Security Target: anssi_cible_2016_04_LITE

Security Target: anssi_cible_2016_04_LITE
Reference
: D1354681
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Security Target Lite
MultiApp V3.1
IAS Classic V4.2 EN+Ext
ST
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Reference
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CONTENT
1.
ST INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................................. 5
1.1
ST IDENTIFICATION ............................................................................................................................................. 5
1.2
ST OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.3
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................ 6
1.3.1
External References .................................................................................................................................... 6
1.3.2
Internal References ..................................................................................................................................... 7
1.4
ACRONYMS.......................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.5
GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................................................... 9
1.6
TOE OVERVIEW ................................................................................................................................................ 10
1.6.1
TOE description ........................................................................................................................................ 10
1.7
TOE BOUNDARIES ............................................................................................................................................. 11
1.8
TOE LIFE-CYCLE ............................................................................................................................................... 12
1.8.1
Four phases............................................................................................................................................... 12
1.8.2
Actors ........................................................................................................................................................ 15
1.8.3
Pre-personalization on module at Gemalto site ........................................................................................ 16
1.8.4
Pre-personalization on inlay at Gemalto site ........................................................................................... 17
2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ................................................................................................................................. 18
2.1
CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM ................................................................................................................................ 18
2.2
PP CLAIM .......................................................................................................................................................... 18
2.3
PACKAGE CLAIM ............................................................................................................................................... 18
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION................................................................................................................ 19
3.1
GENERAL ........................................................................................................................................................... 19
3.2
THREATS ........................................................................................................................................................... 19
3.3
ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ............................................................................................................. 20
3.4
ASSUMPTIONS.................................................................................................................................................... 21
3.5
COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS OF [ST-IAS] AND [ST-PLTF] ........................................ 21
3.5.1
Compatibility between threats of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF] ..................................................................... 21
3.5.2
Compatibility between OSP of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF .......................................................................... 21
3.5.3
Compatibility between assumptions of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF] ............................................................. 22
3.6
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ADDING ASSUMPTIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENT ................................................................. 22
3.6.1.1
4.
Additions to [PP-SSCD-KG] ..................................................................................................................................22
SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................................... 23
4.1
GENERALS ......................................................................................................................................................... 23
4.2
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ................................................................................................................ 23
4.2.1
Common to Part 2 and Part 3 ................................................................................................................... 23
4.2.2
Part 2 specific ........................................................................................................................................... 24
4.2.3
Part 3 specific ........................................................................................................................................... 24
4.2.4
Part 4 specific (additional security objectives related to part 2) .............................................................. 24
4.2.5
Part 5 and part 6 extension (additional security objectives related to part 2 & part 3) ........................... 24
4.2.6
Extensions ................................................................................................................................................. 25
4.3
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ........................................................................ 25
4.3.1
Common to Part 2 and Part 3 ................................................................................................................... 25
4.3.2
Part 3 specific ........................................................................................................................................... 25
4.3.3
Part 4 specific (additional security objectives related to part 2) .............................................................. 26
4.3.4
Part 5 and part 6 extension (additional security objectives related to part 2 & part 3) ........................... 27
4.4
SECURITY OBJECTIVE RATIONALE .................................................................................................................... 28
4.4.1
Threats ...................................................................................................................................................... 28
4.4.2
Organisational security policies ............................................................................................................... 30
4.4.3
Assumptions .............................................................................................................................................. 33
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Reference
: D1354681
Classification Level
4.4.4
4.4.4.1
4.4.4.2
4.4.5
4.4.5.1
4.4.5.2
4.4.5.3
5.
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Compatibility between objectives of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF] ................................................................ 33
Compatibility between objectives for the TOE .......................................................................................................33
Compatibility between objectives for the environment ...........................................................................................33
Justifications for adding & substitution objectives on the environment ................................................... 34
Additions to [PP-SSCD-KG] ..................................................................................................................................34
Additions to [PP-SSCD-KI] ....................................................................................................................................34
Substitution .............................................................................................................................................................34
EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION...................................................................................................... 35
5.1
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMS............................................................................................................. 35
5.2
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API ............................................................................................................... 36
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................................................ 36
6.1
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE .................................................................................... 36
6.1.1
Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) ......................................................................................................... 37
6.1.2
Class FDP User Data Protection ............................................................................................................. 39
6.1.3
Class FIA Identification and Authentication............................................................................................. 44
6.1.4
Class FMT Security Management ............................................................................................................. 46
6.1.5
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ....................................................................................... 49
6.1.6
Class FTP Trusted Path/Channel ............................................................................................................. 50
6.2
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE ...................................................................................... 52
6.3
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE ............................................................................................................. 53
6.3.1
SFR and PP............................................................................................................................................... 53
6.3.2
Security Functional Requirements Rationale ............................................................................................ 54
6.3.2.1
6.3.2.2
7.
Security objectives for the TOE ..............................................................................................................................54
Dependency Rationale ............................................................................................................................................58
6.3.3
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ............................................................................................ 60
6.3.4
Compatibility between SFR of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF] ......................................................................... 60
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ................................................................................................................... 61
7.1
TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS ............................................................................................................................... 61
7.1.1
SF provided by IAS Application ................................................................................................................ 61
7.1.2
TSFs provided by the platform .................................................................................................................. 62
7.2
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE ...................................................................................................... 63
7.2.1
TOE security functions rationale .............................................................................................................. 63
FIGURES
Figure 1: TOE Boundaries .....................................................................................................................................................................11
Figure 2: TOE Personalization ..............................................................................................................................................................12
Figure 3: TOE Operational Use .............................................................................................................................................................14
Figure 4: LC1: Pre-personalization on module at Gemalto site .............................................................................................................16
Figure 5: LC3: Pre-personalization on inlay at Gemalto site .................................................................................................................17
TABLES
Table 1: Identification of the actors .......................................................................................................................................................15
Table 2: Threats, Assumptions, and Policies vs. Security objectives ....................................................................................................28
Table 3: FCS_CKM.1/SCD refinement .................................................................................................................................................37
Table 4: FCS_CKM.1/Session refinement ............................................................................................................................................37
Table 6: FCS_CKM.4 refinement ..........................................................................................................................................................38
Table 7: FCS_COP.1/DSC refinement ..................................................................................................................................................38
Table 8: FCS_COP.1/Other refinement .................................................................................................................................................39
Table 9: Subjects and security attributes for access control...................................................................................................................39
Table 10: FIA_AFL.1/PERSO refinements ...........................................................................................................................................44
Table 11: conditions triggering tests ......................................................................................................................................................50
Table 12: Objective vs. SFR rationale ...................................................................................................................................................54
Table 13: Objective vs. SFR rationale ...................................................................................................................................................56
Table 14: Dependency rationale ............................................................................................................................................................60
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Table 15: TOE security functions list ....................................................................................................................................................61
Table 16: Security Functions provided by the Multiapp V31 Platform .................................................................................................62
Table 17: Rationale table of functional requirements and security functions ........................................................................................64
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Reference
: D1354681
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1. ST INTRODUCTION
1.1 ST IDENTIFICATION
Title:
Version:
ST reference:
Origin:
ITSEF:
Certification Body:
Evaluation scheme
MultiApp V31 IAS EN Core & Extension Security Target
1.0p
D1354681
Gemalto
SERMA Technologies
ANSSI
FRENCH
Product identification:
Security Controllers:
IAS Classic V4.2 on MultiApp V31
NXP P60D144P VA
TOE identification:
TOE documentation:
IAS Classic V4.2 on MultiApp V31
Guidance document [GUIDE]
The TOE identification is provided by the Card Production Life Cycle Data (CPLCD) of the TOE, located in
OTP and in EEPROM. These data are available by executing a dedicated command.
The TOE and the product differ, as further explained in §1.7 TOE boundaries:
 The TOE is the IAS application, with MOC Server on MultiApp V3.1
 The MultiApp V3.1 product also includes 2 applications in ROM.
1.2 ST OVERVIEW
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is composed of the MultiApp V3.1 platform and the electronic signature
application IAS with MOC Server.
The platform includes the hardware and the operating system.
The IC is evaluated in conformance with [PP-IC-0035].
The Platform is evaluated in conformance with [PP-JCS-Open].
The IAS Classic V4.2 application is evaluated in conformance with [PP-SSCD-KG TCCGA TCSCA] and [PPSSCD-KI TCSCA].
The main objectives of this ST are:
 To introduce TOE and the IAS application,
 To define the scope of the TOE and its security features,
 To describe the security environment of the TOE, including the assets to be protected and
the threats to be countered by the TOE and its environment during the product development,
production and usage.
 To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its environment supporting in terms of
integrity and confidentiality of application data and programs and of protection of the TOE.
 To specify the security requirements which includes the TOE security functional
requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and TOE security functions.
ST
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1.3 REFERENCES
1.3.1 External References
[CC-1]
[CC-2]
[CC-3]
[CEM]
[ST-IC]
[CR-IC]
[ST-IC-P60D144]
[CR-IC-P60D144]
[FIPS180-2]
[FIPS46-3]
[ISO15946-1]
[ISO15946-2]
[ISO15946-3]
[ISO7816]
[ISO9796-2]
[ISO9797-1]
[PKCS#3]
ST
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model,
CCMB-2012-09-001, version 3.1 rev 4, September 2012
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 2: Security functional components,
CCMB-2012-09-002, version 3.1 rev 4, September 2012
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 3: Security assurance components,
CCMB-2012-09-003, version 3.1 rev 4, September 2012
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Methodology
CCMB-2009-07-004, version 3.1 rev 4, September 2012
[ST-IC-P60D144]
[CR-IC-P60D144]
ST of NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P60D144PVA BSI-DSZ-CC-0845-V2-2013
Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0845-V2-2013
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH STANDARD
(+Change Notice to include SHA-224),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2002 August 1
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (DES),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Reaffirmed 1999 October 25
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General,
2002
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital Signatures,
2002
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves – Part 3: Key establishment,
2002
ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4:
Organization, security and commands for interchange, FDIS2004
ISO/IEC 9797: Information technology – Security techniques – Digital Signature Schemes
giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based mechanisms,
2002
ISO/IEC 9797: Information technology – Security techniques – Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher,
1999
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard,
An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
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Reference
: D1354681
Classification Level
[PP-IC-0035]
[PP-SSCD]
[PP-SSCD-KG]
[PP-SSCD-KI]
[EN-14169]
[PP-SSCD-KG TCCGA
TCSCA]
[PP-SSCD-KI TCSCA]
[EN-14169-2]
[EN-14169-3]
[EN-14169-4]
[EN-14169-5]
[EN-14169-6]
[PP-JCS-Open]
[GP211]
[DirectiveEC]
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Smartcard IC Platform protection Profile
BSI-PP-0035
[EN-14169]
[EN-14169-2]
[EN-14169-3]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – EN version
[EN-14169-2] & [EN-14169-4] & [EN-14169-5]
[EN-14169-3] & [EN-14169-6]
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part2 : Device with key generation
BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01, Version 2.0;1, February 2012
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part3: Device with key import
BSI-CC-PP-0075-2012, Version 1.0.2, September 2012
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part4: Extension for device with key
generation and trusted communication with certificate generation application
BSI-CC-PP-0071-2012, Version 1.0.1, December 2012
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part5: Extension for device with key
generation and trusted communication with signature-creation application
BSI-CC-PP-0072-2012, Version 1.0.1, December 2012
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device – Part6: Extension for device with key
import and trusted communication with signature-creation application
BSI-CC-PP-0076-2013, Version 1.0.4, April 2013
Java Card System Protection Profile – Open Configuration
th
ANSSI-PP-2010- 03, Version 2.6, April, 19 2010
Global Platform Card Specification v 2.1.1 - March 2003
DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13
December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures
1.3.2 Internal References
[ST-PLTF]
[GUIDE]
ST
D1278582 JCS Security Target - MultiApp V31 DELPHES31
IAS V4.2 user guidance
MultiApp V31 platform User Guidance
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1.4 ACRONYMS
ST
CC
Common Criteria
CGA
Certificate generation application
DTBS
Data to be signed
DTBS/R
Data to be signed or its unique representation
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
OS
Operating System
PP
Protection Profile
RAD
Reference Authentication Data
SAR
Security Assurance Requirements
SCA
Signature-creation application
SCD
Signature-creation data
SCS
Signature-creation system
SDO
Signed data object
SF
Security Function
SFR
Security functional requirements
SSCD
Secure signature-creation device
ST
Security Target
SVD
Signature-verification data
TOE
Target Of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
VAD
Verification authentication data
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GLOSSARY
Term
Definition
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the
biographical data or the portrait. [SS]
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain phases.
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test
the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name
and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to
represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that
person’s document. [SS]
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for
instance used for traceability and for IC identification l (IC identification data).
Electronic component(s) designed to
perform processing
and/or
memory functions. The MultiApp’s chip is a integrated circuit.
The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied
to the document. [SS]
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organization to
personalize the TOE for the holder.
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization
Agent.
IC Dedicated Support
Software
IC Dedicated Test
Software
Impostor
Initialisation Data
Integrated circuit
Personalization
Personalization Agent
Personalization Agent
Authentication
Information
Pre- personalization
Data
Pre –personalized
TOE’s chip
TSF data
User data
ST
P60D144
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the TOE
Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized TOE’s and/or to
secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is
not limited to) the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
TOE’s chip equipped with pre-personalization data.
Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE
[CC-1].
Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF
[CC-1].
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1.6 TOE OVERVIEW
1.6.1 TOE description
IAS is a Java Card application that provides a Secure Signature Creation Device [SSCD] as defined in the
DIRECTIVE 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a
Community Framework for electronic signatures.
[PP-SSCD] defines protection profiles for SSCD:
 [PP-SSCD-KG] is a protection profile for an SSCD with SCD/SVD key generation and signature
creation.
 [PP-SSCD-KI] is a protection profile for an SSCD with SCD key import and signature creation.
[PP-SSCD] also defines possible extensions for the above protection profiles (included in this TOE):
 [EN-14169-4] defines extensions for [PP-SSCD-KG] with trusted communication between SSCD and
CGA.
 [EN-14169-5] defines extensions for [PP-SSCD-KG] with trusted communication between SSCD and
SCA.
 [EN-14169-6] defines extensions for [PP-SSCD-KI] with trusted communication between SSCD and
SCA.
In this document the terminology of [PP-SSCD] is used. In particular, the Signatory's Reference
Authentication Data (RAD) is the PIN stored in the card and the Signatory's Verification Authentication Data
(VAD) is the PIN provided by the user.
The IAS application can be used in contact or contactless mode.
The IAS application supports:

The import of the SCD via a trusted channel

The (on-board) generation of SCD/SVD pairs

The generation of electronic signatures

The export of the SVD to the certification generation application (CGA)
IAS is aimed to create legal valid signatures and therefore provides mechanisms to ensure the secure
signature creation as:
 Authentication of the signatory by PIN or BioPIN,
 Authentication of the administrator (mutual authentication):
 Symmetric scheme with TDES or AES
 Asymmetric scheme with Diffie-Hellman based on RSA or elliptic curves
 Integrity of access conditions to protected data (SCD, RAD),
 Integrity of the data to be signed (DTBS),
 External communication protection against disclosure and corruption (secure messaging),
 Access control to commands and data by authorized users.
ST
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1.7 TOE BOUNDARIES
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD) IAS defined by:
- The underlying Integrated Circuit
- The MultiApp V3.1 platform (JavaCard platform)
- The IAS Classic V4.2 application.
Figure 1: TOE Boundaries gives a description of the TOE and its boundaries.
eTravel EAC
Native
Application
eTravel SAC
Native
Application
TOE boundary
Applications
IAS Classic
V4.2
Application
MOC Server
JavaCard API
Java
API
JCRE
OPEN
Object
Deletion
Logical
Channels
Installer
Exernal
Memory
VM
Applet
Deletion
Manager
Card
Factory
Legend
JKernel
Non-TSF
ICAO NAX interface
Memory Manager
Communication
Cryptography
TSF
HAL API
RESET
MEM
COM
SEC
CRY
Hardware
Drivers
IC
Figure 1: TOE Boundaries
ST
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1.8 TOE LIFE-CYCLE
1.8.1 Four phases
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases:
Phase 1 “Development”:
The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC Dedicated
Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
The Embedded Software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the
guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC Embedded
Software (operating system), the SSCD application and the guidance documentation associated with these
TOE components.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”:
In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the chip Dedicated Software and the parts of
the chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer
writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as SSCD material during the IC manufacturing
and the delivery process to the SSCD manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacturer
to the SSCD manufacturer.
The SSCD manufacturer has the following tasks:
 Initialization: adding the parts of the IC Embedded Software (NVM ES) to the EEPROM,
 Pre-personalization: initialization of the SSCD application,
Phase 3 Personalization of the TOE:
Personalization
application
SSCD
Authentication
data
Personalizer
Authentication
Authentication
CSP
SCD/SVD GA
 SCD/SVD generation
 SCD/SVD export
Import of SCD
 SCD import
 SVD import*
SCD
SVD*
SVD
CSP
Generation of SCD
 SCD/SVD
generation
 SVD export
 Import of certificate
info*
SVD
CGA
 Certificate generation
 Directory service
Certificate
info*
VAD
Signatory
RAD/VAD management
 RAD generation
 RAD transfer to SSCD
 VAD transfer to end user
RAD
Personalisation for
the signatory
 RAD installation
 VAD definition
Figure 2: TOE Personalization
ST
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RAD Import in the Personalization phase,
 The Personalizor (Administrator) authenticates himself to the TOE.
 The Personalizor (Administrator) sends the RAD to the TOE.
 The RAD shall also be securely sent to the Signatory.
SCD Import in the Personalization phase,
 The Personalizor (Administrator) authenticates himself to the TOE.
 The Personalizor (Administrator) requests the generation of a SCD/SVD key pair on the CSP.
 The SCD / SVD pair is generated.
 The SCD is sent to the TOE.
 The SVD is sent to the CGA.
 The CGA generates the certificate.
 The certificate info is imported into the TOE.
SCD/SVD generation in the Personalization phase,
 The Personalizor (Administrator) authenticates himself to the TOE.
 The Personalizor (Administrator) requests the generation of a SCD/SVD key pair on the SSCD.
 The SCD / SVD pair is generated in the TOE.
 The SVD is sent to the CGA.
 The CGA generates the certificate.
 The certificate info is imported into the TOE.
ST
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Phase 4 “Operational Use”
Signature creation
application
SSCD
VAD
Signatory
Authentication
Signatory
DTBS
Signature creation
process
Signature creation
 DTBS import
 Digital signature computation
 Digital signature export
Digital
signature
CSP
SCD/SVD GA
 SCD/SVD generation
 SCD/SVD export
SCD
SVD*
SVD
CSP
SVD
CGA
 Certificate generation
 Directory service
Import of SCD
 SCD import
 SVD import*
Generation of SCD
 SCD/SVD
generation
 SVD export
 Import of certificate
info*
Import of certificate
info*
Certificate
info*
Figure 3: TOE Operational Use
SCD/SVD generation in the usage phase,
 The signatory enters his PIN code (VAD) to authenticate himself to the TOE.
 The signatory requests the generation of a SCD/SVD key pair on the SSCD.
 The SCD / SVD pair is generated in the TOE.
 The SVD is sent to the CGA.
 The CGA generates the certificate.
 The certificate info is imported into the TOE.
SCD Import in the usage phase,
 The signatory authenticates himself to the TOE.
 The signatory requests the generation of a SCD/SVD key pair on the CSP.
 The SCD / SVD pair is generated.
 The SCD is sent to the TOE.
 The SVD is sent to the CGA.
 The CGA generates the certificate.
 The certificate info is imported into the TOE.
Signature Creation in the usage phase,
 The signatory enters his PIN code (VAD) to authenticate himself to the TOE.
 The signatory sends the DTBS or DTBS representation to the TOE.
 The TOE computes the Signature.
 The TOE sends the Signature to the SCA
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1.8.2 Actors
Actors
Integrated Circuit (IC) Developer
Embedded Software Developer
Integrated Circuit (IC) Manufacturer
Initializer
Pre-personalizer
Inlay manufacturer (optional)
Administrator or
Personalization Agent
Signatory or SSCD Holder
Identification
NXP
Gemalto
NXP
Gemalto
Gemalto
Gemalto or another Inlay manufacturer
The agent who personalizes the SSCD for the holder.
The rightful holder of the TOE for whom the
Administrator personalizes the SSCD.
Table 1: Identification of the actors
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1.8.3 Pre-personalization on module at Gemalto site
TOE
protection
Sites
Phase 1
Development
Step 1
Step 2
Embedded Software Development
IC design
IC dedicated software development
TOE under construction
Secured by Environment
Development sites
Step 3
Phase 2
Manufacturing
Integration and photomask fabrication
IC production and testing
Step 4
IC manufacturer
IC packaging and testing
Module manufacturer
Step 5
IC pre-personalization
SSCD manufacturer
Inlay manufacturing
Inlay manufacturer
TOE operational
Secured by TOE
Phase 3
Personalization
Phase 4
Usage
Step 6
Step 7
SCD import or generation
RAD initialization
RAD update
DTBS import
Digital signature computation and export
SCD import or generation
Personalizer
Holder = End User
End of life
Figure 4: LC1: Pre-personalization on module at Gemalto site
Figure 4: LC1: Pre-personalization on module at Gemalto site describes the standard Life Cycle. The module
is manufactured at the founder site. It is then shipped, as wafers or modules, to Gemalto site where it is prepersonalized and then shipped to the Personalizer directly or through an Inlay manufacturer.
During the shipment from Gemalto to the Personalizer, the module is protected by a diversified key.
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1.8.4 Pre-personalization on inlay at Gemalto site
TOE
protection
Sites
Phase 1
Development
Step 1
Embedded Software
Development
TOE under construction
Secured by Environment
Development sites
Step 2
Step 3
Phase 2
Manufacturing
IC design
IC dedicated software development
Integration and photomask fabrication
IC production and testing
IC manufacturer
Step 4
IC packaging and testing
module manufacturer
Inlay manufacturing
Inlay manufacturer
Inlay pre-personalization
SSCD manufacturer
Step 5
TOE operational
Secured by TOE
Phase 3
Personalization
Phase 4
Usage
Step 6
SCD import or generation
RAD initialization
Step 7
RAD update
DTBS import
Digital signature computation and
export
SCD import or generation
Personalizer
Holder = End User
End of life
Figure 5: LC3: Pre-personalization on inlay at Gemalto site
LC3 is another alternative to LC1. Figure 5: LC3: Pre-personalization on inlay at Gemalto site describes the
Life Cycle when Gemalto wishes to receive inlays instead of modules from the founder. In this case, the
founder ships the module to the Inlay manufacturer.
During the shipment from the founder to Gemalto, the module is protected by a diversified key.
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2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This security target claims conformance to
 [CC-1]
 [CC-2]
 [CC-3]
as follows
 Part 2 extended,
 Part 3 conformant.
The

[CEM] has to be taken into account.
The evaluation of the TOE uses the result of the CC evaluation of the platform MultiApp V31 claiming
conformance to [PP-JCS-Open].
2.2 PP CLAIM
This MultiApp v3.1 IAS security target claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profiles:
 [PP-SSCD-KG TCCGA TCSCA] including [PP-SSCD-KG], which defines security requirements for
an SSCD with SCD/SVD key generation and signature creation, with extension [EN14169-4] related
to trusted communication between SSCD and CGA and extension [EN-14169-5] related to trusted
communication between SSCD and SCA.

[PP-SSCD-KI TCSCA] including [PP-SSCD-KI], which defines security requirements for an SSCD
with SCD key import and signature creation with extension [EN-14169-6] related to trusted
communication between SSCD and SCA.
The evaluation is a composite evaluation and uses the results of the CC evaluation of the MultiApp V31
platform. The platform embedded software has been evaluated at level EAL 5+.
The security problem definition, the objectives, and the SFR of the platform are not described in this
document but in [ST-JCS].
The MultiApp V3.1 JCS security target [ST-JCS], claims demonstrable conformance to the Protection Profile
“JavaCard System – Open configuration”, ANSSI-PP-2010- 03, Version 2.6 ([PP-JCS-Open]).
2.3 PACKAGE CLAIM
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 defined in
CC part 3 [CC-3].
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3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 GENERAL
The assets, threats, OSP, and assumptions of the TOE are those defined in [PP-SSCD-KG], [PP-SSCD-KI]
(no additional assets, threats, OSP, and assumptions in extension [EN 14169-4], [EN 14169-5], [EN 141696])The present Security Target deals with the assets, threats, OSP, and assumptions of [PP-SSCD-KG] and
[PP-SSCD-KI].
The assets of [PP-JCS-Open] are studied in [ST-PLTF].
The Common Criteria define assets as entities that the owner of the TOE presumably places value upon.
The term “asset” is used to describe the threats in the operational environment of the TOE.
Assets and objects:
1. SCD: private key used to perform an electronic signature operation. The confidentiality, integrity and
signatory’s sole control over the use of the SCD must be maintained.
2. SVD: public key linked to the SCD and used to perform electronic signature verification. The integrity
of the SVD when it is exported must be maintained.
3. DTBS and DTBS/R: set of data, or its representation, which the signatory intends to sign. Their
integrity and the unforgeability of the link to the signatory provided by the electronic signature must
be maintained.
User and subjects acting for users:
1. User: End user of the TOE who can be identified as Administrator or Signatory. The subject S.User
may act as S.Admin in the role R.Admin or as S.Sigy in the role R.Sigy.
2. Administrator: User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialisation, TOE personalisation or other
TOE administrative functions. The subject S.Admin is acting in the role R.Admin for this user after
successful authentication as Administrator.
3. Signatory: User who holds the TOE and uses it on his own behalf or on behalf of the natural or legal
person or entity he represents. The subject S.Sigy is acting in the role R.Sigy for this user after
successful authentication as Signatory.
Threat agents:
1. Attacker: human or process acting on his behalf located outside the TOE. The main goal of the
attacker is to access the SCD or to falsify the electronic signature. The attacker has got a high attack
potential and knows no secret.
3.2 THREATS
T.SCD_Divulg
Storing , copying, and releasing of the
signature-creation data
An attacker stores or copies the SCD outside the TOE. An attacker can obtain the SCD during generation,
storage and use for signature-creation in the TOE.
T.SCD_Derive
ST
Derive the signature-creation data
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An attacker derives the SCD from publicly known data, such as SVD corresponding to the SCD or signatures
created by means of the SCD or any other data exported outside the TOE, which is a threat against the
secrecy of the SCD.
T.Hack_Phys
Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces
An attacker interacts with the TOE to exploit vulnerabilities, resulting in arbitrary security compromises. This
threat is directed against SCD, SVD and DTBS.
T.SVD_Forgery
Forgery of signature-verification data
An attacker forges the SVD presented by the CSP to the CGA. This results in loss of SVD integrity in the
certificate of the signatory.
T.SigF_Misuse
Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE
An attacker misuses the signature-creation function of the TOE to create SDO for data the signatory has not
decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with
advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.
T.DTBS_Forgery
Forgery of the DTBS-representation
An attacker modifies the DTBS/R sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS/R used by the TOE for signing does not
match the DTBS the signatory intended to sign.
T.Sig_Forgery
Forgery of the electronic signature
An attacker forges a signed data object, maybe using an electronic signature which has been created by the
TOE and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object is not detectable by the signatory or by third
parties. The signature created by the TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high
attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.
3.3 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
The Secure Signature Creation Device usage is for advanced electronic signature. So it is mandatory to
follow the organisational security policy proposed by [PP-SSCD-KG] and [PP-SSCD-KI].
P.CSP_QCert
Qualified certificate
The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate a qualified certificate or non-qualified certificate (see
[DirectiveEC], article 2, clause 9, and Annex I) for the SVD. generated by the SSCD. The certificates contain
at least the name of the signatory and the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole
control of the signatory. The CSP ensures that the use of the TOE as SSCD is evident with signatures
through the certificate or other publicly available information.
P.Qsign
Qualified electronic signatures
The signatory uses a signature-creation system to sign data with an advanced electronic signature (cf.
Directive, Article 1, clause 2), which is a qualified electronic signature if it is based on a valid qualified
2
certificate (according to the Directive Annex I) .
The DTBS are presented to the signatory and sent by the SCA as DTBS/R to the SSCD. The SSCD creates
the electronic signature created with a SCD implemented in the SSCD that the signatory maintain under his
2
It is a non-qualified advanced electronic signature if it is based on a non-qualified certificate for the
SVD.
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sole control and is linked to the DTBS/Rin such a manner that any subsequent change of the data is
detectable.
P.Sigy_SSCD
TOE as secure signature-creation device
The TOE meets the requirements for an SSCD laid down in Annex III of the Directive [0]. This implies the
SCD is used for signature creation under sole control of the signatory and the SCD can practically occur only
once.
P.Sig_Non-Repud
Non-repudiation of signatures
The life cycle of the SSCD, the SCD and the SVD shall be implemented in a way that the signatory is not
able to deny having signed data if the signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in their
unrevoked certificate.
P.Pre-personalisation Strong authentication in pre-personalisation
During pre-personalisation, The TOE protects itself with strong authentication.
3.4 ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
A.CGA
Trustworthy certification-generation application
The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name or pseudonym and the SVD in the (qualified)
certificate by an advanced electronic signature of the CSP.
A.SCA
Trustworthy signature-creation application
The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS/R of the data the
signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
A.CSP
Secure SCD/SVD management by CSP
The CSP uses only a trustworthy SCD/SVD generation device and ensures that this device can be used by
authorised user only. The CSP ensures that the SCD generated practically occurs only once, that generated
SCD and SVD actually correspond to each other and that SCD cannot be derived from the SVD. The CSP
ensures the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to the TOE, does not use the SCD for
creation of any signature and irreversibly deletes the SCD in the operational environment after export to the
TOE.
3.5
COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS OF [ST-IAS] AND [ST-PLTF]
3.5.1 Compatibility between threats of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF]
T.Hack_Phys and T.SCD_Divulg are included in T.Physical
T.SCD_Derive, T.Sig_Forgery, T.SVD_Forgery, T.DTBS_Forgery, T.Sig_Repud, and T.SigF_Misuse are
threats specific to [ST-IAS] and they do not conflict with the threats of [ST-PLTF].
We can therefore conclude that the threats of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF] are consistent.
3.5.2 Compatibility between OSP of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF
P.CSP_QCert, P.Qsign, P.Sigy_SSCD, P.Sig_Non_Repud and P.Pre-personalisation are OSP specific to
[ST-IAS] and they do not conflict with the OSP of [ST-PLTF].
We can therefore conclude that the OSP of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF] are consistent.
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3.5.3 Compatibility between assumptions of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF]
A.CGA, A.SCA, and A.CSP are assumptions specific to [ST-IAS] and they do no conflict with the
assumptions of [ST-PLTF].
We can therefore conclude that the assumptions of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF] are consistent.
3.6 JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ADDING ASSUMPTIONS ON THE ENVIRONMENT
3.6.1.1 Additions to [PP-SSCD-KG]
The only additional assumption on the environment is A.CSP. This assumption deals with the SCD
generation when the SCD is generated off-TOE and imported afterwards. These two operations are outside
the scope of [PP-SSCD-KG]. Therefore the added assumption does not weaken the TOE.
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4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
4.1 GENERALS
This section identifies and defines the security objectives for the TOE and its environment. Security
objectives reflect the stated intent and counter the identified threats, as well as comply with the identified
organisational security policies and assumptions.
The security objectives of the TOE are those defined in [PP-SSCD-KG], [PP-SSCD-KI] and updated
regarding related extension [EN-14169-4], [EN 14 169-5], [EN 14169-6]
The present Security Target deals with security objectives of [PP-SSCD-KG] and [PP-SSCD-KI] and updated
regarding related extension [EN-14169-4], [EN 14 169-5], [EN 14169-6]
.
The security objectives stated in [PP-JCS-Open] can be found in [ST-PLTF].
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
4.2.1 Common to Part 2 and Part 3
OT.Lifecycle_Security
Lifecycle security
The TOE shall detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage. The TOE shall
securely destroy the SCD on demand of the signatory.
OT.SCD_Secrecy
Secrecy of signature-creation data
The secrecy of the SCD (used for signature generation) shall be reasonably assured against attacks with a
high attack potential.
OT.Sig_Secure
Cryptographic security of the electronic signature
The TOE shall create digital signatures that cannot be forged without knowledge of the SCD through robust
encryption techniques. The SCD shall not be reconstructable using the digital signatures or any other data
exported from the TOE. The digital signatures shall be resistant against these attacks, even when executed
with a high attack potential.
OT.Sigy_SigF
Signature generation function for the legitimate signatory only
The TOE shall provide the digital signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and protects the
SCD against the use of others. The TOE shall resist attacks with high attack potential.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE
The TOE must not alter the DTBS/R As by definition of the DTBS/R this may consist of the DTBS
themselves, this objective does not conflict with a signature creation process where the TOE hashes the
provided DTBS (in part or entirely) for signature creation.
OT.EMSEC_Design
Provide physical emanations security
The TOE shall be designed and built in such a way as to control the production of intelligible emanations
within specified limits.
OT.Tamper_ID
Tamper detection
The TOE shall provide system features that detect physical tampering of its components, and uses those
features to limit security breaches.
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Tamper resistance
The TOE shall prevent or resists physical tampering with specified system devices and components.
4.2.2 Part 2 specific
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
Authorized SCD/SVD generation
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke the generation of
the SCD and the SVD.
OT.SCD_Unique
Uniqueness of the signature-creation data
The TOE shall ensure the cryptographic quality of an SCD/SVD pair it creates as suitable for the advanced
or qualified electronic signature. The SCD used for signature creation can practically occur only once and
shall not be reconstructable from the SVD. In that context ‘practically occur once’ means that the probability
of equal SCDs is negligible.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The TOE shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by the TOE. This
includes unambiguous reference of a created SVD/SCD pair for export of the SVD and in creating a digital
signature creation with the SCD.
4.2.3 Part 3 specific
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
Authorised SCD import
The TOE shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke the import of the
SCD.
4.2.4 Part 4 specific (additional security objectives related to part 2)
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth Authentication proof as SSCD
The TOE shall hold unique identity and authentication data as SSCD and provide security mechanisms to
identify and to authenticate itself as SSCD.
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp TOE trusted channel for SVD export
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel to the CGA to protect the integrity of the SVD exported to the CGA.
The TOE shall enable the CGA to detect alteration of the SVD exported by the TOE.
4.2.5 Part 5 and part 6 extension (additional security objectives related to part 2 &
part 3)
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp Trusted channel of TOE for VAD import
The TOE shall provide a trusted channel for the protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the VAD
received from the HID as needed by the authentication method employed.
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp Trusted channel of TOE for DTBS import
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The TOE shall provide a trusted channel to the SCA to detect alteration of the DTBS/R received from the
SCA. The TOE must not generate electronic signatures with the SCD for altered DTBS.
4.2.6 Extensions
OT.Pre-perso_authentication Strong authentication in pre-personalisation
During pre-personalisation, The TOE protects itself with strong authentication.
4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
4.3.1 Common to Part 2 and Part 3
OE.SVD_Auth
Authenticity of the SVD
The operational environment ensures the integrity of the SVD send to the CGA of the CSP. The CGA verifies
the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the signatory and the SVD in the qualified certificate.
OE.CGA_Qcert
Generation of qualified certificates
The CGA shall generate a qualified certificate that includes,(amongst others)
(a) the name of the signatory controlling the TOE,
(b) the SVD matching the SCD stored in the TOE and being under sole control of the signatory,
(c) the advanced signature of the CSP.
The CGA shall confirm with the generated qualified certificate that the SCD corresponding to the SVD is
stored in a SSCD.
OE.DTBS_Intend
SCA sends data intended to be signed
The signatory shall use a trustworthy SCA that
(a) generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and which the signatory
intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for signing by the TOE,
(b) sends the DTBS/R to the TOE and enables verification of the integrity of the DTBS/R by the TOE,
(c) attaches the signature produced by the TOE to the data or provides it separately.
OE.Signatory
Security obligation of the Signatory
The Signatory checks that the SCD stored in the SSCD received from SSCD-provisioning service is in nonoperational state. The Signatory keeps their VAD confidential.
4.3.2 Part 3 specific
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service
Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD Provisioning Service
The SSCD-provisioning service shall initialise and personalise for the signatory an authentic copy of the TOE
and deliver this copy as SSCD to the signatory.
Remark : This Objective is specific to part 3 due to the adding of part 4.
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
ST
Authorized SCD/SVD generation
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The CSP shall provide security features to ensure that authorised users only may invoke the generation of
the SCD and the SVD.
OE.SCD_Secrecy
SCD Secrecy
The CSP shall protect the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to the TOE. The CSP shall
not use the SCD for creation of any signature and shall irreversibly delete the SCD in the operational
environment after export to the TOE.
OE.SCD_Unique
Uniqueness of the signature-creation data
The CSP shall ensure the cryptographic quality of the SCD/SVD pair , which is generated in the
environment,for the qualified or advanced electronic signature. The SCD used for signature generation shall
practically occur only once i.e. the probability of equal SCDs shall be negligible, and the SCD shall not be
reconstructable from the SVD
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
Correspondence between SVD and SCD
The CSP shall ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD generated by the CSP. This
includes the correspondence between the SVD send to the CGA and the SCD exported to the TOE of the
signatory identified in the SVD certificate.
4.3.3 Part 4 specific (additional security objectives related to part 2)
Part 4 substitutes OE.SSCD_Prov_Service from the core PP( part 2) by OE.Dev_Prov_Service and adds
security objectives for the operational environment OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth and OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp in
order to address the additional method of use as SCD/SVD pair generation after delivery to the signatory and
outside the secure preparation environment.
OE.Dev_Prov_Service Authentic SSCD provided by SSCD Provisioning Service
The SSCD Provisioning Service handles authentic devices that implement the TOE, prepares the TOE for
proof as SSCD to external entities, personalises the TOE for the legitimate user as signatory, links the
identity of the TOE as SSCD with the identity of the legitimate user, and delivers the TOE to the signatory.
Note: This objective replaces OE.SSCD_Prov_Service from the core PP, which is possible as it does not
imply any additional requirements for the operational environment when compared to
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service (OE.Dev_Prov_Service is a subset of OE.SSCD_Prov_Service).
OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth Pre-initialisation of the TOE for SSCD authentication
The CSP shall check by means of the CGA whether the device presented for application of a (qualified)
certificate holds unique identification as SSCD, successfully proved this identity as SSCD to the CGA, and
whether this identity is linked to the legitimate holder of the device as applicant for the certificate.
OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp CGA trusted channel for SVD import
The CGA shall detect alteration of the SVD imported from the TOE with the claimed identity of the SSCD.
The developer prepares the TOE by pre-initialisation for the delivery to the customer (i.e. the SSCD
provisioning service) in the development phase not addressed by a security objective for the operational
environment. The SSCD Provisioning Service performs initialisation and personalisation as TOE for the
legitimate user (i.e. the Device holder). If the TOE is delivered to the Device holder with SCD the TOE is a
SSCD. This situation is addressed by OE.SSCD_Prov_Service except the additional initialisation of the TOE
for proof as SSCD and trusted channel to the CGA. If the TOE is delivered to the Device holder without a
SCD the TOE will be a SSCD only after generation of the first SCD/SVD pair. Because this SCD/SVD pair
generation is performed by the signatory in the operational use stage the TOE provides additional security
functionality addressed by OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth and OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp. But this security functionality
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must be initialised by the SSCD Provisioning Service as described in OE.Dev_Prov_Service. Therefore this
PP (part4) substitutes OE.SSCD_Prov_Service by OE.Dev_Prov_Service allowing generation of the first
SCD/SVD pair after delivery of the TOE to the Device holder and requiring initialisation of security
functionality of the TOE. Nevertheless the additional security functionality must be used by the operational
environment as described in OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth and OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. This approach does not
weaken the security objectives of and requirements to the TOE but enforce more security functionality of the
TOE for additional method of use. Therefore it does not conflict with the CC conformance claim to the core
[PP_SSCD_KG]
4.3.4 Part 5 and part 6 extension (additional security objectives related to part 2 &
part 3)
Part 5 and part 6 substitute OE.HI_VAD from the core PP by OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp and OE.DTBS_Protect
from the core PP by OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp
OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp Trusted channel of HID for VAD export
The HID provides the human interface for user authentication. The HID will ensure confidentiality and
integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed including export to the TOE by
means of a trusted channel.
OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp Trusted channel of SCA for DTBS export
The SCA provides a trusted channel to the TOE for the protection of the integrity of the DTBS to ensure that
the DTBS/R cannot be altered undetected in transit between the SCA and the TOE.
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4.4 SECURITY OBJECTIVE RATIONALE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P.Sig_Non-Repud
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp (part 4)
OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth (part 4)
OE.Dev_Prov_Service (part 4) replace
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service (in part 2)
OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P.Sigy_SSCD
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
OE_SCD_Unique
X
X
X
P.Pre-personalisation
OE_SCD_Secrecy
OE.Signatory
OE.DTBS_Intend
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service (part 3)
OE.CGA_QCert
OE.SVD_Auth
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (part 5 & 6)
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp (part 5 & 6)
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp (part 4)
OT.Pre-personalisation
X
X
X
P.QSign
X
X
X
X
T.DTBS_Forgery
OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp (part 5& 6) replace
OE.DTBS_Protect
X
X
T.Sig_Forgery
X
OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp (part 5& 6) replace
OE.HID_VAD
X
X
X
X
T.SVD_Forgery
P.CSP_Qcert
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp
X
X
T.Hack_Phys
T.SigF_Misuse
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp
OT.SCD-Unique
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Sigy_SigF
X
T.SCD_Derive
OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen
T.SCD_Divulg
OT.Sig_Secure
Security objectives
OT.SCD_Secrecy
/
OT.lifecycle_Security
Policies
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth (part 4)
Threats - Assumptions
–
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
A.SCA
X
A.CGA
A.CSP
X
Table 2: Threats, Assumptions, and Policies vs. Security objectives
4.4.1 Threats
T.SCD_Divulg (Storing, copying and releasing of the signature creation data) addresses the threat against
the legal validity of electronic signature due to storage and copying of SCD outside the TOE, as expressed in
recital (18) of the directive. This threat is countered by:
— OT.SCD_Secrecy, which assures the secrecy of the SCD during use by the TOE for signature
creation,
— OE.SCD_Secrecy, which assures the secrecy of the SCD in the CSP environment (when SCD is
generated off-TOE),
Furthermore, generation and/or import of SCD known by an attacker is countered by:
— OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, which ensures that only authorized SCD generation in the environment is
possible (when SCD is generated off-TOE), and
—
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp, which ensures that only authorised SCD import is possible (when SCD is
generated off-TOE).
T.SCD_Derive (Derive the signature creation data) deals with attacks on the SCD via public known data
produced by the TOE, which are the SVD and the signatures created with the SCD.
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen counters this threat by implementing cryptographically secure generation of the
SCD/SVD pair (when SCD is generated on-TOE).
OE.SCD_Unique counters this threat by implementing cryptographically secure generation of the SCD/SVD
pair (when SCD is generated off-TOE).
OT.Sig_Secure ensures cryptographically secure electronic signatures.
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T.Hack_Phys (Exploitation of physical vulnerabilities) deals with physical attacks exploiting physical
vulnerabilities of the TOE. OT.SCD_Secrecy preserves the secrecy of the SCD. OT.EMSEC_Design
counters physical attacks through the TOE interfaces and observation of TOE emanations. OT.Tamper_ID
and OT.Tamper_Resistance counter the threat T.Hack_Phys by detecting and by resisting tampering
attacks.
T.SVD_Forgery (Forgery of the signature verification data) deals with the forgery of the SVD exported by the
TOE to the CGA for certificate generation. T.SVD_Forgery is addressed by:
— OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp, which ensures correspondence between SVD and SCD and unambiguous
reference of the SVD/SCD pair for the SVD export and signature creation with the SCD (when SCD
is generated on-TOE),
— OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp, which ensures correspondence between SVD and SCD and unambiguous
reference of the SVD/SCD pair for the SVD export and signature creation with the SCD (when SCD
is generated off-TOE), and
— OE.SVD_Auth that ensures the integrity of the SVD exported by the TOE to the CGA and verification
of the correspondence between the SCD in the SSCD of the signatory and the SVD in the input it
provides to the certificate generation function of the CSP.
—
(This is specific to [PP SSCD KG] extended with part 4.) Additionally T.SVD_Forgery is addressed
by OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp, which ensures that the TOE sends the SVD in a verifiable form through
a trusted channel to the CGA, as well as by OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp, which provides verification of
SVD authenticity by the CGA.
T.SigF_Misuse (Misuse of the signature creation function of the TOE) addresses the threat of misuse of the
TOE signature creation function to create SDO by others than the signatory to create an electronic signature
on data for which the signatory has not expressed the intent to sign, as required by paragraph 1(c) of Annex
III. OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) requires the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation,
personalisation and operational usage including secure destruction of the SCD, which may be initiated by the
signatory. OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only) ensures that the TOE
provides the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only. OE.DTBS_Intend (Data intended to
be signed) ensures that the SCA sends the DTBS/R only for data the signatory intends to sign. The
combination of OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (Trusted channel of TOE for DTBS) and OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp
(Trusted channel of SCA for DTBS) counters the undetected manipulation of the DTBS during the
transmission form the SCA to the TOE. OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) prevents
the DTBS/R from alteration inside the TOE. If the SCA provides a human interface for user authentication,
OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp (Trusted channel of HID for VAD) requires the HID to protect the confidentiality and
the integrity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed. The HID and the TOE will protect
the VAD by a trusted channel between HID and TOE according to OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp (Trusted channel
of HID for VAD) and OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp (Trusted channel of TOE for VAD). OE.Signatory (Security
obligation of the signatory) ensures that the signatory checks that an SCD stored in the SSCD when received
from an SSCD-provisioning service provider is in non-operational state, i.e. the SCD cannot be used before
the signatory becomes control over the SSCD. OE.Signatory (Security obligation of the signatory) ensures
also that the signatory keeps their VAD confidential.
T.DTBS_Forgery (Forgery of the DTBS/R) addresses the threat arising from modifications of the DTBS/R
sent to the TOE for signing which than does not correspond to the DTBS/R corresponding to the DTBS the
signatory intends to sign. The threat T.DTBS_Forgery is addressed by the security objectives
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (Trusted channel of TOE for DTBS) and OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp (Trusted channel
of SCA for DTBS), which ensure that the DTBS/R is sent through a trusted channel and cannot be altered
undetected in transit between the SCA and the TOE. The TOE counters internally this threat by the means of
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) ensuring the integrity of the DTBS/R inside the
TOE. The TOE IT environment also addresses T.DTBS_Forgery by the means of OE.DTBS_Intend, which
ensures that the trustworthy SCA generates the DTBS/R of the data that has been presented as DTBS and
which the signatory intends to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.
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T.Sig_Forgery (Forgery of the electronic signature) deals with non-detectable forgery of the electronic
signature. OT.Sig_Secure, OT.SCD_Unique and OE.CGA_QCert address this threat in general.
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) ensures by means of robust cryptographic
techniques that the signed data and the electronic signature are securely linked together.
OT.SCD_Unique (when SCD is generated on-TOE) or OE.SCD_Unique (when SCD is generated off-TOE)
ensures that the same SCD cannot be generated more than once and the corresponding SVD cannot be
included in another certificate by chance. OE.CGA_QCert prevents forgery of the certificate for the
corresponding SVD, which would result in false verification decision concerning a forged signature.
4.4.2 Organisational security policies
P.CSP_QCert (CSP generates qualified certificates)
Dedicated to [PP SSCD KI]
establishes the CSP generating qualified certificate or non-qualified certificate linking the signatory and the
SVD implemented in the SSCD under sole control of his signatory. P.CSP_QCert is addressed by
— OT.Lifecycle_Security, which requires the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation,
personalisation and operational usage,
— OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (when SCD is generated on-TOE) or OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp (when SCD is
generated off-TOE), which requires to ensure the correspondence between the SVD and the SCD
during their generation,
— OE.CGA_QCert for generation of qualified certificates or non-qualified certificates, which requires
the CGA to certify the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the
signatory.
— OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, which ensures that the SCD/SVD generation can be invoked by
authorized users only (when SCD is generated off-TOE),
— OT.SCD_Auth_Imp which ensures that authorised users only may invoke the import of the SCD
(when SCD is generated off-TOE).
Dedicated to [PP SSCD KG] extended with part 4
provides that the TOE and the SCA may be employed to sign data with (qualified) electronic signatures, as
defined by the directive (article 5, paragraph 1) refers to SSCDs to ensure the functionality of advanced
signatures. The OE.CGA_QCert addresses the requirement of qualified (or advanced) electronic signatures
as being based on qualified (or non-qualified) certificates. According to OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth the copies of
the TOE will hold unique identity and authentication data as SSCD and provide security mechanisms
enabling the CGA to identify and to authenticate the TOE as SSCD to prove this identity as SSCD to the
CGA. The OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth ensures that the SP checks the proof of the device presented of the
applicant that it is a SSCD. The OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures that the SVD exported by the TOE to the
CGA corresponds to the SCD stored in the TOE and used by the signatory. The OT.Lifecycle_Security
ensures that the TOE detects flaws during the initialisation, personalisation and operational usage.
P.QSign (Qualified electronic signatures) provides that the TOE and the SCA may be employed to sign data
with an advanced electronic signature, which is a qualified electronic signature if based on a valid qualified
certificate. OT.Sigy_SigF ensures signatory’s sole control of the SCD by requiring the TOE to provide the
signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only and to protect the SCD against the use of others.
OT.Sig_Secure ensures that the TOE creates electronic signatures, which cannot be forged without
knowledge of the SCD through robust encryption techniques. OE.CGA_QCert addresses the requirement of
qualified or non-qualified electronic certificates building a base for the electronic signature. OE.DTBS_Intend
ensures that the SCA provides only those DTBS to the TOE, which the signatory intends to sign.
P.Sigy_SSCD (TOE as secure signature creation device) requires the TOE to meet Annex III of the
directive..
Dedicated to [PP SSCD KI]
This is ensured as follows
- OE.SCD_Unique meets the paragraph 1(a) of the directive [1], Annex III, by the requirements
that the SCD used for signature creation can practically occur only once.
- OE.SCD_Unique, OT.SCD_Secrecy and OE.SCD_Secrecy meet the paragraph 1(a) of the
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directive [1], Annex III, by the requirements to ensure the secrecy of the SCD.
OT.EMSEC_Design and OT.Tamper_Resistance address specific objectives to ensure secrecy
of SCD against specific attacks.
OT.SCD_Secrecy and OT.Sig_Secure meet the paragraph 1(b) of the directive [1], Annex III, by
the requirements to ensure that the SCD cannot be derived from SVD, the digital signatures or
any other data exported outside the TOE.
- OT.Sigy_SigF and OE.SCD_Secrecy meet the paragraph 1(c) of the directive [1], Annex III, by
the requirements to ensure that the TOE provides the signature creation function for the
legitimate signatory only and protects the SCD against the use of others.
- OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE meets the requirements the paragraph 2 of the directive [1], Annex III,
The TOE must not alter the DTBS/R.
Please take note, the requirements of the directive Annex III, 2., that the SSCD does not prevent the
data to be signed from being presented to the signatory prior to the signature process is obviously fulfilled
by the method of TOE usage: the SCA will present the DTBS to the signatory and send them to the
SSCD for signing.
The usage of SCD under sole control of the signatory sole control is ensured by
- OT.Lifecycle_Security requiring the TOE to detect flaws during the initialisation, personalisation
and operational usage
- OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, which limits invocation of the generation of the SCD and the SVD to
authorised users only,
- OT.SCD_Auth_Imp, which limits SCD import to authorised users only,
- OE.SCD_Secrecy, which ensures the confidentiality of the SCD during generation and export to
the TOE, and deletes the SCD after export to the TOE. The CSP does not use the SCD for
signature creation.
- OT.Sigy_SigF, which requires the TOE to provide the signature creation function for the
legitimate signatory only and to protect the SCD against the use of others.
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service ensures that the signatory obtains an authentic copy of the TOE, initialised and
personalised as SSCD from the SSCD-provisioning service.
Dedicated to [PP SSCD KG] extended with part 4
The paragraph 1(a) of Annex III is ensured by OT.SCD_Unique requiring that the SCD used for signature
creation can practically occurs only once. The OT.SCD_Secrecy OT.Sig_Secure and OT.EMSEC_Design
and OT.Tamper_Resistance address the secrecy of the SCD (cf. paragraph 1(a) of Annex III).
OT.SCD_Secrecy and OT.Sig_Secure meet the requirement in paragraph 1(b) of Annex III by the
requirements to ensure that the SCD cannot be derived from SVD, the electronic signatures or any other
data exported outside the TOE. OT.Sigy_SigF meets the requirement in paragraph 1(c) of Annex III by the
requirements to ensure that the TOE provides the signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only
and protects the SCD against the use of others. OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE meets the requirements in
paragraph 2 of Annex III as the TOE must not alter the DTBS/R. The usage of SCD under sole control of the
signatory is ensured by OT.Lifecycle_Security, OT.SCD/SVD_Gen and OT.Sigy_SigF.
OE.Dev_Prov_Service ensures that the legitimate user obtains a TOE sample as an authentic, initialised and
personalised TOE from an SSCD Provisioning Service through the TOE delivery procedure. If the TOE
implements SCD generated under control of the SSCD Provisioning Service the legitimate user receives the
TOE as SSCD. If the TOE is delivered to the legitimate user without SCD In the operational phase he or she
applies for the (qualified) certificate as the Device holder and legitimate user of the TOE. The CSP will use
the TOE security feature (addressed by the security objectives OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth and
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp) to check whether the device presented is a SSCD linked to the applicant as
required by OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth and the received SVD is sent by this SSCD as required by
OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. Thus the obligation of the SSCD provision service for the first SCD/SVD pair is
complemented in an appropriate way by the CSP for the SCD/SVD pair generated outside the secure
preparation environment.
P.Sig_Non-Repud (Non-repudiation of signatures)
[PP SSCD KI] & [PP SSCD KG] extended with part 5 and part 6
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deals with the repudiation of signed data by the signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully
verified with the SVD contained in their certificate valid at the time of signature creation. This policy is
implemented by the combination of the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment,
which ensures the aspects of signatory’s sole control over and responsibility for the electronic signatures
created with the TOE. OE.SSCD_Prov_Service ensures that the signatory obtains an authentic copy of the
TOE, initialised and personalised as SSCD from the SSCD-provisioning service. OE.CGA_QCert ensures
that the certificate allows to identify the signatory and thus to link the SVD to the signatory. OE.SVD_Auth
and OE.CGA_QCert require the environment to ensure authenticity of the SVD as being exported by the
TOE and used under sole control of the signatory. OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (when SCD is generated on-TOE)
or OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp (when SCD is generated off-TOE) ensures that the SVD exported by the TOE
corresponds to the SCD that is implemented in the TOE. OT.SCD_Unique (when SCD is generated on-TOE)
or OE.SCD_Unique (when SCD is generated off-TOE) provides that the signatory’s SCD can practically
occur just once.
OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory checks that the SCD, stored in the SSCD received from an SSCD
provisioning service is in non-operational state (i.e. the SCD cannot be used before the signatory becomes
into sole control over the SSCD). The TOE security feature addressed by the security objectives
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth and OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp supported by OE.Dev_Prov_Service enables the
verification whether the device presented by the applicant is a SSCD as required by OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth
and the received SVD is sent by the device holding the corresponding SCD as required by
OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. OT.Sigy_SigF provides that only the signatory may use the TOE for signature
creation. As prerequisite OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory keeps their VAD confidential.
OE.DTBS_Intend, OE.DTBS_Protect and OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE ensure that the TOE generates
electronic signatures only for a DTBS/R that the signatory has decided to sign as DTBS. The robust
cryptographic techniques required by OT.Sig_Secure ensure that only this SCD may generate a valid
electronic signature that can be successfully verified with the corresponding SVD used for signature
verification. The security objective for the TOE OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security), OT.SCD_Secrecy
(Secrecy of the signature creation data), OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security),
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) and OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) protect the SCD
against any compromise.
Dedicated to [PP SSCD KG] extended with part 4
deals with the repudiation of signed data by the signatory, although the electronic signature is successfully
verified with the SVD contained in their certificate valid at the time of signature creation. This policy is
implemented by the combination of the security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment, that
ensure the aspects of signatory’s sole control over and responsibility for the electronic signatures generated
with the TOE. OE.Dev_Prov_Service ensures that the signatory uses an authentic TOE, initialised and
personalised for the signatory. OE.CGA_QCert ensures that the certificate allows to identify the signatory
and thus to link the SVD to the signatory. OE.SVD_Auth and OE.CGA_QCert require the environment to
ensure authenticity of the SVD as being exported by the TOE and used under sole control of the signatory.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp ensures that the SVD exported by the TOE corresponds to the SCD that is
implemented in the TOE. OT.SCD_Unique provides that the signatory’s SCD can practically occur just once.
OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory checks that the SCD, stored in the SSCD received from an SSCD
provisioning service is in non-operational state (i.e. the SCD cannot be used before the signatory becomes
into sole control over the SSCD). The TOE security feature addressed by the security objectives
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth and OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp supported by OE.Dev_Prov_Service enables the
verification whether the device presented by the applicant is a SSCD as required by OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth
and the received SVD is sent by the device holding the corresponding SCD as required by
OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp. OT.Sigy_SigF provides that only the signatory may use the TOE for signature
creation. As prerequisite OE.Signatory ensures that the signatory keeps their VAD confidential.
OE.DTBS_Intend, OE.DTBS_Protect and OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE ensure that the TOE generates
electronic signatures only for a DTBS/R that the signatory has decided to sign as DTBS. The robust
cryptographic techniques required by OT.Sig_Secure ensure that only this SCD may generate a valid
electronic signature that can be successfully verified with the corresponding SVD used for signature
verification. The security objective for the TOE OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security), OT.SCD_Secrecy
(Secrecy of the signature creation data), OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security),
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OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) and OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) protect the SCD
against any compromise.
P.Pre-personalisation (Strong authentication in pre-personalisation) requests a strong authentication
before accessing the SSCD. This is directly addressed by OT.Pre-personaliasation.
4.4.3 Assumptions
A.SCA (Trustworthy signature creation application) establishes the trustworthiness of the SCA with respect
to generation of DTBS/R. This is addressed by OE.DTBS_Intend (Data intended to be signed) which ensures
that the SCA generates the DTBS/R of the data that have been presented to the signatory as DTBS and
which the signatory intends to sign in a form which is appropriate for being signed by the TOE.
A.CGA (Trustworthy certificate generation application) establishes the protection of the authenticity of the
signatory's name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by the advanced signature of the CSP by means of
the CGA. This is addressed by OE.CGA_QCert (Generation of qualified certificates), which ensures the
generation of qualified certificates, and by OE.SVD_Auth (Authenticity of the SVD), which ensures the
protection of the integrity of the received SVD and the verification of the correspondence between the SVD
and the SCD that is implemented by the SSCD of the signatory.
A.CSP (Secure SCD/SVD management by CSP) establishes several security aspects concerning handling
of SCD and SVD by the CSP. That the SCD/SVD generation device can only be used by authorized users is
addressed by OE.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (Authorized SCD/SVD Generation), that the generated SCD is
unique and cannot be derived by the SVD is addressed by OE.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature
creation data), that SCD and SVD correspond to each other is addressed by OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp
(Correspondence between SVD and SCD), and that the SCD are kept confidential, are not used for signature
generation in the environment and are deleted in the environment once exported to the TOE is addressed by
OE.SCD_Secrecy (SCD Secrecy).
This assumption is only applicable when SCD is generated off-card.
4.4.4 Compatibility between objectives of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF]
4.4.4.1 Compatibility between objectives for the TOE
OT.Lifecycle_Security, OT.SCD_Secrecy, OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE, OT.EMSEC_Design, OT.Tamper_ID,
and OT.Tamper_Resistance deal with physical protection of the TOE. These are supported by O.PhysManipulation, O.Phys-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Leak-Inherent, and O.Leak-Forced.
OT.Sig_Secure, OT.Sigy_SigF, OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen, OT.SCD_Unique, OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp,
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp,
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth,
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp,
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp, OT.Pre-personalisation are objectives specific to [ST-IAS] and they do no conflict
with the objectives of [ST-PLTF].
We can therefore conclude that the objectives for the TOE of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF] are consistent.
4.4.4.2 Compatibility between objectives for the environment
OE.SVD_Auth,
OE.CGA_QCert,
OE.SSCD_Prov_Service,
OE.HID_VAD,
OE.DTBS_Intend,
OE.DTBS_Protect, OE.Signatory, OE.SCD/SCD_Auth_Gen, OE.SCD_Secrecy, OE.SCD_Unique,
OE.Dev_Prov_Service,, OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth, OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp and OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp,
OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp, OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp are objectives specific to [ST-IAS] and they do no conflict
with the objectives of [ST-PLTF].
We can therefore conclude that the objectives for the environment of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF] are consistent.
ST
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4.4.5 Justifications for adding & substitution objectives on the environment
4.4.5.1 Additions to [PP-SSCD-KG]
The only additional objectives on the environment are: OE.SCD/SCD_Auth_Gen, OE.SCD_Secrecy,
OE_SCD_Unique, OE.SCD_SVD_Corresp. These objectives request the environment to perform several
operations when the SCD is generated off-TOE and imported afterwards. These two operations are outside
the scope of [PP-SSCD-KG]. Therefore the added objectives on the environment do not weaken the TOE.
4.4.5.2 Additions to [PP-SSCD-KI]
Additional objectives on the environment are: OE.Dev_Prov_Service, (who replace OE.SSCD_Prov_Service)
, OE.CGA_SSCD_Auth, OE.CGA_TC_SVD_Imp, and link to trusted communication with certificate
generation application.
This is outside the scope of [PP-SSCD-KI]. Therefore the added objectives on the environment do not
weaken the TOE
4.4.5.3 Substitution
Part 5 and part 6 substitute OE.HI_VAD from the core PP by OE.HID_TC_VAD_Exp and OE.DTBS_Protect
from the core PP by OE.SCA_TC_DTBS_Exp. These do not weaken the TOE.
ST
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5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
This ST uses two components defined as extensions to CC part 2:
 FPT_EMS.1 which is defined in [PP-SSCD-KG] and [PP-SSCD-KI].
 FIA_API.1 which is defined in [EN-14169-4].
5.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMS
The sensitive family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here to
describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE
and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE.
Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA),
differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for
the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2
[CC-2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)” is specified as follows.
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMS TOE emanation
1
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or
user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or
user data.
Management:
FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
ST
No other components
No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified
limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface
[assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
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5.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of the Class FIA
(Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the
proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of
the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by an
external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling:
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
1
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity:
Management:
Audit:
FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
activities foreseen.
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_API.1.1
No other components
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the
[assignment: authorized user or role].
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
6.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
This chapter defines the security functional requirements for the TOE using functional requirements
components as specified in [PP-SSCD-KI], [PP-SSCD-KG]
and [EN-14169-4] adding an operation of FIA_UAU.1 and adding SFRs: FIA_API.1, FDP_DAU.2/SVD,
FTP_ITC.1/SVD.
and [EN-14169-5] & [EN-14169-6] adding an operation of FIA_UAU.1 and adding SFRs: FDP_UIT.1/DTBS,
FTP_ITC.1/VAD and FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
[ST-PLTF] deals with the security functional requirements of [PP-JCS-Open].
Refinements in this section are underlined when they are PP refinements and in bold characters when they
are additional ones.
ST
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6.1.1 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
FCS_CKM.1/SCD Cryptographic key generation for SCD/SVD pair
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.1.1
/SCD
iteration
/RSA
/ECC
No other components
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall generate SCD/SVD pair in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
algorithm
RSA CRT
generation
ECC
generation
key
key
Key size
1024, 1536, 2048
standards
none (generation of random numbers and
Miller- Rabin primality testing)
None
160, 224, 256, 384, 512,
521
Table 3: FCS_CKM.1/SCD refinement
Application note: part 2 only [PP-SSCD-KG].
Application note:
FCS_CKM.1/SCD is named FCS_CKM.1 in [PP-SSCD-KG]. This naming clarified the purpose of the SFR
and allows for the introduction of FCS_CKM.1/SCD.
FCS_CKM.1/Session Cryptographic key generation for session keys
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.1.1
/Session
iteration
/TDES
/AES
ST
No other components
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
algorithm
TDES
session
key generation
AES session key
generation
Key size
112
standards
[ISO7816], [PKCS#3] DH.
128
[ISO7816], [PKCS#3] DH,
ECDH, [IEEE-P1363] ECDHC
Table 4: FCS_CKM.1/Session refinement
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FCS_CKM.4/SCD Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method Secure erasing of the value that meets the following: None.
FCS_CKM.4.1
/SCD
iteration
/RSA
/ECC
when
new SCD generation or import /signer’s will
new SCD generation or import /signer’s will
Table 5: FCS_CKM.4 refinement
FCS_CKM.4/Session Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method Secure erasing of the value that meets the following: None.
FCS_CKM.4.1
iteration
/TDES
/AES
when
End of session
End of session
Table 6: FCS_CKM.4 refinement
FCS_COP.1/DSC Cryptographic operation – Digital Signature Creation
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1.1
/DSC
No other components
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
iteration
/DSC-RSA
operation
signature
algorithm
RSA CRT
/DSC-ECC
signature
ECC
ST
key size
1024, 1536, 2048,
3072, and 4096
standards
[ISO9796-2]
RSA SHA PKCS#1 v1.5
RSA PSS SHA PKCS#1
[TR-03111] ECDSA SHA
224, 256, 384, 512,
and 521
Table 7: FCS_COP.1/DSC refinement
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FCS_COP.1/Session Cryptographic operation – Other operations
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
The TSF shall perform [assignment: cryptographic operations] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic
key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
FCS_COP.1.1
/Other
iteration
/ENC-TDES
/ENC-AES
/MAC-TDES
/MAC-AES
No other components
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
operation
algorithm
key size
Encryption & decryption
TDES
112
Encryption & decryption
AES
128
MAC
computation
& TDES
112
Verification
MAC
computation
& AES
128
Verification
Table 8: FCS_COP.1/Other refinement
standards
[SP800-67]
[FIPS197] AES 128 NOPAD
[SP800-67] [ISO9797-1]
DES MAC ISO9797-1 M2
[FIPS197] AES 128 NOPAD
6.1.2 Class FDP User Data Protection
The security attributes and related status for the subjects and objects are:
Subject or object the security Security attribute type
attribute is associated with
Value of the security attribute
S.User
Role
R.Admin - S.User acts as S.Admin
R.Sigy - S.User acts as S.Sigy
S.User
SCD / SVD Management
Authorised, not authorised
SCD
SCD Operational
No, yes
SCD
SCD identifier
arbitrary value
SVD
No security attribute
NA
Table 9: Subjects and security attributes for access control
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation Subset access control
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1
/Signature_Creation
ST
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects: S.User,
2. Objects: DTBS/R, SCD
3. Operations: signature creation.
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FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1
/Signature_Creation
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to objects based on the following:
1. the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “Role” and.
2. the SCD with the security attribute “SCD Operational”
FDP_ACF.1.2
/Signature_Creation
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
R.Sigy is allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with SCD which security
attribute “SCD operational” is set to “yes”,
FDP_ACF.1.3
/Signature_Creation
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4
/Signature_Creation
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
S.User is not allowed to create electronic signatures for DTBS/R with SCD which
security attribute “SCD operational” is set to “no”.
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Subset access control
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1
/SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP to objects based on the
following:
1. Subjects: S.User,
2. Objects: SCD, SVD
3. Operations: generation of SCD/SVD pair.
Application note: part 2 only [PP-SSCD-KG].
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
ST
No other components
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1
/SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD Generation SFP to objects based on the
following: the user S.User is associated with the security attribute “SCD/SVD
Management“.
FDP_ACF.1.2
/SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “authorized” is
allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair,
FDP_ACF.1.3
/SCD/SVD_Generation
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
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The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management” set to “not authorised” is
not allowed to generate SCD/SVD pair.
Application note: part 2 only [PP-SSCD-KG].
FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer Subset access control
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1.1
/SVD_Transfer
No other components
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects: S.User,
2. Objects: SVD
3. Operations: export.
Application note: part 2 only [PP-SSCD-KG].
FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1
/SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the SVD Transfer SFP to objects based on the following:
1. the S.User is associated with the security attribute Role
2. the SVD .
FDP_ACF.1.2
/SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
R.Admin or R.Sigy is allowed to export SVD,
FDP_ACF.1.3
/SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4
/SVD_Transfer
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: none
Application note: part 2 only [PP-SSCD-KG].
FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import Subset access control
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1.1
/SCD_Import
No other components
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects: S.User,
2. Objects: SCD
3. Operations: import of SCD.
Application note: part 3 only [PP-SSCD-KI].
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
ST
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FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1
/SCD_Import
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to objects based on the following:
the S.User is associated with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management”.
FDP_ACF.1.2
/SCD_Import
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD Management” set to “authorised” is allowed to
import SCD,
FDP_ACF.1.3
/SCD_Import
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4
/SCD_Import
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules:
S.User with the security attribute “SCD/SVD management” set to “not authorised” is not
allowed to import SCD.
Application note: part 3 only [PP-SSCD-KI].
FDP_DAU.2/SVD_ Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FDP_DAU.2.1
/SVD
The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of
the validity of SVD.
FDP_DAU.2.2
/SVD
The TSF shall provide CGA with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated
information and the identity of the user that generated the evidence.
Application note: Part 4 extension [EN-14169-4] related to core PP key generation [PP-SSCD-KG]..
FDP_ITC.1/SCD Import of user data without security attributes
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
ST
No other components
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ITC.1.1
/SCD
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP when importing user data, controlled under the
SFP, from outside of the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.2
/SCD
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the SCD when imported from
outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3
/SCD
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data controlled under the
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SFP from outside the TOE: none.
Application note: part 3 only [PP-SSCD-KI].
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_RIP.1.1
No other components
No dependency
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the de-allocation of the resource from the following objects: SCD,
The following data persistently stored by TOE have the user data attribute "integrity checked persistent
stored data":
1. SCD
2. SVD (if persistent stored by TOE).
The DTBS/R temporarily stored by TOE has the user data attribute "integrity checked stored data":
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_SDI.1
No dependency
FDP_SDI.2.1
/Persistent
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for integrity error
on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked persistent stored data.
FDP_SDI.2.2
/Persistent
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall :
1. prohibit the use of the altered data
2. inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_SDI.1
No dependency
FDP_SDI.2.1
/DTBS
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for integrity error
on all objects, based on the following attributes: integrity checked stored DTBS.
FDP_SDI.2.2
/DTBS
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall :
1. prohibit the use of the altered data
2. inform the S.Sigy about integrity error.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_UCT.1.1
/SCD
No other components
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
The TSF shall enforce the SCD Import SFP to receive SCD in a manner protected from
unauthorized disclosure.
Application note: part 3 only [PP-SSCD-KI].
ST
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FDP_UIT.1/DTBS Inter-TSF trusted channel – TC Human Interface Device
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1
/DTBS
The TSF shall enforce the Signature Creation SFP to receive user data in a manner
protected from modification and insertion errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2
/DTBS
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification and
insertion has occurred.
Application note: Part 5 extension [EN-14169-5] related to core PP key generation [PP-SSCD-KG] and Part 6
extension [EN-14169-6] related to core PP key importation [PP-SSCD-KI].
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1/SIG Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1
/SIG
The TSF shall detect when [3] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
consecutive failed authentication attempts.
FIA_AFL.1.2
/SIG
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF
shall block RAD.
Note: PIN or BioPIN could be used for user authentication.
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO Authentication failure handling during pre-personalization and personalization
phases
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_AFL.1.1
/PERSO
The TSF shall detect when [Number in Table 10] unsuccessful authentication attempts
occurs related to authentication attempts.
FIA_AFL.1.2
/PERSO
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met, the TSF
shall block key.
Auth type
GP
ST
No other components
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Number
3
Actions
Block GP authentication.
Table 10: FIA_AFL.1/PERSO refinements
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FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_API.1.1
No other components
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a mutual authentication to prove the identity of the SSCD.
Application note: Part 4 extension [EN-14169-4] related to core PP key generation [PP-SSCD-KG]..
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1
/PERSO
The TSF shall allow
1. Identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA_UID.1.
2. No other action.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
/PERSO
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note:
In pre-personalisation, the TSF shall allow no action to be performed before user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1/SIG Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1
/SIG
The TSF shall allow
1. Self test according to FPT_TST.1.
2. Identification of the user by means of TSF required by FIA_UID.1.
3. establishing a trusted channel between the CGA and the TOE by means of TSF
required by FTP_ITC.1/SVD
4. establishing a trusted channel between the HID and the TOE by means of TSF
required by FTP_ITC.1/VAD
5. None.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
/SIG
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note:
The TSF shall allow no Signature generation related action to be performed before user is authenticated.
That means that other actions, not specifically related to the Signature creation, may be performed before
user is authenticated.
Application note: Part 4 extension [EN-14169-4], Part 5 extension [EN-14169-5] and Part 6 extension [EN14169-6] add operations on FIA-UAU.1/SIG.
ST
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FIA_UID.1/PERSO Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FIA_UID.1.1
/PERSO
The TSF shall allow
1. No action.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
/PERSO
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSFmediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.1/SIG Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FIA_UID.1.1
/SIG
The TSF shall allow
1. Self test according to FPT_TST.1.
2. No other Signature generation related action.
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
/SIG
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSFmediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.1.4 Class FMT Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MOF.1.1
No other components
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management functions
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable the signature-creation function to R.Sigy.
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.1.1
/Signatory
ST
No other components
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management functions
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP to restrict the ability to modify the
security attributes SCD operational to R.Sigy.
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FMT_MSA.1/AdminKG Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.1.1
/AdminKG
No other components
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management functions
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP to restrict the ability to modify the
security attributes SCD / SVD management to R.Admin.
Application note: part 2 only [PP-SSCD-KG].
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKI Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.1.1
/AdminKI
No other components
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management functions
The TSF shall enforce the SCD_Import_SFP to restrict the ability to modify the security
attributes SCD / SVD management to R.Admin.
Application note: part 3 only [PP-SSCD-KI].
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.2.1
No other components
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for SCD / SVD Management
and SCD operational.
FMT_MSA.3/Keygen Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1
/Keygen
The TSF shall enforce the SCD/SVD_Generation_SFP, SVD_Transfer_SFP and Signaturecreation_SFP to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
/Keygen
The TSF shall allow the R.Admin to specify alternative initial values to override the default
values when an object or information is created.
Application note: part 2 only [PP-SSCD-KG].
ST
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FMT_MSA.3/KeyImport Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1
/KeyImport
The TSF shall enforce the SCD_Import_SFP and Signature-creation_SFP to provide
restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2
/KeyImport
The TSF shall allow the R.Admin to specify alternative initial values to override the default
values when an object or information is created.
Application note: part 3 only [PP-SSCD-KI].
FMT_MSA.4/Keygen Static attribute value inheritance
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.4.1
/Keygen
No other components
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security attributes:
1. If S.Admin successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair without S.Sigy being authenticated
the security attribute “SCD operational of the SCD” shall be set to “no” as a single
operation.
2. If S.Sigy successfully generates an SCD/SVD pair the security attribute “SCD
operational of the SCD” shall be set to “yes” as a single operation.
Application note: part 2 only [PP-SSCD-KG].
FMT_MSA.4/KeyImport Static attribute value inheritance
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.4.1
/KeyImport
No other components
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
The TSF shall use the following rules to set the value of security attributes:
1. If S.Admin imports SCD while S.Sigy is not currently authenticated, the security attribute
“SCD operational” of the SCD shall be set to “no” after import of the SCD as a single
operation.
2. If S.Admin imports SCD while the S.Sigy is currently authenticated, the security attribute
“SCD operational” of the SCD shall be set to “yes” after import of the SCD as a single
operation.
Application note: part 3 only [PP-SSCD-KI].
FMT_MTD.1/Admin Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1
/Admin
ST
No other components
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create the RAD to R.Admin.
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FMT_MTD.1/Signatory Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1
/Signatory
No other components
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the RAD to S.Sigy.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1.1
No other components
No dependencies
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions:
1. Creation and modification of RAD.
2. Enabling the signature-creation function.
3. Modification of the security attribute SCD/SVD management, SCD operational.
4. Change the default value of the security attribute SCD Identifier.
5. No other security management function.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles R.Admin and R.Sigy
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
6.1.5 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FPT_EMS.1.1
The TOE shall not emit [electromagnetic and current emissions] in excess of
[intelligible threshold] enabling access to RAD and SCD.
FPT_EMS.1.2
The TSF shall ensure [unauthorized users] are unable to use the following interface:
smart card circuit contacts to gain access to RAD and SCD.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_FLS.1.1
ST
No other components
No dependencies
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. self-test according to FPT_TST fails.
2. [No other failure].
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Reference
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FPT_PHP.1 Passive detection of physical attack
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FPT_PHP.1.1
The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise
the TSF.
FPT_PHP.1.2
The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the
TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_PHP.3.1
No other components
No dependencies
The TSF shall resist [clock frequency, voltage tampering and penetration of protection
layer] to the [integrated circuit] by responding automatically such that the SFRs are
always enforced.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [see Table 11: conditions triggering tests] to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF.
Conditions under which self test should occur
During initial start-up
Description of the self test
RNG live test, sensor test, FA detection, Integrity Check
of NVM ES
Periodically
RNG monitoring, sensor test, FA detection
After cryptographic computation
FA detection
Before any use or update of TSF data
FA detection, Integrity Check of related TSF data
Table 11: conditions triggering tests
6.1.6 Class FTP Trusted Path/Channel
FTP_ITC.1/SCD import Inter-TSF trusted Channel
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FTP_ITC.1.1
/SCD import
ST
No other components
No dependencies
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT
product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
Applicable on: June 2015
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Reference
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identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2
/SCD import
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3
/SCD import
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
1. Data exchange integrity according to FDP_UCT.1/SCD.
2. [None].
Application note: part 3 only [PP-SSCD-KI].
FTP_ITC.1/SVD Inter-TSF trusted Channel
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FTP_ITC.1.1
/SVD
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT
product CGA that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification
or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2
/SVD
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3
/SVD
The TSF or the CGA shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
1. Data authentication with Identity of Guarantor according to FIA_API.1 and
FDP_DAU.2/SVD,
2. [None].
Application note: Part 4 extension [EN-14169-4] related to core PP key generation [PP-SSCD-KG]..
FTP_ITC.1/ VAD Inter-TSF trusted channel – TC Human Interface Device
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FTP_ITC.1.1
/VAD
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT
product HID that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification
or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 /
VAD
The TSF shall permit the remote trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 /
VAD
The TSF or the HID shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
1. User authentication according to FIA_UAU.1/SIG,,
2. [None].
Application note: Part 5 extension [EN-14169-5] related to core PP key generation [PP-SSCD-KG] and Part 6
extension [EN-14169-6] related to core PP key importation [PP-SSCD-KI].
ST
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Reference
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FTP_ITC.1/ DTBS Inter-TSF trusted channel – Signature creation Application
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FTP_ITC.1.1
/DTBS
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT
product SCA that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification
or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2 /
DTBS
The TSF shall permit the remote trusted IT product to initiate communication via the trusted
channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3 /
DTBS
The TSF or the SCA shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
1. signature creation,,,
2. [None].
Application note: Part 5 extension [EN-14169-5] related to core PP key generation [PP-SSCD-KG] and Part 6
extension [EN-14169-6] related to core PP key importation [PP-SSCD-KI].
6.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
The SAR for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those taken from
the Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) and augmented by taking the following components: ALC_DVS.2,
and AVA_VAN.5.
ST
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64
6.3 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE
FCS_CKM.1/SCD
FCS_CKM.1/Session
FCS_CKM.4/SCD
FCS_CKM.4/Session
FCS_COP.1/DSC
FCS_COP.1/Session
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation
FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1/SVD transfer SFP
FDP_ACF.1/SVD transfer SFP
FDP_ACC.1/SCD import SFP
FDP_ACF.1/SCD import SFP
FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
FDP_DAU.2/SVD
FDP_UCT.1/SCD
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO
FIA_AFL.1/SIG
FIA_API.1
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO
FIA_UAU.1/SIG
FIA_UID.1/PERSO
FIA_UID.1/SIG
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKG
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKI
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MSA.3/Keygen
FMT_MSA.3/KeyImport
FMT_MSA.4/Keygen
FMT_MSA.4/KeyImport
FMT_MTD.1/Admin
ST
[EN-14169-6]
[EN-14169-5]
[EN-14169-4]
additions
[PP-SSCD-KI]
Requirements
[PP-SSCD-KG]
6.3.1 SFR and PP
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
X X
FMT_SMF.1
X X
FMT_SMR.1
X X
FPT_EMS.1
X X
FPT_FLS.1
X X
FPT_PHP.1
X X
FPT_PHP.3
X X
FPT_TST.1
X X
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import
X
FTP_ITC.1/SVD
FTP_ITC.1/VAD
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
Table 12: Objective vs. SFR rationale
64
[EN-14169-6]
[EN-14169-5]
Pages
additions
X
X
X
X
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp (Part 3 only)
X
OT.SCD_SCD_Corresp (Part 2 only)
Requirements
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Reference
6.3.2 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
FCS_CKM.1/SCD
FCS_CKM.1/Session
FCS_CKM.4/SCD
FCS_CKM.4/Session
FCS_COP.1/DSC
FCS_COP.1/Session
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation
FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1/SVD transfer
ST
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (part 5&6)
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp (part 5&6)
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp (part 4)
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth (part 4)
OT.Pre-personalisation
OT.SCD_Unique (Part 2 only)
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Lifecycle_Security
Requirements
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (Part 2 only)
6.3.2.1 Security objectives for the TOE
X
X
X
X
X
X
Applicable on: June 2015
Content of this document shall not be modified or partially reused without prior written consent of Gemalto
X
X
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OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (part 5&6)
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp (part 5&6)
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp (part 4)
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth (part 4)
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Lifecycle_Security
ST
X
X
X
X
64
OT.Pre-personalisation
Pages
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp (Part 3 only)
Public
Requirements
FDP_ACF.1/SVD transfer
FDP_ACC.1/SCD import
FDP_ACF.1/SCD import
FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
FDP_DAU.2/SVD
FDP_UCT.1/SCD
FDP_UIT.1/ DTBS
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO
FIA_AFL.1/SIG
FIA_API.1
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO
FIA_UAU.1/SIG
FIA_UID.1/PERSO
FIA_UID.1/SIG
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKG
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKI
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MSA.3/Keygen
FMT_MSA.3/KeyImport
FMT_MSA.4/Keygen
FMT_MSA.4/KeyImport
FMT_MTD.1/Admin
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.1
FPT_PHP.3
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OT.SCD_Unique (Part 2 only)
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OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (Part 2 only)
Reference
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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X
X
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (part 5&6)
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp (part 5&6)
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp (part 4)
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth (part 4)
OT.Tamper_Resistance
OT.Tamper_ID
OT.EMSEC_Design
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE
OT.Sigy_SigF
OT.Sig_Secure
OT.SCD_Secrecy
OT.Lifecycle_Security
X
X
64
OT.Pre-personalisation
Pages
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp (Part 3 only)
Public
Requirements
FPT_TST.1
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import
FTP_ITC.1/SVD
FTP_ITC.1/VAD
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
1.0p
(Printed copy not controlled: verify the
version before using)
OT.SCD_SCD_Corresp (Part 2 only)
Classification Level
Release
P60D144
OT.SCD_Unique (Part 2 only)
: D1354681
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (Part 2 only)
Reference
X
X
X
X
Table 13: Objective vs. SFR rationale
OT.Lifecycle_Security (Lifecycle security) is provided by the SFR for SCD/SVD generation FCS_CKM.1,
SCD usage FCS_COP.1/SCD and SCD destruction FCS_CKM.4/SCD which ensure cryptographically
secure lifecycle of the SCD. The SCD/SVD generation is controlled by TSF according to
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation. The SVD transfer for certificate
generation is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer and FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer.
The SCD usage is ensured by access control FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation,
FDP_AFC.1/Signature_Creation which is based on the security attribute secure TSF management according
to FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1/AdminKG, FMT_MSA.1/AdminKI, FMT_MSA.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2,
FMT_MSA.3/KeyGen, FMT_MSA.3/KeyImport, FMT_MSA.4/KeyGen, FMT_MSA.4/KeyImport,
FMT_MTD.1/Admin, FMT_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1. The test functions FPT_TST.1
provides failure detection throughout the lifecycle.
The SCD import is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import, FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import and
FDP_ITC.1/SCD. The confidentiality of the SCD is protected during import according to FDP_UCT.1/SCD in
the trusted channel FTP_ICT.1/SCD.
OT.SCD_Secrecy (Secrecy of signature creation data) is provided by the security functions specified by the
following SFR. FCS_CKM.1 ensures the use of secure cryptographic algorithms for SCD/SVD generation.
Cryptographic quality of SCD/SVD pair shall prevent disclosure of SCD by cryptographic attacks using the
publicly known SVD. The security functions specified by FDP_RIP.1 and FCS_CKM.4 ensure that residual
information on SCD is destroyed after the SCD has been use for signature creation and that destruction of
SCD leaves no residual information. The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that
no critical data is modified which could alter the efficiency of the security functions or leak information of the
SCD. FPT_TST.1 tests the working conditions of the TOE and FPT_FLS.1 guarantees a secure state when
integrity is violated and thus assures that the specified security functions are operational. An example where
compromising error conditions are countered by FPT_FLS.1 is fault injection for differential fault analysis
(DFA). SFR FPT_EMS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 require additional security features of the TOE to ensure the
confidentiality of the SCD.
FDP_UCT.1/SCD and FTP_ICT.1/SCD ensures the confidentiality for SCD import.
OT.Sig_Secure (Cryptographic security of the electronic signature) is provided by the cryptographic
algorithms specified by FCS_COP.1, which ensures the cryptographic robustness of the signature
algorithms. FDP_SDI.2/Persistent corresponds to the integrity of the SCD implemented by the TOE and
FPT_TST.1 ensures self-tests ensuring correct signature creation.
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OT.Sigy_SigF (Signature creation function for the legitimate signatory only) is provided by an SFR for
identification authentication and access control. FIA_UAU.1/SIG and FIA_UID.1/SIG ensure that no
signature creation function can be invoked before the signatory is identified and authenticated. The security
functions specified by FMT_MTD.1/Admin and FMT_MTD.1/Signatory manage the authentication function.
SFR FIA_AFL.1/SIG provides protection against a number of attacks, such as cryptographic extraction of
residual information, or brute force attacks against authentication. The security function specified by
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS ensures the integrity of stored DTBS and FDP_RIP.1 prevents misuse of any resources
containing the SCD after de-allocation (e.g. after the signature creation process). The security functions
specified by FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation and FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation provide access control
based on the security attributes managed according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/Signatory, FMT_MSA.2,
FMT_MSA.3/KeyGen, FMT_MSA.3/KeyImport, FMT_MSA.4/KeyGen, and FMT_MSA.4/KeyImport. The SFR
FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 list these management functions and the roles. These ensure that the
signature process is restricted to the signatory. FMT_MOF.1 restricts the ability to enable the signature
creation function to the signatory. FMT_MSA.1/Signatory restricts the ability to modify the security attributes
SCD operational to the signatory.
OT.DTBS_Integrity_TOE (DTBS/R integrity inside the TOE) ensures that the DTBS/R is not altered by the
TOE. The integrity functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/DTBS require that the DTBS/R has not been altered by
the TOE.
OT.EMSEC_Design (Provide physical emanations security) covers that no intelligible information is
emanated. This is provided by FPT_EMS.1.1.
OT.Tamper_ID (Tamper detection) is provided by FPT_PHP.1 by the means of passive detection of physical
attacks.
OT.Tamper_Resistance (Tamper resistance) is provided by FPT_PHP.3 to resist physical attacks.
SSCD Part 2 only
OT.SCD/SVD_Auth_Gen (Authorized SCD/SVD generation) addresses that generation of a SCD/SVD pair
requires proper user authentication. The TSF specified by FIA_UID.1/SIG and FIA_UAU.1/SIG provide user
identification and user authentication prior to enabling access to authorised functions. The SFR
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation and FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation provide access control for the
SCD/SVD generation. The security attributes of the authenticated user are provided by FMT_MSA.1/Admin,
FMT_MSA.2, and FMT_MSA.3 for static attribute initialisation. The SFR FMT_MSA.4 defines rules for
inheritance of the security attribute “SCD operational” of the SCD.
OT.SCD_Unique (Uniqueness of the signature creation data) implements the requirement of practically
unique SCD as laid down in Annex III, paragraph 1(a), which is provided by the cryptographic algorithms
specified by FCS_CKM.1.
OT.SCD_SVD_Corresp (Correspondence between SVD and SCD) addresses that the SVD corresponds to
the SCD implemented by the TOE. This is provided by the algorithms specified by FCS_CKM.1 to generate
corresponding SVD/SCD pairs. The security functions specified by FDP_SDI.2/Persistent ensure that the
keys are not modified, so to retain the correspondence. Moreover, the SCD Identifier allows the environment
to identify the SCD and to link it with the appropriate SVD. The management functions identified by
MT_SMF.1 and by FMT_MSA.4 allow R.Admin to modify the default value of the security attribute SCD
Identifier.
SSCD Part 2 and part 4
OT.TOE_SSCD_Auth (Authentication proof as SSCD) requires the TOE to provide security mechanisms to
identify and to authenticate themselves as SSCD, which is directly provided by FIA_API.1 (Authentication
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Proof of Identity). The SFR FIA_UAU.1 allows (additionally to the core PP SSCD KG) establishment of the
trusted channel before (human) user is authenticated.
OT.TOE_TC_SVD_Exp (TOE trusted channel for SVD export) requires the TOE to provide a trusted channel
to the CGA to protect the integrity of the SVD exported to the CGA, which is directly provided by
- The SVD transfer for certificate generation is controlled by TSF according to FDP_ACC.1/SVD_Transfer
and FDP_ACF.1/SVD_Transfer.
- FDP_DAU.2/SVD (Data Authentication with Identity of Guarantor), which requires the TOE to provide CGA
with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the SVD and the identity of the user that generated the
evidence.
- FTP_ITC.1/SVD Inter-TSF trusted channel), which requires the TOE to provide a trusted channel to the
CGA.
SSCD Part 3 only
OT.SCD_Auth_Imp (Authorized SCD import) is provided by the security functions specified by the following
SFR. FIA_UID.1/SIG and FIA_UAU.1/SIG ensure that the user is identified and authenticated before SCD
can be imported. FDP_ACC.1/SCD_Import and FDP_ACF.1/SCD_Import ensure that only authorised users
can import SCD.
SSCD part 5 and part 6 in addition with part 2 and part 3
OT.TOE_TC_VAD_Imp (Trusted channel of TOE for VAD import) is provided by FTP_ITC.1/VAD to
provide a trusted channel to protect the VAD provided by the HID to the TOE.
OT.TOE_TC_DTBS_Imp (Trusted channel of TOE for DTBS) is provided by FTP_ITC.1/DTBS to provide a
trusted channel to protect the DTBS provided by the SCA to the TOE and by FDP_UIT.1/DTBS, which
requires the TSF to verify the integrity of the received DTBS.
Extensions
OT.Pre-personalisation (strong authentication in Pre-personalisation) is provided by the security functions
specified by the following SFR. FIA_AFL.1/PERSO, FIA_UAU.1/PERSO, and FIA_UID.1/PERSO
6.3.2.2 Dependency Rationale
Requirements
FCS_CKM.1/SCD
FCS_CKM.1/Session
FCS_CKM.4/SCD
FCS_CKM.4/Session
FCS_COP.1/DSC
CC Dependencies
(FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
(FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2)
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2)
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_COP.1/Session
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation
FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation
(FDP_ACF.1)
(FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)
ST
Satisfied Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/DSC,
FCS_CKM.4/SCD
FCS_COP.1/Session,
FCS_CKM.4/Session
FCS_CKM.1/SCD,
FDP_ITC.1/SCD,
FCS_CKM.1/Session
FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FDP_ITC.1/DTBS,
FCS_CKM.4/SCD,
FCS_CKM.1/SCD,
FCS_CKM.4/SCD,
FDP_ITC.1/SCD,
FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation,
FMT_MSA.3/KeyGen,
FMT_MSA.3/KeyImport
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Reference
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Public
Requirements
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
CC Dependencies
(FDP_ACF.1)
(FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/SVD transfer
FDP_ACF.1/SVD transfer
(FDP_ACF.1)
(FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1/SCD import
FDP_ACF.1/SCD import
(FDP_ACF.1)
(FDP_ACC.1) and (FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_DAU.2/SVD
FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FIA_UID1.
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
No dependencies
No dependencies
No dependencies
[FDP_ACC.1
or
FDP_IFC.1],
[FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1]
(FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1)
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
(FIA_UAU.1)
(FIA_UAU.1)
(FIA_UID.1)
(FIA_UID.1)
No dependencies
No dependencies
No dependencies
(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and
(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
FDP_UCT.1/SCD
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO
FIA_AFL.1/SIG
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO
FIA_UAU.1/SIG
FIA_API.1
FIA_UID.1/PERSO
FIA_UID.1/SIG
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKG
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKI
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and
(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and
(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_MSA.2
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_MSA.3/KeyGen
(FMT_MSA.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_MSA.3/KeyImport
(FMT_MSA.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_MSA.4/KeyGen
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
ST
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Satisfied Dependencies
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FMT_MSA.3/KeyGen
FDP_ACF.1/SVD transfer
FDP_ACC.1/SVD transfer,
FMT_MSA.3/KeyGen
FDP_ACF.1/SCD import
FDP_ACC.1/SCD import,
FMT_MSA.3/KeyImport
FIA_UID.1
FDP_ACC.1/SCD import,
FMT_MSA.3/KeyImport
FDP_ACC.1/Signature_Creation,
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import,
FDP_ACC.1/SCD import,
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO
FIA_UAU.1/SIG
FIA_UID.1/PERSO
FIA_UID.1/SIG
n/a
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Import,
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation,
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation,
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKG,
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKI
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKG,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory,
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKI,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory,
FMT_SMR.1
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
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Reference
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Public
Requirements
CC Dependencies
FMT_MSA.4/KeyImport
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
FMT_MTD.1/Admin
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.1
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_TST.1
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import
(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)
(FMT_SMF.1) and (FMT_SMR.1)
No dependencies
(FIA_UID.1)
No dependencies
No dependencies
No dependencies
No dependencies
No dependencies
No dependencies
FTP_ITC.1/SVD
FTP_ITC.1/VAD
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
No dependencies
No dependencies
No dependencies
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Satisfied Dependencies
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation
FDP_ACC.1/SCD Import,
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_SMF.1
FIA_UID.1/SIG
n/a
n/a
n/a
Table 14: Dependency rationale
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
EAL5 was chosen because it provides a high level of independently assured security in a planned
development. It requires a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable
to specialist security engineering techniques.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the SSCD’s
development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the SSCD’s material.
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by vulnerability
analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack
potential.
6.3.4 Compatibility between SFR of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF]
FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_COP.1 of [ST-IAS] are supported by FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_COP.1 of [ST-PLTF].
FDP_SDI.2 of [ST-IAS] is supported by FDP_SDI.2 of [ST-PLTF].
FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.1 and FPT_PHP.3 of [ST-IAS] are supported by
FPT_TST.1 of [ST-PLTF].
FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_DAU.2, FDP_ETC.1, FDP_ITC.1, FDP_RIP.1, FDP_UCT.1,
FDP_UIT.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_API.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UID.1, FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.2,
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MSA.4, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1, FTP_ITC.1, and FTP_TRP.1,
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS, FTP_ITC.1/VAD, FTP_ITC.1/DTBS are SFR specific to the IAS application and they do
no conflict with the SFR of [ST-PLTF].
We can therefore conclude that the SFR of [ST-IAS] and [ST-PLTF] are consistent.
ST
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7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS
TOE Security Functions are provided by the IAS application with its OS, and by the chip.
The security functions provided by the platform are described in [ST-PLTF].
7.1.1 SF provided by IAS Application
This section presents the security functions provided by the IAS application.
Identification
SF.AUTHENTICATION
SF.CRYPTO
SF.INTEGRITY
SF.MANAGEMENT
SF.SECURE_MESSAGING
SF.CSM
Name
Authentication management
Cryptography management
Integrity monitoring
Operation management and access control
Secure messaging management
Card Security Management
Table 15: TOE security functions list
SF.AUTHENTICATION provides the authentication management on the TOE. It encompasses:
 Signatory authentication failure as defined in FIA_AFL.1/SIG,
 Timing of signatory identification and authentication as defined in FIA_UID.1/SIG and
FIA_UAU.1/SIG,
 Authentication of proof of identity & identity guarantor FIA_API.1 & FDP_DAU.2/SVD
 Pre-personaliser authentication failure as defined in FIA_AFL.1/PERSO,
 Timing of pre-personaliser identification and authentication as defined in FIA_UID.1/PERSO and
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO.
SF.CRYPTO provides the crypto management on the TOE. It encompasses:
 The generation of SCD/SVD and session keys as defined in FCS_CKM.1/SCD and
FCS_CKM.1/Session,
 The destruction of SCD and session keys as defined in FCS_CKM.4/SCD and
FCS_CKM.4/Session,
 The usage of SCD and session keys as defined in FCS_COP.1/DSC and FCS_COP.1/Session
SF.INTEGRITY provides the integrity monitoring on the TOE. It encompasses:
 The integrity of sensitive data as defined in FDP_SDI.2/Persistent and FDP_SDI.2/DTBS, and also
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
SF.MANAGEMENT provides operation management and access control. It encompasses:
 Access management as defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 SFR,
 Data input and output as defined in FDP_ITC.1/SCD,
 Management of functions as defined in FMT_MOF.1 and FMT_SMF.1,
 Management
of
security
attributes
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKG,
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKI,
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory,
FMT_MSA.2,
FMT_MSA.3/KeyImport,
FMT_MSA.3/KeyGen,
FMT_MSA.4/KeyImport, FMT_MSA.4/KeyGen,
 Management of TSF data as defined in FMT_MTD.1/Admin and FMT_MTD.1/Signatory,
 Management of roles as defined in FMT_SMR.1,
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SF.SECURE_MESSAGING provides secure messaging for the TOE. It encompasses:
 Data exchange integrity and confidentiality as defined in FDP_UCT.1/SCD,
 Secure channel and secure path as defined in FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import, in FTP_ITC.1/SVD, in
FTP_ITC.1/VAD, in FTP_ITC.1/DTBS,
SF.CSM provides cards security protection. It encompasses:
 Protection against physical attacks as defined in FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_PHP.1, and
FPT_PHP.3,
 Testing of the card as defined in FPT_TST,
 Secure unavailability of sensitive data as defined in FDP_RIP.
7.1.2 TSFs provided by the platform
The evaluation is a composite evaluation and uses the results of the Platform CC .
SF
Description
SF_FW
Firewall
SF_API
Protection against snooping
SF.CSM
Card Security Management
SF.AID
AID Management
SF.INST
Installer
SF.ADEL
Applet Deletion
SF.ODEL
Object Deletion
SF.CAR
Secure Carrier
SF.SCP
Smart Card Platform
SF.CMG
Card Manager
SF.APIS
Specific API
SF.RND
RNG
Table 16: Security Functions provided by the Multiapp V31 Platform
These SF are described in [ST-PLTF].
ST
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7.2 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION RATIONALE
7.2.1 TOE security functions rationale
FCS_CKM.1/SCD
FCS_CKM.1/Session
FCS_CKM.4/SCD
FCS_CKM.4/Session
FCS_COP.1/DSC
FCS_COP.1/Session
FDP_ACC.1/Signature-creation
FDP_ACF.1/Signature-creation
FDP_ACC.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACF.1/SCD/SVD_Generation
FDP_ACC.1/SVD transfer
FDP_ACF.1/SVD transfer
FDP_ACC.1/SCD import
FDP_ACF.1/SCD import
FDP_ITC.1/SCD
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_SDI.2/Persistent
FDP_SDI.2/DTBS
FDP_UIT.1/DTBS
FDP_DAU.2/SVD
FDP_UCT.1/SCD
FIA_AFL.1/SIG
FIA_API.1
FIA_UAU.1/SIG
FIA_UID.1/SIG
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKG
FMT_MSA.1/AdminKI
FMT_MSA.1/Signatory
FMT_MSA.2
FMT_MSA.3/KeyImport
FMT_MSA.3/KeyGen
ST
SF.CSM
SF.Secure_Messaging
SF.Management
SF.Integrity
SF.Crypto
SF.Authentication
Requirements
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Applicable on: June 2015
Content of this document shall not be modified or partially reused without prior written consent of Gemalto
Page : 63 / 64
Reference
: D1354681
Classification Level
Release
P60D144
1.0p
(Printed copy not controlled: verify the
version before using)
Public
Pages
64
SF.CSM
SF.Secure_Messaging
SF.Management
SF.Integrity
SF.Crypto
SF.Authentication
Requirements
FMT_MSA.4/KeyImport
X
FMT_MSA.4/KeyGen
X
FMT_MTD.1/Admin
X
FMT_MTD.1/Signatory
X
FMT_SMF.1
X
FMT_SMR.1
X
FPT_EMS.1
X
FPT_FLS.1
X
FPT_PHP.1
X
FPT_PHP.3
X
FPT_TST.1
X
FTP_ITC.1/SCD Import
X
FTP_ITC.1/SVD
X
FTP_ITC.1/VAD
X
FTP_ITC.1/DTBS
X
Table 17: Rationale table of functional requirements and security functions
ST
Applicable on: June 2015
Content of this document shall not be modified or partially reused without prior written consent of Gemalto
Page : 64 / 64
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