union, this doctoral study aimed to investigate as its core
research question the extent of ‘Europeanisation’ concerning the immigration policies of four
EU members. The analysis of these cases, namely Germany, the UK, Greece and Italy,
included as a matter of course their convergences/divergences in this policy field as well. The
secondary question the study sought to answer by extension was in other words the
similarities and differences between the selected cases’ national immigration policies.
The main hypotheses to test within this framework concerned relevance of institutional
strength and public attitudes. A twofold approach was followed to operationalise this quest.
First, the selected cases’ historical backgrounds, institutional structures and patterns of
immigration policy-making specifically with reference to the EU/Community law were
treated with a qualitative textual analysis. The findings of this examination were then
substantiated quantitatively by the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) and the
European Commission’s annual assessment reports, backed up occasionally with the help of
recent Eurobarometer Surveys.
iv
For a wider perspective of Europeanisation, the research was designed in compliance with the
‘bottom-up’ model. Having employed this model against a historical/conceptual background where immigration, citizenship and multiculturalism constituted the three chief integral partsand in light of data from the MIPEX and the EU Commission supplementing this framework,
the study came to the conclusion that in the face of the relatively recent and rapidly expanding
immigration flows, the institutional structures in Greece and Italy were not poised for
effective management, which is why the two countries’ immigration policies had to undergo
‘transformation’ vis-à-vis the EU norms/standards/regulations in this category. While
transposition and implementation of the relevant EU texts ran on a certain level of scepticism
in all selected cases –not least because of the negative public attitudes towards immigrationGermany’s supranational commitments turned out to be more considerable than in others.
Despite the strong institutional structure it possessed like Germany, the UK appeared to be a
typical case for ‘Euroscepticism’ here. In any event, compared to that in Greece or Italy, the
extent of Europeanisation in the UK, as well as in Germany, amounted to ‘absorption’ at
most, given the latter two cases’ low-to-moderate needs for policy-change and bigger
regulatory capacities. Put differently, in the end, the immigration policies of Greece and Italy
were throughout the selected period of analysis illustrative of a higher degree of
Europeanisation than those of Germany and the UK.
Keywords: Europeanisation, supranationalisation, migration, immigration, citizenship,
multiculturalism, national policies, institutional framework, EU/Community law, thirdcountry nationals, non-EU nationals.
v
Acknowledgements
I consider myself very fortunate to have completed this work. It marks the end of a chapter of
my life where staying committed, keeping hold of mental toughness, self-discipline and
resilience were the main keys to success. For what started as a ‘holy mission’ and ended as
planned, no matter how tough the going may have gotten all the way, there are debts of
gratitude I certainly wish to acknowledge.
To begin with, I am grateful to my first supervisor Prof. Dr Frank R. Pfetsch for his priceless
comments and guidance throughout this long and tedious journey.
A second name I should particularly mention here is Prof. Dr. Subrata K. Mitra, not only for
the key insights he generously shared as my second supervisor but also for his genuine
character as an intellectual.
Next, warmest thoughts go to my wife, Elisabeth Leneschmidt-Saltik, for her ceaseless
support as well as encouragement to remember the lighter side of life during these extremely
demanding yet by all means constructive years.
Last, to my parents, Saime and Hüseyin Saltik: thank you for your selflessness and love.
vi
Table of contents
Declaration of authorship…..……………………………………………………………...
ii
Quote page.…………………….………………………….………………………………
iii
Abstract..…………………………………………………………………………….....….
iv
Acknowledgements..……………………………………………………………………....
vi
Table of contents..…………………………………………………………………………
vii
List of tables and figures...………………………………………………………………...
xii
List of abbreviations..……………………………………………………………………... xv
Chapters
Introduction..………………………………………………………………………………
1
0.1 Statement of the problem…..………………………………………………………….
5
0.2 Case selection……………………………..….……………………………………….. 6
0.3 Research model, questions and hypotheses………………......……………………….
7
0.4 Definitions..………………………………………………………………………….... 10
0.5 Delimitations……………….……….....………………………………………………
11
0.6 Research outline..……………………………………………………………………...
12
Chapter 1 Methodology..………………………………………………………………….. 13
1.1 Research philosophy..…………………………………………………………………
13
1.2 Research design..……………………………………………………………………… 15
1.3 Research method, questions, hypotheses and measurement…………………………..
17
1.4 Data collection and analysis..…………………………………………………………. 19
1.5 Research limitations..…………………….………………………….………………...
20
Chapter 2 Conceptual framework….……………………………………………………...
22
2.1 Immigration…..……………………………………………………………………….. 22
2.1.1 Historical and theoretical backdrop..………………………………………………... 22
2.1.2 Immigration in European context..………………………………………………….. 25
2.1.2.1 Labour migration..………………………………………………………………… 26
2.1.2.1.1 Integration...……………………………………………………………………..
29
2.1.2.1.2 Family reunion……...............…………………………………………………...
30
vii
2.1.2.1.3 Long-term residence…..………………………………………………………… 31
2.1.2.1.4 Fair treatment of third-country nationals.....…………………………………….
33
2.1.2.2 Irregular migration..……………………………………………………………….
34
2.1.2.3 Asylum..…………………………………………………………………………...
38
2.2 Citizenship…...………………………………………………………………………... 41
2.2.1 Citizenship as legal status……………..……………………………………………
42
2.2.1.1 Naturalisation…..………………………………………………………………….
46
2.2.2 Citizenship as political participation….……………………………………………..
49
2.2.3 Citizenship as identity..………………………………………………………….......
52
2.2.3.1 European identity..………………………………………………………………...
56
2.2.3.2 European citizenship...…………………………………………………………….
60
2.3 Multiculturalism..……………………………………………………………………...
63
2.3.1 Criticism of multiculturalism..……………………………………………………....
68
2.3.2 Integration, participation and assimilation..…………………………………………
70
2.4 Review....…………………………………………………………………………….... 72
Chapter 3 Theoretical framework….……………………………………………………...
76
3.1 Theory in EU Studies………..………………………………………………………...
76
3.2 Europeanisation..……………………………………………………………………… 80
3.2.1 Defining Europeanisation...…………………………………………………………. 80
3.2.2 Scope of Europeanisation…........................................................................................ 82
3.2.3 Models for Europeanisation...……………………………………………………….
84
3.2.4 Mechanisms of Europeanisation..…………………………………………………...
86
3.2.5 Phases of Europeanisation..…………………………………………………………. 87
3.2.6 Europeanisation and other research areas..….………………………………………
88
3.2.6.1 Europeanisation, EU integration and globalisation...……………………………... 88
3.2.6.2 Europeanisation and transnational diffusion..……………………………………..
90
3.2.7 Review of literature..………………………………………………………………... 91
3.3 Analysis.....……………………………………………………………………………. 95
Chapter 4 Legal framework.………………………………………………………………
97
4.1 Hard law..……………………………………………………………………………...
97
4.1.1 EC/EUTreaties.……………………………………………………………………...
97
4.1.2 Directives and Regulations…....…………………………………………………….
101
viii
4.2 Soft law.……………………………………………………………………………….
103
4.2.1 Open Method of Coordination..……………………………………………………..
103
4.2.2 Monitoring programmes: from Tampere to Stockholm……...……………………..
105
4.2.3 European Pact on Asylum and Immigration..……………………………………….
108
Chapter 5 Analysis of cases…..…………………………………………………………...
110
5.1 Country profiles.………………………………………………………………………
110
5.1.1 Germany…..…………………………………………………………………………
110
5.1.1.1 Institutional structure….………………….………………….……………………
113
5.1.1.2 Actors involved in immigration management..…………………….……………...
114
5.1.1.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective..……………….. 116
5.1.1.4 Citizenship and naturalisation policies in Germany.…………………….………..
122
5.1.2 The United Kingdom…..……………………………………………………………. 124
5.1.2.1 Institutional structure.…………………….………………………….……………
127
5.1.2.2 Actors involved in immigration management..…………………….……………... 128
5.1.2.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective..……………….. 130
5.1.2.4 Citizenship and naturalisation policies.……………………….…………………..
133
5.1.3 Greece..……………………………………………….……………………………..
134
5.1.3.1 Institutional structure.…………………….…..……………….…………………..
137
5.1.3.2 Actors involved in immigration management…………………………...………...
139
5.1.3.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective..……………….. 141
5.1.3.4 Citizenship and naturalisation laws in Greece..…………………….……………..
144
5.1.4 Italy.…………………………………………………………………………………
146
5.1.4.1 Institutional structure.…………………….……………………………………….
148
5.1.4.2 Actors involved in immigration management...…………………………………...
150
5.1.4.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective..……………….. 152
5.1.4.4 Citizenship and naturalisation policies in Italy..…………………………………..
154
5.2 Data on MIPEX..……………………………………………………………………… 155
5.2.1 Germany..……………………………………………………………………………
156
5.2.1.1 Labour markets…………....………………………………………………………. 156
5.2.1.2 Family reunion…..…………………………………………………………….......
157
5.2.1.3 Educational standards…...………………………………………………………… 159
5.2.1.4 Political participation..…………………………………………………………….
160
5.2.1.5 Long-term residence..……………………………………………………………... 161
ix
5.2.1.6 Access to nationality..……………………………………………………………..
162
5.2.1.7 Anti-discrimination measures.…………………………………………………….
163
5.2.2 The UK...……………………………………………………………………………. 164
5.2.2.1 Labour markets…………....………………………………………………………. 164
5.2.2.2 Family reunion..…………………………………………………………………...
165
5.2.2.3 Educational standards…...………………………………………………………… 166
5.2.2.4 Political participation..…………………………………………………………….
167
5.2.2.5 Long-term residence..……………………………………………………………... 168
5.2.2.6 Access to nationality..……………………………………………………………..
169
5.2.2.7 Anti-discrimination measures.…………………………………………………….
170
5.2.3 Greece.………………………………………………………………………………
171
5.2.3.1 Labour markets…………...…...…………………………………………………... 171
5.2.3.2 Family reunion..…………………………………………………………………...
172
5.2.3.3 Educational standards……...……………………………………………………… 173
5.2.3.4 Political participation…..………………………………………………………….
174
5.2.3.5 Long-term residence…..…………………………………………………………... 175
5.2.3.6 Access to nationality..……………………………………………………………..
176
5.2.3.7 Anti-discrimination measures.…………………………………………………….
177
5.2.4 Italy..………………………………………………………………………………...
179
5.2.4.1 Labour markets…………....………………………………………………………. 179
5.2.4.2 Family reunion..…………………………………………………………………...
179
5.2.4.3 Educational standards…...………………………………………………………… 180
5.2.4.4 Political participation..…………………………………………………………….
182
5.2.4.5 Long-term residence…..…………………………………………………………... 182
5.2.4.6 Access to nationality..……………………………………………………………..
183
5.2.4.7 Anti-discrimination measures.…………………………………………………….
184
5.3 Symmetry between national and supranational policies….…………………………...
186
5.3.1 Germany...…………………………………………………………………………...
188
5.3.2 The UK..…………………………………………………………………………….. 194
5.3.3 Greece.………………………………………………………………………………
199
5.3.4 Italy.……………………………………………………….……………….………..
205
5.4 Summary..……………………………………………………………………………..
211
5.4.1 Germany…..…………………………………………………………………………
211
x
5.4.2 The UK..…………………………………………………………………………….. 214
5.4.3 Greece.………………………………………………………………………………
217
5.4.4 Italy.…………………………………………………………………………………
219
Conclusion..……………………………………………………………………………….. 223
Bibliography..……………………………………………………………………………... 238
Appendices...………………………………………………………………………………
291
1. Glossary………………………………………………………………………………… 291
2. MIPEX Policy Indicators (2010)……………………………………………………….
xi
297
List of tables and figures
Table 1 Post-WW II net migration in selected EU Member States..………..….……........... 2
Table 2 Recent long-term immigration trends in selected EU Member States..…................
2
Table 3 Immigrant population in selected EU Member States as of 2012...………..............
3
Table 4 Configuration of domestic change..…………………………………………........... 88
Table 5 SSCI entries on Europeanisation (1981-2001)...…………………………………...
92
Table 6 SSCI entries on Europeanisation (2002-2012)...…………………………………...
93
Table 7 SSCI entries on Europeanisation according to disciplinary areas..………………...
93
Table 8 Basic migration statistics, Germany...……………………………………………...
110
Table 9 Stocks of foreign population in Germany.…………………………………………
111
Table 10 German citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life..….............
111
Table 11 Post-war immigration to Germany…………………………………………..........
116
Table 12 Asylum applications in Germany, 1980-1989………………………………......... 118
Table 13 Asylum applications in Germany, 1990-1999………………………………......... 118
Table 14 Basic migration statistics, the UK………………………………………………...
124
Table 15 Stocks of foreign population in the UK..……………………………………......... 124
Table 16 Net migration to/from the UK..…………………………………………………...
125
Table 17 British citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life.……………
125
Table 18 Basic migration statistics, Greece...………………………………………………. 134
Table 19 Stocks of foreign population in Greece..…………………………………….........
135
Table 20 Greek citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life...…………… 137
Table 21 Basic migration statistics, Italy..………………………………………….............
146
Table 22 Stocks of foreign population in Italy..……………………………………….........
148
Table 23 Italian citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life..……………
148
Table 24 Conditions for TCNs at German labour markets.………………………………… 157
Table 25 TCNs’ family reunion conditions in Germany…..…………………………..........
158
Table 26 Educational standards for TCNs in Germany……………………………….......... 159
Table 27 TCNs’ political participation in Germany………………………………………...
160
Table 28 Long-term residence conditions for TCNs in Germany…...……………………...
161
Table 29 TCNs’ access to nationality in Germany……………………………………......... 162
Table 30 Anti-discrimination measures in Germany…...…………………………………... 163
xii
Table 31 Conditions for TCNs at British labour markets...………………………………… 164
Table 32 TCNs’ family reunion conditions in the UK…..…………………………….........
165
Table 33 Educational standards for TCNs in the UK………………………………….........
166
Table 34 TCNs’ political participation in the UK……………………………………..........
167
Table 35 Long-term residence conditions for TCNs in the UK…………………………….
168
Table 36 TCNs’ access to nationality in the UK……………………………………………
169
Table 37 Anti-discrimination measures in the UK…...………………………………..........
170
Table 38 Conditions for TCNs at Greek labour markets…………………………………… 172
Table 39 TCNs’ family reunion conditions in Greece………………………………...........
173
Table 40 Educational standards for TCNs in Greece...………………………………..........
174
Table 41 TCNs’ political participation in Greece……………………………………..........
175
Table 42 Long-term residence conditions for TCNs in Greece.………………………......... 176
Table 43 TCNs’ access to nationality in Greece……………………………………………
177
Table 44 Anti-discrimination measures in Greece..…....……………………………...........
178
Table 45 Conditions for TCNs at Italian labour markets...…………………………………
179
Table 46 TCNs’ family reunion conditions in Italy..………………………………….........
180
Table 47 Educational standards for TCNs in Italy…...………………………………..........
181
Table 48 TCNs’ political participation in Italy………………………………………..........
182
Table 49 Long-term residence conditions for TCNs in Italy.…………………………......... 183
Table 50 TCNs’ access to nationality in Italy………………………………………………
184
Table 51 Anti-discrimination measures in Italy…...…………………………………..........
185
Table 52 EU legal texts on labour migration…..………………………………………….... 186
Table 53 EU legal texts on irregular immigration…..………………………………………
186
Table 54 EU legal texts on asylum issues….……………………………………….............
187
Table 55 Germany’s infringements of the EU Home Affairs Law…………………………
188
Table 56 The UK’s infringements of the EU Home Affairs Law……………………..........
194
Table 57 Greece’s infringements of the EU Home Affairs Law……………………………
200
Table 58 Italy’s infringements of the EU Home Affairs Law………………………………
205
Table 59 Immigration as the main concern in Germany.………….………………………..
212
Table 60 Immigration as the main concern in the UK….…………………………………..
215
Table 61 Immigration as the main concern in Greece..…………………………………….. 217
Table 62 Immigration as the main concern in Italy..……………………………………….. 221
Table 63 Overview of historical, political, legal and institutional characteristics.…...…….
xiii
224
Table 64 Overview of EU law infringements and legal actions..….………………….......... 225
Table 65 Extent of Europeanisation in all selected cases…...………………………………
226
Table 66 Immigration as the main concern in all selected cases…..……………………….. 230
Table 67: EU citizens who believe immigrants are a threat to their ways of life..…………. 231
Figure 1 Basic sources and routes of migration to Europe…………………………………. 1
Figure 2 Population of non-nationals in the EU..………...…………………………………
4
Figure 3 Perception of immigration as a problem in the EU..……………………………… 5
Figure 4 Preference for decision-making level in EU Member States..……………….........
6
Figure 5 Immigration policy-making to political science theories...……………………...... 24
Figure 6 Causal interaction in Europeanisation…………………………………....….........
85
Figure 7 Direction of domestic change..……………………………………………............. 88
Figure 8 Conditions for TCNs in Germany..........……………………………………..........
214
Figure 9 Conditions for TCNs in the UK..…………………………………………….........
217
Figure 10 Conditions for TCNs in Greece...…………………….…………………….........
219
Figure 11 Conditions for TCNs in Italy….…………………...……………………….........
221
Figure 12 Conditions for TCNs in all selected cases...…………...………………………...
228
xiv
List of abbreviations
AFIS Automatic Fingerprint Identification System
AIT Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (of the UK)
ARK Analysis, Research and Knowledge (of the UK)
BA Federal Employment Agency (of Germany)
BAF British Armed Forces
BAMF Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
BKA Federal Criminal Police Office (of Germany)
BMI Federal Ministry of the Interior (of Germany)
BMAS Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (of Germany)
BNA British Nationality Act
BPol Foreigners Authorities of the Federal States (of Germany)
BVA Federal Office of Administration (of Germany)
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis
CDU Christian Democratic Union (of Germany)
CEFR Common European Framework of Reference for Languages
COMPAS Centre on Migration, Policy and Society
CoS Council of the State
CRD Casework Resolution Directorate (of the UK)
CSU Christian Social Union (of Germany)
DG Directorate General
EBF External Borders Fund
EC European Commission
ECHR European Convention of Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
ECJ European Court of Justice
EMN European Migration Network
xv
EMU European Monetary Union
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
EURODAC European Fingerprint Database
FDP Free Democratic Party (of Germany)
FRONTEX European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
of the Member States of the European Union
GSEE General Confederation of Greek Workers
GSEVEE General Federation of Professionals, Small Manufacturers and Merchants of Greece
GVG Courts Constitution Act (of Germany)
HMRC Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (of the UK)
IMEPO Immigration Policy Institute (of Greece)
IMF International Monetary Fund
ILO International Labour Organisation
IND Immigration and Nationality Directorate
IOM International Organisation for Migration
IR International Relations
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
KKE Communist Party of Greece
LAOS Popular Orthodox Rally (of Greece)
MIPEX (Migration Policy Index)
MP Member of Parliament
NAM New Asylum Model (of the UK)
NASS National Asylum Support Service
ND New Democracy (of Greece)
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
OAED Organisation for the Employment of the Labour Force (of Greece)
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
xvi
OMC Open Method of Coordination
PASOK Panhellenic Socialist Movement (of Greece)
PCI Partito Comunista Italiano
QMV Qualified Majority Voting
SCT Self-Categorisation Theory
SEA Single European Act
SEB Federation of Greek Industry
SIS Schengen Information System
SIT Social Identity Theory
SPD Social Democratic Party (of Germany)
SSAS Structured Selection Assessment System
SSCI Social Sciences Citation Index
SYRIZA Coalition of the Democratic Left (of Greece)
TCN Third-Country National
TEU Treaty of the European Union/Maastricht Treaty
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union/Lisbon Treaty
UK United Kingdom
UKBA United Kingdom Border Agency
UN United Nations
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
WW II Second World War
xvii
Introduction
Policy-making in home affairs is not a five-finger exercise. Of many complex variables
defining the course of action to that effect, those concerning immigration are probably the
most salient. From a European perspective, the rigours and challenges are rooted largely in
the history of colonisation and industrialisation. Indeed, the legacy of this thorny past has for
long been manifesting itself across a number of EU lands, with their immigrant populations
originating almost entirely from former colonies and/or socially/economically/politically
underdeveloped regions.
Figure 1: Basic sources and routes of migration to Europe
……. Maritime and/or ferry routes
— — Air, land and/or maritime routes
An aggregate of poor life standards, concerns about political persecution, aspirations for
family reunion, better educational opportunities or job prospects have been pushing
generations of people into France, the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands, to
name a few, if not always at their discretion. The ‘magnet’ periphery in western/northern
Europe expanded lately to the south, when a cluster of other EU Member States such as
Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece began to draw migrants at a continually increasing rate, their
quintessential ‘sending’ status notwithstanding. A browse through net migration patterns,
1
particularly over the latter half of the 20th century, provides supportive evidence in this
regard:
Table 1: Post-WW II net migration in selected EU Member States (in thousands)
Period of analysis
Country
1958-
1963-
1968-
1973-
1978-
1962
1967
1972
1977
Germany
1,075
1,122
802
200
143
-85
106
39
UK
1983-
1988-
1993-
1998-
1982
1987
1992
1997
2002
290
1,891
323
834
937
-97
99
205
499
968
Austria
20
56
101
-28
30
92
275
24
213
France
1,520
314
692
215
355
290
138
188
1,078
Netherlands
12
55
179
181
80
134
220
154
145
Sweden
80
131
19
89
30
135
156
58
142
Spain
-194
-146
97
77
-43
-68
319
796
2,829
Portugal
-548
-702
108
199
-67
-148
149
174
180
Greece
-145
-99
11
330
114
159
465
298
54
Italy
-232
-232
19
165
266
-10
153
224
1,853
EC/EU total
1,454
195
2,234
1,499
779
2,180
4,265
2,639
8,578
All values are approximate, i.e. rounded off to the nearest thousand.
Based on World Bank (2014).
This overview displays general population movements without giving hints at continuity, that
is, whether or not these inflows had a temporary, transitional or permanent nature in the first
place. Since arrival of ‘newcomers’ is problematised currently in almost all these lands for
their lasting impacts, reference to long-term immigration trends is essential:
Table 2: Recent long-term immigration trends in selected Member States (in thousands)
Country
Population
Year of analysis
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Germany
82,002
769
780
707
662
681
682
346(b)
404
489
UK
61,596
431
518
496
529
527
590(b)
567
590
566
Austria
8,355
112
122
114
99
73(b)
74
69
70
82
France
64,366
:
:
:
302(b)
294
297
297
307(b)
320
Netherlands
16,486
105
94
92
101
117
144
123(b)
127
130
Sweden
9,256
64
62
65
96
99
101
102
99
96
Spain
45,828
672(b)
684
719
841
958
599(b)
393
361
371
Portugal
10,627
72(p)
58(p)
49(p)
39(p)
46(p)
30(b)
32
28
20
Greece
11,260
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
119
111
Italy
60,045
470
445
326
298
558
535(p)
443(p)
459
386
EU-27
499,433
:
:
:
:
:
:
1,731(bdp)
1,811(bdp)
1,750(bdp)
:= not available ; b= break in time series ; d= definition differs ; p= provisional
All values are approximate, i.e. rounded off to the nearest thousand.
Based on Eurostat Yearbook, 2013.
2
There is indeed research holding that most international migrants “fall somewhere in between,
in the category of transitional…migrants who arrive on temporary visas and work permits
with no intention to stay permanently” (Gill & Raiser, 2012, p. 333). The above-given figures
seem to deny such arguments, though, suggesting instead that mere reference to transitional
patterns cannot account for Europe’s net migration statistics alone. True, there may have been
idiosyncracies depending on occasional breaks of flows to destination countries, yet, as it
appears, the recent rise of non-national population in Europe has been characterised to a
significant extent by long-term immigration. Besides old destinations in the north, which
seemingly are still magnets for migrants, countries in the EU’s southern periphery have been
attracting sizeable influxes –and these are not really of those coming for short-term stay- at
steady rates.
A thorough inquiry into the true nature of these trends requires keeping an eye on two main
dimensions of immigration. The internal dimension, as it is generally understood in the EU
context, stands for movement of EU citizens from one Member State to another. The external
dimension on the other hand signifies arrival of third-country nationals (TCNs) from non-EU
countries. Recent inquiries observing this distinction demonstrate that the growth of
immigrant population in present-day Europe is moulded predominantly by the latter
dimension, i.e immigration of non-EU nationals coming from without the EU:
Table 3: Immigrant population in selected Member States as of 2012
Foreign nationals
Number of
Countries
immigrants
(1000)
Other Member State
Total
nationals
Non-EU/TCN nationals
(1000)
%
(1000)
%
(1000)
%
Germany
592
504
85
299
50
205
35
UK
498
418
84
158
32
260
52
Austria
92
83
91
52
57
31
34
France
327
212
65
91
28
121
37
Netherlands
125
83
67
51
41
32
26
Sweden
103
82
80
25
25
57
55
Spain
304
273
90
100
33
172
57
Portugal
15
5
36
1
9
4
27
Greece
110
68
61
25
23
43
39
Italy
351
321
92
104
30
217
62
1,694
:
:
:
:
:
:
EU-27
: - not given
Not summing values are due to rounding and the category of ‘unknown citizenship’ which was not taken into consideration.
All values are approximate, i.e. rounded off to the nearest thousand/percentage.
Based on Eurostat Pocketbook, 2014.
3
More on this, a follow-up Eurostat publication concerning demographic trends in Europe
revealed around 1.7 million long-term TCN immigrants who came from outside the Union in
2011. The number of EU citizens moving likewise for long-term stay the same year (yet at the
intra-EU level, i.e. from one Member State to another) was about 1.3 million (European
Commission, 2013b). Accordingly, the highest rates of ‘non-nationals’ (including both other
EU citizens and those from non-EU countries) were estimated in Luxemburg, Cyprus and
Latvia:
Figure 2: Population of non-nationals in Member States (in percentages)
(1): provisional
Source: European Commission (2013a).
In absolute terms, however, Germany stood out with its more than 4.6 million non-EU
citizens (ca. 5.7% of its entire population) on top of all Member States, followed by Italy with
some 3.4 million non-EU nationals (ca. 5.5% of its population). Other eye-catching statistics
came from Spain which hosted around 3.2 million non-EU nationals (some 6.9% of its
population), France with 2.5 million (around 3.8% of its population) and the UK with
approximately 2.4 million TCN size (ca. 3.9% of its total population). Although the number
of non-EU nationals in Greece was estimated to be under 1 million, such a quantity was
relative to the entire population quite high, for it amounted approximately to 7.3% and
outstripped thereby those of the foregoing Member States.
4
0.1 Statement of the problem
Europe’s popularity as a route of migration has long been comparable to that of North
America1 and there are strong signs that it will remain to be the case in the medium to long
run. Nonetheless, the issue of immigration has been for the former hardly a “part and parcel
of…collective memory” (Lucassen, 2005, p. 13). In the absence of a ‘lieu de mémoire’as
such, public attitudes towards immigration have in most European countries been generally
ill-disposed with a high degree of ambivalence (Boswell, 2005). Indeed, at present, for this
reason or another, immigration conjures up in the mind of an average EU citizen rather a
chain of problems to be curbed than opportunities to be seized, so much so that it may at times
suggest more serious an issue than for instance education, foreign affairs, defence or even
terrorism does:
Figure 3: Perception of immigration as a problem in the EU (27)
What do you think are the two most important issues facing your country at the moment?
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
EB 72 (2009)
10%
EB 73 (2010)
0%
Based on Standard Eurobarometer (EB) 73.
Further to that, when asked to choose from two main levels of policy-making in this context –
that is to say, whether treatment of immigration matters should be managed primarily by
supranational authorities or national decion-makers- EU citizens appear to go for the former:
1
To 2004 OECD statistics, net immigration in Europe stood just below that of the US, with an average 3 to 3,1
rate of immigrants out of 1000 inhabitants in total.
5
Figure 4: Preference for decision-making level in the EU Member States (in percentages)
For each of the following areas, do you think that decisions should be made by the national government, or made jointly
within the European Union?
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
National
governments
(EB 72 2009)
EU-level (EB
72 2009)
National
governments
(EB 73 2010)
EU-level (EB
73 2010)
carried out in
EU 27
Based on Standard EB 73.
Considering long-standing commitments to a border-free internal market across EU lands, one
could argue that immigration management would here be more favourable if it held a
predominantly supranational character. The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty was in this sense quite
expressive, insofar as a firm commitment was here made to move decision-making over
national immigration policies to the EU domain. Managing immigration issues under
Community competence as a key component of the Justice and Home Affairs would
accordingly promote policy harmonisation across Member States. Nonetheless, the hitherto
communitarisation attempts have not quite paid off in this respect (Ette & Faist, 2007, p. 13).
Against this rather fruitless background, on the face of it, this doctoral study set out to
undertake a comparative analysis across Germany, the UK, Italy and Greece and shed light on
the extent of ‘Europeanisation’ and convergences/divergences as far as their national
immigration policies were concerned.
0.2 Case selection
Selection of these cases was non-random. Aside from the fact that Germany, the United
Kingdom, and Italy belonged to a cluster of Member States hosting currently the highest
populations of an estimated 35 million non-EU nationals in Europe today, the Greek case
featured as one of the fastest growing immigrant destinations in the EU, as demonstrated
recently by the OECD (2011b) and International Organisation for Migration (2013).
6
For all similarities in this sense, however, these cases might appear to be somewhat uneven in
consideration of their unique national discourses vis-à-vis economic, political or institutional
parameters. As many studies focusing on contemporary immigration in Europe revealed it,
countries in the north were for instance capable of managing more effective control systems
than those in the south (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009). One must nonetheless admit that a
perfect match in case selection applies to hardly any research endeavor, irrespective of the
area it investigates. Structural differences between Germany, the UK, Greece and Italy were
on that account not regarded as research handicaps doing harm to the validity/reliability of
this study. They could on the contrary be of major service to reducing research bias, if any, to
a certain extent.
Obviously, further, all these four countries represented the rather ‘older’ segment of Member
States (the ‘newer’ being the last 12 EU accession countries). Such a preference was in all
fairness based on the undersupply of empirical data concerning the latter in literature,
regardless of the seemingly growing immigrant quotas they might be featuring in recent
times.
0.3 Research model, questions and hypotheses
Research design for harmonisation of national policies in the EU has traditionally been
informed by what in scholarship is commonly referred to as ‘Europeanisation’, drawing
roughly from institutionalist assumptions that the main factor generating policy changes at the
Member State level is its ‘misfit’ with the EU-level (Green-Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001).
Two main vantage points appear to count on this theoretical understanding. The ‘top-down’
outlook as the leadoff perspective in the field assumes that it is mainly the policy-making
mechanism at the EU-level that has a decisive role in the policy changes/adaptations at the
national/domestic level. The research design as seen from the ‘bottom-up’ angle holds the
opposite point of departure. Rather than “starting from European policies (or politics) as
independent variable and tracking down the consequences for domestic actors, policies, and
politics, it starts and finishes at the level of domestic actor” (Radaelli, 2004, p. 4).
To enjoy a wide angle as it may require, this study opted for the latter line of thinking. The
research model designed in accordance did not give credence to a vertical/uni-directional topdown understanding which generally premises that the adaptational pressures upon
domestic/national policy changes have primarily an EU-origin. It aligned instead with the
7
bottom-up perspective which had a capacity to apprehend Europeanisation as a policy-making
process starting first from the domestic/national origins to be then following both horizontal
(policy-making tracks of other Member States and/or non-EU countries) and vertical (those
ascending/descending to/from the EU-level) causal mechanisms.
Based on this research model, the study set out to investigate as its main research question the
extent of Europeanisation in terms of the EU Member States’ national immigration policies.
This query had indeed capacity for asking a second research question inquiring about the
way(s) in which these policies converge with/diverge from one another:
1. To what extent are the EU Member States’ national immigration policies
‘Europeanised’?
2. In what ways are the EU Member States’ national immigration policies similar
to/different from one another?
In making judgments about the extent of Europeanisation on target, a four-outcome model
was consulted as a benchmark (Börzel, 1999; Green-Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001;
Héritier & Knill, 2001; Radaelli, 2003). The situation indicating no considerable policy
change in the national domain amounted accordingly to ‘inertia’. For ‘retrenchment’ to take
place, the major condition was a negative trend by which policies in the area of immigration
became eventually less ‘European’. ‘Absorption’ on the other side suggested that the change
in question was ‘positive’, far-reaching and came broadly as a policy response to the EU’s
adaptational pressure. ‘Transformation’, finally, was to mark more profound positive changes.
Here national policy structures were taken to have seen replacement from head to toe, in
conformity with the EU’s norms/standards within the area of immigration.2
The chief hypothesis underlying the research questions considered briefly that the strength of
a Member State’s institutional framework concerning the area of immigration and the extent
of Europeanisation in this context had a negative correlation. That is to say:
1. The weaker the institutional framework of immigration policies in a Member
State, the bigger the amount of EU’s adaptational pressures upon Member States in
this field.
2
A lengthier account of this differentiation is available in ‘Phases of Europeanisation’ as part of Chapter 3.
8
Another hypothesis which served to highlight a further dimension in research scope argued
that the perceived concerns and attitudes with respect to immigrants in host societies were
significantly decisive for the extent of and/or resistance against Europeanisation:
2. The more the public concerns holding that ‘newcomers’ do not fit in with the host
society, the lower the extent of Europeanisation as far as Member States’
immigration policies are concerned.
To test these hypotheses, a twofold procedure was operationalised. The first line of action
here was that of textual analysis, employed far and wide from data collection to assessment so
as to explore and delineate the selected cases’ historical backgrounds, institutional structures
and patterns of immigration/integration policy-making specifically in reference to the
EU/Community law. Then, to substantiate these findings in statistical terms, a second line of
action was brought into play in the form of numerical analysis. This undertaking concerned a
series of quantitative data obtained from three main sources.
The first source of quantitative data was derived from the Migration Integration Policy Index
(MIPEX), as managed by the non-profit Migration Policy Group and under the auspices of the
European Commission. The core MIPEX data comprising 148 policy indicators3 were
formulated through a rich platform of scholarly contributions with the aim to benchmark the
current immigration policies across 31 countries, a big majority of which were EU members.
The second source of quantitative data comprised the EU Commission’s regular reports,
released annually on the basis of the selected cases’ breach of EU law regarding immigration
matters. This cross-check covered implementation of 28 binding legal texts (of directives and
regulations)
falling
in
three
chief
immigration
areas:
labour/legal
immigration,
irregular/illegal immigration and asylum-seeking issues. Finally, the third host of quantitative
data included the Commission’s Eurobarometer Surveys. These were chiefly in the form of
Standard Eurobarometer opinion polls (the others being Special, Flash and Qualitative), which
were carried out over around 1000 face-to-face interviews amongst the citizens of the selected
cases.
While the method of research inquiry adopted in this framework was fundamentally
qualitative -for it was at the end of the day primarily self-perceptions of textual interpretations
rather than ‘numerical signs’ to be decisive in making conclusive judgments about the
3
Attached in Appendix 2 under ‘MIPEX Policy Indicators (2010)’.
9
selected cases’ Europeanisation of immigration policies- the research consulted inevitably a
series of quantitative methods -though rather indirectly by means of interviews, survey reports
and opinion polls as provided by the MIPEX, the European Commission’ law-monitoring and
DG (Directorate General) services, respectively- to provide depth and richness to its
investigation.
The use of quantitative data as a supplement was certainly meant to help reduce
methodological complexity to a minimum. Still, a core issue to mention to that effect was the
difficulty in identifying the net impact of the EU on national policy changes, i.e. separating
the EU’s influence from that of other sources elsewhere (Keohane & Milner, 1996). To cope
with this challenge to a certain extent, the study turned to the bottom-up research model
alongside methodological techniques like backward-mapping (Elmore, 1979) to take into
account further sources of change other than the EU’s adaptational pressure as well as
process-tracing (Bennett & George, 1997) with the expectation that a cohesive order would by
this means be established amongst all relevant findings acquired in the end. The research
involved against this background a comparative policy analysis whose independent variable
was in brief terms the ‘goodness of fit’, adding up to the EU norms/standards to be observed
in terms of immigration matters. The main dependent variable comprised on the other side the
policy changes/responses the EU Member States appeared to hold in this context.
0.4 Definitions
The central theme of this research is needless to say Europeanisation. While understood
generally as harmonisation of national policy-making on the basis of EU norms/standards, it
is hard to find a definition used congruently in scholarship when referring to Europeanisation.
This divergence stems largely from varying perceptions as to national/domestic policy
changes and their interaction with supranational dynamics. With that in mind, the study used
Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national)
discourse, political structures and public policies (Radaelli 2003, p. 30)
10
as a base with the proviso that the processes/dynamics mentioned herein should take their
final form chiefly under the heel of national policy-making. A comprehensive treatment of
this issue was provided in Chapter 2 as part of the conceptual framework.
With its research confines limited entirely to the EU context, the key migration terms in the
study were principally based on the EU Commission’s terminological databank. Accordingly,
immigration referred to “the action by which a person establishes his/her usual residence in
the territory of an EU State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months,
having previously been resident in another EU State or a non-EU country”. This entry is
indeed an extract from Appendix 1, where a mini glossary of basic terms is presented in
relation to the research field.4
0.5 Delimitations
Intended by immigration as the core theme in the study was almost always the extra-EU
dimension. Put in other words, the research scope overlooked mobility of EU citizens between
Member States to treat instead that of third-country nationals from without the borders of the
Union (into the Member States) as the main focus. The research questions concerning
Europeanisation and convergences/divergences of national immigration policies demanded in
that sense investigation of the selected cases in terms of their third-country nationals.
The selected time-frame included in broad terms the post-World War II period in which
patterns of immigration across Europe showed frequent symptoms of change. A central
weight was laid here on the process following the Amsterdam Treaty’s entry into force (in
1999) whereby Member States’ immigration policies became officially tied to the Community
Method.5 For experimental analysis, that said, the chief emphasis was on the 2004-2012
period. This last arrangement was attached essentially with the breadth of empirical works
fostering this study, i.e. those obtained from the MIPEX, the EU Commission’s law
monitoring system and the Eurobarometer surveys/opinion polls, whose stocks of data were in
circulation essentially as of 2004.
4
Major references used for this purpose are the e-libraries/e-resources of the European Commission, the
International Labour Organisation and the United Nations’ Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
5
To create ‘an area for freedom, security and justice’, the Treaty of Amsterdam introduced a new title (Title IV
of the EC Treaty) relating to ‘visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free movement of
persons’, whereby competences in this area were shifted from the third to the first pillar.
11
References feeding these queries were made up of primary and secondary sources ranging
from online materials to published/unpublished books, theses, interviews and other works of
academic value, which were all available in hard or electronic copies and were retrievable
through library catalogues and databases.
0.6 Research outline
There are five main chapters in the study. The introductory chapter presenting an overview of
the research is followed by Chapter 1, which provides the methodological grounds for the
research philosophy, methodology, data collection/analysis and finally research strategy.
Chapter 2 lays out the conceptual framework on the basis of immigration, citizenship and
multiculturalism, the latter two being the most immediate research areas to the former, as
perceived by the study. The theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 3 includes initially a
set of salient models in EU Studies to pave the way in the end for Europeanisation as the
research’s theoretical basis. The legal framework in Chapter 4 makes room for the core legal
texts Member States consult at the EU level in reference to immigration matters.
As the study’s chief empirical unit, Chapter 5 investigates at the outset a set of key players
guiding into the present day immigration agenda in Germany, the UK, Greece and Italy. This
inquiry is essentially based on immigration histories, institutional structures, principal actors
involved in immigration management as well as national immigration laws and policies, with
special emphasis on transposition and implementation of the EU law. Following that, the
research moves on to deliver data from the MIPEX according to the seven main dimensions of
immigration by which national policies concerning third-country nationals are brought under
scrutiny: labour markets, family reunion, educational standards, political participation, longterm residence, access to nationality and anti-discrimination measures. This inquiry is then
reinforced by analysis of infringements the four selected EU members have so far committed
in reference to the EU law. Selected for this purpose are 28 EU directives and regulations
whose substances cover the three main areas of immigration: labour/legal immigration,
irregular/illegal immigration and asylum issues.
Finally, in the concluding chapter, the study reviews its findings to offer explicit
answers/comments regarding the research questions and hypotheses posed/formulated at the
very outset, before it ultimately makes a last word for future research in the field.
12
Chapter 1 Methodology
This chapter delineates the methodological underpinnings of the study. There is to this end
first a presentation of the research philosophy, then the research design and methods, which in
the last part yield to issues concerning data collection and analysis.
1.1 Research philosophy
The guiding philosophy behind this work resonates closely with critical realism. The most
compelling grounds for this association spring from post-positivist principles in social
sciences. Two main traditions are linked with these principles. To social constructivism, the
very nature of social sciences is not apt to undertake scientific research. At odds with this
position on the other side is critical realism, which holds that “knowledge is fallible and thus
open to revision and replacement through empirical research” (Cruickshank, 2011, p. 4).
To critical realist ontology, ‘reality’ can by no means be reduced to a limited number of
individual observations (Bhaskar, 1975, 1986; Archer, 2007). Its ‘critical’ bit accentuates the
weak character of social knowledge to see to the fundamental question of whether or not
social reality is exogenous to human consciousness (Cohen, Manion & Morrison, 2000)
around two variants: ‘reality within’ and ‘reality without’ human comprehension. Although it
does not split radically from social constructionism, which essentially cites from relativism to
contend that knowledge is basically an extension to discursive power relations, critical realism
refuses to detach itself categorically from positivism, while being polemical about it, to
maintain that it is to a certain extent possible to constitute a positive development of
knowledge (Iosifides, 2011). To find a compromise between positivists and relativists, critical
realists seek to help reconstruct social phenomena by blending the positivist quest for reality specifically through their emphasis on causal links- with a rather moderate interpretivist
treatment taking reality as a social construction. Put differently, while adhering to the
underlying premises of realism, critical realists are informed to a significant degree by
idealism insofar as its conceptual schemes are adaptable for reality. What’s more, being “a
contemporary form of idealism” (Cruickshank, 2003, p. 47), critical realism does not conform
to traditional dualisms like positivist-interpretivist divide but brings together quantitative and
qualitative methods by freeing the former from its positivist restraints and the latter from its
relativist bias.
13
For migration research, the most obvious and outstanding virtue of critical realism is such
“critical methodological pluralism” (Danermark et al., 2002, p. 150), as it borrows from both
qualitative and quantitative models to detach the social world from the natural one. Given an
obvious need for interdisciplinarity in migration research, a pluralistic approach favouring a
well-balanced relationship between agency and structure (Psillos, 2007) becomes more than
an option. The capacity critical realism holds in taking stock of immigrants at the micro-level
and bringing that together with organisational/institutional structures at the macro-level offers
two main variants of causation in social events: horizontal/linear and vertical/non-linear
(Archer, 1998). The key method to choose between these two variants is called ‘retroduction’
(Bhaskar, 1986, p. 11). It is a backward process assigning a circular reasoning in data
collection, regardless of the type of investigation. This ongoing/circular process lasts until a
robust formation of knowledge is achieved to understand, explain and stimulate the
phenomenon (Bhaskar, 1986).
Critical realists explain reality by way of causal analysis. They are yet informed about
possible risks of deviation in this respect (Miles & Huberman, 1994). While believing firmly
that the course of social reality could in fact be determined by a delicate relationship between
structure and agency, the researcher, to critical realists, is at no times detached from the social
phenomena, for the link between ‘the knower’ and ‘the knowledge’ holds at all times an
inseparable nature. On validity questions, critical realism offers an in-depth exploration of the
social systems as they “are always open and usually complex and messy. Unlike some of the
natural sciences, we cannot isolate out these components and examine them under controlled
conditions” (Sayer, 2000, p. 19). From this perspective, an object with a diverse character is a
matter of question only when social scientists rely on interactions between abstractions. A
primary task of the researcher is then to track down concepts taking up new meanings,
becoming part of the public discourse and changing social life in the end. Identifying the
nexus of these discourses would help see that there are always limits to valid or meaningful
argumentation (Waever, 2005).
The epistemological ground of the study is leveled against this background with hermeneutic
phenomenology. This disposition is indeed not coincidental as the study aligns itself largely
with the subjectivist strand of social thought. As a branch of phenomenology looking up to
close links between ‘the knowledge’ and ‘the knower’ and for this reason necessitating
14
individual consciousness (Johnson & Christensen, 2007), hermeneutic phenomenology is
commonly associated with the ontology of dasein, which Heidegger (1927; 1962) offers to
explain the interdependence between ‘the self’ and the social world. 6 Rating these insights
highly, the study acknowledges analysis of “a text from the perspective of the person who
penned it” (Bryman, 2001, pp. 382-383). Seen from this perspective, social phenomena are to
be taken on all occasions as capable of connecting with the researcher, not as remote entities.7
Subjective research, as hermeneutical phenomenology prescribes it, demands that the
researcher take up a proactive position. This active role offers surely advantages for
alternative ways of thinking; however, it also holds risks of ‘value’ bias. One way to stay
clear off such dangers is adopting the ‘triangulation’ method, which encourages use of more
than one research technique, seeing that the nature of social phenomena is best permeable
when approached from a variety of angles (Pickard, 2007).
1.2 Research design
Aligning with critical realism without giving up on constructivist principles entirely has direct
implications for the research design. As formerly argued, the research philosophy underlying
this work renders it inappropriate to take a positivist stance amongst others in consideration of
the policy-oriented issues at its core, which call for an eventual use of subjective assessment.
Despite presumptions about comparative studies communicating in many instances to the
positivist logic (Hopkin, 2002, p. 266), this gives in fact very little room for contextual
relativity (Yin, 1994), which is how it becomes an intrinsic quality for this research.
Research design in European Studies traditionally draws on a number of ‘trade-offs’ including
‘cause of effects’ versus ‘effects of causes’ approach; concept formation versus
measurement; complex notions of causation (including multiple-conjunctural
causation) versus singular linear causation; omitted variables bias versus multicollinearity…; time as a qualitative factor in politics versus time as quantity of years;
6
Like phenomenology, the roots of which go back to Heidegger’s mentor Husserl, hermeneutic phenomenology
draws from the worldly life and human’s everyday experiences. Of several sources of disagreement between the
two, it was mainly Husserl’s appreciation of the material life Heidegger sought to challenge with his thesis of
‘dasein’ or ‘in-der-Welt-sein’. This notion was for Heidegger a way to assign meanings onto material lives.
While Husserl regarded humans as ‘knowers’ in the first place, Heidegger considered them to be capable of
‘doing things’ in this world to the extent of their capacity (Jones, 1975).
7
This proposition was held by Ricoeur, Gadamer, Giorgi and van Manen who amongst others stressed that
understanding social phenomena requires coming to grips with the socio-cultural/historical contexts they are
constructed in (Ray, 1994).
15
and mechanism-oriented research versus variable-oriented analysis (Exadaktylos &
Radaelli, 2009, p. 512).
Choosing one of the six approaches outlined here has obviously to do with the type of causal
analysis at hand. And yet, when the research matter is affiliated with Europeanisation, a
further trade-off comes into play under a ‘top-down versus bottom-up approach’ (Exadaktylos
& Radaelli, 2009, p. 514). To the top-down understanding, the causal analysis starts with
supranational dynamics at the EU-level. The vertical flow here is believed to crop up
irrespective of other possible co-actors which could also potentially change the degree of
fit/misfit between the national and supranational levels (Caporaso, 2001). For critics of the
top-down argument, the launch of the EMU (European Monetary Union) case is quite telling.
While the EMU’s foundation appears at first to be an outcome of supranational decisionmaking diffusing into Member States’ fiscal policies incrementally, the likelihood that it
could alternatively stem from neo-liberal policies at the global level would be overlooked, if
seen purely from the top-down perspective. And with such a ‘linear’ form of causation, as the
criticism goes, research would be ridden with serious fallacies and weaknesses (Saurugger,
2007).
Starting from the domestic level on the basis of “actors, ideas, problems, rules styles and
outcomes…at time zero”, the bottom-up model on the other hand “process-traces the system
over the years and identifies the critical junctures or turning points – for example, when major
ideational change takes place, or the constellation of dominant actors is altered” (Exadaktylos
& Radaelli, 2009, p. 510). To measure EU-specific variables, the researcher, to this model,
can use a backward-mapping technique (Elmore, 1979) in moving from the domestic level all
the way ‘up’ by controlling time-related causal chains which are of significant empirical value
for domestic change. Added to that, the bottom-up approach takes into account other possible
players beyond the national and/or supranational domains. In comparing the EU’s telecom
and electricity policies with those of other countries, Levi-Faur (2004) concludes for instance
that policy change in this sector comes largely as part of global dynamics. In that sense,
awareness of a complex network of discourses and causal sequences which are capable of
dominating the process of Europeanisation “is probably the only guarantee, if any (cf.
Haverland, 2005), of due consideration of the European factor as one of several alternative
explanations” (Vink & Graziano, 2007, p. 10). This argumentation stresses essentially the
16
need to extend the vertical and/or horizontal outlooks to an integrated view whereby policymaking at the national level could be seen as an outcome of domestic, supranational and
international processes simultaneously.
1.3 Research method, questions, hypotheses and measurement
As for the method according to which the research matter would be investigated, the guiding
principle was to follow a procedure capable of providing easy access to “meaning, process
and context” (Devine, 2002, p. 199). It appeared this condition was to be fulfilled most
fittingly by way of the qualitative method. To the quantitative praxis, as the other familiar
tradition to which research design is traditionally carried out, the researcher follows from a
positivist rationale with the assumption that ‘reality’ can only be achieved through a series of
methodical observations and experiments (Marsh & Stoker, 1995). Yet, given that it is
‘transferable’ conclusions (Punch, 1998) which was eventually intended by the completion of
this study, a better fit for its research design demanded a qualitative framework, for it spares
more room for diversity (Devine, 1995). Such an aspiration did however not necessarily
involve a categorical denial of quantitative tools. To test/verify the social phenomenon in
question more compellingly, resting on for instance more than one research method (Guba &
Lincoln, 1994, p.110), the study adopted further the ‘triangulation’ method.
Selection of the qualitative research method was intended to serve for investigation of two
research questions, i.e. the extent of Europeanisation as far as the EU Member States’ national
immigration policies were concerned as well as similarities/differences between them in the
same context. The end results to that effect were taken to be falling in one of the four major
outcomes of Europeanisation: ‘inertia’, ‘retrenchment’, ‘absorption’ or ‘transformation’
(Börzel, 1999; Green-Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001; Héritier & Knill, 2001; Radaelli,
2003). Accordingly, conditions corresponding to no observable policy changes in the national
domain would translate into inertia. Symptoms of retrenchment would be drawn from
‘negative’ changes in light of immigration policies which became progressively less
‘European’. In the event that this trend was ‘positive’, in other words, if the policy changes
were observed to have aligned with the basic terms/conditions of Europeanisation, the
inference would be that it was either absorption or transformation which occurred as a final
outcome. While absorption would suggest that the degree of adaptation to the EU’s
institutional framework was of considerable value, transformation was to mark a far more
17
manifest outcome, so much so that national policy structures became thereby subject to
comprehensive changes under the sway of the ‘European’ institutional framework.
Two main hypotheses were proposed to be explanatory for the investigation of research
questions. The first one conjectured that there should be a negative correlation between the
strength of a Member State’s institutional framework and the extent of Europeanisation in the
area of immigration. The second hypothesis established a further correlation between public
attitudes towards immigration and the extent of Europeanisation. Accordingly, the more
negative the public concerns about immigrants in a Member State were, the more marginal the
degree of Europeanisation would be a matter of question on this matter. A twofold method
was followed to test these hypotheses. To explore historical backgrounds, institutional
structures and policy-making patterns, the chief method to serve as a template was textual
analysis. Then, to support findings in accordance statistically, a second method was put to use
in the form of numerical analysis. Three main sources were consulted for quantitative data
here.
The first source for quantitative data was the Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX).
This was indeed an assessment tool generated and propagated by the EU-supported and nonprofit Migration Policy Group on the basis of a total of 148 indicators. These so-called ‘policy
indicators’ (attached in Appendix 2) were formulated by a wide platform of scholars to
benchmark the current immigration policies across 31 countries (many of which were part of
the EU). The second source of quantitative data included the EU Commission’s annual
assessment reports on the selected cases violation of the EU law (in immigration matters).
Examined here were 28 EU directives and regulations according to labour/legal immigration,
irregular/illegal immigration and asylum-seeking issues, as the three chief areas of
immigration. And finally, the last source of quantitative data covered a number of (Standard)
Eurobarometer Surveys which were conducted over around 1000 face-to-face interviews
amongst EU Member State citizens.
While the research made supplementary use of quantitative methods, by reference to
interviews, survey reports and opinion polls as provided by the MIPEX and the European
Commission, to provide depth and richness to its investigation, one needs to remember that
the method of research inquiry in this framework was essentially qualitative and it was, for
this reason, rather textual interpretations than ‘numerical signs’ to function as the key markers
18
for the investigated research matter. Enjoying qualitative and quantitative reasoning
simultaneously helps no doubt reduce methodological complexity to a minimum. Yet, a main
concern to mention here, which in fact applies to any study tackling Europeanisation as a
research theme, was the challenges of singling out the net impact of the EU on the policy
changes in Member States, in other words, whether or not the EU’s influence was entirely
separable from that of other sources (Keohane & Milner, 1996). To cope with this difficulty to
a certain degree, the study adopted the bottom-up research model, alongside backwardmapping (Elmore, 1979) in search of lower/further sources of change other than the EU’s
adaptational pressure, as well as process-tracing (Bennett & George, 1997) to put these roots
of change in a sequential order.
The cross-country analysis carried out in the research was an illustration of the case study
method. Two sets of cases were chosen to this end. The first set comprised Germany and the
UK, as two of the most established immigration destinations in Europe, according to the
OECD statistics released lately (2011b). Added to these, a second set of cases was brought
into use by way of Italy and Greece, in view of recent immigration patterns in the EU which
seemed to extend over the southern periphery as well. To this comparative policy analysis, the
independent variable was ‘goodness of fit’, i.e. the degree of compatibility between national
policies/institutions and those of the EU, as far as immigration was concerned. The main
dependent variable on the other side comprised the policy changes/responses the EU Member
States appeared to hold in this context.
As already imparted, convergences/divergences between national immigration policies were
explored here additionally through quantitative methods. Of particular relevance in this
category were survey inquiries, provided for this research by the Migration Integration Policy
Index (MIPEX) in the form of secondary data.
1.4 Data collection and analysis
The most common data collection techniques employed characteristically as part of
qualitative methods are “(a) participating in the setting, (b) observing directly, (c)
interviewing in depth, and (d) analysing documents and material culture” (Marshall &
Rossman, 2006, p. 97). Given the large research scope its case selection demanded as opposed
to the narrow resources and logistics held in the beginning to get this study underway, it
would have yet been unfeasible to choose from one of the first three options in particular, no
19
matter how much they meant for the originality and cogency of the research. In the end, under
existing circumstances, the remaining document/material culture analysis appeared to be the
only viable choice here.
Limiting analysis of cases to four immigration lands, two from the old destinations in the
north (as Germany and the UK) and two from the new in the south (Greece and Italy), is
indeed illustrative of purposive sampling8 and small-N approach9. While selection of cases
could have well been expanded through other significant cases (such as France or Spain,
where concentrations of third-country nationals rank today similarly at the top in Europe), it
was believed that the original decision would be adequate to investigate the subject matter
thoroughly, needless to say to the extent of their representativeness for the split between
Europe’s ‘north’ (or ‘west’) and ‘south’. As it were, this divide is in literature often perceived
to represent varying levels of institutional development in terms of the concerning countries’
historical, socio-political and economic backgrounds (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009).
Data in the form of primary sources were consulted insofar as they had connections to the
institutional backgrounds of the selected cases. Common references to this end were the
national laws/acts, the EC/EU Treaties, the Council’s and the European Parliament’s legal
texts including Directives, Regulations and Decisions as well as the Commission’s
Communications. The bulk of secondary sources was comprised of publications from
independent/non-profit organisations (for which the MIPEX was the primary source) and
other academic entries most of which were registered in the Social Sciences Citation Index.
1.5 Research limitations
A major limitation for the undertaking of this work was the poor background of empirical
findings. With its established theoretical principles, Europeanisation is today considered to
offer a firm basis of research (Featherstone, 2003; Börzel, 2005), unlike a period of
ontological uncertainty when it was regarded little more than an ‘attention directing device’
8
The qualitative approach consults chiefly “purposive sampling…to collect the data - mainly, data relating to
people's judgment, preferences, priorities, and/or perceptions about a subject - and analyses it usually through
sociological or anthropological research techniques” whereas the quantitative approach is known to use “random
sample surveys and structured interviews to collect the data - mainly, quantifiable data - and analyses it using
statistical techniques” (Carvalho & White, 1997, p. 1).
9
Although the small-N approach might be criticised for its oversimplification of cases, there is actually no risk
of bias as long as a deliberate negligence of a particular case makes no direct implications to the research
findings (Dion, 1998).
20
(Olsen, 2002). Yet, its handling as part of the immigration context has been very rare,
regardless of the fact that the latter was reportedly the EU’s fastest developing policy field in
the post-Amsterdam period (Monar, 2006). And even if there have been studies traversing the
scope of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA), these were not necessarily of primary relevance to
immigration in the first place (Kohler-Koch & Rittberger, 2006, p. 32).
Another area capable of raising similar reliability/validity questions is the generous use of
secondary sources in this research. To be fair, this issue would actually be applicable to any
research endeavor if it had ambitions to carry out a thorough and impartial investigation. After
all, even for primary sources, there would almost always be second thoughts as to whether or
not they were to have a ‘soft’/‘hard’ nature (Moravcsik, 1998, as cited in Lieshout, Segers &
van der Vleuten, 2004). In this sense, using parliamentary records or even legal documents
might be misleading for reasons of their possibly distorted viewpoints, which is why they are
in fact ‘soft’ by nature. In contrast, “internal government reports, contemporary records of
confidential deliberations among key decision-makers…lengthy interviews with numerous
policy makers” belong to the ‘hard’ category, constituting a far more reliable set of sources
for research inquiry (Moravcsik, 1998, p. 82). Nonetheless, regardless of this reminder, it is
important to bear in mind that this study set out by no means to pursue a positivist
understanding of reliability. Of more weight here was rather ‘rigorous subjectivity’,
‘transparency’ and ‘triangulation’, all informed by “critical elements and wringing plausible
interpretations…something one can pursue without becoming obsessed with finding the right
or ultimate answer, the correct version, the Truth” (Wolcott, 1994, pp. 366-367).
21
Chapter 2 Conceptual framework
To map out the conceptual boundaries of immigration is not an easy task. It becomes even
more so given the limited space in this work. Of many issues which may be closely affiliated
with the research scope, two themes are picked out to dwell on in this chapter (aside from the
leading part reserved for immigration as the central theme of the study). With its social,
economic and political subtexts slanting widely towards immigration, citizenship crops up
indeed to make the most adjacent connections to immigration. Added to that, as the
legal/political weight of citizenship may shade topical concerns like ‘diversity’,
multiculturalism is given here space as a third conceptual area, with the specific aim to bridge
the first two themes in cultural terms.
2.1 Immigration
2.1.1 Historical and theoretical backdrop
Migration is an issue as old as the fig leaf. Driven by personal motivations, struggles to make
a better living or live up to social, political and/or ideological preferences, generations of
people have been on the move -whether individually or in groups, for a short interval or longrelentlessly. For all that chase in the lengthy history of migration, a relatively recent turning
point is the advent of the nation-state. Indeed, understanding migration as a broader concept
of immigration and emigration to describe the process of people’s short or long term
movement “within or across the borders of a state regardless of the form and driving forces
lying behind”10 takes as an origin essentially the construction of the nation-state. Arrival in a
new land has been since then liable to border formalities, the regulation of which rests
primarily upon national citizenship rights and possession of passports. Informed by this frame
of reference, immigration research has adopted to date for the most part the “nation-state point
of view of spatial mobility, because it is (still) the dominant conventional view of the world”
(Favell, 2007, p. 271).
The earliest theoretical approaches to immigration were based on economic models. A
seminal work amongst these is Ravenstein’s (1889) Laws of Migration (Daugherty &
Kammeyer, 1995). Accordingly, it is almost always material interests that drive people away
10
European Commission, Home Affairs, e-Library, Glossary.
22
from their usual places of residence. Indeed, such ‘push and pull’ factors in pursuit of more
affluent conditions came to structure investigation of most notably the early-20th century
migratory movements from Europe to the United States, Canada and Australia (Lewis, 1954;
Ranis & Fei, 1961; Sjaastad, 1962; Lee, 1966; Todaro, 1969; Frank, 1966; Harris & Todaro,
1970; Wallerstein, 1974, 1980; Piore, 1979; Todaro & Maruszko, 1987; Borjas, 1990; Massey
et al., 1993). Central to most of these studies are subjects who “move from country A to
country B and either settle for good (i.e., become ‘immigrants’) or move back home after
reaching their economic objectives (i.e., become ‘sojourners’)” (Guarnizo, Portes & Haller,
2003, p. 1215).
Following economic models, studies from different disciplinary areas made contributions by
centering on other aspects of migration. Sociological models looked for instance into the role
of group dynamics and social structures on the basis of race, ethnicities and religion and their
connection to ‘assimilation’ (Thomas & Zaniecki, 1918; Park & Burgess, 1921; Warner &
Srole, 1945; Gordon, 1964; Alba, 1985; Alba & Nee, 1997; Faist, 2000). The field of vision
these perspectives offered was then made larger by historical and geographical surveys which
were taking into account the role of time and space in the first place (Stewart, 1941; Zipf,
1946; Isard, 1960; Wilson, 1981), while anthropological studies took as a goal to tackle
chiefly kinship and marriage systems (Gonzalez, 1961; Graves & Graves, 1974; Kearney &
Nagengast, 1989; Wilson, 1994).
The entry of political science into the scene was quite late, indeed just about a couple of
decades ago, when a number of theoretical approaches emerged to have investigated the links
between national sovereignty and migration (Hammar, 1985; Carens, 1987; Castles & Kosak,
1985; Freeman, 1995; Young 1996; Barbieri, 1998; Money, 1997; 1999; Hollifield, 2000;
Meyers, 2000; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2000; Zarembka, 2004; Bose, 2006). To be fair, majority
of these analyses were built upon other disciplinary contributions, economics and sociology in
the first place. While some underlined modes of production and participation, others
compared traditional and post-modernist views of the nation-state, sovereignty and
citizenship, and still others moved from the core institutions defining the liberal state to
emphasize the role of interest groups and power distribution behind the making of
immigration policies:
23
Immigration from an IR (International Relations) perspective was guided initially by the Cold
War security discourse on foreign policy-making and diplomatic relations. A most relevant
case in this sense was the handling of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the USA at the
time, which played a critical role in shaping “the timing, size and social character” of the big
migration waves almost always from the former to the latter (Mitchell, 1989, p. 682). The
perception of external security threat in this period was typically military-induced, whereby
immigrants added up hardly to a point of order for security debates by themselves as they
appear to be doing today.
As of the 1970s, a series of world-wide developments including the political crisis in SouthEast Asia, the rise of military regimes in South America and the global oil crisis together with
the ensuing economic setback marked the onset of a new period when flows of people from
outside the territorial borders were causing great anxiety in host societies. A far more
provoking development in this context was the end of the Cold War with which an increasing
number of refugees fleeing from civil wars in Africa, the Balkans and the former Yugoslavia
aroused further public concerns in target destinations, where immigrants held more and more
a tarnished image, recalling at times even that of terrorists (Buzan, Waever & De Wilde,
1998; Meyers, 2000). Despite arguments against immigration as a separate security-agenda
item, for this could risk an all-encompassing understanding of security (Walt, 1991), the
24
terrorist attacks in the early 2000s11 aggravated the already tarnished perception of
immigration.
An additional factor to consider in this thread was the latest EU enlargement which prompted
reconsideration of immigration policies particularly in a number of economically better-off
EU Member States. Linking integration issues which trod further on the heels of new
accession states to the security and terrorism discourses, the heads of a few established
immigration countries in Western Europe officially declared that the immigration/integration
policies they had been pursuing since the 1980s failed to produce desired outcomes (Weaver,
2010).
2.1.2 Immigration in European context
Diverse as they may be, factors behind mass immigration in post-World War II Europe fall
into two main and partly related patterns: economic/industrial interests and colonial legacies.
The first two decades following the war saw inflows driven fundamentally by temporary guest
worker schemes. In response to excessive labour demands, countries like Austria, Germany
and Sweden designed and implemented a series of recruitment plans up to the early 1970s,
attracting millions of newcomers, including returnees of ethnic origin who had previously
been displaced by the war (Bauer, Lofstrom & Zimmermann, 2000). While labour shortages
caused by booming economies applied also to France, the UK, the Netherlands or Belgium,
which similarly turned to recruitment policies, the bulk of newcomers here originated from
former colonies and in most cases were exempt from entry restrictions.
At the outset, most of these lands were well-prepared to provide essential resources for their
immigrants. Yet, as economic prospects showed signs of downturn, most notably following
the oil crisis in the early 1970s, the recruitment programmes in many lands were suspended.
The ensuing period saw not only a change in the composition of immigrant population, for a
considerable number returned to their countries of origin, but also in the ways immigration
was viewed in host societies. Studies checking into public attitudes have come to indicate in
various occasions that senses of antagonism towards immigrants have long been on the rise,
regardless of where they are (Crawley, 2005).
11
These are commonly known as the ‘9/11’ events, caused by the airliner attacks against the World Trade
Organisation and Pentagon in the USA, and the train bombings in London and Madrid in the ensuing period.
25
Spurred by socio-economic factors emerging dramatically in the last quarter of the 20th
century, mainly as a consequence of the post-industrial changes across European societies
(Betz & Immerfall, 1998), perceptions of immigrants as a threat to the host society became
much greater in magnitude. A Eurobarometer survey conducted in the late 1990s revealed
high levels of xenophobia in Member States, with more than 30% of the interviewees
regarding themselves explicitly as racist. To the question of whether or not their country
“benefits from the presence of immigrants from non-European Union countries”, for instance,
48% thought it would “be better off” in the absence of immigrants (in comparison to the 1988
survey’s 40%), while 12% believed their presence “makes no difference” (EB 47.1, 1997).
Public opinions featuring negative perceptions of immigration indeed called for a collective
response amongst Member States. The earliest Member State cooperation on immigration
matters took place as part of the global economic context in the 1970s and was largely based
on an intergovernmental understanding. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty confirmed this means of
cooperation by introducing the legal groundwork to the Community law and attaching it to
Justice and Home Affairs (the so-called ‘third pillar’). The ensuing Treaty of Amsterdam
appeared to change this pattern by providing the Community with far-reaching supranational
competences as far as immigration and asylum policies were concerned. The nearest Tampere
Summit set out to undertake a series of multi-annual working programmes in order to fulfill
the provisions and mandates decided at Amsterdam. Three such programmes have since then
been put into force: the Tampere, Hague and Stockholm Programmes. 12 Regardless of the farreaching action plans invested in these political and legal instruments, it appears today the
joint handling of immigration could not go beyond intergovernmental decision-making. This
verdict follows largely from Member States’ deep-seated second thoughts when it comes to
relinquishing power over ‘sensitive’ matters like immigration and foreign policy.
Regardless of this backdrop, the boundaries of a supranational level immigration policy have
materialised in three core areas: labour migration, irregular migration and asylum matters.
2.1.2.1 Labour migration
Labour migration in EU terms is understood generally as the movement of persons from one
state to another for the purpose of employment. The assumption concerning TCNs here is that
12
Chapter 4 as the legal framework of the study provides more space for these.
26
they enter a Member State through recognised and authorised channels to work and live there
in compliance with its national laws.13 Reference to labour migration amounts in this sense
almost always to legal migration.While the type of mobility here has a central role in fostering
economic development in the long run and in coping with the EU’s current demographic
challenges, the Commission’s proposals were often challenged by the Council on the grounds
that each Member State had its own labour market needs (to be translated into their national
laws).14 There is in literature plenty of work addressing this reasoning. Studies focusing for
instance on the UK, France and Germany appear to underscore tough competition so as to
attract skilled labour from one another (Guellec & Cervantes, 2001; Wyckoff & Schaaper,
2005).
This ‘race for talent’ (Shachar, 2006) is in fact not restricted to the European level. It was
already mentioned in a number of official occasions like the Lisbon Strategy or the Hague
Council where the EU lands were called to reconsider their competition strategies in order
that they could lure more skilled labour than their rivals like Japan or the USA
(Papademetriou & O’Neil, 2004). More on that, an EC Communication15 noted that varying
terms and conditions applicable to the TCNs’ entry, work and/or residence across the Member
States would not serve for the overall interests of the Union. In this context, the 2004 Council
in Brussels came up as part of the Hague Programme with a host of ‘admission procedures’
for labour immigrants16, the regulation of which would be belonging to Member States
individually.
This strategy inspired in essence the EU’s Global Approach to Migration which as a new
impetus to its external migration policy rhymed well with the formerly launched policy
instruments such as the European Neighbourhood Policy. Adopted in late 2005 in the face of
mass influxes of people seeking to cross into the Schengen Zone17, the EU’s Global Approach
to Migration put its initial weight on migratory issues within the context of EU-Africa
relations. The center of focus shifted in time towards the EU’s south-eastern and eastern
13
European Commission, Home Affairs, e-Library, Glossary.
Some states seek to expand this scope further beyond their national borders so that the nationals could get
ahold of further opportunities than what they readily find at the domestic labour markets.
15
COM (2003) 336 final (not published in the Official Journal) on immigration, integration and employment.
16
The Hague Programme (13.12.2004) Council 16054 [2004] 10.
17
In late 2005, hundreds of African migrants stormed to Morocco’s borders with the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta
and Melilla (BBC News Africa, ‘Africans Die in Spanish Enclave’, 29 September 2005).
14
27
borders.18 In late 2007, the EU’s security agenda was expanded with a new emphasis on the
promotion of democracy and the rule of law, calling on the treatment of all migration and
asylum issues in one frame.19 Or else, as it was voiced in the recently transposed Blue Card
Directive, skilled labour would be scared away from Europe to other destinations.20
Another policy strategy by way of which the EU sought to bring this comprehensive approach
into life was the import of labour via short-term/seasonal working. Signing mobility
partnerships with third countries has so far been common practice within this framework.21 In
the absence of a clearly established legal basis yet purely dependent on the coordination skills
of the EU, these mobility partnerships had however rather poor prospects. Seen in particular
from the perspectives of third countries, the launch of such policy initiatives made serious
implications for their labour markets. As it became clear with the Blue Card Directive,
provisions concerning labour immigration catered essentially to the interests of business
communities in destination countries, which in the countries of origin would amount to loss of
human capital. With that in mind, the Commission projected later a ‘win-win’ offer in the
form of for instance tax allowances to the countries of origin22 which could help minimize the
negative effects of brain drain. Added to that were assurances that an eventual circular
migration would in the long run provide positive effects for third countries by way of
remittances or extension of knowledge and experiences gathered in destination countries to
the economic, social and political advantages of countries of origin. What’s more, perhaps
more importantly, the EU immigration law was making references to circular migration –but
not mobility partnerships- as a gesture to consent TCNs’ exemption from all legal actions, if
they decided to return to their home lands at some point.23
The EU texts adopted under the heading of labour immigration so far are to a certain extent
made
up
of
short
residence
issues
regarding
students,
pupils,
unremunerated
trainers/volunteers, scientific researchers and highly qualified workers. Yet, the largest part of
18
Recent focus of FRONTEX on the southern borders revealed that in 2009, for instance, more than 150,000
illegal attempts were seized at the borders of the EU. Almost half of them took place in the Mediterranean and
Atlantic (FRONTEX, 2009).
19
COM (2007) 247 final.
20
Council Directive 2009/50/EC.
21
The EU has so far signed these agreements with Moldova, Cape Verde, Georgia, Armenia, Tunisia and
Morocco. Besides the Mobility Partnerships which were established with Tunisia and Morocco in late 2011, a
few more were on the way to mark the EU’s interest in the recent democratisation movements across North
Africa.
22
COM (2004) 811 final.
23
COM(2001) 127 final; Council Directive 2009/50/EC.
28
policy guidelines governing the extent of cooperation in this area are those regulating matters
of integration, family reunion, long-term residence status and fair-treatment.24
2.1.2.1.1 Integration
A traditional understanding of integration suggests a one-way form of accommodation,
known commonly as ‘assimilation’, whereby immigrants copy the norms and standards of the
host societies with the aim to become similar to them (Entzinger & Biezeveld, 2003; Penninx
& Martiniello, 2004). However, experience in a number of old Member States revealed that
most TCNs had on that score opposite thoughts. Success in integration was to them not
entirely dependent on themselves but instead on the opportunities the state would make
available to all (Robinson & Reeve, 2006).
Indeed, following a Communication25 and a Council document (14615/04), the Commission
underlined in 2005 that integration referred to a “two-way process of mutual accommodation
by all immigrants and residents of Member States”.26 Following a series of policy initiatives
such as the 2007 European Fund for the Integration of TCNs, the 2008 European Pact on
Immigration and Asylum and EU Integration Ministers’ informal meetings at Potsdam and
Vichy in 2007 and 2008 to discuss the reinforcement of integration policies, the 2009
Stockholm Programme27 reiterated the role of ‘mutual interaction’ in integration matters to
argue that success in this policy area was “the key to maximising the benefits of
immigration”. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty made nevertheless little room for integration matters.
Article 79(4) TFEU states that the EU “may establish measures to provide incentives and
support for the action of Member States with a view to promoting the integration of thirdcountry nationals residing legally in their territories, excluding any harmonisation of the laws
and regulations of the Member States”. The inference to be made here is that there were from
the perspective of Lisbon no legislative prospects for supranationalisation of integration
legislation.
The EU’s current integration framework holds three main components: a normative structure,
exchange of information and funding for integration projects (Collett, 2008). The first leg is
characterised by two main legal instruments: the Directives on Racial Equality and
24
Presidency Conclusions, the Tampere Council, 15 and 16 October1999.
COM (2003)336.
26
COM(2005) 389.
27
The Stockholm Programme, 2010/C115/01.
25
29
Employment Equality -aiming to eliminate discrimination in relation to gender, age and raceand the Common Basic Principles on Integration adopted in 2004 “to underpin a coherent
framework on integration of third-country nationals”.28 The second leg of information
exchange uses a number of policy instruments in keeping with the Open Method of
Coordination (OMC). These are National Contact Points on Integration which meet up
regularly to identify the best practices amongst Member States, handbooks and annual reports
published from 2004 onwards, a European Integration Portal and a Forum to discuss and share
related issues with all stakeholders across the EU and a shared platform of Social Protection
and Inclusion Policies whereby Member States could efficiently emulate best policies on key
social issues according to their agenda. The third component of the EU’s integration
framework concerns resources of funding: the Integration Fund targeting the newly arrived
TCNs, the European Social Fund as part of a wider General Programme of Solidarity and
Management of Migration Flows (for the prevention of social exclusion, promotion of equal
opportunities and active participation in labour markets) and finally the Progress programme
concerning funding of areas relating to employment, discrimination and diversity (Collett,
2008).
Though not bound by a supranational ordinance, there has in recent times been a rising trend
towards language and civic tests within the broad context of integration. A twofold purpose is
served through these integration tests. Accordingly, non-EU nationals become liable to a
range of criteria including entry clearances, long-term residence permits, entitlement to family
reunion and naturalisation, as decided by countries of destination. Added to that, integration
tests serve also for immigrant selection. While most traditional immigration countries in
Europe might have previously implemented similar policies as part of the requirement for
TCNs’ naturalisation process, the new understanding aims to formalise them country-wide
(not merely at the regional level as before) and where applicable to apply them (for instance
language tests) prior to newcomers’ arrival, i.e. in the country of origin, already.
2.1.2.1.2 Family reunion
The Commission defines family reunion/reunification (considering the Directive 2003/86/EC)
as “the entry of non-EU national’s family members into and residence in a Member State by
residing lawfully in that Member State in order to preserve the family unit, whether the family
28
COM (2005) 389.
30
relationship arose before or after the resident's entry”. Six Member States currently demand
integration tests within the context of family reunion. This practice began in 2006 with the
Netherlands, followed later on by France, Germany, Denmark, the UK and Austria in turn.
The forms of the tests and levels of language proficiency required are in each of these
countries different. The integration test of the Netherlands includes an oral interview and a
society language test to be applied in the country of origin. The French version demands an
additional written language test. Should these standards prove unsatisfactory, the applicant is
asked to sign an integration contract pledging he/she will later attend a course designed for
that purpose. The requirements in Germany and Austria are similar to those in France but
exclude civic knowledge tests. The UK’s chief requirement in that is an oral test to be applied
in the country of origin. And finally, the Danish requirements are oral language and society
tests which are held after newcomers’ arrival. Except from Denmark, where the level of
language proficiency cannot be below A2 level, all other five Member States demand A1 for
family reunion applications.
With the exception of Denmark, all these Member States appear to require integration tests at
a stage when applicants have not yet left their countries of origin. The same countries, except
for the Netherlands this time, exempt refugees and the mentally disabled from these tests
(Strik et al., 2010). Sanctions for failing the tests differ from one Member State to the other.
While the Netherlands, Germany, the UK and Austria grant in such cases no entry clearance
for the applicant, France delays family reunification for the same reason up to two months.
However, if an applicant fails to meet relevant terms and conditions upon signing the French
integration contract, the social benefits provided by the state could be terminated, renewal of
residence permits declined, leading to expulsion from France in the end (Carrera, 2009, p.
332).
2.1.2.1.3 Long-term residence
The definition of long-term residence status in Member States is laid down by Council
Directive 2003/109/EC.29 According to Article 4(1), granting long-term residence to a TCN
suggests providing him/her with legal residence upon his/her legal and continuous residence
“within its territory for five years immediately prior to the submission of the relevant
application”. For its acquisition, Article 5(1) assigns Member States to check evidence for
29
Council Directive 2003/109/EC.
31
(a) stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain himself/herself and
the members of his/her family, without recourse to the social assistance system of the
Member State concerned. Member States shall evaluate these resources by reference to
their nature and regularity and may take into account the level of minimum wages and
pensions prior to the application for long-term resident status;
(b) sickness insurance in respect of all risks normally covered for his/her own
nationals in the Member State concerned.
Additionally, as Article 5(2) points out, this person may be required “to comply with
integration conditions, in accordance with national law”. If, however, there is a concern about
“public policy or public security”, depending on its “severity or type of offence […] or the
danger that emanates from the person concerned” as well as “duration of residence and…
existence of links with the country of residence”, the Member State in concern reserves the
right to deny application for long-term status (Article 6(1)).
Of particular notice in this context is the distribution of TCNs enjoying long-term status in
Europe. About eighty percent of such people live in three Member States, i.e. Estonia,
Austria, and Czech Republic. The number of people who have to date been able to acquire
this status in Germany and France constitute less than one percent of the total sum. 30 These
percentages were confirmed at the 2010 Ministerial Conference on Integration referring to
barriers before TCNs’ access to long-term residence and calling upon incorporation of TCNs’
“integration issues in a comprehensive way in all relevant policy fields.”31
Currently, fourteen Member States require integration tests as a condition for issuing longterm residence permits: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France,
Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and the UK. While the
language tests are essential for long-term residence permits in all these lands, the type of tests
(oral or written) and proficiency levels required may be different. The language levels vary
from A1 (the Czech Republic and France) and A2 (Austria, Latvia and the Netherlands) to B1
(Denmark, Estonia, Germany and the UK). Meanwhile, Denmark makes an exception by
offering an option to choose between B1 level Danish and A2 Danish plus B1 level English.32
30
European Commission (2011c).
European Ministerial Conference on Integration. Zaragoza, 15 and 16 April 2010. Draft Declaration.
32
The language test is based on the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR), which
classifies learners into three major divisions and six levels- A Basic User: A1 Breakthrough or beginner; A2
Waystage or elementary; B Independent User: B1 Threshold or intermediate; B2 Vantage or upper intermediate;
C Proficient User: C1 Effective Operational Proficiency or advanced; C2 Mastery or proficiency.
31
32
For civic tests, new Member States such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania
and Romania do not impose special requirements for the purpose of long- term residence
permits. On the other side are a number of old EU members with long immigration histories
like the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the UK who require for longterm residence permits not only a minimum level of civic knowledge and/or language
proficiency but also attendance to orientation courses.33
2.1.2.1.4 Fair treatment of third-country nationals
A closely relevant matter that occupies a central place within the context of labour
immigration is TCNs’ fair treatment. The issue came indeed as part of a commitment at the
1999 Tampere Council to provide non-nationals holding legal residence with rights and
obligations comparable to those of Member State nationals. Accordingly, non-nationals with
legal long-term status would have similar residence, education and employment rights (to
those enjoyed by nationals) as well as obligations which were defined by the laws of the
Member State they lived in. Such nationals, as the Tampere Council added further, could also
enjoy at their discretion “the opportunity to obtain the nationality of the Member State in
which they are resident.”34 It was to this end stressed that Member States needed to take all
relevant measures against racism, discrimination and xenophobia for instance by learning
from the best practices amongst themselves and cooperating with the Council of Europe and
the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. The Commission was asked for
this purpose to submit a proposal on the implementation of Article 13 of the EC Treaty.35
More on that, the Council requested that Member States consider the economic and
demographic developments both across the Union and in the countries of origin and
harmonise their national laws in relation to the conditions and characteristics of TCNs they
hosted. Put differently, emphasis was laid here not only on Member States’ reception
capacities but also on historical and cultural links with sending countries.
33
The contents and application of these courses may differ from one Member State to the other. Belgium’s
integration course applies for instance only to the Flemish Regions. In the Netherlands, it is at the discretion of
municipalities to oblige TCNs to attend an integration course.
34
Presidency Conclusions, the Tampere Council.
35
With Amsterdam Treaty, the new Article 13 EC Treaty expanded the scope of Article 12 (formerly Article 6)
which had come to authorise the EC to take action against discrimination in terms of “sex, racial or ethnic origin,
religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation” with an attachment to prohibition on the grounds of
nationality.
33
The 2004 Brussels Council reaffirmed these commitments within the framework of Common
Basic Principles on Integration and noted: “if immigrants are to be allowed to participate fully
within the host society, they must be treated equally and fairly and be protected from
discrimination.”36 A more recent reference to this issue was made in the 2009 Stockholm
Programme which saw fair treatment as part of the EU’s ‘proactive’ arrangements for
immigrants and their rights. Like its predecessors, Tampere and the Hague, the Stockholm
Programme emphasised the need for the EU to guarantee fair treatment of TCNs with legal
residence. As formerly declared at Tampere and the Hague, the issue of fair treatment was
attached to a ‘vigorous’ integration policy to ensure “rights and obligations comparable to
those of citizens of the Union. This should remain an objective of a common immigration
policy and should be implemented as soon as possible, and no later than 2014”.37 And finally,
according to Article 79(1) TFEU (ex Article 63(3) and (4) TEC) of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty,
the construction of a common immigration policy would ensure “at all stages, the efficient
management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country nationals residing legally in
Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced measures to combat, illegal immigration
and trafficking in human beings.”38
The only supranational legal measure affecting the fair treatment category in this context is
the Council Directive on TCNs’ long-term residence (2003/109/EC). Laying out the necessary
conditions for conferring and withdrawing the status for long-term residence, the Directive
clarifies the basic rights non-EU nationals hold in this context, one of which is their fair
treatment in host societies.
2.1.2.2 Irregular migration
To International Labour Organisation (ILO), irregular migration is “movement of a person to
a new place of residence or transit using irregular or illegal means, without valid documents
or carrying false documents”39. For the EU, the Directive 2008/115/EC defines an irregular
migrant as “a non-EU national present on the territory of a Schengen State who does not
36
Presidency Draft Conclusions, the Brussels Council, 18 November 2004.
The Stockholm Programme (2010/C115/01), p.30.
38
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 9 May 2008.
39
International Labour Organisation, Bureau of Library and Information Services, ILO Thesaurus.
37
34
fulfil, or no longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in the Schengen Borders Code
(Regulation 562/2006), or other conditions of entry, stay or residence in an EU State.”40
To most recent statistics, the average number of people entering the EU zone each year by
illegal or irregular means is more than half a million (European Commission, 2009; European
Commission, 2011b). The EU’s legal documents treating this issue in a binding way include a
crowded set of directives and regulations.41 To combat irregular channels of immigration, the
Tampere and Hague Programmes initiated a soft-law instrument putting emphasis on
partnership with the countries and regions of origin and transit. The Presidency Conclusions
of the Tampere Council noted for instance that the EU was in need of “a comprehensive
approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries
and regions of origin and transit”. This approach aimed essentially at “combating poverty,
improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating
democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities,
women and children”. By the same token, the Hague Programme pointed out that an efficient
management of migration flows involved “greater cooperation with third countries in all
fields” 42 which required the EU to support third countries with “existing Community Funds
where appropriate, in their efforts to improve their capacity for migration management” so
that they could amongst others “build border control capacity…and tackle the problem of
return”.
Despite this common agenda, the EU’s priorities in taking action against irregular
immigration were not uniform. Following Kosovo events which provoked mass influxes of
displaced persons, the Tampere Council made in that respect special reference to asylumseeking as voiced earlier with the 1990 Dublin Convention.43 The Hague Programme
extended the coverage area to illegal immigration particularly in consideration of the EU’s
expansion of borders with the latest enlargement. At the Hague, one of the ten priority areas
was developing an ‘integrated management of the Union’s external borders’ which actually
would serve for the purposes of free movement of persons (as stimulated by Schengen’s
40
Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying
third-country nationals.
41
A detailed account of these directives is given in Chapter 4.
42
The Hague Programme, ‘Ten priorities for the next five years’.
43
Signed in 1990, the Dublin Convention came into force in 1997 to restrict the transit of asylum-seekers within
the EU up to their preference. The idea behind this limitation was the assumption that asylum-seeking concerned
principally a matter of international protection. The Convention was replaced in 2003 by the Dublin Regulation
(or Dublin II Regulation) with the aim to speed up asylum seeking procedure (Council Regulation No 343/2003).
35
removal of internal border controls). Besides its emphasis on a common visa policy (which
would operate through a joint visa information system and a European consular service to be
developed in future), the Hague Programme saw to the establishment of the FRONTEX and
the introduction of a biometric system to monitor TCNs’ arrival/departure more efficiently.
To the same end in this framework, the EU would also start sea-patrolling across the
Mediterranean.
To provide financial coverage for these commitments specifically in the Schengen Area, the
Council adopted a Decision in 2007 establishing the External Borders Fund (EBF) for 20072013 period, with a total €1820 million budget as part of the general programme “solidarity
and management of migration flows.”44 With that, there would now be more space for the
EU’s general dialogue with the main sending/transit countries in Africa and Eastern Europe.
While the EU aimed by this means to develop initiatives for a joint administration of
surveillance and patrolling in the short run, the plan for the long-term was to help create jobs
by way of development aids in these countries and make migration a less attractive option.
Considering a series of political transformation waves sweeping across North Africa since the
end of 2010, the Commission’s latest Communication on ‘dialogue for migration, mobility
and security with the southern Mediterranean countries’ for instance reported that “The EU
stands ready to continue supporting all its Southern neighbours who are willing to commit to
democracy, human rights, good governance and rule of law, and to enter into Partnerships
with those countries to achieve concrete progress for the people.”45
On the issue of human trafficking, the Tampere Council had previously voiced its
determination to deal with economic exploitation of migrants at its source. To this end, a
common policy framework would have to be developed in relation to visas and false
documents, “including closer co-operation between EU consulates in third countries and,
where necessary, the establishment of common EU visa issuing offices.”46 To impose
sanctions against human traffickers, a set of legislative measures with an emphasis on the
fragility of children and women would need to be introduced. For cooperation in the area of
border control, and all applicant states wishing to share responsibility were invited to work
closely with Europol and Member States by way of a number of policy instruments like
44
Decision (EC) No 574/2007.
COM (2011) 292 final.
46
European Council (1999), Presidency Conclusions, Tampere Council.
45
36
technology transfer and exchange programmes to be applied particularly within the scope of
maritime affairs.
Much in the same vein, to ensure a sustainable policy approach in addressing the problem of
illegal migration, the EU developed a policy of voluntary return with respect to the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. For reasons of limited Member State capacity, cooperation in this area
was by this way being taken beyond the EU to involve sending and transit countries within
the decision-making process. Following the 1999 Tampere Council which called for
“assistance to countries of origin and transit to be developed in order to promote voluntary
return”, the 2000 Nice and 2001 Laeken Summits made further references to the prevention of
illegal migration.
With the recent rise of ‘unfounded’ claims for asylum in mind, a number of commitments
were made to introduce amongst others the 2003 Reception Conditions Directive ‘laying
down minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers’47, the 2003 Dublin Regulation
(Dublin II) assigning one single Member State to be accountable for processing asylum
application48, the 2005 Asylum Procedures Directive49 urging Member States to give priority
to the asylum procedure and the European Refugee Fund which would provide financial
resources for the common asylum policy. As a further step in this framework, the Regulation
‘establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas
of migration and asylum’50 was adopted. The main aim the EU held by this means was “to
give specific and complementary financial and technical aid to third countries in order to
support their efforts to improve the management of migratory flows in all their dimensions.”51
As the EU Member States changed their national laws in pursuit of stricter measures for
asylum, the issue of ‘voluntary return’ became gradually a controlling instrument. The Hague
programme for instance stressed that
Migrants who do not or no longer have the right to stay legally in the EU must return
on a voluntary or, if necessary, compulsory basis. The European Council calls for the
establishment of an effective removal and repatriation policy based on common
47
European Council Directive 2003/9/EC.
European Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003.
49
European Council Directive 2005/85/EC (Asylum Procedures Directive).
50
Regulation (EC) No 491/2004.
51
Regulation (EC) No 491/2004.
48
37
standards for persons to be returned in a humane manner and with full respect for
their human rights and dignity.52
Another major policy developed in fighting against illegal immigration includes Readmission
Agreements. With Amsterdam’s transfer of competences to the Community Method, the
Commission became in charge of negotiating these agreements with the sending and transit
countries on behalf of the Union.53 While the Council was not willing to lose the upper hand
at this point and moved to take them as a means to the facilitation of forced removals (as well
as the use of the Return Fund), negotiations on that score were characterised by the EU’s
commitments to human rights, as proclaimed for instance under the 1951 Geneva Convention.
In this context, extradition/expulsion of an immigrant regardless of the illegal status (s)he may
hold would not be readily authorised so long as there were risks of death penalty, torture or
any other inhumane conditions in the country of origin.
To sum up, the EU’s policies concerning illegal immigration and human trafficking have so
far served for three major goals. These are combatting problems at their sources, making
illegal immigration as less attractive as it may get and returning immigrants with illegal status
to their countries of origin (or transit countries).
2.1.2.3 Asylum
According to European Migration Network (EMN), which works as part of the Commission’s
DG Home Affairs, asylum suggests a “form of protection given by a State, on its territory,
based on the principle of non-refoulement and internationally or nationally recognised refugee
rights (e.g. access to employment, social welfare and health care)” (European Migration
Network, 2012a). In more precise terms, this protection is granted to someone (asylum
seeker) “who is unable or unwilling to seek protection in his/her country of citizenship and/or
residence, in particular, for fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” (European Migration Network,
2012a).
52
The Hague Programme, 2005/C 53/01.
The first round of agreements was signed in 2004 with Hong Kong, Macao and Morocco. This was followed
in 2005 with Albania, Sri Lanka, in 2007 with Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR of Macedonia, Montenegro,
Moldova, Russia, Serbia and Ukraine, in 2010 with Pakistan, and in 2011 with Georgia. Negotiations are open
with a number of countries like China and Algeria since 2002, Turkey since 2005 and with Cape Verde since
2009.
53
38
While perception of asylum on the basis of non-refoulement54 could be tracked down to
Ancient Greece and the Roman Empire (Lavenex, 1999), its formalisation followed largely
from the massive refugee problem of the 1930s, which was caused essentially by
Nazism/Fascism at the time. Although the purchase of these ideologies ceased to a minimum
in the post-War era, the ensuing hostile climate of the Cold War urged the UN to establish an
agency, i.e. UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), which would be
committed to providing humanitarian support for displaced and stateless persons. Soon after
its establishment, the UNHCR made a major move to institutionalize a world-wide asylum
system by ushering into the adoption of the Status of Refugees as part of the Geneva
Convention in 1951.
The scope of asylum-seeking in the EU case applies only to non-EU nationals and stateless
persons. To Council Directive 2003/9/EC, any such person is regarded as an asylum seeker
unless (s)he asks for a different type of protection. There is however a string attached to this
clause noting that the final decision concerning his/her application is to be taken at a later
time.55 There are in Member States a number of legal arrangements concerning this status. A
most important one aside from national laws is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union which enshrines a wide array of social, economic and political rights not
only for EU citizens but also for TCNs in Member States. While the drafting and
proclamation of the Charter date back to 2000, it did not have a significant legal effect until
becoming a part of the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. According to Article 18 of the Charter, “The right
to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention and
Protocol relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”. In essence, this provision
hinted at other legal instruments such as the Geneva Convention and EC/EU Treaties upon
which the legal content of the Charter was actually built.
The competences granted to the Community over asylum matters were previously defined
under Article 63(1) and (2) EC Treaty. Accordingly, the Council would adopt
54
The 1951 Geneva Convention’s Article 33 formulates non-refoulement to ban the contracting states from
expelling or returning “a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership or a particular social
group or political opinion”.
55
Council Directive 2003/9/EC.
39
1. measures on asylum, in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951
and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees and other
relevant treaties, within the following areas:
(a) criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for
considering an application for asylum submitted by a national of a third-country in
one of the Member States;
(b) minimum standards on the reception of asylum-seekers in Member States;
(c) minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third
countries as refugees;
(d) minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting or withdrawing
refugee status;
2. measures on refugees and displaced persons within the following areas:
(a) minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced persons from
thirdcountries who cannot return to their country of origin and for persons who
otherwise need international protection;
(b) promoting a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing
the consequences of receiving refugees and displaced persons
As it seemed, the EU legislation concerning asylum was here limited largely to setting
‘minimum standards’, which made no direct implications for adopting an overarching asylum
system for the entire Union. A commitment to this latter end came with the 1999 Tampere
Council where a ‘Common European Asylum System’ was envisaged in quest of expanding
the ‘minimum’ coverage of protection for asylum-seekers. With Regulation 343/2003, in
consequence, the Dublin Convention was replaced with ‘Dublin II’ setting rules on the
procedures and responsibilities applying to the undertaking of asylum application in Member
States. A series of directives and regulations were adopted in this period. These were most
importantly Council Directives 2001/55/EC56, 2003/9/EC57, 2004/83/EC58 and 2005/85/EC59
as well as Regulations (EC) 343/200360 and (EC) 439/201061.
The primary EU law defining the current state of asylum issues in the EU is the Treaty of
Lisbon. According to Article 78(1) TFEU
56
Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass
influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving
such persons and bearing the consequences thereof.
57
Council Directive 2003/9/EC on laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers.
58
Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third-country
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the
content of the protection granted.
59
Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and
withdrawing refugee status.
60
Regulation (EC) 343/2003 defining the criteria and mechanisms on the determination of the Member State
responsible in asylum applications.
61
Regulation (EC) 439/2010 establishing a European Asylum Support Office.
40
The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and
temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any thirdcountry national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with
the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the
Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating
to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.
2.2 Citizenship
Citizenship at its very core serves as “the basic building block of political power. It conflates
the right to reside and move about within a given territory and the obligation to defend these
very same rights” (Mitra, 2012, p. 1). Although this understanding is not new to fuel academic
debates, it is very much so when it comes to policy-making in the EU (Zapata-Barrero, 2009).
Since the foundation of the EU, many Member States have gradually aligned with citizenshipbased policy approaches, with the hope to relieve amongst others immigration-guided social
and political tensions.
It goes without saying that immigration is today fairly instrumental to structure/give impetus
to the EU’s growth in economic terms. This was underscored in many policy documents from
the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ to ‘Europe 2020’ within the context of securing “a prosperous, fair and
environmentally sustainable future for all citizens.”62 While labour import serves significantly
for this purpose, particularly in view of the well-known ageing population and pension costs
across Member States63, policy plans for citizenship has provided minimal space for
‘newcomers’. As Bosniak (2008) puts it, this omission is informed largely by concerns about
a coherent and unified political community, which in the absence of formal distinction
between citizens and aliens could be at risk of termination.
Discussing citizenship in a broader spectrum, on the basis of global disparities in educational,
social or economic opportunities, Shachar (2009, p.21) highlights in The Birthright Lottery
that a great majority of the people living in severe poverty conditions are citizens of countries
in Southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Bringing this together with arguments on a
supranational framework of citizenship in Europe, Joppke (2010b) asks: “If citizenship in the
comfort zone matters more than ever, why this nervous attempt, especially in Europe, to
62
European Commission, Education and Training (2010). Focus: From the Lisbon Strategy to ‘Europe 2020’.
European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs (2009). European Economy News: ‘The clock is
ticking…Ageing and the long-term sustainability of public finances’.
63
41
upgrade something the priceless worth of which is beyond doubt?” (p. 13). At stake here are
obviously the implications of newcomers for nationality norms/regulations in host societies.
Pfetsch (2012) compares in this context the concerning ‘legal modalities’ of Germany, Spain,
France and United Kingdom. While almost all these Member States were formerly quite open
to welcoming foreigners, the regulations and laws adopted in recent years became highly
restrictive in view of the changing values, historical, economic or demographic conditions
(Pfetsch, 2012, pp. 123-126). The recent ratification of nationality/citizenship laws in these
countries, particularly with respect to EU texts such as 2004/38/EC64, demonstrates an
obvious disposition towards differentiation as much as harmonisation of immigration.
Following from this observation, one could today argue that citizenship across EU lands is
closely related to the concept of exclusion for it suggests almost always dividing lines
between the ‘hosts’ and ‘aliens’.
In fact, the issue of exclusion concerns fundamentally “the substance of citizenship (what
citizenship is)…its domain or location (where citizenship takes place), and…the class of
citizenship’s subjects (who is a citizen)” (Bosniak, 2008, p. 17). Scholars treat these fairly
overlapping criteria often within the framework of political membership (Walzer, 1989) and
common society (Barbalet, 1988; Held, 1995). This treatment becomes however quite
complicated in the absence of agreement on where the weight should be laid. While some
scholars contend that citizenship should be suggesting on top of everything legal links
“between individual and polity; for others, it signifies active engagement in the life of the
community. For some, it is largely a matter of individual justice, while for others still, it
implicates pressing questions of collective identity” (Bosniak, 2000, p. 455). To sort these
varying interpretations, Kymlicka & Norman (1994) offer classification under ‘citizenship-asrights’, ‘citizenship-as-activity’, and ‘citizenship-as-identity’. At its core, this categorisation
reflects the main dimensions of citizenship: legal status/acquisition of rights, political
participation and identity (Cohen, 1999; Carens, 2000; Kymlicka & Norman, 2000).
2.2.1 Citizenship as legal status
It would be fair to argue that no discussion on citizenship would today be meaningful in the
absence of a legal framework. As it is most commonly acknowledged, “a citizen is someone
64
European Parliament and Council Directive on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States.
42
who possesses rights…denied in a legally stratified or segmented society to non-citizens and
in all societies to resident aliens and foreigners” (Heater, 2004, p. 252). Bauböck (1994)
names this provision ‘nominal citizenship’ whereby the state grants legal status to individuals
by presenting a collection of rights in return for a set of obligations (for instance tax payment)
they are bound to meet.
A chief contribution made to the study of citizenship on the basis of rights came from
Marshall (1950) who designed a theoretical model in light of industrialisation and
democratisation. Accordingly, the whole story starts with the industrialisation process which
gradually led to the rise and expansion of ‘civil rights’ such as property protection or freedom
of conscience. These civil rights formed in time the basis of democracy and political rights
including the right to vote or freedom of speech, paving all the way to the emergence of
‘social rights’, for instance access to welfare state funds or the right to establish labour unions.
While Marshall’s proposal is key to bringing together the ‘republican’ and ‘liberal’
interpretations of citizenship, the launch of welfare state model rendered it lately somewhat
ineffective. With that, the political rights turned to hold in most liberal democracies no more a
prerequisite value for social rights.65
Besides Marshall’s sociological understanding of citizenship, contributions came in more
recent times from political theorists such as Judith Shklar (1991) and Rogers Smith (1998),
who sought to explain the ‘rights’ dimension in the face of citizenship’s exclusionary nature.
For Shklar, in particular, citizenship refers to societal ‘standing’ which often works on a
subordination logic denying the officially declared equal rights for individuals. Though
inspired by differing national backgrounds and disciplines –the English history for Marshall’s
sociological model as opposed to the American national context for Shklar’s political
approach- Marshall and Shklar appeared to share a liberal-democratic perspective to address
“the full and equal enjoyment by individuals of formal recognition and rights” (Bosniak,
2000, p. 465).
The locus of citizenship was until the second half of the 20th century widely regarded as the
nation-state. While nation-states have hardly ever lost control over the distribution of rights,
65
Many countries in Europe and Northern America allow non-citizens to vote in local or regional elections
(Aleinikoff & Klusmeyer, 2002). Another recent development countering Marshall’s historical account is
freedom to choose EP representatives, which is no more restricted to voting in the country (Member State) of
origin.
43
the post-World War II era saw the progressive rise of a human rights regime claiming an
alternative source of rights. So much so that, the gradual transcendence of nation-states’
jurisdiction encouraged some to come to the conclusion that for social rights including
welfare benefits, health coverage or education, citizenship has lost its significance, at least for
the EU (Sassen, 1996), where a new overarching model was already launched under the
banner of ‘European citizenship’. Soysal (1994) attributes this new notion to the recent rise of
post-nationalism, which was informed largely by universal human rights. Further to the
human rights discourse which cast doubts on the supremacy of the nation-state model,
immigration and globalisation made significant implications most notably for sovereignty,
territory and citizenry (Sassen, 2006; Benhabib, 2007).
The immigration bit of this argument meets the issue of democratic rights in Western liberal
states. Benhabib (2001) for instance argues that these states exhibit a ‘paradox of democratic
legitimacy’ by limiting citizenship to nationals despite the universal discourse of human rights
and democracy. The issue of democratic legitimacy is in fact reminiscent of Rawls (1971)
who with his ‘differential principle’ (arguing for a ‘primordial’ type of equality/the ‘original
position’) suggests that inequalities are acceptable as long as they serve for the interests of
‘the least disadvantaged’ in the society (p. 83). The question this formulation poses relates
indeed very much to where immigrants are positioned in the social hierarchy of host societies.
Rawls’ Westphalian perception of citizenship has found criticism specifically in ‘postnationalist’ discourses. Inspired by the political and social implications of globalisation and a
number of groundbreaking projections like European citizenship, post-nationalism has come
to offer a new understanding of citizenship whereby the rights that have traditionally been
conferred onto citizens could now be accessible to non-citizens (Bauböck, 1994). In
accordance, the role of the nation-states in deciding who should be regarded as members of a
collective community is to be replaced with universal values such as human rights defining
who deserves being part of that community. The idea addresses essentially a sort of
‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Held, 1995) seeking to resolve the tension between human rights
and legitimacy issues on the grounds of a catch-all conceptual paradigm. Fitting to this
perspective is Kant’s oft-revisited concept of ‘cosmopolitan citizenship’ and a world-wide
legal order (Falk, 1995; Linklater, 1998) both of which have a fundamental purpose to
transfer the balance of weight from national to international law (Habermas, 2006). Evidence
comes here from the European Court of Human Rights and International Courts and Tribunals
44
which –with their supremacy over national codes of law- have for long been treating their
subjects as cosmopolitan citizens in the first place.
Habermas (1987; 1992) has also presented a set of universal norms onto Rawls’ conception of
societal justice. Through a concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’ on the basis of Sternberger’s
(1990) ‘Verfassungspatriotismus’, a shared sense of values has here been vouched brushing
aside common histories or ethnic origins, as it is the case in ‘Rawlsian’ perception of justice.
Accordingly, immigrants’ major duty in a democratic constitutional state is no more than “the
willingness to enter into the political culture of their new homeland, without having to give up
the cultural form of life of their origins by doing so” (Habermas, 1994, p. 139). This is
actually indicative of an all-embracing conception of citizenship seeking ways to escape
“from the danger of segmentation—from the exclusion of alien subcultures and from a
separatist disintegration into unrelated subcultures” (Habermas, 1994, p. 139).
The growth of interest in cosmopolitan citizenship has offered significant implications for
immigration. It has promised in particular to enlarge the rights which were formerly truncated
by the Westphalian system through ‘translocal’ or ‘transnational’ communities (Basch,
Schiller & Blanc, 1993; Appadurai, 1996; Mandaville, 1999) so as to make sure immigrants
could offset geographical distances between sending and receiving countries by for instance
social and cultural means (Guarnizo & Smith, 1998). Such arguments have however prompted
a split in scholarship between two wings of authors: those of ‘control’ vs. scholars commited
to ‘morality’ (Bloemraad, 2000, p. 18).
To the ‘control’ wing, Brubaker’s (1992) thesis regarding citizenship as “a powerful
instrument of social closure” (p. 23) justifies criticising those who condemn “the nation-state
to the dustbin of history” (p. 189). As state sovereignty is still central to the international
system (Schuck, 1998), it is accordingly “far too early to dismiss the relevance of the nationstate and national citizenship” (Howard, 2006, p. 445). This objection rests largely on the
observation that third-country nationals continue to face far-reaching restrictions (of rights
and benefits) in the host societies they are part of. The familiar ‘citizen vs. non-citizen’ divide
persists, above all, in political rights like voting and running for office. This is also the case
for local elections in many EU lands, let alone national suffrage, during which non-citizens
are denied voting rights irrespective of their permanent residence or long-time working status
(Aleinikof & Klusmeyer, 2002; Bauböck, 2006; Groenendijk, 2008). Added to that, non-
45
citizens are in many lands still stripped of social rights such as welfare programmes which
nationals could enjoy (Dell’Olio, 2005). Further, employers in public sectors across a number
of Member States still select workers on the basis of their national citizenship (Mouritsen,
2009).
As for the ‘morality’ aspect of the debate, the issue at stake relates largely to the normative
limits of state sovereignty. Contrary to those like Hailbronner (1989; 2000; 2006) who
defends that citizenship is in essence a political decision of the states which for this reason
could not be used as a policy-making tool on the basis of moral grounds, others like Carens
(1989; 2005) argue that no matter how much legal freedom they possess, states do not have a
similar moral freedom at their disposal to deprive immigrants of the rights that the nationals
enjoy. This is not least because the former are already active “members of the state through
their life and work in a country” (Bloemraad, 2000, p. 19).
Despite the fact that sixteen Member States currently allow local voting rights for non-citizens
at varying levels, the type of rights that appears to be limited by citizenship still relates to
political life. There is increasing pressure to extend political rights to non-citizens considering
their contribution to states’ economies, be that through labour or in the form of taxes. Some
like Cesarini & Fullbrook (1996, p. 214) remember in this context as far back as the Magna
Carta’s ‘no taxation without representation’ principle which was vowing to ensure ‘fairness’
and ‘return’ in reference to basic rights (as cited in Bloemraad, 2000). Although immigrants
have here a number of options to influence policy-making by way of for instance engagement
with trade unions (Vranken, 1990; Penninx & Roosblad, 2000; Wrench, 2004), such
alternative means have so far been far from offering effective tools due to absence of farreaching voting rights at the national level.
2.2.1.1 Naturalisation
The very idea of citizenship concerns keeping individuals within the political boundaries of a
state apparatus. As the size of immigrants rose all around in time, this calculation became
challenged by questions particularly on the legal relationship between nationals and
newcomers. A most practical solution to such challenges could be acquisition of the host
country’s citizenship through naturalisation. However, cross-national analyses indicate
varying applications in this context. A common reference used in scholarship in this
connection is Brubaker’s (1990) comparative study which came to underscore discrepancies
46
in conceptualising citizenship between the leading countries of the EU. While for instance
French citizenship accorded with the jus soli principle prescribing birthplace as the primary
point of reference and reflecting therewith an understanding of territorial community for
whom nationhood was “state-centered, universalist, and assimilationist, constituted by
political unity but expressed through the pursuit of cultural unity”, the German version hinged
on the principle of jus sanguinis regulating acquisition of citizenship rights according to the
community of descent (or the basis of nationhood), which essentially was “ethnoculturalist
and Volk-centered” (Williams, 1995, p.146).66
There are currently 22 Member States requiring applicants for citizenship to be examined by
way of integration tests, as a major condition for naturalisation.67 For the language component
of these tests, Denmark demands the highest proficiency level -with a score of B2- which is
followed by Finland, Germany and Latvia asking for B1 to that effect. Apart from Bulgaria,
the Czech Republic, Finland, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland and Slovenia, all other countries in
this cluster demand as a condition for citizenship a satisfactory test result concerning
‘knowledge of the society’. Some countries like Austria, Greece, Romania and Slovakia do
not specify clear-cut benchmarks but instead require a ‘basic’, ‘sufficient’, ‘good’ or ‘general’
level of language/civic knowledge, respectively. In any case, these integration tests are in
most Member States obligatory and constitute the final stage of the integration process
(Groenendijk, 2004; Besselink, 2009).
If seen as “sanction-oriented” (Kostakopoulou, 2010, p. 8), such requirements make the
impression of a unidirectional practice (Bagameri, 2011, p. 3) denying the Commission’s
emphasis on a two-way process of integration.68 At this point, Carrera et al. (2011) refer to the
“legally binding nature of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights” suggesting it could be an
66
Germany changed its traditional perspective in 2000 by switching to a conditional form of jus soli. Similar to
models for instance in Ireland and the UK, acquisition of citizenship here became dependent largely on parents’
legal status or length of residence permit. In Belgium, France, the Netherlands or Spain, on the other side,
citizenship is acquired on the condition that minimum one parent was born in the country. One could in this
context also refer to the practices in Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the UK, where
citizenship is not acquired automatically at birth but is granted at the discretion of parents or at the age of
majority (Bauböck, 2008, p. 7.). This picture appears to be somewhat in disparity with that in traditional
immigration countries like the US, Canada and Australia, where citizenship by descent works solely for the
children of expatriates.
67
These are currently Austria, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, and the UK.
68
COM (2003) 336.
47
effective tool to ensure socio-economic rights applicable “to ‘everyone’ (and not to nationals
of the EU member states only)” (p. 7).
Theoretically speaking, naturalisation is a process through which a non-national becomes a
full member of a national community by acquiring the citizenship of the nation-state in
concern. While this transformation holds in its essence a legal purpose, some argue that there
is actually nothing ‘natural’ about it (Goodman, 2010, p. 3). In accordance, while
naturalisation starts with the application of a person hoping to qualify for the intended state’s
citizenship, the outcome of this process is open and by no means taken for granted, as it is for
instance in the case of the ex lege procedure where the applicant does not have to make an
application but is by birth, marriage or upon becoming an adult automatically ‘naturalised’
(OECD, 2011a, p. 25).
While the status of dual citizenship may emerge as a recipe to sort out such concerns, there is
no consensus about it. Despite the fact that traditional immigration lands like the USA and
Canada formulated such arrangements to meet the demands of their multiculturalist societies
(Spiro, 2010), there is tendency amongst the EU Member States to buck the trend and change
national laws to deter dual citizenship. Following a civic reform introducing a complementary
use of jus sanguinis with jus soli recently, Germany for instance allows now holding one
passport (except for cases relating to other EU Member State citizens). In a similar vein,
France requires at present its would-be citizens to sign a charter called Charte de Drois et des
Devoirs du Citoyen Francais as a verification of their consent, suggesting the civic rights
gained therewith would be taken away if they happened to claim an additional citizenship on
French soil.69 More on that, although dual citizenship is legally acknowledged in the
Netherlands, the Dutch government has recently proposed a new law with the aim to
introduce certain limitations within the context of integration (Bevelander & Veenman (2006,
p. 5).
Indeed, such procedures have for some time been a key component of the EU Member States’
integration policies to make financial cuts and lower the social burden of integrating TCNs to
their societies (Guild, Groenendijk & Carrera, 2009). To some, what appears to lie
additionally behind these policy initiatives is the will to make selections amongst third-
69
France TV Info, ‘Une charte de droits et de devoirs pour devenir français’. 15 November 2011.
48
country nationals and keep the number of new incomers at a minimum (Joppke, 2007). It is
for instance officially declared in Austria that the number of applications for naturalisation
could be reduced by this means (Perchinig, 2010). Official statements in Member States like
Denmark, Finland, Greece and Germany argue at this point that those with immigration
backgrounds would in this way be not only familiarised with the major values and norms in
the societies but also become far more self-supporting (de Groot, Kuipers & Weber, 2009;
Fagerlund & Brander, 2010; Christopoulos, 2010). Nevertheless, given that these persons
adopt through naturalisation both national and European forms of citizenship, a number of
economically better-off Member States such as France and Germany have voiced their
concerns for they would probably become the final destinations -via ‘burden sharing’- should
other EU Member States carry on providing easier access to citizenship than themselves
(Lahav & Guiraudon, 2006).
2.2.2 Citizenship as political participation
While it becomes clear against this backdrop that legal status is integral to the political
culture, it may fall short in defining citizenship alone. As a most traditional means to being
part of the political community, political practice -as it is understood in the Western worlddates back to more than two thousand years ago. Historical surveys into citizenship begin
commonly with the Ancient Greek states where participation in political life was reduced to
citizens only. What Aristotle declared in The Politics –as one of the first treatises on
citizenship- through “the man who is a citizen in a democracy is often not one in an
oligarchy” (McKeon, 1941, pp. 1274b-1275a) was indeed indicative of citizens’ role for a
self-governing society at the time. Nonetheless, one should remember that freedom and
equality amongst citizens in early Athens did not secure their participation in state affairs
because the latter was arranged first and foremost on the basis of wealth and/or social status.
Regardless of its handicaps, the Athenian model of governance found broad purchase during
the heyday of the Roman Empire. This was a time when a new conception of legal status, as
St. Augustine of Hippo formulated it, outdid the political one to make a twofold definition of
citizenship: one belonging to the earthly ‘City of Man’ and the other exclusive to the celestial
‘City of God’ (Arthur, 2008). Accordingly, the ultimate goal of individuals was
denouncement of materialistic ambitions during their residence in the earthly cities of Rome,
Babylon or alike for entitlement to future citizenship in the heavenly world (Perreau-Saussine,
2009). As it were, the early Roman approach to citizenship was the individual’s warrant to
49
enjoy the temporary protection of rulers for whom participation was important to the extent it
served for the ultimate purpose of a celestial form of citizenship. In this sense, the Athenian
understanding of “the citizen as a political being” changed into the Roman perception of “the
citizen as a legal being, existing in a world of persons, actions and things regulated by law”
(Pocock, 1995, p. 34). When, however, the Roman Empire fell into the feudal lordships of
medieval ages, citizenship’s participatory role lost its significance. Machiavelli’s Discourses
on Livy came out towards the end of this period calling on search for a new ‘self-rule’
participation mechanism without, all the same, abandoning loyalty to the political community
(Paul, Miller & Paul, 2006).
In a post-Reformation world following long religious struggles at the heart of Europe, a new
political system prevailed as a response to the changing relationship between the rulers and
the ruled. With the foundation of parliamentary sovereignty, the substance of citizenship
began to extend political membership to a larger societal segment. Locke’s The Second
Treatise of Government voiced this inclusion by tying individual liberties to collective
sovereignty. In that, Locke was actually not critical of concession to monarchy, but was
campaigning for individual rights at a minimum level of participation. Rousseau criticised this
conception of citoyens (citizens) later in his modern treatise, On the Social Contract, where he
argued that citizenship was not only about obtaining legal status but instead “a way of life that
required commitment to the common good and active participation in public affairs” (Dagger,
1997, p. 99), as for instance it was the case in Ancient Athens. Rousseau’s classical
republican criticism of the Lockean account of citizenship was also a challenge to the
theoretical premises of Hobbes, Montesquieu, Hume and Smith, who sowed the seeds of
liberalism in political theory by emphasising private ownership and community responsibility,
provided it is for ‘the good of the state’.
In The Philosophy of Right, considered besides On the Social Contract the other important
modern treatise on citizenship, Hegel argued that citizenship in the modern state cannot
simply hold an unwavering commitment to civic virtues as in antiquity (Soeharno, 2009). The
role of legitimacy, as the argument went, had to be emphasised for a rightful membership in
the modern liberal state. While the theoretical premises of this liberal viewpoint appeared to
deny the republican tradition, there was room for civic virtues. A similar perspective was held
by a number of nineteenth-century liberals such as Tocqueville and Mill who were committed
to improving the civic principles of liberalism by way of ‘effective’ government control
50
(Keohane, 2002). In the end, both the republican and liberal traditions of citizenship sought to
assign a self-governing role to citizens, albeit with varying degrees, binding them together by
loyalty and affiliation.
Despite a much longer history at its roots, citizenship as political practice is linked
predominantly to the rise of the nation-state. The more popular sovereignty individuals
achieved through the nation-state, the firmer grip they got ahold of as to public affairs. They
became by this means holders of “passive and active membership”, which the nation-state
topped up “with universalistic rights and obligations at a specified level of equality” (Janoski
& Gran, 2002, p.13). The passive rights of sharing a legal system and active rights of political
participation made way for membership to the state as a political organisation. Central to this
understanding was the French Revolution’s ‘fraternity-equality’ formulation, suggesting equal
treatment to all on the basis of their attachment to the state. This vision did however not
embrace non-nationals for they were not yet allowed to enjoy the rights nationals did. From
this perspective, the nation-state had an exclusionary function in detaching ‘hosts’ from
‘aliens’.
In more recent times, civic republicanism and participatory democracy made a comeback to
stress the participation of citizens in political life. Following most prominently Hannah
Arendt who argued “politics is something that needs a worldly location and can only happen
in a public space, then if one is not present in such a space one is simply not engaged in
politics” (qtd. in Canovan, 1974, p. 635), a number of contributors in the second half of the
20th century like Pateman (1970), Held (1987), Beiner (1992), Mouffe (1992) and Sandel
(1996) stressed the role of political participation for its encouragement of civil relations and
solidarity amongst citizens. In fact, following J.S. Mills, several liberals including T.H. Green
and L.T. Hobhouse also underscored the role of political participation in democracy. By
contrast, republicans and participatory democrats subscribed rather to normative values.
Beiner (1992) for instance puts it quite explicitly by regarding citizenship as “active
membership in a political community where the very fact of such membership empowers
those included in it to contribute to the shaping of a shared collective destiny” (p. 105).
Next to their renewed emphasis on ‘collectivity’, addressing in particular the political
community of the territorial nation-state (Walzer, 1992), an increasing number of dissenting
voices, informed by the republican ideals to bring community members together or
51
transnational forms of political organisation to be taking place at multiple levels (Smith,
1994), rose to invoke alternatives such as ‘local’ forms of citizenship at the urban level
(Magnusson, 1990, 2000; Isin, 2000). This latter line of thinking was indeed largely informed
by the proliferation of transnational political movements such as grassroots activities, NGOs
and human rights regimes, which longed for a global hold of citizenship (Falk, 1995). Such
formulations were however disputed on the grounds that “citizenship can only be
meaningfully practised within a distinct institutional context, that of the political community a formal, organised, territorially-based community with some degree of sovereign selfgovernance” (Bosniak, 2000, p. 475, emphasis original). As there existed, accordingly, no
established global polity, the likelihood of citizenship beyond the nation-state would be one of
a fiction. In response to this state-oriented reflection on citizenship, a number of arguments
were advanced to argue that the practice of citizenship were now exceeding the traditional
norms, with their effects becoming visible for instance in the area of social movements
(Bartlett, 2007), economy (Sennett, 2003), workplace (Lawrence, 2004) or in the family
(Lister, 2001; Hindman, 2007).
It seemed in the end a new area of scholarship began to focus on a transnational form of civil
society and its links with citizenship (Sassen, 2009, p. 236). Central to their interest was the
new political organisation which was characterised by recent social, economic and political
developments exceeding nation-states, ranging from the environmental context to that of
human rights, and more specifically to the rights concerning workers or women (Guarnizo &
Smith, 1998; Bonilla et al., 1998; Skevic, 2005; Merry, 2006).
2.2.3 Citizenship as identity
Well me for example I do feel like being in between…I feel as neither nor a
foreigner…or or well I don’t know…sometimes when I am among Austrian
girls…then I do feel like a foreigner…whereas I am not a I don’t know I am not a
pure foreigner I was only born here…and that is why I only know life as it is
here…and I do not know what it’s like over there that is why when I go there I feel
myself somehow different. (Krzyzanowski & Wodak, 2007, p.1).
Being “endemic to the human condition” (Rosamond, 1997, p. 98), identity serves as the
affective template for citizenship. It is ‘felt’ in all aspects of life, making an impression that
the functions of citizenship in leading to societal organisation are actually based on identity in
the first place. For common ties and membership in a political polity, however, such a
52
replacement does not always work. In essence, identity is about recognising feelings of
attachment between individuals, whereas citizenship concerns attachment to a polity. It is in
this sense through citizenship identity becomes a political concept (Delanty, 1996).
For a vast array of themes falling in its scope, in other words, identity is probably the least
straightforward of all citizenship dimensions. Its conceptualisation covers a broad spectrum
including personality, gender, social memberships, group characteristics, prejudices,
intergroup conflicts, nationality or even cosmos (Bosniak, 2000). Yet, while these concepts
may in all their relevance tell something about ‘identity’, they surely suggest different things.
This point, that is, the fact that the very nature of ‘identity’ is fluid and unsettled finds
widespread recognition in social science research. What Locke imparted in An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding more than three centuries ago under ‘Idea of identity
suited to the idea it is applied to’ (Nidditch, 1975, p. 203) was an early reference to its
semantic ambiguity, which in modern times became gradually a substitute for ‘difference’
(Crosby, 1992) and a source of many theoretical insights for the analysis of race, ethnicity,
nationality, gender, sexuality and culture (Taylor, 1989; Balibar & Wallerstein, 1991;
Connolly, 1991; Kymlicka, 1995; Miller, 1995). Research in Comparative Politics has for
instance come to tie it predominantly to nationalism and ethnic conflicts (Gellner, 1983;
Giddens, 1984; Hobsbawm, 1990; Billig, 1995; Calhoun, 1997). The major focus of
International Relations has often been the identity of states providing material for
constructivist critiques of (neo-) realism and (neo-) liberalism (Kratochwil & Ruggie, 1986;
Wendt, 1992; Katzenstein, 1996; Checkel, 1998). And with a familiar problematique at its
very heart, EU Studies dedicate ample space to the issue of ‘collective identity’ in Europe
(Inglehart, 1970; Duchesne & Frognier, 1995; Kohli, 2000; Wintle, 2000; Risse, 2001;
Castells, 2002; Bruter, 2003; Delanty, 2003; Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009).
When all these various disciplinary foci are brought together, identity “tends to mean too
much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or
nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)” (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000, p. 1). For that
reason, Simon (2004) reminds at this point that “the search for the essence of identity as a
‘thing’, say, in the form of a physiological or hard-wired mental structure would then be a
futile effort” (p. 3). Since such an endeavour will probably end up with an ‘analytic fiction’,
what remains for the social scientist is rather “viewing identities as mediators between the
inputs we receive from the social world and our subsequent interactions with that world”
53
(McKinlay & McVittie, 2011, p. 6). This complexity stems from the affective quality of
identity, which comes from internal abstractions in the form of emotions or senses of
belonging. A fairly simple ‘who am I?’ self-query is in this connection capable of inflaming
the ‘self-other’ conceptual divide when reformulated as ‘am I who you are?’. As this dialectic
makes affective elements inconceivable if detached from the exterior of the ‘self’ concept, the
subject of identity becomes a principal concern for psychology and sociology.
Placing human behaviour at the center of his inquiry, one can approach identity issues from
two main angles. The first and rather ‘self-oriented’ one offers views largely in psychological
terms to focus on the complexity of internal processes at the personal level. The sociological
premises the second approach draws from on the other side promises to extend this reach
beyond personal/self aspects.
Inspired by discourses considering identity as a dynamic and inter-subjective construct
(Lacan, 1977), psychological approaches have dedicated themselves to the introduction of
foundational terms like ‘identity searching’, ‘identity crisis’, ‘self-concept’ and ‘self-esteem’.
The distinction Erikson (1950) makes between the ‘ego identity’ (representing the sense of
‘continuity’ a person’s core being signifies) and the ‘group identity’ (marking the sense of
‘discontinuity’ the same person holds due to a multitude of social roles he/she is engaged in
throughout a lifetime) corroborates this undertaking. Unlike psychologists, sociologists have
associated identities with differentiated/complex social structures. To illustrate, contrary to
Tajfel and Turner, who in their psychological models known as social identity theory (SIT)
and the self-categorization theory (SCT) focus respectively on individuals’ socio-cognitive
processes, Stryker (1989) ignores in his sociological approach the role of internal processes
such as ‘cognition’ or ‘personality’ to establish a straight link between individuals and groups
in terms of social experiences (Kelleher & Leavey, 2004). Inspired by Hogg, Terry & White
(1995), sociologists Stets & Burke (2000) highlight on the other hand commonalities between
the two disciplinary perspectives and call for an integrated approach. The main argument put
forth here is that all identities benefit from the same logic of ‘self-verification process’ (which
concerns affirmation of self-meanings in relevant contexts), regardless of the fact that they
rest upon different bases of persons or groups.
The explanatory frameworks drawn from psychology and sociology denote in the end two
basic types of identity. There is on one side personal identity emphasising uniqueness of the
54
individual. Underscored on the other side is the same individual’s membership to a group
through social identity. As an individual is normally identified with a multitude of social
memberships, reference to social identity comes usually in a plural form, i.e. ‘social
identities’. It is nevertheless possible to come across a third type of identity in literature as in
the form of ‘collective identity’ which, based on the former two variants, makes a difference
with the sense of agency it fosters amongst individuals. What comes as a consequence of this
collective agency is generally thought to include a comparative “shared sense of ‘one-ness’ or
‘we-ness’ anchored in real or imagined shared attributes and experiences” vis-à-vis ‘others’
(Snow, 2001, p. 2). In rough terms, it is indeed this embedded ‘collective action’ in
citizenship that brings the identity component to the fore, in coming to terms amongst others
with diversity and belonging issues.
Studies tackling identity issues within the context of citizenship have recently been on the rise
(Soysal, 2000; Kymlicka, 2002; Krzyzanowski & Wodak, 2007; Delanty, Jones & Wodak,
2007). Despite various thoughts emerging here as to how citizenship rights should be
distributed, there is consensus on what matters to immigrants’ identity in the first place. As it
were, these are most importantly the formal citizenship the state confers on ‘newcomers’, the
time spent and experiences accumulated in the host country and the extent of harmony
between the new and the old cultures.
A most debated ‘differentiated citizenship’ in this context concerning whether rights should
be equally shared between minority and majority groups (Young, 1989; 1990) is indeed
informed by arguments suggesting it is actually social and civic rights that would lead to
optimal cohesion in a political community (Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; 2000). Bearing in
mind that such a multiculturalist reading has the potential to challenge the traditional
understanding of citizenship –that identification with the state through a sense of
compatriotism would be adequate to generate an overarching collective identity at the national
level- a further school of thoughts came to argue that the nation-state is no more “the only
game in town as far as translocal loyalties are concerned” (Appedurai, 1996, p. 165). There is
in this context a burgeoning literature of transnational civil society (Keane, 1988; Cohen,
1995; Ehrenberg, 1999; Halperin & Laxer, 2003) inspired largely by recent developments
within the context of economic globalisation as well as environmental concerns which called
for urgent cooperation across national borders. It seemed, the main impulse for these readers
of ‘transnational identities’ (Cohen, 1995) was a shared identity fostering in the foreground a
55
‘transnational corporate culture’ (Falk, 1995). To bring people together around this identity,
there was need for a type of global citizenship, to be established perhaps most convincingly
on humanitarian grounds (Wingenbach, 1998).
To be fair, trends in these scholarly thoughts correlate highly with global immigration moves
(Benmayor & Skotnes, 1994; Urry, 2000; Geddes, 2000; 2003; Joppke, 1999; 2005; 2010a;
2010b) and interest in transnationalism (Portes, 1996; Westwood & Phizacklea, 2001;
Vertovec, 2004). The best known transnational form of citizenship is of no doubt the one
designed exclusively for EU citizens. While the case of European citizenship is based on the
basic components of national citizenships, a fundamental question rises here to question
cross-border ties bringing Europeans together. It becomes in this sense crucial to look first
into its links to a shared collective identity in Europe, i.e. ‘European identity’.
2.2.3.1 European identity
The official launch of European identity dates back to the Cold War days, when the then
European Community was short of a far-reaching political image in the international scene.
At the 1973 Copenhagen Summit, the then nine Member States of the EC decided to draw up
a document to this end with the expectation that it would define their relations with the rest of
the world more explicitly.70 Indeed, this scheme paid off soon across a number of intracommunity documents such as the 1976 Tindemans Report where proposals on a common
foreign policy, defence collaboration and economic and monetary union were all offered in
the name of e pluribus unum, suggesting ‘a European people’ (Kostakopoulou, 2001).
The elites were fairly convinced that the societal links amongst peoples of Europe would by
this means be effectively reinforced (Lehmkuhl, 2001; Cerutti & Lucarelli, 2008). This frame
of mind was preserved at the 1984 Fontainebleau Summit which called further upon the
Adonnino Committee to create a ‘Europe of citizens’. The most immediate outcome in this
thread was adoption of the European Community flag, anthem and an EC passport as well as
establishment of ‘Europe Day’ seeking “to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among
the people of Europe.”71 The 1985 Schengen I Agreement, the promotion of town-twinning
schemes in 1989, the introduction of European citizenship, consular cooperation in third
countries, an EU ombudsman, the 1993 Maastricht Treaty’s ‘European’ perspective of
70
71
Bulletin of the European Communities, December 1973, Luxembourg.
The Preamble of the 1957 Rome Treaty.
56
education and ‘youth’ exchange programmes all followed suit to establish feelings of
solidarity amongst the citizens of the EC/EU. With commitments “to instil some ‘European
consciousness among the peoples of Europe” (Shore, 2000, pp. 221-22), these political moves
constituted evidently the basis of a ‘Europeanisation’ process which sought to transfer the
economic benefits of the integration project into the political sphere.
While many had faith during this period in the existence of an overarching identity for
Europeans (Inglehart, 1970; Commission of the European Communities, 1985), or at least a
capacity for it (Bloom, 1990; Smith, 1991, 1992), it was hard to put that conviction to an
empirical test. The difficulty here lies particularly in measuring people’s genuine feelings
which to Potter & Wetherell (1987) draw copiously on discursive strategies (as cited in
Cinnirella, 1997, p. 21). In this sense, although one could appear to express favourable
thoughts about the EU, these impressions might be misleading in coming to grips with a
genuine attachment to the EU, for an overarching identity necessitates ferreting out feelings of
belonging deep down.
Regardless of this empirical difficulty, research has made copious attempts to get to the
substance of European identity. There appear three main paths followed to this end. First, an
initial concern was to look into its existence or absence (Smith, 1991; Duchesne & Frognier,
1995; Eriksen, 2002; Breakwell, 2004; Meinhof, 2004). Based on the assumption that it was
not an illusion, a second wave took to formulate its defining features (Risse, 2003; Herrmann
& Brewer, 2004; Castano, 2004; Grundy & Jamieson, 2007). And finally, a third host of
scholarship became committed to exploring the future prospects of a collective identity for
Europe (Habermas, 2001; Nicolaidis, 2004; Rogowski & Turner, 2006). A thorough analysis
of these various perspectives revealed a list of attributes characterising ‘Europeanness’.
Accordingly, being a ‘European’ must be about sharing a geographical entity recognised
officially as Europe; a common history together with a linguistic and cultural heritage in this
geographical space; a religious heritage of Christianity as well as principles and values like
tolerance, pluralism, democracy, human rights, rule of law and fundamental freedoms. Since a
broad consensus over these characteristics was far from being in sight, nevertheless, a further
perspective emerged to point out later on that it was in fact diversity -not uniformity- that
marked the distinguishing quality of being ‘European’ (Delanty & Rumford, 2005).
57
To help reduce the ‘conceptual overstretch’ of European identity, Walkenhorst (2009, pp. 7-8)
offered analysis on the basis of ‘historical-cultural identity’, ‘political-legal identity’, ‘social
identity’, ‘international identity’ and ‘post-identity commonness’. From a historical-cultural
perspective, European identity would represent a shared European past as perceived in terms
of common values and cultural origins. The political-legal identity viewpoint was actually a
constructive recipe to sidestep primordialist outlooks (as the former historical-cultural
understanding was suggesting) through political participation, democratic representation,
principles of legitimacy and the status of citizenship. For social identity, the issue at stake was
the need to bring forward an overarching collective identity in Europe, an image similar to
that of ‘people’s Europe’. Next, if understood as a type of international identity, to
Walkenhorst (2009), European identity would sink into its weakest form, conveying only just
a collective image in the international arena. And finally, the post-identity commonness
perspective was a reflection of post-modernist/post-nationalist theories seeking to bypass the
vicious debate between primordialists/essentialists and constructivists to open up a broader
space of universalism in embracing identity beyond the national level.
Regardless of the fact that these various perceptions provide useful insights in keeping up
with a collective identity for Europe, there have been doubts concerning whether or not this is
an urgent matter vis-à-vis the already existing collection of feelings at the national and subnational levels. A number of sociological roadmaps have already been raised in this context.
Should political communities be treated as cultural products or ‘societal communities’ in
relation to their members’ collective experiences (Parsons, 1967), an overarching identity for
Europe becomes a necessary instrument. Yet, if such communities can be created through the
interplay between system-related factors (Luhmann, 1994) or are made up of individuals’
strategic choices, as seen by some rational choice theories72, European identity comes as a
redundant or counter-productive formulation (Hardin, 1995). In this sense, unless the EU is in
need of an “extensive and far-reaching solidaristic behaviour from its peoples, [a] full-fledged
collective identity is hardly needed” (Armingeon, 1999, p. 236).
Indeed, the challenges of ensuring whether or not a collective identity at the European level
would function as a ‘gap-filler’ or a ‘missing link’ stems at a deeper level from a dilemma:
72
Rational choice theorists do not have a shared position on identity. While the ‘externalist’ side ignores or at
least reduces the concept of identity to emergent conditions, the ‘internalist’ rational choice theorists take
identity as a means to understanding social action (Aguiar & de Francisco, 2009).
58
studying European identity from within or from without. If studied from without, Europe is
generally sighted in terms of its similarities and differences vis-à-vis ‘others’, i.e. its
economic and political contenders elsewhere in the world. The reason why this aspect is
debatable rests on normative grounds. On one side, it is obvious that making a distinction
between Europeans and non-Europeans is unavoidable or else “identity vanishes into
diffusiveness” (Cerutti, 2008, p. 6). Yet, on the other side, basing European identity on a ‘wethey’ or ‘us-them’ divide might provoke antagonism amongst residents in a society, recalling
in a way Huntington’s (1993) ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis.73 The other major source of
difficulty with European identity, if studied from within, concerns its status in relation to
national identities. Reducing European identity by this way to shared memories would
however not necessarily make a positive impression when considered in view of the history of
Europe, as this would evoke a countless number of wars and tragedies on its soil. The recent
proposal of an alternative model around ‘political identity’ (Fuchs, 2000; Habermas, 2001;
Cerutti, 2003; Meyer, 2004 -as cited in Fuchs, 2011, p. 39) is informed very much by this past
to bring the least disputable aspect of European identity to the fore: a shared political culture
informed by universal values such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Habermas (1998) for instance offered in this context ‘constitutional patriotism’, to be capable
of serving as a catalyst for convergence around a collective ‘we-feeling’ and working in
tandem with ‘deliberative democracy’. Despite this analytical attempt to reconcile
‘particularist’ principles with those of universalism, there was in fact, allegedly, nothing
original about ‘Europeanness’ for such qualities could be applicable to many other corners of
the world as well. What’s more, such an offer might perhaps appeal to its original context, i.e.
Germany, which formerly was a ‘half nation’ with an acutely ‘compromised’ form of
nationality “on account of its Nazi past. But…other countries do not have a comparably
difficult past, and therefore are better served by forms of liberal nationalism” (Müller, 2007,
p. 5). Indeed, this latter scepticism about a possible European public sphere stems mainly
from communitarian thoughts arguing on the basis of a so-called ‘no demos’ thesis (Gerhards,
1993; Grimm, 1995; Kielmansegg, 1996; Weiler, 1997, 1999) that a European-level of
democracy is difficult to achieve so long as a perfect harmony between European masses is
73
Following in the footsteps of modernisation theory, Huntington saw identity as a crucial basis of classification
according to which individuals are grouped in clusters of ‘civilisations’ based most notably on their religious
values. Such a view of civilisations as monolithic cultural blocks has however not appealed to a broad audience.
A new scheme of ‘equal but different’ identities came up therefore to value cultural differences as important as
those of the biological race (Hammond, 2007).
59
out of sight. Habermas’ position would amount in this sense to “an oxymoron: as it is seen as
simultaneously an attempt to bridge the universalism of basic rights and the particularity of a
community of allegiance and identification” (Fossum, 2007, p. 4). In the end, a constitution
for the EU would be “uneasily poised between a defence of universal values that is too ‘thin’
to mobilize people’s allegiance and loyalty, and a reconstruction of European values that may
become too ‘thick’ in the way in which Europeans use it as form of identification”
(Castiglione, 2009, p. 44).
As covered earlier, the socio-psychological insights into identity, suggested for instance by
the SIT (social identity theory), imply that a far-reaching group membership like European
identity counts as only just one of the social identities Europeans appear to “borrow from their
membership in social groups” (Castano & Yzerbyt, 1997, p. 2). While multiple social
identities are informed essentially by the principle of ‘sharedness’, there are factors
suggesting differentiation as well. With its similar conception of membership to more than
one social group, the self-categorisation theory (SCT) of Turner (1978) suggests in a similar
vein a multiplicity of identities of which categorisation at different levels of inclusion is
capable of generating the ranking of one identity over the others. This does however not
suggest that identification with one’s nation takes place at the expense of others. Accordingly,
if self-categorisations are secured at more than one level, national and European identities
could be established in a mutually inclusive relationship (Guetzkow, 1955).
All in all, complementarity of national identity and European identity is largely a question of
how identity is defined in the first place. If identities are taken to be fluid and ever-changing
by character, European and national identities could be seen to follow a dynamic process of
defining each other. Should, however, European identity be defined alongside essentialist
approaches, there is little chance for uniformity, for a mere set of primordial features like
cultural and linguistic similarities would roughly provoke putting one identity ahead of the
rest, as if to excel or supersede them.
2.2.3.2 European citizenship
Compared to European identity, the notion of European citizenship appears to have gained a
much wider purchase so far. Maastricht’s commitment “to strengthen the protection of the
rights and interests of its Member States through the introduction of a citizenship of the
60
Union”74, according to which “Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall
be a citizen of the Union”75, have the rights to move and reside freely within Member State
territories76; vote and stand as a candidate here during local and EP elections77; enjoy
diplomatic protection in third countries78; petition the European Parliament and apply to the
Ombudsman79 which would all be monitored by the Commission to be reporting to the
European Parliament, the Council and the Economic and Social Committee on a regular basis,
i.e. every three years80 presented an overarching group membership for Member State
citizens. Such an ambitious commitment was indeed recalling that of ‘European identity’,
which formerly came to introduce with no less ambition construction of Euro-symbols like a
Union flag, anthem and passport, the start of the European Parliament elections by direct
universal suffrage, a new institution under the European Ombudsman and access to
representation at any Member State’s diplomatic mission abroad.
For all these, however, a string attached by way of Article 8(1) EC Treaty to the Amsterdam
Treaty through “Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national
citizenship”81 was manifesting how sensitive Member States were about the national tenets of
citizenship. From this perspective, one could well argue that the main highlight of Maastricht
was actually not that it introduced a supranational form of citizenship but the commitments it
made to create an economic and monetary union.82 Provoking scepticism in this context was
amongst others the Edinburgh Summit which convened the same year as Maastricht with
hardly an agenda item referring to European citizenship (Martiniello, 1995, p. 39). True, the
introduction of a single monetary policy backed up by a single currency, i.e. the ECU
(European Currency Unit) as the then ‘Euro’, was a remarkable progress for the European
integration. However, the impression that an equally important supranational form of
citizenship remained in Euro’s shade was capable of raising doubts about the credibility of
this fairly assertive project (of European citizenship).
74
Title I, Article B of the Maastricht Treaty.
Title II, Part 2, Article 8(1).
76
Title II, Part 2, Article 8a(1).
77
Title II, Part 2, Article 8b(1, 2).
78
Title II, Part 2, Article 8c.
79
Title II, Part 2, Article 8d.
80
Title II, Part 2, Article 8e.
81
Article 8 was replaced by Article 17 to make the first paragraph now read “Citizenship of the Union is hereby
established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship
of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship.”
82
Title II, Provisions Amending the Treaty, Article 3a.
75
61
To be fair, European citizenship was not really a political objective in its own right as it was
first and foremost the national domain to determine who could earn this title. Since the actual
locus of political power was remaining therewith still in Member States (Hall, 1995), it would
be reasonable to state that there was a subordinate relationship between the two citizenships,
recalling Turner’s (1990) placement of citizenship along ‘top-down’ vs. ‘bottom-up’ and
‘passive’ vs. ‘active’ axes of distinction. From this viewpoint, European citizenship appears to
fit rather to a passive or top-down model for it emerged as a compromise between the
institutions of the EU and Member States but not as a consequence of “some kind of
mobilization of the grassroots citizens of Europe” (Bryant, 1991, as cited in Martiniello, 1995,
p. 42). Much in the same way, Delanty (1997) views European citizenship as “a second order
citizenship…defining Europe by reference to the non-Europeans” (pp. 296-297). This quality
runs parallel to that of European identity which was introduced similarly in reference to the
nation-state model as well as “an essentialist conception of political communities (nations)
coterminous with and grounded in homogeneous and spatially contiguous cultural
communities” (Painter, 2002, p. 101).
Meanwhile, a nation-state guided construction of European citizenship did in fact not align
well with contemporary cultural and political theories for these had already shifted their focus
onto issues like transnationalism, plurality of identities or multiculturalism (Mouffe, 1993;
Kymlicka, 1994; Benhabib, 1996, 2002; Isin & Wood, 1999; Delanty, 2000; May, 2002,
2010). Taking European citizenship as a corollary to national sovereignty only would in this
sense mean turning a blind eye to for instance the impacts of globalisation which have long
been signalising that a state-centered citizenship and demos became increasingly dependent
upon sub-national and supranational identities (Shaw, 1997). This projection indeed amounts
to a post-national understanding of membership (in the form of multiple citizenships)
maintaining that the nation-state is no longer the only legitimate form of polity to identify
with (Soysal, 1994).
What remained as an unresolved issue here was how to build a European demos independent
from the traditional method of nation-building. As formerly mentioned, Habermas’
‘constitutional patriotism’ favouring a ‘European Constitution’ in coordination with a
deliberative model of democracy found criticism not only for its alleged ignorance of the fact
that some countries were already at ease with a liberal form of nationalism (Müller, 2007) but
also for overstating a European public sphere with no demos at sight (Gerhards, 1993; Grimm,
62
1995). In this context, Weiler (1997) suggested conceptualising “European Demos and
citizenship as part of a polity with multiple political Demoi to which its members belong
simultaneously…in what may be called ‘concentric circles’” (p. 119). Central to this
formulation was consideration of European citizenship as the expression of a particular
identity or an ‘ethos of Europe’ (Weiler, 1995, p. 337). Nonetheless, this proposal was also
disputed for a number of reasons. Shore (2004) for instance found it “deeply flawed” because
it was “too abstract and rationalistic in inspiration” and “peculiarly elitist, sterile and soulless”
which had “a curious romanticism attached to the idea of ‘transnational’, ‘deterritorialized’
and ‘hybrid’ identities” (pp. 35-37). The only aspect this rather harsh criticism spared was the
separation of nationality from citizenship, which suggested commonly that the links to
democracy can be established through citizenship, not nationality.
To sum up, the overall impression of a supranational form of citizenship is that it rings
different bells to different thoughts. From an essentialist vantage point, most notably, the
construction of European citizenship does not put enough weight on the role of ethnicities,
languages or traditions. Those subscribing to constructivism reassure however that European
citizenship is still in the making, just as the EU’s competences in pursuit of a political
community are (Giesen & Eder, 2001; Trenz & Eder, 2004; Fossum & Schlesinger, 2007).
Accordingly, if Europeans need a strong foothold for an all-embracing identity to this end,
they need to make sure that such an identity is “no longer conceived as a higher order of
reality than politics or something that ‘underlies’ politics” (Eder, 2001, p. 238).
2.3 Multiculturalism
A main undercurrent of the contemporary immigration debate in Europe is without a doubt
multiculturalism. As a far-reaching concept often used in the context of cultural diversity
concerning gender, class, race or ethnicity by ideological or political means (Willett, 1998),
multiculturalism took off in the late 1960s at an official level in Canada, where it became
gradually part of the government’s policy strategy to address ethno-cultural plurality.83
Regardless of its functional use, however, it is today to some a ‘floating signifier’ (Gunew,
2004, p. 28) with many different interpretations (Taylor, 1994; Kymlicka, 1995; Kincheloe &
Steinberg, 1997) depending on the historical context it is placed in. A number of factors like
83
Following a series of recommendations by the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, the
federal government in Canada finally passed the Official Languages Act in 1969. This was followed in 1971
with the introduction of a federal policy, known as the Multiculturalism Policy, within a Bilingual Framework
(Fortier, 2008, p. 1).
63
national political culture or colonial legacy make for example multiculturalism in Canada and
the USA (characterised largely by Québécois nationalism and the race discourse, respectively)
differ from that in the European context, which is informed to a great extent by the colonial
past of traditional immigration countries like Britain, the Netherlands and France as well as
post-immigration experiences of “‘old’ hosts that did not consider themselves as such (for
example, Germany)” and new routes like Italy, Spain and Greece which, despite
acknowledgement at the (political) elite level, “find it even harder to adopt a multicultural
approach” (Triandafyllidou, Modood & Zapata-Barrero, 2006, p. 1).
For all that, the term multiculturalism was not a buzzword until recently. Following early
debates and policy developments on multicultural implications of citizenship, which the EU’s
Maastricht Treaty prompted further with its introduction of European citizenship, the
unprecedented 9/11 terrorism discourse brought issues concerning multiculturalism quickly to
the foreground. A primary consequence of this recent discourse in Europe was disorientation
of European citizenship, “increasingly linking a religion (Islam) with violence and antiWestern values” (Triandafyllidou, Modood & Zapata-Barrero, 2006). Migration agenda
became incrementally anchored to that of security in major EU Member States which for
some time had already been grappling with the thorny issue of integrating their minorities.
During a Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party meeting in 2010, Chancellor Angela
Merkel announced in this context that Germany’s attempts to establish a multicultural society
“utterly failed”.84 In a short while, at a security conference in Munich, her British counterpart
David Cameron criticised ‘state-sponsored’ multiculturalist policies and underscored the need
for a stronger identity for the UK to prevent people from resorting to extremism.85 Like
Merkel and Cameron, the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy also declared the failure of
multiculturalist policies by blaming them for being far more oriented to the identity of
newcomers than that of France.
Such proclamations resonated seemingly for the most part in economically better-off Western
European lands86, where it became clear that the costs of ‘ethnocultural pluralism’, which
were traditionally attributed to newcomers’ lack of civic integration to the host societies
84
The Guardian, ‘Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has “utterly failed”’, 17 October 2010.
BBC News, `‘State multiculturalism has failed’, says David Cameron`, 5 February 2011.
86
Meanwhile, countries like Luxembourg and Norway, which were once known to possess ethnically
homogenous populations, also took their share by attracting progressively immigrants with diverse ethnic
backgrounds.
85
64
(Joppke, 2007), would not readily disappear (Levy, 2000). Informed by rising levels of
cultural and ethnic diversity which came as a consequence of “increased migration since the
mid-1980s, and the prospect of yet more immigration as new states join the European Union”
(Diez Medrano, 2009, p. 84), the critical voices heard at the highest state level were in this
sense the culmination of reactions to the political handling of multiculturalism, which proved
fruitful for neither minority nor majority groups.87 The perceived differences between these
two groups pushed on the other side to a power struggle whereby the former yearned for
acquisition of the same economic, social and political rights as enjoyed by the latter.
The theoretical basis of multiculturalism is characterised to a great extent by identity politics
(Scott, 1992). As the forerunner in this field, Will Kymlicka based his liberal theory
essentially on John Rawls’ perception of wealth and distributive justice. Tackling perceptions
of ‘inequality’ as felt by minorities, Kymlicka (1995, p. 4) argued in Liberalism, Community,
and Culture and Multicultural Citizenship that post-war liberal theory was in need of
furthering the human rights discourse, which alone cannot resolve chronic problems
concerning languages, rights to education and cultural integration. The assumption that the
state could secure basic individual rights (and protect ethnic identities) by distancing itself
with ‘benign neglect’ (Glazer & Moynihan, 1975) was to Kymlicka (1995) purely
hypothetical and for this reason required a supplement of ‘minority rights’ where the
emphasis had to be on the “principles of individual liberty, democracy, and social justice” (p.
6). Three types of ‘group-differentiated’ rights were offered in this context: ‘self-government
rights’, ‘polyethnic rights’, and ‘special representation rights’. Through ‘self-government
rights’, minority groups were to get ahold of a shield of territorial jurisdiction which would
promise them greater political autonomy. Since this projection did not include the entirety of
immigrant minorities, a second set of ‘polyethnic rights’ was formulated as a means to
safeguarding languages and cultural practices applicable to immigrants. And finally, ‘special
representation rights’ would ensure active participation and representation for all minority
groups in the state’s political system. To this specific end, Kymlicka (1995) detached here
national minorities (indigenous groups) from ethnic ones (immigrants).88
87
While the distinction between majority and minority groups has obviously to do with the numerical size, this is
in the context of multiculturalism closely related to discrimination or marginalization on the basis of culture (Lee
& Fiske, 2006). Should the public domain be defined entirely by the culture of the majority group, minorities are
automatically forced to dispense with their cultural or linguistic practices “as the necessary price of entry to the
civic realm” (May, 2002, p. 137).
88
Unlike national minorities such as the Maoris in New Zealand, the Aborigines in Australia or the Native
Americans in the USA, ethnic minorities are groups of people who join a society as newcomers with the hope to
65
An important issue to clarify at this point is the way(s) in which ‘societal’ cultures are of
relevance to national cultures. Given that common values, memories and institutions are in a
nation-state connected through a shared set of social practices, one might interpret the two
forms of culture as variants of the same conception. This presumption is however more farfetched than it sounds considering national minorities’ split from ethnic minorities like
immigrants who generally are thought to leave their societal cultures back in their countries of
origin. While Kymlicka’s ‘special representation rights’ allowed national minorities to keep to
their specific cultures and immigrants and embrace their cultural particularities via
‘polyethnic rights’, minority groups were here also promised protection against illiberal
practices from within, for example in the form of abusing freedom and equality amongst their
own group members. A distinction was therefore made in this specific context between
‘internal restrictions’ and ‘external protections’:
The first kind is intended to protect the group from the destabilising impact of
internal dissent (e.g., the decision of individual members not to follow traditional
practices or customs), whereas the second is intended to protect the group from the
impact of external decisions (e.g., the economic or political decisions of the larger
society) (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 35).
Kymlicka’s liberalist guidance constituted obviously the “clearest starting point in
Anglophone political theories of multiculturalism” (Modood, 2007, p. 21). That said, the
theoretical perspective Charles Taylor put forth appeared to be competitive on the grounds
that Kymlicka’s liberalist formulation was too individual oriented and promised little room
for culture. Stressing that the individual agency would not be meaningful in the absence of
social and cultural identities, Taylor (1994) argued in his renowned essay ‘The Politics of
Recognition’ that minorities suffered largely because they were denied ‘political recognition’
(which was granted to majorities). Although liberalism was claiming to treat all individuals as
equal citizens, accordingly, “what many cultural groups” were in need of was not recognition
“of their sameness, but of their distinctness” (Kukathas, 2004, p. 255). For that, Taylor (1994)
believed such a view of liberalism could in its most favourable interpretation offer only a
short term solution to minorities’ cultural survival.
preserve their ethnic identities and traditions but holding no “legitimate claim to self-government” (Kukathas,
2004, p. 252).
66
Taylor’s ‘recognition’ argument suggesting that minorities are imprisoned within “a confining
or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves” (1994, p. 25) could not escape criticism,
either. To ‘critical multiculturalists’, for instance, it was short of “positionality, in which
people are defined not in terms of fixed identities, but by their location within shifting
networks of relationships, which can be analysed and changed” (Maher & Tetreault, 1994, p.
164). Informed by social construction of identities, the ‘positionality’ argument highlighted
‘change’ in societal roles, which Taylor allegedly did not take into account in his ‘politics of
difference’ thesis. Be that as it may, the underlying tenets of ‘politics of difference’ were
adopted by many theorists (Young, 1990; Tully, 1995, 2003; Devaux, 2000; Baumeister,
2000). Questioning the conception of ‘the common good’, Young (1990) for instance argued
for political representation on the basis of ‘a heterogeneous public’. The main concern here
was “participatory structures in which actual people, with their geographical, ethnic, gender
and occupational differences, assert their perspectives on social issues within institutions that
encourage the representation of their distinct voices” (Young, 1990, p. 116). In light of efforts
seeking to create a homogeneous public, a notion of ‘group-differentiated citizenship’ was
introduced here for the interests of ‘oppressed’ groups, highlighting the rights these could
further enjoy vis-à-vis those of the ‘privileged’.
The debate on the liberalist roots of multiculturalism, as prompted by Kymlicka and Taylor,
inspired a wide range of models. Propositions such as ‘difference multiculturalism’ (Turner,
1993), ‘insurgent multiculturalism’ (Giroux, 1994) and ‘critical multiculturalism’ (Chicago
Cultural Studies Group, 1994) were grouped by Delanty (2003) in the form of ‘traditional’,
‘modern’ and ‘post-modern’ categories. Accordingly, traditional multiculturalism is
characterised by ‘monoculturalism’ (based on denial of cultural diversity, which for instance
Japanese citizenship appears to have endorsed by equating ethnicity with nationality),
‘republican multiculturalism’ (which as in the French case seems like a ‘culture blind’ model
making no official recognition of cultural diversity), ‘pillarisation’ (illustrated formerly by the
educational system in the Netherlands in line with Protestant and Catholic denominations) and
‘liberal multiculturalism’ (inspired by the ‘melting pot’ model in the USA). The category of
modern multiculturalism comprises on the other hand three sub-divisions: ‘communitarian
multiculturalism’ (as posited through Taylor’s politics of recognition, which may be
applicable to India, Ireland, Canada or Belgium), a ‘liberal communitarian’ version (for
instance, the ‘salad bowl’ model offered by Habermas (1998), Parekh (2000) or Touraine
(2000), based on the colonial history of Britain and the Commonwealth) and
67
‘interculturalism’ (through Watson’s (2000) model regarding cultural difference as a ‘positive
virtue’ in light of cultural awareness, tolerance and knowledge of other cultures). And finally,
post-multiculturalism gathers three more versions including ‘radical multiculturalism’ (the
main form of which applies to contemporary USA, where the former liberal ‘melting model’
fits to the frame of race rather than ethnicity), critical multiculturalism (underscoring being
‘different’ as in the case of disadvantaged groups) and ‘transnational multiculturalism’
(informed most notably by globalisation).
2.3.1 Criticism of multiculturalism
Regardless of these diverse perspectives offering what a multiculturalist society should
principally be made up of, a growing wave of recent thoughts came to deny almost all
scenarios attached with multiculturalism. While it is not easy to identify the exact roots of
these antagonistic dispositions, a most suspected source is the ‘9/11 events’ which rose to link
the subject matter largely to the terrorism discourse (McGhee, 2008). The major point
addressed alongside this line of criticism was multiculturalism’s promise of ‘multiple
loyalties’ about which some had for long been sceptical about because it would almost always
jeopardise attachment to the nation-state (Schlesinger, 1998; Huntington, 2004). Despite
reassurances maintaining that it was actually lack of minority rights that disintegrated ‘the
bonds of civic solidarity’ (Kymlicka, 2002), those sensitive to national identity were fearing
“that without a primary loyalty to the nation-state, the civic, political, and even moral
community of a country” would gradually dissolve into obscurity with “problems ranging
from limited democratic engagement to a lack of interest in the policies of redistribution”
(Bloemraad, Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2008, p. 160).
A most leading critical outlook came in this vein from the feminist wing which discredited
multiculturalism’s claims of “respect for all cultural traditions”, for they were not taking into
account “all cultural traditions” (Pollitt, 1999, p. 27). It was in this sense not realistic to
conceive of a state adopting multiculturalist policies at risk of ‘recognising’ those who deny
the rights of their own group members, for instance women’s right to education (Okin,
1998).89 This criticism was shared by liberal egalitarians arguing that multiculturalism did not
at all align well with liberal principles and for this reason could not be adopted as a public
policy (Barry, 2001). Despite its commitments to cultural pluralism, multiculturalism, as the
89
A specific issue here is the financial support the state provides for religious education. Feminist critics argue
against such fundings in the context of right to culture for these generally serve for the sole benefit of ‘boys’
(Okin, 1999).
68
criticism went, was in fact ignoring the distinction of public and private spheres -which is a
central component of liberalism- because it saw no harm in allowing room for groups capable
of intruding upon others’ rights during their power quest for public and/or private spheres.
Moving on, cosmopolitan critics also argued against a monolithic understanding of culture.
To them, an unceasing process of societal interaction in a globalised world introduced “bits of
cultures… into our lives in different sources” (Waldron, 1992, p. 110) but not necessarily
claimed “purity of the impure” or the “immutability of the historical” (Benhabib, 2002, p. 11).
In that case, the “multiculturalist resistance to seeing cultures as internally riven and
contested” would be little more than carrying over “visions to selves” (Benhabib, 2002, p.
16). Mitigation or restoration of uneven power relations necessitated to this train of thoughts a
form of ‘politics of equality’ within the framework of a ‘different but equal’ logic (Mahajan,
2002). States from this perspective had to “acknowledge rather than ignore cultural
particularities” (Gutmann, 1994, p. 5). And if there were cultures committed to principles
other than those offered by liberalism, a narrow interpretation of ‘recognition’ was to be
avoided or else it would end up producing only limited diversity (Tomasi, 1995; Parekh,
2000; Deveaux, 2000). A typical example given at this link was the case of indigenous
peoples who despite their non-liberal practices could still be worthy of respect in terms of
their societal organisations (Spinner-Halev, 2006, p. 549).
It seems against a background of such critical outlooks rounding off cultures/groups alike
would risk major differences/inequalities they hold intrinsically, for instance in the form of
‘internal minorities’ or ‘minorities within minorities’ (Eisenberg & Spinner-Halev, 2004).
This would, put differently, amount “to an overly narrow focus on ‘identity’ as singular—as if
one’s cultural membership were unmediated by other social factors such as gender, sexual
orientation, age, marital status and the like” (Shachar, 2001, p. 30). In any case, considering
particularly ‘politics of recognition’ and ‘politics of equality’, one could argue that the
likelihood for a shared platform of cultural plurality is contingent upon how successful a
country’s integration policy is. Accordingly, success in the integration of immigrant
minorities rests on skillful management of immigration policies for which a common
language and culture should come in the first place. While immigrants may be at a
disadvantageous position in this picture, the situation is first and foremost illustrative of ‘civic
consciousness’ (Taylor, 2011).
69
2.3.2 Integration, participation and assimilation
As already mentioned, multiculturalism in Europe was until recently not a focal point of
political interest. A number of developments such as the
rise of nationalism in Eastern Europe after the fall of the BerlinWall in 1989, the
attraction of communitarian thinking in the 1980s, the increased political activism of
religious conservatives in the 1980s in the USA, and the increase in Muslim
immigrants to Western Europe in the 1970s and afterwards…all brought about an
enlarged interest in the role that groups play in theory and practice (Spinner-Halev,
2004, p. 546).
When this course of events became further clouded in the early 2000s with the ‘9/11 events’
in the USA (followed by bomb attacks in Spain and Britain), multiculturalism was declared at
many fronts to be a ‘fiasco’, with immigrants’ failure to integrate into their host societies, as
the primary wrongdoer (Joppke, 2004). Of a number of urgent actions taken in this context
was recourse to civic integration courses and tests which some countries like the Netherlands
decided to apply in the very country of origin. Given the complexity of its application, the
new understanding of integration went apparently out of the ordinary to make it an admission
requirement for immigration (De Heer, 2004). Further to that, new legislations have been
introduced for instance in France, banning ‘ostentatious’ religious clothing and symbols like
the Sikh turban, Muslim hijab, Jewish kippas and Christian crosses.90 Much in a similar vein
other EU Member States like the UK banned polygamy, female circumcision or arranged
marriages, as practiced by some of their immigrants, in consideration of the rising voices of
dissent in public circles (Phillips & Saharso, 2008), while a German court ruled quite recently
that young boys’ circumcision for religious reasons -carried out traditionally by Jewish and
Muslim communities- equalled ‘bodily harm’ and had to be declared illegal.91
These revisionary acts have indeed come into being under the guidance of not only political
parties but also alongside academic, journalistic and public discourses. It came out, in
accordance, the road to integration demanded participation in a host country’s societal,
economic and political systems. In this new immigration context, while immigrants opting
willingly for integration could, as former British PM Tony Blair addressed, be happily
welcome providing “they have internalised prevailing ‘values’”, others perceived to be
rejecting “liberal democratic norms…are to be excluded through the revocation of their rights
90
91
Financial Times (2008) ‘Sikhs urge Sarkozy to lift turban ban’, January 25, 2008.
BBC News Europe, `German Court rules circumcision is ‘bodily harm’, 26 June 2012.
70
to citizenship and legal residency and, in extreme cases, their detention, denaturalisation and
deportation” (Triadafilopoulos, 2011, p. 862).
With its quest for social cohesion and political participation of minority groups via
citizenship, the issue of integration is without doubt an integral part of multiculturalism
theories. This basic premise is however open to debate considering that participation through
contribution to economic activities, access to educational institutions or residential resources
would not always suffice for integration because a certain degree of involvement would take
place even without a reward of legal citizenship status or legal residence (Leitner & Ehrkamp,
2003). This is indeed where the question of assimilation comes into play.
The rise of assimilation as a significant political instrument is closely related to the
‘exhaustion’ of a ‘state-sponsored’ multiculturalism discourse. On one side, multiculturalism
demands ‘recognition’ of diversity so that “the qualities of out-groups are not
stigmatized…but rather reconstitute the notion of civil competence within the public sphere”
(Mitchell, 2004, p. 642). What assimilation necessitates on the other side is the opposite: it
requires the reinforcement of “public/private split by separating out ‘difference’ and
relegating it to the private sphere” (Mitchell, 2004, p. 642). Nevertheless, as some argue, a
‘backlash’ against multiculturalism and a switch to civic integration -be that through
assimilation or otherwise- does not necessarily suggest exclusion on the basis of ethnicities
but instead a new understanding of citizenship as a reward for an ‘adequate’ degree of
integration (Bauböck, 2006, 2008).
Propagating a discourse underlining the failure of multiculturalism, “state policies of
assimilationism and exclusion represent a return to a recuperative national project that seeks
to (re)locate a universalist notion of civil society firmly within the bounded contours of the
nation state” (Mitchell, 2004, p. 645). In so being, assimilation policies might be regarded as
“historically the first and sociologically the most ‘natural’ response to the contradiction
between public civility and private particularity” (Alexander, 2006, p. 422). This perception
receives however the same criticism as multiculturalism, in particular from non-liberal critics,
because immigrants or minorities would by this means be urged to pick up on liberalist
principles. As Joppke & Morawska (2003) for instance point out, pressure to acquire host
societies’ languages and liberalist values may be an indication of the assimilation discourse.
71
Accordingly, those who fail to resist this pressure are labeled as individuals opting out from
participation in civic life, which is why they allegedly deserve social exclusion.
2.4 Review
A central theme of this study is immigration whose conceptual boundaries are determined
largely by citizenship. Following the Westphalian state system which installed national
citizenship as a core component of international relations, migration became an issue resting
upon progressively restrictive formalities including amongst others authorisation of official
documents like passports, visas and working permits. Political research on immigration has
against this background almost always taken as a base the nation-state vantage point. A
multidisciplinary span enriched this enterprise. Research models affiliated with economic,
sociological, historical, anthropological and political principles gave way to a wide spectrum
of outcomes by offering various points of emphasis, most notably material incentives, social
structures, spatial elements, family induced motivations and state interests, as far as the
interplay between immigration and national citizenship is concerned.
Three interrelated components are of primary relevance for this conceptualisation: legal
status, political participation and identity. Legal status is often located ahead of political
participation and identity as the scope of the latter two is generally thought to be guided by
the former’s emphasis on ‘rights’. That said, mere dependence on rights is bound to remain
ineffective in cases when contribution/involvement of individuals in the political system as
well as their affective quality are neglected at a broader scale. Yet, no matter how much
attachment to the state through emotional bonds matters for a voluntary participation in the
political community, the very nature of identity holds capacity for being problematic,
irrespective of the copious interdisciplinary approaches dedicated to that cause.
Another major theme the study conceives of as central to its research theme is
multiculturalism. Conceptualised generally within the context of citizenship, multiculturalism
was first brought into use in the 1960s by the Canadian government as part of its internal
political strategy to come to terms with ethno-cultural plurality. Regardless of its functional
use, however, the recent rise of critical voices declining multiculturalism in state, public and
academic domains indicates how convoluted citizenship has become in the face of
immigration policies. While it could be a remedy for the flaws of multiculturalism (Schierup,
Hansen & Castles, 2006), an upsurge in “resident noncitizens as well as nonresident, or
72
external citizens” (Barry, 2006, p. 17) brought about a new conception of ‘transnationalised’
citizenship, which came to make a wide array of implications. The introduction of European
citizenship with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty had in this context a significant value particularly
for the connection it established between territoriality and citizenship. While citizenship was
traditionally anchored with the legal status as introduced by the nation-state, the advent of
European citizenship offered a different viewpoint, in particular with its alternative sight on
‘national membership’ and sovereignty. This formulation was however taken by many with a
pinch of salt seeing that the ‘gate-keeping’ role was still firmly belonging to the nation-state.92
And if “the traditional, classical vocabulary of the citizenship” should still be elementary to
the EU version, “its very introduction into the discourse of European integration is
problematic” (Weiler, 1999, p. 327). As there appeared in this sense no overarching European
demos, attachment to the Union on the basis of a new formulation of citizenship was far from
being realistic (Weiler, 1995). At stake here was obviously a short-sighted European political
identity which appeared to give the supranational form of citizenship not much room to
survive. As Mouffe (1992) notes
if Europe is not to be defined exclusively in terms of economic agreements and
reduced to a common market, the definition of a common political identity must be at
the head of the agenda and this requires addressing the question of citizenship.
European citizenship cannot be understood solely in terms of a legal status and set of
rights, important as these are (p. 8).
Seen from this perspective, the subject of European citizenship plays a critical role in testing
citizenship beyond the conceptual boundaries of the nation-state. Nevertheless, this
argumentation is disputed on the grounds that citizenship cannot be a legal issue about
“existing social groups of quasi-primordial nature in order to convert them into a political
entity” but instead “a concept of social stratification from which the consciousness of
belonging together” or differentiation between in- and out-groups “largely ensues” (Besson &
Utzinger, 2008, p. 188). From this perspective, the argument that European citizenship cannot
survive in the absence of a European demos is not plausible because “the status of citizenship
and the identity of the demos are functionally linked through a process of mutual
reproduction” (Besson & Utzinger, 2008, p. 188). Regardless of a given set of rights,
citizenship includes in this regard being part of a political entity on the basis of democracy or
what Bellamy (2001) refers to in more profound terms as ‘the right to have rights’.
92
Article 17 TEU (Treaty of the European Union, Maastricht Treaty) attached here a string emphasising
“citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national citizenship”.
73
The discussion of who to include within (and who to exclude from) the stretch of citizenship,
rests, as far as the above-mentioned mutual relationship is concerned, very much on social
cohesion/civic integration. Still, the recent rise of terrorism discourse made this issue more
precarious than it always was. Multiculturalism as a thematic element across scholarly debates
was prior to ‘9/11’ placed largely within the context of human rights/universalism. Yet, it
appears, the issue has for some time been linked for the most part to national identity, as a
result of which the former promise of ‘multiple loyalties’ is now declared ‘null and void’.
The entire backcloth presented through citizenship and multiculturalism so far is essentially
informed by three competing schools of political thought. As first, the liberal understanding of
citizenship connotes largely to legal status by which members of a political entity are granted
social, political and civil rights in return for which they are bound with a number of
obligations. Seen from this perspective, citizenship is in the first place “a matter of
entitlement” rather than “political participation or civic commitment” (Bellamy, Castiglione
& Shaw, 2006, p. 9). Despite different lenses they consult to come to terms with cultural
plurality, liberalists see multiculturalism largely as a means to accommodating and protecting
diversity “to promote liberal values such as equality, autonomy, toleration or equal respect.
Thus, although it may well allow a degree of cultural preservation or protectionism, that isn’t
the central aim or telos of this approach” (Ivison, 2010, p. 3).
Then, for the republican citizenship, ‘rights’ are backed up typically by political participation.
Based on models retrieved from Ancient Greece which restricted participation to citizens but
not ‘subjects’, republicans demand stronger commitments from individuals, through
commitment to civic and political life, at the very least. Conceptualisation of the ‘nation’
requires in this sense further than “the basis of descent, a shared tradition and a common
language” to include more of ‘praxis’ and exercise of civil rights actively (Habermas, 1992).
Last, to communitarians, citizenship brings people together within a political community on
the basis of shared norms and values. Membership of citizens is here characterised through
moral qualities like loyalty and solidarity binding community members to one another
(Martiniello, 2000). Contrary to liberals and republicans who look alike by subscribing to
universalist principles in orientation, communitarians credit a protective logic allowing for
74
‘recognition’ of minority groups like immigrants provided that the latter would concede the
majority groups’ cultural privileges (Ivison, 2010).
75
Chapter 3 Theoretical framework
The EU’s raison d'être as a political actor is often met with scepticism in scholarship.
Cooperation in the early stages between Member States (the so called ‘European Political
Cooperation’) was reportedly shallow and lame. Amidst polemics over the ‘normative’ role
attached distinctively in international terms (Duchene, 1973; Manners, 2002), the EU’s
growing institutional structure at the internal level led gradually to “the creation and
dissemination of a range of new databases, the scope for systematic testing and falsification of
theories” bringing about in the end “an increasingly promising arena for the practice of
‘normal science’” (Pollack, 2005, p. 379). This chapter will begin with a preface to this new
field which in literature is filed as theory in EU Studies. The main aim intended here is to
locate Europeanisation in this broad framework before it is subsequently presented as the
main theory of the research.
3.1 Theory in EU Studies
To be sure, social sciences abound with theories, paradigms, approaches or schools of
thinking which scholars turn to one way or another to reify research challenges. Featuring
alongside this diversity is a long standing rivalry initiated from one perspective for what is
supposedly not explained, formulated or accomplished from those of the rest. This issue, put
differently, the fact that a theory’s supremacy relates closely to its competitive strength over
the others has been informative also for EU Studies. Nonetheless, though fairly prolific, this
relatively young area is a derivative of International Relations (IR) and has to date not been
impressive enough to reassure its own agenda or at least anything further than what the latter
or Comparative Politics already said (Hollis & Smith, 1990).
The IR theory is generally known to have risen upon a long legacy of ‘bloody conflicts’ to
give insights into how further outbreaks of war could be prevented. To change the world for
the better, both liberalists and realists had faith in the give-and-take between theory and
practice, while the realist agenda rather filtered it “by trying to understand as dispassionately
as possible the constraints on realising the vision which the ‘utopians’ had been too anxious to
embrace” (Burchill et al., 2005, p. 9). In fact, up to the post-War era when the European
integration took a start with its sui generis configuration, it was the realist paradigm which
found more audience in the IR field. Commitments made by EC/EU have since then been
76
analysed in many ways over a series of grand-, middle- and small-range theories (Nugent,
2003). The forerunner in the first cluster was neo-functionalism which captured scholarly
attention with its liberalist ‘spill-over’ motto. To neo-functionalists, the safety valve of a warfree Europe was a system of mutual interests -as their predecessors, functionalists, had
similarly formulated (Mitrany, 1943)- which, if states could take advantage of it collectively,
had the potential to let integration in one sector expand into others through a ‘spill-over’
process (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963). The heyday of neo-functionalism coincided with
Deutsch’s ‘transactionalism’93 which as a theoretical contribution maintained that the
horizontal relations across Member States could one way or another release a ‘sense of
community’ (Deutsch et al., 1967). A certain shift of ‘loyalties’ for a supranational rule would
however not guarantee unconditional commitment to the European ideals (Lerner & Gorden,
1969).
Indeed, the ‘empty chair’ crisis94 of the 1960s cast a shadow over the neo-functionalist
arguments which were soon declared ‘obsolete’ by the founder Haas himself (Schmitter,
2004) as if to submit itself clearly to Hoffmann’s (1964) ‘intergovernmentalism’. Classified in
literature as ‘classical intergovernmentalism’, this second grand theory also found criticism
because it appeared to explain nothing but why Member States would not really volunteer for
further integration. This issue was later filed down by Moravcsik (1993, 1998) under ‘liberal
intergovernmentalism’ to highlight not merely the deceleration of the integration in the 1960s
but also the EU’s historic achievements up to the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). In any
case, the ‘comeback’ of realism (hence neo-realism) was by this means declaring the nationstate once again as the core unit of the international system “in spite of all the remonstrations
to the contrary” (Hoffman, 1966, p. 895).
The early 1990s saw a transformation in the EU-guided research bringing about its own
research agenda with multiple perspectives (Pollack, 2005). The EU began to appear
thereafter as a system of ‘governance without government’ further beyond an international
organisation (Majone, 1994). As the macro exposure of grand-theories could not shoot the
details of this new EU picture, a number of meso-level/middle-range theories rose to put
93
The term ‘transactionalism’ is essentially meant to stand for the role of transaction level/communication which
is capable of increasing sense of trust amongst people.
94
The ‘empty chair’ crisis of 1966 came as the culmination of France’s boycott series of the Council’s meetings
upon failure to receive veto rights for its ‘highly significant’ national interests. This was indeed a blow to
paralyse the Community method and therewith supranationalisation of the integration process.
77
emphasis on the EU’s capacity to govern ‘effectively and democratically’ (Scharpf, 1999;
Schmitter, 2000). The leading multi-level governance (MLG) approach (Marks, 1993;
Jachtenfuchs, 1995; Majone, 1996; Kohler-Koch & Eising, 1999 and Kohler-Koch &
Rittberger, 2006) argued in this cluster that the EU became a system of governance marked by
“a unique set of multi-level, non-hierarchical and regulatory institutions, and a hybrid mix of
state and non-state actors” (Hix, 1998, p. 39). Perceiving the EU as a complex decisionmaking system with multiple actors (the state being only one of them), MLG theorists focused
primarily on the weakening of the state which could, as they claimed, no more be defined as a
sovereign actor but a body of rules or formal institutions (Marks et al., 1996).
As another meso-level approach the main tenets of which were in fact reminiscent of MLG,
the policy network approach (Marsh & Rhodes, 1992; Peterson, 1992) conceived across
governmental and non-governmental networks of “actors, each of which has an interest, or
‘stake’ in a given…policy sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure”
(Peterson & Bomberg, 1999, p. 8). Separating these networks as ‘horizontal and vertical’
(Heinelt & Smith, 1996), ‘open issue and closed policy’ (Peters, 1998), ‘dyadic and triadic’
(Ansell, Parsons & Darden, 1997) and ‘generalised and task specific’ (Marks & Hooghe,
2004), policy network theorists aimed to show the ways in which structure and agency
conflicted each other.
Further theoretical approaches the meso-level cluster comprises besides the MLG and policy
network analyses are rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism and
sociological institutionalism which altogether are classified in literature under ‘new
institutionalisms’ (Hall & Taylor, 1996). With a commitment to relocate institutions back into
the heart of politics and society (Radaelli, 2003, 2004), these analytical approaches dwelled
principally on “particular slices of the EU polity” (Rosamond, 2000, p. 126), through various
lenses, such as the ‘calculus approach’ of rational choice institutionalists focusing specifically
on the consequences of national preferences (Hall & Taylor, 1996), the temporal emphasis of
historical institutionalists underlining the ‘path dependent’ character of institutional
arrangement (Thelen, 1999) and the ‘cultural approach’ of sociological institutionalists
explaining the link between institutions and agents in reference to the ‘logic of
appropriateness’ (March & Olsen, 1998). Added to these, a more recent formulation came in
this category via discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2000, 2002; Schmidt & Radaelli,
2004), which emerged as a synthetic approach bringing the older ‘new institutionalisms’
78
together. To do that, discursive institutionalism referred to ideational factors to underscore the
role of discursive interaction across institutional networks (Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004).
With its ‘logic of appropriateness’ and emphasis on social norms, like sociological
institutionalism (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 5), social constructivism aligned also with the second
wave of theoretical approaches. That said, what made social constructivism different from the
rest in this group was the weight it put on the ‘finality’ of the EU (Wiener & Diez, 2004). In
so doing, social constructivists were especially critical of the rationalist school for they
seemed to dwell too much on material interests rather than key attributes of European
integration such as cultural richness and ideational factors. Nonetheless, it is important to
underline here that there was no uniform structure applicable to the ontological basis of social
constructivism.95
A further theoretical approach which represented the ‘normative’ school of thoughts amongst
the meso-level theories was characterised by Habermas’ (1996) social theory of ‘deliberative
democracy’ (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009). Pointing to an inclusive political framework at a
universal level (rather than an economic one), theorists subscribing to deliberative democracy
(Eriksen, 2006; Pensky, 2008) asserted that a constitution for the EU could gather Member
State citizens around a shared European goal. Those searching for a supranational identity on
the basis of the EU’s ‘normative power’ (Manners, 2002) could also be associated with this
group.96
Despite their different focal points, the roots of all these perspectives -be they of MLG, policy
network analysis, various forms of institutionalism, social constructivism or deliberative
democracy- could be tracked down to the end of the 1970s when ‘policy-making’ at the EUlevel became central to scholarly interest (Wallace, Wallace & Webb, 1977). In contrast to
neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists who perceived the European integration as a
dependent variable, theorists in this latter generation focused collectively on the EU’s
complex institutional structure. Viewing the EU foremost as an aggregate of policies and
95
Constructivism is far from being monolithic. Some constructivists like Checkel (1998) do not necessarily deny
the rationalist position, for they for instance do not reject “science or causal explanation: their quarrel with
mainstream theories is ontological, not epistemological. The last point is key, for it suggests that constructivism
has the potential to bridge the still vast divide separating the majority of IR theorists from postmodernists” (p.
327).
96
The emphasis laid on ‘identity’ was in essence characterised by the ‘social’ character of institutions which in
the EU case had already been developing since their establishment in the 1950s (Christiansen, Jørgensen &
Wiener, 2001).
79
politics at national and supranational levels (Jachtenfuchs, 2001, p. 250) and highlighting
implications of identity formation for the European integration (Chryssochoou, 2000), this
line of arguments came to extract gradually an independent variable from the European
integration. It is indeed against the background of this ‘governance/normative turn’ that
‘Europeanisation’ could be best illustrated, as a theoretical approach drawing largely on
policy diffusion across the EU’s complex institutional network with a certain extent of
supranationalisation as its independent variable.
3.2 Europeanisation
3.2.1 Defining Europeanisation
Research on European integration has for some time been engrossed first and foremost in the
EU’s domestic impacts. Cutting across a wide range of policy areas, this undertaking is
associated essentially with a new research field by the name of ‘Europeanisation’. Despite the
obvious rise of research interest for it “or perhaps even because of it”, attempts to define this
new field remain all the same somewhat poor and confusing (Mair, 2004, p. 338). The
hitherto recourse to its conceptualisation in an array of policy fields from trade, commerce
and environment to external affairs provokes its “faddish use” in various contexts which
might “easily obscure its substantive meanings” (Featherstone, 2003, p. 3). While
Europeanisation in a narrow sense suggests “a response to the policies of the European Union
(EU)” its scope “is broad, stretching across existing member states and applicant states, as the
EU's weight across the continent grows” (Featherstone, 2003, pp. 3-4). This coverage might at
times extend beyond reference to the EU and embrace for instance the cultural influence of
former European colonial powers away from their current territorial boundaries.
Although a shared definition did not come into being for long (Olsen, 2002; 2003),
Europeanisation suggests at present to political scientists “the direct and indirect processes
between EU member states and between the EU and individual member states, through which
actors, policies and institutions influence each other structurally, ideologically and
procedurally” (Palmowski, 2011, p. 636). An initial definition attempt came from Andersen &
Eliassen (1993) who through ‘Europeification’ referred to a certain degree of power share
between the EU and national governments. Ladrech (1994) furthered this interpretation to
include “an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree
that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national
politics and policy-making” (p. 69). In a similar vein, Radaelli (2000, p. 4) mentioned a host
80
of processes whereby the EU action at social, economic and political levels become
“incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public
policies”. Börzel’s (1999) former reference as a “process by which domestic policy areas
become increasingly subject to European policy-making” (p. 574) indeed drew from the same
reasoning.
The contribution of Risse, Green-Cowles & Caporaso (2001) sought to address the distinctly
European structures which “formalize interactions among the actors, and of policy networks
specialising in the creation of authoritative European rules” (p. 4) and the functionalist roots
of European integration (Haas, 1958). This perspective was indeed denying that of Bulmer &
Burch (2000) who in underscoring the multiplicity of policy-making factors argued that
“European integration is not just ‘out there’ as some kind of independent variable” (p. 9).
These explanatory attempts were expanded later to include
Processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and
informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and
shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub-national)
discourse, political structures and public policies (Radaelli 2003, p. 30).
Indeed, Radaelli’s broad definition appeared to give substance to the multifaceted nature of
Europeanisation, which Dyson & Goetz (2002, p. 2) had previously pointed out:
It is sometimes used narrowly to refer to implementation of EU legislation or more
broadly to capture policy transfer and learning within the EU. It is sometimes used to
identify the shift of national policy paradigms and instruments to the EU-level.
(Other)…times it is used in a narrower way to refer to its effects at the domestic
level…or in a more expansive way to include effects on discourse and identities as
well as structures and policies at the domestic level (qtd. in Howell, 2002, p. 6).
A wide range of perceptions like these could however risk overrrating the ‘shadow of
hierarchy’ as in the case of Member States (Börzel, 2010) or the ‘shadow of conditionality’
for accession states (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005), which would “screen out other
domestic causes” in conceptualising Europeanisation (Bulmer & Burch, 2005, p. 864). This
warning is indeed informed by research findings regarding the rather neglected dimension of
Europeanisation, i.e. its influence in faraway regions. Jetschke & Murray (2012) argued on
this score that the EU Treaties played an inspirational role in the construction of the 2008
81
ASEAN Charter. Such evidence does not necessarily suggest that the signatories of the
Charter became by this means somewhat Europeanised, yet similar arguments apply in fact
theoretically to supranationalisation/Europeanisation of other states. For EU Member State
candidates, to illustrate, accession to the EU involves by all means a certain extent of
institutional adaptation. It would however be erroneous to argue that the EU is here the only
source of change leading to domestic reforms (Noutcheva & Düzgit, 2012).
3.2.2 Scope of Europeanisation
The hitherto attempts to understand Europeanisation have addressed three main prerequisites
for its conceptualisation: capacity of states to accommodate to the EU’s institutional
framework; acquisition of norms and values attached to Europe such as democracy, rule of
law or human rights; and identification with the historical past of Europe. The first imperative
concerning institutional adaptation falls in essence within the research scope of political
science where scholars’ attention is generally drawn by the analysis of national/subnational
actors. The latter two conditions relating to norms/values together with identity/belonging
seem to reflect for the most part sociological, psychological and anthropological undertakings.
With a backdrop of insights into the confines of the EC/EU (Green-Cowles, Caporaso &
Risse, 2001) and approaches questioning the limits of supranationalisation (Flockhart, 2010),
these undertakings have so far postulated two dimensions of Europeanisation. As Börzel &
Risse (2003) observe, it has been mainly the ‘policy’ dimension that captured scholars’
interest in the first place. Aside from several studies focusing on the EU domain (Goetz &
Hix, 2001), the second dimension of ‘politics’ has not found much purchase. Schmidt (2008)
attributes this ‘escape’ essentially to the weak image of EU-level politics. In the case of
immigration for instance, most studies can be catalogued under ‘policy’, with their general
tendency to look into labour, refugee/asylum, family reunification and irregular aspects.
The four main conditions by which domestic institutional change is brought about are taken to
be ‘domestic incentives’, ‘degrees of (limited) statehood’, ‘democracy vs. autocracy’ and
‘power asymmetries’ (Börzel & Risse, 2012, pp. 11-14). The first scope condition of domestic
incentives is essentially a description of whether or not domestic actors’ move to initiate EUguided reforms at home is at their own discretion. As research has come to demonstrate in the
case of accession candidates (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2004; 2005), Europeanisation is
informed here to a great extent by the ‘conditionality principle’. This tool operates like a code
82
of conduct within the broader context of ‘liberal reform coalitions’ whereby the EU aspires
for overhauling corrupt or authoritarian regimes by offering them opportunity to consolidate
their power via approval of EU requirements (Börzel & Pamuk, 2012). For that, ‘the logic of
appropriateness’ is conveyed through ‘norm entrepreneurs’ for the simple purpose of ‘doing
the right thing to do’ (Börzel & Risse, 2007). Such domestic incentives are not necessarily
limited to the EU’s immediate sphere of influence. As Börzel & Risse (2012) maintains,
processes of ‘emulation’ are applicable to all places as long as policy adaptation fits the
interests of domestic actors (p. 11).
The second scope condition concerning degrees of (limited) statehood has to do with states’
capacity in policy-making, which by definition suggests discontinuance for domestic change.
While it is difficult to show at length how diffusion mechanisms are influenced, a number of
actors including business circles may push states significantly into domestic reforms. This is
particularly the case for states with fragile institutional structures. Considering a certain
degree of ‘normative’ character involved here, which in fact applies to all states seeking to
increase their legitimacy, one can argue that there is always a potential to “induce domestic
and regional actors to adopt EU institutional solutions” (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 12).
Democracy vs. autocracy as the third scope condition concerns in essence states’ eagerness
for domestic change via democracy. This is indeed a significant issue in view of the costs of
adaptation for EU requirements, which for democratic states with market economies are far
lower than they are for authoritarian states. From this perspective, aligning with the EU
standards would be a cost-effective option for the latter. However, as pressure from civil
societies in authoritarian states is almost always at a minimum, the EU’s influence upon
domestic change in these countries is often limited. It is possible to claim all the same “that
regime type is not a dichotomous variable, but there are degrees of democracy and autocracy”
(Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 12). This argument is supported by research on the EU-induced
institutional change in countries with varying democratisation levels (Van Hüllen, 2012;
Noutcheva & Düzgit, 2012; Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2012; Börzel & Pamuk, 2012).
Power asymmetries, as the last scope condition for domestic change, relates essentially to
differences between the EU and target states in terms of their material/ideational resources.
For countries with great economic and political resources, exerting pressure for
accommodation to the EU standards has so far proved to be highly demanding. Indeed, there
83
is in Europe hardly a country which could even out the EU’s capabilities with symmetrical
arrangements. Seen from this angle, it would obviously be to the interest of the EU’s
neighbourhood to establish close ties with the Union. Nonetheless, this scope condition
suggests a lower value for, say, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa)
into which the EU’s sphere of influence does not stretch wide enough (Jetschke & Murray,
2012). Such economic and political power balance may even take a discursive meaning
(Barnett & Duvall, 2005), as in the cases of China and some Latin American states like
Venezuela or Cuba, which in many occasions have come to challenge the EU’s discourses on
democracy and human rights. It would in this sense be fair to conclude that the more the EU is
“able to exert direct influence and adaptational pressure for institutional change, the greater
the material power asymmetries in its favour” (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 14).
3.2.3 Models for Europeanisation
The initially launched ‘top-down’/‘downloading’ model in Europeanisation research follows
broadly from the premise that institutional adaptation at the national level sources chiefly
from norms/regulations designed at the EU (Risse, Green-Cowles & Caporaso, 2001). A
major determinant to this effect is the ‘goodness of fit’, suggesting there exists a certain
degree of (in)compatibility between the national and supranational institutional frameworks
(Börzel & Risse, 2003). Other than that, institutional adaptation is also contingent upon an
intrinsic form of motivation characterised by a range of what is termed as ‘mediating factors’,
‘veto points’ or ‘facilitating factors’, which are all capable of animating or intimidating states’
decisions vis-à-vis supranational guidelines (Héritier & Knill, 2001).
Challenging this top-down perception, a follow-up model holds that one could indeed come to
terms with the basic patterns of EU-level policy-making by starting first and foremost at the
Member State level. As the launch of the Common Agricultural Policy and the establishment
of the Monetary Union formerly manifested,97 it is accordingly highly likely that Member
States seek to maximise their interests at each turn, as part of their grand strategies. To this
‘bottom-up’ understanding (Börzel, 2002; Radaelli & Pasquier, 2007), states seek to reduce
the burden of downloading supranational guidelines by transposing their agenda into the
supranational sphere. Based to a certain extent on the rational-choice understanding, which
regards the EU as little more than a means to the advancement of national interests (Laffan &
97
These initiatives were in fact serving for the long term strategic plans of France and Germany (Börzel & Risse,
2003).
84
Stubb, 2003), the bottom-up model considers Europeanisation to be a process whereby
Member States are in search of exporting their own policy goals to the EU, at every
opportunity they seize (Bulmer & Burch, 1998).
Put in brief, the bottom-up understanding of Europeanisation (as launched to be an alternative
to the top-down model) tracks down the origin of policy adaptation to its domestic roots. Still,
one needs to remember that this perception rests not only on a vertical reasoning but also on a
horizontal one, i.e. a ‘sideways’ form of interaction with other states, whether EU members or
not, which could eventually push domestic systems to undergo a process of change
collectively (Radaelli, 2000). A sample governance tool which supports this thesis is the Open
Method of Coordination (OMC). As a mode of governance aiming at ‘best practices’ amongst
the EU Member States, the OMC essentially intends to help share mutual experiences,
bringing about eventually a broader platform of ‘learning’ process.98 Here, the degree of
learning and implementation of best practices depend on the exchange of cultural, social and
political exercises which presumably have the capacity to generate policy convergence
between Member States and the institutions of the EU (Quaglia et al., 2007).
With this in mind, it is possible to argue that the eventual policy adaptation at the national
level is in fact an aggregate of multiple levels of interaction:
Figure 6: Causal interaction in Europeanisation
98
Radaelli (2003, p. 52) distinguishes here between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ types of learning. While the former
involves actors’ readjustment to remain close to their original positions, ‘thick learning’ occurs when actors
make radical strategic changes.
85
Accordingly, policy-making starting in a national setting at one time is subject to
supranational and/or international influences concurrently, promoting in the end
renewal/reproduction of policy adaptation at another time.
3.2.4 Mechanisms of Europeanisation
Intrinsic in these two basic models of Europeanisation are a number of mechanisms, which
can be classified into ‘physical or legal coercion’, ‘utility calculations’, ‘socialisation’ and
‘persuasion’ (Börzel & Risse, 2012). The first mechanism of physical or legal coercion looks
over how readily states accommodate to the EU’s ‘external’ influence (Holzinger, Knill &
Sommerer, 2007). While the EU does not typically exercise ‘coercion’ in its third party
engagements, one might recall the ‘conditionality principle’ throughout the accession talks
with candidate states, for instance, insofar as it invokes a restrictive logic when the question is
one of replacing the legal order in these countries. Such a potential does however not
necessarily suggest the use of ‘force’ in its traditional meaning. Being an accession candidate
requires by definition a series of conditions to be met for the ultimate membership to the
Union, the most important of which is probably law enforcement. Seen in this sense, a certain
degree of coercion is actually an intrinsic quality of diffusion prescribing that Member States
comply with the norms and legal requirements as assigned by the EU’s supranational
framework.
The second mechanism of utility calculations concerns the sizing up of states vis-à-vis the
technical/financial aids offered by other states or international actors. The EU makes use of
these aid packages commonly as part of its conditionality and ‘capacity-building’ schemes to
get its institutional model adapted in candidate and neighbourhood countries (Vachudova,
2005; Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; Börzel, Pamuk & Stahn, 2008) with hints of
economic prosperity or environmental protection in return (Sedelmeier, 2012; Spendzharova
& Vachudova, 2012; Börzel & Pamuk, 2012; Noutcheva & Düzgit, 2012). That being the
case, a negative assessment of such incentives in that their costs would probably outweigh the
potential benefits might urge rearrangement of national strategies in the end. One can on that
account argue that “the more the EU itself is interested in market access to other regions”, the
less it is likely for utility calculations as an “influence mechanism to matter” (Börzel & Risse,
2012, p. 7).
86
The third mechanism of socialisation (March & Olsen, 1998) functions very much in line with
‘the logic of appropriateness’. In accordance, states do not necessarily seek to maximise their
self-interests in the first place but instead aim to meet a host of basic social requirements
(Johnston, 2007) informed by complex learning processes such as ‘habitualisation’ or ‘talking
the talk’. To this understanding, the EU is a big ‘socialisation agency’ (Checkel, 2005) or a
‘teacher of norms’ (Finnemore, 1993) for Member States, accession candidates and
neighbourhood countries. Needless to say, the size of the EU as a role-model depends largely
on the concerning state’s willingness to embrace its regulations/norms such as liberal
democracy (Van Hüllen, 2012; Börzel & Pamuk, 2012).
The fourth mechanism of persuasion is comparable to ‘the logic of arguing’, whereby actors
aim “to persuade each other about the validity claims inherent in any causal or normative
statement” (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 8). The EU applies this tool specifically in its relations
with a candidate, neighbourhood or any other third-country as part of its external relations.
Similar to socialisation, the EU consults persuasion regularly alongside its ‘conditionality’
strategy to induce accession candidates into adopting its institutional or normative validity
and appropriateness (Kelley, 2004). While this strategy is also important in geographically
far-away countries, it is usually the EU’s ‘communicative skills’ for the promotion of
European norms -human rights, democracy and the rule of law, most notably- that appears to
be the chief policy instrument the EU uses in expanding its sphere of influence into these
countries (Lenz, 2012; Jetschke & Murray, 2012).
3.2.5 Phases of Europeanisation
Leaving their varying points of emphasis aside, one could track down all these formulations
(of Europeanisation mechanisms) to economic integration models, for instance that of Pinder
(1968) where a common framework for policy coordination is achievable either through
positive/voluntary cooperation or a negative one with some sort of coercion involved in it
(Rosenbaum, 2003). Depending on the level of misfit between the national and supranational
levels, the consequent degree of domestic change is accordingly observable in three states,
‘absorption’, ‘accommodation’, and ‘transformation’, (Börzel & Risse, 2003). The absorption
state refers here to a minimum need for alignment with the EU’s institutional framework. For
accommodation, a sizeable measure of institutional adaptation is needful. As the highest state
of domestic change, transformation relates to a thorough replacement of existing policy
structures on the basis of supranational guidelines.
87
Table 4: Configuration of domestic change
Phases
Characteristics
Degrees
Absorption
no substantial policy adaptation
low
Accommodation
sizable policy adaptation
moderate
Transformation
paradigmatic policy adaptation
high
Based on Börzel & Risse (2003, p. 69-70).
The four outcomes presented in the same vein formerly by way of ‘retrenchment’, ‘inertia’,
‘absorption’ and ‘transformation’ (Börzel, 1999; Green-Cowles, Caporaso & Risse, 2001;
Héritier & Knill, 2001) follow from the very same logic indeed. Here, the direction of
domestic policy change hinges on inertia, denoting a situation of no observable domestic
change. Retrenchment stands for a negative trend suggesting policies have receded from
becoming ‘European’ in the end. Absorption on the other hand is indicative of a considerable
degree of positive change towards the EU’s institutional framework. And finally,
transformation marks paradigmatic positive changes replacing domestic policy structures
from head to toe.
Figure 7: Direction of domestic change
Based on Radaelli (2003, p. 35).
3.2.6 Europeanisation and other research areas
3.2.6.1 Europeanisation, EU integration and globalisation
First off, there has been in scholarship a clear tendency to cut Europeanisation and EU
integration from the same cloth, so to say, and speak of their eventual convergence. Such
perceptions are indeed based on the two fields’ ontological dispositions which are commonly
engaged with description of structural changes in Europe “variously affecting actors and
institutions, ideas and interests” (Featherstone, 2003, p. 3). Yet, as Risse, Green-Cowles &
Caporaso (2001) argue, Europeanisation boasts a process which is far more inclusive than that
of European integration.
88
For Europeanisation, the main talk of the town was in the beginning its ‘substance’ in relation
to concepts like internationalisation or globalisation. Such a comparison drew essentially from
the increasingly ‘nested’ policy-making structures at national and international levels, or the
‘new modes of governance’, suggesting signs of harmonisation between the EU and Member
States could be evocative of globalisation (Gourevitch, 1978). Conceptualised in rough terms
as the removal of boundaries most notably in the face of expanding international organisations
such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation
(Held & McGrew, 2002), globalisation was for Europeanisation seemingly a major source of
guidance given that the latter is similarly inspired by a dynamic institutional network as
demanded by the EU’s integration process (Wallace, 2000a). This projection is however
denied by some like Risse, Green-Cowles & Caporaso (2001) on the grounds that it is poor in
holding ‘something exclusive’ to Europe/the EU.
While acknowledging its role “as a conduit for global forces”, Schmidt (2002) believes that
Europeanisation is in fact a sort of buttress against such forces “opening member states to
international competition in the capital and product markets” but at the same time securing
their ‘EU exclusive’ interests amongst others “through monetary integration and the Single
Market” (p. 14). Accordingly, with its far-reaching regulations and commitments to a shared
political project, the institutional structure of the EU outdoes other international/regional
economic authorities.
As for links between regionalisation and globalisation, several scholarly thoughts have come
to stress the virtues of liberal democracy or ‘embedded liberalism’ (Ruggie, 1983; 1996) as
the normative framework of Europeanisation is commonly known to hold when referring to
institution building beyond the national level. Despite their consensus on the merits of
liberalism, scholars in this group hold different predispositions. The neo-liberalist students of
Hayek (1976) and Kegan & Ohmae (1990) have for instance a pro-globalisation position,
whereas subscribers to liberal internationalism like Hinsley (1986) favour regionalisation
instead. Conceding to the primacy of liberal democracy as a governance model, some like
Held et al. (1999) meanwhile bid for a ‘better working’ globalisation via ‘cosmopolitan
democracy’. When seen in light of the cosmopolitan nature of regional organisations like the
89
EU (Habermas, 1998), Europeanisation could to this understanding be promoted on the
condition that it serves for a benign form of globalisation.99
Granted that there is in literature much faith in liberal values in establishing links between
Europeanisation and its liberal roots, one needs to take into account also ‘protectionists’ who
essentially argue for strengthening state competences so that threats guided by liberal
democracy against national-sovereignty could be effectively driven away (Leftwich, 2000).
To this reasoning, regional organisations like the EU would be desirable as long as they
would defer to the powers of the state. Some critics on the other hand frown upon the EU’s
operational capacity for being subservient to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and imposing therewith rigid practices such as welfare
cutbacks or deregulation of labour markets (Scharpf, 2002). With its attachment to Western
standards, Europeanisation is from this perspective little more than a facilitator of
globalisation (Rosamond, 1999). An alternative working system to draw from this argument is
a new governance model based on the principles of equality, self-governance and direct
democracy (Falk, 1995; Callinicos, 2000). Europeanisation could in this sense be a ‘filter’ for
further liberalisation/’Americanization’ (Leibfried, 2000) or function as an ‘antidote’ to
globalisation offsetting for instance the latter’s detriments to social justice (Graziano, 2003).
By and large, it would in the end be fair to argue that both Europeanisation and globalisation
enjoy the same “continuum of policy-making that spreads from the country, through the
European arena, to the global level” (Wallace, 2000b, p. 7). Despite idiosyncracies and
eccentricities to bear in mind here, one could draw parallels between supranationalisation of
Member State policies and globalisation movements for they appear to follow from the same
systemic principles such as free market rules, (Western) liberal democracy or liberalization.
3.2.6.2 Europeanisation and transnational diffusion
There is against this backdrop tendency to place Europeanisation within the larger framework
of transnational diffusion research (Holzinger, Knill & Sommerer, 2007; Simmons, Dobbin &
Garrett, 2008; Gilardi, 2012). As a matter of fact, the basic features and conditions of
Europeanisation are not in denial of those specific to transnational diffusion at all, which on
the contrary would be quite instrumental in shedding light upon the EU’s domestic impacts
99
The perceived threat of globalisation can be observed in literature through concomitant use of terms like
‘harnessed’, ‘tamed’, ‘humanized’ and ‘managed’ (Jacoby & Meunier, 2010).
90
(Börzel & Risse, 2012). Given that Europeanisation is a “special instance of policy and
institutional diffusion” and diffusion “a process through which ideas, normative standards,
or…policies and institutions spread across time and space”, research in both areas can serve to
iron out the creases of for instance the ‘top-down’ perspective (Börzel & Risse, 2012, p. 5).
Accordingly, both areas of research set their sights on three ‘logics of social action’. Based on
an instrumental type of rationality, ‘the logic of consequences’ addresses the self-interested
drive of actors who are all ‘utility maximisers’. Then again, ‘the logic of appropriateness’
argues for a normative type of rationality stressing that actors follow rules to ‘do the right
thing’ for the overall purpose of integrating into a community. And finally, ‘the logic of
arguing’ points out with some ‘communicative’ rationality that actors’ primary goal is to
persuade each other on the basis of a set of norms and arguments they could substantiate in
depth (Habermas, 1981; Risse, 2000).
On could in fact reduce these ‘logics of social action’ to ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ types of
diffusion (Börzel & Risse, 2012). Scholarship in Europeanisation has so far tended to quote
from direct diffusion according to which the balance of influence between the supranational
and national domains tilts in favour of the former. For the indirect type of diffusion on the
other hand, ‘emulation’, as one may also refer to it, the direction of influence stems from the
national side. Accordingly, when states are after the right ‘way of doing things’ (the logic of
appropriateness) or ‘best practices’ (the logic of consequences), they could simply download a
sample institutional model from within, which prompts no urgency to subscribe to a
supranational model dictated by the EU.
3.2.7 Review of literature
Given these qualities attributed widely to Europeanisation, it seems scholarship has already
done away with its post-ontological underpinnings (Caporaso, 1996 -as cited in Featherstone,
2003), irrespective of the difficulty to locate links between structure and agency. Besides
scholarly works tackling its nature, mechanisms and consequences (Olsen, 2002; Radaelli,
2003; Börzel & Risse, 2003; Lenschow, 2005; Caporaso, 2007), there is abundance of
research studying the issue of domestic change as far as actors, institutions and ways of doing
things are concerned (Ladrech, 2005; Bulmer & Radaelli, 2005; Börzel, 2005). Added to these
are recent analyses whose major emphases appear to be on the EU’s impact both within the
91
framework of enlargement and beyond the European context (Sedelmeier, 2006;
Schimmelfennig, 2007 -as cited in Exadaktylos & Radaelli, 2009, p. 508).
A SSCI (Social Sciences Citation Index) scan over the last twenty years reveals an increase of
this research interest (Featherstone, 2003, pp. 5-6):
Table 5: SSCI entries on Europeanisation (1981-2001)
Years
Number of entries
1981-88
3
1989
2
1990
1
1991
4
1992
2
1993
9
1994
8
1995
3
1996
5
1997
6
1998
7
1999
20
2000
24
2001
22
116
Total
Source: Featherstone (2003, p. 5).
Most of these analyses have sought to give publicity to the historical, transnational-cultural,
institutional and policy-based outcomes of Europeanisation. From a historical perspective,
Europeanisation appears to serve as a means to promoting the EU’s institutional structure and
‘way of life’ across Europe’s geographical boundaries, for instance by way of colonisation
(Olsen, 2003). Accordingly, former imperial powers such as France, Spain, Portugal, the
Netherlands and Britain have distributed their national values under the guise of European
civilisation. The main focal point of transnational-cultural accounts of Europeanisation is its
understanding on the basis of ideas, identities or cultural norms exchanged between countries
with respect to political culture (Pamir, 1994), cultural assimilation (Soysal, 1994) or
citizenship (Joppke, 1995). Next, there is research tying Europeanisation to EU membership
to observe the ways in which EU accession influences political parties (Ladrech, 1994;
Holden, 1999; Cole, 2001), non-governmental actors like trade unions (Turner, 1996) or
public administration (Wessels, 1998; Jørgensen, 1999; Bulmer & Burch, 2001). A final area
of Europeanisation research relates to the EU membership’s policy-based outcomes. Here, the
92
main concern is the EU’s regulatory capacity to produce domestic change in different sectors
such as employment and social policy (Doogan, 1992), environment (Nilson, 1993; Jordan,
1998), agriculture (Rothstein et al., 1999) and foreign policy (Wallace, 1994; Knutsen, 1996;
Agh, 1999; Featherstone, 2000).
A more up-to-date scan of the SSCI database covering a ten-year period of research in the
same context (between 2002 and the second half of 2012) delivers as many as 702 hits:
Table 6: SSCI entries on Europeanisation (2002-2012)
Year
Number of entries
2002
34
2003
21
2004
47
2005
60
2006
51
2007
54
2008
87
2009
110
2010
100
2011
95
2012 (first half)
43
702
Total
Based on Social Sciences Citation Index, Thomson Reuters, 2012.
Of these publications, the first three thematic categories fall in the disciplinary fields of
Political Science (286 entries), Public Administration (144) and International Relations (67)
with respect to their given entry titles in database. A detailed configuration of these
contributions is as follows:
Table 7: SSCI entries on Europeanisation according to disciplinary areas (first five)
Disciplinary fields
Number of entries
Percentages
Political Science
286
41%
Public Administration
144
21%
International Relations
67
10%
Other areas
497
28%
Total
702
100%
Percentages are rounded off to the nearest value.
Based on Social Sciences Citation Index, Thomson Reuters, 2012.
While research entries up to 2005 appear to relate to Europeanisation per se (Knill &
Lehmkuhl, 2002; Fligstein & Merand, 2002; Börzel, 2002b; Featherstone, 2003; Eder, 2004)
93
or its implications for the old EU members (Knodt, 2002; Roederer-Rynning, 2002; Irondelle,
2003; Gualini, 2003; Geyer, 2003; Sotiropoulos, 2004; Economides, 2005), a great number of
more recent contributions concern chiefly the latest accession states (Gorton, Löwe & Selei,
2005; Baun et al., 2006; Hille & Knill, 2006; Gasior-Niemiec & Glinski, 2007; Krasovec &
Lajh, 2008; Lewis, 2008; Spirova, 2008; Andreou & Bache, 2010; Bache, 2010; Debus,
Müller & Obert, 2011; Spendzharova & Vachudova, 2012; Tanasoiu, 2012), accession
candidates (Fink-Hafner, 2008; Oguzlu & Ozpek, 2008; Vujovic & Komar, 2008; Ulusoy,
2008; Onis & Yilmaz, 2009; Bache & Tomsic, 2010; Muftuler-Bac & Gursoy, 2010;
Noutcheva & Düzgit, 2012) and the neighbourhood countries (Gabanyi, 2005; Melnykovska
& Schweickert, 2008; Barbé, 2009; Gänzle & Muentel, 2011; Petrov & Kalinichenko, 2011;
Börzel & Pamuk, 2012).
As for research on Europeanisation of national immigration policies, scholarship on that
matter does not have an old history. The newly growing interest in this policy area relates
very much to the fairly recent abolition of the EU’s third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs.
Following the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, the area of immigration policies moved into the
jurisdiction of the Community method, known formerly as the first pillar. There is in
scholarship a twofold perception of this relocation. While some view a high degree of
supranationalisation in there (Thielemann, 2002), others find it only marginal (Vink, 2002;
Geddes, 2003). To Ette & Faist (2007), this divided picture could be attributed to the overly
descriptive quality of research in this policy area which allows for “only few insights about
the underlying driving forces of the European impact on its member states” (p. 10).
Regardless, there has been a growing number of studies with their main focus on the extent of
Europeanisation in Member States’ national immigration policies, such as those of Germany
(Tomei, 2001; Ette & Kreienbrink, 2007; Prumm & Alscher, 2007), the UK (Geddes, 2005;
Ette & Gerdes, 2007; Bache, 2008), the Netherlands (Vink, 2001, 2002, 2005), Spain (Fauser,
2007) or Greece, Cyprus and Malta (Ladi, 2011). For comparative analyses with theoretical
emphasis, contributions from Thielemann (2002), Lavenex & Ucarer (2002), Geddes (2003)
and Grabbe (2005) are of particular notice. It appears however these analyses have often
tended to put weight on security aspects, dwelling most typically on asylum-seeking, yet
reserving little space for other central themes like irregular immigration, labour immigration
or family unification. Further, most studies were carried out to compare supranationalisation
of immigration policies amongst either newest Member States like those from Central and
94
Eastern Europe (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005) or old Members such as the UK, Italy
and Germany (Mastenbroek, 2005) but not in the form of cross-country analyses between the
two clusters (Ette & Faist, 2007, p. 13).
3.3 Analysis
Academic scholarship has no apparent consensus in conceptualising ‘domestic change’.
Regardless of the rising number of studies dedicated to that end, the substance attached with
Europeanisation has in these works been incurring “the risk of ‘conceptual stretching’”
(Radaelli, 2003, p. 27). And without a firm basis of empirical work,100 theoretical approaches
introduced in this framework are apt to remain overcast.
Put in a nutshell, there are two models often consulted to describe the ways in which
Europeanisation ‘occurs’. A leading top-down approach overlooks the national context as a
primary source of domestic policy change. From this ‘downloading’ viewpoint, in other
words, the strategic choices of Member States which might be ruling over the EU norms and
regulations in the background appear to deserve little attention. In the context of migration,
for instance, the fact that the interior ministers of Member States formerly took advantage of
various Council meetings to sidestep the challenges they encountered in their national
parliamentary sessions (Guiraudon, 2000) is to the top-down understanding of
Europeanisation hardly a telling matter. The following bottom-up model however pays
homage to this last point. What comes fundamental in accordance is the design of “a politics
of Europeanisation rather than a Europeanisation of policy” (Geddes, 2007, p. 55), suggesting
the EU action is transferable to Member States as long as it poses no major challenges against
domestic agenda. In this sense, the introduction of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) as the
third pillar of the Maastricht Treaty could be interpreted as a precautionary ‘national interestdriven’ move to control the intensity of immigration, regardless of the fact that people’s
mobility was an elementary component of the European integration. Despite the follow-up
Amsterdam Treaty’s achievement in annexing JHA matters to the Community pillar through
an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, the introduction of derogations to the EU’s last
enlargement restricting people’s mobility in eight of the ten new Member States (where
100
Lodge (2006) for instance argues that the existing empirical literature may already be flawed for the collected
data in this framework are usually subject to manipulation by states.
95
migratory outflows were thought to be most likely) could then be viewed as a backstage
manoeuvre, casting shadows upon any supranationalisation attempt whatsoever.
It is possible to argue in light of key policy factors that the bottom-up understanding of
Europeanisation emerges to be more eclectic, accounting for a myriad of pathways whereby
norms/values might be diffused into national institutional structures. Bringing a further
dimension into the limelight from the same perspective is for instance an additional
‘sideways’ approach to Europeanisation, in terms of the horizontal influence of one Member
State upon the other or a similar type of interaction between Member States and non-EU
countries. From this perspective, states’ learning from one another plays in domestic policymaking as significant a role as accentuated alongside vertical impacts. In the foreign policy
framework, arguments tying Europeanisation of France’s foreign affairs largely with those of
its German counterpart (Wong, 2007) come as a reflection of this latter approach.
It is against this background (of a more comprehensive and inclusive perspective) this study
decided to adopt the bottom-up understanding as its research model of Europeanisation. Such
an integrative approach, as it is widely believed here, could to a large extent serve well as a
solution to the ‘equifinality’ problem (Müller & de Flers, 2009) observed typically in the
separation of dependent and independent variables.
96
Chapter 4 Legal framework
To present insights into the supranational legal framework which has for some time been
acting upon Member States’ national immigration policies in various degrees, this chapter
reviews the EU’s chief legal texts concerning immigration. Of many such texts which are of
first order of importance in this scope, two main sets stand in the foreground. On one hand are
treaties, directives and regulations, as the primary and secondary law instruments, which have
direct and indirect effects on Member States’ national legal orders. 101 There are on the other
side opinions, resolutions, recommendations or guidelines developed by the EU for policy
actions which despite a certain degree of legal value do not have binding effects. These two
sources of legal texts are in literature commonly known as the EU’s hard and soft law
measures.
4.1 Hard law
4.1.1 EC/EUTreaties
The EU’s policy-making in the area of immigration has a history defined by national
sensitivities. A hard evidence for that is the belated incorporation of TCNs (third-country
nationals) into the EU legal order, only with the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. Amsterdam was
indeed a turning point for a possible common immigration policy ahead. With its entry into
force in 1999, decision-making on immigration was removed from the third pillar’s intergovernmental structure102 and extended to the Community Method. According to Article
67(1) EC Treaty, the Council could now make unanimous decisions (upon the Commission’s
proposal or a Member State’s initiative and consulting the European Parliament) only for
another five years. Then again, as emphasised in the second paragraph, its competences in
relation to immigration and asylum would “be governed by the co-decision procedure
established in Article 251 EC Treaty and qualified majority vote”. While this proclamation (of
101
Article 258 of TFEU and 106a of the Euratom Treaty lay down Member States’ responsibility for the timely
transposition and thorough implementation of the EU’s primary and secondary law instruments. If a Member
State fails to do so, i.e. if it commits an act of ‘non-compliance’, the Commission (having observed the act itself
or following a complaint) is in charge of starting the pre-litigation procedure by investigating over the matter,
sending a letter of ‘formal notice’ to the Member State and then demanding a ‘reasoned opinion’, if the breach of
law persists. Should the non-compliance action remain, the infringement case is finally referred to the European
Court of Justice, which opens the litigation procedure to promulgate an appropriate penalty in response.
102
Meanwhile, as the capacity of the European Commission, European Parliament and European Court of Justice
(which are commonly known as the EU’s supranational institutions) was raised to a higher level of efficiency,
Denmark, Ireland and the UK opted out from the enforcement of the relating Title IV to avoid subordination of
the EU law in the interests of their own ‘civil law’ structures.
97
the unanimity voting rule’s imminent removal) appeared to end the hitherto sway of
intergovernmentalism, Article 63(3) EC stated that the Council would continue regulating
immigration policy on issues concerning
(a) conditions of entry and residence, and standards on procedures for the issue by
Member States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the
purpose of family reunion;
(b) illegal immigration and illegal residence, including repatriation of illegal
residents
In 2004, the Council extended the scope of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to the removal
of internal border controls on persons, application of standards for internal border checks and
a maximum three-month long freedom of movement for TCNs within the European Union
(Article 62(1)). QMV became in this way applicable to cooperation amongst Member States
on matters of asylum-seeking, illegal immigration as well as repatriation of illegal immigrants
(Article 63(2b) and Article 63(3b)). However, areas which were often perceived to have a
direct connection to Member States’ justice and security policies (such as legal immigration)
would continue to be part of the third pillar (Title VI of the TEU).
Marking the third pillar’s differentiation from the first pillar’s ‘Community Method’, Article
29 TEU demanded that the former should continue to drop competences relating to
immigration in the hands of Ministers of Interior and/or Justice “to provide citizens with a
high level of safety within an area of freedom, security and justice by developing closer
cooperation between police forces, customs authorities and other competent authorities in the
member states”. An obviously intergovernmentalist understanding in this way was inducing,
however, a disparaging effect on the EU’s supranational image (Balzacq & Carrera, 2006, p.
4).
The most recent legal arrangements concerning supranational immigration policies103 are
traceable to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty (‘Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’,
TFEU). Having abolished most importantly the hitherto three-pillar administrative structure104
by extending the former third pillar policy areas further to the co-decision procedure (now
103
The new Title V TFEU, following the Title IV EC, was now called the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and
Justice’.
104
In doing that, Lisbon kept largely to the 2004 Draft Constitutional Treaty, which consolidated the EU’s three
pillars in a unified text.
98
called the ‘Ordinary Legislative Procedure’) and QMV,105 Lisbon sought indeed to provide a
de jure character for Amsterdam. To this end, it also replaced the formulation of Title IV EC
Treaty to gather all issues concerning immigration under Title V TFEU, or as it was now
called the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ). Here, in Chapter 1 (General
Provisions), Article 67(1) and (2) (formerly Article 61 EC and Article 29 TEU) read
1. The Union shall constitute an area of freedom, security and justice with respect for
fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member
States.
2. It shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a
common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on
solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. For
the purpose of this Title, stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals.
Articles 77, 78, 79 and 80 in Chapter 2 (‘Policies on border checks, asylum and immigration’)
dealt with these issues far more comprehensively. Commitments to common inmmigration
policy were made through Article 79(1) (formerly Article 63(3) and Article (4) EC) which
declared
The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all
stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country
nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced
measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.
To demonstrate the institutional setup for these goals, Article 79(2) maintained that the
European Parliament and the Council would be adopting measures in relation to
(a) the conditions of entry and residence, and standards on the issue by Member
States of long-term visas and residence permits, including those for the purpose of
family reunification;
(b) the definition of the rights of third-country nationals residing legally in a Member
State, including the conditions governing freedom of movement and of residence in
other Member States;
(c) illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal and
repatriation of persons residing without authorisation;
(d) combating trafficking in persons, in particular women and children.
105
Article 68 TFEU.
99
Initially, these paragraphs gave the impression that Lisbon was for the area of immigration far
more revolutionary than Amsterdam. Nevertheless, such thoughts were actually being
dismayed by Article 79 (5) TFEU which noted
This Article shall not affect the right of member states to determine volumes of
admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to their territory in
order to seek work, whether employed or self employed.
Regardless of this word of caution, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a remarkable change into
the ECJ’s sphere of influence. With Lisbon, the AFSJ (formerly JHA, Justice and Home
Affairs) came under the purview of the ECJ and so could the Court now rule on all cases
except for those crossing into Member States’ domestic legal provisions or judicial
cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation (Article 276 TFEU). Other than this, to
ease the restrictions of Amsterdam Treaty on the ECJ’s jurisdiction over asylum and
immigration policy, the new Article 267 TFEU (formerly Article 177 EC Treaty and Article
234 EC Treaty) enabled for instance all Member State courts and tribunals to work closely
with the ECJ on asylum, immigration and civil law questions.106 What’s more, to introduce
“an integrated management system for external borders,”107 Amsterdam’s ‘minimum
standards’ were replaced at Lisbon with ‘uniform standards’108 with which the EU could now
develop ‘common policies’ for all individuals. For legal TCNs, the EU laws were reinforced
through a set of conditions defining basic terms of working, moving or residing in Member
States.
While it is at this stage fairly premature to hypothesise in relation to these legal adjustments,
one could argue that Lisbon’s impressions for the EU’s decision-making procedures have
been fairly promising. To say the least, the Commission may now start at its discretion the
standard co-decision procedure for directives and regulations on immigration, insofar as there
is reference to it in the TFEU.
106
Article 267 TFEU states: “The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
a) the interpretation of the Treaties; b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or
agencies of the Union. Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court
or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request
the Court to give a ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal
of a Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal
shall bring the matter before the Court. If such a question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of
a Member State with regard to a person in custody, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall act with the
minimum of delay”.
107
Article 77 TFEU.
108
Article 63 TFEU.
100
4.1.2 Directives and Regulations
The objectives formulated in the EC/EU Treaties have so far been achieved through a number
of legal acts which differ from one another on the basis of their binding and non-binding legal
effects. The binding legal instruments are regulations (to be applied in their entirety across all
Member States), decisions (which are applicable directly to what/whom they are addressed)
and directives (the application of which depends on its conversion by Member States’ into
their own legal systems). There are on the other side also legal acts which the EU issues in a
non-binding fashion such as recommendations (suggesting courses of action without
earmarking legal consequences) and opinions (imposing no legal obligations).
The supranational legal context regulating the field of immigration in a binding way rests
essentially upon a set of directives and regulations which can be categorised by reference to
their effect on the three main areas of immigration: labour/legal immigration, irregular/illegal
immigration and asylum-seeking issues. There are in the area of legal immigration six main
binding documents. These are Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family
reunification, Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals
who are long-term residents, Council Directive 2004/114/EC on conditions of third-country
nationals’ admission for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or
voluntary services, Council Directive 2005/71/EC on a specific procedure for admitting thirdcountry nationals for the purposes of scientific research, Council Directive 2009/50/EC (the
Blue Cards Directive) on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for
the purposes of highly qualified employment and the Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 amended by
Regulation (EC) 380/2008 defining uniform format for residence permits.
The number of binding EU texts concerning irregular/illegal immigration is by far the biggest.
There are sixteen key directives and regulations here. On the directive side are Council
Directive 2001/40/EC concerning the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of
third-country nationals, Council Directive 2001/51/EC supplementing the provisions of
Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985,
Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and
residence, Council Directive 2004/81/EC on the residence permit issued to third-country
nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an
action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities, Council
101
Directive 2004/82/EC (the Carriers Liability Directive) on the obligation of carriers to
communicate passenger data, Council Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and
designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve
their protection, Council Directive 2008/115/EC (the Return Directive) of the European
Parliament and of the Council on common standards and procedures in Member States for
returning illegally staying third-country nationals, Council Directive 2009/52/EC (the
Employers’ Sanctions Directive) providing minimum standards on sanctions and measures
against employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, Directive 2011/36/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on preventing and combating trafficking in human
beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA.
The regulations issued in this field so far are Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing a
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of
the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), Regulation (EC) 2725/2000
concerning the establishment of ‘EURODAC’ for the comparison of fingerprints for the
effective application of the Dublin Convention, Regulation (EC) 539/2001 listing the third
countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders
and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, Regulation (EC) 2252/2004 on
standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by
Member States amended by Regulation (EC) 444/2009, Regulation (EC) 562/2006 amended
by Regulation (EC) 265/2010 concerning the movement of persons with long-stay visas,
Regulation (EC) 1931/2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land
borders of the Member State amended by Regulation (EU) 1342/2011 of the European
Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) 767/2008 concerning the Visa
Information System and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas
amended by Regulation (EC) 810/2009.
And finally, for the area of asylum-seeking, the six most notable binding EU documents are
Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts
between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof,
Council Directive 2003/9/EC (the Reception Conditions Directive) on laying down minimum
standards for the reception of asylum-seekers, Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum
standards for the qualification and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as
102
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the
protection granted, Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, Regulation (EC) 343/2003
defining criteria and mechanisms on the determination of the Member State responsible in
asylum applications and Regulation (EC) 439/2010 establishing a European Asylum Support
Office.
4.2 Soft law
4.2.1 Open Method of Coordination
A major reference commonly made in scholarship on the Open Method of Coordination
(OMC) is the 2000 Lisbon Strategy for which the heads of the EU Member States set as a
goal at the time for the next decade “to become the most competitive and dynamic
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more
and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Council, 2000, §5). This strategic goal
was to be facilitated by identifying and adopting the best policy practices amongst Member
States, which they were advised to perform by subscription to a ‘peer reviewing’ procedure
called Open Method of Coordination.
While it was with the 2000 Lisbon Strategy that the OMC became operative at the national
level, its origins date back to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. Despite many novelties which
Maastricht came to introduce -the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was probably the
most memorable amongst them- several countries voiced their concerns to that effect. While
Danish voters for instance did not approve of the new supranational arrangements and
declined the draft Treaty at a referendum, those in France gave the go only by a narrow
margin (Schäffer, 2004, p. 8). There was in Germany not a similar crisis of consent; however,
the Constitutional Court’s position on the Treaty was not entirely clear. In any case,
Maastricht started a convergence process on the basis of a number of criteria required for
accession to the EMU (De la Porte, Pochet & Room, 2001). To fulfill these standards,
Member State governments were not urged with a top-down course of action but instead were
asked to develop methods of their own which would at the end of each year be reviewed by
way of assessment reports. Regardless of Maastricht’s agenda guided by the EMU, the
Summits at Copenhagen (1993) and Essen (1994) set in motion the White Paper (the so called
‘Delors plan’) and a host of non-binding objectives to deal with the problem of
unemployment and social cohesion. To avoid more Commission involvement in national
103
policy-making, as Maastricht rose to do, which at that stage would obviously jeopardise the
formerly granted ‘permissive consensus’ to supranationalisation, a soft law apparatus was
considered more appropriate. For this purpose, the EC Directorate-General (DG) for
Economic and Financial Affairs along with DG for Employment & Social Affairs would be
monitoring and reporting each year on the achievement of the 1994 Essen Council’s
objectives.
These two sets of mechanisms, one linked to Maastricht’s commitment to the EMU and the
other to that of Essen, which collectively featured “common objectives, national
implementation and surveillance by the Commission and member states” were indeed
constituting the basis of the OMC (Schäfer, 2004, p. 8). The process launched therewith
paved the way to the 2000 Lisbon Council which introduced the OMC’s ‘benchmarking’
qualities as
1. fixing guidelines (common objectives) for the Union combined with specific
timetables for achieving the goals with the member states set in the short, medium
and long terms;
2. establishing, where appropriate, quantitative and qualitative indicators and
benchmarks (common indicators) against “the best in the world”, tailored to the
needs of different member states and sectors as a means of comparing “best
practice”;
3. translating these European guidelines into national and regional policies by setting
specific targets and adopting measures, taking into account their differences; the
translation of the common objectives into national policy plans provided by the
member states to the European Commission in the form of National Action Plans
(NAPs).109
Intended originally with social inclusion and employment concerns in mind, the OMC’s
sphere of influence was with the Treaty of Amsterdam extended to immigration-related
issues. Observing the need for coordination in this context, the Commission issued in 2001 a
Communication.110 The role of the OMC here was support for the legislative process by
encouraging collective action between national policies. To this end, the Commission was to
work for the establishment of ‘European guidelines’ by launching political initiatives as far as
immigration was concerned. Adding up to the Commission’s role, the Council would
accordingly be bringing about a series of multi-annual guidelines which Member States could
109
European Council (2000), Presidency Conclusions of the Extraordinary Lisbon European Council of 23–24
March, SN100/1/00, Brussels.
110
COM(2001) 387.
104
use in keeping with a timetable for their ‘National Action Plans’. This course of action would
then be subject to a monitoring process whereby policy changes, if needed, would be put into
place on a yearly basis. Meanwhile, to help facilitate the legislative procedure, the European
Commission would draw out ‘Synthesis Reports’ to highlight problem areas and possible
solutions (Caviedes, 2004; Velluti, 2007).
4.2.2 Monitoring programmes: from Tampere to Stockholm
To coordinate management across Amsterdam’s AFSJ, into which immigration issues were
now integrated, the EU decided to launch a series of five-year working programmes. The
layout of the underlying ‘roadmap’ procedure -as these programmes were meant to monitorhas to date been (re)designed in three different occasions: at Tampere, the Hague and
Stockholm Councils. First, the 1999 Tampere Summit called for the development of a
common European immigration policy based on “partnership with countries of origin; a
common asylum system; fair treatment for third-country nationals; and management of
migration flows.”111 As part of the Amsterdam Treaty, the AFSJ was at the Tampere Council
given precedence over other policy issues and put on top of the Union’s political agenda to be
run on a timetable. Accordingly, the Commission would draw up a scoreboard to review the
progress in AFSJ every six months.112
The directives the EU adopted in the course of the Tampere Programme (1999-2004) included
those on family reunification (European Council Directive 2003/86/EC), long-term residence
(European Council Directive 2003/109/EC), studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training
or voluntary service (European Council Directive 2004/114/EC) and finally scientific research
(European Council Directive 2005/71/EC). Although the European Commission initially
made a proposal ‘on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the
purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities’113, the Council declined
it arguing that there was compromise for neither single entry permits nor rights for migrants
between Member States.
111
European Council (1999), Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, 15 and 16 October 1999.
Scoreboards presented under the Tampere Programme were COM (2000) 167 final, COM (2000) 782 final,
COM (2001) 278 final, COM (2001) 628 final, COM (2002) 261 final, COM (2002) 738, COM (2003) 291 final
and COM (2003) 812 final.
113
COM(2001) 386 final.
112
105
Following the Tampere Council, the 2001 Summit at Laeken114 called for an Action Plan on
illegal immigration and trafficking of human beings in the EU, which was adopted later at the
2002 Seville Council.115 Much in the same vein, the Commission proposed in 2005 the
Common Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (COM 2005/389). As
Tampere’s follow-up, the 2004 Hague Programme identified for the next five years (20052009) four important priority areas: defining a balanced approach to migration, developing
integrated management of the Union’s external borders, setting up a common asylum policy
and maximising the positive impact of immigration. For “a more effective, joint approach to
cross-border problems such as illegal migration, trafficking in and smuggling of human
beings, terrorism and organised crime, as well as the prevention thereof”116, the Hague
Programme called special attention to fundamental freedoms and rights. The level of
achievement was here to be measured through a mid-term ‘scoreboard’ evaluation, as was
employed at Tampere.
Conforming to the needs of the Hague, the Commission adopted a Green Paper in early 2005
‘on an EU approach to managing economic migration’. The main aim here was to establish a
forum between the Member States, the EU institutions and civil society on how to regulate the
entry and residence of TCNs seeking employment within the Community legislative
framework. The contents of the Green Paper were in fact reminiscent of the key points
addressed alongside the (declined) directive proposal in 2001, as far as the rights of thirdcountry workers and the Community principle were concerned. Drawing on the Green Paper,
the Commission presented a policy plan on legal migration117 for the 2006-2009 period. As a
roadmap for legal migration, which would provisionally replace the withdrawn directive, this
policy plan sought essentially to cope with economic and demographic challenges, putting
more weight on immigration. Another area which was equally emphasised here related to the
link between migration and development. Drawing on the 2002 Communication, which was
the Commission’s first move to establish links between the two policy areas, the Commission
released in 2005 a further Communication underscoring the link between economic and social
development.
114
European Council (2001), Presidency Conclusions, Laeken.
European Council (2001), Presidency Conclusions, Seville.
116
COM (2005) 184 final.
117
COM (2005) 669.
115
106
Two directives were adopted during the course of the Hague: the Return Directive
(2008/115/EC), ‘on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning
illegally staying third-country nationals’118, and the Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC), ‘on
the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly
qualified employment.’119 With fewer legal acts it passed in comparison to Tampere, the
Hague Programme was in essence preoccupied with monitoring the implementation of the
former directives. A supervision of this kind was for instance the Commission’s report 120 on
the directive concerning family reunification (2003/86/EC). The transposition of this directive
was according to the report satisfactory, with the exception of its implementation in a few
Member States which happened to slow down visa procedures even in the case of family
members whose entry applications were already accepted.
With the end of the Hague Programme, a new EU agenda was put in place at the 2009
Stockholm Summit. As the third in the series to stay in use until the end of 2014, the
Stockholm Programme identified its chief priority areas as labour migration, illegal migration,
migration and development, integration, rights of third-country nationals together with asylum
issues.121 In so doing, Stockholm appeared to dwell more on the external dimension of
migration compared to its predecessors. In reference to the EU’s Global Approach to
Migration,122 it addressed the role of working closely with the third countries for which
coordination between Europol, Eurojust, the Fundamental Rights Agency, FRONTEX and
civil law was highly significant. Of several concrete goals added to the agenda items in this
118
Despite being the first important EU migration legislation endorsed jointly by the European Parliament (EP)
and the Council under co-decision procedure, the Return Directive was criticised particularly by a number of UN
agencies and civil society organisations on the grounds that the Member States did not seem to show enough
care for the security of migrants they returned118. Further to security, criticism was also launched in reference to
the issue of ‘dignity’, which allegedly was ignored by Member States during return or deportation of immigrants.
As a result, several NGOs called it the ‘directive of shame’ (Lutz, 2010).
119
One of the major issues the Blue Card Directive brought up was concerning the position of developing
countries which following this legal arrangement were were apt to lose their most educated workforce.
120
Commission’s Report on the application of Directive 2003/86 on the right to family reunification published
on 8 October 2008, MEMO/08/611.
121
European Council. The Stockholm Programme – an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens.
Official Journal of the European Union. 4 April 2010.
122
The EU’s Global Approach underscores the management of legal migration which demands fight against
irregular immigration and the reinforcement of migration and development links. To this end, a set of
mechanisms are to be implemented: “i) mobility partnerships for enhanced migration management cooperation
between the EU and individual third countries; and ii) migration profiles to enhance migration data management
and promote evidence-based policy-making in EU partner countries” (International Organisation for Migration,
2010, p. 151).
107
context, a most important one was the construction of the Common European Asylum System
(CEAS) by 2012.123
4.2.3 European Pact on Asylum and Immigration
Apart from the three working Programmes of Tampere, the Hague and Stockholm, a number
of political initiatives have recently been undertaken on migration management. Declaring
“its conviction that migration issues are an integral part of the EU’s external relations”, the
Council under the 2008 French Presidency stressed that the 2005 Global Approach to
Migration could “make sense only within a close partnership between the countries of origin,
transit and destination.”124 To be able to control illegal immigration, as the argument went,
there was need for organisation of a more comprehensive legal migration framework. In an
attempt to make the achievements of Tampere and the Hague Programmes sustainable (for
instance harmonisation of border policies, endorsement of a common visa policy, definition of
terms concerning labour immigration and commitments to controlling illegal immigration by
establishing the FRONTEX), the Council announced in the end that it was time to adopt the
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum
in a spirit of mutual responsibility and solidarity between Member States and of
partnership with third countries, to give a new impetus to the definition of a common
immigration and asylum policy that will take account of both the collective interest
of the European Union and the specific needs of each Member State.125
This was indeed not a legally binding political initiative. The Council sought to make its
structure by this means more relevant to the upcoming Stockholm Programme, ensuring: “The
programme that will be the successor of the Hague Programme in 2010 will, in particular,
enable the Pact to be transposed further into practical actions”.
Considering the needs of national labour markets, most notably, the European Pact on
Immigration and Asylum proposed a few important recommendations. To some, nonetheless,
the method it followed to do so made the impression of an initiative overstating the EU’s
intergovernmental mode of governance vis-à-vis national migration policies (Carrera & Guild,
2008, p. 8). To illustrate, when referring to legal migration, the Pact opted for using
‘immigration choisie’ (selective immigration), which in France was at the time a highly
123
The Stockholm Programme’s course of action was stilling running at the time this thesis was being written.
Council of the European Union, Draft of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, September 2008.
125
Council of the European Union, Draft of the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, September 2008.
124
108
debatable way of reference used in the context of immigration due to the implications it made
to the varying political interests between the state and those with TCN origins. Yet, as
indicated in the Presidency Conclusions of Tampere, such a policy-making approach was not
limited to “the exclusive preserve of the Union’s own citizens. Its very existence acts as a
draw to many others world-wide who cannot enjoy the freedom Union citizens take for
granted”126. Seen from this perspective, while the Pact was praising Tampere’s achievement
of supranationalisation in many areas, it was denying on the other side the Union’s broader
aim to achieve ‘an open and secure European Union’, where ‘openness’ was indicative also of
fair treatment.
126
Presidency Conclusions, the Tampere European Council.
109
Chapter 5 Analysis of cases
This chapter provides empirical material for the study. The research model used to look into
the similarities/differences and analyse the extent of Europeanisation across the EU Member
States’ immigration policies is the eclectic bottom-up approach, which intrinsically embraces
also the top-down understanding, as formerly argued. The bottom-up reading starts
accordingly with a general survey into the selected countries’ immigration histories,
institutional structures, principal actors involved in immigration management as well as
national immigration laws and policies. Aside from refererences to a series of Eurobarometer
opinion polls, the cross-examination here exploits two main sources of empirical analysis: the
MIPEX (Migration Integration Policy Index) and the EU Commission’s annual reports
concerning immigration. While the MIPEX data are meant to view further from the
‘uploading’ vantage point, an inquiry into Member State policies by reference to
implementation of the EU law (on the basis of the EU Commission’s annual reports) is
believed to convey chiefly a ‘downloading’ reading of Europeanisation. The time span
stretching in broad terms over ten years to that end rests on indeed the bulk of these two sets
of data which are accessible for the most part from 2004 onwards.
5.1 Country profiles
5.1.1 Germany127
Table 8: Basic migration statistics
Net migration (2009)
-13,000
TCN immigration (2008)
237,901
Largest third countries of origin (2008)
Turkey, Serbia and Montenegro, Iraq
TCN population (2009)
4,655,215
TCN as part of population (2009)
5.70%
Foreign born as part of population (2009)
8.80%
Permits delivered for family (2009)
54,139
Permits delivered for work (2009)
16,667
Permits delivered for study (2009)
31,345
Permits delivered for humanitarian reasons (2008)
37,500
TCN employment rate (2009, change since 2006)
48.00%; +3.5%
National employment rate (2009, change since 2006)
70.90%; +3.4%
127
‘Germany’ here is taken to represent its present-day political status, that is, following re-unification of the
Bundesrepublik Deutschland and Deutsche Demokratische Republik in October 1990.
110
TCN unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006)
18.30%; -5%
National unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006)
7.50%; -2.3%
Nationality acquisitions (2008, change since 2005)
94,470; -22,771
Source: MIPEX III (2011).
To recent statistics, Germany is one of the leading EU Member States whose foreign
population stock amounts to just under ten percent:
Table 9: Stocks of foreign population in Germany
of total population
2001
in thousands
7,319 7,336 7,335 6,717 6,756 6,751 6,745 6,728 6,695 6,754 6,931
in percentages
8.9
2002
8.9
2003
2004
8.9
8.1
2005
2006
8.2
8.2
2007
8.2
2008
8.2
2009
8.2
2010
8.3
2011
8.5
All thousands are rounded off to the nearest value.
Source: OECD (2011b)
An overview of the EU history demonstrates Germany as a Musterknabe (Prümm & Alscher,
2007, p. 73). From early days on, it sought indeed to sustain a leading position in the EC/EU
by customizing/promoting the founding layouts of the European integration. This agendasetting role has however also been challenged by moments of hesitation. Since the
Amsterdam Treaty, governance at the national and subnational levels manifested signs of
foot-dragging, blocking further integration attempts in the area of immigration.
Such wavering steps in incorporating relevant supranational legislation into the domestic law
could to a large extent be attributed to the slumping public attitudes towards a progressively
growing size of immigrants in the country. An opinion poll checking into citizenship and
senses of belonging in the early 2000s indicated that 59% of the Germans considered
immigrants to be making no contribution worthy of mention to their country (Special
Eurobarometer 60.1, 2004). Perhaps more importantly, almost half of the interviewees (49%)
saw the latter as a ‘threat’ to their way of life:
Table 10: German citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life (in percentages)
Responses (options)
Germany
EU 15
Totally agree
12
16
Tend to agree
27
26
Tend to disagree
34
30
Totally disagree
15
18
Don’t know
12
10
Source: Special Eurobarometer Wave 60.1.
111
Leaving this aside assuming that a diverse range of social, economic or political conditions
may have been in play to change German perceptions of immigration, as elsewhere in Europe,
one could argue that the norms and conventions of the EU have in broad terms presented no
major challenges for Germany. To be fair, seen within the post-WW II global context, the
country’s earliest supranational commitments like the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) and the European Economic Community have often been informed by its willingness
to integrate into the West. Spurred domestically by a pro-integrationist voice amongst the
elites, Germany, together with France, played more often than not a cardinal role in the
European integration process. As of the 1990s, nevertheless, the governments -particularly in
the Länder- appeared to voice their concerns about loss of ‘subsidiarity’ on a number of
issues, if competencies were to be transferred further to the supranational level (Hellmann et
al., 2005). While a pro-integrationist mindset was still preserved, it was alongside this
perception that the federal governments came to deny the country had become one of
immigration already, irrespective of the statistics indicating that the massive waves of
immigration it had been attracting in the post-war period were quite steady. Put more
precisely, the balance of net migration reached between 1950 and 1993 to more than 12
million amounting to “80% of the population growth. The new microcensus of 2005 indicated
that 15 million out of 82 million inhabitants have a migratory background, that means are
either born abroad or are descendants of parents of whom at least one is not born in Germany”
(Kolb, 2008, p. 2).
The abandonment of this denial in the 1990s (that Germany is not a land of immigration)
brought about the main objectives of present day German migration policy. These are the
traditional policy of minimising unwanted immigration characterised by refugees, asylumseekers or undocumented immigrants and the relatively newer competition policy of attracting
highly skilled labour. The first objective was indeed applicable also to the EU-level, yet the
second one “remains attached to the nationstate, as the German position is to maintain labour
migration as a field of exclusively national competence” (Prümm & Alscher, 2007, p. 74). For
this latter position, the legislative role of the Bundesrat, as the representative body of the
German Länder at the federal level, has a significant value.128 Regardless of the consensusoriented German politics informed largely by interest groups, the binding effect of laws in
128
The German legislature has a bicameral structure of the Bundestag, as the federal parliament elected by the
people, and the Bundesrat, made up of members appointed by the Länder.
112
cases of direct influence on the Länder’s interests necessitates the joint approval of the
parliament’s both chambers, i.e. the Bundesrat and Bundestag.
5.1.1.1 Institutional structure
According to the Basic Law, the executive and legislative powers in Germany
(Bundesrepublik Deutschland) are shared between the Federation (Bund) and the Federal
States (Länder or Bundesländer), each of which has its own government, parliament and
constitution. Sharing the Federation’s law-making authority, the Länder hold principally the
right to legislate on their own as long as the issue in concern is not conferred directly to the
federal dimension. There are in this connection several policy areas which are up to
legislation between the two levels concurrently, others being subject to the Federation’s
exclusive power. Should the Federation enact a law on issues where federal regulation is
“necessary in the national interest” (German Basic Law, Art. 72 (2)), the Länder cannot act
alone. This power share between Berlin and sixteen Federal State capitals is further expanded
through municipal administrations amongst others when it comes to migration and asylum
issues, making up altogether a three-legged executive layout (Rudzio, 2006, p. 319).
The judiciary power in Germany is regulated by the Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, GVG (Courts
Constitution Act). Aside from the Federal Constitutional Court, there are accordingly five
main court types: ordinary courts such as the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice),
which is responsible for most civil cases and criminal matters; courts of administrative law
such as Bundesverwaltungsgericht (Federal Administrative Court); courts in charge of tax law
like Bundesfinanzhof (Federal Court of Finance); courts accountable for labour law, for
instance, Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Court of Labour); courts of social law like
Bundessozialgericht (Federal Social Court) and constitutional law courts whose primary duty
is to monitor the review and interpretation of the Constitution (Basic Law).
Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court) occupies the highest rank in this
category (Böckenförde, Wiesner & Nora, 2006).
The centralised and unitary nature of the federal system orders that many sensitive issues
including migration and asylum be treated at more than one level.129 The veto power the
federal states hold conjures up in this regard their key position for the interplay between
129
The legislation handled purely at the Länder level relates in this context to science, education and police
matters.
113
horizontal and vertical levels of cooperation (Schmidt-M.G., 2003). Delegates representing
the federal state governments constitute the Bundesrat as a second chamber which deliberates
upon federal bills endorsed by the Parliament (German Bundestag), with the right to ratify
them in cases of administrative interest for the Länder. For appeal laws (concerning all other
cases), the Bundestag’s word has an absolute value.
5.1.1.2 Actors involved in immigration management
While immigration management is essentially up to the Länder’s initiative –residence permits
and passports are for instance liable to Ausländerbehörden (Foreigners Authorities of the
Federal States)- issues concerning integration were transferred with the 2005 Immigration Act
to the federal government’s jurisdiction. Certain policy areas such as accommodation of
asylum-seekers are however subject to the federal states, which need to cooperate with the
federal police or law enforcement offices in cases where deportation of a foreigner is
imminent. Decisions concerning asylum applications and refugee status are initiated by the
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. Entitlement to political asylum became, after the
Immigration Act’s entry into force in 2005, subject to the sole authority of the Federal
Minister of the Interior.
Responsibility over immigration and asylum matters is divided typically between the
executive and operational levels (Schneider, 2009, pp. 17-21). The key institutions at the
executive level are Bundesministerium des Innern, BMI (Federal Ministry of the Interior),
which is accountable for not only the formulation of migration and integration policies at the
federal level but also technical and legal supervision of how relevant issues are to be
administered by federal offices, and Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales, BMAS
(Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs), which provides legal service for foreigners’
accession to the labour market, including their integration by way of language courses and a
consultation network named ‘Integration through Qualification’. There are additionally
several other important government-based units like the Diplomatic Missions of the
Auswärtiges Amt (Federal Foreign Office), issuing in accordance with the Residence Act’s
Section 71(2) all visa and passport issues abroad; Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für
Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration (Federal Government Commissioner for Migration,
Refugees and Integration), providing consultancy and supportive legislation service for the
Federal Government (according to the Residence Act’s Sections 92, 93 and 94) and
Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Aussiedlerfragen und nationale Minderheiten in
114
Deutschland (Federal Government Commissioner for Issues on Repatriates and National
Minorities in Germany), which is in charge of the Federal Government’s Spätaussiedler
(ethnic German immigrants) affairs.
At the operational level, on the other side, the main actors are Bundesamt für Migration und
Flüchtlinge, BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees), which as part of the Federal
Ministry of the Interior accounts for carrying out all asylum related proceedings, including
management of the Ausländerzentralregister (Central Aliens Register) and implementation of
the EU’s operational tasks, funding programmes, integration courses as well as several
international agreements such as the Dublin II Regulation, the 1951 United Nations
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European Convention on Human
Rights; Bundesverwaltungsamt, BVA (Federal Office of Administration), which organises the
entry and admission of Spätaussiedler and registers data into the Central Aliens Register and
Schengen Information System (SIS); Bundespolizei, BPol (Federal Police), conducting as part
of the Federal Ministry of the Interior all air, water and land operations for the prevention of
illegal entries of all sorts, from human trafficking to smuggling, both inland and at the
borders; Police Forces of the Federal States (Landespolizei), which is in charge of controlling
foreign nationals in Bundesländer for public order and safety and in case of unlawfulness
their removal within 30 to 50 kilometres to the border zone in cooperation with the BPol;
Foreigners Authorities of the Federal States (Ausländerbehörden), which according to the
Residence Act’s Section 71(1) lays out most of the measures for passport and residence
permits, Bundeskriminalamt, BKA (Federal Criminal Police Office), which provides
assistance to the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees by working out asylum-seekers’
fingerprints through AFIS (Automatic Fingerprint Identification System) as well as analysing
and reporting data through the EU’s EURODAC and BPol’s INPOL systems and
Bundesagentur für Arbeit, BA (Federal Employment Agency), which approves, denies or
cancels foreign nationals’ employment in accordance with the Residence Act’s sections 39-41
(Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2009).
Application of third-country nationals for citizenship is up to the local Ausländerbehörden
depending on a number of prerequisites. Accordingly, naturalisation process starts by
submitting a form of request in person, having completed 16 years of age; for those under 16,
application must be made by parents (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2011).
Eligibility for naturalisation requires having legal residence in Germany for minimum eight
115
years; completing an integration course (qualification requires seven years); declaring
allegiance to the German constitution and having adequate command of the German language
(Nationality Act 2000, Section 10(1)). Upon investigation by the BPol as well as institutions
like the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, the final decision-maker is the
Federal Ministry of the Interior.
There are other than these official departments a number of non-governmental institutions,
interest groups or stakeholders that also take part –though rather indirectly- in the
management of immigration issues. The most notable amongst these are the United Nations’
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Pro-Asyl, the autonomous refugee councils of
the Länder, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and numerous Ausländerbeiräte
(advisory boards of foreigners) working in cooperation with the city councils.
5.1.1.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective
The major influx of mass immigration in German history dates back to the onset of the
Gastarbeiter recruitment in the 1950s. As Vogel & Cyrus (2000, p. 11) observes, however,
the historical backdrop was indeed characterised right after the end of World War II, when big
numbers of ethnic Germans started to return from different corners around Europe. There
came alongside this inflow also those from the new German Democratic Republic, whose size
amounted altogether to some 12 million until the rise of the Berlin Wall in 1961.
Table 11: Post-war immigration to Germany
Period
Feature
1945-1961
Aussiedler/ethnic German immigrant influxes
1961-1973
Gastarbeiter recruitment programme
1973-1989
family unification
1989-2000
the new naturalisation law
2000- …
divided immigration policy
Source: Vogel & Cyrus (2000, p. 11).
The first Aliens Law concerning immigration issues in Germany came into force in 1965,
following the decision to launch a wholesale recruitment of foreign workers, which continued
with intervals until 1973. Before the Aliens Law, it was a host of administrative guidelines
and ruling cases issued by courts that regulated alien matters in Germany. The Gastarbeiter
phase which lasted in rough terms from the building of the Berlin Wall to the global oil crisis
116
in 1973130 was initiated at the discretion of a large platform of employers, labour unions and
official governing bodies, which collectively agreed to import labour from a number of
countries mostly from the south of Europe.131 Enormous as the flow of foreign labour may
have been in time, the recruitment programme was actually designed to work on a temporary
basis. And yet, despite the Anwerbestopp (the end of recruitment) in the early 1970s, one third
of these workers –an estimate about two million, according to the Federal Department of
Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1999)- decided to stay in Germany.
The ensuing period of immigration (1973-1989) was marked by the arrival of the family
members -of those staying to continue employment- whose residence rights were secured by
the Grundgesetz (the German Basic Law).132 With the new waves of EU enlargement and a
series of programmes initiated until 1984 to encourage the return of Gastarbeiter, the core
issue causing a main concern at the state level was integration of immigrants into the host
society. As the country confronted in time more inflows than was initially planned, a draft law
was made to (re)codify rights of entry and residence. Following this so called Aliens Act
which came into force in 1991, immigrants were given a statutory right to naturalisation,
which after a long process became attached with German citizenship as a legal right and was
codified into the ‘Law on Foreigners and Aliens’. As a consequence, naturalisation became
restricted with twenty-three years of age initially on the condition of residence with a
minimum length of eight years, six years of formal school attendance and lack of conviction
of serious crimes. For those above the age limit, the main requirement was residence in
Germany for minimum fifteen years (without being charged with petty offences and enjoying
any type of state-sponsored social assistance).
An important legal source to consider in the context of family reunification is the German
Basic Law, grounded essentially upon universal human rights (including the international law
concerning the rights of refugees). With its Constitution tied firmly to the principle of
‘dignity’133, treatment of asylum matters in Germany has often proved fairly liberal, so much
130
While the German authorities initially attempted to reduce the number of a new flow of foreign workers by
increasing the recruitment fee from DM 300 to DM 1,000, the oil crisis in the Arabian Peninsula urged the end
of the recruitment programme (Gonzalez-Ferrer, 2007, p. 13).
131
The initial agreement made with Italy in 1955 was followed by those signed later on with Spain and Greece
(1960), Turkey (1961), Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965) and Yugoslavia (1968), as the domestic
economy showed signs of labour shortages in the post-WW II period.
132
Article 6 (1) of the Basic Law reads: “Marriage and the family shall enjoy the special protection of the state”.
133
Inspired by the Kantian maxim, ‘[a]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of
another, always as an end and never as a means only’, the Grundgesetz is anchored to the “architectonic value of
117
so that it was in many occasions the main reason why the state could not deny asylumseekers, even if there might be a general tendency to do so (Joppke, 1999). For this reason or
another, there were between 1980 and 1989 around 700,000 asylum-seekers in Germany:
Table 12: Asylum applications, 1980-1989
Land
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Germany
107,818
49,391
37,423
19,737
35,278
73,832
99,649
57,379
103,076
121,318
EC/EU
total
149,037
129,709
93,026
70,579
97,837
157,280
189,538
166,780
215,250
283,421
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Geneva, 2001.
The number of these applications surged throughout the 1990s to two millions, chiefly as a
consequence of the post-Cold War liberation movements:
Table 13: Asylum applications, 1990-1999
Land
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
Germany
193,063
256,112
438,191
359,401
127,210
166,951
149,193
151,700
143,429
138,319
EC/EU
total
402,027
492,391
673,947
549,696
301,693
307,629
260,423
290,570
340,430
414,444
Source: UNHCR (2001).
About half of some three million people who sought for German asylum in the 1980s and 90s
were granted the right to have it. Indeed, the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall
in 1989 made direct implications at this point. Large numbers of immigrants swarmed to the
then Federal Republic of Germany claiming right to accommodation and financial coverage.
A massive influx of not only Eastern and ethnic Germans from the former communist block
(as restrictions in this context became largely nullified in the early 1990s), but also of asylumseekers from elsewhere had a stirring effect in the host society. To cope with further pressure
following the German unification in the mid-1990s, Eastern Germans were denied the right to
accommodation in the formerly Western territory, while a de facto quota (followed later on by
a number of legislative restrictions) was imposed upon ethnic German immigration. 134 Added
to that, several legislative and administrative measures were taken to make the asylum
procedure more demanding. The souring figures urged the governing CDU/CSU (Christian
human dignity”, suggesting “each person is valuable per se as an end in himself, which government and fellow
citizens must give due respect” (Eberle, 2008, pp. 3-4; bracket original).
134
When the National Socialist rule ended, millions of Germans living away from the German territory were
granted the right to acquire citizenship by the Grundgesetz on the condition of settlement (defined essentially by
the Federal Displacement and Refugee Act). While a marginal number of Germans could enjoy this right over
the Cold War period, the early 1990s saw a dramatic rise to that effect. In response, the 1990 Ethnic Germans
Reception Act and the 1993 Law to Settle the Results of the War redefined ethnic citizenship to deny it for
instance to those born after 1993 (Vogel & Cyrus, 2000, p. 12).
118
Social Union) and FDP (Free Democratic Party) coalition as well as the opposing SPD (Social
Democratic Party) to come up in 1992 with a new policy paradigm collectively. To this
‘asylum compromise’, Article 6 of the Basic Law saw a fundamental change to grant the right
to asylum-seekers, provided they would not cross into Germany via ‘safe third countries’
(Giesler & Wasser, 1993).135 The Constitutional Court’s confirmation of this amendment in
1996 gave the green light to keep immigration flows under control, which soon became an
official policy paradigm. In accordance, issuing of residence permits to foreigners became
extremely limited to cases of most notably “seasonal workers, contingency workers, Jewish
migrants from the former Soviet Union – and above all in the case of family reunification”
(Prümm & Alscher, 2007, p. 76).
In 1999, the German Basic Law saw amendments making room for more flexible
requirements, the most important of which was expansion of citizenship by way of the jus soli
principle to be working in tandem with the jus sanguinis.136 Following this change, a proposal
was made in 2000 to put a points-based system in use for highly skilled foreigners, designed
in fact specifically for the sector concerning information technology. A maximum five-year
long visa status, as planned with the points-based system became however unappealing with
the crisis impacting the IT industry soon. Similar efforts in quest of ‘brain gain’ were made in
2001 when a draft bill was initiated in order to manage and restrict immigration, regulate the
stay of foreigners and integrate non-EU citizens more effectively.137 In accordance, the
existing legislation on foreigners (Ausländerrecht) was to be improved in favour of non-EU
immigrants, to bring the ethno-cultural understanding of immigration policy to an end. For
this purpose, a series of changes allowing for less bureaucracy during visa processes were put
in place. These attempts became however inconclusive upon rejection by the oppositional
CDU & CSU block, thanks to their majority seat in the Bundesrat. 138 To be fair, this
resistance was backed up with a wide-reaching public support alongside the rising
135
The ‘safe third-country’ rule regulates the conditions under which a refugee can be declined at the intended
country’s external borders or sent back to the sending countries by route of which (s)he has arrived in the
destination country. The principle enables states on the other side to deny a refugee’s asylum demand pointing at
the sending country’s protection of human rights in agreeable terms (European Parliament, 2000).
136
With that, one could become entitled to German citizenship as long as (minimum) one of the parents had an
unlimited residence permit (unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis) for at least three years, an unlimited right to
residence (Aufenthaltsberechtigung) or a legal permanent residence in Germany for minimum eight years.
137
Draft legislation: Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen SPD und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. Entwurf eines
Gesetzes zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration
von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz).
138
The bill was declined despite the independent commission (chaired by CDU MP Rita Süssmuth) propped up
by a large platform of trade unions, local governments and high-level delegates from employers’ associations.
119
unemployment figures at the time, spurred amongst others by the ‘9/11 attacks’ which
provoked EU-wide concerns about foreigners as a potential threat to public security. That
said, in 2004, the draft bill managed to pass in the Parliament after long negotiations.
Despite a certain degree of compromise made by the opposition, the 2005 Immigration Act
did not include the entirety of what was previously envisioned. Of particular importance here
was the 1973 recruitment ban which remained in effect139 instead of the formerly espoused
points-based system concerning the selection of highly skilled foreign workers. Permanent
residence for third-country researchers was also disposed of from the originally intended draft
coverage. There were nevertheless a number of radical changes introduced with the new law.
A most notable one was the additional one-year visa extension provided for foreign students
in case they would wish to stay in Germany upon graduation from a (German) university for
employment purposes. Added to that was a permanent residence permit granted to highprofile non-EU scientists, managers as well as self-employed individuals investing minimum
one million Euros in their business and creating at least ten new jobs upon a three-year
residence permit. Meanwhile, asylum-seekers with validated applications became with the
new law entitled to a three-year long provisional residence permit. Should the conditions in
the beginning continue to apply, accordingly, the temporary status would turn into an
unlimited one.140 What’s more, foreigners who suffered non-state or gender-specific
persecution in their countries of origin could now enjoy refugee status. Those fitting to this
profile were previously (based on the 1951 Geneva Convention) subject to a temporary
suspension of deportation, for reasons of non-refoulement in their country of origin. With the
Immigration Act’s entry into force, they could, as in the case of asylum applicants, receive an
unlimited residence permit following a probation period of three years (which would also
provide access to the labour market).141
On interior security matters, those charged with terrorist activities or ‘provoking hatred’ in
public became subject to restriction of freedom, should deportation be out of the question.142
139
Exceptions were issued by a further decree enabling the application of recruitment to certain professions such
as IT specialists, nurses and seasonal agricultural workers.
140
Currently, such asylum applicants are offered unlimited residence permits with no probation period.
141
While this issue is currently regulated under the 2008 Asylum Procedure Act, its legal basis is the 1997
Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (the Asylum Benefits Act), which sought support for asylum-seekers and other
foreigners with no permanent residence. The Residence Act, as part of the Immigration Act, offers in this context
further support on for instance matters relating to residence permits and subsidiary protection.
142
Due to its potential to violate the German Constitution, extension to administrative detention (as demanded by
the CDU/CSU opposition) was not adopted.
120
Last but not least, the Residence Act (of the 2005 Immigration Act) brought forward language
and integration classes which are compulsory for non-EU immigrants.143 Failure of attendance
to these classes could cost them loss of certain social benefits and/or non-renewal of their
residence permits. All schooling expenses within the framework of integration of immigrants
would be met by the federal government.144
Following the 2007 Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz, which transferred eleven EU directives into
the national law145, the German Immigration Act underwent a series of key changes.
Amendments relating to the German asylum and refugee law were characterised by the
implementation of the Qualification and Procedure Directives (the Council Directive
2004/83/EC and the Council Directive 2005/85/EC, respectively) as of January 2009 and the
Arbeitsmigrationssteuerungsgesetz (Labour Migration Control Act)146, which began to allow
access to the labour market for designated migrant groups.
Besides federal acts that are subject to the consent of the Parliament and the Bundesrat, there
are certain ordinances decreed by the Federal Government/Minister in charge and confirmed
in most cases by the Bundesrat, to be contributing to the regulation of employment, residence
and integration of third-country nationals and asylum-seekers: the Residence Ordinance, the
Employment Ordinance, the Employment Procedure Ordinance, the Ordinance on Integration
Courses and the Ordinance on Determining Asylum Competences (Schneider, 2009, p. 16).
143
Besides provisions introduced by the 2005 Residence Act, the entry of non-EU nationals intending short-term
stay is essentially regulated by the Schengen Convention.
144
Such courses were at the time applicable to the (Spät-) Aussiedler, i.e. ethnic German immigrants from
Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
145
These were Council Directive 2002/90/ EC on the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence;
Council Directive 2003/86/EC concerning the right to family reunification; the Council Directive 2003/110/EC
concerning assistance in cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air; the Council Directive 2003/109/EC
on the status of long-term resident Third-Country Nationals; the EP and Council (joint) Directive 2004/38/EC
concerning the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the
territory of the Member States; the Council Directive 2004/81/EC concerning the residence permit issued to
Third-Country Nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an
action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities; the Council Directive
2003/9/EC on minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers; the Council Directive 2004/83/EC
concerning minimum standards for the qualification and status of Third-Country Nationals or stateless persons as
refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted; the
Council Directive 2004/114/EC concerning the conditions of admission of Third-Country Nationals for the
purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service; the Council Directive
2005/71/EC concerning a specific procedure for admitting Third-Country Nationals for the purposes of scientific
research and finally, the Council Directive 2005/85/EC concerning minimum standards on procedures in
Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status.
146
Act to Control the Immigration of Highly Skilled Foreigners qualifying for the Labour Market and to amend
further regulations of the Resident Law of 20 December 2008, Federal Law Gazette I, 24 December 2008.
121
When the transitional period suspending labour migration from the Central and Eastern
European Countries expired in 2011, workers from these Member States were granted
unrestricted access to the labour markets in Germany. Shortly after this, the government
adopted the ‘Concept for Securing the Skilled Labour Base’ so as to encourage skilled labour,
in light of the declining working-age population.147 Accordingly, a list of demanded jobs on
the domestic labour markets was to be specified by the Federal Employment Agency twice a
year. The pre-2009 minimum salary to be paid to highly skilled TCNs was however lowered.
To keep domestic labour intact, a new law called Berufsqualifikationsfeststellungsgesetz,
BQFG (the Professional Qualifications Assessment Act) on the assessment of TCNs’
professional qualifications came into force in 2012. While nationality became with this
‘Recognition Act’ no more a relevant condition for job applications, foreign qualifications
were now to be evaluated to the extent they would make preferable options vis-à-vis those of
the German citizens (OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2012).
5.1.1.4 Citizenship and naturalisation policies in Germany
TCNs’ access to German citizenship was for a lengthy period of the twentieth century
restrictive. Following an official view of naturalisation as an exceptional practice rather than
as part of the legal order even for the latter generations of immigrants, the last decade saw
considerable liberalisation movements bringing about today’s pro-naturalisation policy
(Williams, 2010, p. 14). This development came along with a discursive change whereby
Germany’s denial of being an immigration country up to the 2000s was abandoned at the state
level, promising ease of TCNs’ naturalisation process.
Despite scepticism about the effects of the Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (StAG), which entered
into force as of 1 January 2000, the past decade witnessed remarkable changes in legislative
and administrative practices giving clear signals that the temporary understanding of
immigration was taking to a permanent form (Green, 2004). In retrospect, the ethnic-based
perception of citizenship in the post-war period was in this sense an official strategy against
that of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), i.e. 1967 Staatsbürgerschaftsgesetz der
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. To circumvent the GDR’s official framework which
granted citizenship to the nationals of other communist states such as Vietnam (alongside the
147
BMAS, Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) Action
Programme of the Federal Government (2008): Labour Migration's Contribution to Securing the Skilled Labour
Base in Germany.
122
repatriation agreements), the Federal Republic’s jus sanguinis would serve as a safety valve.
Nonetheless, with the end of the Cold War and the re-unification of Germany, the ethnicitybased citizenship appeared to be a loophole attracting large waves of immigration to
Germany. While it became clear that German ancestry was no more a deterrent measure,
debates in relation to German national identity became widespread in light of pressure from
the second- and third-generation of immigrants, who despite their birth and education in the
country were still not naturalised, as there was no room for jus soli citizenship in the German
law until the legislative reform in 1999.
Informed to a large extent also by the pressure of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) and the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which came to play an increasingly
important judiciary role in the late 20th century Europe, the 2000 Nationality Act introduced
three major sets of changes to citizenship coverage (Howard, 2006). The first set comprised
reduction of length of stay for residency from 15 to 8 years (on the condition of a valid
residence permit, lack of criminal convictions, gainful employment and willingness to
dispense with former citizenship), an oath of loyalty for the ‘free and democratic order of the
Constitution’ and language tests administered at the Länder level. The second package of
changes on citizenship brought forward, as defined by Article 4 of the new law, the extension
of the jus sanguinis principle with that of the jus soli. Accordingly, children born in Germany
could now enjoy automatic entitlement to German citizenship on the condition of an eightyear long residence permit or a three-year long unlimited residence permit to be declared by
one of the parents. That said, the jus soli practice did not really include the entirety of TCNs,
as it demanded a record of unbroken paid-employment with no dependence on German
State’s welfare benefits. And finally, the third component of the 2000 Nationality Act as far as
naturalisation was concerned included the Optionsmodell which regulated basic terms and
conditions applying to dual citizenship. Accordingly, children receiving German citizenship
through the jus soli procedure were allowed to hold dual citizenship until adulthood, provided
that they would make a choice between the two citizenships before reaching 18 years of
age.148
148
At the time this dissertation was being written, the new coalition government was close to a deal which would
extend dual citizenship to Germany-born TCN children and naturalised Germans.
123
5.1.2 The United Kingdom149
Table 14: Basic migration statistics
Net migration (2009)
182,000
Foreign-born immigration flow (2007)
237,000
Largest third countries of origin (2008)
India, USA, Pakistan
TCN population (2008)
2,406,000
TCN as part of population (2008)
3.90%
Foreign-born as part of population (2008)
6.60%
Permits delivered for family (2009)
121,280
Permits delivered for work (2009)
116,670
Permits delivered for study (2009)
268,525
Permits delivered for humanitarian reasons (2009)
6,602
TCN employment rate (2009, change since 2006)
57.40%; -2%
National employment rate (2009, change since 2006)
69.90%; -1.7%
TCN unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006)
11.20%; +1.5%
National unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006)
7.60%; +2.2%
Nationality acquisitions (2008, change since 2005)
129,260; -32,495
Source: MIPEX III.
Seeing into its recent foreign population stocks over the last decade, one can observe a steady
increase in the UK’s immigration density:
Table 15: Stocks of foreign population in the UK
of total population
2001
2010
2011
in thousands
2,587 2,584 2,742 2,857 3,035 3,392 3,824 4,186 4,348 4,524
4,785
in percentages
4.4
2002
4.4
2003
4.6
2004
4.8
2005
5.1
2006
5.7
2007
6.4
2008
6.9
2009
7.1
7.4
7.7
All thousands are rounded off to the nearest value.
Source: OECD (2011b).
While this trend applies in fact to many other immigration lands in Europe, a significant
factor to bear in mind for the British case is the country’s nearly two century-long colonial
rule overseas. The strong links it retained over the entire 20th century with the Old and New
Commonwealth countries150, which formerly were under its imperial rule, resulted in rising
149
Intended with the United Kingdom is what the official name of the country reads: the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. For practical purposes, however, there will be occasional use of ‘British’ and
‘Britain’ in reference to the entire country.
150
These two groups of fifty-four independent states make up altogether the Commonwealth. While the Old
Commonwealth consists of the pre-1945 dominions (which gained independence before 1945), namely
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Canada founded together with the UK the British Commonwealth
(which later took the name the Commonwealth). The others making up the New Commonwealth are the
remaining forty-nine Asian and African countries which gained their independence in the 1960s and 1970s. To
124
flows of immigrants from them, particularly as of the end of World War II. In recent times, of
the 1995-2004 period for instance, the net international migration to/from the UK by
nationality was calculated as follows:
Table 16: Net migration to/from the UK (in thousands)
nonCommonwealth
EU
British
nationals
nationals
nationals
(old and new)
75
-52
127
23
56
1995
54
-62
116
29
47
1996
47
-60
107
18
50
1997
139
-23
162
33
72
1998
163
-23
186
8
80
1999
163
-57
220
6
101
2000
172
-53
225
11
101
2001
153
-91
245
11
101
2002
151
-85
236
14
107
2003
223
-120
342
74
164
2004
All values are approximate, i.e. rounded off to the nearest thousand.
Source: UK Government Home Office (2004). Command Paper 6690.
Period
All
nationals
British
nationals
Other
foreign
nationals
48
41
38
57
98
113
113
133
115
104
Accordingly, of around two million migrants who came to the UK between 1995 and 2004,
some 880,000 originated from the Old and New Commonwealth countries, about 227,000
from other Member States and ca. 860,000 from non-EU countries (other than Old/New
Commonwealth). Given some 630,000 British nationals who moved overseas in this period,
the net migration amounted to 1.3 million in approximate figures.
To be fair, it was economic demands that gave rise to the arrival of newcomers (from former
colonies in the first place). Yet, as the size of inflows reached a peak in the 1960s, a
protectionist mindset grew gradually in public, with rising levels of xenophobia and
antagonism towards immigrants. This tendency appears fairly intact today, as shown by recent
surveys demonstrating more than half of the interviewees with extremely conservative
attitudes, so much so that they consider immigrants to be a threat to their way of life:
Table 17: British citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life (in percentages)
Responses (options)
UK
EU 15
Totally agree
28
16
Tend to agree
26
26
Tend to disagree
24
30
Totally disagree
13
18
Don’t know
9
10
Source: Special Eurobarometer Wave 60.1
qualify for membership (of the Commonwealth), this latter group was required to recognise that the Crown is
‘the symbol’ and chair of the association.
125
One needs to mention in this context a central issue that made earlier British immigration
policy somewhat distinctive, which in rough terms could be described as the weak role of
‘client politics’. Contrary to many countries in Europe where non-political actors such as
interest groups, NGOs and courts exert considerable pressure against a backdrop of economic
trends or international human rights, politics of immigration has for most of British history
been characterised predominantly by the ruling executive (Ette & Gerdes, 2007). A secondary
feature of this traditional pattern stands out most notably in the form of an utterly
discriminatory immigration policy, which in the early 1970s “selected white over
nonwhite…and wealthy…over poor ones” (Messina, 2007, p. 235).
Much in a similar vein, regarding policies in relation to the supranational goals of the EU, the
UK comes to mind as a fairly ‘selective’ land. A tendency to associate this attribute with some
“Anglo-Saxon exceptionalism” (Ette & Gerdes, 2007, p. 93) indeed takes the foundation of
the European Communities as a reference point, when the UK declined to take part in the then
European Coal and Steel Community and the ensuing 1956 Rome Treaty. Following two
unsuccessful attempts in 1963 and 1967, it managed to accede to the EC as a member state in
1973. Yet, even many years after its membership to the EC/EU, the UK was still charged with
“failure to find a point of equilibrium in European policy in terms of either politics or
relationships with other member states” (Wallace, 1997, p. 677). While this puzzle loosened
up to a certain extent towards the end of the 1990s, the UK was for many still a country
failing to grasp its “advantages of membership…relationship with the other leading member
states, and…the direction that it would like the European Union to take” (Allen, 2005, p.
120).
Following its decision to stay outside the Schengen Agreement in the 1980s, the UK carried
on with its traditional indifference to supranationalisation moves in the 1990s. To illustrate,
most importantly, it opted out from the Amsterdam Treaty’s Title IV on visas, asylum and
immigration. True, the aftermath of Amsterdam saw signs of changes (for instance, during the
2002 Seville European Council, the UK worked with the hosting Spain closely to come up
with an effective anti-discrimination directive on illegal immigration); however, patterns
marking some kind of ‘standoffishness’ were still in place when it came to harmonisation at
the EU-level.
126
5.1.2.1 Institutional structure
The United Kingdom has a Westminster-based unitary government system working to the
principles of parliamentary democracy and holding responsibilities devolved to the Scottish
Government in Edinburgh, the Welsh Assembly Government in Cardiff and the Northern
Ireland Executive in Belfast. There are in accordance with this semi-autonomous governing
structure three main legal systems: the English law applying in England and Wales, the Scots
law in Scotland and Northern Ireland law in Northern Ireland. The judiciary of the UK is not
constituted by a single body but instead separate legal systems in these regions. The broader
jurisdiction belongs to Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, the Special Immigration
Appeals Commission, Employment Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunal (UK
Government Cabinet Office, National Archives, 2007). Although the UK Parliament and
Government at Westminster are responsible for all ‘reserved’ matters for Scotland and
Northern Ireland, such as local government, justice, agriculture, education and health, and all
‘non-transferred’ matters for Wales, like public expenditure, law and order, they do not deal
with issues concerning for instance tax collection or police services devolved generally to the
Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and Northern Ireland Assembly (UK
Government, Cabinet Office, National Archives, 2010).
The political system involves representation of local constituencies in the House of Commons
through election of parliament members and a government. The three main political parties
that came to rule throughout most of British political life are the Labour Party, the
Conservatives (Tories) and the Liberal Democrats. There is further to the elected House of
Commons also the House of Lords, which makes up the unelected chamber of the Parliament.
Choosing ministers from both chambers, the Prime Minister seeks to rule the government
activity with the aid of the non-partisan UK Civil Service. For each policy area, there are
Parliamentary Select Committees which lobby for their constituencies and/or certain interest
groups.
The chief government department in charge of immigration (and asylum) policy is the Home
Office led by the Home Secretary (representing the Home Department) who works in
collaboration with a Minister of State to structure government policy in accordance with the
ideological commitments of the party in power (voiced often as ‘manifestos’). The branch of
the Home Office that regulates non-British citizens’ all bureaucratic formalities -as far as their
entry and stay in the UK is concerned- is the UK Border Agency (UKBA). The UKBA is in
127
this sense a shadow agency of the Home Office responsible for the prevention of illegal
immigration and maintenance of controls at borders (entry ports).151 According to the 2007
UK Borders Act, the border control is carried out largely by the UKBA’s Immigration
Officers rather than direct police involvement. Working in cooperation with the UKBA, a
number of separately elected Local Councillors are in charge of immigration matters.
The current legal framework pertaining to immigration is based on the 1971 Immigration Act,
which underwent a series of amendments through the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, the
2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, the 2004 Asylum and Immigration Act, the
2006 Immigration and Nationality Act, the 2007 UK Borders Act and finally 2009 Borders,
Citizenship and Immigration Act. Besides a host of statutory instruments making up
secondary legislation together with the EU-sourced regulations and directives, a rich reservoir
of case law is ordered by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal and Special Immigration
Appeals Commission to govern the complex network of immigration policy-making and
practice in the UK.
5.1.2.2 Actors involved in immigration management
According to the 1971 Immigration Act,152 rules concerning immigration matters are
generally characterised by the Home Secretary following approval of both chambers of the
Parliament. Added to that, the Home Secretary is entitled to exert his/her sole initiative in
certain individual cases, bearing in mind the courts’ supervision may cause restrictions in
practice. Other than the Home Secretary, the State Secretary for borders and immigration is
the other top-rank bureaucrat responsible for the UKBA at the ministry level. Employed by
the UKBA and appointed by the State Secretary, Immigration Officers are entitled to the
examination of entry clearances besides their monitoring duties like arresting those in case of
breach of law. As part of the UKBA, the Entry Clearance Officers (ECOs) working at Visa
Services of British Missions are at the helm of granting visas.153 In cases where cooperation
with a neighbouring country is required, the controlling activity is performed at the
concerning foreign port.
151
It brings together the tasks carried out previously (before 2008) by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s
UK Visa Services, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Border and Immigration Agency.
152
The relevant sections are 1(4) and 3(2).
153
One needs to make sure at this point that arrival and entry are under British law not regarded as the same
concepts. If a case is a ‘leave to enter’, it is usually the Immigration Officer at the UK port of entry who grants
the visa.
128
Administration of asylum issues belonged previously to the National Asylum Support Service
(NASS) which worked as part of the former Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND).
Despite continuing reference to NASS across the Home Office, it was actually disbanded in
2006 transferring its functions to numerous UKBA units such as the Casework Resolution
Directorate (CRD), which is in charge of handling old cases, and the office of the New
Asylum Model (NAM), which processes asylum claims. Asylum applications are made to
Immigration Officers either while or after crossing into the UK territory. On entry, asylumseekers are required to apply for ‘leave to enter’ the UK in return for which they are either
detained during the course of application or granted temporary admission.
For statutory instruments, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT), being an executive
agency as part of the Ministry of Justice, hears to adjudicate cases appealed by the Secretary
of State in a ‘fast-track procedure’. A Chief Inspector is in charge of monitoring the AIT’s
deeds. The appeals governed by the AIT concern the decision of granting leave to enter or
remain. For claims of unfair denial of support, the First-tier Tribunal (formerly knowns as the
Asylum Support Tribunal) is responsible. For detention purposes, a number of non-official
security firms are authorised by the UK Border Agency. These firms cooperate with
airline/carrier companies which are officially required to contribute to the security process by
checking visas and passports.
Aside from these main actors, there are also a number of international stakeholders which
have fundamental roles in immigration management. Two such leading organisations are the
UNHCR, i.e. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (which working in close
cooperation with the UK Government is in charge of protecting the rights of refugees and
improving asylum conditions) and the IOM, International Organisation for Migration, which
also works closely with the British government to advise on matters relating to asylumseekers’ voluntary return to their country of origin.
Other key non-governmental organisations that contribute to the making and application of
immigration policy are the International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Chatham
House and the Refugee Council. As far as legal advice to asylum-seekers is concerned,
several charity organisations such as the Refugee Legal Centre, the Immigration Law
Practitioners’ Association, the Immigration Advisory Service and Asylum Aid have
fundamental duties. Besides government units which provide statistical and other relevant
129
knowledge database like the Home Office’s Research Development Statistics Directorate
(which works as part of the UKBA), and the Analysis, Research and Knowledge Management
Directorate, there are also research centers which make publications on immigration and
asylum issues like the Refugee Study Centre and Information Centre about Asylum and
Refugees as well as academic units such as the University of Oxford’s Centre on Migration,
Policy and Society (COMPAS) and the University of Sussex’s Centre for Migration Research.
5.1.2.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective
The historical turn in making the United Kingdom a country of immigration dates back to the
post-war period when large waves of immigrants from former colonies began to come for
labour purposes. This large-scale move was backed up by entry and citizenship priorities
specific to the Commonwealth citizens, who in the post-war period were not labeled
straightforward as ‘aliens’, for their accession to the UK was subject to entry clearance. This
was indeed a response to British labour shortages at the time, which was well-received by a
large-scale supply up to the early 1960s, when such labour demands took a twist to fall and
public opposition to immigration rose considerably.
While the predominantly Conservative-led governments sought in this era to attract foreign
labour for the purpose of restoring Britain’s war-stricken infrastructure, a fundamental drive
lying behind was the UK’s ‘superpower image’ which by reinforcing links with the newly
independent ex-colonies (mostly of Commonwealth nations) could be revitalised to a certain
extent. Supported by a citizenship regime154 which was in favour of further inflows until the
1960s, migration remained usually in reasonable margins, as proportional to labour market
needs. The succeeding Labour government did not fully back immigrant import when it most
importantly passed the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrant Act, which introduced under the
guise of ‘partiality’ a racialised division between Commonwealth citizens (Sales, 2007). With
this Act, the Commonwealth citizens were stripped of the right to free movement (to the UK)
with the exception of those born in the country or with British passports (Herlitz, 2005).
The replacement of the Labour government by the Conservatives in 1970 was informed
largely by the latter’s election campaign promising to carry out reforms in the immigration
law and terminate the ongoing immigration waves in particular from the New Commonwealth
154
According to the 1948 British Nationality Act (BNA), nationals of the former colonies were entitled to British
citizenship and entry rights even if they were officially treated as permanent residents in these lands.
130
(Hampshire, 2005). With specific provisions to make changes to that effect, a new act was
enshrined into the UK law in 1971. The 1971 Immigration Act imposed restrictions regarding
family reunification as well. To the 1982 House of Commons archives, the number of the
Commonwealth immigrants fell between 1971 and 1980 from an estimate 126,000 to 87,000
(Herlitz, 2005, p. 18). Interestingly, the entry into force of the new Act in 1973 synchronised
with the UK’s accession to the EC, making way for the communitarisation of the British
labour markets, providing EEC citizens with free movement, as envisaged by the provisions
of the 1957 Rome Treaty, yet lifting on the other side the same privileges granted formerly to
the Commonwealth citizens. Upon new concerns at the labour market, the Thatcher
government launched the 1981 British Nationality Act to bring forward a new understanding
of British citizenship. As of 1983, accordingly, the old citizenship status of ‘the Citizens of
the United Kingdom and Commonwealth’ was replaced with ‘the Citizens of the United
Kingdom and Others’. Much in the same vein, the jus soli principle enabling automatic
citizenship to UK born children (which was in force since the 1914 British Nationality Act)
turned to the jus sanguinis “to maintain the alien status of generations of immigrant families
born in the host country” (Schain, 2008, p. 12).
Concerns about rising numbers of asylum-seekers155 and refugees gave way to a new
Immigration Act in 1988 and with that visa controls for nationals of India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and Ghana (as part of the Commonwealth). While the higher
rates in the 1990s stemmed essentially from family reunification and settlement, a national
policy on asylum/refugee matters was at the time still out of sight.156 To this end, the
Conservative government introduced in 1996 the Asylum and Immigration Act to stop the
growing influxes.157 The new Act put into use additional provisions from the 1993 Asylum
and Immigration Appeals Act, such as restriction of social benefits and abolition of the right
to permanent accommodation for refugees. To raise efficiency in a number of areas from
economic migration to border control, the subsequent Labour government took measures like
155
The area of asylum was not a major concern in the 1971 Immigration Act. This was possibly because the
average annual entry of asylum applications until the 1990s remained around a relatively low number of 10,000
(in comparison to many other leading immigration countries). As the figures came to rise to 70,000s in 1991, a
full body of legislation was worked out on asylum issues, paving the way through the 1993 and 1996 Asylum
and Immigration Appeals Act for the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act, which all introduced new procedures
on cases of appeal, conditions of support and enforcement. Despite surging numbers (of 100,000s) in the early
2000s, claims for asylum started to fall in the second half to some 30,000 at most (UK Home Office, 2009).
156
The perception of the immigrants by the host society as competitors for social services and rare jobs peaked
in this period.
157
Meanwhile, the 1951 Geneva Convention was incorporated partially into the Immigration Rules.
131
lowering incentives for labour import and doing away with welfare benefits for asylumseekers. Further to the establishment of the NASS (National Asylum Support System), to be
in charge of a stricter control of asylum applications, the police officers became authorised to
detain and arrest asylum-seekers in cases when their applications had no valid grounds.
While the 1951 Geneva Convention (on the status of refugees) was not entirely transferred
into the British law, there were references to it for instance in the 1993 and 1996 Asylum and
Immigration Appeals Act, the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the 2004
Asylum and Immigration Act, the 2006 Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act and the
2006 Regulations (concerning the cases of refugees and persons in need of humanitarian
protection) together with the Immigration Rules. Cases falling into the area of human rights
were supported by the introduction of the 1998 Human Rights Act. With that, treatment of
migrants became recognised as a subject of the ECHR (European Convention on Human
Rights).158
The number of foreign workers contributing to UK labour force coupled in recent times. As
part of national schemes to enforce more influential policy measures in this context, the
British Parliament passed in 2007 the UK Borders Act. Through this one of the two chief
legislation documents concerning immigration in present day UK (the other being the 2009
Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act), the UKBA’s authority was expanded to help
combat illegal labour by for instance allowing for automatic deportation of foreigners in case
of imprisonment for more than one year or criminal offences such as drug dealing, rape and
manslaughter. Besides several quasi-police powers provided for immigration officers during
search, entry and increased detention under an ‘e-borders’ programme (introducing further
use of technological methods such as biometric identity cards), the new act also made room
for a points-based system to encourage skilled labour import.159
Following the 2008 Immigration and Citizenship Bill designed to overhaul and simplify the
immigration law, the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act was adopted as the
158
Incorporation of the Human Rights Act into the UK law suggested that asylum claims be now made under the
ECHR’s Article 3 concerning actions against degrading treatment like torture. According to the 1993 Asylum
and Immigration Appeals Act, which covered the cases of refugees in Sections 1 and 2, immigration rules could
not stand in contradiction with the Geneva Convention.
159
This was a five-tier points-based system designed to make the long immigration process simpler by enforcing
single application to replace all schemes concerning entry clearance and work permit. The so-called five tiers
were the highly skilled (tier one), skilled with job offer (tier two), low skilled (tier three), students (tier four) and
temporary workers/youth mobility (tier five).
132
second chief document of contemporary immigration legislation. Accordingly, immigration
officers became entitled to perform revenue and customs duties in border issues, leaving the
department of HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs) to take care of internal revenue
and customs affairs. Other than these, the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act brought
in also new citizenship rules. Tying foreign nationals’ eligibility for naturalisation to an eightor five-year (in cases of marriage) permanent residence, the Act introduced the ‘probationary
citizenship leave’ as a new temporary ‘leave to remain’ category with which immigrants
would provisionally be denied access to labour markets and welfare benefits. What’s more,
the new Act assigned the Secretary of State a duty ‘to safeguard and promote’ the welfare of
children. Here, automatic British nationality was granted to UK born children provided one of
the parents was a Commonwealth citizen or a foreign BAF (British Armed Forces) member.
Although citizenship provisions in the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act were to
come into force as of July 2011, the newly elected coalition government did not opt to go
ahead with the scheme declaring its wish to reduce the number of immigrants from third
countries. The new Home Secretary launched to this end reform plans to bring in a type of
immigration quota.160 As of April 2012, following this move, a number of changes were
introduced to the Immigration Rules under the points-based system (tiers 1, 2, 4 and 5). In
effect, access to student visa regulations, for instance, became tighter than before.161
5.1.2.4 Citizenship and naturalisation policies
Third-country nationals’ access to British citizenship was until recent times far more liberal
than it is at present. As of the early 2000s, a broadly conservative frame of mind came to
introduce further restrictive changes to naturalisation, following the progressive rise of
immigrants and asylum-seekers.162 While a counter-immigration attitude during the
parliamentary discussions of the 2002 Nationality, Asylum and Immigration Law was largely
specific to the Conservative Party, the debates concerning the 2006 Immigration, Asylum and
160
While the Home Office sought to make fundamental changes to the student visa system after detecting
‘widespread abuse’ in the points-based system’s Tier 4, there were also intentions to curb non-EU rooted
economic migration by revising Tiers 1 and 2 as well as plans to reform the routes to family reunification.
161
For those applying for student visas or degree programmes in the UK, for instance, the required English
proficiency score went up from a minimum B1 intermediate level of English (according to the Common
European Framework of Reference for Languages, CEFR) to B2 upper intermediate level. To the coalition
government's compromise package, there would with such changes be reportedly more than 25% fall on the
number of foreign students coming to Britain each year (Travis, 2011).
162
As a matter of fact, such discourses were formerly part of the UK’s post-war immigration policy as well, most
notably under the Conservative Governments in the early 1970s.
133
Nationality and the 2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Laws indicated a surge of
anti-immigration rhetoric at a greater platform (UK Parliament, 2005a: c. 275; 2009b: c. 190,
193, 207; 2009e: 1172). In consequence, requirements in the naturalisation context became far
more demanding in a ‘firm-but-fair system’ (UK Parliament, 2009b, c. 174; 2009e, c. 11301131).
Given its long colonial/post-colonial relations with the Commonwealth countries, the UK has
often been quite diffident in developing “a free-standing citizenship policy” (Williams, 2010,
p. 10). Granting naturalisation today on the basis of marriage, registration of minor children
according to a parent’s nationality or residence permits given to refugees and highly skilled
TCN workers is from this perspective quite reasonable (Danzelman, 2009). More on that,
informed by a number of external factors such as the 2001 airliner attacks in the USA and the
2005 London bombings, the UK came to adopt a far stricter outlook to language and
integration regulations in recent times.
Current application of third-country nationals for citizenship in the UK starts by contacting
the UK Border Agency. The initial step involves showing in person provided the applicant has
completed 18 years of age (UK Border Agency, 2012). Eligibility for naturalisation requires
having a ‘sound mind’, ‘good character’, ‘lawful residence’ (of five years, in normal
circumstances, or three years in the case of being ‘married or in a civil partnership with a
British citizen’), adequate knowledge of English, Welsh or Scottish Gaelic as well as ‘life in
the UK’ and intention for a predominantly UK-based residence. Following the enquiry
procedure, which may possibly include the applicant’s interview by the police or any other
state official, the Home Office declares its final decision on the naturalisation process.
5.1.3 Greece
Table 18: Basic migration statistics
Net migration (2009)
27,000
TCN immigration (2008)
49,035
Largest third countries of origin (2008)
Albania, Ukraine, Georgia
Third-country nationals population (2009)
767,919
TCN as part of population (2009)
6.80%
Foreign-born as part of population (2009)
8.30%
Permits delivered for family (2009)
22,637
134
Permits delivered for work (2009)
16,383
Permits delivered for study (2009)
1,489
Permits delivered for humanitarian reasons (2009)
1,275
TCN employment rate (2009, change since 2006)
66.60%; -1.3%
National employment rate (2009, change since 2006)
61.20%; +0.2%
TCN unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006)
10.30%; +2.3%
National unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006)
9.50%; +0.6%
Nationality acquisitions (2008, change since 2004)
16,920; 15,024
Source: MIPEX III.
Immigration is not a long-established policy field in Greece. As the country was until recent
times rather a ‘sending’ one, the introduction of a comprehensive policy area on immigration
matters does not date back to more than a couple of decades ago. To the latest statistics, that
said, stocks of foreign population in Greece have been on the rise:
Table 19: Stocks of foreign population in Greece
of total
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
in thousands
356
437
473
533
553
570
643
734
840
810
757
in percentages
3.2
4.0
4.3
4.8
5.0
5.1
5.7
6.5
7.4
7.2
6.7
population
All thousands are rounded off to the nearest value.
Source: OECD (2011b).
Indeed, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, large numbers of immigrants from the Balkans as
well as some former Soviet states took to the destination of many politically and economically
well-off (mainly EU) countries, one of which was Greece. The Greek share from this mobility
was in rough terms some 630,000 people marking a gigantic rise from an estimate 167,000
foreign residents up to around 797,000 (Kasimis & Kassimi, 2004). Judging by around
10,250,000 Greek population in 1991 and 10,950,000 in 2001 (according to the 1991 and
2001 censuses, respectively), one can argue that the percentage of foreign nationals residing
in Greece amounted in time to just under 10 percent of the entire Greek population, 163 which
indeed marks the highest rise of immigration amongst the EU lands in this period
(Avramopoulou et al., 2005, p. 2). The results of the latest 2011 census revealed that the
population of Greece turned to 10,787,690, a figure marking about 1.6% fall in comparison to
that of 2001.164
163
According to the 2011 OECD Report on International Migration Trends, 57% of this entire immigrant profile
was constituted by Albanian citizens.
164
To the Hellenic Statistical Authority, the methodology followed during the 2011 census was in line with the
new EU regulation, to make a difference from the earlier ones for the first time. Counted here was the de facto
population, i.e. those with permanent residences and who are available during the census, rather than those who
135
In retrospect, the migrant flows to Greece were of a larger scale. Some 1.4 million people
from the Balkans/Turkey and about 350,000 others from mainly Turkey and Egypt came here
with the end of the Balkan Wars and in the period after the Second World War (Gropas &
Triandafyllidou, 2007, p. 141). For that, however, the unfavourable political and economic
conditions up to the 1980s urged a growing number of nationals to leave the country, most
notably for countries like the USA, the UK, Germany and Australia.
Current immigration profile in Greece is characterised mainly by low-skilled foreign workers,
who kept coming in big waves regardless of the overwhelming red-tape requirements. The
growth of Greek labour market demands was obviously a major reason behind these flows.
And it was for the main actors of economy here, who were chiefly small- and medium-sized
family businesses, common practice to search for cheap labour, albeit with some 40% loss
this would suggest for the GDP (Gropas & Triandafyllidou, 2005, pp. 11-12).
A further factor to consider in the entire Greek immigration context is the weak public
discourse. As “stakeholders and operators (such as migrants’ associations and specialised
NGOs) are left out of the dialogue about migration policies and legislation” (Avramopoulou
et al., 2005, p. 1), there is more elbow room for illegal entries here, for which the
geographical position serves ideal conditions (with some 6,000 big- and small-sized islands
and 16,000 km long maritime borders), making the country in this sense one of the front-line
gateways to the EU.165
As Greece was all but prepared for the growing inflows in recent times, attitudes towards
immigration turned increasingly negative. The issue from the perspective of an average Greek
citizen is today almost equivalent with unemployment or criminality (Zarafonitou, 2009). A
survey conducted in the early 2000s demonstrated that 69% of the nationals viewed
immigrants to be threatening for –or at least non-conforming to- the Greek way of life,
placing the country in this category on top of all Member States:
could be present at a particular location during the count. This statistical method ruled out automatically recently
arrived immigrants with no permanent legal residence in Greece. In any case, as the Hellenic Statistical
Authority has not released further details on immigration data, it would at this stage be premature to make
comments on the course of immigration.
165
To the Greek Police, most illegal immigrants come by way of Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria and Turkey.
136
Table 20: Greek citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life (in percentages)
Responses (options)
Greece
EU 15
Totally agree
35
16
Tend to agree
34
26
Tend to disagree
21
30
Totally disagree
7
18
Don’t know
3
10
Source: Special Eurobarometer Wave 60.1
Since this tendency was also illustrative of the political elite’s position, the official response
was for the most part search for ‘zero immigration’ policies, which indeed was firmly
embraced until the end of the 1990s. Legislative action throughout this period aimed as a
matter of course at measures such as “controlling external borders; restricting immigration of
third-country nationals of non-Greek ethnic origin; safeguarding internal security; and
fighting illegal immigration” by “granting full responsibility for managing the status and
rights of aliens to the Ministry of Public Order” (Mavrodi, 2007, p. 157). While there have
since then been signs of liberalisation, in compliance with the EU harmonisation goals in this
policy field, the extent of approximation has often remained limited with respect to the social,
political and economic conjuncture in the country.
5.1.3.1 Institutional structure
(The Hellenic Republic of) Greece is a parliamentary democracy where the executive power
is exercised by the elected government and the president at the highest official level. The
president’s duties are largely ceremonial, leaving political power primarily in the hands of the
prime minister. The legislative powers belong to the unicameral parliament, which from
1967-1974 was controlled by the military junta. The current constitution regulating the
political structure came into force in 1975, with the end of the junta period. The judiciary
system is made up of three Supreme Courts (the Council of State, the Court of Cassation and
the Court of Auditors), a number of administrative and civil courts (The Constitution of
Greece, 2001).
Politics of immigration as understood in conventional terms is to be secured by the judiciary
power without being subject to public leverage (Soysal, 1994). The competences of the courts
in the Greek case have however proved to be somewhat limited so far, when compared in
particular to those of the executive. The socialist Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)
and the conservative New Democracy (ND) as the mainstream political parties came to hold
137
deep-rooted powers, which became even more chronic following the junta constitution. It is
indeed this long-lasting legacy that came to be decisive for the appointment of judiciary posts
and recruitment of technocrats through political parties, not by means of civil service as in
many democracies elsewhere. A cursory look at the administrative arrangements throughout
the 1981-1989 and 1990-1992 periods reveals that many posts in the civil service structure
became occupied on the basis of party loyalty (Sotiropoulos, 1993).
While this system is reminiscent on one hand of a ‘cartel party’ model 166 in which the
authority of one-party prevails across the entire political spectrum (Katz & Mair, 1995), the
Greek system fits in fact hardly to such a pronouncement, owing to bitter competition ruling
party politics. Nevertheless, the prevailing party power over the post-dictatorship period
helped detour challenges/obstacles before government bills quite straightforwardly.
Regardless of the fact that a somewhat poor judicial configuration has left the executive rule
often unchecked, a prominent character of the political scene in Greece has been ‘client
politics’. This feature comes as a consequence of the political elite’s close affiliation with the
private sector which often led to various corruption practices such as tax evasion and labour
fraud (Inman, 2012).
With this nature of domestic politics in order, the course of Greek immigration policies has in
the general run of things introduced weak outcomes for the TCNs. Each time a government
attempted to initiate reforms, the chronic attributes of the party system struck back,
consolidating the already intermingled political class and business interests. In recent times,
however, this status-quo appeared to inflict serious losses. The two electoral contests in 2012
after five years of economic recession and political uncertainty brought about dormant
cleavages between for instance the rural and the urban, the old and the young and the tax
evaders and tax payers. The rising popular discontent with the recently announced austerity
measures reinvigorated the formerly marginal anti-bailout parties to attain high scores. In the
end, the traditional PASOK/New Democracy dominance appeared to be shattered by the
remarkable success of minor parties.167
166
The criteria for this model as offered by Pempel (1990) apply in particular to PASOK’s composition.
The major highlight of the May 2014 EP elections was SYRIZA, which as a coalition of the left-wing
fractions took advantage of the deep fissures in the resigning PASOK government. A similar success was valid
also for the Golden Dawn (of the right extremists) while the anti-European Communist Party (KKE) suffered big
electoral losses.
167
138
5.1.3.2 Actors involved in immigration management
According to Act 3386/2005, entry to Greek territory is subject to the authority of the
Ministry of Interior and its departments, most notably the Hellenic Police. All entries through
airports, sea ports and terrestrial checkpoints are coordinated primarily by the Ministries of
Interior, Foreign Affairs, National Defense, Justice, Economy, Transport and Mercantile
Marine.168 Conditions and procedures concerning all visas and entry clearances are
determined by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.169 While these are as a rule of thumb issued by
the Greek Consular Offices in the countries of residence, passport control officers at entry
gates are charged with similar duties.
Issuance of work permits/allowance for financial activities in Greece is subject to the
initiative of the Board of Labour Inspectors, which works under the Ministry of Employment
and Social Protection. Application for residence permits (concerning both issuance and
renewal) is made at the Prefectures/Municipalities of residence. Here, the administrative
authorities make an initial analysis of the concerning application and extend it to the
Foreigners and Immigration Service of the Regions,170 which has an option to invite the
applicant for an interview prior to that of the Immigration Committee. Following the
Immigration Committee’s decision, the Secretary General of the Region issues the residence
permit.
For asylum matters, the Presidential Decree 220/2007 defines the Hellenic Police as the
responsible authority for processing asylum applications. The police units assigned
specifically for this area are the Asylum Departments of the Aliens Police, the Security
Departments of the State Airports and the Security Divisions and Sub-divisions of the Police
Department. The main decision-maker for entitlement of asylum is the Director of the Aliens
Division. Following that as a second authority is the Recourse Committee working under the
Ministry of Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation. The Recourse Committee’s
decision is up to the confirmation of the Minister of Interior, Administration and
Decentralisation who may declare an accepted asylum application void, should the occasion
arise. A final authority accountable for the granting of asylum is the Council of State. The socalled Hospitality Centers reserved specifically for asylum-seekers work as part of the
168
To these ministries, one can also add the Ministry of Public Order, which was abolished between 2007 and
2009 to work under the Ministry of the Interior as a General Secretariat.
169
Act 3386/2005, Article 6 (7).
170
The state structure is divided further into Regions and Prefectures.
139
Ministry of Health and Social Solidarity. Added to that, the Greek Council for the Refugees
provides asylum-seekers and refugees with social services and consultation, to which the
Greek Ombudsman may additionally advise for legal support. Much in the same context, the
National Commission for Human Rights acts as a supervisory board to observe grey areas of
legislation in terms of human rights and international law.
Access to Greek citizenship starts by application at the residence community/municipality.
With an attachment of important supplementary documentation including proof of identity,
residence permit and criminal record, the concerning application is then forwarded to the
Prefecture, which depending on the result of the examination may involve an interview, as a
further step, to be taking place at the Ministry of Interior’s Naturalisation Committee.171 The
last and absolute decision-maker in the Greek citizenship process is the Minister of the
Interior.
In view of lack of social research constituting a big gap in the poor management of
immigration policies, the Greek state has for some time been funding and supervising a
number of institutes such as IMEPO (Migration Policy Institute) and EKKE (the National
Centre for Social Research), in quest of constructive/informative statistical data in this
context. While IMEPO initiates on that score comparative research amongst the EU Member
States as far as immigrants’ education, welfare and health levels or their participation at
labour markets are concerned, EKKE provides in-depth analyses on national contribution to
the European Social Survey by compiling research on legislation and stakeholders
(Avramopoulou et al., 2005, p. 13).
There are further than these a number of non-governmental national/international
organisations taking part in immigration management. The Recourse Committee for instance
informs the UNCHR about asylum cases. The UNCHR monitors here not only domestic
applications in relation to asylum-seekers and refugees but also organises seminars for Greek
institutions like the Police Authorities and provides financial support for the schools in this
scheme.
171
According to Act 3284/2004, the main requirements of Greek citizenship for a third-country national are
being an adult, having legal residence in Greece for 10 years (or for 5 years if the applicant holds an officially
recognised refugee status), not having a criminal record for more than one year and demonstrating adequate
knowledge of Greek language, culture and history.
140
5.1.3.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective
As previously indicated, large waves of immigration to Greece in the late 1980s were
illustrative of an untimely happening which caught the state officials unprepared. The first
comprehensive Greek law on immigration matters was formulated in 1991. With its title ‘on
the entry, exit, sojourn, employment, removal of aliens, procedure for the recognition of
refugees and other measures’, this new law (1975/1991) sought in the first place to facilitate
the removal of illegal entrants and stop economic immigration for the general purpose of
‘zero immigration policy’. While the law focused fundamentally on prevention and settlement
of undocumented immigration, it also aimed to align with the 1985 Schengen Treaty and the
1990 Dublin Convention (ratified in the same year as Law 1996/1991).
As the 1990s saw no major decline in the size and pace of illegal immigration, two
presidential decrees (358/1997 and 359/1997) were introduced to make way for a
regularisation programme.172 Upon weak success owing to state services’ organisational
problems in coping with the reception and examination of an increasing number of
applications –with almost 372,000 immigrants applying for the white card and 213,000 for the
green card (Gropas & Triandafillidou, 2005, p. 35)- the second regularisation programme was
presented in 2001 (in support of Law 2910/2001) aiming most notably at those excluded in
the first programme. With its supplementary theme of ‘naturalisation and other measures’, the
new law had a more liberal nature to cope with immigration issues in the long run. To this
end, it contained provisions on legal immigration areas such as family reunion, education and
employment, as well as conditions of asylum seeking, other than tightening border controls.
Following that, shortly, some 362,000 immigrants applied for legal residence (Gropas &
Triandafillidou, 2005, p. 36). As part of the same scheme, a three-year action plan (the Action
Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants) was introduced in the same year to take effect
for the 2002-2005 period. Measures taken in this connection were mostly relating to
immigrants’ access to labour markets and health services as well as xenophobic/racist
tendencies against them. Since these provisions were not fully implemented (Cholezas &
Tsakloglou, 2008), a supplementary act (Act 3202/2003) was launched upon consultations
with the NGOs, trade unions and the Greek Ombudsman, in the first place, to introduce a
series of amendments as of 2004.
172
Within the framework of this first regularisation programme, the so-called white card (officially known as
Temporary Residence Permit Card) and the green card, allowing a limited duration of residence, were
introduced.
141
With its fairly intricate administrative procedure regulating most notably the areas of
education and employment, the 2001 law is usually regarded as a turning point for the history
of immigration policies in Greece. It was indeed the first comprehensive migration law
initiated by the government on the basis of an action plan and backed up financially by the
European Commission and the European Social Fund. That said, failure to manage
particularly economic immigration and illegal entries soon gave rise to a new law (3386/2005)
updating the former legal provisions and incorporating the EU Directives 2003/109/EC
(relating to the status of long-term residents) and 2003/86/EC (concerning the right to family
reunification) into the domestic law. With Act 3386/2005, third-country nationals’ entry,
residence and social integration to the host society were further revised to introduce a number
of changes such as putting an end to separate work/residence permits and increasing
application costs from €150 up to €450 depending on the duration of stay.173
The 2005 Law regulated also conditions of financial investment in Greece. To Articles 24-27,
those investing a minimum amount of €300,000 in Greece would be granted an unlimited
residence permit or a limited one in the case of €60,000 investment for independent financial
activities. Added to that was the development in another important area, namely protection
against human trafficking, the details of which were presented in Articles 46-52. Moving on,
Articles 53-60 were covering the provisions on the right to family reunification and Articles
67-69 regulating the status of long-term residents in conformity with the EU Directives
2003/86/EC and 2003/109/EC. Accordingly, the main requirement for long-term residence
was the basic knowledge of the Greek history, language and culture.
The deportation procedure in Act 3386/2005 was defined in Article 76, while Article 84
banned undocumented foreign nationals from access to social security and public services,
with the exception of hospital services in emergency cases. Children of these non-nationals
were exempted from any form of legal status through Law 2910/2001. While Act 3386/2005
is today still in force, it has seen a number of amendments within the framework of Act
3536/2007. Article 18 of this latter act introduced a small-scale regularisation programme on
residence permits, modifying specifically conditions of renewal and waiver of application
charges for under-age children.
173
Following reactions by several NGOs, these costs became later inclusive of dependent family members.
142
For the regulation of asylum matters in particular, the legal origins date back again to Law
1975/1991, which following several revisions such as the Presidential Decree 83/1993 took a
final form and went into force in 1996 to accord domestic asylum policies with the 1990
Dublin Convention and the Community legislation. Following this move, a number of other
Presidential Decrees envisaged improvement of asylum matters, most importantly Presidential
Decree 189/1998, which sought to grant the right to employment for refugees and asylumseekers, Presidential Decree 61/1999 on the ‘Procedure of Recognition of a foreign refugee,
withdrawal of recognition and deportation, entry of family members and ways of cooperation
with the Representative of the UN High Commission for the refugees in Greece’, Presidential
Decree 220/2007 on the ‘Adaptation of the Hellenic Legislation to the provisions of Council
Directive 2003/9/EC, regarding the minimum requirements for the reception of asylumseekers in member states’, Presidential Decree 96/2008 on the ‘Adaptation of the Hellenic
Legislation to the provisions of the Council Directive 2004/83/ΕC for the establishment of
minimal requirements for the recognition and the status of nationals of third countries or
stateless as refugees or as persons that require international protection for other reasons’ and
Presidential Decree 90/2008 on the ‘Adaptation of the Greek Legislation to the provisions of
Council Directive 2005/85/EK with regard to the minimal specifications on the procedures
under which the member states grant and recall the status of refugee’ (European Migration
Network, 2008, pp. 15-16).
With the entry into force of the Dublin II Regulation in 2003, Greece became accountable for
processing asylum applications in the first country of entry into the EU. Bearing in mind that
it was for asylum-seekers already a major gateway to the EU174, the Dublin II prompted a big
rise of returned asylum-seekers in Greece. To reform the asylum system further, the Greek
Parliament passed in 2011 a new law changing the location of refugees’ first contact from the
police to civilian organisations and introducing a new appeals system. A first system of
reception and decentralised offices was drawn up in this framework depending on the
availability of financial resources.
In 2011, a further immigration law was passed in the Greek Parliament. Besides significant
reforms such as incorporation of the EU ‘Return Directive’ into the domestic legislation, the
174
Council Regulation No 343/2003.
143
new law introduced biometric residence permits to align with the EC Regulations 1030/2002
and 380/2008175 and replaced the Municipality Offices as the former places of application for
non-EEA national permits with ‘One-Stop’ local administration centers. For the
implementation of these provisions, the Greek Government cautioned that there might be
possible delays, particularly in view of the newly launched national austerity plans, which had
recently introduced a set of strict economic measures such as cutting down on government
staff.
5.1.3.4 Citizenship and naturalisation laws in Greece
For most of the Greek nation-building history, most importantly as of the independence
movements from the Ottoman Empire in the first half of the 19th century, the nationality laws
and policies largely followed ethnocentric lines. Granting citizenship rights since then almost
exclusively to those with an ethnic descent, “the development of Greek institutions and legal
norms has systematically privileged the interests of national unity often at the expense of the
rights of individuals and minorities” (Anagnostou, 2011, p. 1). This frame of mind on the
basis of a homogeneous nation-state was sustained in the post-WW II period during attempts
to reinforce external borders and form new democratic institutions. Allocation of citizenship
rights according to parental descent for instance continued up to the collapse of the junta
regime in 1974, which despite large-scale political moves to restore democracy introduced no
major changes as far as restrictions on minority rights were concerned (Howard, 2006). While
there were reform packages concerning nationality laws and policies in the meantime (which
apparently challenged the formerly restrictive policies), the main objectives these were
seeking concerned ‘re-ethnicisation’ schemes, questing for mainly homogenes (those with
Greek origins) but not allogenes (non-ethnic Greeks) of any kind, be they newly immigrated
TCNs or minorities with long residential past in Greece. The state authorities aimed to lower
in contrast the rising number of naturalisation applications in recent times, by way of for
instance imposing application fees or lengthier residence requirements (Christopoulos, 2010).
Since the 1990s, however, the Greek governments initiated a series of reforms abolishing first
Article 19 of the Greek Nationality Code (as the major source of discrimination for TCNs’
naturalisation until then), which eventually paved the way for a new legal arrangement in
2010 bringing forward far less restrictive policies in this context. With this new Law
175
Those applying for residence permits with six years of age and above became now liable to submission of
digital photographs and fingerprints.
144
3838/2010, the TCNs’ acquisition of citizenship on the basis of residence (jus domicili) and
birth in Greece (jus soli) was granted for the first time in the history of Greek immigration. As
a matter of fact, the roots of this reformation process can be traced to the 2001 Immigration
Law and the 2004 Greek Nationality Code. Following the completion of an initial
regularisation programme launched in 1997, the Law 2910/2001 law was the first concise
immigration law to attach great importance to legal immigration (by proclaiming proper
routes of entry for employment and family reunification) with its new regularisation
programme (which particularly aimed at those excluded from the earlier programme). The
government change bringing the Conservatives to the power in 2004 was conducive to the
formulation of a new citizenship law, namely the Greek Nationality Code. As a follow-up to
the former PASOK-iniated reform process, the ND Government introduced stateless persons
acquisition of citizenship on the condition of birth to a Greek parent or birth in Greece. That
said, access to naturalisation was for foreign nationals largely curbed, due to the long
bureaucratic procedure required for entitlement, irrespective of their ownership of legal
residence in the country.
With the arrival of PASOK to power in the following term, a new citizenship law was passed.
This Law 3838/2010 (of the ‘Contemporary provisions for Greek Citizenship and the political
participation of coethnics and legally residing immigrants’) put an end to the historical
allogenes-homogenes distinction. Introducing the maiden use of the jus soli principle, the new
law provided naturalisation and citizenship acquisition for all TCN immigrants. Accordingly,
a Greek-born child of at least one non-Greek parent with a five-year long residence permit
could enjoy citizenship at birth. Acquisition of citizenship applied therewith also to TCNs’
children with minimum six grades of school attendance. Further, a seven-year (and
uninterrupted) legal residence would now be the lowest benchmark for naturalisation
application.
While the former law’s vague requirement under ‘the moral quality and personality’ of the
citizenship applicant was with Law 3838/2010 abolished, the new law put in place integration
tests, with the specific aim to measure qualification for citizenhip on the basis of a groundlevel knowledge of Greek history and civilization, involvement in economic activity,
familiarity with the domestic political institutions and participation in the organisational and
political system as other Greek citizens (Law 3838/2010, Article 5A). Apart from this new
regulation, which in fact was already in use in many other EU Member States, the formerly
145
declared naturalisation precondition of the EU long-term resident status became with the new
law subject to certification of adequate Greek language and history, but not necessarily by
way of attendance to state-run courses like in some Member States.176 A yet another gain nonnationals made with the new law concerned political participation. Despite several
prerequisites demanded to that end, such as holding a long-term residence permit and
minimum five-year stay in the country, foreign nationals were now granted local voting rights
in Greece (OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2012).
Recently, nonetheless, the highest administrative court in Greece, i.e. the Council of the State
(CoS), ruled that the newly introduced jus soli principle as well as the right to vote TCNs
acquired for local elections were contravening the Greek Constitution. The ground for
violation according to the CoS was that a naturalised third-country national would never be
able to embody a strong attachment with the Greek nation, nor ‘Greek consciousness’ in its
proper sense (Anagnostou, 2011, p. 28).
5.1.4 Italy
Table 21: Basic migration statistics
Net migration (2009):
318,000
TCN immigration (2008):
283,687
Largest third countries of origin (2008):
Albania, Morocco, China
TCN population (2009):
2,759,528
TCN as part of population (2009):
4.60%
Foreign born as part of population (2009):
6.50%
Permits delivered for family (2009):
75,153
Permits delivered for work (2009):
106,134
Permits delivered for study (2009):
10,011
Permits delivered for humanitarian reasons (2009):
1,431
TCN employment rate (2009, change since 2006):
61.80%; -3.9%
National employment rate (2009, change since 2006):
57.50%; -0.9%
TCN unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006):
37.30%; +1.8%
National unemployment rate (2009, change since 2006):
7.80%; +1%
Nationality acquisitions (2008, change since 2004):
53,700; 41,766
Source: MIPEX III.
176
Initially, proof of adequate Greek knowledge did not comprise certificates from higher educational
institutions like universities or state departments but was limited exclusively to accredited high-schools or
special courses coordinated by the state.
146
Similar to the Greek case, the history of mass immigration in Italy is not so long. A notable
expansion of immigrant size dates back here only to the end of the 1970s. This rise reached in
recent times to all-time highs, making the country a yet another immigration hub in the entire
European Union.
From Resurgimento (the Italian unification) in 1861 to the 1970s, more than 26 million
Italians lefts for the Americas, Australia and other European countries, with some two fifths
of the outflow stemming from the southern regions of the country (Del Boca & Venturini,
2003, p. 1). The chief reason behind this massive emigration was the countrywide poor
economic conditions at the time. There were until the second quarter of the post-WW II
period hardly any inflows. With the improvement of domestic economic conditions
(particularly in the northern regions) and as a consequence of the above-mentioned lands’
closure of borders following the oil crisis in the 1970s, the route of migration from the Third
World to Europe was diverted considerably to the south. What made Italy here additionally
attractive was its relatively weak colonial connections -when compared for instance to the
UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and France- which made somewhat better public image in the
Third World (Veikou & Triandafyllidou, 2000). In any case, for one reason or another, Italy
was soon a back door to many northern European lands turning from a sending country to one
of the biggest receiving EU Member States at present (Calavita, 2004).
The early inflows to Italy were characterised essentially by Eastern European, Latin
American, Asian, Middle Eastern and North African migrants and asylum-seekers most of
whom were escaping severe economic and political conditions in their countries of origin.
Following this first wave, the 1980s saw the rise of undocumented migrants coming often
illegally as “fishermen, carpenters, street-vendors or on the tomato harvest; women from
Eritrea, Somalia and the Philippines; and Chinese entrepreneurs running restaurants or cottage
industries and employing fellow-nationals of both sexes” (Zincone & Caponio, 2006, p. 2).
The large extent of this undocumented flow, as confirmed officially by the 1981 census, was
for modern Italy quite a new phenomenon. There was now a strong demand of informal
labour in the newly flourishing urban areas, in particular, the industrial north. Two main
structural characteristics accounted for flows to these places: the “large underground economy
and a rigid segmentation of the labour market” (Veikou & Triandafyllidou, 2000, p. 4).
147
Despite recurrences of economic crisis which as a matter of course led to a significant decline
in annual quotas, immigration to Italy is today still at high levels. To current OECD statistics
(2012), waves of newcomers specifically from Eastern Europe (as a consequence of the Iron
Curtain’s collapse) and the Southern Mediterranean space (of North African countries led
particularly by Libya) have pushed stocks of foreign nationals to some 5 million in recent
times, amounting steadily to 8% of the entire Italian population.
Table 22: Stocks of foreign population in Italy
of total
2001
2002
2003
2004
population
in thousands
in percentages
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
1,448
1,549
1,990
2,402
2,671
2,939
3,433
3,891
4,235
4,570
4,826
2.5
2.7
3.5
4.2
4.6
5.0
5.8
6.6
7.1
7.6
8.0
All thousands are rounded off to the nearest value.
Source: OECD (2011b).
An inevitable consequence of these soaring figures was the negative image of immigrants in
the country. Surveys seeing into recent senses of belonging/citizenship deliver that almost half
of the Italians (48%) do not view immigrants to be contributing to their country significantly
(Special Eurobarometer 60.1, 2004). Accordingly, those seeing them as a threat to their way
of life constitute 38% of the population:
Table 23: Italian citizens regarding immigrants as a threat to their way of life (in percentages)
Responses (options)
Italy
EU 15
Totally agree
11
16
Tend to agree
27
26
Tend to disagree
30
30
Totally disagree
24
18
Don’t know
8
10
Source: Special Eurobarometer Wave 60.1
With multiple factors lying behind such perceptions, from cultural to economic concerns in a
wider global context, particularly in the last two decades, these figures are indeed important to
understand the default position of public opinion in present-day Italy, which apparently has a
largely anti-immigrant character.
5.1.4.1 Institutional structure
Modern day (Republic of) Italy is a parliamentary democracy. The executive power belongs
to the government elected for five years under the rule of the Prime Minister, known also as
148
the President of the Council of the Ministers. The current multi-party composition came into
being when the fascist rule ended in the early post-WWII period. The two main parties in this
structure have so far been Partito della Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democratic Party)
and Partito Comunista Italiano (Italian Communist Party) ahead of several small but
influential parties, such as the neo-fascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (Italian Social
Movement) and the leftist Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party).
All these parties have in fact seen a series of nominal/structural changes since the end of the
Cold War. Following prosecutions concerning corruption of several party members, the
Christian Democratic Party was replaced by Partito Popolare Italiano (Italian Popular Party),
while a number of new parties such as Forza Italia alliance, Lega Nord (the Northern
League),177 as a federalist movement in the north, and Alleanza Nazionale (the National
Alliance), being a successor of the neofascist Italian Social Movement, rose to dominate the
right and centre-right of the Italian political party system. The Partito Comunista Italiano
(PCI) became in this same period Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Democratic Party of the
Left), which turned later into Democratici di Sinistra (Democrats of the Left). With recent
developments, the center-weight political scene became populated by many small parties.
Following short-lived alliances like the House of Freedoms on the right wing and the leftist
Ulivo (Olive Tree), Partito Democratico (the Democratic Party) came to the scene as a new
centre-left party, after the Christian Democratic Party joined Margherita, as another centrist
party. This urged Forza Italia to merge with Alleanza Nazionale for a new formation under
Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom). The centre-right alliance collapsed in 2010 when
Alleanza Nazionale turned into Futuro e libertà per l’Italia as yet another centre-right party.
The legislative power in Italy is exercised through a bicameral system. Accordingly, the 945
elected members (parlamentari) of the Parliament (Parlamento Italiano) are distributed
between two houses, 315 for the Senate (Senato della Repubblica) and 630 for the Chamber
of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati). While these two chambers work for a maximum five
years and all bills are subject to their approval before turning into laws, the President of the
177
This was formerly a separatist party aspiring for an independent northern Italy, the so-called Padania. In time,
however, it converted its ‘anti-southern’ programme into an ‘anti-immigration’ agenda.
149
former has privileges to act as the Head of State when there is need for a new President of the
Republic.178 The Senate is thus regarded traditionally as the upper house of the legislature.
The higher layer of the judicial power is constituted by the Supreme Law Council and the
Constitutional Court. These two legal authorities observe, as vested by the Constitution of the
Italian Republic, legitimacy of the government rule and mediate independently across the
State’s power distribution. The main parts of the Constitution are Articles 1 to 12 introducing
Principi Fondamentali (Fundamental Principles), Diritti e Doveri dei Cittadini (Rights and
Duties of Citizens) as defined by Articles 13 to 54 and Ordinamento della Repubblica
(Organisation of the Republic) by Articles 55–139 which are ultimately appended by a
number of Disposizioni transitorie e finali (Transitory and Final Provisions). Besides its
significance in marking the end of the fascist rule in the post-war era, the Constitution has
today a conciliatory role to maintain a careful balance between the three main ideologies of
party politics in Italy (known also as the ‘constitutional compromise’): the Roman Catholicrooted democratic solidarity, appreciation of socialist and/or communist principles to a certain
extent and finally a liberal interpretation of the Italian society and politics (Smyth, 1948).
5.1.4.2 Actors involved in immigration management
The organisation of asylum and migration policies in Italy is managed at the ministry level
essentially by the Ministry of Interior (Ministero Dell’Interno). The duties of the ministry
cover a wide range from citizenship issues, entry, residence and integration of newcomers to
irregular immigration. This broad authority was reduced recently, with the formation of a
technical government in late 2011, when Ministry for International Cooperation and
Integration was established to be in charge of migration and integration matters only. The job
division between the two ministries is defined by the Central Directorate for Immigration and
Asylum Policies, which assigns the main tasks upon a Coordinating and Monitoring
Committee and a special Technical Working Group. Coordination at the sub-national level, as
far as integration policies are concerned, is administered by way of the Territorial Councils
for Immigration, consisting of representatives from all political parties at the local level
(Cesarini et al., 2011, p. 5).
178
Apart from his/her chief roles such as appointing the Prime Minister and judges for the Corte Costituzionale
della Repubblica Italiana (Constitutional Court) as well as presiding over Consiglio Superiore della
Magistratura (the Supreme Law Council), the President of the Republic has a symbolic meaning to represent
national unity since the Resurgimento, the unification of city states in 1876.
150
The main departments of the Ministry of Interior are the Department for Civil Liberties and
Immigration and the Department of Public Security. The Department for Civil Liberties and
Immigration is structured around a number of sub-units such as Central Directorate for Civil
Rights, Citizenship and Minorities, Central Directorate for Immigration and Asylum Policy
and Central Directorate for Assistance to Immigrants and Asylum-seekers. Each of these
directorates is accountable for coordinating and monitoring the acts of the Territorial Councils
within the Prefectures and the management of irregular migration and asylum-seeking. The
main functions of the Department of Public Security include on the other hand controlling
external borders via National Police offices, i.e. the Questure, at the provincial level as well as
issuing/extending residence permits through the Single Desk for Immigration, which works as
the office of liaison for the Department. The Italian National Police, Polizia di Stato, serves
also under the Department of Public Security to deal with matters relating to foreigners, most
notably on issues concerning return procedures in the case of lack of legal status.
Serving at the ministry level for management of immigration and asylum (other than the
Ministry of Interior) are also Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and
Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale (Ministry of Labour and Social Security).
While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributes in this framework mainly by issuing visas
to non-EU citizens through its Diplomatic Missions abroad, the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security is in charge of identifying needs for foreign manpower and developing policies to
cover the social welfare interests of immigrants.
At the implementation level on the other hand are the Prefettura (the Prefectures) which
principally seek through the Territorial Councils to deal with legal aliens’ social cohesion by
for instance coordinating initiatives formulated in the Provinces. A supplementary role within
the prefectures is provided by the Single Desks which essentially observe the formality
procedures non-EU citizens need to follow, such as their residence permits, entrance to the
labour markets and family reunification. The main state institutions to consult in this context
are the Local Police Headquarters which are in charge of issuing and renewing residence
permits in the first place. For patrolling services, it is since 2002 the Central Directorate for
Immigration and Border Police which has a superlative authority. The main area of
responsibility is about guarding activities here. Working in coordination with the Italian
Navy, police forces, Carabinieri (national military office) and harbour offices, the Directorate
develops and adopts all relevant measures/initiatives to counter illegal immigration.
151
Besides stakeholders at the state level, there are a number of social partners that aim to protect
the rights of immigrant workers in Italy. These include a broad range from trade unions and
employers’ associations such as Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian
General Confederation of Labour), as the biggest trade union, Confederazione Italiana
Sindacati Lavoratori (Italian Confederation of Trade Unions and Unione Italiana del Lavoro
(the Italian Labour Union), Confindustria (Italian Employers’ Federation) to immigrant
associations like Associazione Nazionale Oltre Le Frontiere
(The National Association
Beyond Borders), as well as religious institutions, the most important of which are the
Catholic Church, entrusted by the Vatican’s Pontifical Council (‘for the Pastoral Care of
Migrants and Itinerant People’) to meet immigrants’ spiritual needs, Caritas Italiana,
dedicated to helping immigrants integrate in the Italian society, and Fondazione Migrantes,
which provides pastoral care not only to third-country nationals in Italy but also Italians
abroad (Jonjic & Mavrodi, 2012).
5.1.4.3 National immigration laws and policies in historical perspective
Despite the fact that Italy has often performed ahead of many other Southern European EU
members in making legal arrangements for immigration purposes, it was only in 1986 the first
nation-wide law was here introduced to that effect. The relevant provisions were up to that
moment restricted largely to foreign citizens’ legal stay in the country. To be fair, this narrow
coverage was based on the far-reaching perception of immigrants, who were almost always
associated with working illegally (Zincone & Caponio, 2006). With the enactment of Law
943/1986, conditions for entrance, admission and residence of foreigners into Italy were
regulated not only to meet interior security needs but also to provide equal rights for
newcomers vis-à-vis Italian citizens. Given its deficits mainly in the legalisation of
immigrants (in particular refugees), this early legal arrangement was replaced later with Law
39/1990. The new law, also known as the Legge Martelli Law, came to be the first act to
introduce visa requirements for many of the sending countries, to reform deportation
procedures and to impose sanctions for those staying illegally and/or engaged in immigrant
smuggling/trafficking. What’s more, with Law 39/1990, asylum-seeking procedure saw a
certain measure of revision for the first time to ease applications made by those from non-EU
countries (Sopemi, 1991).
152
The current legislation governing immigration matters in Italy is based on two chief legal
texts: Law 40/1998 (‘Turco-Napolitano Law’) and Law 189/2002 (‘Bossi-Fini Law’). In fact,
both laws came as a response to the political developments at the time, most notably in
relation with developments across the former Republic of Yugoslavia, Albania and Somalia.
The civil wars in these lands provoked a series of big-scale illegal immigration and asylumseeking flows destined for Italy, as a result of which it became urgent to revise domestic
legislation concerning immigration.179
In view of increasing illegal entry rates, the 1998 Turco-Napolitano Act was designed to take
new measures the most important of which was probably establishment of detention centres.
While the new law was committed to the improvement of conditions enjoyed by TCNs in
Italy, such as easing conditions for working permits at the labour markets, it introduced a host
of new quotas (through the introduction of the Decreto flussi, as a law decree brought in use
to fix the number of newcomers coming by way of legal channels). These provisions were
changed with the Bossi-Fini Act, which as a formulation of the centre-right coalition
government took deeper consideration of security concerns. In effect, new policy tools like
limiting legal entries and applying non-flexible procedures for residence permits were
developed to combat undocumented entries in a more effective way. Further, with Law
189/2002, temporary detention of irregular immigrants was extended to maximum 60 days.
Meanwhile, a ‘sea landings-decree’ brought further authorisation to the Italian Navy for use in
maritime traffic, in case of clandestine attempts in open sea (Rusconi, 2010). The Bossi-Fini
Act did not modify social/family rights; however, it was alongside these amendments the
largest extent of regularisation was managed on this matter in the recent history of European
immigration history.180
There have more recently been additional legislative rearrangements in this framework. With
the so-called ‘Security Package’ including Law 125/2008 and Law 94/2009, a series of
changes were made on irregular immigrants’ detention and imprisonment, return of aliens,
fees for citizenship application (of €200) and residence permits (€80-€200 during first issues
and renewals) as well as a new host of family reunification regulations which became stricter
in nature. Added to that, the ‘Integration Agreement’ in 2010 introduced two-year ‘points179
Indeed, being a signatory of the Schengen criteria as of the mid-1980s, Italy was already required to practise
frequent border controls against uncontrolled immigration (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009).
180
During the right-wing government in this period, more than 600,000 people became subject to this process
(Rusconi, 2010).
153
based’ stay applicable to foreigners (exclusively adults) in the context of residence permits.
This arrangement brought in also compulsory language tests for the acquisition of long-term
residence permits. What’s more, with the second security package launched in 2010,
municipalities became authorised to monitor renewal of residence-permits. When provisions
concerning the EU Directives 2004/38/EC and 2008/115/EC were in 2011 finally completed,
a number of new provisions became applicable to financial resources, detention measures and
return of EU citizens. And finally, on matters relating to highly qualified workers and
employers hiring illegally staying TCNs, two more Council Directives were transposed in
2012 (2009/50/EC and 2009/52/EC).
5.1.4.4 Citizenship and naturalisation policies in Italy
More than half of some 40,000 recent applications for Italian citizenship were based on
residential status, followed closely by cases concerning family reunion (Jonjic & Mavrodi,
2012, p. 101). Although the number of entries yielding naturalisation increased slightly in the
last years, Italy ranked here lower than the EU average, due to the high rate of unfulfilled
applications (European Migration Network, 2012b, p. 30). Indeed, a cursory look into the
Italian law reveals that eligibility criteria in the context of citizenship are more restrictive than
they are in many immigration countries across the EU. Current provisions are for the most
part extensions of the 1992 Citizenship Act, Law 91/1992 (and regulations DPR 572/1993 and
DPR 362/1994), with most of them grounded upon the principle of jus sanguinis. There is
however room for jus soli as well, regulating the status of persons with birth on Italian soil
“whose parents are unknown, Stateless or cannot pass on their citizenship to their child
according to the laws of the State of which they are citizen” as well as “of unknown parentage
found on Italian soil and whose natural citizenship is impossible to ascertain” (Ministero degli
Affari Esteri, 2012). Three main applicant profiles stand out here: persons who have lost their
citizenship and wish to reinstate it due to birth in Italy, those claiming citizenship as
descendants of Italian citizens and foreign citizens applying for Italian citizenship.181
181
Recently, in 2011, President Giorgio Napolitano started a debate by arguing that the relevant legal order in
force was in need of revision, considering particularly the aging population in the country as well as the rise of
immigrant children in recent times, who without citizenship rights appeared to experience serious challenges in
their school life. A first area of debate following this argumentation was whether or not the principle of jus
sanguinis should be switched entirely to jus soli. While the then Minister of Interior was in favour of the former,
on the condition that a certain period of residence would be required of TCN parents, the Minister for
International Cooperation and Integration came up with a proposal arguing for jus culturae, which would expand
the eligibility criteria for citizenship also to minors provided they would study in Italy (European Migration
Network, 2012b).
154
The basic requirement for automatic acquisition is the history of parentage in Italy (providing
there are no stories of renouncement involved in the background). For acquisition by claim,
official documentation is a prerequisite. Accordingly, “foreign or Stateless descendents (up to
the second degree) of Italian citizens can claim citizenship” as long as they could provide the
state department with a valid “birth certificate; certificate of Italian citizenship of mother or
father or a direct ancestor up to the second degree; certificate of residence, where requested”.
This rule does however not dismiss those without Italian descent. The primary document
demanded from claimants born on Italian soil is “continuous legal residence in Italy up to
legal age, and upon declaration of their desire to do so” (Ministero degli Affari Esteri, 2012).
For naturalisation, knowledge of the Italian language and culture is a must.
Third-country nationals are granted naturalisation rights on the condition that they have here a
minimum ten-year-long legal and continuous residence. Access to citizenship is for refugees,
stateless persons and those with co-ethnic backgrounds (for instance ethnic Italians from the
former Yugoslavian Republic) much easier. To Article 9 of the 1992 Citizenship Act,
refugees and stateless persons need to fulfill five years of continuous stay (it is for non-EU
citizens ten years and for other EU citizens four years), while minimum period for
naturalisation in the case of TCNs with Italian backgrounds is three years, with the exception
of a must-have two years from minors (Zincone & Basili, 2013, p. 6).
Although Il Popolo della Liberta and Partito Democratico tended to cooperate as the two
major political parties to reduce TCNs’ minimum period from ten to five years in recent
times, the entire process ended up with a new set of restrictive amendments. With the 2009
Security Act, most importantly, TCNs marrying Italian citizens became subject to the
requirement to possess two years of legal residence at least (which formerly was six months).
Article 1 of Law 94/09 introduced additionally a payment of €200 fee to apply for citizenship.
5.2 Data on MIPEX182
Managed currently by the British Council and the Migration Policy Group 183 and co-financed
by the European Commission under the scheme of European Fund for Third-country
182
The core source of reference used here was MIPEX’s interactive website (www.mipex.eu).
Migration Policy Group is a Brussels-based think-tank which initiates research on migration related issues
including equality, discrimination and integration.
183
155
Nationals, the MIPEX was first launched in 2004 as the European Civic Citizenship and
Inclusion Index to measure the then EU-15 governments’ commitments to their immigration
agenda comparatively. The ensuing MIPEX II was released in 2007 to add up policies
concerning immigrants in the ten new EU Member States, as well as Canada, Norway and
Switzerland. The third in the series, MIPEX III, was concluded in 2011 to bring Japan and
Australia as the new countries in focus. With its final form, MIPEX III drew on a wide array
of contributions from 37 NGOs, universities, research institutes, think-tanks and more than
150 national experts in 31 countries across Europe and North America in seven main areas:
labour markets, family reunion, education, political participation, long-term residence, access
to nationality and anti-discrimination.
To explore into immigrant matters, the MIPEX project uses policy indicators checking into
the highest standards as pointed out by relevant EU legal texts and Council of Europe
Conventions. Added to these are EU-wide policy recommendations in cases where a country’s
performance remains at minimum standards. Policy indicators are formulated as questions
targeting a particular component of one of the seven intended policy areas. 184 Legal and
policy materials informing these questions are entirely official. They are compiled by the
Migration Policy Group to give the final form of the index.
Answers to policy indicators are obtained out of three options. The highest standards of equal
rights, duties and opportunities concerning TCNs are scored with 3 points, while 2 marks
policies that are not mature yet, and 1 standing for default value to demonstrate gaps/deficits
in national policies vis-à-vis EU legal texts. These scores receive an average value for each of
the seven main areas of integration, representing the ‘dimension score’. The dimension scores
are then averaged together to identify the overall score for a country. To make a thorough
comparison here, the 1-2-3 scale used in the beginning is later calculated over the 0-50-100
scale, according to which 100% marks the highest score.
5.2.1 Germany
5.2.1.1 Labour markets
With its sixth post on the MIPEX III list, Germany is regarded as a ‘slightly favourable’
country when its labour market policies are viewed from the perspective of the third-country
184
A full list of these indicators is available in Appendix II, as part of MIPEX III.
156
nationals. Non-EU workers enjoy here a limited degree of equal access and rights. Following
the 2007 EU-Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz, which quested for more participation in society,
the CDU, CSU and FDP coalition government decided to reduce labour shortages for whitecollar positions such as doctors, scientists or engineers by way of qualified immigration from
abroad. It seems, however, this move has so far proved less fruitful than intended. While local
governments set their sights on an efficient public sector and try to include more TCNs, the
basic procedures required for TCNs’ employment have been meeting bureaucratic hurdles
between Länder and professional organisations. In effect, a significant portion of the
newcomers are today employed below their genuine levels of qualification. What’s more,
apart from cases of ‘urgent official needs’, they almost never have access to the public sector.
Table 24: Conditions for TCNs at German labour markets
Access
Immediate access to employment
50
Access to private sector
100
Access to public sector
50
Immediate access to self-employment
50
Access to self-employment
100
Access to general support
Access to public employment services
100
Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants
0
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU
50
Targeted support
State facilitation of recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU
50
Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market
100
Additional measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market
100
Support to access public employment services
100
Workers' rights
Membership of and participation in trade unions associations and work-related negotiation bodies
100
Equal access to social security
100
Equal working conditions
100
Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or regional in federal states)
100
Germany average
77
EU average
57
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.1.2 Family reunion
TCN families residing in the EU are in ideal conditions subject to the same rights and
responsibilities as families from Member States. In Germany, which ranks 17th on MIPEX,
newcomers may upon arrival make applications for family reunification through a free and
157
brief procedure, to cover additionally their parents/grandparents, on condition that these are in
need of family care. Unless they are fraudulent and/or threatening for the country’s security,
these applications cannot be declined. For examinations required under the scheme of longterm residence, Germany joins old immigration countries like the Netherlands, Denmark and
France, which all demand language (and culture) tests from TCN spouses in their countries of
origin. These tests are in the German case not free of charge. The length of time as required
from the person applying for family union (sponsor) is changeable, depending on the degree
of his/her affinity to the beneficiary. Refusal/withdrawal requires consent of both sides,
leaving room for appeal.
Table 25: TCNs’ family reunion conditions in Germany
Eligibility
Family reunion eligibility conditions (average)
50
Eligibility conditions for partners other than spouses (average)
75
Eligibility for minor children
50
Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line
50
Eligibility for dependent adult children
50
Conditions for acquisition of status
Pre departure integration conditions (average)
57
Upon arrival integration conditions (average)
32
Accommodation requirement
50
Economic resources requirement
50
Maximum length of application procedure
100
Costs of application and/or issue of permit or renewal
50
Security of status
Duration of validity of permit
50
Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status
0
Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law)
100
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal
100
Rights associated with status
Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority
50
Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional
violence
50
Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor
0
Access to education and training for adult family members
100
Access to employment and self-employment
100
Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing
100
Germany average
60
EU average
60
Based on MIPEX III.
158
5.2.1.3 Educational standards
The educational standards third-country nationals enjoy in Germany rank 17th on MIPEX,
particularly in view of the pupils/students with migration backgrounds who are not entirely
integrated with the multilayer school system here. While this might also have to do with own
migration experiences, there are obvious patterns indicating that most projects intended to
encourage access to schools are reliant upon the financial resources and political will, which
are restricted to a certain number of schools or a particular stage in educational career.
Pupils/students may enrol at the Länder level in all types/tracks of schools, yet a mechanism
allowing for healthy placement (to assess learning experiences of a pupil/student before
arrival to Germany) is still missing. Additionally, while pupils of TCN origin can enjoy
support and funding for being socially disadvantaged, equal opportunities do not apply to all
cases, given that only five Länder provide them with legal service regardless of whether or
not their parents are ‘undocumented’. Schools can obtain rich resources of performance data,
thanks to for instance periodically arranged panels on national education. What’s more,
immigrant languages are taught both in and outside classroom, with curricula fostering
‘diversity’, though rather incompletely as these do not cover all immigrant cultures.
Regardless of several language assessment tools such as those provided by ‘FörMig’, there
are no official standards regarding language learning and/or teacher training, nor are there
state-sponsored programmes targeting intercultural education. A recent development in this
context demonstrates all the same a rising interest in many Länder as to encouragement of
TCNs for study in educational sciences and/or become teachers.
Table 26: Educational standards for TCNs in Germany
Access
Access and support to access pre-primary education
50
Access to compulsory-age education
50
The assessment in compulsory education of migrants' prior learning and language qualifications and learning
obtained abroad
0
Support to access secondary education
50
Access and support to access and participate in vocational training
50
Access and support to access and participate in higher education
50
Access to advice and guidance on system and choices at all levels of compulsory and non-compulsory education
50
Targeting needs
Requirement for provision in schools of intensive induction programmes for newcomer pupils and their families
about the country and its education system
0
Provision of continuous and ongoing education support in language(s) of instruction for migrant pupils (average)
50
Policy on pupil monitoring targets migrants
100
Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups
0
Teacher training and professional development programmes include courses that address migrant pupils' learning
needs, teachers' expectations of migrant pupils and specific teaching strategies to adress this
0
159
New opportunities
Provision of option to learn immigrant languages (average)
100
Provision of option to learn immigrant cultures (average)
0
Measures to promote social integration through school (average)
50
Measures to support migrant parents and communities in the education of their children
50
Intercultural education for all
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity in school curriculum
State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout
society
Possibility to modify school curricula and teaching materials to reflect changes in diversity of the school
population
50
50
0
Adaptability of daily life at school based on cultural or religious needs to avoid exclusion of pupils
50
Measures to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce
100
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity for all in teacher training and
professional development programmes
50
Germany average
43
EU average
39
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.1.4 Political participation
Ranking eighth on the MIPEX scale and considered ‘slightly favourable’ as far as
immigrants’ political participation are concerned, Germany provides its TCNs with certain
privileges, such as freedom to join political parties (even if some of these may deny internal
positions to non-nationals) and civil society organisations. Such services do not cover the
basic rights given to nationals, like for instance voting (the revision of which requires a
constitutional change but has so far been out of sight). Integration into the political system is
to a certain extent encouraged by the Länder and municipalities so that TCNs could elect their
own groups. At the national level, however, such representatives are appointed by national
governments, which may provide funding in return for cooperation/consultation.
Table 27: TCNs’ political participation in Germany
Electoral rights
Right to vote in national elections
0
Right to vote in regional elections
0
Right to vote in local elections
0
Right to stand for elections at local level
0
Political liberties
Right to association
100
Membership of and participation to political parties
100
Right to create media
100
Consultative bodies
Implication of foreign residents at national level (average)
30
Implication of foreign residents at regional level (average)
80
160
Implication of foreign residents at capital city level (average)
80
Implication of foreign residents on local city level (average)
80
Implementation policies
Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states)
50
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level
100
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on regional level
100
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on local level in capital city
100
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level in city
100
Germany average
64
EU average
44
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.1.5 Long-term residence
As a major component of its integration policies, long-term residence is a fairly demanding
procedure in Germany. To the 31-country MIPEX list, the current situation here deserves the
24th place. Relevant conditions are almost comparable to those concerning full citizenship, as
seemingly no other country stipulates as many requirements as Germany does for long-term
residence. While many EU countries demand in this context basic documents such as legal
incomes or language knowledge, the related process in the German case starts with a
comprehensive integration test. For tertiary education, within the scheme of attracting
international students, Germany‘s performance lags behind that of an average old immigration
land like the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Austria or Sweden, for reasons of red
tape/comprehensive paperwork.
Table 28: Long-term residence conditions for TCNs in Germany
Eligibility
Eligibility conditions (average)
50
Is time of residence as a pupil/student counted?
0
Periods of absence allowed previous to granting of status
50
Conditions for acquisition of status
Integration conditions (average)
32
Economic resources requirement
0
Maximum length of application procedure
0
Costs of application and/or issue of status
0
Security of status
Duration of validity of permit
100
Renewable permit
100
Periods of absence allowed after granting of status
0
Grounds of rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status
100
Protection against expulsion. Due account taken of:
100
Expulsion precluded
0
161
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal, non-renewal or withdrawal
100
Rights associated with status
Residence right after retirement
100
Access to employment (with the only exception of activities involving the exercise of public authority), selfemployment and other economic activities, and working conditions
100
Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare, and housing
100
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications
50
Germany average
50
EU average
59
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.1.6 Access to nationality
Third-country nationals enjoy naturalisation rights in Germany providing they hold permanent
residence. While these were offered to the first generation via entitlement, the second
generation could acquire citizenship by birth. Achievement of citizenship is here generally
regarded as a stepping stone for better integration. In the absence of economic and linguistic
integration, however, it is not possible to have access to this scheme thoroughly. While many
EU members allow for dual-citizenship, Germany reduced it to EU nationals from 2007 to
2013 during the CDU, CSU & FDP coalition government. The new CDU & SPD coalition in
2014 expanded the scope, nevertheless, to include those born in Germany as well.
Table 29: TCNs’ access to nationality in Germany
Eligibility
First generation immigrants
50
Periods of absence allowed previous to acquisition of nationality
100
Requirements for spouses, partners and cohabitees of nationals (average)
100
Second generation immigrants (born in the country)
100
Third generation immigrants (born in the country)
100
Conditions for acquisition
Language requirements and exemptions (average)
45
Citizenship/integration requirements and exemptions (average)
83
Economic resources requirement
0
Criminal record requirement
0
Good character clause
100
Maximum length of application procedure
0
Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title
0
Security of status
Additional grounds for refusing status
0
Discretionary powers in refusal
100
Additional elements taken into account before refusal
0
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal
100
Grounds for withdrawing status
100
162
Time limits for withdrawal
100
Withdrawal that would lead to statelessness
50
Dual nationality
Requirement to renounce / lose foreign nationality upon naturalisation for first generation
50
Dual nationality for second and/or third generation.
50
Germany average
59
EU average
44
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.1.7 Anti-discrimination measures
The German law provides more room than the EU’s minimum requirements for prohibition of
ethnic, religious and racial discrimination in most areas. One might all the same encounter
discrimination on the basis of nationality. Despite progress since 2008, NGOs in Germany do
not have far-reaching roles, which is why the country ranks only 22nd on the MIPEX list.
Those facing discrimination can enjoy the support service of the Federal Anti-discrimination
Agency, whose powers are however quite limited. Compared to several EU members such as
Sweden and the United Kingdom, which hold strong legislative mechanisms at the state level,
Germany performs somewhat poorly on that score.
Table 30: Anti-discrimination measures in Germany
Definitions and concepts
Definition of discrimination includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to
discriminate
50
Definition of discrimination includes discrimination by association and on basis of assumed characteristics
0
Anti-discrimination law applies to natural and legal persons
100
Anti-discrimination law applies to the public sector
100
Legal prohibitions in matters of discrimination
50
Restriction of freedom of association, assembly and speech is permitted when impeding equal treatment
0
Existence of specific rules covering multiple discrimination
50
Fields of application
Employment and vocational training
50
Education (primary and secondary)
100
Social protection, including social security
100
Social advantages
100
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including housing
50
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including health
50
Enforcement mechanisms
Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination to judicial, criminal and administrative procedures
100
Alternative dispute resolution procedures
50
Grounds for access for victims
100
Average length of procedures
50
Shift in burden of proof
50
163
Acceptance by national legislation of courts accepting situation testing and statistical data as evidence
50
Protection against victimisation
100
State provides financial assistance to pursue complaint where victims do not have the necessary means and
interpreter free of charge
100
Role of legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending principle of equality
0
Range of legal actions
0
Range of sanctions
0
Discriminatory motivation treated as aggravated circumstance
0
Equality policies
Specialised Equality Agency has been established with a mandate to combat discrimination
50
Specialised Agency has the powers to assist victims
50
Specialised Agency acts as a quasi-judicial body
0
Specialised Agency has the legal standing to engage in proceedings in name of the complainant
0
Specialised Agency has the power to instigate proceedings in own name, lead own investigation and enforce
findings
State itself disseminates information and provides and ensures structured social dialogue on discrimination with
civil society
Existence at national level of mechanisms to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination and equality law, and
governmental/ministerial units working on these grounds
Obligation for public bodies to promote equality in their functions and ensure that their contract partners respect
non-discrimination
0
0
0
0
Law provides for introduction of positive action measures and assesment of these measures
50
Germany average
59
EU average
48
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.2 The UK
5.2.2.1 Labour markets
A TCN-oriented labour market revision has for the UK hardly been the case in recent times.
The conditions TCNs enjoy here are ranked at the 16th place on MIPEX, due to their average
standards relative to counterparts elsewhere in Europe. Qualification to the points system is in
the UK of vital importance as only thereafter can TCNs achieve comparable rights to those of
nationals. All job services are open to immigrants. For that, however, access to social security
services are largely denied, which differs radically from what several old immigration
destinations such as France and Germany offer in this context. Unlike those, say, in Germany,
Denmark and Sweden, TCNs can in the UK enjoy little official support from the state.
Table 31: Conditions for TCNs at British labour markets
Access
Immediate access to employment
50
Access to private sector
100
Access to public sector
100
Immediate access to self-employment
50
Access to self-employment
100
164
Access to general support
Access to public employment services
100
Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants
50
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU
50
Targeted support
State facilitation of recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU
100
Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market
0
Additional measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market
0
Support to access public employment services
0
Workers' rights
Membership of and participation in trade unions associations and work-related negotiation bodies
Equal access to social security
100
0
Equal working conditions
100
Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or regional in federal states)
0
UK average
55
EU average
57
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.2.2 Family reunion
With a 20th place on MIPEX, policies regarding family reunion in the UK are not worthy of
praise. The average performance has broadly to do with the TCNs’ weak societal integration
here. While basic requirements for the married are quite similar to those in many immigration
lands across Europe, TCN couples under 20 can enjoy no family reunification rights in the
UK (these start for nationals at the age of 18). To be fair, this bias stems largely from
intentions to discourage forced marriages, as observable in families with third-country
national backgrounds. Access to public benefits is here not level with that of nationals, which
makes the UK in this category one of the seven European MIPEX countries limiting non-EU
citizens’ rights.
Table 32: TCNs’ family reunion conditions in the UK
Eligibility
Family reunion eligibility conditions (average)
100
Eligibility conditions for partners other than spouses (average)
50
Eligibility for minor children
50
Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line
0
Eligibility for dependent adult children
0
Conditions for acquisition of status
Pre departure integration conditions (average)
100
Upon arrival integration conditions (average)
100
Accommodation requirement
50
Economic resources requirement
50
165
Maximum length of application procedure
0
Costs of application and/or issue of permit or renewal
50
Security of status
Duration of validity of permit
100
Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status
0
Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law)
100
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal
100
Rights associated with status
Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority
0
Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional
violence
50
Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor
0
Access to education and training for adult family members
100
Access to employment and self-employment
100
Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing
0
UK average
54
EU average
60
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.2.3 Educational standards
Thanks to policies providing migrant pupils with a decent support system in schools, the UK
earns the seventh place on MIPEX in terms of educational standards. This quality is closely
related to the priorities recent UK governments have been attaching with as far as the issue of
‘diversity’ is concerned. Though criticised at times, British schools are known to promote a
wide range of cultural, racial and religious services in line with the 2000 Race Relations
Amendment Act. These services are since 2006 in place to help contribute to societal
‘cohesion’, through most importantly ‘Citizenship Education’ (in particular with respect to its
‘identity and diversity’ component). There is in the UK also an organised teacher
training/development network laying special weight on candidates from ethnic minorities. To
data on TCN pupils’ achievement and segregation in British schools, the UK’s education
policies are ‘slightly favourable’. Migrant families can here hardly benefit from language
orientation programmes or training opportunities.
Table 33: Educational standards in the UK
Access
Access and support to access pre-primary education
50
Access to compulsory-age education
50
The assessment in compulsory education of migrants' prior learning and language qualifications and learning
obtained abroad
50
Support to access secondary education
100
Access and support to access and participate in vocational training
50
166
Access and support to access and participate in higher education
50
Access to advice and guidance on system and choices at all levels of compulsory and non-compulsory education
50
Targeting needs
Requirement for provision in schools of intensive induction programmes for newcomer pupils and their families
about the country and its education system
0
Provision of continuous and ongoing education support in language(s) of instruction for migrant pupils (average)
17
Policy on pupil monitoring targets migrants
100
Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups
100
Teacher training and professional development programmes include courses that address migrant pupils' learning
needs, teachers' expectations of migrant pupils and specific teaching strategies to adress this
100
New opportunities
Provision of option to learn immigrant languages (average)
25
Provision of option to learn immigrant cultures (average)
0
Measures to promote social integration through school (average)
50
Measures to support migrant parents and communities in the education of their children
0
Intercultural education for all
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity in school curriculum
State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout
society
Possibility to modify school curricula and teaching materials to reflect changes in diversity of the school
population
100
100
100
Adaptability of daily life at school based on cultural or religious needs to avoid exclusion of pupils
100
Measures to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce
100
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity for all in teacher training and
professional development programmes
50
UK average
58
EU average
39
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.2.4 Political participation
TCNs’ political participation in the UK is viewed to deserve the 13th position by MIPEX
standards. Despite being in one of the oldest immigration countries in Europe, TCNs are not
allowed to vote in local/national elections here, with the exception of those holding
Commonwealth citizenship. For that, however, all non-EU nationals are granted basic
liberties to establish for instance their own political organisations. Nonetheless, contrary to
recent trends in several EU Member States, the British state does not recognise them as
consultative bodies.
Table 34: TCNs’ political participation in the UK
Electoral rights
Right to vote in national elections
50
Right to vote in regional elections
50
Right to vote in local elections
50
Right to stand for elections at local level
50
Political liberties
167
Right to association
100
Membership of and participation to political parties
100
Right to create media
100
Consultative bodies
Implication of foreign residents at national level (average)
0
Implication of foreign residents at regional level (average)
0
Implication of foreign residents at capital city level (average)
0
Implication of foreign residents on local city level (average)
0
Implementation policies
Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states)
100
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level
50
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on regional level
50
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on local level in capital city
50
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level in city
50
UK average
53
EU average
44
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.2.5 Long-term residence
Long-term residence in the UK is ranked on MIPEX at a dramatic 31st place, which amounts
to the last post on the entire list. Contrary to EU citizens, non-EU nationals are here not
granted the right to permanent residence automatically. There was in this vein a fairly
demanding procedure called ‘indefinite leave to remain’ until recently, for which the TCNs
were required to follow security coverages to qualify for a certain degree of basic rights. The
2009 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act did not promise much for third-country
nationals in this context. For permanent residence, they became required with the entry into
force of the new law to wait up to eight years, regardless of their legal status. Students and a
segment of workers were excluded from this application as their cases would be dependent
upon a period of three- to five-year-long probation, depriving them of public benefits. Further,
with the new law, they became subject to limitations concerning for instance travelling
outside the UK.
Table 35: Long-term residence conditions for TCNs in the UK
Eligibility
Eligibility conditions (average)
0
Is time of residence as a pupil/student counted?
0
Periods of absence allowed previous to granting of status
0
Conditions for acquisition of status
Integration conditions (average)
68
Economic resources requirement
0
168
Maximum length of application procedure
0
Costs of application and/or issue of status
0
Security of status
Duration of validity of permit
0
Renewable permit
0
Periods of absence allowed after granting of status
0
Grounds of rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status
0
Protection against expulsion. Due account taken of:
50
Expulsion precluded
0
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal, non-renewal or withdrawal
100
Rights associated with status
Residence right after retirement
100
Access to employment (with the only exception of activities involving the exercise of public authority), selfemployment and other economic activities, and working conditions
100
Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare, and housing
100
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications
50
UK average
31
EU average
59
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.2.6 Access to nationality
Ranked currently at the 11th place on MIPEX, the UK was until recently considered a
working model in terms of its citizenship policies towards third-country nationals. The 2009
Act introduced however complications in the naturalisation process. Unlike in several other
immigration lands, such as France, Sweden or the Netherlands, the citizenship standards in
the UK require now lengthier procedures chiefly because of the newly attached probation
period.
Table 36: TCNs’ access to nationality in the UK
Eligibility
First generation immigrants
50
Periods of absence allowed previous to acquisition of nationality
0
Requirements for spouses, partners and cohabitees of nationals (average)
75
Second generation immigrants (born in the country)
100
Third generation immigrants (born in the country)
100
Conditions for acquisition
Language requirements and exemptions (average)
65
Citizenship/integration requirements and exemptions (average)
42
Economic resources requirement
0
Criminal record requirement
0
Good character clause
0
Maximum length of application procedure
100
Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title
0
169
Security of status
Additional grounds for refusing status
0
Discretionary powers in refusal
0
Additional elements taken into account before refusal
100
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal
100
Grounds for withdrawing status
0
Time limits for withdrawal
100
Withdrawal that would lead to statelessness
0
Dual nationality
Requirement to renounce / lose foreign nationality upon naturalisation for first generation
100
Dual nationality for second and/or third generation.
100
UK average
59
EU average
44
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.2.7 Anti-discrimination measures
British laws and policies in the context of anti-discrimination prove according to latest
MIPEX figures way above the average standards (second best in Europe, after Sweden).
Although the 2006 Equality Act previously called for the establishment of the Equality and
Human Rights Commission, to fight racial, ethnic and religious discrimination, the
concerning plan was lacking enforcement mechanisms, giving for instance active roles to
NGOs in court decisions (like in many other countries across Europe and North America).
With the introduction of the 2010 Equality Act, TCNs are offered here legal protection in a
wider range of policy issues, from age, gender, race, religion to disability, sexual orientation,
maternity and marriage/civil partnership.
Table 37: Anti-discrimination measures in the UK
Definitions and concepts
Definition of discrimination includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to
discriminate
100
Definition of discrimination includes discrimination by association and on basis of assumed characteristics
100
Anti-discrimination law applies to natural and legal persons
100
Anti-discrimination law applies to the public sector
100
Legal prohibitions in matters of discrimination
100
Restriction of freedom of association, assembly and speech is permitted when impeding equal treatment
100
Existence of specific rules covering multiple discrimination
100
Fields of application
Employment and vocational training
100
Education (primary and secondary)
100
Social protection, including social security
100
Social advantages
100
170
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including housing
100
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including health
100
Enforcement mechanisms
Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination to judicial, criminal and administrative procedures
100
Alternative dispute resolution procedures
50
Grounds for access for victims
100
Average length of procedures
0
Shift in burden of proof
100
Acceptance by national legislation of courts accepting situation testing and statistical data as evidence
100
Protection against victimisation
100
State provides financial assistance to pursue complaint where victims do not have the necessary means and
interpreter free of charge
100
Role of legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending principle of equality
0
Range of legal actions
0
Range of sanctions
50
Discriminatory motivation treated as aggravated circumstance
100
Equality policies
Specialised Equality Agency has been established with a mandate to combat discrimination
100
Specialised Agency has the powers to assist victims
100
Specialised Agency acts as a quasi-judicial body
0
Specialised Agency has the legal standing to engage in proceedings in name of the complainant
0
Specialised Agency has the power to instigate proceedings in own name, lead own investigation and enforce
findings
State itself disseminates information and provides and ensures structured social dialogue on discrimination with
civil society
Existence at national level of mechanisms to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination and equality law, and
governmental/ministerial units working on these grounds
Obligation for public bodies to promote equality in their functions and ensure that their contract partners respect
non-discrimination
100
100
100
100
Law provides for introduction of positive action measures and assesment of these measures
100
UK average
86
EU average
59
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.3 Greece
5.2.3.1 Labour markets
The restrictions its TCNs face at labour markets offer Greece a moderate 19th place on
MIPEX. This post is in fact worse than those of other immigration destinations in southern
Europe, most notably Portugal and Spain, where third-country nationals are subject to
restrictions neither in the public sector nor in self-employment. Obscured by weak legal
prospects at labour markets, access to the public sector is not fostered equally here. Non-EU
citizens must fight here a hampering red tape procedure to be able to start their own business,
with no promises for social security, equal working conditions or general support from the
171
state. In brief, regardless of a number of recent improvements most notably in the area of
family reunion, non-EU nationals’ access to employment remains to be ‘slightly
unfavourable’ in Greece.
Table 38: Conditions for TCNs at Greek labour markets
Access
Immediate access to employment
50
Access to private sector
100
Access to public sector
0
Immediate access to self-employment
50
Access to self-employment
0
Access to general support
Access to public employment services
100
Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants
50
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU
100
Targeted support
State facilitation of recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU
0
Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market
0
Additional measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market
0
Support to access public employment services
0
Workers' rights
Membership of and participation in trade unions associations and work-related negotiation bodies
100
Equal access to social security
100
Equal working conditions
100
Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or regional in federal states)
0
Greece average
50
EU average
57
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.3.2 Family reunion
With a fairly low 24th place on the MIPEX list, Greek performance concerning non-EU
nationals’ family reunion ranks far below the average of many old/new immigration countries
in Europe. Unlike in many EU Member States, sponsors are required here to fulfil extremely
demanding conditions and bypass bureaucratic hurdles for eligibility, such as administrative
delays applicable to permanent residence permits. Parents and adult children are excluded
from the coverage in this framework. While families are granted better rights at present,
thanks to Law 3801/2009 granting reunited family members full access to employment,
security of status cannot go beyond the average.
172
Table 39: TCNs’ family reunion conditions in Greece
Eligibility
Family reunion eligibility conditions (average)
50
Eligibility conditions for partners other than spouses (average)
50
Eligibility for minor children
50
Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line
0
Eligibility for dependent adult children
0
Conditions for acquisition of status
Pre departure integration conditions (average)
100
Upon arrival integration conditions (average)
100
Accommodation requirement
50
Economic resources requirement
0
Maximum length of application procedure
50
Costs of application and/or issue of permit or renewal
0
Security of status
Duration of validity of permit
100
Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status
0
Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law)
50
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal
50
Rights associated with status
Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority
50
Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional
violence
50
Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor
0
Access to education and training for adult family members
100
Access to employment and self-employment
100
Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing
100
Greece average
49
EU average
60
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.3.3 Educational standards
Policies concerning non-EU nationals’ education in Greece are ranked at an average 18th
place on MIPEX. As in many other EU Member States, pupils with TCN origins are offered
here access to all layers of the school system. Yet, the same pupils face barriers when it comes
to language learning and ongoing support, which many old immigration countries have in
recent times been effectively dealing with. Policies encouraging intercultural education
thoroughly, like in Germany, Sweden, Spain and Portugal, are in Greece still out of sight.
173
Table 40: Educational standards for TCNs in Greece
Access
Access and support to access pre-primary education
50
Access to compulsory-age education
100
The assessment in compulsory education of migrants' prior learning and language qualifications and learning
obtained abroad
50
Support to access secondary education
50
Access and support to access and participate in vocational training
50
Access and support to access and participate in higher education
50
Access to advice and guidance on system and choices at all levels of compulsory and non-compulsory education
0
Targeting needs
Requirement for provision in schools of intensive induction programmes for newcomer pupils and their families
about the country and its education system
0
Provision of continuous and ongoing education support in language(s) of instruction for migrant pupils (average)
67
Policy on pupil monitoring targets migrants
0
Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups
0
Teacher training and professional development programmes include courses that address migrant pupils' learning
needs, teachers' expectations of migrant pupils and specific teaching strategies to adress this
100
New opportunities
Provision of option to learn immigrant languages (average)
75
Provision of option to learn immigrant cultures (average)
75
Measures to promote social integration through school (average)
25
Measures to support migrant parents and communities in the education of their children
0
Intercultural education for all
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity in school curriculum
State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout
society
Possibility to modify school curricula and teaching materials to reflect changes in diversity of the school
population
50
0
100
Adaptability of daily life at school based on cultural or religious needs to avoid exclusion of pupils
0
Measures to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce
0
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity for all in teacher training and
professional development programmes
100
Greece average
42
EU average
39
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.3.4 Political participation
Greece ranks 17th on MIPEX as far as the TCNs’ political participation in the country is
concerned. Thanks to Law 3838/2010, there has here been significant progress in granting
non-EU residents political rights like voting at local elections. New integration councils,
regardless of their limited powers, seek to promote further democratic values at the national
level. This might in medium- to long-term pave the way for representation of immigrants in
the so-called National Commission for Migrants’ Integration. There is however no funding for
TCN-established civil society organisations (as for instance in Portugal).
174
Table 41: TCNs’ political participation in Greece
Electoral rights
Right to vote in national elections
0
Right to vote in regional elections
0
Right to vote in local elections
50
Right to stand for elections at local level
50
Political liberties
Right to association
100
Membership of and participation to political parties
100
Right to create media
100
Consultative bodies
Implication of foreign residents at national level (average)
0
Implication of foreign residents at regional level (average)
0
Implication of foreign residents at capital city level (average)
30
Implication of foreign residents on local city level (average)
30
Implementation policies
Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states)
50
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level
0
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on regional level
0
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on local level in capital city
0
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level in city
0
Greece average
40
EU average
44
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.3.5 Long-term residence
TCNs fulfilling standard requirements for long-term residence can enjoy in Greece basic
security options and rights as guaranteed by the EU law. This issue is however quite tricky, as
the rate of successful applicants to benefit from that coverage is generally lowered by highly
restrictive conditions such as application fees. Although Law 3838/2010 reduced the €900
application to €600 recently, it still appears to be much higher than what many of the 31
countries on MIPEX list demand. Added to that, while many EU Member States demand no
more than a basic income and language knowledge for long-term residence, Greece asks its
TCNs to document high income as well as integration course/test scores. To be able to attend
state-sponsored classes on this latter score, there apply yearly quotas and long waiting lists.
The Greek score in terms of long-term residence is in the end lower than the EU average.
175
Table 42: Long-term residence conditions for TCNs in Greece
Eligibility
Eligibility conditions (average)
75
Is time of residence as a pupil/student counted?
50
Periods of absence allowed previous to granting of status
50
Conditions for acquisition of status
Integration conditions (average)
39
Economic resources requirement
0
Maximum length of application procedure
50
Costs of application and/or issue of status
0
Security of status
Duration of validity of permit
100
Renewable permit
50
Periods of absence allowed after granting of status
0
Grounds of rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status
100
Protection against expulsion. Due account taken of:
50
Expulsion precluded
0
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal, non-renewal or withdrawal
100
Rights associated with status
Residence right after retirement
100
Access to employment (with the only exception of activities involving the exercise of public authority), selfemployment and other economic activities, and working conditions
50
Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare, and housing
100
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications
100
Greece average
56
EU average
59
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.3.6 Access to nationality
An average 14th position by 2010 MIPEX grading on this matter owes much to the newly
adopted and relatively more liberal Greek citizenship. Following Law 3838/2010, TCNs’
eligibility for nationality has now become comparable to that in old immigration countries. In
accordance, all non-EU nationals’ children can now enjoy Greek citizenship at birth or obtain
dual citizenship automatically without having to face extra administrative hurdles as in the
past. For naturalisation, however, the citizenship scheme seems to demand an exorbitant €700
fee (despite reduction from €1,500). The new citizenship package does not guarantee
constitutional protection, indicating applicants and new citizens hold here one of the most
insecure (second worst) conditions amongst the 31 MIPEX countries. They can for instance
be left ‘stateless’ on many grounds, regardless of the length of their Greek citizenship.
176
Table 43: TCNs’ access to nationality in Greece
Eligibility
First generation immigrants
100
Periods of absence allowed previous to acquisition of nationality
100
Requirements for spouses, partners and cohabitees of nationals (average)
25
Second generation immigrants (born in the country)
50
Third generation immigrants (born in the country)
100
Conditions for acquisition
Language requirements and exemptions (average)
40
Citizenship/integration requirements and exemptions (average)
25
Economic resources requirement
100
Criminal record requirement
0
Good character clause
100
Maximum length of application procedure
50
Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title
0
Security of status
Additional grounds for refusing status
0
Discretionary powers in refusal
0
Additional elements taken into account before refusal
0
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal
50
Grounds for withdrawing status
0
Time limits for withdrawal
0
Withdrawal that would lead to statelessness
0
Dual nationality
Requirement to renounce / lose foreign nationality upon naturalisation for first generation
100
Dual nationality for second and/or third generation.
100
Greece average
57
EU average
44
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.3.7 Anti-discrimination measures
Ranking 20th on MIPEX, Greece’s anti-discrimination policies in relation to TCNs are below
the MIPEX average. Unlike in many EU Member States, discrimination on the basis of
nationality is not explicitly forbidden in the Greek law. Further, as there is no legal statement
dismissing racial profiling categorically (like in the UK and France), non-EU nationals in
Greece remain extremely vulnerable. They may benefit from assistance by the state or NGOs,
only without direct access to equality bodies, not least because supervisions/investigations
(most importantly by the Ombudsman) have no primary relevance to enforcement here.
177
Table 44: Anti-discrimination measures in Greece
Definitions and concepts
Definition of discrimination includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to
discriminate
50
Definition of discrimination includes discrimination by association and on basis of assumed characteristics
50
Anti-discrimination law applies to natural and legal persons
100
Anti-discrimination law applies to the public sector
100
Legal prohibitions in matters of discrimination
0
Restriction of freedom of association, assembly and speech is permitted when impeding equal treatment
50
Existence of specific rules covering multiple discrimination
0
Fields of application
Employment and vocational training
50
Education (primary and secondary)
50
Social protection, including social security
50
Social advantages
50
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including housing
50
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including health
50
Enforcement mechanisms
Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination to judicial, criminal and administrative procedures
100
Alternative dispute resolution procedures
0
Grounds for access for victims
50
Average length of procedures
0
Shift in burden of proof
100
Acceptance by national legislation of courts accepting situation testing and statistical data as evidence
0
Protection against victimisation
100
State provides financial assistance to pursue complaint where victims do not have the necessary means and
interpreter free of charge
100
Role of legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending principle of equality
50
Range of legal actions
0
Range of sanctions
100
Discriminatory motivation treated as aggravated circumstance
50
Equality policies
Specialised Equality Agency has been established with a mandate to combat discrimination
50
Specialised Agency has the powers to assist victims
100
Specialised Agency acts as a quasi-judicial body
0
Specialised Agency has the legal standing to engage in proceedings in name of the complainant
Specialised Agency has the power to instigate proceedings in own name, lead own investigation and enforce
findings
State itself disseminates information and provides and ensures structured social dialogue on discrimination
with civil society
Existence at national level of mechanisms to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination and equality law, and
governmental/ministerial units working on these grounds
Obligation for public bodies to promote equality in their functions and ensure that their contract partners
respect non-discrimination
100
0
100
0
0
Law provides for introduction of positive action measures and assesment of these measures
50
Greece average
50
EU average
59
Based on MIPEX III.
178
5.2.4 Italy
5.2.4.1 Labour markets
With a 10th place on MIPEX, the conditions Italy provides the third-country nationals at its
labour markets are above the EU average. For integration of legal TCN workers into the
Italian economy, there are no visible barriers put by the state. Nonetheless, the equal access
and support provided here are counterbalanced by a poor skill/qualification assessment.
Indeed, contrary to those in many old immigration lands, as well as in new ones like Portugal,
public service in Italy does not seem to make full use of non-EU residents. This handicap
stems mainly from the lack of ‘targeted support’, which eventually pushes TCNs outside the
legal labour market.
Table 45: Conditions for TCNs at Italian labour markets
Access
Immediate access to employment
100
Access to private sector
100
Access to public sector
0
Immediate access to self-employment
100
Access to self-employment
100
Access to general support
Access to public employment services
100
Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants
100
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU
50
Targeted support
State facilitation of recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU
50
Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market
50
Additional measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market
0
Support to access public employment services
0
Workers' rights
Membership of and participation in trade unions associations and work-related negotiation bodies
100
Equal access to social security
100
Equal working conditions
100
Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or regional in federal states)
50
Italy average
69
EU average
57
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.4.2 Family reunion
Reunification of families with a migration background is secured in Italy by relatively new
laws and policies, which with a fairly decent sixth position appears as ‘slightly favourable’ by
179
MIPEX standards. Despite this relatively high ranking, one needs to be mindful of a number
of basic and critical procedures which, as one gathers from recent data, may have been
overlooked. The issue relates in particular the case of non-EU families who cannot enjoy
rights to secure residence, work and study entirely here. Sponsors of non-EU national origins
are required to meet extremely high standards for family reunion, concerning accommodation
in the first place. What’s more, the 120/2008 decree does not allow TCNs’ elderlies to benefit
from the right to family renion.
Table 46: TCNs’ family reunion conditions in Italy
Eligibility
Family reunion eligibility conditions (average)
75
Eligibility conditions for partners other than spouses (average)
50
Eligibility for minor children
100
Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line
50
Eligibility for dependent adult children
50
Conditions for acquisition of status
Pre departure integration conditions (average)
100
Upon arrival integration conditions (average)
100
Accommodation requirement
0
Economic resources requirement
50
Maximum length of application procedure
50
Costs of application and/or issue of permit or renewal
0
Security of status
Duration of validity of permit
100
Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status
100
Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law)
50
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal
100
Rights associated with status
Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority
100
Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or
emotional violence
50
Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor
100
Access to education and training for adult family members
100
Access to employment and self-employment
100
Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing
100
Italy average
74
EU average
60
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.4.3 Educational standards
There is today an obvious need in all EU Member States to make educational standards meet
the growing ‘diversity’ demands in their host societies. The situation in Italy does not seem to
180
be promising on this matter. Considering the schools which are far from giving priorities to
teaching ‘life in harmony’, one can argue that pupils with a migration background are here
often underprivileged. While TCNs under 18 have irrespective of their status access to school
systems and may enjoy general support for the disadvantaged, there exist no clear tools
enabling placement of newcomers at the right level. Compared to those in many other EU
Member States, Italian school curricula do not lay much emphasis on immigrant languages,
overlooking intercultural education right from the start.
Table 47: Educational standards for TCNs in Italy
Access
Access and support to access pre-primary education
50
Access to compulsory-age education
100
The assessment in compulsory education of migrants' prior learning and language qualifications and learning
obtained abroad
0
Support to access secondary education
0
Access and support to access and participate in vocational training
50
Access and support to access and participate in higher education
0
Access to advice and guidance on system and choices at all levels of compulsory and non-compulsory
education
50
Targeting needs
Requirement for provision in schools of intensive induction programmes for newcomer pupils and their
families about the country and its education system
Provision of continuous and ongoing education support in language(s) of instruction for migrant pupils
(average)
0
50
Policy on pupil monitoring targets migrants
100
Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups
50
Teacher training and professional development programmes include courses that address migrant pupils'
learning needs, teachers' expectations of migrant pupils and specific teaching strategies to adress this
100
New opportunities
Provision of option to learn immigrant languages (average)
0
Provision of option to learn immigrant cultures (average)
0
Measures to promote social integration through school (average)
50
Measures to support migrant parents and communities in the education of their children
50
Intercultural education for all
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity in school curriculum
State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout
society
Possibility to modify school curricula and teaching materials to reflect changes in diversity of the school
population
100
0
0
Adaptability of daily life at school based on cultural or religious needs to avoid exclusion of pupils
50
Measures to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce
0
Inclusion of intercultural education and appreciation of cultural diversity for all in teacher training and
professional development programmes
100
Italy average
41
EU average
39
Based on MIPEX III.
181
5.2.4.4 Political participation
Ranking 14th on MIPEX, political opportunities offered to TCNs in Italy are below the EU
average. Non-EU nationals are here not granted voting rights for local elections and it seems
the necessary constitutional change to that end will not take off the ground in near future.
Apart from rare practices like in Rome’s town council whereby non-EU nationals are
currently allowed to elect Adjunct Counsellors, consultative bodies in Italy are not
encouraged. To be fair, basic political liberties are respected here in some measure and there
is funding allocated for third-country nationals. Yet, these remain largely superficial by
comparison to the challenges the latter face. To illustrate, non-EU nationals wishing to
own/publish newspapers here are allowed to do so only when they have native co-propriators.
Table 48: TCNs’ political participation in Italy
Electoral rights
Right to vote in national elections
0
Right to vote in regional elections
0
Right to vote in local elections
0
Right to stand for elections at local level
0
Political liberties
Right to association
100
Membership of and participation to political parties
100
Right to create media
0
Consultative bodies
Implication of foreign residents at national level (average)
30
Implication of foreign residents at regional level (average)
40
Implication of foreign residents at capital city level (average)
100
Implication of foreign residents on local city level (average)
40
Implementation policies
Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states)
0
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level
100
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on regional level
100
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on local level in capital city
100
Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level in city
100
Italy average
50
EU average
44
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.4.5 Long-term residence
Non-EU residents in Italy enjoy a certain degree of security until they obtain long-term
residence. Compared to several EU Member States such as Austria, Belgium, Spain and
Portugal which currently extend long-term residence also to students, Italian laws and policies
182
are somewhat less liberal, not least because long-term residence is here not entirely
standardised with legal immigration. It is all the same possible to argue that requirements in
this category are relatively less demanding than those applicable to family reunion and
naturalisation. With the 2009 Security Act, language and integration rose to be the main
requirements for long-term residence qualifications.
Table 49: TCNs’ long-term residence in Italy
Eligibility
Eligibility conditions (average)
25
Is time of residence as a pupil/student counted?
0
Periods of absence allowed previous to granting of status
50
Conditions for acquisition of status
Integration conditions (average)
43
Economic resources requirement
100
Maximum length of application procedure
100
Costs of application and/or issue of status
50
Security of status
Duration of validity of permit
100
Renewable permit
100
Periods of absence allowed after granting of status
0
Grounds of rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status
50
Protection against expulsion. Due account taken of:
50
Expulsion precluded
50
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal, non-renewal or withdrawal
100
Rights associated with status
Residence right after retirement
100
Access to employment (with the only exception of activities involving the exercise of public authority), selfemployment and other economic activities, and working conditions
100
Access to social security, social assistance and healthcare, and housing
100
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications
100
Italy average
66
EU average
59
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.4.6 Access to nationality
As Italy turned from a ‘sending’ country to one of immigration, its eligibility criteria for
nationality became highly restrictive. Unlike in many other cases, citizenship is here not
granted automatically to second/third generations. The residence requirements are together
with those in Spain the most demanding in Europe. Non-EU nationals appear to be excluded
183
from many areas of life regardless of their birth in the country. Italy holds all the same a
seventh place by MIPEX standards on this matter thanks to the basic conditions for equal
citizenship which third-country nationals have for some time been enjoying. In light of its big
diaspora in many countries and the rise of sojourners lately, the Italian law permits now dual
citizenship as a general rule, which it formerly denied in the case of a further citizenship.
Table 50: TCNs’ access to nationality in Italy
Eligibility
First generation immigrants
0
Periods of absence allowed previous to acquisition of nationality
0
Requirements for spouses, partners and cohabitees of nationals (average)
50
Second generation immigrants (born in the country)
50
Third generation immigrants (born in the country)
50
Conditions for acquisition
Language requirements and exemptions (average)
100
Citizenship/integration requirements and exemptions (average)
100
Economic resources requirement
0
Criminal record requirement
0
Good character clause
100
Maximum length of application procedure
50
Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title
0
Security of status
Additional grounds for refusing status
100
Discretionary powers in refusal
0
Additional elements taken into account before refusal
0
Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal
100
Grounds for withdrawing status
100
Time limits for withdrawal
100
Withdrawal that would lead to statelessness
100
Dual nationality
Requirement to renounce / lose foreign nationality upon naturalisation for first generation
100
Dual nationality for second and/or third generation.
100
Italy average
63
EU average
44
Based on MIPEX III.
5.2.4.7 Anti-discrimination measures
Italy ranks 15th on MIPEX in terms of its anti-discrimination policies towards third-country
nationals. Despite improvements, in particular following the European Commission’s general
call to make legal revisions in this category, the weakest equality policies in the EU are
ascribed to Italy. Its Office for Racial Discrimination in particular is largely ineffective
184
(second worst in Europe after that of Spain). In the event of racial, religious or ethnic
discrimination, it is primarily the EU law that provides legal source of reference. A diversity
charter concerning the business sector has already been adopted; however, promotion of
equality is far from being a priority goal here.
Table 51: Anti-discrimination measures in Italy
Definitions and concepts
Definition of discrimination includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to
discriminate
Definition of discrimination includes discrimination by association and on basis of assumed characteristics
100
0
Anti-discrimination law applies to natural and legal persons
100
Anti-discrimination law applies to the public sector
100
Legal prohibitions in matters of discrimination
50
Restriction of freedom of association, assembly and speech is permitted when impeding equal treatment
100
Existence of specific rules covering multiple discrimination
0
Fields of application
Employment and vocational training
100
Education (primary and secondary)
100
Social protection, including social security
100
Social advantages
100
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including housing
100
Access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including health
100
Enforcement mechanisms
Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination to judicial, criminal and administrative procedures
100
Alternative dispute resolution procedures
50
Grounds for access for victims
100
Average length of procedures
0
Shift in burden of proof
50
Acceptance by national legislation of courts accepting situation testing and statistical data as evidence
50
Protection against victimisation
100
State provides financial assistance to pursue complaint where victims do not have the necessary means and
interpreter free of charge
100
Role of legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending principle of equality
100
Range of legal actions
0
Range of sanctions
100
Discriminatory motivation treated as aggravated circumstance
100
Equality policies
Specialised Equality Agency has been established with a mandate to combat discrimination
0
Specialised Agency has the powers to assist victims
50
Specialised Agency acts as a quasi-judicial body
0
Specialised Agency has the legal standing to engage in proceedings in name of the complainant
0
Specialised Agency has the power to instigate proceedings in own name, lead own investigation and enforce
findings
State itself disseminates information and provides and ensures structured social dialogue on discrimination
with civil society
185
0
50
Existence at national level of mechanisms to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination and equality law, and
governmental/ministerial units working on these grounds
Obligation for public bodies to promote equality in their functions and ensure that their contract partners
respect non-discrimination
0
0
Law provides for introduction of positive action measures and assesment of these measures
0
Italy average
62
EU average
59
Based on MIPEX III.
5.3 Symmetry between national and supranational policies
To check into the extent of harmony between the EU and national policy-making levels, the
study consults at this point the Commission’s annual assessment reports, adopting a rather
top-down perspective, that is, without being mindful of where the EU law drew its origins
from before diffusing into the national law. The analysis made to that end, in quest of the
selected cases’ breach of EU immigration law during the period of analysis, covers
transposition and implementation of twenty-eight legal texts, which were all issued in the
form of directives/regulations, and for this reason have binding effects on national
legal/political orders. The breakdown of these documents across the three main immigration
areas, i.e. labour/legal immigration, irregular/illegal immigration and asylum-seeking issues,
is as follows:
Table 52: EU legal texts on labour migration
Date of
release
Transposition
deadline
Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification
22/09/2003
03/10/2005
Council Directive 2003/109/EC on TCNs who are long-term residents
25/11/2003
23/01/2006
Council Directive 2004/114/EC on TCNs’ admission for study or training purposes
13/12/2004
12/01/2007
Council Directive 2005/71/EC on TCNs’ admission for scientific research
12/10/2005
12/10/2007
Council Directive 2009/50/EC Blue Cards Directive (on highly qualified TCN workers)
25/05/2009
19/06/2011
Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 defining a uniform format for residence permits
13/06/2002
13/06/2002
Date of
release
Transposition
deadline
Council Directive 2001/40/EC on the mutual recognition of decisions concerning TCNs’
expulsion
28/05/2001
02/12/2002
Council Directive 2001/51/EC supplementing the Schengen Agreement
28/06/2001
11/02/2003
Council Directive 2002/90/EC on unauthorised entry, transit and residence
28/11/2002
04/12/2004
Council Directive 2004/81/EC on TCNs’ residence permits in the cases of trafficking or
other actions illegal immigration
29/04/2004
06/08/2006
Text
Table 53: EU legal texts on irregular immigration
Text
186
Council Directive 2004/82/EC on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data
29/04/2004
05/09/2006
Council Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European critical
infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection
8/12/2008
12/01/2011
Council Directive 2008/115/EC -the Return Directive- on common standards and procedures
for returning illegally staying TCNs
16/12/2008
24/12/2010
&24/12/2011 (for
Article 13(4))
18/06/2009
20/07/2011
05/04/2011
06/04/2013
26/10/2004
26/10/2004
11/12/2000
11/12/2000
15/03/2001
15/03/2001
13/12/2004
13/12/2004
15/03/2006
15/03/2006
20/12/2006
20/12/2006
09/07/2008
09/07/2008
Date of
release
Transposition
deadline
20/07/2001
31/12/2002
27/01/2003
06/02/2005
29/04/2004
10/10/2006
01/12/2005
01/12/2007&01/12/20
08 (for Article 15)
18/02/2003
18/02/2003
19/05/2010
19/05/2010
Council Directive 2009/52/EC on minimum standards on sanctions and measures against
employers of illegally staying TCNs
Directive 2011/36/EC on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and
protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA
Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 establishing the FRONTEX, European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the
European Union
Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 concerning the Establishment of 'EURODAC' for the
Comparison of Fingerprints for the Effective Application of the Dublin Convention
Regulation (EC) 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession
of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that
requirement
Regulation (EC) 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports
and travel documents issued by Member States
Regulation (EC) 562/2006 establishing the Schengen Borders Code on the rules governing
the movement of persons across borders
Regulation (EC) 1931/2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at Member States’
external land borders and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention
Regulation (EC) 767/2008 concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange
of data between Member States on short-stay visas
Table 54: EU legal texts on asylum issues
Text
Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on relevant measures
Council Directive 2003/9/EC -the Reception Conditions Directive- on laying down
minimum standards for the reception of asylum-seekers
Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of
TCNs or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international
protection
Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for
granting and withdrawing refugee status
Regulation (EC) 343/2003 defining criteria and mechanisms on the determination of the
Member State responsible in asylum applications
Regulation (EC) 439/2010 establishing the European Asylum Support Office
As formerly explained, the breach of EU law here is decided in accordance with a twofold
legal procedure exercised by the EU Commission and European Court of Justice. As
guaranteed by Article 258 of TFEU and 106a of the Euratom Treaty, Member States are
responsible before the Commission for the timely transposition and thorough implementation
of the EU law. If a Member State somehow fails to do so (that is, if it commits an act of ‘noncompliance’), the Commission starts the ‘pre-litigation’ procedure to conduct investigation
over the matter, sending a letter of ‘formal notice’ to the Member State and demanding a
‘reasoned opinion’ from it, if the breach of law persists. Should non-compliance remain, the
187
infringement case is finally referred to the European Court of Justice, which runs the
‘litigation’ procedure in order to impose a fitting sanction.
5.3.1 Germany
Based on the Commission’s annual assessment reports (drawn up by the Directorate-General
of the Home Affairs Department) on the Community law’s implementation in Member States,
the EU legal documents which Germany infringed upon between 2005 and 2012 and the legal
actions processed in response are as follows:
Table 55: Germany’s infringements of EU Home Affairs Law
Year
2005
2006
Area of law
Infringement of
Actions taken
Labour migration
2003/86/EC on family reunification
2002/90/EC on unauthorised entry, transit and
residence
formal notice
formal notice and
reasoned opinion
formal notice and
reasoned opinion
reasoned opinion;
formal notice and
reasoned opinion
Irregular migration
Asylum
2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers
Labour migration
2003/86/EC on family reunification;
2003/109/EC on long-term residence
Labour migration
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
Irregular migration
Asylum
2004/81/EC on residence in illegal cases;
2004/82/EC on carriers’ communication of
passenger data;
2002/90/EC on unauthorised entry, transit and
residence
2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers;
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for
stateless persons
2004/81/EC on residence in illegal cases
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for
stateless persons
-
Labour migration
2009/50/EC on highly qualified workers
Irregular migration
Asylum
2007
Labour migration
Irregular migration
Asylum
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
Irregular migration
Asylum
2008/115/EC on common standards and
procedures for returning illegal entries/stays
2003/86/EC on family reunification
-
formal notice;
formal notice;
referred to ECJ
Number of
infringements
5
8
referred to ECJ;
formal notice
reasoned opinion
2
reasoned opinion
formal notice and
reasoned opinion
formal notice and
reasoned opinion
formal notice
-
0
0
0
4
1
20 for
28 texts in total
Total
For the 28 EU legal texts Germany was throughout the selected assessment period
supranationally bound by, there were 20 occurrences of law breach. The distribution of
infringements across the three areas of immigration was fairly symmetrical, making it hard to
188
declare that documents in one area were violated more frequently than those in others.
Considering the traditional patterns of immigration policy-making in Germany, one could all
the same draw a number of inferences, in coming to terms with what may have been
conducive to this effect.
A cursory look at the German governmental agencies delivers a set of special supranational
units (‘task forces’) representing the EU. With the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in
1993, the legislative structure appointed here a special committee to be responsible for
relations with the EU. The ‘Committee of European Union Affairs’ which became legally
attached to the Grundgesetz at the time operates currently as the back stage of the German
Parliament’s policy-making on European issues. Different from its equivalents elsewhere, this
particular committee can issue binding opinions besides those released by the federal
government. Apart from its active participation in many supranational policy areas ranging
from the EU’s institutional reform packages or enlargement to cooperation with the European
Parliament or amendment of EU Treaties, the Committee of European Union Affairs is as a
matter of course also involved in the blueprint of national legislation. Partly because of this
active collaboration, and partly not, a common tendency observed thus far in the decisionmaking of immigration is a country-wide compromise, particularly as far as border and
asylum issues are concerned (Geddes, 2003). To illustrate, in the initial stages, the Tampere
Council’s decision to promote cooperation amongst Member States found hardly any
challenge in the German Parliament. Trends of communitarisation remained largely intact
over years during many coalition governments, which saw support on the side of oppositional
parties as well.
The main law regulating immigration matters in present day Germany is the 2005
Immigration Act. The ratification of the act came after a long negotiation process and
occasional foot-dragging at the Landtags (state parliaments), coming finally into force as
capable of bridging the European Commission’s proposals with the national legislation on
immigration. In cases of a lack of compromise between political parties, special hearings of
experts or committees were held. To illustrate, following the CDU’s demand for a revision of
the Council Proposal on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting
and Withdrawing Refugee Status (COM (2002) 326 final) arguing “the German airport
protocol, the safe country principle and the principle of unfounded appeal were endangered”,
the government established a hearing of experts, which eventually approved of the proposal.
189
Similarly, the Council Directive 2004/83/EC (‘on Minimum Standards for the Qualification
and Status of Third-country Nationals or Stateless Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who
Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the Protection Granted’), which
gave rise to a friction between the governing SPD & Greens and the oppositional CDU &
CSU, was adopted only after the Committee on Human Rights recommended its acceptance.
Despite such challenges, however, there was by no means tendency towards a denial of
communitarisation efforts, if not for a number of compromises made to keep immigration
within reasonable limits at the most. What often became a matter of intensive debates were
policy instruments concerning the ‘safe third-country’ status. In any case, “the so-called
‘escape to Europe’ itself has never been questioned by any political party” (Prümm &
Alscher, 2007, p. 80).
As formerly argued, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty was a milestone for the incorporation of
supranational immigration policies into the national context. When the Treaty transferred
some of the competences covered as part of the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs
previously to the first pillar/Community Method, many aspects of migration -from asylum to
visa regimes- became subject to communitarisation. Regardless of the fact that Germany was
already an ‘agenda-setter’ for the handling/formulation of former Treaties, Amsterdam was
surely a turning point for German immigration and asylum policy. Yet, its formerly
supporting attitude towards introduction of the QMV at the Maastricht Summit acquired in the
aftermath of Amsterdam initially an oppositional character, in particular on matters relating to
asylum and refugee issues. This turn reasoned from the Länder’s rising concerns about loss of
political leverage in the event that they would need to share their competences with other
lands in relevant policy areas (Hellmann et al., 2005).
The follow-up 1999 Tampere European Council was clearly a projection of Amsterdam as it
brought forward many directives and regulations on Europeanisation of immigration policies,
such as the launch of a joint framework on asylum and illegal migration. While Germany
appeared to back these communitarisation attempts, its major focus remained rather on
undocumented aspects of migration (Santel & Weber, 2000). Following Tampere, the
Summits at Laeken (2001), Seville (2002) and Thessaloniki (2003) all underscored the
priority areas voiced at Amsterdam, like measures against human trafficking, smuggling and
all types of illegal migration including the issue of illegal residence. Adaptation of
supranational political instruments such as regulations and directives into German legislation
190
has not always followed the same path. Since incorporation of directives into the national
legislation allowed for ‘fine-tuning’, there arose complications leading delays such as on the
expansion of refugees’ entitlement rights. Except for the ‘safe third-country’ case, however,
there were for the German policy framework no major areas of misfit in this context.
Before the Treaty of Amsterdam came into force, the coalition between CDU/CSU and FDP
drew to a close after some sixteen-year-long service. As one of their first policy changes, the
new coalition of SPD and the Greens sought to upgrade the existing immigration policy (Bade
& Bommes, 2000). From a supranational perspective, this was a natural consequence of the
recent EU regulation which required screening individual cases of asylum, despite the former
coalition’s so-called ‘asylum compromise’ enabling public access. Indeed, this policy
commitment helped the political elite recognise for the first time that Germany was an
immigration country. Regardless of that, however, the new immigration policy was largely
restrictive, not least because it introduced further prerequisites for legal residence in
Germany.
Despite the apparent paradigm shift in Germany’s official immigration discourse, there were
signs of reluctance to this effect. To illustrate, during the Convention drawing up the EU
Constitution in 2003, both government and opposition parties stressed the need for veto
powers on matters concerning asylum and refugee policy. The then Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer’s letter, prepared in collaboration with the SPD and CDU delegates, to the Convention
President Valery Giscard d'Estaing voiced German concerns about switch to qualified
majority voting in the area of immigration, seeing that the issues on that score concerned the
internal policy’s ‘most sensitive’ component (Mahony, 2003). As a clear reflection of interior
concerns, this rather ‘conservative’ demand came at a time when the Interior Minister Otto
Schily was trying to pass a controversial law on immigration, which was found ‘too soft’ by
the CDU, as the main opposition party holding a majority in the Bundesrat.
It is possible to argue in retrospect that many supranational measures did not have a major
influence on the routine course of action in German immigration policy. To illustrate, the
proposal for Council Directive 2003/9/EC laying down minimum standards for the reception
of asylum-seekers (which was calling Member States to prevent successive migratory
movements by limiting asylum-seekers’ right to move, but at the same time providing them
with reasonable standards of living by way of for instance health care) had already been
191
pronounced in the German national law in reference to the social benefits for asylum
applicants (Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz).
Indeed, the intended prevention of ‘asylum shopping’ as part of ‘burden-sharing’ was surely
welcome by Germany, as a top destination for asylum-seekers in Europe. In this context,
however, the approval of the Council Directive 2001/55/EC (‘on minimum standards for
giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons
and bearing the consequences thereof’) the same year appeared to modify the concerning
rights in view of the fact that asylum-seekers’ access to the German labour market and
possible demands for family reunification were previously out of the question.
Implementation of this directive was suggesting that the German state would not have a full
grip on asylum/refugee matters in its own territory. Observing similar concerns from other
Member States, the Commission issued soon another proposal (COM/2001/510) for a
directive which the Council approved of in 2004 with an amendment declaring Member States
can deny the protection of asylum-seekers as long as this can be secured by other parties or
international organisations (Council Directive 2004/83/EC). Placing improvement of
subsidiary protection into the asylum/refugee context (which was secured under the 1951
Geneva Convention), this directive expanded the main scope of the German asylum policy. A
forum of debates started in this connection on the concept of state persecution as a
prerequisite for minimum residence, which previously produced no positive outcomes for the
protection of stateless people. In consequence, the 2005 Immigration Act made room for the
implementation of non-state persecution as part of the Aufenthaltsgesetz (Residence Act).185
For asylum procedures, the Commission’s proposal –via COM (2000) 578 final- sought in
particular to build a joint framework of appeal provisions amongst the newly acceding
member states. This attempt was however also an opportunity for the old Member States to
make adjustments in their own standards, which were obviously much higher than those of the
former. In accordance, issues concerning safe countries of origin and safe third countries
became subject to EU implementation. More on that, the Council’s acceptance of a revised
proposal in 2004 granted additionally the right to legal advice in case of denial and the right to
185
The Immigration Act is composed of the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz), the Act on the General Freedom
of Movement for EU Citizens (Freedom of Movement Act-EU) and amendments to additional legislation
(Federal Ministry of the Interior, 2005).
192
appeal at the ECtHR. This rather top-down application appeared to threaten initially Article
16a of the German Basic Law, which came to deny refugees the right to reassessment of
individual cases.
Despite this contradiction with the Basic Law, the new regulation did not pose a major threat
in practical terms, as Germany had following the latest enlargement waves become
surrounded by states which -with the exception of Switzerland- had already signed the 2003
Dublin II Convention.186 Similar to the Dublin II Convention, the Council Directive
2004/83/EC sought to come up with effective methods to disable secondary migration. Much
in the same vein, the Commission’s 1999, 2000 and 2002 proposals raised the issue of
children’s age to qualify for family reunification. The importance of the issue lay in
identification of an upper age limit above which residence and entry clearance would have to
fall in another framework (than that of family reunification). Following a hot debate during
the negotiations of the 2005 Immigration Act, it was agreed that those above 16 years of age
could not benefit from this option in Germany (BAMF, Bundesamt für Migration und
Flüchtlinge, 2004).
For the issue of undocumented migration, the objectives as set forth by the Council Directives
2001/40/EC and 2001/51/EC (concerning mutual recognition of expulsion and harmonisation
of financial sanctions against carriers (vehicles) engaged in activities such as clandestine
transportation187, respectively) were incorporated into the 2005 Immigration Act.188 Following
the
2005
Immigration
Act,
the
EU
Directives
Implementation
Act
(Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz) exposed German asylum and immigration law to a number of
important changes. While the Immigration Act enabled amongst others harmonisation of the
refugees’ right of residence –provided their status would be acknowledged under the 1951
Geneva Convention- and the involvement of non-state actors in persecution upon entitlement
to asylum initially under Article 16a of the German Basic Law, the Directives Implementation
Act transposed a total number of eleven EU directives (which were concerning the issue of
protection in the same context) into the national law. Accordingly, changes in the Basic Law,
which became communitarised in close reference to the humanitarian framework, would
186
Regulation (EC) 343/2003. Accordingly, as stipulated by Regulation (EC) 2725/2000, states where asylum
applications were made became responsible for entrance to the EU providing it would for this purpose use a socalled EURODAC fingerprint system. The safe third state became in this way no more a critical issue for the
German asylum policy, which traditionally perceived the matter as ‘normative’ (Hailbronner, 2006).
187
This provision was already envisaged by the Schengen Agreement (Article 26).
188
§58(2) and (3) and §63 AufenthG, respectively.
193
apply specifically to the granting of residence for temporary protection (§24, AufenthG),
residence for persons enjoying refugee status on the basis of the Geneva Convention (§25,
Paragraph 2, AufenthG), residence for persons entitled to subsidiary protection (§25,
Paragraph 3, AufenthG) and victims of human trafficking (§25, Paragraph 4 a, AufenthG).
For the areas concerning fight against illegal immigration and enhancement of security,
Regulation 539/2001 issued a list of countries (in compliance with the 1985 Schengen
Agreement and the 1990 Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement) whose
nationals were subject to visas. As part of combatting illegal immigration, a European visa
policy was drawn up to envisage a uniform set of criteria on visa applications, including
agreements on the facilitation of visa agreements with the third countries. For short-term stays
of not more than 90 days (out of an entire period of six months) as well as for the issuing of
transit visas using the Schengen area, the statutory basis of the European law was constituted
by Regulation 810/2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas.
5.3.2 The UK
To the Commission’s annual reports on breach of the Community law, the legal texts the UK
infringed between 2005 and 2012 in two of the three main areas of immigration (given that
the UKcame to enjoy like Ireland and Denmark an opt-out clause from Amsterdam’s labour
immigration component189) and the legal actions administered by the Commission in response
are as follows:
Table 56: The UK’s infringements of EU Home Affairs Law
Year
Area of law
Infringement of
Actions taken
2005
Labour migration
Irregular migration
-
-
Asylum
2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers
formal notice
Labour migration
Irregular migration
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for
stateless persons
-
2006
Asylum
2007
2008
Labour migration
-
-
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for
stateless persons
-
-
Labour migration
Irregular migration
189
1
1
formal notice
Irregular migration
Asylum
Number of
infringements
1
reasoned opinion
-
1
However, this option allowed the UK Government to enjoy a three-month period in case it would want to
change its position to cooperate in this area.
194
Labour migration
Irregular migration
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for
stateless persons
-
Asylum
-
-
Labour migration
Irregular migration
-
-
Asylum
-
-
Labour migration
-
Asylum
2009
2010
2011
Irregular migration
2012
Asylum
Labour migration
Irregular migration
2008/114/EC on critical infrastructures and
their assessment
-
Asylum
-
referred to ECJ
-
0
0
formal notice
1
-
0
5 for
22 texts in total
Total
It seemed, accordingly, for the 22 EU legal texts the UK was throughout the assessment
period accountable for, there were 5 occurrences of law breach in total. Since the UK had an
opt-out clause from the EU legal texts concerning labour immigration and most law
infringements took place within the context of asylum, it is hard to speak of a symmetrical
distribution of violations across the three areas of immigration.
To put it as a backdrop, the UK’s accession to the EC in 1973 did not bring a radical turn in
its traditional immigration politics. The ruling governments led often by the Conservatives
and the Labour Party adopted in principle almost always a ‘gatekeeping’ role, sticking to the
main principles of immigration policy-making (regardless of their restrictive consequences for
the course of supranationalisation). As Bulmer & Burch (1998; 2004) observed, such a
cautious strategy was founded on systemic markers like the centralised, sovereignty-based
and majoritarian governing structure of the British political system, which more often than not
denied policy dispositions calling for alignment with the EU’s modus operandi.
Policy-making in immigration matters has broadly been managed by the Home Office so far.
For most of its history, the decision-making method the Home Office adopted to that effect
was intergovernmental. One can however observe an increase of commitments to the EU’s
multi-level/coalition-building for some time. In the absence of a constitutional basis
supporting supranationalisation of immigration in proper terms, such moves of approximation
remained somewhat limited. With its long established praxis of common law, the British legal
system was indeed far from catching up with the EU’s supranational dispositions which came
to be traditionally informed by the Roman law (Allen, 2005). While the domestic legal
195
structures were for instance following the 1998 Human Rights Act190 geared to a certain
extent towards the European model, adaptation of the Community law to the
domestic/national legislation remained low, around fifteen percent at most (Page, 1998).
What’s more, despite a seemingly radical change for the national government system, as it
normally would suggest a considerable shift of political weight from the executive to the
judiciary level, the ECHR’s incorporation into the domestic legal system did not make major
implications for the legislative sovereignty, mainly because of the British courts failing to
urge the UK Parliament -at times of incompatibility with the ECtHR decisions- into adopting
the legislation of the latter (Flinders, 2005). Harmonisation at low levels did in the end not
amount to high levels of Europeanisation.
A major relevant case concerned here detention of foreign nationals for an uncertain period
(on suspicion of terrorist activities), which appeared to cause controversy between the
provisions of the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act and the ECHR. In this respect,
the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, as the predecessor of the current Supreme Court of the UK,
issued a ‘declaration of incompatibility’, resulting ultimately in the change of the legislation,
albeit with its minor effects on the case of detainees. A more recent clash in the same context
arose again between the ECtHR and the Supreme Court of the UK in 2011 over the use of
‘hearsay evidence’, i.e. evidence from victims and witnesses who do not show at the
courtyards. While challenging the testimony of a witness was to the ECtHR contingent upon
attendance to court hearing, the Supreme Court commented otherwise. Following objections
from British lawyers, the grand chamber of the ECtHR refined its position to back the UK
court. This was however not a vindication for the British cause entirely, as the ECtHR found
in a follow-up case conviction of an appellant by the British government unfair and ordered
the UK to pay him financial recompensation for costs and damages (Bowcott, 2011).
Apart from signs of misfit as far as the judicial system is concerned, another source of friction
between the British and European politics of immigration relates to domestic interest groups.
The interest group system which is based on “pluralism and the normal policy style in the UK
is one of ‘bureaucratic accommodation’ and the ‘logic of negotiation’” (Ette & Gerdes, 2007,
p. 105). Jordan & Richardson (1982) point at several prominent groups and departments of
government which make up this system through “bargaining rather than imposition”,
190
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was incorporated into the British national law with the
1998 Human Rights Act.
196
suggesting a good number of policy proposals the Home Office puts forward on immigration
issues are designed in consultation with such stakeholders (Ette & Gerdes, 2007), despite
studies arguing for only marginal effects in this sense (Castles & Kosack, 1985; Freeman,
1979; Schönwälder, 2001).
Whether or not these groups have been ‘Europeanised’ to a certain extent is closely related to
their place in a broader European network, where they could voice their political positions to
a larger audience. For that, one can refer to several British NGOs which by their research
findings contend that national and international NGOs like Britain’s Immigration Law
Practitioners’ Association, the Refugee Council and the Amnesty International have already
been engaged in multi-level activities with the hope to bring various components into the
European polity (Gray & Statham, 2005). This strategy has proved fruitful in policy areas like
environmental policies; however, there is less optimism for far-reaching effects in the field of
immigration (Ette & Gerdes, 2007). Such a sceptical outlook is indeed grounded upon the
long-established roots of policy-making in immigration. With that in mind, it would be hard
to argue that involvement at an EU-level immigration management has to date generated
remarkable changes in the UK’s national politics of immigration. With the exception of some
measure of incorporation from the ECHR into the British legal structure, the status quo on
that score has seemingly been maintained for the most part.
British governments have historically taken a positive approach towards a certain level of
cooperation for communitarisation of national immigration policies. This support was mostly
limited to bilateral and intergovernmental forums between Member States (Ette & Gerdes,
2007, p. 96). At the bilateral level, cooperation on immigration matters has since the 1991
Sangatte Protocol increased in particular with France, in pursuit of a system of cross-border
controls.191 The broader intergovernmental level of cooperation started much earlier with the
1967 Naples Convention, which was the earliest political initiative concerning TCNs’
migration in Europe (Geddes, 2000). Added to this is also the Trevi Group192 where the UK
became a participant in 1975. The Council Presidency in the 1980s leading to the
establishment of an AdHoc Group on immigration as well as the signing of the Dublin
Convention, the London Resolution (concerning applications for asylum) and the drafting of
191
Under this scheme, the British immigration officers could now carry out pre-boarding controls at Eurostar
stations, including ports in France.
192
The Trevi Group was originally meant to be an initiative on terrorism but expanded later on to include
immigration issues.
197
EURODAC/European Fingerprint Database in the 1990s are other examples worth
mentioning in this context (Ette & Gerdes, 2007).
Compared to a certain degree of harmonisation, brought about through such initiatives up to
the end of the 1990s, the aftermath of Amsterdam Treaty saw marginal developments in terms
of British immigration policies’ approximation to their counterparts as part of the
supranational framework in Europe. One can in light of these proceedings argue that the mode
of Europeanisation prior to Amsterdam was informed primarily by policy learning on the
British part. However, with Amsterdam’s “substantial provisions concerning the development
of a common European immigration policy…over a five-year period [and] new institutional
and procedural regulations [transferring] central immigration matters from the third pillar to
Title IV in the first pillar”, decision-making in immigration became no more dependent on an
intergovernmental approach, but instead on “‘intensive transgovernmentalism’” (Ette &
Gerdes, 2007, p. 97).
While the UK opted out from Amsterdam’s Title IV, it maintained an option to revert with a
legislation proposal, provided the Council would be informed about it three months in
advance. The committee in charge of EU affairs in the House of Lords advised in several
occasions that opting in to the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC) and the Longterm Residents Directive (2003/109/EC) for instance would be in the UK’s interests, for they
would strengthen the rights of the economic migrants here as in the rest of the EU.
Accordingly, while with the entry into force of the Directive 2003/109/EC, third-country
national workers in the UK (including those with five year-long residence permits) would not
be able to benefit from the provisions offered in other Member States, such a restriction
would be “neither in their interests nor in the United Kingdom’s. Moreover, assimilating the
position of long-term third-country nationals’ rights to that of migrant citizens of the Union,
including by enabling participation in the political life of the country” would not just be “a
matter of improving their living and working conditions” but “also a matter of fostering their
harmonious integration into society” (House of Lords, European Union Committee, 2005, p.
43).
Transposition of EU legislation concerning immigration and asylum policies into the UK law
started essentially under the Tampere Programme. Of legal texts adapted into the national law
were most notably Council Directive 2003/9/EC on ‘Minimum Standards for the Reception of
198
Asylum-seekers’ (as a synthesis between pre-existing legislation), changes to the Immigration
Rules and the follow-up 2005 Asylum Seekers/Reception Conditions Regulations together
with the 2005 Asylum Support (Amendment) Regulations, the Qualification Directive
(2004/83/EC), which was enshrined by combining the 2006 Qualification Regulations on the
‘Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection’ and changes to the Immigration Rules
(HC 395, as amended) as well as the Procedures Directive (2005/85/EC) and the 2007
Asylum (Procedures) Regulations. The two major directives the EU issued under the ensuing
Hague Programme (2005-2010), the joint European Parliament and Council Directive ‘on
Common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying thirdcountry nationals’, also known as the Return/Removals Directive (2008/115/EC) and the
Council Directive adopted in 2009 ‘on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment’, also known as the Blue Card
Directive (2009/50/EC) were not adopted by the UK.
To the UK government, as far as the Return/Removals Directive was concerned, such
provisions would make the issue of returning even “more difficult and more bureaucratic -by
introducing restrictions on detention, obligations to provide legal aid to irregular migrants,
and increasing the possibilities for challenging the return decision- over and above the strong
protections already in place in EU law” (EP, Press Release, 2008). Indeed, in reference to the
EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) in general, the UK Government’s guiding document
stresses that the domestic approach as regulated further by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty’s JHA
Opt-in Protocol is “of significant political importance. Policy leads of all departments should
be alert to any elements of JHA policy in their dossiers (such as migration, civil, criminal
judicial and police cooperation, as set out under Title V of the TFEU) in order that the opt-in
remains protected” (HM Government, Transposition Guidance, 2011, p. 21). Put differently,
in transposing European initiatives, be they directives or regulations, a common tendency the
UK governments came to hold is to ensure that provisions of supranational texts are
transposable to the extent that these would be cost-effective, i.e. serving to the domestic needs
and interests in the long run.
5.3.3 Greece
To the Commission’s appraisal reports, the EU legal texts Greece violated as of 2005 and the
legal actions taken in response are as follows:
199
Table 57: Greece’s infringements of EU Home Affairs Law
Year
Area of law
Labour migration
2005
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
2006
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
2007
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
2008
Irregular migration
Asylum
2009
Labour migration
Irregular migration
Asylum
2010
2002/90/EC on unauthorised entry, transit and
residence
2001/55/EC on minimum standards for
displaced persons’ temporary protection;
2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers
2003/86/EC on family reunification;
2003/109/EC on long-term residence;
2004/82/EC on carriers’ communication of
passenger data
2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers;
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for
stateless persons;
Reg343/2003 on Member States responsible
for asylum applications
2004/82/EC on carriers’ communication of
passenger data; 2004/114/EC on admission for
study or training purposes;
2005/71/EC on admission for scientific
research
2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers;
Reg343/2003 on Member States responsible
for asylum applications; 2004/83/EC on
minimum standards for stateless persons
2004/114/EC on admission for study or
training purposes;
2005/71/EC on admission for scientific
research
Reg343/2003 on Member States responsible
for asylum applications
2003/109/EC on long-term residence
2005/85/EC on minimum standards for
granting and withdrawing refugee status
2003/109/EC on long-term residence
Irregular migration
2005/85/EC on minimum standards for
granting and withdrawing refugee status
2009/50/EC on highly qualified workers
2008/114/EC on critical infrastructures and
their assessment; 2008/115/EC on common
standards and procedures for returning illegal
entries/stays
2009/50/EC on highly qualified workers
-
Labour migration
2012
2003/86/EC on family reunification
Labour migration
Asylum
2011
Infringement of
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
Irregular migration
Asylum
Actions taken
Number of
infringements
formal notice
formal notice and
reasoned opinion
referred to ECJ;
formal notice and
reasoned opinion
reasoned opinion;
formal notice and
reasoned opinion;
formal notice
-
6
7
referred to ECJ
formal notice;
formal notice
reasoned opinion; formal
notice; formal notice
-
6
formal notice; reasoned
opinion; reasoned
opinion
reasoned opinion;
reasoned opinion
3
referred to ECJ
formal notice
-
2
formal notice
complementary formal
notice
complementary formal
notice
formal notice
formal notice; formal
notice
reasoned opinion
-
2
3
1
30 for
28 texts in total
Total
For the 28 EU legal texts Greece was over the 2004-2012 period in supranational terms bound
by, there were 30 instances of law breach. When viewed in terms of their distribution across
the three main immigration areas, incidents falling in labour migration and asylum matters
outnumber that of irregular migration. This result could obviously be attributed to the national
sensitivities concerning labour market privileges in Greece, specifically in light of the rising
200
number of asylum-applicants in recent times. Yet, seen in historical terms, one could come
across other defining markers of immigration policy-making in Greece.
For one, a traditionally strong executive layer in the political system is commonly the main
reason why supranational policy-making has often been treated in marginal terms in Greece
(Mavrodi, 2007, p. 170). Unlike on other issues which have often captured “the headlines of
the press …or…a central issue in Greek politics”, the two mainstream parties, PASOK and
ND, have so far tended to act in harmony when it came to migration policies (Triandafyllidou,
Maroufof, & Nikolova, 2009, p. 60). Policy-making powers and practices193 have in this field
been characterised largely by ministerial decisions and presidential decrees through which
immigration policy remained largely untouched by parliamentary scrutiny (Mavrodi, 2010, p.
10).
In seeking to implement EU norms throughout the 1990s, Greece’s compliances did not have
a significant value for non-binding policy instruments/principles agreed at the EU Councils
(for instance those concerning expansion of rights to immigrants). The 1996 Council
Resolution on the status of long-term residents was to this effect not given the green light for
almost a decade (until it became an EU Directive and was adopted in 2005 as 2003/109/EC)
on the grounds that similar provisions were already in force within the framework of the 1991
Immigration Act. A major factor to bear in mind here is the institutional legacy of the
Ministry of Public Order, which in areas concerning security issues saw it almost always a
taboo to take supranational steps. The communitarisation attempts were for this reason limited
at most to policy import from other Member States, most notably traditional immigration
destinations like France and Germany.
Despite the 2001 Immigration Act, which transferred competences in many immigration
matters (most importantly on legal immigration) from the Ministry of Public Order to the
Ministry of Interior, the latter had a poor institutional background. Nonetheless, the new
ministry moved to initiate closer cooperation at the EU-level, by for instance adopting the
Council Directives on family unification and long-term residence. A series of internal-level
institutionalisation took place in this sense to lead to the foundation of the Immigration Policy
Institute (IMEPO), which would be operating as the government’s consultancy service on
immigration matters.
193
The 1991 Immigration Act (Law 1975/1991) provided in particular extended powers for the executive.
201
For Greece, transposition of binding EU norms in the form of directives were not an easy task
at the time, as there were no legal grounds in national law to grant a comprehensive collection
of rights to foreign nationals (Mavrodi, 2010, p. 16). Full incorporation of the concerning
directives into the domestic legal order could realise only in 2007, alongside a recently
launched Immigration Act (Law 3386/2005) and relevant domestic legislation (Ministry of
Interior, 2005). The executive’s lack of experience in EU affairs was counterbalanced in this
period through IMEPO, thanks to the alternative procedures it offered in implementing
legislation on family reunification and long term-residence, upon cross-examination of policy
frameworks in the Netherlands, the UK, France, Spain, Italy and Germany (IMEPO, 2005;
2006). One can in this sense argue that it was only through fragmentation of the governmental
structure (in the form of subdivisions like IMEPO) that a more positive response to EU-level
policy-making appeared to rise.
Against a background of the PASOK- and ND-led governments throughout the 1990s up to
the mid-2000s, which had little friction over immigration policies (despite deviations in their
traditional policy-making preferences), the left-wing NGOs and the newly emerging migrant
organisations lobbied extensively to bring immigration matters to the fore. Here, the Greek
Orthodox Church was quite ineffective compared to for instance the Catholic Church in Italy
and Spain (Triandafyllidou, Maroufof, & Nikolova, 2009). Though not so willingly, the
political elites started to acknowledge gradually immigrants’ presence, for instance by making
them more room in the party structures.
Besides these pro-immigration winds, PASOK’s initiative for the naturalisation and schooling
of TCNs’ children, their voting rights in local elections as well as a number of social and
employment rights found support in other left-wing parties like the Coalition of the
Democratic Left (SYRIZA) and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). The conservative ND
on the other hand did not voice many policy plans of similar nature. While the ND issued a
series of draft legislations leading finally to the declaration of the National Migration Policy
plan (Naftemporiki, 2008), these were generally informed by concerns about possible loss of
votes to particularly the extreme right-wing parties like the Popular Orthodox Rally, LAOS
202
and the Chrysi Avgi, i.e. the Golden Dawn194 (Triandafyllidou, Maroufof, & Nikolova, 2009,
p. 63).
Compared to the political parties which were usually reluctant to integrate immigrants into
Greek politics, trade unions emerged to take more active roles. The main platform for trade
unions, the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE) and the Hellenic Forum of
Migrants as the chief federation of migrant organisations have since the 1990s underscored on
many platforms the bureaucratic and legal hurdles before immigrants’ political integration. A
most notable action worth mentioning in this context was the participation of the GSEE and
the Hellenic Forum of Migrants in a recent EU-funded programme (called EQUAL) for the
general purpose of integrating immigrants and refugees into the European labour markets.
There was for this purpose no considerable contribution from the employers’ unions such as
the SEB (Federation of Greek Industry), the Union of Greek Industries or the GSEVEE
(General Federation of Professionals, Small Manufacturers and Merchants of Greece)
(Triandafyllidou, Maroufof, & Nikolova, 2009, p. 65).
The latest EU enlargement suggested in many ways that cooperation at the supranational level
would bring about restrictions on national immigration policies (Mavrodi, 2007, p. 162). The
1985 Schengen Agreement demanded that Greece -as the newest Member State at the timeadopt policies within the context of visa regulations, unlawful immigration and border
controls as required for participation in the EU’s relevant institutional network. From this
perspective, one could argue that communitarisation of immigration policies started in Greece
as a consequence of the ‘conditionality principle’, which manifested itself clearly through the
release of the Immigration Act in 1991. The parliamentary meetings at the time witnessed
indeed frequent references to compliance with the European treaties to that effect (Greek
Parliament Plenary Sessions, 1991).
The EC law’s incorporation to the domestic legal order came out however only after the
Amsterdam Treaty’s entry into force in 1999. The main reasons for instance why the Council
Directive 2004/83/EC did not promptly lead to legislative transformation in the Greek asylum
policies had to do with either a minimum extent of ‘misfit’ between European and national
asylum frameworks or, in the case of big degrees of ‘misfit’, the Greek government’s
194
The Golden Dawn’s election campaign was mainly based on unemployment and anti-immigration rhetoric
which helped gain a large electorate support during the 2012 elections.
203
purposeful strategy to bypass major action in the initial stages (Papagianni & Naskou-Perraki,
2004, p. 146). One can in this context also name the role of Greek bureaucracy in relation to
better standards for asylum-seekers’ reception, temporary protection and procedures
concerning judicial appeal (Mavrodi, 2007, p. 164). To illustrate, although a presidential
decree declared the transposition of the Council Directive 2001/55/EC on temporary
protection and burden-sharing into the domestic legal order, there was no official adaptation
to be introduced by a ministerial decision for long (Skordas & Sitaropoulos, 2004, p. 38).
Such delays of government action in the Greek case had obviously major implications for
TCNs’ basic accommodation and social welfare needs, which initially had no legal grounds in
the Greek law and required urgent action upon replacement of the 1990 Dublin Convention.
More recently, it became quite evident that the Dublin II Convention put an increasing burden
on countries like Greece, which are located at Europe's external borders. About three quarters
of more than 100,000 irregular migrants that entered the EU in 2009 by way of Greece rose in
early 2010 by 80% (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Its commitments to Regulation 343/2003
have recently obliged Greece to accept the return of more than 10,000 asylum-seekers from
other EU Member States. The presidential decree to introduce a full-scale emergency reform
in this context was postponed as a consequence of the recent economic crisis and the
government change in 2012.
There were aside from the principle of conditionality other factors that characterised the basic
patterns of Greek immigration policy-making. For instance, despite lack of obligation
concerning the EU’s non-binding legislation such as on recognition of refugee status, the
Presidential Decree 61/1999 declared incorporation of this Community law into the domestic
legal order.195 In a similar vein, the 2001 legal amendments concerning family reunification
did not come as a consequence of some external pressure, either. In either way, the then ruling
government was watching “a balance between specific, Greek domestic interests and the
country’s international, mostly EU, obligations” (Mavrodi, 2007, pp. 165-166). What’s more,
bearing in mind that the 2001 Immigration Act’s introduction dated before the transposition of
relevant EU norms, it would not be fair to consider the formation of the domestic law to be a
direct outcome of the Community legislation. In response to the oppositional pressure to
195
Article 4 of the Presidential Decree makes direct reference to the earlier (1992) Resolutions of the Council on
“manifestly unfounded asylum applications and the concept of safe third host country, stipulating that these
Resolutions should be used as interpretative guidelines in practice” (Skordas & Sitaropoulos, 2004, p. 31).
204
further approximate to EU legislation on family reunification, the Greek government moved
to attach its priorities with illegal residence, for the new act was serving well with the EU
framework (Ministry of Interior, 2001). The ensuing 2005 Immigration Act drew on the other
hand more inspiration from the EU law. The former act’s provisions on the improvement of
conditions for family reunification and the status of long-term residents were in essence
informed by obligations to liberalise the national immigration legislation (Ministry of Interior,
2005).
The role of the judiciary throughout the policy adaptation process deserves also particular
mention. According to Articles 2, 5 and 28 of the 1975 Greek Constitution, the domestic legal
order had to be in conformity with the provisions of the ratified international treaties (Skouris
& Venizelos, 1985). In this sense, the EU Treaties and European Convention of Human
Rights as well as the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) emerged as providers of international norms into the Greek
law. That said, there was over a long period (1990-2005) no major impact of the ECtHR and
ECJ on the immigration law. From the ECJ’s perspective, the rules Amsterdam introduced as
part of the Justice and Home Affairs required Greek courts’ compliance to a certain extent.
However, the latter made in this period no major reference to TCNs’ rights to entry, residence
and labour, contrary to their for instance Dutch, German or British counterparts (Mavrodi,
2010, p. 24). Similarly, the eight cases for which Greece was a defendant at the ECtHR
between 1993 and 2007 ended with a verdict against it, that is to say, Greece was found to
have violated the European Convention of Human Rights.
5.3.4 Italy
Based on the Commission’s annual assessment reports for the selected period of analysis,
Italy’s infringements of the EU legal texts and the legal actions taken in response are as
follows:
Table 58: Italy’s infringements of EU Home Affairs Law
Year
2005
2006
Area of law
Infringement of
Actions taken
Labour migration
Irregular migration
2003/86/EC on family reunification
-
Asylum
2003/9/EC on reception of asylum-seekers
Labour migration
2003/86/EC on family reunification;
2003/109/EC on long-term residence;
Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 on uniform
residence permits
formal notice
formal notice and
reasoned opinion
reasoned opinion;
formal notice and
reasoned opinion;
formal notice
205
Number of
infringements
3
7
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
2007
2008
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
2009
2010
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
2011
Irregular migration
Asylum
Labour migration
Irregular migration
2012
Asylum
2004/81/EC on residence in illegal cases;
2004/82/EC on carriers’ communication of
passenger data
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for
stateless persons
2003/86/EC on family reunification;
2003/109/EC on long-term residence;
2004/114/EC on admission for study or
training;
2005/71/EC on admission for scientific
research
2005/85/EC on minimum standards for
granting and withdrawing refugee status
Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 on uniform
residence permits
2003/109/EC on long-term residence;
2009/50/EC on highly qualified workers
2008/114/EC on critical infrastructures and
their assessment;
2008/115/EC on common standards and
procedures for returning illegal entries/stays
2003/109/EC
on long-term residence
2003/9/EC
on minimum standards for reception of
asylum-seekers;
2004/83/EC on minimum standards for
stateless persons;
2005/85/EC on minimum standards for
granting and withdrawing refugee status;
Regulation (EC) 343/2003on Member States
responsible for asylum applications
formal notice;
formal notice
formal notice
referred to ECJ;
referred to ECJ;
formal notice;
formal notice
4
1
formal notice
referred to ECJ
formal notice;
formal notice and
reasoned opinion
formal notice;
formal notice
1
0
5
complementary formal
notice
-
formal notice;
formal notice;
formal notice;
formal notice
5
26 for
28 texts in total
Total
The 28 EU legal texts Italy was in this period supranationally liable to saw, as it appeared, 26
instances of law breach in total. To the above-given distribution, these infringements seem to
have taken place mostly within the context of labour migration and asylum matters. This
breakdown might to a certain extent suggest how sensitive labour market management in Italy
recently became specifically in the face of rising numbers of asylum-seekers. Based on
patterns of immigration in historical terms, one could still identify other dynamics shaping the
course of action here.
For all the delays and flaws in moving towards communitarisation of national policies,
immigration matters in Italy have generally tended to align with the EU standards. To
generalise that for the entire political domain would however not really be well founded.
206
Initially, in the 1980s, a host of interest groups led by the Catholic Church and trade unions
played a vital role for the public perception of immigration (Sciortino, 1999). To them, the
core issue was easy to grasp if approached from labour market perspectives, and stressed the
need for strict control over its links to irregularities (Magnani, 2012). This was indeed a rather
security outlook informed largely by the position of business circles at the time, which would
soon inspire the formulation of the Martelli Law.
As of the 1990s, immigration became gradually a major political battleground between the
left and right-wing parties. While those on the right denied as a rule the structural demands of
the immigration agenda, there appeared gradually a growth of declarations acknowledging
both the EU and national dimensions of the matter. To illustrate, the 2007 Carta dei Valori
(Chart of Values) assigned specific roles onto the mass media for the encouragement of
cultural pluralism and fight against xenophobia, as it was aspired in other Member States.
Although there was alongside these calls direct implications for the rise of religious and
cultural diversity in the country, it was to some the old societal traditions or the fundamental
values of Italians that were emphasised in the first place (Peres, Coux & Motard, 2009).
Following the early 1990s, when Italy had to face large-scale immigration waves mainly from
Albania and the former Yugoslavian Republic, immigration management started to undergo a
process of politicisation change, based for the most part on center-left discourses. Parties like
the Movimento Sociale Italiano (the Italian Social Movement) and Partito Repubblicano
Italiano (the Republican Party) were in particular determined to replace the elite discourses by
locating immigration at the center of their electoral campaigns. Indeed, with a new
understanding of solidarity which sought to mediate between values characteristic of the
Catholic tradition and the non-conservative tendencies, these parties played an active role in
introducing immigration matters to a broader segment of the society.
A milestone for the change of the elite discourse proved to be the coalition governments in the
1990s. The Ulivo coalition of the Christian Democrats, the Italian Socialist Party and a
number of small centrist parties led by Romano Prodi made a clear difference to that effect.
To ease concerns during reform debates on illegal immigration, for which the extreme leftists
in the coalition offered an ‘equality discourse’ seeing immigrants as holders of the same legal
rights as nationals, Prodi proposed to be mindful of the complexities involved, hinting
specifically at the illegal dimension. Much in the same way, the Minister of Social Affairs
207
Livia Turco explained to the Italian daily the Repubblica that “clandestines, who have never
looked the State in the face, and irregulars who contribute to our society and try to put
themselves in order” could not be seen alike (as cited in Magnani, 2012, p. 655).
Following this frame of mind in its core, the 1998 Turco–Napolitano Law reduced application
of immediate ‘forced expulsion’ mainly to undocumented immigrants (Einaudi, 2007). While
the Ulivo coalition was seeking a more effective way to manage labour migration, that is,
showing the right way or ‘the front door’ to enter the country (Zincone, 2006), it was offering
reconstruction of Italian identity as a core component of European identity at the same time
(Pasquino, 2003). Indeed, compared to the rhetoric used by many centre-right governments in
the past, there was under the centre-left rule less emphasis on national interests.
To be sure, the shift in perceptions of national identity and the ensuing legal rearrangements
were characterised to a great extent by Italy’s efforts to comply with the Schengen agreement.
As the then Interior Minister Napolitano put it, there were reservations “that Italy would not
be admitted because Italian borders are not trustable, because Italy is a colander and the soft
belly of Europe” (as cited in Magnani, 2012, p. 652). Locating the EU context at the center of
immigration debate by this means had indeed a direct influence on the traditional
understanding of immigration control. The rise of a new discourse conforming to
supranational goals across many EU Member States was now ruling Italian immigration
politics as well. With this new paradigm, immigration management began to be seen as part of
a structural problem which was ‘natural’ and had to be grasped in light of the unfavorable
economic and political conditions in sending countries.
The 2002 Bossi–Fini Act (following the 1998 Turco-Napolitano Law) did not introduce a new
legal order until 2009. There were times the governments arranged ‘quick’ legislative
packages in this period. To illustrate, the centre-left government passed in 2007 an emergency
decree allowing for deportation of EU citizens and their family members (in response to the
rape and murder of an Italian citizen by a non-national at the time). This was in fact quite
momentary for the history of the right-left immigration discourses, as the radical left criticised
the decree for holding fascist tones, whereas it was for the governing Democratic Party rather
a question of rights and a security matter to the Italian citizens (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009).
The securitisation logic pervading over the early 2000s was preserved by the ensuing
Berlusconi government in 2009, which as an alliance between the Forza Italia, the Northern
208
League and the National Alliance passed Law 94/2009 to reinforce fight against irregular
migration, as it was linked in the new law to auxiliary issues such as organised crimes and
urban security (Merlino, 2009). Such rather conservative tendencies (which replaced the
leftist narratives in the 1990s) aimed, as a member of the extreme right National Alliance
party put it, “to improve the quality of immigration by promoting initiatives of vocational
training and pre-emptive screening in the countries of origin” (as cited in Magnani, 2012, p.
657). Accordingly, Italy could profit from the unremitting flows of immigrants only if they
would bring skilled labour and could undergo cultural and/or social assimilation (Magnani,
2012).
It would be fair to argue that that the EU law has been a major source of influence upon
Italy’s legal documents on immigration. That said, policies in this scope were until the 1998
Turco-Napolitano Law chiefly driven by regularisation attempts, which in principle sought to
ease undocumented migration and heavy pressure on borders (Campani, 2007). One should at
this point remember that Italy did not take part in the formulation of the Schengen Treaty. To
some, this absence reasoned essentially from the lack of a concise immigration framework at
the time (Pastore, 2008). To help remove EC-wide concerns for the proper functioning of
Schengen, a new act via Law 943/1986 was put into force. With the 1990 Martelli Law, early
provisions in the 1986 law were enhanced further in light of the Schengen’s conditionality,
which eventually made way for Italy’s official entry to the border-free zone. Then, a further
set of legal arrangements came with the Turco-Napolitano law, which consolidated Schengen
as part of the EU law, following the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.
While these initial moves appear to be parts of a whole making the impression that Italy was
harmonising its immigration policies with those of major EU members, there was scepticism
given the “discrepancy between the law ‘on the books’ and the law ‘in action’” (Calavita,
2004, p. 369). To illustrate, decision-makers on illegal immigration made initially minor
references to migrants’ rights (despite Amsterdam’s provisions contrariwise), but instead to
mass regularisation policies, as the country was then grappling with huge migrant flows in
particular from North Africa (Brick, 2011).
The EU Council’s Directive 2008/115/EC evokes obligations in this context, especially with
respect to the right to seek asylum (under both the European Convention on Human Rights
and the Geneva Convention). Accordingly, Italy's recent practices of for instance sending
209
boats carrying asylum-seekers in the absence of a screening procedure away have been acts of
denial of asylum-seeking rights. This issue was raised clearly in a report by the Council of
Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CPT), which blamed the Italian authorities for having “knowingly pushed back
particularly vulnerable persons and perhaps also persons who could attest to their status as
refugees” (Council of Europe, 2010). Italy on the other side pointed out the bilateral
agreements it signed with North African countries, according to which it preserved the right to
stop those from disembarking on the Italian soil and lodging asylum claims.196 The oftreferred 2008 European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was indeed consenting to the
signing of such bilateral agreements with these countries; however, as the criticism went,
Italy’s main responsibility in such cases was checking into the political and human rights
conditions in North Africa than seeking ways to justify the readmission negotiations.
At the time this research was being carried out, a number of EU legal texts were still not
entirely transposed in the Italian legal/political order. A most notable amongst them was the
Council Directive 2004/114/EC, whose transposition deadline dated back to 2007. According
to the Commission reports, basic requirements for TCN students’ admission for study
purposes and training or voluntary service were in Italy not properly transferred into the
domestic law (European Commission, 2011d). Much in a similar vein, Council Directives
2003/109/EC (on long-term residence) and Directive 2003/86/EC (on family reunification)
could be transferred to the national order with long delays. Despite its transposition, the
implementation of the Directive 2003/109/EC in particular was not accommodated to the EC
standards. The problem here stemmed from the fact that the status of legally resident TCNs in
Italy was often treated as ‘temporary’, irrespective of their overall duration of stay. What’s
more, periods of lawful and continuous residence as part of the framework regarding longterm residence status were not really observed. As a matter of fact, leaving all these aside, one
could argue according to the recent Commission reports (2011c) that Italy violated in many
occasions even EU citizens’ intra-EU mobility rights, by subjecting them to annual
immigration quotas or imposing restrictions on their employment in public service.
It is today common to hear Italian officials making references to the Directive 2001/55/EC
(‘on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of
196
For example, the ‘Treaty of Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation’ it signed in 2008 with Libya.
210
displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in
receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof’) to call attention that the EU
should use more initiatives on ‘burden sharing’, raise the competences of FRONTEX for
more effective border controls and take active roles in creating and managing centers across
the Union. Within this same context of crisis management, there was also official reference to
the need for an amount of minimum 100 million Euros in the initial stages (European
Migration Network, 2012b).
As formerly mentioned, the Italian governments have so far volunteered in many occasions to
abide by the EU norms and standards, particularly since the country’s bid for accession to the
Schengen Area in the 1980s, and transpose relevant supranational texts into the national law.
Nevertheless, the unceasing clandestine/irregular influxes specifically from North Africa have
for long been posing enormous challenges vis-à-vis implementation of the adopted EU
directives and regulations in the national law. To bring the national legal order in conformity
with the Council’s Returns Directive (Directive 2008/115/EC) and standardise procedures in
coping with undocumented migration, the Italian Parliament ratified in 2011 a decree law. A
fundamental aim of the new regulation under this Law 89/2011 was to restore an immediate
procedure in the event of compulsory expulsion for reasons of threat to public order and
security. What’s more, with this new provision, the maximum length of administrative
detention in the Centri di Accoglienza and Centri di Permanenza Temporanea e Assistenza
(Centres for Identification and Expulsion) was extended from six to eighteen months (Jonjic
& Mavrodi, 2012, p. 106).
5.4 Summary
5.4.1 Germany
The early decades following the end of WW II saw in Germany a period of dynamic economy
encouraging full employment and therewith a relatively easygoing relationship between the
‘newcomers’ and the host society. Three main factors informed this alliance. First, the jobs
offered to immigrant workers were generally not those the indigenous were interested to take.
Second, the initial concerns that the trade unions had in cases where newcomers took betterpaid positions -as this would possibly cause the wages to go down- were allayed by the ruling
governments, which promised equal terms/conditions between foreign and domestic workers.
And third, a great majority of immigrants came under the ‘guest-worker’ programmes and
there was widespread conviction that their stay would be ‘temporary’.
211
To be fair, this harmonious setting coincided with a period of EC integration which found farreaching approval amongst Germans, of the elite and the ordinary alike. One could on that
score argue that Europeanisation of national policies did not meet major political barriers in
the initial stages. As of the 1970s, however, with signs of a stagnant economy spreading out
largely from the global oil crisis at the time, the initial ‘permissive consensus’ started to
change into a ‘constraining dissensus’ across the EU lands (Hooghe & Marks, 2006). The
impacts of this turn are today still thick on the ground, in particular with regard to public
impressions about immigrants/immigration.
A series of Eurobarometer surveys carried out over the last decade checked into public
opinions with the aim to find out whether or not immigration was a main concern for the EU
citizens. The results in the German case demonstrated:
Table 59: Immigration as the main concern in Germany (in percentages)
Year of analysis
Country
2003
2008
2012
Germany
5
6
8
EU 15/27
13
11
8
Based on Standard EBs 59 (2003), 69 (2008) and 78 (2012).
While figures in Germany tended to rank much lower than the EU average, it appeared, there
was a steady rise in public impressions regarding immigration as more serious a matter than it
formerly was. Indeed, this picture gives grounds for the findings of another survey, where one
tested item on matters concerning immigration was EU citizens’ opinions on whether or not
“Immigrants are a threat to [our] way of life” (Special Eurobarometer 60.1). The results for
the German context revealed a considerable 39% who believed in one way or another that
immigrants were threatening their ways of life.
Turning to the supranational context in light of these disillusioned thoughts, one could
perhaps find more relevance in why the process of EU Directives’ implementation in national
legal/political orders of Germany sought delays and/or incorporation into the national law
with certain trade-offs. To talk in specific, transposition of ‘subsidiary protection’ as the main
scheme of 2004/83/EC Qualification Directive (on minimum standards for the qualification
212
and status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees) was for a long time far
from being in full force and effect. In effect, its eventual transferral with a rough form (at
minimum standards) caused the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) to
contend with the European Court of Justice (Amnesty International, 2007). While the Council
Directive 2005/85/EC (on minimum standards about refugee status) and the replacement of
the 1990 Dublin Convention through the Dublin II via Regulation (EC) 343/2003 did not
cause major conflicts between national and supranational frameworks (thanks to similar
domestic provisions which were at the time already in force), the Council Directives
2002/90/EC, 2004/81/EC, 2004/82/EC, 2003/9/EC and 2008/115/EC took a relatively lengthy
period to get transposed into the domestic law, mainly because of their implications for a
radical change of the relevant national order. A most recent case related in this sense to the
2009 Blue Card Directive (2009/50/EC). Despite the EU regulation prescribing that holders of
Blue Cards should be paid higher than the average rate in a Member State, the coalition
government at the time attempted to defy it by lowering the benchmark to an earlier tariff and
raising time limits for acquisition of these cards to a maximum (Deutsche Welle, 2012).
Following a long process of parliamentary debates, however, a policy plan was adopted in a
law package called Berufsqualifikationsfeststellungsgesetz, BQFG (the Professional
Qualifications Assessment Act).
For matters concerning irregular migration in Germany, the use of EU-formulated
arrangements came in quite handy for the restoration of national legal/political order. Indeed,
this method of ‘venue-shopping’ or ‘escape to Europe’ was in the German case quite
reasonable in particular when it became obvious that making a domestic reform, for instance
in the area of asylum, would be much more demanding than adopting an EU legislation (in
view of the matter’s ties to the German Constitution). Either way, the German legal order
presented in the face of the community law often low levels of ‘misfit’. That is to say, despite
occasional political controversy, most EC directives and regulations were adopted into the
national law without being exposed to radical changes. In the end, the direction of policy
adaptation for German immigration often vacillated between ‘inertia’ and ‘absorption’.
Looking into the legal aspects of immigration by way of MIPEX data, one could conclude
that conditions applying to TCNs in Germany showed significant signs of improvement. Yet,
these could still be interpreted as ‘halfway favourable’ when compared to many other
established immigration lands in the EU:
213
Figure 8: Conditions for TCNs in Germany
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
EU 15 2007
EU 27 2010
Germany 2007
Germany 2010
Education was not an area of
analysis in 2007
Based on MIPEX II & III.
To illustrate, Germany was classified on the 31-country MIPEX list as an ‘average’ country in
terms of the educational opportunities and family reunion prospects its TCNs enjoyed.
Conditions for anti-discrimination and permanent residence appeared here even lower than the
EU average. The 2007 EU-Richtlinienumsetzungsgesetz rose to be promising in many ways to
that end. Yet, the recently adopted integration tests posed considerable setbacks, in particular
due to the additional red-tape they involved. Thanks to better consultancy services at the
Länder level, one can all the same mention signs of improvement.
5.4.2 The UK
The ‘guest-worker’ schemes in the German case, which led to the initial impression that
immigration would not necessarily translate into permanent stay, do not apply much to the
British case. An earlier instance of politicisation and a progressive development of
institutional frameworks as far as immigration management was concerned took place here in
the absence of recruitment programmes. That being the case, to revamp the war-stricken
economic state at the time and partly because of the will to restore the blemished imperial
image, the Labour-led British governments were in the early post-WW II period generally in
favour of immigration, specifically from the country’s former colonies. The Conservative-led
right-wing foregrounded in response domestic concerns about international labour. Added to
that, the ongoing imperialist sentiments had the capacity to promote counter-immigration
214
feelings further, not least because there was widespread discrimination all around. Indeed, a
long trail of these convictions stretches into present times.
Recent Eurobarometer surveys held amongst others to look into immigration as the main
concern in the EU Member States revealed in this sense supportive evidence:
Table 60: Immigration as the main concern in the UK (in percentages)
Year of analysis
Country
2003
2008
2012
UK
32
35
24
EU 15/27
13
11
8
Based on Standard EBs 59 (2003), 69 (2008) and 78 (2012).
It appreaed, accordingly, tackling unwanted immigration signified for the British respondents
a matter of greater urgency than it was for those from other EU nations. These findings testify
indeed to the outcomes of another survey which looked into whether or not immigration could
be perceived by the EU citizens as a ‘threat’ to their ways or life (Special Eurobarometer
Wave 60.1). A remarkable 54% of the British respondents returned with ‘yes’, suggesting
they believed immigrants were one way or another a source of threat to them.
When seen in a European context, the late accession of the UK to the EC in 1973 (following
two failed attempts in 1963 and 1967) could be interpreted as a natural consequence of the
country’s skeptical thoughts concerning the EU integration. And yet, even after its entry into
the EC, the supranational policy formulations did not really hint at radical changes for the
UK’s legal/political order. It is however important to note that minimal adaptations required
in the British context hardly covered the legal/labour area, but instead came as an outcome of
the largely security-based agenda of the two other areas –irregular immigration and asylum
matters- for which the country volunteered to adopt supranational initiatives selectively. Put
more precisely, of all the 45 EU initiatives falling in the area of immigration and asylum
(these were made up of 13 directives, 17 regulations and 15 decisions), the British ‘opt-in’
was applicable to 27 texts, marking 60% participation in the policy field (Ette & Gerdes,
2007, p. 98). While such a rate seemed fairly reasonable (given the traditional ‘British
exceptionalism’ towards supranational ends), in fact, a largely selective strategy was ruling
this cooperation, insofar as the UK declared to opt-out from entitlements within the area of
labour migration.
215
Seen from this latter perspective, the relatively smooth transposition/implementation of EU
the texts concerning asylum-seeking so far was not as impressive as it initially appeared.
Indeed, since becoming Europe’s biggest recipient of asylum-seekers in the early 2000s,
adaptation of the EU legislations into the national order was in the UK relatively effortless,
yielding a somewhat uncomplicated transposition of the Council Directives 2001/55/EC (on
temporary protection to displaced persons), 2003/9/EC (on minimum standards for the
reception of asylum-seekers), 2004/83/EC (on minimum standards for the qualification and
status of third-country nationals or stateless persons as refugees), 2005/85/EC (on minimum
standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status) and
Regulations such as 343/2003 (defining asylum criteria) and 439/2010 (establishing a
European Asylum Support Office). The other area where the UK cooperated within the
framework of supranationalisation of immigration policies was irregular migration, for which
it transposed most importantly 2001/51/EC (supplementing the Schengen Agreement),
2002/90/EC (on unauthorised entry, transit and residence), 2011/36/EC (on humantrafficking), 2001/40/EC (on the expulsion of third-country nationals) as well as Regulations
(EC) 2007/2004 (establishing FRONTEX) and 2725/2000 (on EURODAC) into its national
legal order.
The conditions the UK offered its TCN residents in the selected period of analysis appeared in
broad terms ‘slightly less favourable’ (MIPEX III). Recent concerns about non-EU nationals’
costs vs. benefits vis-à-vis labour markets, in particular following the 2004 EU enlargement,
were worked out in 2008 to present a points-based system which introduced limitations to
TCNs’ labour market access. While this move indicated a change of paradigm in that labour
policies were now to be qualification-based (not purely seeking ‘control’), the highly
demanding conditions required from third-country nationals illustrated a largely restrictionist
frame of mind.
The strength of British immigration policies in terms of third-country nationals’ integration
related very much to the state’s effective anti-discrimination measures so far. Conditions
which were of relevance to political participation, family reunion and labour market in the
first place indicated average values; those concerning long-term residence suggested however
lower standards compared to the 2007 data:
216
Figure 9: Conditions for TCNs in the UK
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
EU 15 2007
EU 27 2010
The UK 2007
The UK 2010
Education was not an area of
analysis in 2007
Based on MIPEX II & III.
5.4.3 Greece
Given its entire migration history in the 20th century, Greece proved to be a case in point for
an emigration country. The sporadic inflows in the first decades of the post-WW II period
were featuring broadly those of ‘return’ to a predominantly agricultural land where the
economy and relevant institutional structures were not mature enough to attract large-scale
foreign labour force. The big unemployment rates at the time encouraged sizeable emigration
to industrialised lands in Europe, North America and Australia. To speak of immigration here,
in its proper sense, one needs to refer to the 1980s when many in the country’s immediate
neighbourhood came in search of better political/economic prospects.
Judging by a series of Eurobarometer surveys conducted over the last decade, one catches the
impression that immigration was here not necessarily viewed as a ‘main concern’:
Table 61: Immigration as the main concern in Greece (in percentages)
Year of analysis
Country
2003
2008
2012
Greece
6
4
7
EU 15/27
13
11
8
Based on Standard EBs 59 (2003), 69 (2008) and 78 (2012).
By comparison to the EU averages these rates were relatively low. Yet, seeing to another
survey held in the same period, it is possible to argue that the growing influxes in the country
in fact gave rise to progressively negative attitudes towards immigration (Special
Eurobarometer Wave 60.1). Of several policy matters used to check into the public opinion
217
here, the immigration bit included a straightforward question inquiring about whether
immigrants were causing a threat to the EU citizens’ way of life. In the Greek case, a striking
69% returned with agreement. This meant in plain text that a big majority of nationals in
Greece believed immigrants were threatening their lives.
While such reflections might be interpreted as voices against a supranational framework of
immigration in Greece today, the country’s early EU history was characterised largely by
requirements for EU membership and accession to the Schengen Zone. Incorporation of
relevant EU texts into the national order indicated a diverse range of policy adaptation in that
context. The process of supranationalisation was showing here its different ‘faces’, including
voluntary incorporation, conditionality and formal obligation (Mavrodi, 2007, p. 172). Many
supranational texts were either ‘absorbed’ or ‘transformed’, amounting in the end to various
degrees of change in the existing political/legal order. These outcomes were initially
attributed to the country’s little experience in immigration/asylum policy-making and the
inadequate institutional structure. The legacy of these handicaps, as one may refer to them, is
all too evident at present.197
Further to the conditionality principle, which demanded by definition the alignment of the
Greek immigration management with the European norms/regulations, there were in the early
2000s instances of voluntary cooperation, specifically in relation to asylum matters. Indeed, in
view of the rising numbers of asylum applications at the time, cooperation within the EU’s
broad protective security framework would be to the national interests of Greece. A number
of supranational measures were drawn up on that score, such as 2001/55/EC (on minimum
standards for temporary protection), 2003/9/EC (on minimum standards for the reception of
asylum-seekers) and 2004/83/EC (on minimum standards for international protection).
Transposition of these texts into the Greek order did not run smoothly, not least because of the
bureaucratic hurdles in the state structure. A further aspect to note at this last point was the
role of ‘client politics’ in Greece, which in fact was rooted in its faulty party system.
A last major issue to bear in mind within the context of ‘downloading’ EU norms into the
institutional structure of Greece concerned the role of the judiciary system. While the Greek
197
The EU Commission decided recently to provide Greece with counselling service on training and
administration for immigration matters (European Commission, Staff Working Paper, 2010).
218
courts appeared in general to be safeguarding TCN rights, there were times they did not
observe the jurisprudence of the ECJ/ECtHR on that account. To illustrate, communitarisation
efforts concerning immigration and asylum matters were during the transposition of EU
legislations paralysed occasionally by the Greek courts’ deferrals, reminding as a matter of
fact the executive’s default position (seeking as a rule to ‘upload’ national preferences to the
supranational institutions in the first place).
The general conditions the TCNs enjoy in Greece are to recent data of ‘average’ value.
Figure 10: Conditions for TCNs in Greece
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
EU 15 2007
EU 27 2010
Greece 2007
Greece 2010
Education was not an area of
analysis in 2007
Based on MIPEX II & III.
There were in recent times signs of improvement across long-term residence, political
participation, access to nationality and anti-discrimination, when seen by MIPEX standards.
One needs to note here however that it was the ‘minimum standards’ that counted in most
cases, particularly on matters concerning family reunion, permanent residence and antidiscrimination. Nevertheless, amongst a total of 31 countries on MIPEX, Greece was
observed to have made the most considerable progress to that effect.198
5.4.4 Italy
Similar to Greece, Italy lacked until about a couple of decades ago basic legal provisions with
regard to the area of immigration. Incorporation of EU legal arrangements to the Italian order
generally vouched for patterns of ‘absorption’ and ‘transformation’, depending on the extent
198
In acquiring these data, the MIPEX III cautioned possible shortcomings to be stemming from the Greek
state’s inadequate statistical services so far.
219
of proximity between the national and supranational frameworks. Like in all other Member
States, accommodation to supranational texts (on immigration) underwent phases of footdragging here. Despite eventual transposition, their full implementation across the national
legal/political order was not really the case.
As formerly stated, mass immigration is in Italy a late phenomenon of the 1970s, when the
former emigrant population started to return in growing measures, and more importantly in
the early 1980s with the industrial growth in the north. It comes in this sense as no surprise
the launch of the first comprehensive immigration law in Italy dates back only to 1986. To be
fair, a major determinant behind this relatively new phenomenon for the country was the entry
restrictions introduced by the established destinations in northern Europe. The tighter the
borders became in the latter, in other words, the more popular Italy became as a destination
country for migrants.
It is particularly important to note that a significant share of the hitherto flows to Italy were
made up of asylum-seekers. The number of entry attempts by way of deadly boat trips grew to
alarming rates in recent times. Those managing to reach the nearest destinations, most notably
the islands of Lampedusa, Sicily and Sardinia, were usually sent back to their countries of
origin. There were certainly cases of transferral to the so-called identification and detention
centres. Still, the rate of expulsion has been generally high so far.199
In case of criticism following in this thread that Italy’s practices of interception and/or
forcible return were not compatible with the EU’s legal provisions, most importantly the
Council Directive 2008/115/EC (on common standards and procedures for returning illegal
entries/stays), the Italian officials often claimed that the area of ‘operation’ was the high seas
(Human Rights Watch, 2009).200 After all, as the argument went, the Council Directive
2001/55/EC was allowing Italy to implement the concerning EU norms only with ‘minimum’
requirements.
In reading the rationale behind Italy’s immigration management until recent times, one could
refer to the changing public attitudes towards ‘newcomers’ in the country. A series of
199
Those who could make it to the Italian territory were not always welcome by warm feelings. The 2010 riots in
Rosarno, a town in Reggio Calabria, was a clear evidence of locals’ negative reaction their arrivals.
200
Or else (if in Italian waters), they would have enjoyed the non-refoulement principle.
220
Eurobarometer surveys carried out amongst EU citizens in 2003, 2008 and 2012 sought
amongst others to identify whether or not respondents would be locating immigration as a
main concern their countries were facing at the time. The results gathered from the Italian
participants showed:
Table 62: Immigration as the main concern in Italy (in percentages)
Year of analysis
Country
2003
2008
2012
Italy
13
7
2
EU average
13
11
8
Based on Standard EBs 59 (2003), 69 (2008) and 78 (2012).
These lower rates, as compared to those reported in many other EU countries, could imply
that issues concerning immigration were not in need of urgent treatment for Italians. Another
survey carried out in a similar context revealed, however, a fairly different outcome. To the
Eurobarometer survey checking into the EU citizens’ attitudes towards immigrants as “a
threat to [our] way of life”, 38% of the Italian respondents agreed to the question (Special
Eurobarometer 60.1). This meant a considerable number of Italians were at the time thinking
that immigrants in their country were somehow threatening their ways of life.
Despite a wide range of limitations, such as working quotas, the economic recession hitting
the job markets in the country to a worrying level and the ‘push-back’ policies to North Africa
in recent times, the conditions third-country nationals enjoyed in Italy were by MIPEX
standards of the best in Europe.
Figure 11: Conditions for TCNs in Italy
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
EU 15 2007
EU 27 2010
Italy 2007
Italy 2010
Education was not an area of
analysis in 2007
Based on MIPEX II & III.
221
It seemed standards for family reunion and long-term residence were here particulary high,
though measures concerning the latter issue deteriorated lately, owing much to the new
security law which made integration conditions ‘slightly less favourable’. While it turned to
be way above the EU average, the situation concerning third-country nationals’ labour market
conditions in Italy did not show signs of improvement. What’s more, there were during the
selected period of analysis neither active voting rights nor citizenship reforms in sight.
Although the anti-discrimination regulations got slightly better lately, they were still in need
of refinement, when for instance compared to those in other major immigration destinations
across Europe.
222
Conclusion
Based on the findings in Chapter 5, the study rounds off its investigation here to the degree
that the selected cases are representative of the entire research area. Three steps will be
followed for that purpose. First, to provide definitive answers to the research questions, the
findings as to the changing patterns of immigration policies in Germany, the UK, Greece and
Italy are encapsulated to give an overall account of the extent of their Europeanisation and
similarities/differences in this context. These results are reviewed later in light of the research
hypotheses to reconsider, specifically, the latter’s explanatory capacity for the former. And
finally, an overall summary is provided in the third step to speak a last word on what the
gathered research outcomes might signify for future studies in this area.
Assessment
Studying the selected cases in line with the bottom-up research model involves, as formerly
explained, an analysis at all levels, assuming that the so-called supranational rules,
regulations, practices and ideological factors rise originally at the national level, then evolve
into Community standards to finally have collective impacts back upon the national level,
traversing the EU’s wider scope of diffusion. Such premises entail necessarily a historical
investigation of the key events/turning points for the management of immigration policies.
The principles of the top-down perspective, as one of the two mainstream methods used in
Europeanisation research, are taken in this study to be in the stock of its rival bottom-up
model already. Accordingly, the latter holds the capacity to offer two main directions as to
influence upon domestic policy changes. The first and fundamental one comprises the
‘uploading’ potential of Member States as far as the making of supranational policies is
concerned. To this end, for the production of an overarching policy-making structure,
Member States can simulate (or interact with) one another, or even other countries outside the
EU. The second direction of influence is in contrast one of ‘downloading’ to the degree that
policy-making is rooted first and foremost in supranational origins.
The prefatory ‘uploading’ leg of the inquiry has been fulfilled by exploration of the selected
cases’ histories of immigration, their institutional frameworks together with key policy
indicators in recent times as provided by the Migration Integration Policy Index. To bring this
223
task to an end, the target Member States’ legal performances were studied in relation to the
Community law, regarding these as the key markers for the ‘downloading’ nature of policy
diffusion in the entire process of Europeanisation.
Research question one: Europeanisation of immigration policies
The ‘uploading’ investigation of institutional frameworks starting from case-specific factors
at the national level, including the selected Member States’ immigration histories,
political/legislative structures and principal actors in immigration management delivered that
the relatively recent advent of influxes and precarious political systems in Greece and Italy
held back robust institutional frameworks in this category. Although policy adaptations
guided by supranational objectives ran across measures of deliberation in all four cases, the
extent of mistrust in Germany proved lower than in others, not only because of the former’s
comprehensive institutional arrangement but also due to the far-reaching political consensus
on the ‘EU project’ in the country. Regardless of its similarly strong institutional layout, the
UK stands out here as a chronic case of ‘Euroscepticism’. Indeed, the entire history of
supranationalism abounds with British reservations, irrespective of their relevance to
immigration. That being the case, the far-reaching immigration experiences, legal tools and
measures it developed for management on that score as well as a mature democracy and
political culture it characteristically had to its name gave way for a strong institutional
framework, similar to that in the German case, and yet, unlike those in Greece and Italy:
Table 63: Overview of historical, legal, political and institutional characteristics
Cases
Germany
UK
Greece
Italy
Main political features
Strength of
institutional
frameworks
relatively longer experiences in the
immigration field; a largely receiving country
of labour immigrants (as of the end of WW II)
longest experiences in the immigration field
due to a long colonial background; a largely
receiving country of labour immigrants (as of
the early 20th century
limited/recent experiences in the immigration
field; a largely sending country of labour
emigrants (until the 1980s)
Earliest
comprehensive
law packages
relatively old:
1965 and 1991
Alien Acts
deep-rooted party-system;
consensus on supranational
goals
strong
old:
1914 and 1948
Nationality Acts
deep-rooted party-system;
scepticism about
supranational goals
strong
relatively new:
Act 1975/1991;
Act 2910/2001
limited/recent experiences in the immigration
field; a largely sending country of labour
emigrants (until the 1970s)
relatively new:
Law 943/1986;
Law 39/1990 and
Law 40/1998
unstable party-system,
‘client politics’; scepticism
about supranational goals
unstable party-system,
electoral success of
xenophobic parties;
scepticism about
supranational goals
Basic features
weak
weak
Following an ‘uploading’ reading of the selected cases’ institutional frameworks, in terms of
their impact upon the extent of Europeanisation in immigration matters at present, the
‘downloading’ analysis was carried out in light of the selected cases’ performances vis-à-vis
the EU law. A probe into the annual reports the Commission has been drawing up since the
224
Amsterdam Treaty revealed a list of instances where Germany, the UK, Greece and Italy
breached the EU law’s immigration framework and became subject to legal action.
Accordingly, with its 30 infringement acts for the 28 EU legal texts it was supranationally
liable to from 2004 to 2012 (the selected period of analysis), Greece outweighed all other
selected cases. Italy came here second with its 26 violations, ahead of Germany and the UK
with 20 and 5 instances of EU law breach, respectively. While this picture does not offer a
symmetrical distribution across the three areas of immigration, issues concerning labour
immigration came in all cases to the fore, given the policy areas where the EU law was
violated at most, as was seen in the German, Greek and Italian cases, or taking into account
national sensitivities, as demonstrated typically by the UK, which thanks to its ‘labourexempt’ supranational engagement was bound by a total 22 EU legal texts instead of the 28
directives and regulations Germany, Greece and Italy were each accountable for.
Table 64: Overview of EU law infringements and legal actions
In light of these two main sets of data covering country-specific attributes in relation to
institutional frameworks and the selected cases’ infringements of the Community law
225
concerning immigration issues, one could conclude that the extent of Europeanisation in
Germany and the UK amounted during the selected period of analysis to ‘absorption’ at most,
given their low-to-moderate needs for policy-change vis-à-vis supranational norms. To the
same frame of analysis, the depth/breadth of the need for domestic policy change on this
matter denoted in Greece and Italy further beyond the ‘absorption’ state. In view of multiple
occasions demanding radical institutional rearrangements in both countries -owing very much
to their weak frameworks at the time the requisite EU legal texts had to be transposed into the
national legal/political orders- it is possible to argue that the extent of Europeanisation as to
immigration policies in Greece and Italy was much higher than in Germany and the UK.
Table 65: Extent of Europeanisation in the selected cases’ immigration policies
Cases
Need for policy change
Extent of Europeanisation
Germany
low-to-moderate
inertia-absorption
UK
low-to-moderate
intertia-absorption
Greece
high
absorption-transformation
Italy
high
absorption-transformation
Research question two: similarities/differences between immigration policies
The aforementioned outcomes, as derived from the selected cases’ institutional frameworks
and records of infringement in relation to the EU law, suggest that incorporation of EU’s
immigration norms/standards/regulations into the national legal/political order has taken place
similarly, with varying adaptational measures and lengths of delay depending on the
regulatory capacity of the concerning Member State. To be fair, the course of conduct was
here largely moulded by the Council, as it consented to Member States’ incorporation and
implementation of the EU procedures only with ‘minimum standards’, for an otherwise
application aiming at uniformity across the entire Union could risk the administrative
capabilities in some Member States, whose institutions were not yet sophisticated to that
effect. Regardless of the Council’s precautionary measures, there was already solid evidence
for a protectionist logic in particular with respect to labour immigration, the regulation of
which was violated by the selected Member States more frequently than in relation to other
policy-making areas. While this pattern could not be confirmed in the British case
straightforwardly, for it enjoyed an opt-out status as far as supranational liabilities to labour
immigration law were concerned, the very decision to stay out of cooperation in this policy
226
field as a rule was in fact an evidence for the UK’s apprehension when it came to transferring
competences to supranational institutions in the immigration context.
Over and above such similarities, there appeared remarkable differences between the selected
cases, given their management and/or policy-making of immigration matters so far. A most
salient divide concerned here the Community law’s incorporation, which for the German and
British norms generally suggested lower degrees of incompatibility than it was the case for
those in Greece and Italy. This split grew for the most part as a consequence of varying levels
of ‘misfit’ between the national and supranational levels as far as the selected cases’ legal and
political institutional networks were concerned. The EU legal texts’ hitherto transposition and
implementation across national orders provided in this sense grounds for a ‘south vs. north’
split, as illustrated by Greece and Italy in the south on one hand versus Germany and the UK
in the north on the other. With their comparatively longer experiences in the immigration
field, the legal adaptations whereby EC directives and regulations were adopted into the
national law without having to undergo ‘transformational’ changes were in the German and
British cases more recurrent than in Greece and Italy. Since the latter two belonged until
recent times rather to the ‘sending’ countries and neither of them was fully prepared for largescale migration flows as of the 1980s, the introduction of comprehensive approaches to the
handling of immigration policy framework came here only recently.
While such developments appeared at first sight to be indicative of idiosyncrasies specific to
Greece and Italy, the lax control systems in these lands vis-à-vis the provisions of the
Schengen Treaty made alarming implications for the EU’s control policies. Such undertones
were in fact verifiable in light of recent tendencies suggesting both Greece and Italy had for
some time been serving as the main ports of undocumented and/or transit migration towards
Northern Europe. Regardless of whether it was justifiable in proper terms or not, a somewhat
weak exposure to immigration matters at the official level together with a lack of thorough
legal framework to absorb such pressure indeed came to be the chief handicaps concerning
the Greek and Italian cases.
Although hostile feelings towards immigration stood out a mile in all selected Member States,
the extent of animosity in Italy soared to record levels when xenophobic parties like Lega
Nord achieved electoral success to become part of the coalition governments in the 2000s. To
be fair, this last point could be regarded as a further sign of the south-north dichotomy, in that
227
the political system in Italy and Greece differed broadly from those in Germany and the UK.
Next to many alliances, coalitions and transformations of party structures on the Italian scene,
which came following a number of corruption scandals lately, the Greek case was illustrative
of a ‘cartel-party’ model working in tandem with a system of ‘client politics’ for most of the
modern-day Greek political history. In all honesty, the legacy of this period which became
increasingly complex with the junta regime and its constitution during the 1970s is still in
place. Indeed, many take to blame this recent past for the unresolved political landscape in
today’s Greece. As it were, particularly in terms of Greece-EU relations, the reform attempts
to revive the incapacitated institutional structures and initiate a certain level of
Europeanisation (of immigration policies) were hijacked in many occasions because of such
flaws in the political system.
On similarities/differences across national immigration policies, other than the two sources of
data concerning country-specific institutional frameworks and infringements of the EU law,
the study consulted the MIPEX to investigate the conditions the third-country nationals had
lately been enjoying in the selected cases. A browse through the policy indicators examining
seven areas in this respect -conditions applying to labour market needs, family reunion,
educational standards, political participation, long-term residence, access to nationality and
anti-discrimination measures- came to an end with the following comparative overview:
Figure 12: Conditions for TCNs in the selected cases
Accordingly, to the extent that labour market policies across the Union were concerned,
Germany –followed closely by Italy- offered the most favourable conditions for non-EU
nationals. While far from being ideal to world standards, another area where TCNs appeared
228
to enjoy relatively better conditions in Germany was political participation, for which the UK
offered the second best. For family reunion, long-term residence and access to nationality,
Italy provided its TCNs with the friendliest environment, ahead of Germany, Greece and the
UK, in the order of fulfilment on these matters. While education was a barren area for TCNs
in all EU lands, by comparison to the situation in old immigration lands such as Canada and
Australia, the UK rose to be the only case that remained above the average here. Another area
the UK scored relatively by agreeable standards was anti-discrimination, which was where it
led Italy as the second case way ahead, according to MIPEX.
Relevance of research hypotheses
The first research hypothesis of the study was premised on the mutual relationship between
the extent of Europeanisation for Member States’ immigration policies and the development
of institutional frameworks in this area. Given the selected cases’ migration backgrounds, it is
indeed possible to argue that the course of immigration policy-making correlates significantly
with the strength of institutional capacity in this area. A detailed look into the historical
patterns -be they of political/legislative structures, actors involved in immigration
management/law-making or policies concerning citizenship/naturalisation- suggested that the
relatively more established/settled immigration management in the German and British cases
promoted a cohesive link between their legal and political frameworks and the EU
norms/standards. For Greece and Italy, on the other hand, the state of administrative
mechanisms regarding immigration management was up to the 1980s rather underdeveloped.
The policy-making framework in these lands came to be largely security-based, with special
emphasis laid on tightening the extremely porous borders in the first place. Yet, such efforts
were usually free from systematic action plans, as for instance prescribed in the EU directives
and regulations like 2008/114/EC on critical infrastructures and their assessment. In the end, a
compatible national immigration policy framework with the EU norms/standards required for
both Greek and Italian institutional structures to undergo paradigmatic changes in the face of
the Community law, which eventually led to ‘transformation’ of the relevant regulations in
the national domain. In Germany and the UK, on the other side, the legal/political orders
concerning immigration in the selected period of analysis proved to be more full-fledged,
suggesting that policy-adaptation vis-à-vis the EU norms/standards measured here to
‘absorption’ at the most.
229
As for the second research hypothesis, associating the extent of Europeanisation with the
nature of public attitudes towards immigration in host societies, one could draw a number of
inferences in light of findings from the first two sources of research data, namely historical
analysis of national institutional frameworks and assessment of policies in terms of the seven
key areas of immigration, as explored by the MIPEX. First, regardless of the breadth of
immigration experiences and relevant management in this field, the average attitude,
disposition or frame of mind towards immigration was far from being positive. A cursory look
into the selected cases’ immigration histories suggested that migration flows in the form of
‘guest-worker schemes’ or asylum-seeking did not remain temporary as initially appeared. As
many of such arrivals developed gradually into permanent stays in these countries, the
conviction that immigrants would serve to cover shortages at labour markets for a limited
period became in the public eye largely far-fetched. Perhaps more importantly, the fact that
most immigrants brought along their cultures and lifestyles into these lands signified cultural
diversity as an embedded feature of migration experience. A common reference often used in
the German-speaking world to remember the immigration context of the 1960s is as a matter
of fact still valid today: it is after all ‘people’ that come, not ‘workers’ per se.201
In fact, one could refer in this vein to a number of recent opinion polls which investigated
public attitudes towards immigration in the EU lands. Accordingly, the rate of respondents
(amongst EU citizens) who saw immigration as the main concern in their countries
corresponded to:
Table 66: Immigration as the main concern in all selected cases (in percentages)
Years of analysis
Cases
2003
2008
2012
Germany
5
6
8
UK
32
35
24
Greece
6
4
7
Italy
13
7
2
EU 15/27
13
11
8
Based on Standard EBs 59 (2003), 69 (2008) and 78 (2012).
Factors which guided changing thoughts in this context ran presumably parallel to the
financial/economic crises over the last decade. As the economic disparities between Member
States became more obvious –those like Germany and the Netherlands sustained their
201
The quote belongs to the late Swiss author Max Frisch, who originally said “Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte, und es
kamen Menschen”, when referring in particular to the Italian workers in Switzerland at the time (Hefty, 2011).
230
stability, whereas others like Greece, Spain and Italy showed signs of faltering- many
Europeans manifested their disenchantment with the EU, finding faults amongst others in
immigrants. Of many questions asked as part of such surveys inquiring for instance if
respondents would agree to “People from other ethnic groups enrich the cultural life of (our
country)”, “The presence of people from other ethnic groups is a cause of insecurity”, “The
presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in (our country)”, “We
need immigrants to work in certain sectors of our economy”, “The arrival of immigrants in
Europe can be effective in solving the problem of Europe’s ageing population”, “Immigrants
can play an important role in developing greater understanding and tolerance with the rest of
the world”, “Immigrants contribute more in taxes than they benefit from health and welfare
services” or “Legal immigrants contribute more in taxes than they benefit from health and
welfare services”, a most straightforward query was “Immigrants are a threat to [our] way of
life”.202
The chief opinion poll featuring this very last question was the 2003 Special Eurobarometer,
with ‘citizenship and sense of belonging’ as its main focus. The percentages of respondents in
the selected cases who believed that immigrants were one way or another threatening their
ways of life read as follows:
Table 67: EU citizens who believe immigrants are a threat to their ways of life (in percentages)
Responses (options)
Countries
Germany
UK
Greece
Italy
EU 15
Totally agree
12
28
35
11
16
Tend to agree
27
26
34
27
26
Tend to disagree
34
24
21
30
30
Totally disagree
15
13
7
24
18
Don’t know
12
9
3
8
10
Based on Special Eurobarometer Wave 60.1 (2003).
Greece ranked here at the top with 69% of its citizens holding negative opinions about
immigrants -and this being the highest rate amongst all 15 Member States at the time the
survey was carried out- followed by the UK, where more than half of the respondents (54%)
202
In reading through these polls, one needs to bear in mind that the responses may have reflected a diverse
range of political debates at the time surveys were conducted. Given that each country has its own multicultural
setting, and that capturing various perceptions of life is here not an easy task for researchers, chances are
interpretations of the survey questions may have included a large collection, which in the end had the potential to
lead to bias in their categorisation. Regardless of this key factor to bear in mind, most importantly that cultural
differences may lead to various understandings of a social phenomenon in everyday life, there are at present
distinct anti- immigration patterns in all selected cases.
231
tended to have similar dissenting thoughts concerning ‘newcomers’. The figures in Germany
(39) and Italy (38) did not seem to exceed that of the EU average (42%). Yet, one can hardly
deny that these were indeed fairly high scores, specifically for Germany, which did not
experience a severe economic downturn in the last decades, by comparison with other
selected cases.
While most of the jobs the ‘newcomers’ were coming to take, as part of the recruitment
programmes, were not aspired by the natives, there were serious concerns that the new
developments at the labour markets would put a downward pressure on wages, as voiced by
the trade unions at the time (Hansen, 2003). Following a period of such worries which were
later on dispelled at the state level through promises for equal conditions, policy-making in
many of these countries imposed progressively an order of tighter control over the size of
non-EU residents. Given data from the Migration Integration Policy Index, one could address
strict management policies, which actually were in force for a long time to affect TCNs’
family reunion, political participation, long-term residence and access to nationality in the
destination countries. The launch and implementation of many citizenship/naturalisation laws
were indeed informed widely by public opinions, to the extent that these responded in most
cases to the multicultural configuration of the society. Perceiving this latter as a key stimulus,
the political parties in power, as well as those in opposition, promoted equality and diversity
programmes in close relationship with the size of immigrant population.
It follows from this latter argument that the economic perspective may not suffice to come to
grips with the mainspring of European immigration. A labour market-driven approach would
in fact suit well to account for the bulk of flows to Germany and the UK, and to a certain
extent Italy. Yet, the same reasoning does not really apply to the Greek immigration. Here,
low population density and the lack of heavy industry, despite the sustained economic
development from the 1950s to 1973, suggested that the primary reason why Greece became a
major point of attraction in recent times was first and foremost its geographical convenience
for being a transit land to the main immigration destinations in northern Europe.
Bearing in mind that many other factors might have played decisive roles in the pace, extent
and direction of immigration in all selected Member States, it would perhaps be more fitting
to expand the rationale behind Europeanisation of national immigration policies. As already
hinted, the MIPEX policy indicators on immigrants’ integration to the labour markets
232
suggested that the growing size of minority groups in Member States was by the majoritygroups treated with mistrust not only for economic reasons (as both groups competed for the
same scarce conditions and/or welfare state resources) but also for political and cultural
orientations, as the traditions the former practised did not seem to be in compliance with those
of the latter. To the same sources of data, in other words, it might have well been the case that
those with other cultural/ethnic backgrounds were taken to be ‘free riders’, in view of their
potential to for instance establish ‘parallel societies’, deriving benefit from the citizenship and
democratic culture of the country they lived in. And such perceptions of threat, which in time
became embedded in the selected cases’ cultural arrangements, lead to the conclusion that the
larger the cultural diversity gets in a host society, the more the pressure will be on the
economic, cultural, and political room immigrants could enjoy here.
Last word
As the entry points became increasingly tighter in Northern/Western European countries such
as Germany and the UK, migrant flows to the south gained momentum, in particular when the
formerly sending countries like Greece and Italy started to receive decent shares from the
TCN supply in Europe. Due to lack of adequate experiences, legal frameworks and public
administration systems, however, the latter countries were often to serve as “the weak
underbelly of the EU” (Finotelli & Sciortino, 2009, p. 120), which is why they are today
considered to be little more than entry ports and transit routes to the former more established
immigration countries in the north/west.
With a wide range of socio-economic and political factors in the background, the political
climate across the entire European Union is at present anything but favourable to encourage
arrival/residence of further foreign nationals. The EU Member States tend to lay more
emphasis on restrictive goals rather than what Brussels prescribes as integrative solutions in
broad/supranational terms. When seen in hindsight, such patterns of skepticism or ‘footdragging’ are traceable to the early days of EU integration (Bendel, 2007 -as cited in Ette &
Faist, 2007).
From the 1957 Treaty of Rome to the 1986 Single European Act (SEA), Community norms
were treated amongst Member States with a high degree of reluctance. As immigration
management was at the time exclusively state-oriented, the attempts the Commission sought
to expand cooperation at the Community level were challenged by the Council’s
233
intergovernmental dispositions. The Schengen Treaty in 1985 came in this sense as a moment
to mellow the Council’s rigid outlook to supranational goals in particular as far as free
movement of people was concerned. A most proximate effect in this context was the
commencement of a new period, specifically with the ensuing Single European Act (SEA),
whose security implications urged further cooperation/collaboration on immigration policies.
Yet, the establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group in accordance with the SEA’s security
provisions on free movement soon disclosed amongst Member States similar signs of cold
shoulder towards supranationalism, through what could be defined as ‘informal
intergovernmentalism’ (Ette & Faist, 2007). The 1993 Maastricht Treaty marked in this sense
a new frame shifting cooperation to ‘formal intergovernmentalism’, when it became obvious
that coordination of immigration would be a key asset to the EU’s future supranational
decision-making. The follow-up Amsterdam Treaty’s entry into force in 1999 introduced an
unprecedented era insofar as it kindled a reform process encouraging expansion of
supranational competences in the area of immigration policy-making. Nevertheless, the multiannual (five-year) programmes of Tampere and the Hague -which were launched to monitor
the functioning of EU-wide immigration policies post Amsterdam- demonstrated that
commitments to EU norms were at the national level not so high.
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty emerged to be more progressive than its antecedents, yet a
standardised implementation of immigration policies was (at the time this thesis was being
written) still out of sight. A big promise made at the outset concerned the Community’s
legislative measures relating to immigration matters, which following Lisbon would become
tied to a new procedure.203 Aligning the Parliament’s decision-making power with that of the
Council (subject to a qualified majority vote) and expanding for instance entitlement of
persons to subsidiary protection (which went further beyond the former requisite of minimum
standards), Lisbon appeared to open indeed a new phase in the history of European
immigration. Nonetheless, considering its intention to adopt “certain sensitive measures
relating to policies which remain at the core of national sovereignty” (Commission of the
European Union, 2004, pp. 3-4), one would still have serious doubts about the intended
supranational commitments here. The chief reference for such reservations is data from
current trends in international migration, suggesting that a generous share of the global
immigration trends is today received by the EU Member States, where the increase of inflow
203
Viewing it as the key legislative process for the Community's decision-making system, Article 294 of the
TFEU defined the co-decision procedure after a parity principle, according to which the European Parliament
and the Council were to adopt legislation jointly.
234
rates is more than twofold (International Organisation for Migration, 2003). A direct
consequence of this evident pressure is the rise of extremely conservative thoughts and
nationalistic impulses in these lands, which in immigration terms would amount to further
resistance towards supranational policy-making.
Antagonistic feelings towards immigrants are obviously mixed, ranging from economic and
political concerns to social and cultural considerations including prejudice and/or overdose of
nationalistic sentiments. The root indicator stems here usually from the average national on
the street observing that non-nationals have cultural traits and lifestyles which somehow
appear to challenge his/hers. And the main question here is whether or not the whole would be
greater than the sum of its parts, or put more precisely, whether or not what starts as an
individual observation/thought/reaction on the street could swell into big political campaigns,
movements, or even parties at some point in the future. As it recently came out in the cases of
the AfD (Alternativ für Deutschland-Alternative for Germany), the UKIP (UK Independence
Party), the Lega Nord of Italy and the Greek Golden Dawn, the winners are usually the farright political parties.204 This suggests in plain English that the more ungrounded the
politicians’ promises are, as if to downplay immigration like a power switch one can turn on
and off at his/her own will, the more likely it will be that they end up drawing water to
somebody else’s mill, in this case those who are racist by their nature. 205 And should antiimmigration sentiments be treated in the way many zealots, partisans and tabloids practise,
immigrants are bound to face discrimination, regardless of where they are.
The post 9/11 security/terrorism discourse as well as global economic/financial crises in the
2000s rose to remind in this context the risks and pitfalls before an overarching immigration
policy framework for the entire EU. Much in the same context, an additionally important
factor putting Europeanisation of Member States’ immigration policies to a test for some time
is the political transformation in North Africa and the Middle East. Indeed, recent political
developments in the immediate neighbourhood of Europe are particularly tectonic for the
southern EU lands, which are economically and politically in close proximity with this
turbulent region, so much so that some of them even sought to revert to pre-Schengen
204
While the question of how far to the right the UKIP and AfD lie was still debatable in the UK and Germany,
the slogans they came to use before making significant gains in national elections were based on Euroscepticism
and aiming at those who do not prefer to live in a centralised European state.
205
In venting their anger at the immigration policies of the country, those attracted to recent far-right populist
movements such as the PEGIDA (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes-Patriotic
Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident) in Germany appeared to draw on racist discourses.
235
conditions. Despite the 2003 Dublin II Regulation which ordered that the EU country where
asylum-seekers enter first should be responsible for processing their asylum claims, Italian
governments, for instance, lately declared their reluctance to do so, pointing out that Italy was
already overwhelmed by tens of thousands seeking asylum (Hawitt, 2011). And when some
8,000 of these applicants were issued six-month residence permits in a fairly short period
(which would allow them to head probably to France because a big majority of them were
Francophones), Italy’s political problem became suddenly one of France’s. The French
bureaucracy moved quickly to fortify the porous borders with Italy through checkpoints, on
the basis of what Schengen describes as a ‘grave threat to public order or internal security’. In
the end, a joint letter was issued by the two countries petitioning the suspension of Schengen
at the face of big refugee influxes.206
For such reasons or others, fears of new ‘exodi’ knocking at the gates of Europe provide at
present a big reservoir of pretexts for anti-immigrant lobbies and populist parties. Recently,
some European ‘Tea Party’ movements such as the Dutch Freedom Party and the French
National Front polled around a remarkable 20 percent in elections after spending many years
as the ultra-nationalists on the fringe. The principal factors to consider in this context are the
influences of demographic variables and social security systems in Western Europe. Recent
statistics indicate a faster increase in the number of non-nationals than of citizens in many
immigration lands, which to a significant extent is caused by the latter’s aging population and
poor fertility levels (European Commission, 2008a). Further, it is common to hear within the
context of the welfare state-model practised in many old EU members that ‘newcomers’ are a
burden on the host system because they “only receive and do not contribute” (Lucassen, 2005,
p. 15). In view of a political climate whereby many far-right political parties play the
conservative card, hinting at climbing unemployment rates and provoking loud voices against
‘multiculturalism’ (European Commission, 2011a), it comes no surprise that every second EU
citizen regards immigration at present as less of an opportunity than a threat (German
Marshall Fund of the United States, 2008).
While it goes without saying that collaboration/cooperation on migration matters is for
Member States a sine qua non –as long as they all aspire to an economically and politically
206
Amidst tensions over these migrant influxes, Denmark similarly expressed its intention to revert to the old
geographical borders with Sweden and Germany, in view of about 40,000 asylum-seekers who fled from Tunisia
and Libya over to the nearby Lampedusa in the first five months of 2011, to be moving later possibly towards
northern Europe (Macqueen, 2011).
236
more interdependent Union- a ‘one size fits all solution’ is for them still out of reach. Many in
these countries hold to the traditional understanding that shifting decision-making in the area
of immigration policy to the EU-level would be “an ‘invasion’ of one of the most sacred areas
of national jurisdiction” (Bertozzi, 2007, p. 7). That Europeanisation of immigration has so far
almost always been subject to intergovernmental manoeuvres, which are characterised largely
by public concerns or ‘feelings’ of threat or challenge, is in this sense more understandable
than shocking.
It remains against this background to be seen how long-lasting political commitments like the
EU’s new and reinforced ‘ordinary legislative procedure’ -based principally on the ‘codecision’ between the Parliament and the Council- will persist in situations where the old
immigration countries have traditionally been challenging the Commission’s proposals. Given
that a paradigmatic policy change has to date been far from a reality on that account, chances
are a sheer communitarisation/Europeanisation of national immigration policies will not be
likely in the near future, for this would amount to a decisive power shift from the Council
over to the Commission.
In the end, it is meaningful to assume that future research into Europeanisation of Member
States’ national immigration policies will continue to keep an eye on perceptions of
citizenship and multiculturalism in these countries. And yet, still and all, the major weight
will most likely be -as it has always been- on the state of equilibrium concerning the twofold
dialectical structure of policy-making here: ‘supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism’
or ‘rights versus control’.
237
Bibliography
Agh, A. (1999). Europeanisation of Policy-Making in East Central Europe: the Hungarian
Approach to EU Accession. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(5), 839-854.
Aguiar, F. & de Francisco, A. (2009). Rational Choice, Social Identity, and Beliefs about
Oneself. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 39(4), 547-571.
Alba, R.D. & Nee, V. (1997). Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration.
International Migration Review, 31(4), 826-75.
Alba, R.D. (1985). Italian Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Alcoff, L.M. (2006) Visible identities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Aleinikoff, T. A. & Klusmeyer, D. (2002). Citizenship Policies for an Age of Migration.
Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for InternationalPeace.
Alexander, J.C. (2006). The Civil Sphere. New York: Oxford University Press.
Amnesty International (2007). Joint opinion on the legislation to implement EU directives on
residence and asylum law. Retrieved from http://www.proasyl.de/fileadmin/
proasyl/fm_redakteure/ Englisch/Joint_Opinion_Eu_directives.pdf [22 June 2012].
Anagnostou, D. (2011). Citizenship Policy Making in Mediterranean EU States: Greece.
Technical Report. EUDO Citizenship Observatory. Florence: European University Institute.
Andersen, S.S. & Eliassen, K.A. (Eds.). (1993). Making Policy in Europe. The
Europeification of National Policy-Making. London: Sage.
Andreou, G. & Bache, I. (2010). Europeanisation and multi-level governance in Slovenia.
Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 10(1), 29-43.
Ansell, C., Parsons, C. & Darden, K. (1997). Dual Networks in European Regional
Development Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 35(3), 347-75.
Appedurai, A. (1996). Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Archer, M.S. (1998). ‘Introduction: Realism in Social Sciences’. In M.S. Archer, R. Bhaskar,
A. Collier, T. Lawson & A. Norrie (Eds.), Critical Realism: Essential Readings, 189-205.
London: Routledge.
Archer, M.S. (2007). ‘The ontological status of subjectivity: the missing link between
structure and agency’. In C. Lawson, J. Latsis & N. Martins (Eds.), Contributions to Social
Ontology, 17-31. Abingdon: Routledge.
238
Armingeon, K. (1999). ‘From the Europe of nations to the European nation: Introduction’. In
H. Kriesi, K. Armingeon, H. Siegrist & A. Wimmer (Eds.), Nation and National Identity: The
European Experience in Perspective, 235-241. Zurich: Rüegger.
Arthur, J. (2008). ‘Christianity, Citizenship and Democracy’. In J. Arthur, I. Davies, & C.
Hahn (Eds.), The Sage Handbook of Education for Citizenship and Democracy, 305-313.
London: Sage.
Avramopoulou, I., Karakatsanis, L., Pavlou, M. & Miltos, P. (2005). ‘Greece’. In J. Niessen,
Y. Schibel, & C. Thompson (Eds.) Current Immigration Debates in Europe: A Publication of
the European Migration Dialogue, Brussels: Migration Policy Group.
Bache, I. (2008). Europeization and multilevel governance. Cohesion policy in the European
Union and Britain. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Bache, I. (2010). Building Multi-level Governance in South East Europe? Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies, 10(1), 111-122.
Bache, I. & Tomsic, D. (2010). Europeanisation and nascent multi-level governance in
Croatia. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 10(1), 7-83.
Bagameri, D. (2011). Changing Integration Policy towards Third-country Nationals in the
European Union: Language and Knowledge of Society Tests in the Member States. LSE
Migration Studies Unit Working Papers. No 2011/13. Retrieved from http://www2.lse.ac.uk/
government/ research/resgroups/MSU/documents/workingPapers/WP_2011_13.pdf [12
March 2012]
Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2002). Semi-reluctant Hosts: Southern Europe's Ambivalent Response
to Immigration. Brown Journal of World Affairs, 8(2), 211-229.
Balibar, E. & Wallerstein, I. (1991). Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. London:
Verso.
Balzacq, T. & Carrera,S. (2006). ‘The Hague Programme: The Long Road to Freedom,
Security and Justice’. In Balzacq, T. & Carrera, S. (Eds.), Security versus Freedom: A
Challenge for Europe’s Future, 1-34. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Barbalet, J.M. (1988). Citizenship Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality. Minneapolis:
University Minnesota Press.
Barbé-Izuel, M.E. (2009). The Union for the Mediterranean: from the Europeanisation of
Foreign Policy to the Decommunitarisation of Mediterranean Policy. Revista de Derecho
Comunitario Europeo, 32(1), 9-46.
Barbieri. W.A. (1998). Ethics of Citizenship. Immigration and Groups Rights in Germany.
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Barnett, M. & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in International Politics. International Organisation,
59(1), 39-75.
239
Barry, B. (2001). Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Barry, K. (2006). Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration
Context. New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers. Paper 23.
http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_plltwp/23 [26 December 2010]
Bartlett, A. (2007) ‘The City and the Self: The Emergence of New Political Subjects in
London’. In Sassen, S. (Ed.), Deciphering the Global: Its Spaces, Scales and Subjects, 221242. New York: Routledge.
Basch, L.G., Schiller, N.G. & Blanc, C.S. (1993). Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects,
Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States. Langhorne, PA: Gordon &
Breach.
Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz, GG). Promulgated on 23 May
1949 (first issue of the Federal Law Gazette, dated 23 May 1949), as amended up to and
including 20 December 1993. 10 March 2012. Retrieved from http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/
statutes/GG.htm
Bauböck, R. (1994). Transnational Citizenship. Membership and Rights in International
Migration. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
Bauböck, R. (2006). Migration and Citizenship: Legal Status, Rights, and Political
Participation. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Bauböck, R. (2008). Stakeholder Citizenship: An Idea Whose Time Has Come? Washington,
D.C.: Migration Policy Institute.
Bauer, T., Lofstrom, M. & Zimmermann, K.F. (2000). Immigration Policy, Assimilation of
Immigrants, and Natives’ Sentiments towards Immigrants: Evidence from 12 OECD
Countries. Swedish Economic Policy Review, 7(2), 11-53.
Baun, M., Dürr, J., Marek, D. & Saradin, P. (2006). The Europeanisation of Czech Politics:
The Political Parties and the EU Referendum. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies,
44(2), 249-280.
BBC News Africa, ‘Africans Die in Spanish Enclave’, 25 September 2005. Retrieved from
http://www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4292490.stm [10 October 2011]
BBC News Europe, ‘German Court Rules circumcision is `bodily harm`’, 26 June 2012.
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18604664 [15 July 2012]
BBC News Europe, ‘State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron’. 5 February
2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994 [18 March 2011].
Beichelt, T. & Bafoil, F. (2008). ‘Elements of comparing Europeanisation processes in
Central and Western Europe, and beyond’. In F. Bafoil & T. Beichelt (Eds.), Europeanisation
d’Ouest en Est, 31-53. Paris: L’Harmattan.
240
Beiner, R. (1992). What’s the Matter with Liberalism? Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Bellamy, R. (2001). ‘The `Right to Have Rights`: Citizenship Practice and the Political
Constitution of the EU’. In R. Bellamy, & A. Warleigh (Eds.), Citizenship and Governance in
the European Union, 41-70. London: Continuum.
Bellamy, R., Castiglione, D. & Shaw, J. (Eds.) (2006). Making European Citizens: Civic
Inclusion in a Transnational Context. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Benhabib, S. (1996). Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Benhabib, S. (2001). Transformations of Citizenship. Dilemmas of the Nation-State in the Era
of Globalisation. The Spinoza Lectures, Amsterdam: Van Gorcum.
Benhabib, S. (2002). The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Benhabib, S. (2007). Twilight of Sovereignty or the Emergence of Cosmopolitan Norms?
Rethinking Citizenship in Volatile Times. Citizenship Studies, 11(1), 19-36.
Benmayor, R. & Skotnes, A. (Eds.) (1994). Migration and Identity. A Special Edition of
International Yearbook of Oral History and Life Stories, Vol. III. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Bennett, A. & George, A.L. (1997). Process Tracing in Case Study Research. Paper presented
at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs (BCSIA), Harvard University, October 17-19, 1997.
Bertozzi, S. (2007). Legal Migration: Time for Europe to Play Its Hand. CEPS Working Paper
No. 257. Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies.
Besson, S. & Utzinger, A. (2008). Toward European Citizenship. Journal of Social Policy,
39(1), 185-208.
Betz, H-G. & Immerfall, S. (Eds.) (1998). The New Politics of the Right. Neo-Populist Parties
and Movements in Established Democracies. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Bevelander, P. & Veenman, P. (2006). Naturalisation and Socioeconomic Integration: The
Case of the Netherlands. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2153, Bonn.
Bhaskar, R. (1975). A Realist Theory of Science. Leeds: Leeds Books.
Bhaskar, R. (1986). Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. London: Verso.
Bhaskar, R. (1989). Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy.
London: Verso.
Billig, M. (1995). Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.
241
Bloemraad, I. (2000). Citizenship and Immigration: A Current Review. Journal of
International Migration, 1(1), 9-37.
Bloemraad, I., Korteweg , A. & Yurdakul , G. (2008). Citizenship and Immigration:
Multiculturalism, Assimilation, and Challenges to the Nation-State. Annual Review of
Sociology, 34(1), 153-179.
Bloom, W. (1990). Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
BMAS, Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales (Federal Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs) (2008). Action Programme of the Federal Government: Labour Migration's
Contribution to Securing the Skilled Labour Base in Germany. Retrieved from http://www.
bmas.de/portal/ 27100/property=pdf/2008__07__16__aktionsprog ramm__fachkraefte__
englisch.pdf. [12 May 2012]
Del Boca, D. & Venturini, A. (2003). Italian Migration. IZA Discussion Papers, No 938.
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Böckenförde, M., Wiesner, V. & Nora, I. (2006). Manual on the judicial systems in Germany
and Sudan. Heidelberg: Max Planck Institut für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und
Völkerrecht.
Bonilla, F., Mélendez, E., Morales, R. & de los Ángeles Torres, M. (Eds.) (1998). Borderless
Borders: U.S. Latinos, Latin Americans, and the Paradox of Interdependence. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Borjas, G.J. (1990). Friends or Strangers: The Impact of Immigrants on the US Economy.
New York: Basic Books.
Börzel, T. (1999). Towards Convergence in Europe? Institutional Adaptation to
Europeanisation in Germany and Spain. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(4), 573–596.
Börzel, T. (2001). Non-Compliance in the European Union. Pathology or Statistical Artefact?
Journal of European Public Policy, 8(5), 803-824.
Börzel, T. (2002a). Pace-Setting, Foot-Dragging, and Fence-Sitting: Member State Responses
of Europeanisation. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 193-214.
Börzel, T. (2002b). States and Regions in the European Union: Institutional Adaptation in
Germany and Spain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Börzel, T. (2003). ‘How the European Union Interacts with its Member States’. In S. Bulmer
& C. Lesquesne (Eds.), Member States of the European Union, 45-76. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Börzel, T. (2009). When Europe hits … beyond its borders: Europeanisation and the near
abroad. Comparative European Politics, 9(4), 394-413.
242
Börzel, T. (2011). When Europe Hits Limited Statehood. Europeanisation and Domestic
Change in the Western Balkans. KFG Working Papers. Research College, The
Transformative Power of Europe. Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin.
Börzel, T. & Buzogany, A. (2010). Environmental Organisations and the Europeanisation of
Public Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: The Case of Biodiversity Governance.
Environmental Politics, 19(5), 708-735.
Börzel, T. & Buzogany, A. (2010). Governing EU accession in transition countries. The role
of non-state actors. Acta Politica, 45(1-2), 158-182.
Börzel, T. & Pamuk, Y. (2012). Pathologies of Europeanisation: Fighting Corruption in the
Southern Caucasus. West European Politics, 35(1), 79-97.
Börzel, T., Pamuk, Y. & Stahn, A. (2008). One Size Fits All? How the European Union
Promotes Good Governance in Its Near Abroad. SFB 700 Working Paper No. 18.
Börzel, T. & Risse, T. (2000). When Europe Hits Home: Europeanisation and Domestic
Change. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 4(15). Retrieved from
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/ texte/2000-015a.htm [12 January 2012].
Börzel, T. & Risse, T. (2003). ‘Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe’. In K.
Featherstone & C. Radelli (Eds.), The Politics of Europeanisation, 57-80. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Börzel, T. & Risse, T. (2007). ‘Europeanisation: The Domestic Impact of EU Politics’. In
K.E. Jørgensen, M.A. Pollack, & B. Rosamond (Eds.), Handbook of European Union Politics,
483-504. London: Sage.
Börzel, T. & Risse, T. (2009). The Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union
and the Diffusion of Ideas, KFG Working Paper No. 1, April 2009. Berlin: Free University
Berlin.
Börzel, T. & Risse, T. (2012). When Europeanisation Meets Diffusion. Exploring New
Territory. West European Politics. 35(1), 192-207.
Bose, C. (2006). Immigration ‘Reform’: Gender, Migration, Citizenship, and SWS. Gender
Society, 20(5), 569–575.
Bosniak, L. (2000) Citizenship Denationalized. Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies.
7(2), 447-510.
Bosniak, L. (2008). The Citizen and the Alien. Dilemmas of Contemporary Membership.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Boswell, C. (2005). Migration in Europe. Paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and
Research Programme of the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), Institute
of International Economics,Hamburg, September 2005.
243
Bowcott, O. (2011, December 15). European court backs British judges over hearsay
evidence. The Guardian. Retrived from http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/dec/15/
european-court-of-human-rights-ukcrime
Breakwell, G.M. (2004). ‘Identity Change in the Context of the Growing Influence of
European Union Institutions’. In R.K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M.B. Brewer (Eds.),
Transnational Identities. Becoming European in the EU, 25-39. Oxford: Rowman &
Littlefield.
Brown, P. (2008). ‘Immigration, Settlement and Cultural Diversity – From Objectivist to
Interpretivist Research Methods’. In P.J. Maginn, S. Tonts & S. Thompson (Eds.), Qualitative
Urban Analysis: An International Perspective, 135-153. London: Routledge.
Brubaker, R. (1990). Immigration, Citizenship, and the Nation-State in France and Germany:
A Comparative Historical Analysis. International Sociology 5(4), 379-407.
Brubaker, R. (1992). Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany. Harvard
University Press.
Brubaker, R. & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond `Identity`. Theory and Society, 29(1), 1-47.
Bruter, M. (2003). On What Citizens Mean by Feeling ‘European’: Perceptions of News,
Symbols and Borderlessness. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 30(1), 21-39.
Bryant, C.G.A. (1991). Europe and the European Community 1992. Sociology, 25 (2), 189207.
Bryman, A. (2001). Social Research Methods. New York: Oxford University Press.
Bulletin of the European Communities. December 1973, No 12. Luxembourg: Office for
Official Publications of the European Communities.
Bulmer, S. & Burch, M. (1998). Organising for Europe - Whitehall, the British State and the
European Union. Public Administration, 76(4), 601-628.
Bulmer, S. & Burch, M. (2001). ‘The Europeanisation of Central Government: The UK and
Germany in Historical Institutionalist Perspective’. In G. Schneider & M. Aspinwall (Eds.),
The Rules of Integration - Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe, 73-92.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Bulmer, S. & Burch, M. (2005). The Europeanisation of UK Government: from Quiet
Revolution to Explicit Step-Change? Public Administration, 83(4), 861-890.
Bulmer, S. & Radaelli, C. (2005). ‘The Europeanisation of National Policy’. In S. Bulmer &
C. Lequesne (Eds.), The Member States of the European Union, 338-359. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Burchill, S., Linklater, A., Devetak, R., Donnelly, J., Paterson, M., Reus-Smit, C. & True, J.
(2005), Theories of International Relations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
244
Buzan, B., Waever, O. & De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis.
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Calhoun, C. (1997). Nationalism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota.
Callinicos, A. (2000) Equality. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Campani, G. (2007). Migration and Integration in Italy: A Complex and Moving Landscape.
Retrieved from http://migrationeducation.de/38.1.html?&rid=178&cHash=b18ff335ad74
f6e52754cfcb43318922 [2 January 2013]
Caporaso, J. (1996). The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or
Post-modern. Journal of Common Market Studies, 34(1), 29-52.
Caporaso, J. (2007). ‘The Three Worlds of Regional Integration Theory’. In P. Graziano & M.
Vink (Eds.) Europeanisation: New Research Agendas, 23-34. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Carens, J. H. (1987). Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders. The Review of Politics,
49(2), 251-273.
Carens, J.H. (1989). ‘Membership and Morality: Admission to Citizenship in Liberal
Democratic States’. In R. Brubaker (Ed.), Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in
Europe and North America, 31-49. New York: University Press of America.
Carens, J.H. (2000). Culture, Citizenship and Community: A Contextual Exploration of
Justice as Evenhandedness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carens, J.H. (2005). The Integration of Immigrants. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2(1), 2946.
Carrera, S. (2009). In Search of the Perfect Citizen? The Intersection between Integration,
Immigration and Nationality in the EU, Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Carrera, S. & Guild, E. (2008). The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and
Asylum: Intergovernmentalism vs. Europeanisation? Security vs. Rights. CEPS Policy Briefs,
No. 170, Brussels.
Carrera, S., Atger, F., Guild, E. & Kostakopoulou, D. (2011). Labour Immigration Policy in
the EU:A Renewed Agenda for Europe 2020, Justice and Home Affairs. CEPS Policy Briefs,
No 240, Brussels.
Carvalho, S. & White, H. (1997). Combining the Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to
Poverty Measurement and Analysis. World Bank Technical Paper 366, Washington D.C.:
World Bank Publications.
Castano, E. (2004). ‘European identity: A social psychological perspective’. In R.K.
Herrmann, T. Risse & M.B. Brewer (Eds.), Transnational Identities. Becoming European in
the EU, 40-58. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
245
Castano, E. & Yzerbyt, V. (1997). Building a European identity. Acts of the Fifth Biennial
European Community Studies Association (ECSA). International Conference, Seattle, WA.
Castells, M. (2002). ‘The Construction of European Identity’. In M.J. Rodrigues (Ed.), The
New Knowledge Economy in Europe, 232-241. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.
Castiglione, D. (2009). ‘Political identity in a community of strangers’. In J. Checkel & P.
Katzenstein (Eds.), European Identity, 29-51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Castles, S. (2007). Twenty-First Century Migration as a Challenge to Sociology. Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 33 (3), 351-371.
Castles, S. & Kosack, G. (1985). Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Caviedes, A. (2004). The Open Method of Coordination in Immigration Policy: A Tool for
Prying Open Fortress Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(2), 289-310.
Cerulo, K.A. (1997). Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions. Annual Review of
Sociology, 23(1), 385-409.
Cerutti, F. (2003). A Political Identity of the Europeans? Thesis Eleven, 72(1), 26-45.
Cerutti, F. (2008). ‘Why political identity and legitimacy matter in the European Union’. In F.
Cerutti & S. Lucarelli (Eds.), The Search for a European Identity: Values, Policies and
Legitimacy of the European Union, 3-22. London: Routledge.
Cerutti, F. & Lucarelli, S. (Eds.) (2008). The Search for a European Identity: Values, Policies
and Legitimacy of the European Union. London: Routledge.
Cesarini, D. & Fulbrook, M. (Eds.) (1996). Citizenship, Nationality and Migration in Europe.
London: Routledge.
Cesarini, E., Giuliani, M., Pittau, F. & Ricci, A. (2011). Italy, Annual Policy Report.
European Migration Network EMN, IDOS Study and Research Centre. Retrieved from
http://www.emnitaly .it/ down/rs-29-02.pdf [2 October 2012].
Checkel, J. (1998). The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. World Politics
50(2), 324-348.
Checkel, J. (2005). International institutions and socialization in Europe: Introduction and
framework. International Organisation, 59(4), 801-826.
Checkel, J. & Katzenstein, P. (Eds.). (2009). European Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K.E. & Wiener, A. (Eds.). (2001) The Social Construction of
Europe. London: Sage.
246
Christopoulos, D. (2010). Country report: Greece. Retrieved from http://eudocitizenship.eu/docs/ CountryReports/ recentChanges/Greece.pdf. [10 March 2012]
Chryssochoou, D.N. (2000). Meta-Theory and the Study of the Europan Union: Capturing the
Normative Turn. Journal of European Integration, 22(2), 123-144.
Cinnirella, M. (1997). ‘Ethnic and national stereotypes: a social identity perspective’. In
C.C. Barfoot (Ed.), Beyond Pug’s Tour: National and ethnic stereotyping in theory and
literary practice, 253-274. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi.
Cohen, J. (1995). ‘Interpreting the Notion of Civil Society’. In M. Walzer (Ed.), Toward a
Global Civil Society, 35-40. Providence: Berghahn Books.
Cohen, J. (1999). Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos.
International Sociology, 14(3), 245-268.
Cohen, L., Manion, L. & Morrison, K. (2000). Research Methods in Education. London:
Routledge.
Cole, A. (2001). National and Partisan Context of Europeanisation: The case of the French
Socialists. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(1), 15-36.
Collett, E. (2008). What does the EU do on integration? EU Integration Policy Factsheet.
April 2008.Retrieved from http://www.migrationinformation.org/integration/files/EU
Integration PolicyFactsheet-04-2008.pdf. [26 March 2012]
Collins, J. (1991). Migrant Hands in a Distant Land. Sydney: Pluto Press.
Communication from the Commission of 11 June 2001to the Council and the European
Parliament on an Open Method of Coordination for the Community Immigration Policy,
COM (2001) 387 final.
Communication from the Commission of 15 November 2001to the Council and the European
Parliament on a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration, COM (2001) 627 final.
Communication from the Commission of 3 June 2003 to the Council, the European
Parliament, the European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions
on Immigration, Integration and Employment, COM (2003) 336 final [Not published in the
Official Journal of the European Union].
Communication from the Commission of 11 January 2005. Green Paper on an EU Approach
to Managing Economic Migration, COM (2004) 811 final [Not published in the Official
Journal of the European Union].
Communication from the Commission of 21 December 2005. Policy Plan on Legal Migration,
COM(2005) 669.
Communication from the Commission of 1 September 2005 to the Council, the European
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.
247
A Common Agenda for Integration - Framework for the Integration of Third-country
Nationals in the European Union, COM/2005/389 final.
Communication from the Commission of 10 May 2005 to the Council and the European
Parliament. The Hague Programme: Ten Priorities for the Next Five Years, COM (2005) 184
final.
Communication from the Commission of 25 January 2006 to the European Parliament and the
Council. Thematic Programme for the Cooperation with Third-countries in the Areas of
Migration and Asylum, COM(2006) 026 final.
Communication from the Commission of 16 May 2007 to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions
applying the Global Approach to Migration to the Eastern and South-Eastern Regions
Neighbouring the European Union, COM(2007) 247 final [Not published in the Official
Journal of the European Union].
Communication from the Commission of 23 October 2007. Proposal for a Council Directive
on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third-country Nationals for the Purposes of
Highly Qualified Employment, COM(2007) 637.
Communication from the Commission of 17 June 2008 to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A
Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Actions and Tools, COM(2008) 359
final [Not published in the Official Journal of the European Union]
Communication from the Commission of 24 May 2011 to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A
Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern Mediterranean Countries,
COM(2011) 292 final.
Communication from the Commission of 2 December 2011 to the Council, the European
Parliament, the European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions
on Enhanced Intra-EU Solidarity in the Field of Asylum. An EU Agenda for Better
Responsibility-sharing and More Mutual Trust, COM(2011) 835 final.
Connolly, W.E. (1991). Identity/Differerence: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox.
New York: Cornell University Press.
Council of Europe (2006). Recent demographic developments in Europe 2005. Strasbourg:
Council of Europe Publishing.
Council of Europe (2010). Report to the Italian Government on the Visit to Italy Carried Out
by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 to 31 July 2009. Strasbourg: Council of Europe
Publishing. Retrieved from http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/ita/2010‐inf‐14‐eng.htm [2
September 2013]
248
Council of Europe (2011). Common European Framework of Reference for Languages:
Learning, Teaching, Assessment. Retrieved from: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/
source/framework_en.pdf [11 October 2011]
Crawley, H. (2005). Evidence on Attitudes to Asylum and Immigration: What We Know,
Don’t Know and Need to Know. Centre on Migration, Policy and Society Working Paper No.
23, University of Oxford. Retrieved from https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/
files/Publications/working_papers/WP_2005/Heaven%20Crawley%20WP0523.pdf [12 May
2104]
Crosby, C. (1992). ‘Dealing with differences’. In J. Butler & J.W. Scott (Eds.), Feminists
theorize the political, 130-143. New York: Routledge.
Cruickshank, J. (Ed.). (2003). Critical Realism: The Difference It Makes. London: Routledge.
Cruickshank, J. (2011). ‘The Positive And The Negative: Assessing Critical Realism and
Social Constructionism as Post-Positivist Approaches to Empirical Research in the Social
Sciences’, Paper 42, International Migration Institute Working Paper Series, Oxford
Department of International Development, University of Oxford. Retrieved from
http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/ publications/working_papers [2 November 2013]
Dagger, R. (1997). Civic Virtues. Rights, Citizenship, and Republican Liberalism. New York:
Oxford University Press.
Danermark, B., Ekstrom, M., Jakobsen, L. & Karlsson, J.C. (2002). Explaining Society:
Critical Realism in the Social Sciences. London: Routledge.
Daugherty, H.G. & Kammeyer, K.C.W. (1995). An Introduction to Population. New York:
The Guilford Press.
De Groot, G-R., Kuipers, J-J. & Weber, F. (2009). ‘Passing citizenship tests as a requirement
for naturalisation: a comparative perspective’. In E. Guild, K. Groenendijk & S. Carrera
(Eds.), Illiberal liberal states. Immigration, citizenship and integration in the EU, 51-77.
Farnham: Ashgate.
De Heer, J. C. (2004). The concept of integration in converging Dutch minority and migration
policies. In A. Böcker, B. de Hart & I. Michalowski (Eds.), Migration and the Regulation of
Social Integration (Special issue of IMIS-Beiträge 24), 177-88. Osnabrück: University of
Osnabrück Press.
Deaux, K. & Burke, P. (2010). Bridging Identities. Social Psychology Quarterly, 73(4), 315320.
Debus, M., Müller, J. & Obert, P. (2011). Europeanisation and Government Formation in
Multi-level Systems: Evidence from the Czech Republic. European Union Politics, 12(3),
381-403.
De la Porte, C., Pochet, P. & Room, G. (2001). Social benchmarking, policy making and new
governance in the EU. Journal of European Social Policy, 11(4), 291-307.
249
Delanty, G. (1996). Beyond the Nation-State: National Identity and Citizenship in a
Multicultural Society – A Response to Rex, SociologicalResearch Online, 1(3), ISSN 13607804. Retrieved from http://www.socresonline.org.uk/1/3/1.html [12.10.2011]
Delanty, G. (1997). Models of Citizenship: Defining European identity and Citizenship.
Citizenship Studies, 1(3), 285-303.
Delanty, G. (2000). Citizenship in a Global Age. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Delanty, G. (2003). ‘Communitarianism and Citizenship’. In E.F. Isin & B.S. Turner (Eds.),
Handbook of Citizenship Studies, 131-144. London: Sage.
Delanty, G., Jones, P.R. & Wodak, R. (Eds.). (2007). Migrant Voices: Discourses of
Belonging and Exclusion. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
Delanty, G. & Rumford, C. (2005). Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of
Europeanisation. London: Routledge.
Dell’Olio, F. (2005). The Europeanisation of Citizenship: Between the Ideology of
Nationality, Immigration and European Identity. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Deutsch, K.W., Edinger, L.J., Macridis, R.C. & Merritt, R.L. (1967). France, Germany and
the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics.
New York: Charles Scriber's Sons.
Deutsche Welle (2012). German ‘Blue Card’ to simplify immigration. 28 April 2012.
Retrieved from http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,15915424,00. html [22 June 2012].
Deutscher Bundestag Gesetzentwurf der Fraktionen SPD und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
Drucksache 14/7387 14. Wahlperiode 08.11.2001 Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Steuerung und
Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Regelung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von
Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwanderungsgesetz). Retrieved from http://dipbt.bundestag.
de/dip21/btd/14/073/1407387.pdf [11 March 2011]
Deveaux, M. (2000). Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
Devine, F. (1995). ‘Qualitative Analysis’. In D. Marsh & G. Stoker (eds), Theories and
Methods in Political Science, 137-153. London: Macmillan.
Diez Medrano, J. (2009). ‘The Public Sphere and the European Union’s Political Identity’. In
J. Checkel, & P. Katzenstein (Eds.), European Identity, 81-109. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Dion, D. (1998). Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study. Comparative
Politics, 30(2), 127-145.
Doogan, K. (1992). The Social Charter and the Europeanisation of Employment and Social
Policy. Policy and Politics, 20(3), 167-176.
250
Duchesne, S. & Frognier, A.P. (1995). ‘Is There a European Identity?’. In Niedermayer, O. &
Sinnott, R. (Eds.), Public Opinion and the International Governance, 193-226. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Dutchman grounded. Multiple citizenship is on the rise. But some states continue to deter it.
The Economist (2012, January 7). Retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/21542394
[11 March 2013]
Dyson, K. & Goetz, K. (2002). Germany and Europe: Beyond Congruence. Paper presented
at the Conference: Germany and Europe, A Europeanized Germany? British Academy, 11
March.
Eberle, E.J. (2008). The German Idea of Freedom. Oregon Review of International Law,
10(1), 1-76.
Economides, S. (2005). The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy. West European
Politics, 28(2), 471-491.
Eder, K. (2001). ‘Integration through Culture? The Paradox of the Search for a European
Identity’. In K. Eder & B. Giesen (Eds.), European Citizenship: between National Legacies
and Postnational Projects, 222-244. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Eder, K. (2004). The Two Faces of Europeanisation. Synchronizing a Europe moving at
varying speeds. Time & Society, 13(1), 89-107.
Ehrenberg, J. (1999). Civil Society: The Critical History of an Idea. New York: New York
University Press.
Eisenberg, A. (2004). ‘Identity and liberal politics: the problem of minorities within
minorities’. In A. Eisenberg & J. Spinner-Halev (Eds.), Minorities within Minorities: Rights,
Equality and Diversity, 249-270. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Elmore, R. F. (1979). Backward Mapping: Implementation Research and Policy Decisions.
Political Science Quarterly, 94(4). 601-616.
Entzinger, H. & R. Biezeveld, R. (2003). ‘Benchmarking in Immigrant Integration’. European
Commission, Brussels. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/justice/funding/2004_2007/
doc/study_ indicators_ integration.pdf. [11 March 2011]
Eriksen, T. H. (2002). Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives. London:
Pluto Press.
Eriksen, E.O. (2006). The EU: A Cosmopolitan Polity? Journal of European Public Policy,
13(2), 252-269.
Erikson, E.H. (1950). Childhood and society. New York: Norton.
Ette, A. & Faist, T. (2007). ‘Europeanisation of National Policies and Politics of Immigration:
Research, Questions and Concepts’. In A. Ette & T. Faist (Eds.), The Europeanisation of
251
National Policies and Politics of Immigration. Between Autonomy and the European Union,
3-31. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ette, A. & Gerdes, J. (2007). ‘Against exceptionalism: British interests for selectively
Europeanizing its immigration policy’. In A. Ette & T. Faist (Eds.), The Europeanisation of
National Policies and Politics of Immigration. Between Autonomy and the European Union,
93-115. New York: Macmillan.
Ette, A. & Kreienbrink, A. (2007). The unbearable lightness of complying with European
immigration policies? Germany’s first mover advantage. Paper prepared for presentation at
the European Union Studies Association Conference, Montreal, Canada, 17-19 May.
European Commission (1989). Special Eurobarometer 41: Public Opinion in the European
Community, November 1989. Racism and Xenophobia and Intolerance. Brussels: European
Commission DG Press and Communication. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_
opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_41_en.pdf [18 June 2014]
European Commission (1997). Eurobarometer Opinion Poll No. 47.1: Racism and
Xenophobia, December 1997. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
archives/ebs/ebs_113_en.pdf [12 May 2014]
European Commission (2003). Standard Eurobarometer 59: Public Opinion in the European
Union, July 2003. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb59
/eb59_rapport_final_en.pdf [14 December 2013]
European Commission (2004). Special Eurobarometer Wave 60.1: Citizenship and Sense of
Belonging, February 2004. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/
ebs_199.pdf [12 May 2014]
European Commission (2008a). Regions 2020. Demographic challenges for European
Regions. Background document to Commission Staff Working Document SEC (2008) 2868.
Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/working/regions2020/
pdf/regions2020_demographic.pdf [10 November 2011]
European Commission (2008b). Standard Eurobarometer 69: Values of Europeans, November
2008. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb69/eb69_values_en.
pdf [12 May 2014]
European Commission (2009). An Opportunity and a Challenge. Migration in the European
Union. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Union.
European Commission (2010). Standard Eurobarometer 73: Public Opinion in the European
Union, May 2010. Brussels: European Commission DG Press and Communication. Retrieved
from http://ec.europa.eu/ public_ opinion/archives/eb/eb73/eb73_vol2_en.pdf [12 March
2012]
European Commission (2011a). Standard Eurobarometer 75: Public Opinion in the European
Union, August 2011. Brussels: European Commission DG Press and Communication.
Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75_ publ_en.pdf [12 March
2012]
252
European Commission (2011b). Eurostat: Migration and migrant population statistics.
Retrieved from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Migration
_and_migrant _population_statistics [11 November 2013]
European Commission (2011c). Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council on the application of Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of thirdcountry nationals who are long-term residents. COM (2011) 585 final, Brussels, 28 September
2011. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/news/intro/docs/20110928/1_EN_
ACT_part1_v62. pdf [12 January 2012]
European Commission (2011d). Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and
the Council on the application of Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of
third- country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or
voluntary service, COM (2011) 587 final, Brussels, 28 September 2011. Retrieved from
http://ec.europa.eu/ dgs/home-affairs/e-library/documents/policies/immigration/pdf/study-ortraining/1_en_act_part1_ v6.pdf [12 January 2012]
European Commission (2012). Standard Eurobarometer 78: Public Opinion in the European
Union, December 2012. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb78
/eb78_first_en.pdf [12 May 2014]
European Commission (2013a). Eurostat: population by sex, group and citizenship, January
2013. Retrieved from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/
File:Share_of_non-nationals_in_the_resident_population,_1_January_2013_(%25)_YB14
_II.png [22 November 2013]
European Commission (2013b). EU Employment and Social Situation, Quarterly Review.
Special Supplement on Demographic Trends. Retrieved from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/
portal/page/ portal/population/documents/Tab/ESSQR_Mar2013_demogr_suppl_final.pdf [22
November 2013]
European Commission (2013c). Eurostat yearbook, 2013: Immigration. Retrieved from
http://ec. europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/download.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode
=tps00176 [20 February 2014]
European Commission (2014). Eurostat Pocketbook, 2014. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu
/eurostat/documents/3930297/6309576/KS-EI-14-001-EN-N.pdf/4797faef-6250-4c65-b89701c210c3242a [20 April 2014]
European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs (2009). European Economy News,
‘The clock is ticking… Ageing and the long-term sustainability of public finances’, Issue 14,
July 2009. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/een/014/article_8881_en.htm
[21 April 2011]
European Commission, Education and Training (2010). Focus: From the Lisbon Strategy to
‘Europe 2020’. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/education/focus/focus479_en.htm [23
April 2011]
253
European Commission Green paper on pensions. Reference: MEMO/10/302. Brussels, 7 July
2010. Retrieved from http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/
302 [21 May 2011]
European Commission, Home Affairs (2012). e-Library, Glossary. Retrieved from
http://ec.europa. eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-library/glossary/index_i_en.htm [24 November 2012]
European Commission Staff Working Paper (2005). Situation in the Different Sectors.
Accompanying the document Report from the Commission 23rd Annual Report on Monitoring
the Application of EU Law. COM(2006) 416 final.
European Commission Staff Working Paper (2006). Situation in the Different Sectors.
Accompanying the document Report from the Commission 24th Annual Report on Monitoring
the Application of EU Law. COM(2007) 398 final.
European Commission Staff Working Paper (2007). Situation in the Different Sectors.
Accompanying the document Report from the Commission 25th Annual Report on Monitoring
the Application of EU Law. COM(2008) 777 final.
European Commission Staff Working Paper (2008). Situation in the Different Sectors.
Accompanying the document Report from the Commission 26th Annual Report on Monitoring
the Application of EU Law. SEC(2009) 1684/2.
European Commission Staff Working Paper (2009). Situation in the Different Sectors.
Accompanying the document Report from the Commission 27th Annual Report on Monitoring
the Application of EU Law. COM(2010) 538.
European Commission Staff Working Paper (2010). Situation in the Different Sectors.
Accompanying the document Report from the Commission 28th Annual Report on Monitoring
the Application of EU Law. COM(2011) 588 final.
European Council (1999). Tampere, Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 October 1999. Retrieved
from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm [12 November 2011]
European Council (2001). Presidency Conclusions, Laeken,14-15 December 2001. Retrieved
from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement_new/europeancouncil/pdf/laeken_en.pdf
[10 November 2011]
European Council (2001). Presidency Conclusions, Seville, 21-22 June 2002. Retrieved from
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/72638.pdf [10
November 2011]
European Council (2004). Presidency Draft Conclusions, Brussels, 18 November 2004, on the
establishment of Common Basic Principles for immigrant integration policy in the European
Union. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/funding/2004_2007/docs/council_
conclusions_common_basic_principles.pdf [12 December 2011]
European Council (2010). The Stockholm Programme – an open and secure Europe serving
and protecting citizens. 4 April 2010. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C: 2010:115:0001:0038:EN:PDF. [18 October 2011]
254
European Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of
third-country nationals who are long-term residents.
European Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family
reunification.
European Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards
for the reception of asylum-seekers.
European Council Directive 2004/114/EC of 13 December 2004 on the conditions of
admission of third-country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange,
unremunerated training or voluntary service.
European Council Directive 2005/71/EC of 12 October 2005 on a specific procedure for
admitting third-country nationals for the purposes of scientific research.
European Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 2009 on the conditions of entry and
residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment.
European Council Framework Decision 2002/246/JHA of 28 November 2002 on the
strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the facilitation of unauthorized entry, transit
and residence. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europea.eu/LexUrlServ/LexUrlServ.do?uri=
CELEX:32002F0946:EN:NOT [22 January 2012]
European Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria
and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum
application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national.
European Council, Vienna, Presidency Conclusions, 11 and 12 December 1998. Retrieved
from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00300R1.EN8.htm [11 November 2011]
European Migration Network (2008). Organisation of Migration and Asylum Policies in
Greece. Athens: Center for Security Studies. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/homeaffairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/
migration-policies/08._gr_emn_ncp_national_report_migration__asylum_policies_version_
6feb09_en.pdf [11 December 2013]
European Migration Network (2011). Temporary and Circular Migration: Empirical
Evidence, Current Policy Practice and Future Options in EU Member States. Luxembourg:
Publications Office of the European Union.
European Migration Network (2012a). EMN Glossary. Retrieved from http://emn.intrasoftintl.com/Glossary/viewTerm.do?startingWith=A&id=13 [22 January 2012]
European Migration Network (2012b). Annual Policy Report 2011, Italy. Retrieved from
http://www.emnitaly.it/rs-29.htm [23 January 2013]
255
European Ministerial Conference on Integration. Zaragoza, 15 and 16 April 2010. Draft
Declaration. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/ewsi/UDRW/images/items/docl_13055_
519941744.pdf [15 January 2012]
European Parliament (2000). Asylum in the EU Member States. European Parliament
Working Paper (LIBE 108). Brussels, European Parliament.
European Parliament (2008). Parliament adopts directive on return of illegal immigrants.
Press Release (online). 18 June 2008. Retrieved from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do? language=en&type=IM-PRESS&reference=20080616IPR31785 [23 April 2011]
European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory
of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC,
90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. Official Journal of the European Union, L 158. Retrieved from
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0038:en:NOT [22
December 2011]
European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 December 2008 on Common
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
nationals. Official Journal of the European Union, L 348/98. 24 December 2008. Retrieved
from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:348:0098:0107:EN
:pdf [22 December 2011]
European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 491/2004 of 10 March 2004
establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third countries in the areas
of migration and asylum (AENEAS). Official Journal of the European Union. 18 March
2004. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
32004R0491:EN:NOT [22 December 2011]
European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 763/2008 of 9 July 2008 on population
and housing censuses. Official Journal of the European Union. 13 August 2008. Retrieved
from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32008R0763:EN:NOT
[22 December 2011]
European Parliament Resolution on the responsibility of the Member States for the
application of and compliance with Community law. Official Journal of the European Union,
C 68/32-4, 14 February 1983. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri
Serv.do?uri=OJ:C: 1983: 068:0027:0057:EN:PDF [22 December 2011]
European Union: Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July
2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx
of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts Between Member
States in Receiving such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof. Official Journal of
the European Union, L 212/223, 7 August 2001. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/ 3ddcee2e4.html [19 March 2012]
Exadaktylos, T. & Radaelli, C. (2009). Research Design in European Studies. Journal of
Common Market Studies, 47(3), 507-530.
256
Fagerlund, J. & Brander, S. (2010). Country report: Finland, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/docs/
CountryReports/Finland.pdf [11 January 2012]
Faist, T. (2000). The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational.
Social Spaces. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Falk, R. (1995). On Humane Governance: Towards a New Global Politics. University Park,
PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Favell, A. (2007). ‘Rebooting Migration Theory. ‘Interdisciplinarity, Globality, and
Postdisciplinarity in Migration Studies’. In C. Brettell & J.F. Hollifield (Eds.), Migration
Theory. Talking across Disciplines, 259-278. London: Routledge.
Favell, A., & Hansen, R. (2002). Markets Against Politics: Migration, EU Enlargement and
the Idea of Europe. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 28(4), 581-601.
Fearon, J.D. (1991). Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science. World
Politics, 43(2), 169-195.
Featherstone, K. (2000). Cyprus and the Onset of Europeanisation: Strategic Usage, Structural
Transformation and Institutional Adaptation. South European Society and Politics, 5(2), 141162.
Featherstone, K. (2003). ‘Introduction: In the name of “Europe”’. In K. Featherstone & C.
Radaelli (Eds.), The Politics of Europeanisation, 3-27. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Featherstone, K. & Radaelli, C. (Eds.) (2003). The Politics of Europeanisation. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Federal Ministry of Interior (2005). Immigration Law and Policy [22 October 2011].
Retrieved from http://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Broschueren/
Zuwanderungspolitik_und_Zuwanderungsrecht_en.pdf?__blob=publicationFile
Federal Ministry of Interior (2009). Topics- Migration & Integration. Nationality Act (online
resource). Retrieved from http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Themen/MigrationIntegration/
Nationality/nationality_node.html [22 October 2011]
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2011). Focus on people- support and integrate.
Naturalisation in Germany (online resource). Retrieved from http://www.bamf.de/EN/
Einbuergerung/InDeutschland/indeutschland-node.html [17 March 2012]
Feldt, J.E. (2009). ‘Citizenship and Cultural Clashes: The Cartoon Crisis and Changing
Notions of Citizenship’. In W. Zank (Ed.), Clash or Cooperation of Civilisations?:
Overlapping Integrations and Identities, 167-182. Farnham: Ashgate.
Financial Times (2008, January 25). ‘Sikhs urge Sarkozy to lift turban ban’. Retrieved from
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5d84c0f4-cb5f-11dc-97ff-000077b07658.html#axzz1vic465oA
[18 March 2013]
257
Fink-Hafner, D. (2008). Europeanisation and party system mechanics: comparing Croatia,
Serbia and Montenegro. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 10(2), 167-181.
Finotelli, C. & Sciortino, G. (2009). The Importance of Being Southern: The Making of
Policies of Immigration Control in Italy. European Journal of Migration and Law, 11(2),
119–138
Fligstein, N. & Merand, F. (2002). Globalisation or Europeanisation? Evidence on the
European Economy Since 1980. Acta Sociologica, 45(1), 7-22.
Flockhart, T. (2010). Europeanisation or EU-ization? The Transfer of European Norms
Across Time and Space. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(4), 787-810.
Fortier, A-M. (2008). Multicultural Horizons: Diversity and the Limits of the Civil Nation.
London: Routledge.
Fossum, J. E. & Schlesinger, P. (2007). ‘The European Union and the Public Sphere: A
Communicative Space in the Making?’. In J.E. Fossum & P. Schlesinger (Eds.), The
European Union and the Public Sphere. A Communicative Space in the Making?, 1-19. New
York: Routledge.
Fossum, J. E. (2007). On the Prospects for a Viable Constitutional Patriotism in Complex
Multinational Entities: Canada and the European Union Compared. Paper presented at the
Annual Conference of the Canadian Political Science Association, Saskatoon, 31 May.
Retrieved from http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2007/Fossum.pdf [11 March 2012]
Frank, A.G. (1966). The Development of Underdevelopment. Monthtly Review, 18(4), 17-31.
Freeman, G.P. (1979). Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies: The
French and British Experience, 1945-75, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Freeman, G.P. (1995). ‘Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states’.
International Migration Review, 24(4), 881-902.
Frontex (2009). Annual Report 2008, Warsaw: Frontex.
Fuchs, D. (2000). ‘Demos und Nation in der Europäischen Union’. In H.D. Klingemann & F.
Neidhardt (Eds.), Zur Zukunft der Demokratie. Herausforderungen im Zeitalter der
Globalisierung, 215-236. Berlin: WZB-Jahrbuch.
Fuchs, D. (2011) ‘Cultural diversity, European Identity and the Legitimacy of the EU: A
Theoretical Framework’. In D. Fuchs & H.D. Klingemann (Eds.), Cultural Diversity,
European Identity and the Legitimacy of the EU, 27-57. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Gabanyi, A.U. (2005). A perspective on a perspective: Moldova and the EU's new
Neighbourhood Policy. Osteuropa, 55(2), 24-39.
Gänzle, S. & Muentel, G. (2011). Europeanisation ‘Beyond’ Europe? EU Impact on Domestic
Policies in the Russian Enclave of Kaliningrad. Journal of Baltic Studies, 42(1), 57-79.
258
Gasior-Niemiec, A. & Glinski, P. (2007). Europeanisation of Civil Society in Poland. Revija
za Socijalnu Politiku, 14(1), 29-48.
Geddes, A. (2000). Immigration and European Integration: Towards Fortress Europe?
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Geddes, A. (2003). The Politics of Migration and Immigration in Europe. London: Sage.
Geddes, A. (2005). Getting the Best of Both Worlds? Britain, the EU and Migration Policy.
International Affairs, 81(4), 723-740.
Geddes, A. (2007). ‘The Europeanisation of What? Migration, Asylum and the Politics of
European Integration’. In A. Ette & T. Faist (Eds.), The Europeanisation of National Policies
and Politics of Immigration: Between Autonomy and the European Union, 49-70. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Geddes, A. & Guiraudon, V. (2004). Britain, France, and EU Anti- Discrimination Policy: the
Emergence of an EU Policy Paradigm. West European Politics, 27(2), 334-353.
Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Gerhards, J. (1993). Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung
einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 22(2), 96-110.
German Marshall Fund of the United States (2008). Transatlantic Trends: Immigration.
September 2008. Retrieved from http://trends.gmfus.org/immigration/doc/TTI_2008_
Final.pdf [12 April 2012]
Geyer, R.R. (2003). Globalisation, Europeanisation, Complexity, and the Future of
Scandinavian Exceptionalism. Governance, 16(4), 559-576.
Giddens, A. (1984). The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Giesen, B. & Eder, K. (2001). ‘European Citizenship. An Avenue for the Social Integration of
Europe’. In Giesen, B. & Eder, K. (Eds.), European Citizenship. National Legacies and
Transnational Projects, 1-16. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gilardi, F. (2012). ‘Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies’. In W. Carlsnaes, T.
Risse & B. Simmons (Eds.), Handbook of International Relations, 453-477. London:
Thousand Oaks.
Gill, I.S. & Raiser, M. (2012). Golden Growth: Restoring the Lustre of the European
Economic Model. Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications.
Glazer, N. & Moynihan, D. (1975). Ethnicity: Theory and Experience. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
259
Global Commission on International Migration, GCIM (2005). Migration in an
Interconnected World: New Directions for Action, Geneva: Global Commission on
International Migration.
Golini, A. & Birindelli, A.M. (1990). ‘Italy’. In W.J. Serow et al. (Eds.), Handbook on
International Migration, 143-165. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Golinowska, S. (2009). A case study of the European welfare system model in the
postcommunist countries – Poland. Polish Sociological Review, 166(2), 273-296.
Gonzalez, N. (1961). Family Organisation in Five Types of Migratory Wage Labor. American
Anthropologist, 63(6), 1264-1280.
Gonzalez-Ferrer, A. (2007). The process of family reunification among original guest-workers
in Germany. Zeitschrift für Familienforschung (Journal for Family Research), 3(1), 10-33.
Goodman, S.W. (2010). Naturalisation Policies in Europe: Exploring Patterns of Inclusion
and Exclusion. EUDO Citizenship Observatory, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies. Florence: European University Institute.
Gordon, M. (1964). Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National
Origins. New York: Oxford University Press.
Gorton, M., Löwe, P. & Zellei, A. (2005). Pre-accession Europeanisation: The Strategic
Realignment of the Environmental Policy Systems of Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia towards
Agricultural Pollution in Preparation for EU Membership. Sociologia Ruralis, 45(3), 202-223.
Goetz, K.H. & Hix, S. (Eds.). (2001). Europeanised Politics? European Integration and
National Political Systems. London: Frank Cass.
Gourevitch, P. (1978). The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic
Politics. International Organisation, 32(4), 881-912.
Grabbe, H. (2005). ‘Regulating the Flow of People across Europe’. In F. Schimmelfennig &
U. Sedelmeier (Eds.), The Europeanisation of Central and Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press.
Graves, N.B. & Graves, T.D. (1974). Adaptive Strategies in Urban Migration. Annual Review
of Anthropology, 3(1), 117-151.
Gray, E. & Statham, P. (2005). Becoming European? The Transformation of the British ProMigrant NGO Sector in Response to Europeanisation. JCMS: Journal of Common Market
Studies, 43(4), 877-898.
Graziano, P. (2003). Europeanisation or globalisation? A framework for empirical research
(with some evidence from the Italian case). Global Social Policy, 3 (2), 173-194.
Green-Cowles, M. (2003). Non-state Actors and False Dichotomies: Reviewing IR/IPE
Approaches to European Integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 10 (1), 102-120.
260
Green-Cowles, M., Caporaso, J. & Risse, T. (Eds.). (2001). Transforming Europe:
Europeanisation and Domestic Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Greer, S. (2006). Uninvited Europeanisation: Neofunctionalism and the EU in Health Policy.
Journal of European Public Policy, 13(1), 134-152.
Greer, S.L., da Fonseca, E.M. & Adolph, C. (2008). Mobilizing Bias in Europe. Lobbies,
Democracy and EU Health Policy-Making. European Union Politics, 9(3), 403-433.
Grimm, D. (1995). Does Europe need a Constitution? European Law Journal, 1(3), 282-302.
Groenendijk, K. (2008). Local Voting Rights for Non-nationals in Europe: What We Know
and What We Need to Learn. Study for the Transatlantic Council on Migration. Washington,
D.C.: Migration Policy Institute.
Gropas, R. & Triandafyllidou, A. (2005). Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Greece.
Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS. Oldenburg: Oldenburg:
Interdisziplinäres Zentrum für Bildung und Kommunikation in Migrationsprozessen.
Gropas, R. & Triandafyllidou, A. (2007). ‘Greece’. In Triandafyllidou, A. & R. Gropas
(Eds.), European Immigration: A Sourcebook, 141-153. London: Ashgate.
Grundy, S. & Jamieson, L. (2007). European Identities: From Absent-minded Citizens to
Passionate Europeans. Sociology, 41(4), 663-680.
Gualini, E. (2003). Challenges to multi-level governance: contradictions and conflicts in the
Europeanisation of Italian regional policy. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(4), 616636.
Guarnizo, L. E., Portes, A. & Haller, W.J. (2003). Assimilation and Transnationalism:
Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants. American
Journal of Sociology, 108(6), 1121-1148.
Guarnizo, L.E. & Smith, M.P. (1998). ‘The Locations of Transnationalism’. In L.E. Guarnizo
& M.P. Smith (Eds.), Transnationalism from Below, 3-34. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction
Publishers.
Guba, E.G. & Lincoln, Y.S. (1994). ‘Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research’. In N.K.
Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of Qualitative Research, 105-117. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage.
Guellec, D. & Cervantes, M. (2001). ‘International Mobility of Highly Skilled Workers: From
Statistical Analysis to Policy Formulation’. In International Mobility of the Highly Skilled,
71-98. Paris: OECD Publications.
Guetzkow, H. (1955). Multiple Loyalties. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Guild, E., Groenendijk, K. & Carrera, S. (2009). ‘Understanding the contest of community:
illiberal practices in the EU?’. In E. Guild, K. Groenendijk & S. Carrera (Eds.), Illiberal
liberal states. Immigration, citizenship and integration in the EU, 1-28. Farnham: Ashgate.
261
Guiraudon, V. (2000). European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-Making As
Venue Shopping. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 38(2), 251-271.
Gunew, S. (2004). Haunted Nations: The Colonial Dimensions of Multiculturalisms. London:
Routledge.
Haas, E.B. (1958). The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces 1950-1957.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Habermas, J. (1987). Theory of Communicative Action, Volume II: Lifeworld and System: A
Critique of Functionalist Reason. Boston: Beacon Press.
Habermas, J. (1992). Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität. In Faktizität und Geltung.
Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
Habermas, J. (1994). ‘Struggles for Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State’. In
Gutmann, A. (Ed.), Multiculturalism. Examining the Politics of Recognition, 107-148.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Habermas, J. (1996). Between Facts and Norms. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Habermas, J. (1998). The European Nation-State: On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and
Citizenship. Public Culture, 10(2), 397-416.
Habermas, J. (2001). Why Europe Needs a Constitution. New Left Review, 11(1), 5-26.
Habermas, J. (2006). The Divided West (C. Cronin, Trans.). Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hailbronner, K. (1989). ‘Citizenship and Nationhood in Germany’. In R. Brubaker (Ed.),
Immigration and the politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America, 67-79. Lanham:
University Press of America.
Hailbronner, K. (2000). Immigration and Asylum Policy of the European Union. The Hague:
Kluwer Law International.
Hailbronner, K. (2006). ‘Nationality in Public International Law and European Law’. In R.
Bauböck, E. Ersboll, K. Groenendijk & H. Waldrauch (Eds.), Acquisition and Loss of
Nationality, Volume I: Comparative Analyses: Policies and Trends in 15 European Countries,
35-104. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
Hall, S. (1995). Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union. Leiden-Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Hall, S. (1996). ‘Who Needs Identity?’. In P. du Gay, J. Evans, & P. Redman (Eds.), Identity:
A Reader, 15-30. London: Sage.
Hall, S. (2003). ‘Cultural, Identity and Diaspora’. In J. Rutherford (Ed), Identity: Community,
Culture, Difference, 222-237. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
262
Hall, P. & Taylor, R. (1996). A Political science and the three new institutionalisms.Political
Studies, 44(5), 936-957.
Halperin, S. & Laxer, G. (2003). Global Civil Society and its Limits. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Hammar, T. (Ed.). (1985). European Immigration Policy: A Comparative Study. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hammond, P. (2007). Media, War and Postmodernity. London: Routledge.
Hansen, R. (2003). Migration to Europe since 1945: Its History and its Lessons. Political
Quarterly, 74(1), 25-38.
Hardin, R. (1995). One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Harris, J.R. & Todaro, M.P. (1970). Migration, unemployment and development: A twosector analysis. American Economic Review, 60(1), 126-142.
Haverland, M. (2005) ‘Does the EU Cause Domestic Developments? The Problem of Case
Selection in Europeanisation Research’. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 9(2), 115. Retrieved from http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2005-002.htm [23 June 2012]
Hawitt, G. (2011). Europe and immigration, BBC, April 26. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.
co.uk/ blogs/thereporters/gavinhewitt/2011/04/europe_and_immigration.html [23 April 2012]
Hawkins, F. (1991). Critical Years in Immigration: Canada and Australia Compared.
Montreal: McGill University Press.
Hayek, F. (1976). The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge.
Heater, D. (2004). Citizenship: The civic ideal in world history, politics and education.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Hefty, G.P. (2011, October 27). Halbfremd hier wie dort. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
Retrieved from http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/kommentar-halbfremd-hier-wie-dort11509912.html
Heidegger, M. (1962). Being and Time (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson, Trans.). New York:
Harper & Row. (Original work published in 1927).
Heinelt, H. & Smith, R. (Eds.) (1996). Policy Networks and the Structural Funds. Aldershot:
Avebury.
Held, D. (1987). Models of Democracy. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Held, D. (1991). ‘Democracy and the Global System’. In D. Held (Ed.), Political Theory
Today, 197-235. Cambridge: Polity Press.
263
Held, D. (1995). Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan
Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Held, D. & McGrew, A. (2002). Globalisation/Anti-Globalisation. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. & Perraton, J. (1999). Global Transformations: Politics,
Economics and Culture. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hellmann, G., Baumann, R., Bösche, M., Herborth, B. & Wagner, W. (2005). DeEuropeanisation by Default? Germany’s EU Policy in Defense and Asylum. Foreign Policy
Analysis 1(1), 143-164.
Henry, C. (2009). The political science of immigration policies. Journal of Human Behaviour
in the Social Environment, 19(6), 690-701.
Héritier, A. & Knill, C. (2001). ‘Differential Responses to European Policies: A Comparison’.
In A. Héritier, C. Knill, D. Kerwer, M. Teutsch & A-C. Douillet (Eds.), Differential Europe:
New Opportunities and Restrictions for Member State Policies, 257-294. Lanham: Rowman
& Littlefield.
Herlitz, L. (2005). A review of the recent literature on the impact of immigration on the UK,
Pilot research study for the European Migration Network, Croydon: IRSS. Retrieved from
http://ec. europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network
/reports /docs/emn-studies/illegally-resident/uk-finalstudyt3-6_en.pdf [11 May 2013]
Herrmann, R.K. & Brewer, M.B. (2004). Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in
the EU. In R.K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M.B. Brewer (Eds.), Transnational Identities.
Becoming European in the EU, 1-22. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Hille, P. & Knill, C. (2006). `It’s the Bureaucracy, Stupid`: The Implementation of the Acquis
Communautaire in EU Candidate Countries, 1999-2003. European Union Politics, 7(4), 531552.
Hindman, H. (2007). ‘Outsourcing Difference: Expatriate Training and the Disciplining of
Culture’. In S. Sassen (Ed.), Deciphering the Global: Its Scales, Spaces and Subjects, 153176. New York: Routledge.
Hinsley, F. H. (1986) Sovereignty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hix, S. (1998). The Study of the European Union II. The `New Governance` Agenda and Its
Rival. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(1), 38-65.
HM Government (2011). Transposition Guidance: How to implement European Directives
effectively [electronic resource]. April 2011. London: Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills, 30 pages. Retrieved from http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/better-regulation/
docs/t/11-775-transposition-guidance [23 May 2012]
Hobsbawm, E. (1990). Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
264
Hoffmann, S. (1964). The European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes. JCMS: Journal of
Common Market Studies, 3(2), 85-101.
Hoffmann, S. (1966). Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of
Western Europe. Daedalus, 95(3), 862-915.
Hogg, M.A., Terry, D.J. & White, K.M. (1995). A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical
Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory. Social Psychology Quarterly,
58(4), 255-269.
Holden, R. (1999). ‘New Labour’s European Challenge: from Triumphant Isolationism to
Positive Integration?’ In G.R. Taylor (Ed.), The Impact of New Labour, 177-189. New York:
St. Martin’s Press.
Holland, D., Lachiotte, L., Skinner, D. & Cain, C. (1998). Identity and Agency in Cultural
Worlds. Cambridge; MA: Harvard University Press.
Hollifield, J. F. (2000). ‘The Politics of International Migration: How We Can Bring the State
Back in’. In C.B. Brettell & J.F. Hollified (Eds.), Migration Theory: Talking across
Disciplines, 137-185. New York: Routledge.
Hollis, M. & Smith, S. (1990). Explaining and Understanding International Relations.
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Holzinger, K., Knill, C. & Sommerer, T. (2007). ‘Konvergenz der Um-weltpolitiken in
Europa? Der Einfluss internationaler Institutionen und der ökonomi-schen Integration‘. In K.
Holzinger, H. Jörgens & C. Knill (Eds.), Transfer, Diffusion und Konvergenz von Politiken,
377-406. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2000). Feminism and Migration. The ANNALS of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 571(1), 107-112.
Hooghe, L. & Marks, G. (2006). Europe’s Blues: Theoretical SoulSearching after the
Rejection of a European Constitution. Politics and Political Science, 39(2): 247-250.
Hopkin, J. (2002). ‘Comparative Methods’. In D. Marsh & G. Stoker (Eds.), Theory and
Methods in Political Science, 249-267. New York: Macmillian.
House of Lords, European Union Committee (2005). Economic Migration to the EU. 14th
report of session 2005-2006, HL Paper 58. London: House of Lords. Retrieved from
http://www. publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldselect/ldeucom/58/58.pdf. [12 April
2012]
Howard, M.M. (2006). Comparative citizenship: an agenda for cross-national research.
Perspectives on Politics, 4(3), 443-455.
Howell, K. (2002). Developing Conceptualizations of Europeanisation and European
Integration: Mixing Methodologies. ESRC Seminar Series / UACES Study Group on the
Europeanisation of British Politics, November 29, 2002. Retrieved from http://www.shef.
ac.uk/ebpp/howell.pdf [18 November 2012]
265
Human Rights Watch (2009). Pushed Back, Pushed Around - Italy’s Forced Return of Boat
Migrants and Asylum-seekers, Libya’s Mistreatment of Migrants and Asylum-seekers.
Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2009/09/21/pushed-back-pushed-around [16
August 2013]
Human Rights Watch (2010). Greece: Asylum Reform Delay Unacceptable. 20 September
2010. Retrieved from http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/09/20/greece-asylum-reform-delayunacceptable [18 June 2012]
Huntington, S. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72 (3), 22-49.
Huntington, S. (2004). Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity. New
York: Simon & Schuster.
Husserl, E. (1962). Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (W.R.B. Gibson,
Trans.). London: Allen & Unwin. (Original work published in 1913).
Inglehart, R. (1970). Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity. Comparative Politics,
3(1), 45-70.
Inman, P. (2012, September 9). Primary Greek tax evaders are the professional classes. The
Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/09/greece-taxevasion-professional-classes
International Labour Organisation (1997). International Migration Statistics, Annex: Labour
Migration Statistics Questionnaire’s Terms and Concepts. Retrieved from http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/protection/migrant/download/ilmdbqs.pdf
International Labour Organisation (2011). Bureau of Library and Information Services, ILO
Thesaurus. Retrieved from www.ilo.org/thesaurus/default.asp [30January 2011]
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2003). World Migration 2003: Managing
Migration Challenges and Responses for People on the Move. Geneva: IOM.
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2010). Migration Initiatives Appeal 2010.
Geneva: IOM.
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2013). World Migration 2013: Migrant WellBeing and Development. Geneva: IOM.
Iosifides, T. (2011). Qualitative Methods in Migration Studies: A Critical Realist Perspective.
Farnham: Ashgate.
Irondelle, B. (2003). Europeanisation without the European Union? French military reforms
1991-96. Journal of European Public Policy, 10(2), 208-226.
Isard, W. (1960). Methods of Regional Analysis: An Introduction to Regional Science. New
York: John Wiley.
266
Isin, E.F. (Ed.). (2000). Democracy, Citizenship and the Global City. London: Routledge.
Ivison, D. (2010). ‘Multiculturalism as a Public Ideal’. In D. Ivison (Ed.), The Ashgate
Research Companion to Multiculturalism, 1-18. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Jachtenfuchs, M. (1995). Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance. European Law
Review, 1(2), 115-133.
Jachtenfuchs, M. (2001). The Governance Approach to European Integration. JCMS: Journal
of Common Market Studies, 39(2), 245-264.
Jacoby, W. & Meunier, S. (2010). Europe and the Management of Globalisation. Journal of
European Public Policy, 17(3), 299-317.
Janoski, T. & Gran, B. (2002). ‘Political Citizenship: Foundations of Rights’. In E.F. Isin &
B.S. Turner (Eds.), Handbook of citizenship studies, 13-52. London: Sage.
Jetschke, A. & Murray, P. (2012). Diffusing Regional Integration: The EU and Southeast
Asia. West European Politics, 35(1), 174-191.
Johnson, B. & Christensen, L.B. (2007). Educational Research: Quantitative, Qualitative,
and Mixed Approaches. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Johnston, A.I. (2007). Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Jones, W. T. (1975). The Twentieth Century to Wittgenstein and Sarte. San Francisco:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Jonjic, T. & Mavrodi, G. (2012). Immigration in the EU: Policies and politics in times of
crisis 2007-2012. EUDO Report 2012, 5.
Joppke, C. (1995). Multiculturalism and immigration. A comparison of the United States,
Germany and Britain. Florence: European University Institute.
Joppke, C. (1999). Immigration and the Nation-State: the United States, Germany and Great
Britain. New York: Oxford University Press.
Joppke, C. (2003). Citizenship between de- and re-ethnicization. European Journal of
Sociology, 44(3), 429-458.
Joppke, C. (2004). The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy.
British Journal of Sociology, 55(2), 237-257.
Joppke, C. (2005). Selecting by Origin. Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Joppke, C. (2007). Beyond National Models. Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in
Western Europe. West European Politics, 30(1), 1-22.
267
Joppke, C. (2010a). Citizenship and Immigration. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Joppke, C. (2010b). The inevitable lightening of citizenship. European Journal of Sociology,
51(1), 9-32.
Joppke, C. & Morawska, E. (2003). ‘Integrating immigrants in liberal nation-states: policies
and practices’. In C. Joppke & E. Morawska (Eds.), Toward Assimilation and Citizenship:
Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States, 1-36. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jordan, A. (1998). The Politics of a Multi-Level Environmental Governance System: EU
Environmental Policy at 25, CSERGE Working Paper PA 98-01. Norwich: University of East
Anglia.
Jørgensen, K.E. (1999). The Social Construction of the Acquis Communautaire: A
Cornerstone of the European Edifice. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 3(1), 1-24.
Retrieved from http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-005a.htm [5July 2006]
Kasimis, C. & Kassimi, C. (2004). “Greece: A History of Migration.” Migration Information
Source Washington, D.C.: Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved from
http://www.migrationpolicy .org/article/greece-history-migration [21 July 2013]
Katz, R.S. & Mair, P. (1995). Changing Models of Party Organisation and Party Democracy:
The Emergence of the Cartel Party. Party Politics 1(1), 5-28.
Katzenstein, P. (Ed.). (1996). The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World
Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.
Keane, J. (1988). Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives. London: Verso.
Kearney, M., & Nagengast, C. (1989). Anthropological Perspectives on Transnational
Communities in Rural California. Working Group on Farm Labor and Rural Poverty.
Working Paper No. 3. Davis/CA: California Institute.
Kegan, P. & Ohmae, K. (1990). The Borderless World. London: Collins.
Kelleher, D. & Leavey, G. (Eds.) (2004). Identity and Health. London: Routledge.
Keohane, R.O. (Ed.) (2002). Power and Governance in a Partially Globalised World. New
York: Routledge.
Keohane, R.O. & Milner, H.V. (Eds.) (1996). Internationalization and Domestic Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kielmansegg, P.G. (1996). ‘Integration und Demokratie’. In M. Jachtenfuchs & B. KohlerKoch (Eds.), Europäische Integration, 49-83. Opladen: Leske and Budrich.
Kincheloe, J.L. & Steinberg, S.R. (1997). Changing Multiculturalism. Buckingham: Open
University Press.
268
Knill C. & Lehmkuhl, D. (2002). The National Impact of EU Regulatory Policy: Three
Europeanisation Mechanisms. European Journal of Political Research, 41(2), 255-280.
Knodt, M. (2002). Europeanisation of regional governance: with Sinatra towards more
autonomy in German federalism? Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 43(2), 211-234.
Knutsen, P. (1996). Europeanisation of NATO and a Common European Defence Policy.
Internasjonal Politikk, 54(4), 501-526.
Kohler-Koch, B. & Eising, R. (1999). The transformation of governance in the European
Union. London: Routledge.
Kohler-Koch, B. & Rittberger, B. (2006). The ‘Governance Turn’ in EU studies. JCMS:
Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(1), 27-49.
Kohli, M. (2000). The Battlegrounds of European Identity. European Societies, 2(2), 113-137.
Kolb, H. (2008). Immigration into a Non-immigration Country: the German Experience.
Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdffiles/bueros/seoul/
06050.pdf [11 January 2012]
Kostakopoulou, D. (2001). Citizenship, Identity and Immigration in the European Union:
Between Past and Future. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Kostakopoulou, D. (2010). ‘Introduction’. In R. van Oers, E. Ersbøll & D. Kostakopoulou
(Eds.), A Re-Definition of Belonging? Language and Integration Tests in Europe, 1-23.
Leiden-Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Krasovec, A. & Lajh, D. (2008). Have democratization processes been a catalyst for the
Europeanisation of party politics in Slovenia? Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans,
10(2), 183-203.
Kratochwil, F. & Ruggie, J.G. (1986). International Organisation: A State of the Art on an Art
of the State. International Organisation, 40(4), 753-775.
Krzyzanowski, M. & Wodak, R. (2007). ‘Multiple Identities, Migration and Belonging:
`Voices of Migrants`’. In C. Caldas-Coulthard & R. Iedema (Eds.), Identity Troubles, 95-116.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kukathas, C. (2004). ‘Nationalism and Multiculturalism’. In G.F. Gaus & C. Kukathas (Eds.),
Handbook of Political Theory, 250-264. London: Sage.
Kymlicka, W. (1995). Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Right. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Kymlicka, W. (2002). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Kymlicka, W. (2012) Multiculturalism: Success, Failure, and the Future. Washington D.C.:
Migration Policy Institute.
269
Kymlicka, W. & Norman, W. (1994). Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on
Citizenship Theory. Ethics, 104(2), 352-381.
Kymlicka, W. & Norman, W. (2000). Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Lacan, J. (1977). The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.
London: Hogarth Press.
Ladi, S. (2011). Policy Change and Soft Europeanisation: The Transfer of the Ombudsman
Institution to Greece, Cyprus and Malta. Public Administration, 89(4), 1643-1663.
Ladrech, R. (1994). Europeanisation of Domestic Politics and Institutions: the Case of France.
JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 32(1), 69-88.
Ladrech, R. (2005). ‘The Europeanisation of Interest Groups and Political Parties’. In S.
Bulmer & C. Lequesne (Eds.), The Member States of the European Union, 317-337. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Ladrech, R. (2010). Europeanisation and National Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Laffan, B. & Stubb, A. (2003), ‘Member States’. In E. Bomberg & A. Stubb (Eds.), The
European Union: How Does it Work?, 69-87. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lahav, G. & Guiraudon, V. (2006). Actors and venues in immigration control: closing the gap
between political demands and policy outcomes. West European Politics, 29(2): 201-223.
Lavenex, S. (1999). Safe Third Countries. Extending the EU Asylum and Immigration
Policies to Central and Eastern Europe. Budapest: Central European University Press.
Lavenex, S. (2001). The Europeanisation of Refugee Policies: Normative Challenges and
Institutional Legacies. Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(1), 851-74.
Lavenex, S. (2006). Shifting Up and Out: the Foreign Policy of European Immigration
Control. West European Politics, 29 (2), 329-350.
Lavenex, S. & Uçarer, E.M. (Eds.) (2002). Migration and the Externalities of European
Integration. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Lawrence, A. (2004). From Collective Action to Institutionalized Labor Rights: Parallel and
Diverging Logics of Collective Action in Germany and South Africa. New Political Science
26(2), 189-204.
Leconte, C. (2005). The fragility of the EU as a community of values: lessons from the Haider
affair. West European Politics, 28(3), 620-649.
Lee, E.S. (1966). A Theory of Migration. Demography, 3(1), 47-57.
270
Lee, T. L. & Fiske, S. T. (2006). Not An Out-group, But Not Yet An In-group: Immigrants in
the Stereotype Content Model. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 30(6), 751768.
Leftwich, A. (2000). States of Development. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Lehmkuhl, U. (2001). Diplomatiegeschichte als internationale Kulturgeschichte: Ansätze,
Methoden und Forschungsergebnisse zwischen Historischer Kulturwissenschaft und
soziologischem Institutionalismus. Geschichte und Gesellschaft, 27(3), 394-423.
Leibfried, S. (2000). National Welfare States, European Integration and Globalisation: A
Perspective for the Next Century. Social Policy and Administration, 34(1), 44-63.
Lenschow, A. (2005). ‘Europeanisation of Public Policy’. In J. Richardson (Ed.), European
Union. Power and Policy-making, 55-71. London: Routledge.
Lenz, T. (2012). Spurred Emulation: The EU and Regional Integration in Mercosur and
SADC. West European Politics, 35(1), 155-173.
Lerner, D. & Gorden, M. (1969). Euratlantica. Changing Perspectives of the European Elites.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Levi-Faur, D. (2004). On the `Net Impact` of Europeanisation: The EU’s Telecoms and
Electricity Regimes Between the Global and the National. Comparative Political Studies,
37(1), 3-29.
Levy, J. (2000). The Multiculturalism of Fear. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lewis, P.G. (2008). Changes in the party politics of the new EU member states in Central
Europe: patterns of Europeanisation and democratization. Journal of Southern Europe and the
Balkans, 10(2), 151-165.
Lewis, W.A. (1954). Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour. Manchester
School of Economic and Social Studies, 22(2), 139-91.
Lieshout, R.H., Segers, M.L.L. & van der Vleuten, A.M. (2004). De Gaulle, Moravcsik, and
the Choice for Europe: Soft Sources, Weak Evidence. Journal of Cold War Studies, 6(4), 89139.
Lindberg, L. (1963). The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration. Standford:
Stanford University Press.
Linklater, A. (1998). The Transformation of Political Community. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Lister, R. (2001). New Labour: a study in ambiguity from a position of ambivalence. Critical
Social Policy, 21(4), 425-447.
Lodge, M. (2006). ‘The Europeanisation of Governance – Top Down, Bottom Up or Both?’.
In G.F. Schuppert (Ed.), The Europeanisation of Governance, 59-76. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
271
Lucassen, L. (2005). The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in
Western Europe since 1850. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
Luhmann, N. (1994). An Interview with David Sciulli. Theory, Culture & Society, 11(2), 3769.
Lutz, F. (2010). The Negotiations on the Return Directive. Nijemegen: Wolf Legal
Publications.
Macqueen, A. (2011). The Invasion of Lampedusa. International investigative documentary
series. Glasgow, UK: BBC Two, June 14.
Magnani, N. (2012). Immigration control in Italian political elite debates: Changing policy
frames in Italy, 1980s -2000s. Ethnicities, 12(5), 643-664.
Magnusson, W. ( 2000). ‘Politicising the Global City’. In E.F. Isin (Ed.), Democracy,
Citizenship, and the Global City, 289-306. London: Routledge.
Magnusson, W. (1990). ‘The reification of political community’. In R.B.J. Walker & S.H.
Mendlovitz (Eds.), Contending Sovereignties, 45-60. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Maher, F.A. & Tetreault, M.K. (1994). The Feminist Classroom. New York: Basic Books.
Mahony, H. (2003). ‘Germany Calls to Keep Veto in Immigration Policy’. 2 July 2003.
Retrieved from http://euobserver.com/justice/11932 [11 November 2011]
Mair, P. (2004). The Europeanisation Dimension. Journal of European Public Policy, 11(2),
337-348.
Majone, G. (1994). The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe. West European Politics,
14(3), 77-101.
Majone, G. (Ed.). (1996). Regulating Europe. London: Routledge.
Mandaville, P. (1999). Territory and Translocality: Discrepant Idioms of Political Identity.
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 28(3), 653-673.
Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power in Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? JCMS: Journal
of Common Market Studies, 40(2), 235-258.
March, J.G. & Olsen, J.P. (1998). The Institutional Dynamics of International Political
Orders. International Organisation, 52(4), 943-69.
Marks, G. (1993). ‘Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC’. In A. Cafruny &
G. Rosenthal (Eds.), The State of the European Community: Volume 2, 391-410. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner.
Marks, G. & Hooghe, L. (2004). ‘Contrasting Visions of Multi-Level Governance’. In I.
Bache & M. Flinders (Eds.), Multi-Level Governance, 15-30. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
272
Marks, G., Scharpf, F.W., Schmitter, P. & Streeck, W. (Eds.). (1996). Governance in the
European Union. London: Sage.
Marsh, D. & Stoker, G. (1995). Theory and Methods in Political Science. London:
Macmilllan.
Marshall, C. & Rossman, G. B. (2006). Designing Qualitative Research. Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Marshall, T.H. (1950). Citizenship and Social Class. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Martiniello, M. (1995). ‘European Citizenship, European Identity and Migrants: towards the
Post-National State?’. In R. Miles & D. Thränhardt (Eds.), Migration and European
Integration: the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion, 37-52. London: Pinter Publishers.
Martiniello, M. (2000). Citizenship in the European Union. In T. A. Aleinikoff & D.
Klusmeyer (Eds.), From migrants to citizens: Membership in a changing world, 342-380.
Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Peace.
Massey, D.S., Arango, J., Hugo, G., Kouaouci, A., Pellegrino, A. & Taylor, J.E. (1993).
Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal. Population and Development
Review, 19(3), 432-466.
Mastenbroek, E. (2005). EU Compliance: Still a ‘Black Hole’? Journal of European Public
Policy, 12(6), 1103-1120.
Mavrodi, G. (2007). Ulysses Turning European: the Different Faces of ‘Europeanisation’ of
Greek Immigration Policy. In A. Ette & T. Faist (Eds.), The Europeanisation of National
Policies and Politics of Immigration: Between Autonomy and the European Union, 157-177.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
May, S. (2002). ‘Multiculturalism’. In D.T. Goldberg & J. Solomos (Eds.), A Companion to
Racial and Ethnic Studies, 124-144. Malden: Blackwell Publishers.
May, S. (2010). Critical Multiculturalism: Theory and Praxis. New York: Routledge.
McKeon, R. (1941). The basic works of Aristotle. New York: Random House.
McKinlay, A. & McVittie, C. (2011). Identities in context: Individuals and Discourse in
Action. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell
Meinhof, U.H. (2004). ‘Europe Viewed from Below. Agents, Victims and the Threat of the
Other’. In R.K. Herrmann, T. Risse & M.B. Brewer (Eds.), Transnational Identities:
Becoming European in the EU, 214-244. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Melnykovska, I. & Schweickert, R. (2008). Bottom-up or Top-down – What Drives the
Convergence of Ukraine's Institutions towards European Standards? Southeast European and
Black Sea Studies, 8(4), 445-468.
273
Merry, S. (2006). Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle.
American Anthropologist, 108(1), 38-51.
Messina, A.M. (2007): The Logics and Politics of Post-WWII Migration to Western Europe.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Meyer, T. (2004). Die Identität Europas: Der EU eine Seele? Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Meyers, E. (2000). Theories of International Immigration Policy-A Comparative Analysis.
International Migration Review, 34(4), 1245-1282.
Miles, M.B. & Huberman, A.M. (1994). Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded
Sourcebook. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Miller, D. (1995). Nationalism. London: Oxford University Press.
Ministero degli Affari Esteri (2012). Website of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Farnasina). http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Italiani_nel_Mondo/ServiziConsolari/
Cittadinanza.htm [2 October 2012]
Ministero Dell’Interno (2012). Website of the Italian Ministry of the Interior.
http://www.interno.it/mininterno/site/it/sezioni/ministero/dipartimenti/dip_immigrazione
[2 October 2012]
MIPEX III (2011). Migration Integration Policy Index III. Brussels: British Council and
Migration Policy Group. Retrieved from http://www.mipex.eu/ [1-16 November 2013]
Mitchell, C. (1989). International Migration, International Relations and Foreign Policy.
International Migration Review, 23(3), 681-708.
Mitchell, K. (2004). Geographies of Identity: Multiculturalism Unplugged. Progress in
Human Geography, 28(5), 641-651.
Mitra, S.K. (2012). ‘Introduction. Citizenship Today- Shifting Paradigms’. In S.K. Mitra
(Ed.), Citizenship and the Flow of Ideas in the Era of Globalisation., 1-29. New Delhi:
Samskriti.
Mitrany, D. (1943). A Working Peace System: An Argumentation for the Functionalist
Development of International Organisations. London: Oxford University Press.
Modood, T. (2007). Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Monar, J (2006). Specific Factors, typology and development trends of modes of governance
in the EU Justice and Home Affairs domain. NEWGOV, New Modes of Governance,
Integrated Project. Strasbourg: Université Robert Schuman de Strasbourg.
Money, J. (1997). No Vacancy: The Political Geography of Immigration Control in Advanced
Industrial Countries. International Organisation, 51(4), 685-720.
Money. J. (1999). Fences and neighbors. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
274
Moravcsik, A. (1993). Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal
Intergovernmentalist Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(4), 473-524.
Moravscik, A. (1998). The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina
to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Mouffe, C. (1992). ‘Democratic citizenship and the political community’. In C. Mouffe (Ed.),
Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, 225-239. London:
Verso.
Mouffe, C. (1993). The Return of the Political. London: Verso.
Mouritsen, P. (2009). On the Liberal Plateau: The Meaning of the Civic Integrationist Turn.
Paper presented at the Belonging, Britishness and Alienation conference, organised by
COMPAS, Bristol University and the Leverhulme Foundation, 18-19 June, St Anne’s
College, Oxford, UK.
Müller J.W. (2007). Constitutional Patriotism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Müller, P. & de Flers, N.A. (2009). Applying the Concept of Europeanisation to the Study of
Foreign Policy: Dimensions and Mechanisms. Working Papers of the Vienna Institute for
European integration research (EIF), No. 05.
Nicolaidis, K. (2004). We, the Peoples of Europe... Foreign Affairs, 83(6), 97-110.
Nidditch, P. (Ed.) (1975). John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Niessen, J. (2002). Consultations on Immigration Policies. European Journal of Migration
and Law, 4(1), 79-83.
Nilson, H. R. (1993). European Integration and Environmental Cooperation in the Barents
Region: The Baltic Sea Cooperation -A Model for Europeanisation. Internasjonal Politikk,
51(2), 185-198.
Noutcheva. G. & Aydin-Düzgit, S. (2012). Lost in Europeanisation: The Western Balkans and
Turkey. West European Politics, 35(1), 59-78.
Nugent, N. (2003). The Governments and the Politics of the European Union. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
OECD (2004). Trends in International Migration 2003. Paris: OECD Sopemi.
OECD (2011a). A Passport for the Better Integration of Immigrants? OECD Publishing.
Retrieved from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/8111061e.pdf?
expires=1346514329&id=id&accname=ocid57016285&checksum=E268A86DF9E492729D1
3578B97F2DC28 [8 June 2012]
275
OECD (2011b). International Migration Policies and Data. Key Statistics on Migration in
OECD Countries. Stocks and Flows of Immigrants, 2001-2011. Retrieved from
http://www.oecd.org/els/ mig/keystat.htm [11 June 2012]
OECD (2012). International Migration Outlook. OECD Publishing. Retrieved from
http://www. oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/download/fulltext/8112071e.pdf?expires=134650947
4&id=id &accname=ocid57016285&checksum=B6C78EF73CDC224BFA0C03F1546C9F7C
Official Journal of the European Communities (1992). Treaty on the European Union. 29 July
1992. Notice No: C 191. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/11992M/htm/
11992M. html [19 March 2012].
Official Journal of the European Communities (1997). Treaty of Amsterdam amending the
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and related
acts. 10 November 1997. Notice No: C 340. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/
treaties/dat/11997D/htm/11997D.html [19 March 2012]
Official Journal of the European Communities (2001). Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on
European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related
Acts. 10 March 2001. Notice No: 2001/C80. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12001C/
htm/12001C.html [19 March 2012]
Official Journal of the European Union (2004) Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.
16 December 2004. Notice No: 2004/C 310/01. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:
2004:310:SOM:EN:HTML [19 March 2012]
Official Journal of the European Union (2008). Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. 9 May 2008. Retrieved from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:115:0047:0199:en:PDF [19 March 2011]
Oguzlu,T. & Ozpek, B.B. (2008). Turkey’s Europeanisation. International Journal, 63(4),
991-1009.
Olsen, J. (2002). The Many Faces of Europeanisation. Journal of Common Market Studies,
40(5), 921-52.
Olsen, J. (2003). Towards a European Administrative Space? Journal of European Public
Policy, 10(4), 506-31.
Onis, Z. & Yilmaz, S. (2009). Between Europeanisation and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy
Activism in Turkey During the AKP Era. Turkish Studies, 10(7), 7-24.
Painter, J. (2002) ‘Multi-Level Citizenship, Identity and Regions in Contemporary Europe’. In
J. Anderson (Ed.), Transnational Democracy: Political Spaces and Border Crossings, 93110. London: Routledge.
Palmowski, J. (2011). The Europeanisation of the Nation-State. Journal of Contemporary
History, 46 (3), 631-657.
276
Pamir, M. (1994). Turkey Between Europe and Europeanisation. Internasjonal Politikk,
52(2), 177-179.
Papademetriou, D.G. & O’Neil, K. (2004). Efficient Practices for the Selection of Economic
Migrants. Paper prepared for the European Commission DG Employment and Social Affairs,
Migration Research Group. Hamburg: Hamburg Institute of International Economics
(HWWI).
Parekh, B. (2000). Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Parsons, T. (1967). Sociological Theory and Modern Society. New York: Free Press.
Pastore, F. (2008). ‘Report from Italy’. In J. Doomernik & M. Jandl (Eds.), Modes of
Migration Regulation and Control in Europe, 105-128. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
Press.
Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Paul, E.F., Miller, F. D. & Paul, J. (2006). Justice and Global Politics. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Penninx, R. & Martiniello, M. (2004). ‘Integration Processes and Policies: State of the Art
and Lessons’. In R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello & S. Vertovec (Eds.), Citizenship in
European Cities: Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies, 139-163. Aldershot:
Ashgate.
Penninx, R. & Roosblad, J. (Eds.). (2000). Trade unions, immigration and immigrants in
Europe 1960-1993. New York: Berghahn Books.
Pensky, M. (2008). The Ends of Solidarity: Discourse Theory in Ethics and Politics. Albany,
NY: State University of New York Press.
Perchinig, B. (2010). ‘All you need to know to become an Austrian: naturalisation policy and
citizenship testing in Austria’. In R. van Oers, E. Ersbøll & D. Kostakopoulou (Eds.), A ReDefinition of Belonging? Language and Integration Tests in Europe, 25-50. Leiden-Boston:
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Peres, H., Coux, C. & Motard, A-M. (2009). The Recognition of Diversity and the Enduring
Relevance of National. Integration Models: A Comparison Between New and Old
Immigration. Countries (Italy, Spain, France and Britain). International Political Science
Association. Online Paper Room. Retrieved from http://www.aecpa.es/uploads/files/
congresos/congreso_09/grupos-trabajo/area01/GT03/09.pdf [2 February 2013]
Perreau-Saussine, E. (2010). ‘Heaven as a Political Theme in Augustine’s City of God’. In M.
Bockmühl & G. Stroumsa (Eds.), Paradise in Antiquity, 179-191. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Peters, B.G. (1998). ‘Policy Networks: Myth, Metaphor and Reality’. In D. Marsh (Ed.),
277
Comparing Policy Networks, 21-32. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Peterson, J. (1992). The European Technology Community: Policy Networks in a
Supranational Setting. In D. Marsh & R.A.W. Rhodes (Eds.), Policy Networks in British
Government, 226-248. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Peterson, J. & Bomberg, E. (1999). Decision-Making in the European Union. London:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Petrov, R. & Kalinichenko, P. (2011). Europeanisation of Third-country Judiciaries through
Application of the EU Acquis: The Cases of Russia and Ukraine. International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, 60(2), 325-353.
Pfetsch, F.R. (2012). ‘European Citizenship: A Concept of Interrelatedness and
Conditionality’. In S.K. Mitra (Ed.), Citizenship and the Flow of Ideas in the Era of
Globalisation., 111-136. New Delhi: Samskriti.
Phillips, A. & Saharso, S. (2008). Guest Editorial: the Rights of Women and the Crisis of
Multiculturalism’, Ethnicities, 8(3), 291-301.
Pickard, A.J. (2007) Research Methods in Information. London: Facet Publishing.
Pinder, J. (1968). Positive integration and negative integration: Some problems of Economic
Union in the EEC. The World Today, 24(3), 88-110.
Piore, M.J. (1979). Birds of passage: Migrant labour in industrial societies. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Pocock, J.G.A. (1995). ‘The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times’. In R. Beiner (Ed.),
Theorizing Citizenship, 29-52. New York: State University of New York Press.
Pollack, M.A. (2005). Theorizing the European Union: International Organisation, Domestic
Polity, or Experiment in New Governance? Annual Review of Political Science, 8(1), 357398.
Pollitt, K. (1999). ‘Whose culture?’. In J. Cohen, M. Howard & M. Nussbaum (Eds.), Is
Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, 27-30. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Potter, J. & Wetherell, M. (1987). Discourse and Social Psychology. London: Sage.
Pries, L. (1999). Migration and Transnational Social Spaces. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Prümm, K. & Alscher, S. (2007). ‘From model to average student: The Europeanisation of
migration policy and politics in Germany’. In A. Ette & T. Faist (Eds.), Europeanisation of
National Policies and Politics of Immigration. Between Autonomy and the European Union,
73-92. New York: Macmillan.
Punch, K.F. (1998). Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative
Approaches. London: Sage.
278
Quaglia, L., Neuvonen, M., Miyakoshi, M. & Cini, M. (2007). ‘Europeanisation’. In M. Cini
(Ed.), European Union Politics, 405-420. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Radaelli C. (1997). How does Europeanisation produce domestic change? Comparative
Political Studies, 30(5), 553-575.
Radaelli, C. (2000). Whither Europeanisation? Concept Stretching and substantive change.
European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 4(8). Retrieved from http://eiop.or.at/eiop/index.
php/eiop [10 May 2011]
Radaelli, C. (2002). The domestic impact of European Union public policy: notes on
concepts, methods, and the challenge of empirical research. Politique Européenne, 5(1), 105136.
Radaelli, C. (2003). ‘The Europeanisation of Public Policy’. In K. Featherstone & C. Radaelli
(Eds.), The Politics of Europeanisation, 27-55. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Radaelli, C. (2004). Europeanisation: Solution or Problem? European Integration Online
Papers (EIoP), 8 (16), 1-26. Retrieved from http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-016a.htm [7
December 2011].
Radaelli, C. & Franchino, F. (2004). Analysing Political Change in Italy. Journal of European
Public Policy, 11(6), 941-953.
Radaelli, C. & Pasquier, R. (2007). ‘Conceptual Issues’. In P. Graziano & M. Vink (Eds.),
Europeanisation. New Research Agendas. 35-45. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Radaelli, C. & Schmidt, V.A. (2003). Special issue on policy change and discourse in Europe
– Conclusions. West European Politics, 27(2), 364-379.
Ranis, G. & Fei, J.H.C. (1961). A theory of economic development. American Economic
Review, 5(4), 533-565.
Ravenstein, E.G. (1885). The Laws of Migration. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society,
48(2), 167-227.
Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Ray, M.A. (1994). The Richness of Phenomenology: Philosophical, Theoretical and
Methodologic Concerns. In J.M. Morse (Ed.), Critical Issues in Qualitative Research
Methods, 117-133. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Risse, T. (2003). An Emerging European Public Sphere? Theoretical Clarification and
Empirical Indicators. Paper presented at the Annual EUSA Meeting, Nashville, March 2003.
Risse, T.(2004). ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’. In A. Wiener & T. Diez
(Eds.), European Integration Theory, 159-176. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
279
Risse, T. (2005). Neofunctionalism, European identity, and the Puzzles of European
Integration. Journal of European Public Policy, 12(2), 291-309.
Risse, T. (Ed.) (2011). Governance without a State? Policies and Politics in Areas of Limited
Statehood. New York: Columbia University Press.
Risse, T, Green-Cowles, M. & Caporaso, J. (2001). ‘Europeanisation and Domestic Change:
Introduction’. In M. Green-Cowles, J. Caporaso & T. Risse (Eds.), Transforming Europe:
Europeanisation and Domestic Change, 1-20. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Risse, T. & Wiener, A. (1999). `Something Rotten` and the Social Construction of Social
Constructivism: A Comment on Comments. Journal of European Public Policy 6(5), 775-782.
Ritchie, J. & Lewis. J. (Eds.) (2003). Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social
Science Students and Researchers. London: Sage.
Robinson, D. & Reeve, K. (2006). Neighbourhood Experiences of New Immigration:
Reflections on the Evidence Base. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
Roederer-Rynning, C. (2002). Farm Conflict in France and the Europeanisation of
Agricultural Policy. West European Politics, 25(3), 107-126.
Rogowski, R & Turner, C. (Eds.) (2006). The Shape of the New Europe. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Rosamond, B. (1997). ‘Political Culture’. In B. Axford, G.K. Browning, R. Huggins, B.
Rosamond & J. Turner (Eds.), Politics: An Introduction, 75-106. London: Routledge.
Rosamond, B. (1999). Discourses of Globalisation and the Social Construction of European
Identities. Journal of European Public Policy, 6(4), 652-668.
Rosamond, B. (2000). Theories of European Integration. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rosenbaum, J. (2003). In the EU's Image: Transformation of Broadcasting in Five Central
and Eastern European Countries. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International
Communication Association, San Diego, CA, May 27.
Rothstein, H., Irwin, A., Yearley, S. & McCarthy, E. (1999). Regulatory science,
Europeanisation and the control of agrochemicals. London: LSE Research Articles Online.
Retrieved from http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000351 [12 May 2011]
Ruggie, J.G. (1983). Review: Continuity and transformation in the world polity: Toward a
neorealist synthesis. World Politics 35(2), 261-285.
Ruggie, J.G. (1996). Globalisation and the Embedded Liberalism Compromise: The End of an
Era? Cologne: Max Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung.
Rusconi, S. (2010): Italy’s Migration Experiences. Retrieved from http://migrationeducation.
de/38.1.html?&rid=178&cHash=b18ff335ad74f6e52754cfcb43318922 [12.9.2012].
280
Sack, D. (2010). Europeanisation and Party Politics in German Federal States-The
Jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the Amendments of Public Procurement
Regulation. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 51(4), 619-642.
Sandel, M. (1996). Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sassen, S. (1996). Beyond Sovereignty: Immigration Policy-Making Today. Social Justice,
23(3), 9-20.
Sassen, S. (2006). Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages,
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sassen, S. (2009). Incompleteness and the Possibility of Making: Towards Denationalized
Citizenship? Cultural Dynamics, 20(1), 229-258.
Saurugger, S. (2007). Differential impact: Europeanizing French nonstate actors. Journal of
European Public Policy, 14(7), 1079-1097.
Sayer, A. (2000). Realism and Social Science. London: Sage.
Schäfer, A. (2004). Beyond the Community Method: Why the Open Method of Coordination
Was Introduced to EU Policy-making. European Integration Online Papers (EIoP), 8(13).
Retrieved from http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-013a.htm [12 December 2011]
Scharpf, F.W. (1999). Regieren in Europa: Effektiv und Demokratisch? Frankfurt am Main:
Campus Verlag.
Scharpf, F.W. (2002). The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity.
Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(4), 645-670.
Schierup, C.U., Hansen, P. & Castles, S. (2006). Migration, Citizenship, and the European
Welfare State: A European Dilemma. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schimmelfennig, F. (2007). European Regional Organisations, Political Conditionality and
Democratic Transformation in Eastern Europe. East European Politics and Societies, 21(1),
126-141.
Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U. (2004). Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer
to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of European Public Policy,
11(4), 661-679.
Schimmelfennig, F. & Sedelmeier, U. (Eds.). (2005). The Europeanisation of Central and
Eastern Europe. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Schmidt, M.G. (2003). Political Institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Schmidt, V.A. (2000). Democracy and Discourse in an Integrating Europe and a Globalising
World. European Law Journal, 6(3), 277-300.
281
Schmidt, V.A. (2002). Europeanisation and the Mechanics of Economic Policy Adjustment.
Journal of European Public Policy, 9(6), 894-912.
Schmidt V.A. (2008). Discursive institutionalism: the explanatory power of ideas and
discourse. Annual Review of Political Science, 11(1), 303-326.
Schmidt, V.A. & Radaelli, C. (2004). Policy Change and Discourse in Europe: Conceptual
and Methodological Issues. West European Politics, 27(2), 183-210.
Schmitter, P.C. (2000). How to Democratize the European Union … And Why Bother?
Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Schmitter, P.C. (2004). ‘Neo-Functionalism’. In A. Wiener & T. Diez (Eds.), European
Integration Theory, 45-74. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schneider, J. (2009). The Organisation of Asylum and Migration Policies in Germany.
Working Paper 25. Nürnberg: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees.
Schuck, P. (1998). Citizens, Strangers, and In-betweens: Essays on Immigration and
Citizenship. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Sciortino, G. (1999). ‘Planning in the Dark: the Evolution of Italian Immigration Control’. In
G. Brochmann & T. Hammar (Eds.), Mechanisms of Immigration Control. A Comparative
Analysis of European Regulation Policies, 233–260. Oxford: Berg.
Scott, J.W. (1992). Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity. October, 61(3), 12-19.
Sedelmeier, U. (2006). Europeanisation in New Member and Candidate States. Living
Reviews in European Governance, 1(3), 1-52.
Seawright, J. & Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A
Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. Political Research Quarterly, 61(2), 294-308.
Sedelmeier, U. (2012). Is Europeanisation through Conditionality Sustainable? Lock-in of
Institutional Change after EU Accession. West European Politics, 35(1), 20-38.
Senato della Republica (2012). Official Website of the Italian Senate. Retrieved from
http://www. senato.it/3801 [9 June 2012]
Sennett, R. (2003). Respect in an Age of Inequality. New York: Norton.
Shachar, A. (2001). Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shachar, A. (2006). The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive
Immigration Regimens. New York University Law Review, 8(1), 148-206.
Shachar, A. (2009). The Birthright Lottery. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
282
Shaw, J. (1997). Citizenship of the union: towards post-national membership? Jean Monnet
Working Paper No.6/97. Retrieved from http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01
/011401.html [12 February 2011]
Shore, C. (2000). Building Europe. The Cultural Politics of European Integration. London:
Routledge.
Shore, C. (2004). Whither European Citizenship? Eros and Civilisation Revisited. European
Journal of Social Theory, 7(1) 27-44.
Simmons, B.A., Dobbin, F. & Garrett, G. (2008). ‘Introduction: The International Diffusion
of Liberalism’. In B.A. Simmons, F. Dobbin & G. Garrett (Eds.), The Global Diffusion of
Markets and Democracy, 1-63. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Simon, B. (2004). Identity in Modern Society. A Social Psychological Perspective. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Single European Act (1986). Official Journal of the European Union, L 169/1-25. 17
February 1986. I.L.M. 506.
Sjaastad, L.A. (1962). The Costs and Returns of Human Migration. Journal of Political
Economy, 70(5), 80-93.
Skevic, A. (2005). Women’s Citizenship in the Time of Activation: the Case of Lone Mothers
in ‘Needs-Based’ Welfare States. Social Politics, 12(1), 42-66.
Smith, A.D. (1991). National identity. London: Penguin.
Smith, A.D. (1992). National Identity and the Idea of European Unity. International Affairs,
68(1), 55-76.
Smith, R. (1998) ‘Transnational Localities: Community, Technology, and the Political
Membership within the Context of Mexico and U.S. Migration; in M. Smith & L. Guarnizo
(Eds.), Transnationalism from Below, 196-241. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers.
Smith, M.P. (1994). Can You Imagine? Transnational Migration and the Globalisation of
Grassroots Politics. Social Text 39(1), 15-33.
Smyth, H.M. (1948). Italy: From Fascism to the Republic (1943–1946). The Western Political
Quarterly, 1(3), 205-222.
Snow, D. (2001). Collective identity and Expressive forms. CSD Working Papers, Center for
the Study of Democracy, University of California. Retrieved from
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/ 2zn1t7bj [12 January 2013]
Snow, D. & McAdam, D. (2000). ‘Identity Work Processes in the Context of Social
Movements: Clarifying the Identity/Movement Nexus’. In S. Stryker, T.J. Owens & R.W.
White (Eds.), Self, Identity, and Social Movements, 41-67. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
283
Soeharno, J. (2009). The Integrity of the Judge. A Philosophical Inquiry. Burlington: Ashgate.
Sotiropoulos, D.A. (1993). ‘A colossus with feet of clay: The state in post-authoritarian
Greece’. In H. J. Psomiades & S. B. Thomadakis (Eds.), Greece, the new Europe, and the
changing international order, 43–56. New York: Pella.
Sotiropoulos, D.A. (2004). The EU's impact on the Greek welfare state: Europeanisation on
paper? Journal of European Social Policy, 14(3), 267-284.
Soysal, Y.N. (1994). Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in
Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Soysal, Y. N. (2000). Citizenship and identity: living in diasporas in post-war Europe? Ethnic
and Racial Studies, 23(1), 1-15.
Spendzharova, A.B. & Vachudova, M.A. (2012). Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal
Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession. West European Politics, 35(1), 3958.
Spinner-Halev, J. (2006). ‘Multiculturalism and its Critics’. In J.S. Dryzek, B. Honig & A.
Phillips (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory, 546-563. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Spiro, P.J. (2010). Dual Citizenship As Human Right. International Journal of Constitutional
Law, 8(1), 111-130.
Spirova, M. (2008). Europarties and party development in EU candidate states: The case of
Bulgaria. Europe-Asia Studies, 60(5), 81-109.
Statistisches Bundesamt [Federal Statistical Office] (1999). Statistisches Jahrbuch für die
Bundesrepubik Deutschland 1999. Wiesbaden: Metzler/Poeschel.
Sternberger, R. (1990). Verfassungspatriotismus. Frankfurt a.M.: Insel.
Stets, J.E. & Burke, P.J. (2000). Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory. Social
Psychology Quarterly, 63(3), 224-237.
Stewart, J.Q. (1941). An Inverse Distance Variation for Certain Social Influences. Science,
93(1), 89-90.
Strik, T., Böcker, A., Luiten, M. & van Oers, R. (2010). The INTEC project: synthesis report.
Integration and naturalisation tests: the new way to European Citizenship. Retrieved from
http://www.ru.nl/publish/pages/621216/synthesis_intec_finalmarch2011.pdf [6 October
2011]
Stryker, S. (1989). ‘Further Developments in Identity Theory: Singularity versus Multiplicity
of Self’. In J. Berger, M. Zelditch & B. Anderson (Eds.), Sociological Theories in Progress,
35-57. Newbury Park: Sage.
284
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J.C. (1986). ‘The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour’. In S.
Worchel & W.G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations, 7-24. Chicago: NelsonHall.
Tanasoiu, C. (2012). Europeanisation Post-Accession: Rule Adoption and National Political
Elites in Romania and Bulgaria. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 12(1), 173-193.
Taylor, C. (1989). The Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Taylor, C. (1994). ‘The Politics of Recognition’. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), Multiculturalism.
Examining the Politics of Recognition, 25-76. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
The Constitution of Greece (2004). As revised by the parliamentary resolution of April 6th
2001 of the VIIth Revisionary Parliament (X. Paparrigopoulos & S. Vassilouni, Trans.).
Athens: Eptalofos S.A.
Thelen, K. (1999). Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics. Annual Review of
Political Science, 2, 369-404.
Thielemann, E.R. (2002). The ‘Soft’ Europeanisation of Migration Policy: European
Integration and Domestic Policy Change. ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Turin, 22-27
March.
Thomas, W.I. & Zaniecki, F. (1918). The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: Monograph
of an Immigrant Group. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Thomson Reuters (2012). Social Sciences Citation Index. Retrieved from http://www.ub.uniheidelberg.de/Englisch/helios/kataloge/heidi.html [10 August 2012]
Todaro, M.P. & Maruszko, L. (1987). Illegal migration and US immigration reform: A
conceptual framework. Population and Development Review, 13(1), 101-114.
Todaro, M.P. (1969). A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in LessDeveloped Countries. American Economic Review, 59(1), 138-148.
Tomasi, J. (1995). Kymlicka, Liberalism and Cultural Minorities. Ethics, 105(3), 580-603.
Tomei, V. (Ed.). (2001). Europäisierung nationaler Migrationspolitik. Eine Studie zur
Veränderung von Regieren in Europa. Stuttgart: Lucius & Lucius.
Travis, A. (2011, March 23). Visa curbs will cut overseas students by 80,000, says Theresa
May. The Guardian, Retrieved from http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2011/ mar/22/
number-foreign-students-to-be-cut [11 March 2011]
Trenz, H-J. & Eder, K. (2004). The Democratizing Dynamics of a European Public Sphere.
Towards a Theory of Democratic Functionalism. European Journal of Social Theory, 7(1), 525.
285
Triandafyllidou, A., Maroufof, M. & Nikolova, M. (2009). Greece: Immigration towards
Greece at the Eve of the 21st century: A Critical Assessment. Athens: ELIAMEP IDEAS
Working Paper 4.
Triandafyllidou, A., Modood, T. & Zapata-Barrero, R. (2006). ‘European challenges to
multicultural citizenship: Muslims, secularism and beyond’. In T. Madood, A. Triandafyllidou
& R. Zapeto-Barrero (Eds.), Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship: A European
Approach, 1-22. New York: Routledge.
Turner, B.S. (1990). Outline of a Theory of Citizenship. Sociology, 24(2) 189-217.
Turner, J.C. (1978). ‘Social Categorization and Social Discrimination in the Minimal Group
Paradigm’. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation Between Social Groups, 101-140. London:
Academic Press.
Turner, T. (1993). Multiculturalism and anthropology. Cultural Anthropology, 8(4), 411-429.
Turner, L. (1996). The Europeanisation of Labour: Structure before Actionburch. European
Journal of Industrial Relations, 2(3), 325-344.
UK Government Cabinet Office (2007). The National Archives. Retrieved from http://www.
legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2007/15/part/1 [10 March 2012]
UK Government Cabinet Office (2010). The National Archives. Retrieved from http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ devolution/guidance/
glossary_of_devolution_terms.aspx [11 February 2012]
UK Government Home Office (2004). Control of Immigration: Statistics United Kingdom
2004. Command Paper 6690. Retrieved from webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20110218135832/ http:/rds. homeoffice .gov.uk/rds/immigration-asylum-publications.html
[18 January 2012]
UK Government Home Office (2009). Migration Advisory Committee. Analysis of the Points
Based System, December 2009. Retrieved from http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.
uk/sitecontent/ documents/aboutus/workingwithus/mac/pbsanalysis-09/0809/mac-august09?view=Binary [18 January 2012]
Ulusoy, K. (2008). The Europeanisation of Turkey and its impact on the Cyprus problem.
Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 10(3), 309-329.
United Nations (1998). Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1,
Glossary. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division. Retrieved from
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesM/SeriesM_58rev1E.pdf. [24 November 2012]
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (1978). Convention and Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees. Geneva, 24 August 1978. Retrieved from http://www.unhcr.org/
3b66c2aa10 .html [12 February 2012]
286
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2001). Asylum Applications in
Industrialized Countries, 1980-1999. Geneva, 12 November 2001. Retrieved from
http://www.unhcr.org/ statistics/STATISTICS/3c3eb40f4.pdf [8 June 2012]
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) (1998). Migration and Development: Report of the
Technical Symposium on international Migration and Development held in The Hague on 29
June- 3 July 1998, United Nations, New York.
Urry, J. (2000). Sociology Beyond Societies. London: Routledge.
Van Hüllen, V. (2012). Europeanisation through Cooperation? EU Democracy Promotion in
Morocco and Tunisia. West European Politics, 35(1), 117-134.
Veikou, M. & Triandafyllidou, A (2000). Immigration Policy and its Implementation in Italy:
A Report on the State of the Art. European University Institute. Retrieved from
http://www.mmo.gr/ pdf/library/Italy/trianda [12 June 2013]
Velluti, S. (2007). What European Strategy for Integrating Migrants? The Role of the OMC
Soft Mechanisms in the Development of an EU Immigration Policy. European Journal of
Migration and Law, 9(1), 53-82.
Vertovec, S. (2004). Migrant transnationalism and modes of transformation. International
Migration Review, 38(3), 970-1001.
Vink, M. (2001). The Limited Europeanisation of Domestic Citizenship Policy: Evidence
from the Netherlands. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 39(5), 875-896.
Vink, M. (2002). Negative and positive integration in European immigration policies.
European Integration Online papers (EIoP), 6(13). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.325522 [7 May 2012]
Vink, M. & Graziano, P. (2007). ‘Challenges of a New Research Agenda’. In P. Graziano &
M. Vink (Eds.), Europeanisation: New Research Agendas, 3-20. New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Vogel, D. & Cyrus, N. (2000). ‘Immigration as a side effect of other policies - principles and
consequences of German non-immigration policy’. In A. Triandafyllidou (Ed.), Migration
Pathways. A historic, demographic and policy review of four European countries, 9-37.
Brussels: European Commission.
Vranken, J. (1990). ‘Industrial rights’. In Z. Layton-Henry (Ed.), The Political Rights of
Migrant Workers in Western Europe, 47-73. London: Sage.
Vujovic, Z. & Komar, O. (2008). Impact of the Europeanisation process on the transformation
of the party system of Montenegro. Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, 10(2), 223241.
Walkenhorst, H. (2009). The Conceptual Spectrum Of European Identity. Limerick Papers in
Politics and Public Administration, No.3. Retrieved from http://www.ul.ie/ppa/content/files/
Walkenhorst_conceptual.pdf [22 March 2012]
287
Wallace, H. (2000a) ‘The Policy Process’. In H. Wallace & W. Wallace (Eds.), PolicyMaking in the European Union, 39-64. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wallace, H. (2000b). ‘The Institutional Setting: Five Variations on a Theme’. In H. Wallace
& W. Wallace (Eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union, 3-37. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Wallace, H. (1997). At Odds With Europe. Political Studies, 45(4), 677-688.
Wallace, H., Wallace, W. & Webb, C. (Eds.) (1977). Policy Making in the European
Communities. London: John Wiley and Sons.
Wallace, W. (1994). Regional Integration: The West European Experience. Washington D.C.:
The Brookings Institute.
Wallerstein, I. (1974). The Modern World System I, Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of
the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press.
Wallerstein, I. (1980). The Modern World System II, Mercantilism and the Consolidation of
the European World-Economy, 1600-1750. New York: Academic Press.
Walt, S. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly, 35(2),
211-239.
Walzer, M. (1989). ‘Citizenship’. In T. Ball, J. Farr & R.L. Hanson (Eds.), Political
Innovation and Conceptual Change, 211-219. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Walzer, M. (1992). ‘The Civil Society Argument’. In C. Mouffe (Ed.), Dimensions of Radical
Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community, 89-107. London: Verso.
Walzer, M. (1994). Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Chicago:
University of Notre Dame Press.
Warner, W.L. & Srole, L. (1945). The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Wasem, R. E. (2012). U.S. Immigration Policy on Permanent Admissions. CRS Report for
Congress. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service. Retrieved from
http://www.fas.org /sgp/crs/homesec/RL32235. pdf [2 May 2012]
Weaver, M. (2010, October 17). Angela Merkel: German multiculturalism has “utterly
failed”. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/oct/17/
angela-merkel-german-multiculturalism-failed
Weiler, J.H.H. (1995). Does Europe Need a Constitution? Reflections on Demos, Telos and
the German Maastricht Decision. European Law Journal, 1(3), 219-258.
Weiler, J.H.H. (1997). The Reformation of European Constitutionalism. Journal of Common
Market Studies, 35(1), 97-130.
288
Weiler, J.H.H. (1999). `The Constitution of Europe: Do the New Clothes have an Emperor`
and Other Essays on European Integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics.
International Organisation, 46(2), 391-425.
Wessels, W. (1998). Comitology: Fusion in Action. Politico-Administrative Trends in the EU
System. Journal of European Public Policy, 5(2), 209-234.
Westwood, S. & Phizacklea, A. (2001). Trans-Nationalism and the Politics of Belonging.
London: Routledge.
Wiener, A. & Diez, T. (Eds.) (2004). European Integration Theory. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Willett, C. (1998). Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate. Oxford:
Blackwell.
Williams, F. (1995). Race/Ethnicity, Gender and Class in Welfare States: A Framework for
Comparative Analysis. Social Politics, 2(1), 127-159.
Williams, H. (2010). Changing the national narrative: Discourse on citizenship and
naturalisation policy in Germany and the UK 2000-2010. Political Perspectives, 4(2), 6–24.
Wilson, A.G. (1981). Catastrophe Theory and Bifurcation. Applications to Urban and
Regional Systems. London: Croom Helm.
Wilson, T.D. (1994). What Determines Where Transnational Labor Migrants Go?
Modifications in Migration Theories. Human Organisation, 53(3), 269-278.
Wingenbach, E. (1998). ‘Justice After Liberalism: Democracy and Global Citizenhip’. In E.
Slawner & M.E. Denham (Eds.), Citizenship After Liberalism, 147-168. New York: Peter
Lang.
Wintle, M. (2000). ‘The Question of European Identity and the Impact of the Changes of
1989/90’. In J. Shahin & M. Wintle (Ed.), The Idea of a United Europe: Political, Economic
and Cultural Integration Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall, 11-30. New York: St. Martin’s
Press.
Wolcott, H.F. (1994). Transforming Qualitative Data: Description, Analysis and
Interpretation. London, Sage.
Wong, R. (2007). ‘Foreign Policy’. In P. Graziano & M. Vink (Eds.), Europeanisation: New
Research Agendas, 321-336. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
World Bank (2014). Data on net migration. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SM.POP.NETM [20 April 2014]
289
Wrench, J. (2004). Trade Union Responses to Immigrants and Ethnic Inequality in Denmark
and the UK: the Context of Consensus and Conflict. European Journal of Industrial
Relations, 10(1), 7-30.
Wyckoff, A. & Schaaper, M. (2005). The Changing Dynamics of the Global Market for the
Highly-Skilled. Advancing Knowledge and the Knowledge-Economy Conference.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, OECD. 10-11 January 2005. Retrieved
from http:// advancingknowledge.com/ [21 March 2010]
Yin, R. (1994). Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Young, I.M. (1989). Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal
Citizenship. Ethics, 99(2), 250-274.
Young, I.M. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Zarafonitou, C. (2009). Criminal Victimisation in Greece and the Fear of Crime: A ‘Paradox’
for Interpretation. International Review of Victimology, 16(3), 277-300.
Zarembka, J.M. (2004). ‘America’s Dirty Work: Migrant Maids and Modern-Day Slavery’. In
B. Ehrenreich & A.R. Hochschild (Eds.), Global Women, 142-153. New York: Metropolitan.
Zincone, G. (2006). The Making of Policies: Immigration and Immigrants in Italy. Journal of
Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32(3), 347-375.
Zincone, G. & Basili, M. (2013). Country Report: Italy, EUDO–Citizenship Observatory,
Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies in Collaboration with Edinburgh University
Law School. Florence: European University Institute.
Zincone, G. & Caponio, T. (2005). Immigrant and Immigration Policy-Making: The case of
Italy. IMISCOE Working Paper: Country report. Retrieved from http://imiscoe.socsci.uva.nl/
publications/workingpapers/documents/country_report_italy.pdf [22 January 2012]
Zipf, G. K. (1946). The P1P2/D Hypothesis: On the Intercity Movement of Persons. American
Sociological Review, 11(6), 677-686.
290
Appendices
1. Glossary207
Acculturation: The process in which norms, values or behavioural patterns of one culture are
progressively adopted by the ethnic group(s) of another. The extent of adaptation is
determined by the degree of interaction between the two sides depending generally on social
and economic interests.
Alien/non-national/foreigner: A person who is officially not recognised as the national of a
particular state.
Assimilation: A further process ahead of acculturation in which an ethnic or social group
adapts to another. This adaptation is a switch of belonging through absorption of the majority
group’s cultural values in particular its traditions and language.
Asylum: A form of territorial protection given by a state based on the principle of nonrefoulement and a set of refugee rights such as access to employment, social welfare and
health care. It is granted to a person who is unable or unwilling to seek protection in his/her
country of citizenship and/or residence for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion. If used in the context of ‘diplomatic asylum’,
however, it takes the form of seeking refuge whereby a state grants protection to an individual
providing relief from the authority of the country of origin which presses for his/her
persecution or custody. There exists in international law no obligation for diplomatic asylum.
It is typically asked at places such as aircrafts, warships, diplomatic missions and private
residences belonging to the heads of mission.
Circular migration: Temporary or long-term movement of people between countries which
promises benefits to all involved, if it happens on a voluntary basis as part of the labour needs
of countries of origin and destination.
Clandestine migration/irregular migration/undocumented migration: The type of
migration that eludes the official recording of a state in reference to the legal restrictions
about border-crossing as well as the legal principles regulating access to its labour market.
207
The sources consulted for this compilation include the glossary of the European Commission, Justice and
Home Affairs; International Labour Organisation’s International Migration Statistics, 1997, Annex: Labour
Migration Statistics Questionnaire’s Terms and Concepts and the United Nation’s (UN) 1998 Recommendations
on Statistics of International Migration, Revision 1, Glossary. Latest entry to all web links: 24 November 2012.
291
Deportation/expulsion: A state’s act of expelling an alien from its territory to eliminate the
detriments or illegality his/her presence causes.
Displaced person: Based on Council Directive 2011/55/EC, the EU Commission defines
displaced persons as non-EU nationals or stateless persons who have had to leave or been
evacuated from their country or region of origin (in response to an appeal by international
organisations) to which they are unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the
situation prevailing in that country. The case of displaced persons is generally covered in
Article 1A of the Geneva Convention as well as a number of other international or national
instruments giving international protection to persons who have fled areas of armed conflict
or endemic violence and are at serious risk of, or who have been the victims of, violations of
human rights.
Documented migration/regular migration: The type of migration in which a person moves
to a country with the intention to remain there, observing its compulsory regulations on entry
and stay.
Economic migration: The type of migration that occurs when a person takes up residence in
a new country other than that of origin to improve his/her quality of life. While the term may
apply to the act of leaving the country of origin over a previously declared agricultural season,
for employment through seasonal working, or the act of moving into the destination country
with no valid entry permit and/or by means of asylum procedures lacking bona fide causes, it
is often used to address its dissimilar connotations from those of ‘refuge’.
Emigration: The act of moving from the country of origin with the purpose to settle in
another country. According to the basic norms of international law, only in rare circumstances
is a state entitled to impose restrictions on exit in this context, suggesting all persons may as a
rule of thumb enjoy freedom to leave their countries of birth.
Expulsion: To the European Commission, expulsion means sending away a non-EU national
on account of his/her perceived threat to public order or national security in a Member State.
Decision of expulsion is generally taken in the following cases: conviction of a non-EU
national by the issuing EU State for an offence involving deprivation of liberty of at least one
year; the existence of serious grounds for believing that a non-EU national has committed
serious criminal offences or the existence of solid evidence of his/her intention to commit
such offences within the territory of an EU State and a non-EU national subject to an
expulsion decision based on failure to comply with national rules on the entry or residence of
aliens.
292
Family reunification/family reunion: Based on the Council Directive 2003/86/EC, the
Commission defines this term as the entry into and residence of a non-EU national’s family
members to reside lawfully in an EU State (the so-called ‘sponsor’ state) on the grounds of
preserving the family unit.
Highly qualified migrant: To the EU Commission, this term refers to a person who moved
to a country for employment purposes on the basis of his/her managerial, executive or similar
professional qualifications.
Host country/receiving country: While the term refers usually to the country of destination,
it may also be the country of origin in cases of return or repatriation. This amounts for the EU
case to a Member State in which a non-EU national takes up legal residence.
Humanitarian principles: These include ethical standards grounded upon international
human rights/law aiming to protect the integrity of all humanitarian actors. The first reference
to humanitarian principles was made in the 1965 ‘Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross
and Red Crescent’.
Illegal migration: While the term may be used interchangeably with irregular migration, it
also connotes to trafficking of migrants.
Immigration: Based on the 1998 UN Recommendations (on Statistics of International
Migration, Revision 1), the EU defines immigration as the action by which a person
establishes his/her usual residence in the territory of an EU State for a period that is, or is
expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been resident in another EU State or a
non-EU country.
Integration: The term is used to describe the entire process whereby migrants’ acceptance to
a host society –both as individuals or groups- depends principally on whether or not they
fulfill the specific conditions stipulated by the host country they live in.
International migration: A person’s crossing the borders of his/her country of residence or
origin with the goal to settle down in another country on a temporary or permanent basis.
Irregular migration: Immigration of a person to a new place of residence using irregular or
illegal means, i.e. without valid documents.
Jus sanguinis: A Latin-derived term which is used to indicate that a child’s nationality does
not rest on the place of his/her birth but on the nationality of his/her parents.
Jus soli: A Latin-derived term which is used to indicate that a child’s nationality rests on the
place of his/her birth but not on the nationality of his/her parents.
Labour migration: This type of migration to the European Commission describes the
movement of a person from one state to another, or within his/her own country of residence,
293
for the purpose of employment. While it is in national laws usually treated to address labour at
domestic markets, some states expand its usage across national borders to provide
opportunities for their nationals also abroad.
Long-term migration/permanent settlement: Movement of a person from his/her country
of residence or origin to another for minimum one year. For the EU, this issue is covered
under Directive 2003/109/EC.
Migration: The process of a person’s short or long-term movement within or across the
borders of a state, regardless of the form and driving forces lying behind it. It is in the EU
context used as a broader term of immigration/emigration to describe the action by which a
person ceases to have his/her usual residence in an EU State for minimum twelve months.
Migrant: A broader-term of immigrant/emigrant, referring to a person who leaves one
country (or a location in a country) to settle in another often in search of better life conditions.
Naturalisation: The entire process in which a state eventually grants nationality to a nonnational following his/her formal application. Despite lack of explicit rules thereof, the
authority of states to naturalize aliens (non-nationals) is recognised by international law.
Net migration: The difference between emigration from and immigration to a given area in
one year. It is important to note here that many countries often lack precision to that effect,
which suggests net immigration figures are often estimated values.
Non-refoulement: A principle of expulsion or return in international law (codified in Article
33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention) which restrains states from expelling a person to a
country where (s)he will possibly face torture or persecution except that “there are reasonable
grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which [s]he is, or who,
having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger
to the community of that country” (Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention).
Receiving country: The term is often used to refer to the country of destination or a thirdcountry (excluding the cases of return and repatriation in which it could also be the country of
origin) which has principally accepted to receive a certain number of refugees and migrants
by a presidential, ministerial or parliamentary decision.
Refoulement: A state’s declining or expelling a person usually by way of deportation,
extradition or rejection at its borders into the territorial borders of another state where (s)he is
likely to face torture or persecution.
Refugee: A person who “owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
294
of the protection of that country” (Article 1 A(2) of the 1951 Geneva Convention which was
modified by the 1967 Protocol concerning the Status of Refugees).
Regular migration: Migration that occurs by way of lawful channels.
Regularisation: The process whereby a non-national is granted legal status in a country
following a certain period of his/her irregular residence in there. A most common means to
this end is the granting of a form of amnesty.
Remittance: The financial transfer made by a migrant to his/her beneficiaries in his/her
country of origin.
Repatriation: The right given to a refugee or a prisoner of war personally by a number of
international law instruments such as the 1907 Fourth Hague Convention regulating the Laws
and Customs of War on Land or the 1949 Geneva Convention (and 1977 Protocols) to return
to the country of origin under specific conditions. It is binding both on the detaining country
and the country of origin which are obliged to release all eligible persons regardless they are
civilians, soldiers, diplomatic envoys or international officials and are bound to admit to their
return, respectively.
Safe country of origin: A country from which an asylum-seeker originates is considered safe
if it does not typically serve as a source to this end in historical terms. Receiving countries
may use the concept of safe country of origin as a basis for rejecting summarily (without
examination of the merits) particular groups or categories of asylum applicants. According to
Directive 2005/85/EC, a ‘safe country of origin’ is a country where it can be shown that there
is generally and consistently no persecution as defined in Directive 2004/83/EC, no torture or
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and no threat by reason of indiscriminate
violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict. The key reference here is the
extent of protection against persecution or mistreatment by the relevant laws and regulations
of the country and the way they are applied; observance of the rights and freedoms laid down
in the European Convention on Human Rights and/or the International Covenant for Civil and
Political Rights and/or the Convention against Torture, in particular the rights from which
derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the said European Convention; the nonrefoulement principle according to the Geneva Convention and provision for a system of
effective remedies against violations of these rights and freedoms.
Seasonal worker: A worker with a migration background who works on seasonal terms
applicable solely to part of the year (Article 2(2)(b) of the 1990 International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families).
295
Secondary migration: Any further migration of a person from/within a country other than
his/her first leave from the country of domicile.
Sending country: The country from which migration originates.
Short-term migrant: A person who leaves his/her country of residence or origin to another
for a period between minimum three and maximum twelve months excluding long term trips
of business, medical treatment, holiday, recreation or visits to family members or friends.
Skilled migrant: A worker with a migration background who during admission to a host
country is subject to fewer restrictions on employment, family reunification and length of stay
thanks to his/her training/job skills.
Stateless person: A person who is not considered as the national of a state under the
operation of its law.
Third-country: Any country other than the country of origin. In the EU context, the term is
almost always synonymous with a non-EU country which is where a person without the
nationality of an EU state comes from.
Trafficking/human trafficking: An intermediary act of diverse forms which persons exploit
others usually economically (described as ab initio) while helping them move to countries
other than those of residence or origin. Article 3(a) of the 2000 UN Protocol Supplementing
the UN Convention Against Organised Crime to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children limits it to “The recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms
of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation”.
Transit country/transit state: Any country through which a person passes during his/her
journey to the country of destination. Article 6(c) of the 1990 International Convention on the
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families limits it to
the country travelled on one’s way to where the place of employment is or from this place to
the state of residence or origin.
Undocumented migration: Type of migration which takes place when workers or members
of workers’ families enter, stay or work in a state although they are not authorised to do so.
Voluntary return: Assisted or independent return to the country of origin, transit or thirdcountry based on the free will of the returnee.
296
2. MIPEX Policy Indicators (2010)
Labour Markets
Access
1 Immediate access to employment
What categories of third country national residents have equal access to employment as nationals?
a. Long-term residents
b. Residents on temporary work permits (excluding seasonal)
c. Residents on family reunion permits (same as sponsor)
Access to private sector:
Are TCN residents able to accept any private-sector employment under equal conditions as EU nationals?
3
Access to public sector (activities serving the needs of the public. Not restricted to certain types of employment
or private or public law):
Are TCN residents able to accept any public-sector employment (excluding exercise of public authority) under
equal conditions as EU nationals?
4
Immediate access to self-employment
What categories of third country national residents have equal access to self-employment as nationals?
a. Long-term residents
b. Residents on temporary work permits (excluding seasonal)
c. Residents on family reunion permits (same as sponsor)
5
Access to self-employment
Are TCN residents able to take up self-employed activity under equal conditions as EU nationals?
297
2
Access to general support
6 Access to public employment services
Do TCN residents have access to placement and public employment services, under equal conditions as EU
nationals?
7
Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants
What categories of TCN residents have equal access?
a. Long-term residents
Scores according to options
100
All of them
50
Not c or certain categories of b
0
Only a
Yes; there are no
additional restrictions
than those based on
type of permit
mentioned in 1
Other limiting conditions that
apply to all TCN residents,
e.g. linguistic testing
Certain sectors and
activities solely for
nationals/EU nationals
Yes; only restriction is
exercise of public
authority and safeguard
general state interest
Other restrictions
Only for nationals/EU
nationals
All of them
Not c or certain categories of b
Only a
Yes; there are no
additional restrictions
than those based on
type of permit
mentioned in 4
100
Equal treatment with
nationals
Other limiting conditions (such
as linguistic testing)
Certain sectors and
activities solely for
nationals/EU nationals
50
Certain restrictions
0
No equal treatment
All of them
Not c or certain categories of b
Only a
b. Residents on temporary work permits (excluding seasonal)
c. Residents on family reunion permits (same as sponsor)
8
Recognition of academic and professional qualifications acquired outside the EU
Targeted Support
Same procedures as for
EU/EEA nationals
Different procedure as for
EU/EEA nationals
No recognition of titles or
possible down-grading of
qualifications
100
50
0
b and (a or c)
a or c
None
10 Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market
a. National policy targets to reduce unemployment of third country nationals
b. National policy targets to promote vocational training for third country nationals;
c. National policy targets to improve employability through language acquisition
Programmes
All elements
Any of these elements (or
other) but not all
No elements
11 Measures to further the integration of third-country nationals into the labour market
a. National policy targets to address labour market situation of migrant youth
b. National policy targets to address labour market situation of migrant women
Both
One of these
Neither of these
12 Support to access public employment services
a) Right to resource person, mentor, coach linked to public employment service is part of integration policy for
Newcomers
b) Training required of public employment service staff on specific needs of migrants
Both
One
None; only through
voluntary initiatives or
projects
100
Equal access with
nationals
50
Restricted access to elected
positions
0
Other restrictions apply
14 Equal access to social security
Do TCNs have equal access to social security in the following areas? (unemployment benefits, old age pension,
invalidity benefits, maternity leave, family benefits, social assistance)
Equal treatment with
nationals in all areas
No equal treatment in at least
one area
No equal treatment in
more than one area
15 Equal working conditions
Do TCNs have guaranteed equal working conditions? (safe and healthy working conditions, treatment in case of
job termination or dismissal, payment/wages, taxation)
Equal treatment with
nationals in all areas
No equal treatment in at least
one area
No equal treatment in
more than one area
Policy of information by
Ad hoc information campaigns
No active policy of
9
State facilitation of recognition of skills and qualifications obtained outside the EU:
a) existence of state agencies/information centres that promote the recognition of skills and qualifications
b) national guidelines on fair procedures, timelines and fees for assessments by professional, governmental, and
non-governmental organisations
c) provision of information on conversion courses/profession-based language courses and on procedures for
assessment of skills and qualifications (regardless of whether assessments are conducted by governmental or
non-governmental organisations)
298
Workers`rights
13 Membership of and participation in trade union associations and work-related negotiation bodies
16 Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or regional in federal states)
state targeted at
migrant workers and/or
employers on individual
basis
towards migrant workers
and/or employers (or only
individual campaigns in certain
regions)
information
100
≤ 1 year of legal
residence and/or
holding a residence
permit for ≤ 1 year
50
> 1 year of legal residence
and/or holding a permit for > 1
year
0
≥ 2 years of legal
residence and/or holding
a permit for ≥ 2 years
Any residence permit
Certain residence permits
excluded
Permanent residence
permit
Both
Only one or only for some
types of partners (ex.
homosexuals)
Neither; only spouses
≤ Age of majority in
country (18 years)
> 18 ≤ 21 years with
exemptions
> 21 years OR > 18 years
without exemptions
19 Eligibility for minor children (<18 years)
a. Minor children
b. Adopted children
c. Children for whom custody is shared
All three
Only a and b
A and b but with
limitations
20 Eligibility for dependent relatives in the ascending line
Allowed
Certain conditions (other than
dependency) apply
Not allowed
21 Eligibility for dependent adult children
Allowed
Certain conditions (other than
dependency) apply
Not allowed
100
No requirement OR
voluntary
course/information
50
Requirement to take a
language course
0
Requirement includes
language test/assessment
A1 or less set as
standard
A2 set as standard
B1 or higher set as
standard OR no
standards, based on
administrative discretion
Family reunion
Eligibility
17a Eligibility for ordinary legal residents
17b Documents taken into account to be eligible for family reunion
18a Eligibility for partners other than spouses:
a. Stable long-term relationship
b. Registered partnership
18b Age limits for sponsors and spouses
299
Conditions for acquisition of status
22a Form of pre-departure language measure for family member abroad (if no measure, leave blank)
22b Level of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted)
Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course or other forms of assessments.
22c Form of pre-departure integration measure for family member abroad, ex. not language, but social/cultural (if no
measure, leave blank)
None OR voluntary
information/course
Requirement to take an
integration course
Requirement to pass an
integration
test/assessment
Both of these
One of these
Neither of these
a and b, ex. language
or education institutes
a but not b, ex. citizenship/
integration unit in government
Neither a nor b, ex. police,
foreigners' service,
general consultant
No or nominal costs
Normal costs
Higher costs
a and b
a or b
Neither a nor b
22h Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank)
No or nominal costs
Normal costs
Higher costs
23a Form of language requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory (if no measure, leave
blank)
No requirement OR
voluntary
course/information
Requirement to take a
language course
Requirement includes
language test/assessment
A1 or less set as
standard
A2 set as standard
B1 or higher set as
standard OR no
standards, based on
administrative discretion
No requirement OR
voluntary
course/information
Requirement to take an
integration course
Requirement includes
integration
test/assessment
Both of these
One of these
Neither of these
a and b, ex. language
or education institutes
a but not b, ex. integration unit
in government
Neither a nor b, ex. police,
foreigners' service,
general consultant
No or nominal costs
Normal costs
Higher costs
a and b
a or b
Neither a nor b
22d Pre-departure requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank)
a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications
b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability
22e Conductor of pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
a. Language or education specialists
b. Independent of government (ex. not directly subcontracted by or part of a government department)
22f Cost of pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
22g Support to pass pre-departure requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide
b. Assessment based on publicly available course
300
Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments.
23b Level of language requirement, (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted)
Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments.
23c Form of integration requirement for sponsor and/or family member after arrival on territory ex. not language, but
social/cultural
23d Language/integration requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank)
a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications
b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability
23e Conductor of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
a. Language or education specialists
b. Independent of government (ex. not directly subcontracted by or part of a government department)
23f Cost of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
23g Support to language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide
b. Assessment based on publicly available course
23h Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank)
No or nominal costs
Normal costs ex. if provided
by state, same as regular
administrative fees; if provided
by private sector, same as
market price in countries
Higher costs
None
Appropriate accommodation
meeting the general health
and safety standards
Further requirements
25 Economic resources requirement
None or at/below level
of social assistance and
no income is excluded
Higher than social assistance
but source is not linked with
employment
Linked to employment/no
social assistance
26 Maximum length of application procedure
≤ 6 months defined by
law
> 6 months but the maximum
is defined by law
No regulation on
maximum length
27 Costs of application and/or issue of status
None
Same as regular
administrative fees and duties
in the country
Higher costs
100
Equal to sponsor’s
residence permit and
renewable
50
Not equal to sponsor’s
residence permit but ≥ 1 year
renewable permit
0
< 1 year renewable permit
or new application
necessary
No other than a-b
Grounds include c
All grounds and others
than those included on
the list, such as d and
others
All elements
Elements include any of these
(or other) but not all
No elements
All rights
At least a and b
One or both of a and b
are not guaranteed
24 Accommodation requirement
301
Security of status
28 Duration of validity of permit
29 Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing or refusing to renew status:
a. Actual and serious threat to public policy or national security,
b. Proven fraud in the acquisition of permit (inexistent relationship or misleading information).
c. Break-up of family relationship (before three years)
d. Original conditions are no longer satisfied (ex. unemployment or economic resources)
30 Before refusal or withdrawal, due account is taken of (regulated by law) :
a. Solidity of sponsor’s family relationship
b. Duration of sponsor’s residence in MS
c. Existing links with country of origin
d. Physical or emotional violence
31 Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal or withdrawal
a. reasoned decision
b. right to appeal
c. representation before an independent administrative authority and/or a court
Rights associated with status
100
50
0
After ≤ 3 years
After > 3 ≤ 5 years
After > 5 years or upon
certain conditions (e.g.
normal procedure for
permanent residence)
Yes automatically
Yes but only on limited
grounds or under certain
conditions (ex. fixed period of
prior residence or marriage)
None
After ≤ 3 years
After > 3 years or upon certain
conditions (e.g. normal
procedure for permanent
residence)
None
35 Access to education and training for adult family members
In the same way as the
sponsor
Other conditions apply
None
36 Access to employment and self-employment
In the same way as the
sponsor
Other conditions apply
None
37 Access to social security and social assistance, healthcare and housing
In the same way as the
sponsor
Other conditions apply
None
100
Both of these
50
One of these
0
Neither; restrictions in
law on access for some
categories of migrants
AND migrants only benefit
from general support for
all students (and targeted
non-governmental
initiatives where
provided)
Explicit obligation in law
for all categories of
migrants to have same
access as nationals
Implicit obligation for all
children (no impediment to
equal access in law. e.g. no
link between compulsory
education and residence, or
no category of migrant
Restrictions in law on
access for some
categories of migrants
32 Right to autonomous residence permit for partners and children reaching age of majority
33 Right to autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, death, or physical or emotional
violence
34 Right to autonomous residence permit for other family members having joined the sponsor
302
Education
Access
38 Access and support to access pre-primary education: a. All categories of migrants have
same access in law as nationals, regardless of their residence status (includes undocumented);
b. State-supported targeted measures (e.g. financial support, campaigns and other means) to increase participation of migrant
pupils (can also be to increase parental engagement).
Note: Use definition of pre-primary in your country .
39 Access to compulsory-age education:
Access is a legal right for all compulsory-age children in the country, regardless of their residence status
(includes undocumented).
Note: Use definition of compulsory-age in your country
excluded)
40 The assessment in compulsory education of migrants' prior learning and language qualifications and learning
obtained abroad:
a. Assessment with standardised quality criteria and tools;
b. Requirement to use trained staff.
Both of these
One of these
Case-by-case
assessment by school
staff without standardised
criteria or training
41 Support to access secondary education:
a. Targeted measures to increase migrant pupils' successful participation in secondary education;
b. Targeted measures to increase migrant pupils' access to academic routes that lead to higher education.
Both of these
One of these
Neither
42 Access and support to access and participate in vocational training:
Training through apprenticeships or other work-based learning, with state support and/or screening and quality
control measures.
a. All categories of migrants have same legal access as nationals, regardless of their residence status (includes
undocumented);
b. Measures to specifically increase migrant pupil participation in such schemes, e.g. incentives;
c. Measures to increase employers' supply of such schemes to migrant pupils, e.g. campaigns, support and
guidance.
Two or more of these,
including a
At least one of these
None of these
Restrictions in law on
access for some
categories of migrants
AND migrants only benefit
from general support. If
there is targeted support
for migrants, it is only
through non-governmental
initiatives.
43 Access and support to access and participate in higher education:
a. All categories of migrants have same access in law as nationals, regardless of their residence status (includes
undocumented);
b. Targeted measures to increase acceptance and successful participation of migrant pupils, e.g. admission
targets, additional targeted language support, mentoring, campaigns, measures to address drop-outs.
Both of these
One of these
Neither. Restrictions in
law on access for some
categories of migrants
AND migrants only benefit
from general support. If
there is targeted support
for migrants, it is only
through non-governmental
initiatives
All three of these
One or two of these
Migrants only benefit from
general support. If there is
targeted support for
migrants, it is only through
non-governmental
initiatives.
100
50
0
Note: This includes extra tuition, monitoring, and learning opportunities and assessments. Depending on the
school system, this may also include movement between school routes and structures (e.g. academic and
technical).
303
Note: This indicator does not include international students migrating specifically for higher education
44 Access to advice and guidance on system and choices at all levels of compulsory and non-compulsory
education (pre-primary to higher):
a. Written information on educational system in migrant languages of origin;
b. Provision of resource persons/centres for orientation of migrant pupils;
c. Provision of interpretation services for families of migrant pupils for general educational advice and guidance
at all levels.
Targeting needs
45 Requirement for provision in schools of intensive induction programmes for newcomer pupils and their families
about the country and its education system:
a. Existence of induction programme;
b. Inclusion of parents.
Note: This does not refer to language induction courses.
Both of these
Only a
No requirement
46a Provision of continuous and on-going education support in language(s) of instruction for migrant pupils:
a. In compulsory education (both primary and secondary);
b. In pre-primary education.
Note: Migrant pupils may be placed in the mainstream classroom or a separate classroom for a transitional
phase. This question relates to language support in either case.
Both of these
One of these
No provision. Only
through private or
community initiatives.
46b If you answered Option 3 to 46a, skip this question:
Provision includes:
a. Communicative literacy (general fluency in reading, writing, and communicating in the language);
b. Academic literacy (fluency in studying, researching, and communicating in the language in the school
academic setting).
Both of these
Only one of these
Level/goals not specified
or defined
Two or more of these
At least one of these
None of these elements
System disaggregates
migrants into various
sub-groups, ex. gender,
country of origin
System monitors migrants as
a single aggregated group
None. Migrants are only
included in general
categories for monitoring
that apply to all students.
48 Targeted policies to address educational situation of migrant groups:
a. Systematic provision of guidance (e.g. teaching assistance, homework support);
b. Systematic provision of financial resources.
Both of these
One of these
None. Migrants only
benefit from general
support. If there is
targeted support for
migrants, it is only through
voluntary initiatives.
49 Teacher training and professional development programmes include courses that address migrant pupils'
learning needs, teachers' expectations of migrant pupils, and specific teaching strategies to address this:
a. Pre-service training required in order to qualify as a teacher;
b. In-service professional development training.
Both of these
One of these
None
100
State regulations /
recommendations
50
Bilateral agreements or
schemes financed by another
country
0
No provision; only
through private or
community initiatives
46c If you answered Option 3 to 46a, skip this question: Provision includes quality measures:
a. Requirement for courses to use established second-language learning standards;
b. Requirement for teachers to be specialised and certified in these standards;
c. Curriculum standards are monitored by a state body.
304
47 Policy on pupil monitoring targets migrants.
New opportunities
50a Provision of option (in or outside school) to learn immigrant languages.
50b If you answered Option 3 to 50a, skip this question:
Option on immigrant languages is delivered:
a. In the regular school day (may involve missing other subjects);
b. As an adaptation of foreign-language courses in school, which may be open to all students (equal status as
other languages);
c. Outside school, with some state funding.
Two or more of these
One of these
No delivery in school or
funding by state
State regulations /
recommendations
Bilateral agreements or
schemes financed by another
country.
No provision. Only
through private or
community initiatives.
Two or more of these
One of these
No delivery in school or
funding by state
52a Monitoring segregation between educational institutions:
a. Requirement to monitor segregation of migrant pupils into different educational institutions at all levels;
b. This requirement includes special needs education.
Both of these
One of these
None. Migrants are only
included in general
categories that apply to all
students.
52b Measures to promote societal integration:
a. Measures to encourage schools with few migrant pupils to attract more migrant pupils and schools with many
to attract more non-migrant pupils;
b. Measures to link schools with few migrant pupils and many migrant pupils (curricular or extra-curricular).
Both of these
One of these
None. Only general
measures .
53 Measures to support migrant parents and communities in the education of their children:
a. Requirement for community-level support for parental involvement in their children's learning (e.g. community
outreach workers);
b. Requirement for school-level support to link migrant students and their schools (e.g. school liaison workers);
c. Measures to encourage migrant parents to be involved in school governance.
Intercultural education for all
54 The official aims of intercultural education include the appreciation of cultural diversity, and is delivered:
a. As a stand-alone curriculum subject;
b. Integrated throughout the curriculum.
Two or more of these
One of these
None. Migrant parents
and communities are only
included in general
categories that apply to
all.
100
Both of these
50
One of these
0
Intercultural education not
included in curriculum, or
intercultural education
does not include
appreciation of cultural
diversity.
Initiatives part of
mandate of statesubsidised body
Initiatives part of state budget
line for ad hoc funding.
Neither
51a Provision of option (in or outside school) to learn about migrant pupils' cultures and their / their parents' country
of origin.
51b If you answered Option 3 to 51a, skip this question:
Option on cultures of origin is delivered:
a. In the regular school day (may involve missing other subjects);
b. Integrated into the school curriculum, which may be open to all students;
c. Outside school, with some state funding.
305
55
State support for public information initiatives to promote the appreciation of cultural diversity throughout society.
56
The school curricula and teaching materials can be modified to reflect changes in the diversity of the school
population:
a. State guidance on curricular change to reflect both national and local population variations;
b. Inspection, evaluation and monitoring of implementation of (a).
Both of these
Only a
None
57
Daily life at school can be adapted based on cultural or religious needs in order to avoid exclusion of pupils.
Such adaptations might include one or a few of the following: Changes to the existing school timetable and
religious holidays; educational activities; dress codes and clothing; school menus.
State regulations or
guidelines concerning
local adaptation
Law allows for local or schoollevel discretion
No specific adaptation
foreseen in law
58
Measures (i.e. campaigns, incentives, support) to support bringing migrants into the teacher workforce:
a. To encourage more migrants to study and qualify as teachers;
b. To encourage more migrants to enter the teacher workforce.
Both of these
One of these
None
59
Teacher training and professional development programmes include intercultural education and the appreciation
of cultural diversity for all teachers:
a. Pre-service training required in order to qualify as a teacher;
b. In-service professional development training.
Both of these
One of these
Training on intercultural
education not provided, or
intercultural education
does not include
appreciation of cultural
diversity.
100
Equal rights as
nationals after certain
period of residence
50
Reciprocity or other special
conditions for certain
nationalities
0
No right
Political participation
306
Electoral rights
60 Right to vote in national elections
61 Right to vote in regional elections (blank if not applicable)
Equal rights as nationals Requirement of more than five
or requirement of less than years of residence, reciprocity,
or equal to five years of
other special conditions or
residence
special registration procedure
or only in certain regions
No right
62 Right to vote in local elections
Equal rights as EUnationals or
requirement of less than
or equal to five years of
residence
Requirement of more than five
years of residence, reciprocity,
other special conditions or
special registration procedure,
or only in certain municipalities
No right
63 Right to stand for elections at local level
Unrestricted (as for EUnationals)
Restricted to certain posts,
reciprocity or special
requirements
No right / other
restrictions apply
100
No restrictions on
creation of associations
50
A minimal number of national
citizens should be on board,
0
No right
Political liberties
64 Right to association
65 Membership of and participation in political parties
66 Right to create media (newspaper, radio, television, etc.)
Consultative bodies
67a Consultation of foreign residents on national level
67b Composition of consultative body of foreign residents on national level
307
67c Leadership of consultative body (repeat for each consultative body)
67d Institutionalisation (as either right or duty of body in law)
Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the Body has:
a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.
b. Right to a response from the national authority to the its advice or recommendations.
67e Representativeness
Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organisations must include:
a. Both genders
b. All nationalities/ethnic groups
68a Consultation of foreign residents on regional level (blank if not applicable)
by foreigners, no
restrictions regarding
the composition of the
board of such
associations
other restrictions apply (i.e.
with regard to creation of
political organisations or
parties)
Equal access with
nationals (no
restrictions imposed by
government)
Restricted access to internal
elected positions
Other restrictions apply
No restrictions on
creation of media by
foreigners apply (or
similar restrictions as
for non-immigrant
media)
Other restrictions than those
for non-immigrant media apply
No right
100
Structural consultation
members elected by
foreign residents or
members appointed by
associations of foreign
residents without
special state
intervention
50
Ad hoc consultation
members elected by foreign
residents or members
appointed by associations of
foreign residents but with
special state intervention
0
No consultation
members of consultation
body are selected and
appointed by the state
only
Chaired by participant
(foreign resident or
association)
Co-chaired by participant and
national authority
Chaired by national
authority
Both guaranteed in
law/statutes
One guaranteed in
law/statutes
None guaranteed in
law/statutes
Both required in
law/statutes
One required in law
No criteria in law/statutes
Structural consultation
Ad hoc consultation or
structural consultation only
No consultation
present in some regional
entities
68b Composition of consultative body of foreign residents on regional level (blank if not applicable)
Members elected by
foreign residents or
members appointed by
associations of foreign
residents without
special state
intervention
Members elected by foreign
residents or members
appointed by associations of
foreign residents but with
special state intervention
Members of consultation
body are selected and
appointed by the state
only
68c Leadership of consultative body (repeat for each consultative body)
Chaired by participant
(foreign resident or
association)
Co-chaired by participant and
national authority
Chaired by national
authority
Both guaranteed in
law/statutes
One guaranteed in
law/statutes
None guaranteed in
law/statutes
Both required in
law/statutes
One required in law
No criteria in law/statutes
69a Consultation of foreign residents on local level in capital city
Structural consultation
Ad hoc consultation
No consultation
69b Composition of consultative body of foreign residents on local level in capital city
Members elected by
foreign residents or
members appointed by
associations of foreign
residents without
special state
intervention
Members elected by foreign
residents or members
appointed by associations of
foreign residents but with
special state intervention
Members of consultation
body are selected and
appointed by the state
only
69c Leadership of consultative body (repeat for each consultative body)
Chaired by participant
(foreign resident or
association)
Co-chaired by participant and
national authority
Chaired by national
authority
Both guaranteed in
law/statutes
One guaranteed in
law/statutes
None guaranteed in
law/statutes
Both required in
One required in law
No criteria in law/statutes
68d Institutionalisation (as either right or duty of body in law)
Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the Body has:
a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.
b. Right to a response from the national authority to the its advice or recommendations.
308
68e Representativeness
Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organisations must include:
a. Both genders
b. All nationalities/ethnic groups
69d Institutionalisation (as either right or duty of body in law)
Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the body has:
a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.
b. Right to a response from the national authority to the its advice or recommendations.
69e Representativeness
309
Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organisations must include:
a. Both genders
b. All nationalities/ethnic groups
law/statutes
70a Consultation of foreign residents on local level in city (other than capital) with highest proportion of foreign
residents
Structural consultation
Ad hoc consultation
No consultation
70b Composition of consultative body of foreign residents on local level in city (other than capital) with highest
proportion of foreign residents
Members elected by
foreign residents or
members appointed by
associations of foreign
residents without
special state
intervention
Members elected by foreign
residents or members
appointed by associations of
foreign residents but with
special state intervention
Members of consultation
body are selected and
appointed by the state
only
70c Leadership of consultative body (repeat for each consultative body)
Chaired by participant
(foreign resident or
association)
Co-chaired by participant and
national authority
Chaired by national
authority
Both guaranteed in
law/statutes
One guaranteed in
law/statutes
None guaranteed in
law/statutes
Both required in
law/statutes
One required in law
No criteria in law/statutes
100
Policy of information by
state targeted at foreign
residents (or targeted at
all) on individual basis
50
Information campaigns (on a
non-individual basis) towards
foreign residents(or only
individual campaigns in certain
regions)
0
No active policy of
information (or no political
rights at any level to be
informed about)
Funding or support (in
kind) for immigrant
organisations involved
in consultation and
advice at national level
without further
conditions than being a
partner in talks (or
Funding or support (in kind)
dependent on criteria set by
the state (beyond being a
partner in consultation and
different than for nonimmigrant groups)
No support or funding
70d Institutionalisation (as either right or duty of body in law)
Beyond consultation on policies affecting foreign residents, the Body has:
a. Right of initiative to make its own reports or recommendations, even when not consulted.
b. Right to a response from the national authority to the its advice or recommendations.
70e Representativeness
Existence of selection criteria to ensure representativeness. Participants or organisations must include:
a. Both genders
b. All nationalities/ethnic groups
Implementation policies
71 Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states)
72 Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on national level
similar conditions as for
non-immigrant
organisations)
Funding or support (in
kind) for immigrant
organisations involved
in consultation and
advice at regional level
without further
conditions than being a
partner in talks (or
similar conditions as for
non-immigrant
organisations)
Funding or support (in kind)
dependent on criteria set by
the state (beyond being a
partner in consultation and
different than for nonimmigrant groups) or not in all
regions
No support or funding
74 Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on local level in capital city
Funding or support (in
kind) for immigrant
organisations involved
in consultation and
advice at local level
without further
conditions than being a
partner in talks (or
similar conditions as for
non-immigrant
organisations)
Funding or support (in kind)
dependent on criteria set by
the state (beyond being a
partner in consultation and
different than for nonimmigrant groups)
No support or funding
75 Public funding or support of immigrant organisations at local level in city (other than capital) with highest
proportion of foreign residents
Funding or support (in
kind) for immigrant
organisations involved
in consultation and
advice at local level
without further
conditions than being a
partner in talks (or
similar conditions as for
non-immigrant
organisations)
Funding or support (in kind)
dependent on criteria set by
the state (beyond being a
partner in consultation and
different than for nonimmigrant groups)
No support or funding
100
< 5 years
50
5 years
0
> 5 years
310
73 Public funding or support of immigrant organisations on regional level
Long-term residence
Eligibility
76a Required time of habitual residence
76b Documents taken into account to be eligible for long-term residence
77 Is time of residence as a pupil/student counted?
78 Periods of absence allowed before granting of status
Conditions for acquisition of status
79a Form of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
79b Level of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank) (not weighted)
Any residence permit
Seasonal workers, au pairs
and posted workers excluded
Additional temporary
residence permits
excluded
Yes, all
Yes, with some conditions
(limited number of years or
type of study)
No
Longer periods
Up to 10 non-consecutive
months and/or 6 consecutive
months
Shorter periods
100
No requirement OR
voluntary
course/information
50
Requirement to take a
language course
0
Requirement includes
language test/assessment
A1 or less set as
standard
A2 set as standard
B1 or higher set as
standard OR no
standards, based on
administrative discretion.
No requirement OR
voluntary
course/information
Requirement to take an
integration course
Requirement includes
integration
test/assessment
Both of these
One of these
Neither of these
a and b, ex. language
or education institutes
a but not b, ex. integration unit
in government
Neither a nor b, ex. police,
foreigners' service,
general consultant
No or nominal costs
Normal costs ex. if provided
by state, same as regular
administrative fees; if provided
by private sector, same as
market price in countries
Higher costs
a and b
a or b
Neither a nor b
No or nominal costs
Normal costs ex. if provided
Higher costs
Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments.
311
79c Form of integration requirement ex. not language, but social/cultural
79d Language/integration requirement exemptions (if no measure, leave blank)
a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications
b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability
79e Conductor of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
a. Language or education specialists
b. Independent of government (ex. not directly subcontracted by or part of a government department)
79f Cost of language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
79g Support to pass language/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide
b. Assessment based on publicly available course
79h Cost of support (if no measure or support, leave blank)
by state, same as regular
administrative fees; if provided
by private sector, same as
market price in countries
80 Economic resources requirement
None or at/below level
of social assistance and
no income is excluded
Higher than social assistance
but source is not linked with
employment
Linked to employment/no
social assistance
81 Maximum length of application procedure
≤ 6 months defined by
law
> 6 months but the maximum
is defined by law
No regulation on
maximum length
82 Costs of application and/or issue of status
No or nominal costs
Normal costs ex. same as
regular administrative fees in
the country
Higher costs
100
≥5
50
<5≥3
0
<3
Automatically
Upon application
Provided original
requirements are still met
≥ 3 years
<3>1
≤1
No other than a and/or
b
Includes c or d
Includes c and d and/or
additional grounds
All elements
At least b, c, d and e
One or more of b, c, d or
e are not taken into
account
In all three cases
At least one case
None
Security of status
83 Duration of validity of permit
84 Renewable permit
312
85 Periods of absence allowed for renewal, after granting of status (continuous or cumulative)
86 Grounds for rejecting, withdrawing, or refusing to renew status:
a. proven fraud in the acquisition of permit
b. actual and serious threat to public policy or national security,
c. sentence for serious crimes,
d. Original conditions are no longer satisfied (ex. unemployment or economic resources)
87 Protection against expulsion. Due account taken of:
a. personal behaviour
b. age of resident,
c. duration of residence,
d. consequences for both the resident and his or her family,
e. existing links to the Member State concerned
f. (non-)existing links to the resident’s country of origin (including problems of re-entry for political or citizenship
reasons), and
g. alternative measures (downgrading to limited residence permit etc.)
88 Expulsion precluded:
a. after 20 years of residence as a long-term residence permit holder,
b. in case of minors, and
c. residents born in the Member State concerned or admitted before they were 10 once they have reached the
age of 18
89 Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal, non-renewal, or withdrawal:
a. reasoned decision
b. right to appeal
c. representation before an independent administrative authority and/or a court
All rights
At least a and b
One or both of a and b
are not guaranteed
Option 1
Maintained
Option 2
Maintained with less
entitlements
Option 3
Not maintained
91 Access to employment (with the only exception of activities involving the exercise of public authority), self- employment and
other economic activities, and working conditions
Equal access with
nationals and equal
working conditions
Priority to nationals/ EEA
citizens
Other limiting conditions
apply
92 Access to social security, social assistance, health care and housing
Equal access with
nationals
Priority to nationals/ EEA
citizens
Other limiting conditions
apply
Same procedures as for
EEA nationals
Different procedure to EEA
nationals
No recognition of titles
100
After ≤ 5 years of total
residence
50
After > 5 < 10 years of total
residence
0
After ≥ 10 years of total
residence
Longer periods
Up to 10 non-consecutive
months and/or 6 consecutive
months
Shorter periods (includes
uninterrupted residence or
where absence not
regulated by law and left
to administrative
discretion)
After ≤ 3 years of
residence and/ or
marriage
After > 3 ≤ 5 years of
residence and/or marriage
After > 5 years of
residence and/ or
marriage
Same as for spouse of
national
Longer than for spouses, but
shorter than for ordinary TCNs
Same as for ordinary
TCNs
Rights associated with status
90 Residence right after retirement
93 Recognition of academic and professional qualifications
Access to nationality
313
Eligibility
94 First generation
Note: "Residence" is defined as the whole period of lawful and habitual stay since entry. For instance, if the
requirement is 5 years with a permanent residence, which itself can only be obtained after 5 years' residence,
please select "After ≥ 10 years"
95 Periods of absence allowed previous to acquisition of nationality
96a Spouses of nationals
Note: "Residence" is defined as the whole period of lawful and habitual stay since entry. If there is a required
period of marriage that is less than the residence/waiting period, please answer according to the most favourable
option. For instance, if spouses may apply after 3 years of marriage OR 4 years of residence, please select
Option 3.
96b Residence requirement for partners/co-habitees of nationals
97 Second generation
Automatically at birth
(may be conditional
upon parents' status)
Upon simple application or
declaration after birth
Naturalisation procedure
(facilitated or not)
Automatically at birth
(may be conditional
upon parents' status)
Upon simple application or
declaration after birth
Naturalisation procedure
(facilitated or not)
100
No assessment OR A1
or less set as standard
50
A2 set as standard
0
B1 or higher set as
standard OR no
standards, based on
administrative discretion.
Both of these
One of these
Neither of these
99c Conductor of language requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
a. Language-learning specialists
b. Independent of government (ex. not part of a government department)
a and b, ex. language
institutes
a but not b, ex. language unit
in government
Neither a nor b, ex. police,
foreigners' service,
general consultant
99d Cost of language requirement (Blank if no assessment)
No or nominal costs
Normal costs ex. if provided
by state, same as regular
administrative fees; if provided
by private sector, same as
market price
Higher costs
a and b
a or b
Neither a nor b
99f Cost of language support (Blank if no language assessment or support)
No or nominal costs
Normal costs ex. if provided
by state, same as regular
administrative fees; if provided
by private sector, same as
market price
Higher costs
100 Citizenship/integration requirement
a
No requirement OR
voluntary
course/information
Requirement to take an
integration course
Requirement includes
integration
test/assessment
Note: Second generation are born in the country to non-national parents
98 Third generation
Note: Third generation are born in the country to non-national parents, at least one of whom was born in the
country.
Conditions for acquisition
99a Language requirement
Note: Can be test, interview, completion of course, or other forms of assessments.
99b Language requirement exemptions (Blank if no assessment)
a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications
b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability
314
99e Support to pass language requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide
b. Assessment based on publicly available course
Note: Can be test, interview, or other forms of assessments.
100 Citizenship/integration requirement exemptions (Blank if no assessment)
b a. Takes into account individual abilities ex. educational qualifications
b. Exemptions for vulnerable groups ex. age, illiteracy, mental/physical disability
100 Conductor of citizenship/integration requirement (if no measure, leave blank)
c a. Education specialists
b. Independent of government (ex. not part of a government department)
Cost of citizenship/integration requirement (Blank if no assessment)
100 Support to pass citizenship/integration requirement (if no assessment, leave blank)
e a. Assessment based on publicly available list of questions or study guide
b. Assessment based on publicly available course
100f Cost of citizenship/integration requirement (Blank if no assessment)
One of these
Neither of these
a and b, ex. educational
institutes
a but not b, ex. citizenship/
integration unit in government
Neither a nor b, ex. police,
foreigners' service,
general consultant
No or nominal costs
Normal costs ex. if provided
by state, same as regular
administrative fees; if provided
by private sector, same as
market price
Higher costs
a and b
a or b
Neither a nor b
No or nominal costs
Normal costs ex. if provided
by state, same as regular
administrative fees; if provided
by private sector, same as
market price
Higher costs
None
Minimum income (ex.
acknowledged level of poverty
threshold)
Additional requirements
(ex. employment, stable
and sufficient resources,
higher levels of income)
Crimes with sentences
of imprisonment for ≥ 5
years OR Use of
qualifying period
instead of refusal
Crimes with sentences of
imprisonment for < 5 years
For other offences (ex.
misdemeanours, minor
offenses, pending criminal
procedure)
None
A basic good character
required (commonly used, i.e.
also for nationals)
Higher good character
requirement (i.e. than for
nationals) or vague
definition
≤ 6 months
> 6 months but the maximum
is defined by law
No regulation on
maximum length
No or nominal costs
Normal costs ex. same as
regular administrative fees
Higher costs
315
Both of these
101 Economic resources requirement
102 Criminal record requirement
Note: Ground for rejection or application of a qualifying period (not rejection, but longer residence period)
103 Good character' clause (different from criminal record requirement)
104 Maximum length of application procedure
105 Costs of application and/or issue of nationality title
Security of status
106 Additional grounds for refusing status:
a. Proven fraud (ex. provision of false information) in the acquisition of citizenship
b. Actual and serious threat to public policy or national security.
100
No other than a
50
No other than a-b
0
Other than a-b
Explicit entitlement for
applicants that meet the
conditions and grounds
in law
Discretion only on limited
elements
Discretionary procedure
All elements
At least b, c, d, e and f
One or more of b, c, d, e
or f are not taken into
account
109 Legal guarantees and redress in case of refusal:
a. reasoned decision
b. right to appeal
c. representation before an independent administrative authority and/or a court
All guarantees
At least a and b
One or both of a and b
are not guaranteed
110 Grounds for withdrawing status:
a. Proven fraud (ex. provision of false information) in the acquisition of citizenship
b. Actual and serious threat to public policy or national security.
No other than a
No other than a-b
Other than a-b
111 Time limits for withdrawal (including other means of ceasing nationality by authority's decision)
≤ 5 years after
acquisition
> 5 years after acquisition
No time limits in law
Explicitly prohibited in
law
Discretionary, Taken into
account in decision
Not addressed in law
100
None. Dual nationality
is allowed
50
Requirement exists, but with
exceptions (when country of
origin does not allow
renunciation of citizenship or
sets unreasonably high fees
for renunciation)
0
Requirement exists
Allowed at birth
Subject to conditions such as
Dual nationality is not
107 Discretionary powers in refusal
108 Before refusal, due account is taken of (regulated by law):
a. personal behaviour of resident
b. age of resident,
c. duration of residence and holding of nationality,
d. consequences for both the resident and his or her family,
e. existing links to the Member State concerned
f. (non-)existing links to the resident’s country of origin (including problems of re-entry for political or citizenship
reasons), and
g. alternative measures (downgrading to residence permit etc.)
316
112 Withdrawal (including other means of ceasing nationality by authority's decision) that would lead to statelessness
Dual nationality
113 Requirement to renounce / lose foreign nationality upon naturalisation for first generation
114 Dual nationality for second and/or third generation.
for those born in wedlock or
those with dual nationality if
acquired by jus soli
allowed
100
All three grounds
50
Two grounds
0
Ground a, none, or only
based on international
standards or constitution,
subject to judicial
interpretation
All three grounds
Two grounds
Ground a, none, or only
based on international
standards or constitution,
subject to judicial
interpretation
117 Anti-discrimination law applies to natural and legal persons:
a) In the private sector
b) Including private sector carrying out public sector activities
a and b
a or b
None
118 Anti-discrimination law applies to the public sector, including:
a) Public bodies
b) Police force
a and b
a or b
None
All
a, b and c
Two of these or less
All three grounds
Two grounds
Ground a, none or subject
to judicial interpretation
Yes, and victim has the
choice of the main
ground to invoke in
courts
Yes but the victim has no
choice on the main ground to
invoke in courts
No
100
50
0
Anti-discrimination
Definitions and concepts
115 Definition of discrimination includes direct and indirect discrimination, harassment and instruction to discriminate
on grounds of:
a) race and ethnicity
b) religion and belief
c) nationality
116 Definition of discrimination includes discrimination by association and on basis of assumed characteristics
covering:
a) race and ethnicity
b) religion and belief
c) nationality
317
119 The law prohibits:
a) Public incitement to violence, hatred or discrimination on basis of race/ethnicity; religion/belief/nationality
b) Racially/religiously motivated public insults, threats or defamation
c) Instigating, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit such offences
d) Racial profiling
120 Restriction of freedom of association, assembly and speech is permitted when impeding equal treatment in
respect of:
a) race and ethnicity
b) religion and belief
c) nationality
121 Are there any specific rules covering multiple discrimination?
Fields of application
122 Anti-discrimination law covers employment and vocational training:
All three grounds
Two grounds
a) race and ethnicity
b) religion and belief
c) nationality
Ground a, none, or only based
on international standards or
constitution, subject to
judicial interpretation
All three grounds
Two grounds
Ground a, none, or only
based on international
standards or constitution,
subject to judicial
interpretation
124 Anti-discrimination law covers social protection, including social security:
a) race and ethnicity
b) religion and belief
c) nationality
All three grounds
Two grounds
Ground a, none, or only
based on international
standards or constitution,
subject to judicial
interpretation
125 Anti-discrimination law covers social advantages: a) race and ethnicity
b) religion and belief
c) nationality
All three grounds
Two grounds
Ground a, none, or only
based on international
standards or constitution,
subject to judicial
Interpretation
126 Anti-discrimination law covers access to and supply of goods and services available to the public, including
housing:
a) race and ethnicity
b) religion and belief
c) nationality
All three grounds
Two grounds
Ground a, none, or only
based on international
standards or constitution,
subject to judicial
interpretation
127 Anti-discrimination law covers access to supply of goods and services available to the public, including health:
a) race and ethnicity
b) religion and belief
c) nationality
All three grounds
Two grounds
Ground a, none, or only
based on international
standards or constitution,
subject to judicial
interpretation
100
All three
50
Two of these
0
Only one of these
a and b
a or b
None
318
123 Anti-discrimination law covers education (primary and secondary level):
a) race and ethnicity
b) religion and belief
c) nationality
Enforcement mechanisms
128 Access for victims, irrespective of grounds of discrimination, to:
a) judicial civil procedures
b) criminal procedures
c) administrative procedures
129 Alternative dispute resolution procedures
a) decisions are binding
b) appeal of rulings possible
Note: Alternative dispute resolution covers procedures like mediation. It does not include the normal judicial system or
quasi-judicial bodies
130 Access for victims includes:
a) race and ethnicity
b) religion and belief
c) nationality
All grounds
Two grounds
Ground a
131 Average length of both judicial civil and administrative procedures does not exceed:
≤ 6 months
≤ 1 year
> 1 year
132 a) shift in burden of proof in judicial civil procedures
b) shift in burden of proof in administrative procedures
a and b
only a
none
133 Does national legislation allow courts to accept the following evidence:
a) situation testing
b) statistical data
a and b
a or b
Neither of these
In all areas
a and b
a or none
a and b
a or b
None
All possibilities
Only a or b
Only b
137 Legal actions include:
a) individual action
b) class action (court claim where one or more named claimants pursue a case for themselves and the defined
class against one or more defendants)
c) Actio popularis (Action to obtain remedy by a person or a group in the name of the collective interest)
All three
Only two of these
One or none
138 Sanctions include:
a) financial compensation to victims for material damages
b) financial compensation to victims for moral damages/ damages for injuries to feelings
c) restitution of rights lost due to discrimination/ damages in lieu
d) imposing positive measures on discrimination
e) imposing negative measures to stop offending
f) imposing negative measures to prevent repeat offending
At least 5
At least c, e and h
At least 2
134 Protection against victimisation in:
a) employment
b) vocational training
c) education
d) services
e) goods
319
135 a) state provides financial assistance or free court-appointed lawyer to pursue complaint before courts where
victims do not have the necessary means
b) where necessary an interpreter is provided free of charge
136 Legal entities with a legitimate interest in defending the principle of equality:
a) may engage in proceedings on behalf of victims
b) may engage in proceedings in support of victims
c) can bring cases even if no specific victim is referred to (in which case the consent of a victim is not required)
g) specific sanctions authorising publication of the offence (in a non-judicial publication, i.e. not in court documents
h) specific sanctions for legal persons
Yes for 3 grounds
Only race or religion
Race only or subject to
judicial interpretation
100
All three grounds
50
Two grounds
0
Ground a
141 Specialised Agency has the powers to assist victims by way of
a) independent legal advice to victims on their case
b) independent investigation of the facts of the case
All
Only one
None
142 If the specialised Agency acts as a quasi-judicial body:
a) its decisions are binding
b) an appeal of these decisions is possible
All
Only one of these
Neither of these
143 Specialised agency has the legal standing to engage in:
a) judicial proceedings on behalf of a complainant
b) administrative proceedings on behalf of the complainant
a and b
a
b or none
144 Specialised agency has the power to:
a) instigate proceedings in own name
b) lead own investigation and enforce findings
a and b
b
None
All three
At least one of these
None
146 On the national level there are:
a) Mechanism for current and future mainstream legislation to ensure compliance with anti-discrimination and equality law
b) Unit in government/ministries directly working on anti-discrimination/equality on these grounds
Both of these
Only one of these
Neither of these
147 Law provides for:
a) obligation for public bodies to promote equality in carrying out their functions
b) obligation for public bodies to ensure that parties to whom they award benefits like loans or grants respect non-discrimination
Both of these
Only one of these
Neither of these
148 Law provides for:
a) introduction of positive action measures
b) assessment of these measures (ex. research, statistics)
Both of these
Only a
None of these
139 Discriminatory motivation on the grounds of race/religion/nationality treated as aggravating circumstance
Equality policies
140 Specialised Equality Agency has been established with a mandate to combat discrimination on the grounds of:
a) race and ethnicity
b) religion and belief
c) nationality
320
145 Law provides that the State itself (rather than the specialised agency):
a) disseminates information
b) ensures social dialogue around issues of discrimination
c) provides for structured dialogue with civil society
This page has been left blank intentionally.
321
Was this manual useful for you? yes no
Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Download PDF

advertisement