Security Target: 0643b_pdf

Security Target: 0643b_pdf
Security Target Lite
for the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport, version 1.2.0
a Product of
Sagem Identification bv
Certification ID: BSI-DSZ-CC-0643
Version:
1.0.0
Date:
2010-10-27
Sagem Identification bv
Security Target Lite for the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport 1.2.0
2010-10-27
Document Revision History
Version
Date
1.0.0
2010-10-27
Author
Description
Sagem Identification
Public Release
 Copyright Sagem Identification, 2010. All rights reserved
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Table of Contents
1 ST Introduction
1.1 ST Reference
1.2 TOE Reference
1.3 TOE Overview
1.4 TOE Description
1.4.1 TOE usage and security features for operational use
1.4.2 TOE life cycle
5
5
5
6
9
10
11
2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
2.2 PP Claim / Package Claim
14
14
14
3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Assets
3.1.2 Subjects
3.2 Assumptions
3.3 Threats
3.3.1 Threats to be averted by the TOE and its environment
3.3.2 Threats to be averted by the TOE independently
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
15
15
15
16
18
20
20
22
23
4 Security Objectives
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
4.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
25
25
28
28
5 Extended Components Definition
5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
5.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API
5.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
5.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
32
32
33
34
35
37
6 Security Requirements
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
6.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
6.1.6 Protection of the Security Functions
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
39
41
41
41
47
53
57
63
65
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7 TOE Summary Specification
68
8 Annex
8.1 Glossary
8.2 Abbreviations
8.3 References
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74
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1 ST Introduction
The aim of this document is to describe the Security Target for the Machine Readable
Travel Document (MRTD) chip with the ICAO application and Extended Access Control
on the NXP JCOP operating system.
The Security Target (ST) defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses the
advanced security methods Basic Access Control, Extended Access Control, Chip Authentication, and Active Authentication.
1.1 ST Reference
Title:
Security Target Lite for the Sagem Identification EAC
ePassport 1.2.0
Version Number:
1.0.0
Document Reference:
8158-8101-107 Sagem Identification EAC ePassport
1.2.0 - ST-Lite v1.0.0.doc
CC version:
3.1
Provided by:
Sagem Identification bv
Evaluation assurance level:
EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
1.2 TOE Reference
TOE Name:
Sagem Identification EAC ePassport
TOE Version:
1.2.0
Developer:
Sagem Identification bv
TOE identification:
Sagem Identification EAC ePassport 1.2.0
Certification ID:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0643
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1.3 TOE Overview
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
(LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control according to the ICAO document [9303], Active Authentication according to the ICAO document [9303], and the Extended Access Control (Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication) according to the technical report
[TG_EAC].
The TOE [Sagem Identification EAC ePassport] comprises of
•
The NXP J3A080 Revision 2 Secure Smartcard Controller (also named JCOP
v2.4.1), comprising of
o
the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the NXP P5CD080V0B integrated circuit, IC)
with hardware for the contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors;
o
the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software;
o
the IC Embedded Software (operating system): JCOP v2.4.1;
•
the MRTD application: Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet version 1.2.0;
•
the associated guidance documentation.
For this TOE, only one application will be present on the IC, namely the MRTD Application.
The TOE utilises the evaluation of the underlying platform, which includes the NXP chip, the
IC Dedicated Software, and the JCOP v2.4.1 (certification BSI-DSZ-CC-0597-2010).
The hardware platform NXP P5CD080V0B is certified by BSI (BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007) and
the crypto libraries in the hardware are certified by BSI (BSI-DSZ-CC-0417-2008).
State or organisation issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel. The
traveller presents its MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD
in the context of this security target contains:
i.
visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder,
ii.
a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR
methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and
iii.
data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to the LDS for contactless machine
reading.
The authentication of the traveller is based on:
i.
the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity
as given on the biographical data page and
ii.
biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
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The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s.
The receiving State trusts genuine MRTD of issuing State or Organization.
The security functionality of the TOE respectively the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport
applet will be externally available to the user by APDU commands according to the access
conditions specified by the according policies considering the life cycle state, user role and
security state.
The following overview shows the security features of the composite TOE.
Authentication mechanisms
The different authentication mechanisms are supported by according APDU commands and parameters using the cryptographic functions provided by the platform.
Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. The TOE can optionally demonstrate that the MRTD
data is contained on the intended chip by using an RSA signature described in [9303].
Chip Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. This protocol provides evidence of the MRTD’s chip authenticity and prevents data traces described in [9303].
Extended Access Control uses the secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication
Mechanism to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during
their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system.
Authentication of the Personalization Agent using the according keys written to the TOE by the
Manufacturer during pre-personalization.
Cryptographic functions support
3DES (112 bit keys) for en-/decryption (CBC and ECB) and signature (MAC) generation and verification, all provided by the platform.
SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256 hash algorithm, provided by the platform.
ECDSA signature verification with key lengths 224 and 256 Bit, provided by the platform.
Diffie-Hellman key agreement with EC over GF(p) and cryptographic key sizes from
224 and 256 bit according to [ANSI X9.63], provided by the platform.
RSA digital signature generation for Active Authentication with key sizes of 1280, 1536 and 1792 Bit
according to [ISO 9796-2] and [SHA-1 digest], provided by the platform
Destruction of cryptographic keys: A special javacard.security method of the JCOP platform is
used. The transient keys will be reset by the JCOP platform if a deselect of the DF or a reset occurs
in an authenticated phase of the TOE.
Random number generation according to class K3, SOF-high, of AIS 20 [AIS20], provided by the
platform.
Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass
The JCOP platform protects the TOE against malfunctions that are caused by exposure to operating
conditions that may cause a malfunction. This includes hardware resets and operation outside the
specified norms.
The JCOP platform will provide protection against physical attack and perform self tests.
].
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Security domains are supported by the JavaCard platform used by the TOE underlying platform.
The Sagem Identification EAC Applet uses transient memory where a hardware reset should revert
the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet to an unauthenticated state.
Access control / Storage and protection of logical MRTD data
Security attribute based access control. Access control is enforced by the APDU methods as
specified in the interface defined in the functional specification.
Authenticity and integrity of data are protected by a digital signature created by the document
signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip.
Write-only-once access control is set by the personalization agent and integrity protection by physical means is provided by the platform.
Confidentiality is ensured by the Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Extended Access Control Mechanism.
Keys: The Sagem Identification EAC Applet only stores keys in Java Card specified Key structures,
which are protected by JCOP platform.
Secure Messaging
Secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive established by the
Chip Authentication Mechanism.
Retail MAC is part of every APDU command/response when secure messaging is active for Basic
Access Control. Re-authentication is performed by the mandatory MAC in secure messaging.
Security and life cycle management
Initialization and pre-personalisation functionality is supported by both the JCOP platform and the
Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet .
Personalization and Configuration of the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet is performed
using the commands available in the personalization phase.
Management of TSF-Data can only be done after successful Terminal Authentication.
The test features of the JCOP platform are protected by ways described in JCOP platform.
The JCOP platform protects the TOE against malfunctions that are caused by exposure to operating conditions that may cause a malfunction.
The Document Basic Access Keys, the Chip Authentication Private Key, and the Personalization Agent Keys are protected from disclosure.
The JCOP platform protects the TOE against malfunctions that are caused by exposure to operating conditions that may cause a malfunction.
The INSTALL for INSTALL method of the JCOP platform will be used to store the chip identification
data.
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1.4 TOE Description
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
(LDS), providing the Basic Access Control and Active Authentication according to the ICAO
document [9303], and the Extended Access Control (Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication) according to the technical report [TG_EAC].
The TOE comprises of the following items:
•
the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the contactless interface, e.g. antenna, capacitors,
•
the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software,
•
the IC Embedded Software (operating system): JCOP v2.4.1,
•
the eMRTD application: Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet version 1.2.0,
•
the associated guidance documentation.
A schematic overview of the TOE is shown in Figure 1:
•
The MRTD’s chip circuitry and the IC dedicated software forming the Smart Card Platform (Hardware Platform and Hardware Abstraction Layer);
•
The IC embedded software running on the Smart Card Platform consists of
•
o
Java Card virtual machine, ensuring language-level security;
o
Java Card runtime environment, providing additional security features for Java
card technology enabled devices;
o
Java card API, providing access to card’s resources for the Applet;
o
Global Platform Card Manager, responsible for management of Applets on the
card. For this TOE post issuance loading or deletion of Applets is not allowed;
o
Native Mifare application, for this TOE the Mifare application is disabled
The Applet Layer is the Sagem Identification EAC Applet.
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Figure 1: TOE
1.4.1 TOE usage and security features for operational use
For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD
holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3) the printed portrait.
b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure as specified by ICAO in [9303], Volume 2, Section III, on the contactless
integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4)
or both1
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
1
These additional biometric reference data are optional
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The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and
the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [SSMR]. These
security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by
the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of
the MRTD’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive
biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO document [9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently
of the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD
i.
in integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and
ii.
in confidentiality by the Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Extended Access
Control Mechanism.
This ST addresses the Chip Authentication described in [TG_EAC] and Active Authentication stated in [9303].
1.4.2 TOE life cycle
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases.
1.4.2.1 Phase 1: “Development”
The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components. The IC developer also acts as the developer of the embedded software (operating
system) which is the JCOP v.2.4.1platform.
The software developer uses the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Embedded Software (operating system) and develops the MRTD application and the guidance
documentation associated with this TOE component.
The MRTD application, the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet run time code is
securely sent directly from the software developer (Sagem Identification) to the IC manufacturer (NXP). The applet code will be integrated in the ROM mask code by the IC manufacturer.
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1.4.2.2 Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
Both IC manufacturer and MRTD manufacturer are involved in this life-cycle phase. In a first
step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip Dedicated Software
and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile nonprogrammable
memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to
control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to
the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the MRTD
manufacturer.
The MRTD manufacturer
i.
adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable
memories (for instance EEPROM) if necessary,
ii.
creates the MRTD application,
iii.
equips MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization Data, and
iv.
combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the passport booklet or card.
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides
the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
As final step in the TOE preparation the Personalization Agent Key Set is installed. The
TOE is securely delivered to the Personalization Agent.
1.4.2.3 Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
The personalization of the MRTD includes
i.
the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data,
ii.
the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data),
iii.
the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
iv.
the writing the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and
v.
the writing the TSF Data into the logical MRTD and configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the
creation of
i.
the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
ii.
the digitised portrait (EF.DG2), and
iii.
the document security object.
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The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [9303] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD
holder for operational use.
This Security Target distinguishes between the Personalization Agent as entity known to the
TOE and the Document Signer as entity in the TOE IT environment signing the Document
security object as described in [9303]. This approach allows but does not enforce the separation of these roles.
The Personalization Agent authenticates by two 112 bit Triple-DES keys (MAC and ENC)
that meet [FIPS46].
1.4.2.4 Phase 4 “Operational Use”
The TOE is used as MRTD’s chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the Issuing
State or Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the Issuing State
but they can never be modified.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
This security target claims to be conformant to the Common Criteria version 3.1, which
comprises
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 1, September 2006 [CC-1]
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007 [CC-2]
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, [CC-3]
as follows:
•
•
Part 2 extended with
o FAU_SAS
o FCS_RND
o FIA_API
o FMT_LIM
o FPT_EMSEC
Audit data storage
Generation of random numbers
Authentication proof of identity
Limited capabilities and availability
TOE emanation
Part 3 conformant
The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM), Part 2:
Evaluation Methodology; Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007 [CC-4]
has been taken into account.
2.2 PP Claim / Package Claim
This security target claims conformance to the
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0026, version 1.2 [PP]
This ST is package conformant to EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM and the data groups DG1 to DG16
(with different security needs) and the Document security object EF.SOD according
to LDS [9303]. These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing
elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16
contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Active Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG15) is used by the inspection system for Active Authentication of the chip
(optional). The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) is used by the inspection
system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system
for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD. The EF.CVCA is used for the Terminal Authentication.
Even if all assets could be protected with a high security level (with the EAC mechanisms), some of them called later “standard data”, have to be accessible through a
mechanisms with a lower security level (BAC mechanisms). This is due to interoperability reasons as the [9303] specifies only the BAC mechanisms.
Logical MRTD standard User Data
• Personal Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG16)
• Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15
• Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14
• Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD
• Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate’s CAR value in EF.CVCA
• Common data in EF.COM
Logical MRTD sensitive User Data
• Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
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Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveller to proof his possession of a genuine MRTD.
3.1.2 Subjects
This security target considers the following subjects:
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the
MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the
default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role
Manufacturer.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organisation to personalize
the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities
i.
establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD,
ii.
enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the
encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s)
iii.
writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined
for global, international and national interoperability,
iv.
writing the initial TSF data and
v.
signing the Document Security Object defined in [9303].
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of
the issuing Country or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed in
form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving Country with
respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the
Extended Inspection Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of
the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits
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provided by the issuing States or Organizations in form of the Document Verifier
Certificates.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.
Inspection system
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State
i.
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity
and
ii.
verifying the traveller as MRTD holder..
The Basic Inspection System (BIS)
i.
contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip,
ii.
implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and
iii.
gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information.
The Active Authentication Basic Inspection System (AABIS)2 is a Basic Inspection System which implements additional the Active Authentication Mechanism,
The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additional the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
The Active Authentication General Inspection System (AAGIS)3 is a General Inspection System which implements additional the Active Authentication Mechanism,
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System
i.
implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and
ii.
is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document
Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
The Active Authentication Extended Inspection System (AAEIS)4 is a Extended
Inspection System which implements additional the Active Authentication Mechanism,
The security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
2
added by the ST author
3
added by the ST author
4
added by the ST author
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MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalised the MRTD.
Traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of
the MRTD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying
i.
to identify and to trace the movement the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without
knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD),
ii.
to read or to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or
iii.
to forge a genuine MRTD.
3.2 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
A.Pers_Agent
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of
i.
the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder,
ii.
the Document Basic Access Keys,
iii.
the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip,
iv.
the Active Authentication Public Key (EF.DG15) if stored on the MRTD’s
chip, and
v.
the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip).
The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization
Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the
TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State
i.
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and
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verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability
i.
includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public
Key of each issuing State or Organization, and
ii.
implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [9303].
The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD being under Basic Access
Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD. The
General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements
the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Active Authentication Inspection Systems
(AABIS, AAGIS, and AAEIS) must be able to verify that the Active Authentication
private key (stored on the MRTD IC) matches the Active Authentication public key
contained in the logical MRTD using a challenge response mechanism in the TOE,
[9303], Volume 2, Section IV, par. 7.2.2.
The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during
inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection System
i.
supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and
ii.
is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document
Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
A.Signature_PKI
PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the
logical MRTD. The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA)
which
i.
securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair, and
ii.
manages the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pairs.
The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and distributes the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The
Document Signer
i.
generates the Document Signer Key Pair,
ii.
hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification,
iii.
keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and
iv.
uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document
Security Objects of the MRTDs.
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The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public
Keys and distributes them to the receiving States and organizations.
A.Auth_PKI
PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for card verifiable certificates of the extended access control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the
access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing
States or Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the
Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems
of the receiving States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organizations distributes the public key of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD’s
chip.
3.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
3.3.1 Threats to be averted by the TOE and its environment
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Chip_ID
Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the
MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening a communication through the contactless
communication interface. The attacker cannot read optically and does not know in
advance the physical MRTD.
T.Skimming
Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
the contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker cannot read and
does not know in advance the physical MRTD.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
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Read the sensitive biometric reference data
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An attacker with high attack potential knowing the Document Basic Access Keys is
trying to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the MRTD’s chip.
The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threats T.Skimming in respect of
the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on
the MRTD’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack
methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the
MRTD’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visual readable on the physical MRTD as well.
T.Forgery
Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security related data in order to impose on an inspection system by
means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may
alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the
printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveller. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual
inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication
mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data
to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system.
The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new
forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker write the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference data of finger read from the logical MRTD of a traveller into an other MRTD’s
chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this
MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD in another contactless chip.
T.Counterfeit
MRTD’s chip
An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveller by
possession of a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data
from a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate
this genuine MRTD’s chip.
The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.
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3.3.2 Threats to be averted by the TOE independently
The TOE independently shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func
Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in order
i.
to manipulate User Data,
ii.
to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or
functions of the TOE or
iii.
to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
T.Information_Leakage
Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in
the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This
leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from
measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by
contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related
to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper
Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order
i.
to disclose TSF Data, or
ii.
to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to
i.
modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip,
ii.
modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software,
iii.
to modify User Data or
iv.
to modify TSF data.
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The physical tampering may be focused directly on the discloser or manipulation of
TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF
Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the
TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used.
Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be
identified. Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and
TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
T.Malfunction
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to
i.
deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or
ii.
circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information
about the functional operation.
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply to the following organisation security policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations (see
CC part 1 [CC-1], sec. 3.2).
P.Manufact
Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the security of
the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC
uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization
tion only
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Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organiza-
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The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical
data, the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and
other data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization
of the MRTD for the holder is performed by authorized agents of the issuing State or
Organization only.
P.Personal_Data
Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the
MRTD’s chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitised portrait (EF.DG2), the
biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris
image(s) (EF.DG4) and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16)
stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data
groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder i.e. if the
MRTD is presented to an inspection system. Additional to the Basic Access Control
Authentication defined by ICAO in [9303] the MRTD’s chip shall protect the confidentiality and integrity of the personal data during transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip authentication.
P.Sensitive_Data
Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are
sensitive private personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the inspection system. The issuing State
or Organization authorizes the Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage
the authorization of inspection systems within the limits defined by the Document
Verifier Certificate.
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4 Security Objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for
the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into
security objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives
for the operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be met by
the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers
Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the
Document security object according to LDS [9303] and the TSF data can be written
by authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during personalization and cannot
be changed afterwards.
OT.Data_Int
Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip
against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the
integrity of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection
System after Chip Authentication.
OT.Data_Conf
Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and
EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 and the Document Security Object of the logical MRTD by
granting read access to terminals successfully authenticated by as
i.
Personalization Agent or
ii.
Basic Inspection System or
iii.
Extended Inspection System.
The TOE implements the Basic Access Control as defined by [9303] and enforce
Basic Inspection System to authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control
based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the
confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
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OT.Sens_Data_Conf
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Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data
(EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized inspection systems. The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate
chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their
transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive
biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Identification
Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification Data in its non-volatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during
Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. In Phase 4
“Operational Use”, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated
Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
Proof of MRTD’S chip authenticity
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems (and optionally support the
Active Authentication Inspection Systems5) to verify the identity and authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means
of the Chip Authentication as defined in [TG_EAC] or Active Authentication as defined in [9303]5. The authenticity prove provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected
against attacks with high attack potential.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip
independent of the TOE environment.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE delivery can be abused in order
5
i.
to disclose critical User Data,
ii.
to manipulate critical User Data of the Smartcard Embedded Software,
iii.
to manipulate Soft-coded Smartcard Embedded Software or
This part of the objective is added to the PP to cover active authentication.
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iv.
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bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the
TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of
the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored
and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
•
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the
time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic
field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
•
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
•
by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data,
the TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection
against attacks with high attack potential by means of
•
measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the
chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
•
measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC
failure analysis)
•
manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
•
controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
•
reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not
been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may
include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts),
clock frequency, or temperature.
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4.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing
Environment
OD.Assurance
facturing Environment
Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manu-
The developer and manufacturer ensure that the TOE is designed and fabricated
such that it requires a combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time
to be able to derive detailed design information or other information which could be
used to compromise security through attack. This includes the use of the Initialization Data for unique identification of the TOE and the pre-personalization of the TOE
including the writing of the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s). The developer provides necessary evaluation evidence that the TOE fulfils its security objectives and is resistant against obvious penetration attacks with high attack potential.
OD.Material
Control over MRTD Material
The IC Manufacturer, the MRTD Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent must
control all materials, equipment and information to produce, to initialise, to prepersonalize genuine MRTD materials and to personalize authentic MRTD in order to
prevent counterfeit of MRTD using MRTD materials.
4.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Personalization
Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organisation
i.
establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographic data for the
MRTD,
ii.
enrol the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the
encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and
iii.
personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and
logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these
data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The Issuing State or Organization must
i.
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generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing Key Pair,
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ii.
ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing Private Key and sign Document
Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and
iii.
distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing Public Key to receiving States
and organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity.
The Issuing State or organization must
i.
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signing Key Pair and ensure the
secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys,
ii.
sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational
environment only and
iii.
distribute the Certificate of the Document Signing Public Key to receiving
States and organizations.
The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data
in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [9303].
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
MRTD Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to
i.
generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair and optionally the
MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair,
ii.
store the Chip Authentication Private Key, and store the Chip Authentication
Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14,
iii.
store the Active Authentication Private Key, and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 (if
generated), and
iv.
support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the
Chip and Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
ence Data
Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Refer-
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s
holders to authorized receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization generates card verifiable
Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
Receiving State or organization
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The Receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD
Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the Receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by
the traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and
to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for
global interoperability
i.
includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public
Key of each issuing State or Organization, and
ii.
implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [9303].
Additionally General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform
the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s
chip.
An Active Authentication (Basic, General or Extended) Inspection system performs
all the functions of the Basic, General, respectively Extended Inspection System,
and verifies the IC authenticity with an RSA signature generated by the MRTD (if
available).
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the Receiving State uses the inspection system to verify
the traveller as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of
the logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and organizations must
manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signing Public Key
maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
Protection of data of the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will
prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System
authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip for access to the sensitive biometric
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reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.
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5 Extended Components Definition
This ST uses the extended components defined by the PP [PP, 4]. That definition uses
components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components are defined in
[PP_IC], other components are defined in this Security Target.
5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE an sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of
the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN,
because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
1
FAU_SAS.1
Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
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FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS_RND)
of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The
component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys as the component
FCS_CKM.1 is. The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers
which are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
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Component leveling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
1
FCS_RND.1
Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers
meet a defined quality metric.
Management:
FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
5.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API)
of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification
by an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the verification of the
identity of an external entity.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be
verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
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Component leveling:
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management:
FIA_API.1
1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Audit:
There are no actions defined to be auditable .
FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FIA_API.1.1
The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism]
to prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or rule].
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
5.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the
TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class
addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues
of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a
combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific
manner.
Component leveling:
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1
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
2
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its
genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be
achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a
specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM)
of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were
defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the
TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is
appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting
the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities
so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
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FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability
so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
5.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the
TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The
TOE shall prevent attacks against the SCD and other secret data where the attack is based
on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are
evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential
power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements
for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other
component of CC part 2 [CC-2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation
1
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Management:
FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
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Audit:
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FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess
of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment:
list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user
data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to
use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain
access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment:
list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No other components.
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6 Security Requirements
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph 2.1.4 of [CC-2]. Each of these
operations is used in this security target.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement. Refinement of security requirements that add or change words are in bold
text. In cases where words from a CC requirement were deleted, a separate attachment
indicates the words that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating
a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections filled in by
the ST author appear as slanted and underlined text.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors are
denoted by showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a
footnote. Assignments to be filled in by the ST author appear as slanted and underlined
text.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component
identifier.
The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used:
Name
Data
Country Verifying Certifica- The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a private
tion Authority Private Key
key (SKCVCA) used for signing the Document Verifier Certificates.
(SKCVCA)
Country Verifying Certifica- The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public
tion Authority Public Key
Key (PKCVCA) as part of the TSF data to verify the Document Verifier
(PKCVCA)
Certificates. The PKCVCA has the security attribute Current Date as
the most recent valid effective date of the Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate or of a domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
Country Verifying Certifica- The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be a
tion Authority Certificate
self-signed certificate or a link certificate (cf. [TG_EAC] and Glos(CCVCA)
sary). It contains (i) the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as authentication reference data, (ii) the coded access control rights of the Country Verifying Certification Authority,
(iii) the Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date
as security attributes.
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Name
Data
Document Verifier Certificate (CDV)
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i) the Document Verifier
Public Key (PKDV) as authentication reference data (ii) identification
as domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the coded access control
rights of the Document Verifier, the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security
Inspection System Certificate (CIS)
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the Document
Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference data the Inspection System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded access control rights of
the Extended Inspection System, the Certificate Effective Date and
the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Chip Authentication Public
Key Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used for
Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to RFC
2631 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO 15946.
Chip Authentication Public
Key (PKICC)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the EF.DG14
Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical MRTD and used
by the inspection system for Chip Authentication of the MRTD’s chip.
It is part of the user data provided by the TOE for the IT environment.
Chip Authentication Private The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE to
Key (SKICC)
authenticate itself as authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF
data.
Country Signing Certifica- Country Signing Certification Authority of the Issuing State or Ortion Authority Key Pair
ganization signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate with the
Country Signing Certification Authority Private Key and the signature
will be verified by Receiving State or Organization (e.g. a Basic Inspection System) with the Country Signing Certification Authority
Public Key.
Active Authentication Public Key
The optional Active Authentication Public Key is stored in the
EF.DG15 Active Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical
MRTD and used by the inspection system for Active Authentication
of the MRTD’s chip. It is part of the user data provided by the TOE
for the IT environment.
Active Authentication Private Key ()
The optional Active Authentication Private Key is used by the TOE to
authenticate itself as authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF
data.
Document Signer Key
Pairs
Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization signs the
Document Security Object of the logical MRTD with the Document
Signer Private Key and the signature will be verified by a Basic Inspection Systems of the Receiving State or organization with the
Document Signer Public Key.
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Name
Data
Document Basic Access
Keys
The Document Basic Access Key is created by the Personalization
Agent, loaded to the TOE, and used for mutual authentication and
key agreement for secure messaging between the Basic Inspection
System and the MRTD’s chip.
BAC Session Keys
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between the TOE and a BIS in result of the Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol.
Chip Session Key
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between the TOE and a GIS in result of the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Table 1: Keys and Certificates
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following the main security functionality.
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
For the extended components definition refer to [PP] chapter 4.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
FAU_SAS.1.1
Dependencies:
No other components.
The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer6 with the capability to
store the IC Identification Data7 in the audit records.
No dependencies.
6.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryp-
6
[assignment: authorized users]
7
[assignment: list of audit information]
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tographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by
the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Key Derivation Function by the MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
KDF_MRTD
Dependencies:
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic
Access Key Derivation Algorithm8 and specified cryptographic key
sizes 112 bit9 that meet the following: [9303], Volume 2, Section
IV, Appendix 510.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Application note: The TOE uses this key derivation function as well to derive other
session keys from shared secrets established by the Chip Authentication Protocol for
the secure messaging required by FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/
MAC_MRTD. The algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC generated by TSF as
required by FCS_RND.1/MRTD.
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by
the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
DH_MRTD
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH Key
Agreement Algorithm over GF(p) and 3DES11 specified cryptographic key sizes of 224 or 256 bits, respectively 112 bits12 that
meet the following: [TG_EAC, Annex A.1]13
8
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
9
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
10
[assignment: list of standards]
11
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
12
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
13
[assignment: list of standards]
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Dependencies:
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[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Application note14: The TOE generates a shared secret value with the terminal secret value during the Chip Authentication Protocol (see TG_EAC] sec. 3.1 and Annex
A.1, [ECCTR]) based on the ECDH protocol compliant to [BSI], Annex A.1. This protocol is based on the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol ECDH compliant to ISO 15946 (i.e. an
elliptic curve cryptography algorithm) (cf. [TG_EAC], Annex A.1, [TG_ECC] and
[ISO15946-3] for details). The shared secret value is used to derive the 112 bit TripleDES key for encryption and the 112 bit Retail-MAC Chip Session Keys according to
the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm [9303], Volume 2, Appendix 5
to Section IV, par. A5.1, for the TSF as required by FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method physically overwriting the
keys15 that meets the following: none16.
14
Adapted to TOE
15
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
16
[assignment: list of standards]
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Dependencies:
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[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
6.1.2.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by
MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
The TSF shall perform hashing17 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224 or SHA-25618 and
cryptographic key sizes none19 that meet the following: FIPS
180-220.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_MRTD
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Application note: The TOE implements the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic
primitive to derive the keys for secure messaging from the shared secrets of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism. The Chip Authentication Protocol may use SHA-1.
The TOE implements the additional hash functions SHA-224 and SHA-256 for the Terminal
Authentication Protocol (cf. [TG_EAC], Annex A.2.2 for details).
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption
Triple DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
17
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
18
[assignment: cryptographic algforithm]
19
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
20
[assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1.1/
TDES_MRTD
Dependencies:
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The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption21 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm TripleDES in CBC mode22 and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit23 that meet
the following: FIPS 46-3 [FIPS46] and [9303], Volume 2, Appendix 5 to
Section IV24.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC_MRTD
Dependencies:
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication
code25 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC26 and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit27 that meet the following:
ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message
Counter, padding mode 2)28.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
21
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
22
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
23
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
24
[assignment: list of standards]
25
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
26
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
27
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
28
[assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_VER
Dependencies:
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The TSF shall perform digital signature verification 29 in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA30 and cryptographic
key sizes 224bit and 256bit31 that meet the following: [ISO15946-2]32
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic operation – RSA Signature
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
RSA
Dependencies:
The TSF shall perform digital signature generation33 in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA34 and cryptographic key
sizes 1280, 1536 and 1792 Bit35 that meet the following: [ISO 9796-2]
and [SHA-1 digest]36
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
6.1.2.2 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
29
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
30
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
31
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
32
[assignment: list of standards]
33
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
34
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
35
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
36
[assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1/
MRTD
Dependencies:
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet class K3, of [AIS 20]37
No dependencies.
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Application note: The following table provides an overview on the authentication
mechanisms used.
Name
SFR for the TOE
SFR for the
TOE environment
(terminal)
Algorithms and key sizes
according to [AIII], Annex E, and [TG_ECC]
Symmetric Au- FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
thentication
Mechanism for
Personalization
Agents
FIA_API.1/PT
Triple-DES with 112 bit
keys
Basic Access
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
Control Authen- FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
tication Mechanism
FIA_UAU.4/BT,
FIA_UAU.6/BT
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys
and
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys
Chip Authentication Protocol
FIA_API.1/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_UAU.4/GIS,
FIA_UAU.5/GIS,
FIA_UAU.6/GIS
ECDH and
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys
Terminal Authentication
Protocol
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
FIA_API.1/EIS
EC-DSA with SHA
Table 2: Overview on authentication SFR
37
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
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Note the Chip Authentication Protocol include the asymmetric key agreement and the
check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code
with the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
6.1.3.1 Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall allow
(1) to establish the communication channel,
(2) to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS38
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.3.2 Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
38
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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FIA_UAU.1.1
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The TSF shall allow
(1) to establish the communication channel,
(2) to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
(3) to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key39
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
6.1.3.3 Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/MRTD
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES40.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.3.4 Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
39
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
40
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
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FIA_UAU.5/MRTD Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide
1.
2.
3.
4.
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
Terminal Authentication Protocol,
Secure Messaging in MAC_ENC-mode,
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on TripleDES41
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by one of the following mechanisms
(a) The Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
with the Personalization Agent Keys,
(b) The Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key,
(c) The Terminal Authentication Protocol with Personalization Agent Keys
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access
Keys.
3. After successful authentication as Basic Inspection System
and until the completion of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE accepts only received command with correct
message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with key agreed with the authenticated terminal
by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism.
4. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE
accepts only received commands with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with
key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
5. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of
the Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal
uses secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism42.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
41
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
42
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
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6.1.3.5 Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/MRTD
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
1. Each command sent to TOE after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and until the completion of the Chip Authentication Mechanism shall be verified as being sent by
the authenticated BIS.
2. Each command sent to TOE after successful run of the
Chip Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent
by the GIS43.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.3.6 Authentication Failure Handling (FIA_AFL.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Failure Handling (FIA_AFL.1)” as
specified below.
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_AFL.1.1
43
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable
positive integer within one to 3276744 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to BAC authentication45.
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
44
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of acceptable values]
45
[assignment: list of authentication events]
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FIA_AFL.1.2
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When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall wait an
administrator configurable time before the next authentication attempt can be performed46.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FIA_API.1/CAP Authentication Proof of Identity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API/CAP
The TSF shall provide an Chip Authentication Protocol according to [TG_EAC]47 to prove the identity of the TOE48.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API/AA
46
The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication Protocol according to [9303]49 to prove the identity of the TOE50.
[assignment: list of actions]
47
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
48
[assignment: authorized user or rule]
49
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
50
[assignment: authorized user or rule]
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Dependencies: No dependencies.
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
6.1.4.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP51 on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to the data in the
EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD52.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
6.1.4.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control53
Hierarchical to: No other components.
51
[assignment: access control SFP]
52
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
53
The bold text below has been added to allow the use of active authentication.
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FDP_ACF.1.1
FDP_ACF.1.2
FDP_ACF.1.3
2010-10-27
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP54 to objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a.
Personalization Agent
b.
Basic Inspection System
c.
Extended Inspection System
d.
Terminal
2. Objects:
a.
data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
b.
data in EF.COM
c.
data in EF.SOD
3. Security attributes
a.
authentication status of terminals
b.
Terminal Authorization55.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is
allowed to write data and to read data of the data of the
EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is
allowed to read data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1,
EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
and request active authentication,
3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read data in EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
4. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read data in EF.DG3 according to the
Terminal Authorization,
5. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is allowed to read data in EF.DG4 according to the
Terminal Authorization56.
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following sensitive rules: none57.
FDP_ACF.1.4
54
[assignment: access control SFP]
55
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFP-relevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
56
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled operations on controlled objects]
57
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
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1.
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule: A terminal authenticated as
CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
2.
A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read
data in the EF.DG4,
3.
A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read
data in the EF.DG3,
4.
A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read
data in the EF.DG4,
5. the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD58.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ITC.1.1 Import of user data without security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP59 when importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the
TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the
user data when imported from outside the TSC.
FDP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user
data controlled under the SFP from outside the TSC: none60.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control],
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
58
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
59
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
60
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
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FDP_UCT.1.1/MRTD The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP61 to be able to
transmit and receive62 user data in a manner protected from
unauthorized disclosure after Chip Authentication.
Dependencies:
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP63 to be able to
transmit and receive64 user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay65 errors after Chip
Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2/MRTD
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay66 has occurred after Chip Authentication.
61
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
62
[selection: transmit, receive]
63
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
64
[selection: transmit, receive]
65
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
66
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
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Dependencies:
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[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1.
Initialization,
2.
Personalization
3.
Configuration67.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Country Verifier Certification Authority,
4. Document Verifier,
5. Basic Inspection System,
6. domestic Extended Inspection System
7. foreign Extended Inspection System68.
67
[assignment: list of security management functions to be provided by the TSF]
68
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FMT_SMR.1.2
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The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below. For the extended components definition refer to [PP] chapter 4.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks69.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified
below. For the extended components definition refer to [PP] chapter 4.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
FMT_LIM.2.1
No other components.
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks70.
69
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
70
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
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Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data
and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write71 the Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data72 to the Manufacturer73.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for
users to74 the Initialization Data75 to the Personalization
Agent76.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
71
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
72
[assignment: list of TSF data]
73
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
74
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
75
[assignment: list of TSF data]
76
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA Certificate and Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_INI
Dependencies:
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date77
to the Personalization Agent78.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifier Certification Authority
Hierarchical to: No other components.
The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_UPD
Dependencies:
1. Country Verifier Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate79
to Country Verifier Certification Authority80.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/Date Management of TSF data – Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ Date
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current Date81to
1. Country Verifier Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier
3. domestic Extended Inspection System82.
77
[assignment: list of TSF data]
78
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
79
[assignment: list of TSF data]
80
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
81
[assignment: list of TSF data]
82
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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Dependencies:
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FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write83
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE
Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write84 the Document
Basic Access Keys and the Active Authentication
Keys85 to the Personalization Agent86.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK
Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load87 the Chip Authentication Private Key to the Personalization Agent88.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read89
Hierarchical to: No other components.
83
The bold text below has been added to allow the use of active authentication.
84
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
85
[assignment: list of TSF data]
86
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
87
[selection: create, load]
88
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
89
The bold text below has been added to allow the use of active authentication.
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FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ
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The TSF shall restrict the ability to read90 the
1.
Document Basic Access Keys,
2.
Chip Authentication Private Key,
3.
Active Authentication Private Key,
4. Personalization Agent Keys91
to none92.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.3.1
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate
chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and the Access Control.
Dependencies:
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Refinement: The certificate chain is valid at the Current Date if and only if
(1) the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current
Date of the TOE,
(2) the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
(3) the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of
the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before
the Current Date of the TOE.
90
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
91
[assignment: list of TSF data]
92
[assignment: the authorized identified roles]
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The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization
of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.
6.1.6 Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information flow for User Data and
TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent
leakage. With respect to forced leakage they have to be considered in combination
with the security functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to
physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFR “Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack
(FPT_PHP.3)” prevent deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified
below. For the extended components definition refer to [PP] chapter 4.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation93
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
93
The TOE shall not emit variations in power consumption or timing during command execution94 in excess of non-useful information95 enabling access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key, Active Authentication Private Key, and Chip Authentication Private Keys 96 and none97
The bold text below has been added to allow the use of active authentication.
94
[assignment: types of emissions]
95
[assignment: specified limits]
96
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
97
[assignment: list of types of user data]
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The TSF shall ensure any users98 are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit contacts99 to gain access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key, Active Authentication
Private Key, and Chip Authentication Private Keys100 and
none101.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
Dependencies: No other components.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following
types of failures occur:
(1) exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur,
(2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1102.
Dependencies: ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FPT_TST.1.1
98
[assignment: type of users]
99
[assignment: type of connection]
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up103
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
100
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
101
[assignment: list of types of user data]
102
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
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FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to
verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FPT_PHP.3.1
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing104 to the TSF105 by responding automatically such that the
SFRs are always enforced.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
The following security functional requirements protect the TSF against bypassing and
support the separation of TOE parts.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The security assurance requirements (SAR) for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4
(EAL4) augmented by the following components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The following table lists all SARs for the evaluation of the TOE:
Assurance class
Assurance component
Development
ADV_ARC.1
Denotation
Security architecture description
103
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, at
the conditions ]
104
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
105
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
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Assurance class
Assurance component
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Denotation
ADV_COMP.1
Design compliance with
the platform certification
report, guidance and
ETR_COMP
ADV_FSP.4
Complete functional specification
ADV_IMP.1
Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_TDS.3
Basic modular design
AGD_OPE.1
Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1
Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMS.4
Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_COMP.1
Integration of the application into the underlying
platform and Consistency
check for delivery and
acceptance procedures
ALC_DEL.1
Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.2
Sufficiency of security
measures
ALC_LCD.1
Developer defined lifecycle model
ALC_TAT.1
Tools and techniques –
Well-defined development
tools
Guidance documents
Life-cycle support
Security Target evaluation ASE_CCL.1
ASE_COMP.1
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Conformance claims
Consistency of Security
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Assurance class
Tests
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Assurance component
Denotation
ASE_ ECD.1
Extended components
definition
ASE_INT.1
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.2
PP claims
ASE_REQ.2
IT security requirements
ASE_SPD.1
Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1
TOE summary specification
ATE_COMP.1
Composite product functional testing
ATE_COV.2
Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1
Depth – Testing:high-leve
design
ATE_FUN.1
Functional testing
ATE_IND.2
Independent testing –
sample
AVA_COMP.1
Composite product vulnerability assessment
AVA_VAN.5
Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Vulnerability assessment
Table 1: Security Assurance Requirements
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the
MRTD’s material.
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides the assurance that the TOE is shown
to be highly resistant to penetration attacks to meet the security objectives
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper and OT.Prot_Malfunction.
The Assurance Requirements for the selected level EAL 4 augmented are described in the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation documents. They are not listed in detail here.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
As described in the TOE description (see chapt. 1.4) the TOE provides security features
which can be associated into following groups:
•
Identification and Authentication mechanisms
•
Cryptographic functions support
•
Access control /Storage and protection of logical MRTD data
•
Secure messaging
•
Security and Life-cycle management
Moreover the TOE will protect itself against interference, logical tampering and bypass.
The security functionality of the TOE respectively the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport
applet will be externally available to the user by APDU commands according to the access
conditions specified by the according policies considering the life cycle state, user role and
security state.
The following overview shows how these features satisfy the security functional requirements specified in chapt. 6.1.
SF.I&A Identification and Authentication
include the mechanisms for
•
Basic Access Control Authentication mechanism
•
Chip Authentication
•
Terminal Authentication Protocol
•
Authentication of the Personalization Agent with the personalization key set
Authentication mechanisms
The different authentication mechanisms are supported by according APDU commands and parameters using the cryptographic functions provided by the platform. The authentication mechanisms are
enforced by protocols and APDU methods as specified in the functional specification.
1. Symmetric Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism used by the Basic Inspection System
knowing the Document Basic Access Keys (printed on the passport)
• FIA_UID.1 Timing of Identification
• FIA_UAU.1 Timing of Authentication
• FIA_AFL.1 Authentication Failure Handling
• FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
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• FIA_UAU.5/MRTD Multiple authentication mechanisms
• FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
• FMT_SMR.1 Seurity Roles
2. Chip Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. This protocol provides evidence of the MRTD’s chip authenticity and prevents data traces described in [9303], Volume 2, Appendix 7 to Section IV, par.
A7.3.3. It is used by a General Inspection System, an enhanced Basic Inspection System.
The implementation of Chip authentication contributes to
• FIA_API.1/CAP Authentication Proof of Identity – MRTD
• FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
• FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
3. Terminal Authentication for Extended Access Control uses the secure messaging established by
the Chip Authentication Mechanism to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Domestic and
foreign Extended Inspection Systems have the certificates (provided by the Country Verifier Certification Authority and Document Verifier) to use Terminal Authentication.
• FIA_UAU.5/MRTD Multiple authentication mechanisms
• FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
• FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
4. Symmetric Authentication of the Personalization Agent using the according keys written to the TOE
by the Manufacturer during pre-personalization.
• FIA_UAU.5/MRTD Multiple authentication mechanisms
• FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
• FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
5. Active Authentication of the the MRTD’s chip. This protocol provides evidence of the MRTD’s chip
authenticity as described in [9303]. It is used by a Active Authentication System, an enhanced Basic,
Generic or Extended Inspection System.
• FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity – MRTD
• FMT_SMR.1 Security Roles
SF.CF Cryptographic functions support
Following functionality is provided, mostly by the platform:
1. 3DES (112 bit keys) for en-/decryption (CBC and ECB) and signature (MAC) generation and verification, all provided by the platform.
• FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES
• FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
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2. SHA-1, SHA-224, and SHA-256 hash algorithm, provided by the platform.
• FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD and
according the application in paragraph 6.1.2.1 in this ST:
• The TOE implements the hash function SHA-1 for the cryptographic primitive to derive the
keys for secure messaging from the shared secrets of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (cf. [9303], Volume 2, Appendix 5 to Section IV. par. A5.1).
• The Chip Authentication Protocol uses SHA-1 (cf. [TG_EAC], Annex A.1.1).
• The TOE implements additional hash functions SHA-224, and SHA-256 for the Terminal Authentication Protocol (cf. [TG_EAC], Annex A.2.2 for details).
3. ECDSA digital signature verification according to [ISO 15946-2] with key lengths 224 and 256 bits,
provided by the platform
• FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
4. Diffie-Hellman key agreement with EC over GF(p) and cryptographic key sizes from
224 and 256 bit according to [ANSI X9.63], provided by the platform
• FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the TOE
5. Destruction of cryptographic keys:
A special javacard.security method of the JCOP platform is used.
The transient keys will be reset by the JCOP platform if a deselect of the DF or a reset occurs in an
authenticated phase of the TOE
• FCS_CKM.4/MRTD Cryptographic key destruction – MRTD
The TOE will destroy the BAC Session Keys
(i) after detection of an error in a received command by verification of the MAC and
(ii) after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol.
The TOE will destroy the Chip Authentication Session Keys after detection of an error in a
received command by verification of the MAC.
The TOE will clear the memory area of any session keys before starting the communication
with the terminal in a new power-on-session.
6. Cryptographic key generation according to the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm
and a key size of 112.
• FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Key Derivation Function by the
MRTD
7. RSA digital signature generation for Active Authentication with key sizes of 1280, 1536 and 1792
Bit according to [ISO 9796-2] and [SHA-1 digest], provided by the platform
• FCS_COP.1/RSA Cryptographic operation – RSA Signature
8. Random number generation according to class K3, of AIS 20 [AIS20], provided by the platform
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• FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
SF.ILTB Protection against interference, logical tampering and bypass
1. Security domains are supported by the JavaCard platform used by the TOE underlying platform
JCOP v. 2.4.1. The JCOP platform provides protection against physical attack and performs self tests
as described in [JCOP_ST].
The JCOP platform protects the TOE against malfunctions that are caused by exposure to operating
conditions that may cause a malfunction. This includes hardware resets and operation outside the
specified norms.
The Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet uses transient memory where a hardware reset
should revert the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet to an unauthenticated state.
• FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
• FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
• FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
SF.AC Access control / Storage and protection of logical MRTD data
Following functionality is provided including access control to MRTD data:
1. The TOE implements the subjects, objects, security attributes and rules according to the security
attribute based access control. Access control is enforced by the APDU methods as specified in the
interface defined in the functional specification.
This functionality contributes to
• FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
• FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
• FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity – MRTD
• FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
SF.SM Secure Messaging
Following functionality is provided, mostly by the platform:
1. Secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive established by the
Chip Authentication Mechanism. This functionality is based on SF.CF.
The functionality contributes to
• FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
• FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
• FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
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2. The Retail MAC is part of every APDU command/response when secure messaging is active for
Basic Access Control. Re-authentication is performed by the mandatory MAC in secure messaging.
• FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
SF.LCM Security and life cycle management
Following functionality is provided:
Management of phases and roles
1. The manufacturing phase is split up by the TOE into initialization and pre-personalization subphases. The initialization and pre-personalisation functionality is supported by both the JCOP platform
and the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet.
Initialization and pre-personalization are part of the JCOP platform TOE preparation and will be performed according to the JCOP Administrator and User Guidance. Additional pre-personalisation steps
are performed according to ALC_LCD of the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport.
•
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (Initialization part)
•
FMT_SMR.1.1 Security roles (Manufacturer)
•
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
•
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
2. Personalization and Configuration of the Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet is performed
using the commands available in the personalization phase. Writing of Initialization data of the JCOP
platform is restricted to the Manufacturer by the Transport Key and the Pre-Personalization Key Set.
Special APDU commands are used to write the initial Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate’s CAR, the Document Number, the initial Current Date, Active Authentication keys, Chip authentication keys and BAC keys to the TOE. These commands are only available for Authenticated Personalization Agent in the Personalization Phase.
•
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (Personalization and Configuration part)
•
FMT_SMR.1.1 Security roles (Personalization Agent)
•
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA Certificate
and Current Date
•
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
•
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
•
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes
3. Management of TSF-Data can only be done after successful Terminal Authentication. Updating the
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Country Verifier Certification Authority Public Key and Certificate is restricted to the Country Verifier
Certification Authority. Modifying the Current Date is restricted to the Country Verifier Certification
Authority, the Document Verifier and the domestic Extended Inspection System.
•
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions (Configuration part)
•
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles (Personalization Agent)
•
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifier Certification
Authority
•
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Current date
4. The test features of the JCOP platform are protected by ways described in JCOP platform.
The Sagem Identification EAC ePassport Applet will not have any test features implemented.
The security management support functionality contributes to
•
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
•
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
6. The Document Basic Access Keys, the Chip Authentication Private Key, the Active Authentication
Private Key, and the Personalization Agent Keys are protected from disclosure. The Sagem Identification EAC Applet only stores keys in Java Card specified Key structures, which are protected by
JCOP platform.
•
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
•
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
7. Functionality provided by the JCOP platform will be used to store the chip identification data.
•
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8 Annex
8.1 Glossary
Term
Definition
Active Authentication Security mechanism defined in [9303]. Option by which means the MTRD’s
chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of
the MTRD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of organization.
Application note
Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting information
that is considered relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of
the TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic Access Control
Security mechanism defined in [9303] by which means the MTRD’s chip
proves and the inspection system protect their communication by means of
secure messaging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip using
the Document Basic Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading
the logical MRTD.
Biographical data
(biodata).
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as text in
the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a
passport book or on a travel card or visa. [0]
biometric reference
data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Counterfeit
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made
by whatever means. [0]
Country Signing CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key (KPuCSCA) issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Document Basic Access Keys
Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption
(key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [9303]. It is drawn from the
printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the
printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security
Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the
MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [9303]
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Definition
Eavesdropper
A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD’s
chip.
Enrolment
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing
that person's identity. [9303]
Extended Access
Control
Security mechanism identified in [9303] by which means the MTRD’s chip (i)
verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read the
optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the
optional biometric reference data during their transmission to the inspection
system by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same
mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and
TSF data.
Extended Inspection A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to read
System (EIS)
the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of the
Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the
biographical data or the portrait.
Global Interoperabil- The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different
States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
ity
systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their
respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable
data in all MRTDs. [9303]
IC Dedicated Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test
the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
Impostor
A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name
and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s document.
Improperly documented person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document or
visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or
visa, if required. [9303]
Initialisation Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for
instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC
identification data).
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Definition
Inspection
The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveller (the
MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [9303]
Inspection system
(IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity
and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit (IC) Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is a integrated circuit.
Integrity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have
not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [9303]]
Issuing State
The Country issuing the MRTD. [9303]
Logical Data Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology [9303]. The capacity expansion technology used is the
MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD
Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [9303]
as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Logical travel document
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
personal data of the MRTD holder
the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, DG1),
the digitized portraits (DG2),
the biometric reference data of finger(s) (DG3) or iris image(s) (DG4) or
both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (DG5 to DG16).
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in
the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity)
and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate
mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine read. [9303]
Machine readable
visa (MRV):
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein, formulated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder. Contains
mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of being machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is
attached to a visa page in a passport. [9303]
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page
or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and
optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [9303]
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Definition
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint
or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read
and verified by machine. [0]
MRTD application
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the
IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
the file structure implementing the LDS [9303] ,
the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself
(i.e. content of DG1 to DG13 and DG 16) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except the
authentication data itself.
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the
MRTD Basic Access
inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key
Control
seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
-
MRTD holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip
A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO,
[9303].
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and
embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (DG4)
or (iii) both. Note that the European commission decided to use only finger
print and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and (ii)
comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values
contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization
The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied
to the document.
Personalization
Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organisation to personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder for the
biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded
iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for
the holder.
Personalization
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization
Agent Authentication Agent.
Information
Personalization
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to prove
Agent Authentication their identity and get access to the logical MRTD according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4/BT FIA_UAU.6/BT and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT and (ii) by the MRTD’s
Key
chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent
according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and
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Definition
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
Physical travel
document
Pre-personalization
Data
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to
present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the MRTD
Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or to
secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is
not limited to) the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Receiving State
The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [9303]
reference data
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication
attempt.
secondary image
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document
by whatever means. [0]
secure messaging in Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
encrypted mode
Skimming
Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
the contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the
printed MRZ data.
Terminal Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations of the Inspection System
Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifier Certification
Authority which shall be valid for the Current Date.
Travel document
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel. [9303]
Traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the TOE
(CC part 1).
Unpersonalized
MRTD
MRTD material prepared to produce an personalized MRTD containing an
initialised and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
User data
Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of the TSF
(CC part 1).
Verification
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrolee whose identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrolee’s template. [9303]
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Definition
Verification data
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to
the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
The country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It enforces the Privacy policy of
the issuing Country or Organization in respect to the protection of sensitive
biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. It is
Document Verifier
Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates and managing the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data
of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations
General Inspection
System
A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
Extended Inspection A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip Authentication
Mechanism, (ii) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (iii) is
System
authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier
of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Current date
The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate card verifiable certificates.
Certificate chain
Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest level), Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates (highest level), where the certificate of a lower lever is signed with the
private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher
level. The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate is signed with the
private key corresponding to the public key it contains (self-signed certificate).
8.2 Abbreviations
CC
Common Criteria, see [CC]
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
PP
Protection Profile
ST
Security Target
SEF
Security Enforcing Functions
SOF
Strength Of Function
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functions
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8.3 References
[PP]
Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0026, Version 1.2, 19 November 2007
[CC-1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; Version 3.1, Revision 1, September 2006, CCMB2006-09-001
[CC-2]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB2007-09-002
[CC-3]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Requirements; Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB2007-09-003
[CC-4]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 2, September 2007, CCMB-2007-09004
[9303]
ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1, “Machine Readable Passports”, sixth edition, 2006, and
Part 3, “Machine Readable Official Travel Documents”, third edition, 2008
[SSMR]
Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports,
Fifth Edition – 2003
[PP_IC]
PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July
2001; registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
[FIPS46] Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, Data
Encryption Standard (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S. department of
Commerce/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[ASM]
Technical Report Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Version 0.8 (final), BSI,
[TG_EAC] Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable
Travel Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, TR-03110,
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
[PKCS_3] PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note, Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
[TG_ECC] Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TRECC, BSI 2006.
[ISO15946-1] ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002.
[ISO15946-2] ISO/IEC15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002.
[ISO15946-3] ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
[ISO 9796-2] ISO/IEC 9796-2: 2002, Information Technology — Security Techniques —
Digital Signature Schemes giving message recovery — Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms.
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2010-10-27
[SHA-1 digest] FIPS PUB 180-1, „Secure Hash Standard”, Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication, 17 April 1995.
[ANSI X9.63] ANSI X9.62:2005, “Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)”, 7 January
1999.
[AIII]
ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE
TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine
Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
[JCOP_ST] NXP J3A080 v2.4.1 Secure Smart Card Controller Security Target
[AIS20]
Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) AIS 20, Version 1,
Date: 2 December, 1999, Status: Mandatory, Subject: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for, deterministic random number generators, Publisher: Certification body of the BSI, Section II 2, as part of the certification
scheme
[ETR_COMP] ETR for Composition, V5: NXP J3A080 and J2A080 Secure Smart Card
Controller Revision 2, 21.07.2010, TÜVIT GmbH
Public release
Sagem Identification bv
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