MultiApp V3 eTravel EAC v2.0 EAC on BAC Security Target

MultiApp V3 eTravel EAC v2.0 EAC on BAC Security Target
MultiApp v3: eTravel EAC on BAC Security Target
MultiApp V3 eTravel EAC v2.0 EAC
on BAC
Security Target
UPDATES
Date
Feb 14
ST
Author
Gemalto
Applicable on
Modification
Creating from evaluated ST (V1.0)
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MultiApp v3: eTravel EAC on BAC Security Target
CONTENT
1.
ST INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 4
1.1
ST IDENTIFICATION ................................................................................................................................. 4
1.2
ST OVERVIEW .......................................................................................................................................... 5
1.3
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................................ 6
1.3.1
External References......................................................................................................................... 6
1.3.2
Internal References ......................................................................................................................... 7
1.4
TOE OVERVIEW....................................................................................................................................... 8
1.4.1
TOE definition ................................................................................................................................. 8
1.4.2
TOE boundaries .............................................................................................................................. 8
1.4.3
TOE usage and security features for operational use ................................................................... 10
1.4.4
Toe Life-cycle ................................................................................................................................ 12
1.4.4.1
1.4.4.2
1.4.4.3
1.4.4.4
1.4.4.5
2.
Four phases ................................................................................................................................................ 12
Actors ........................................................................................................................................................ 13
Init on module at Gemalto site ................................................................................................................... 15
Init on module at Founder site ................................................................................................................... 16
Init on inlay at Gemalto site ....................................................................................................................... 17
1.4.5
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE ....................................................... 18
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ..................................................................................................................... 19
2.1
CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM .................................................................................................................... 19
2.2
PP CLAIM, .............................................................................................................................................. 19
2.3
PACKAGE CLAIM .................................................................................................................................... 19
2.4
CONFORMANCE STATEMENT .................................................................................................................. 19
3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION .................................................................................................... 20
3.1
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 20
3.1.1
Assets ............................................................................................................................................. 20
3.1.2
Subjects ......................................................................................................................................... 20
3.2
ASSUMPTIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 21
3.3
THREATS ................................................................................................................................................ 22
3.4
ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES .................................................................................................. 25
3.5
COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS OF [ST-EAC] AND [ST-IC] ................................ 26
3.5.1
Compatibility between threats of [ST-EAC] and [ST-IC] ............................................................. 26
3.5.2
Compatibility between OSP of [ST-EAC] and [ST-IC] ................................................................. 26
3.5.3
Compatibility between assumptions of [ST-EAC] and [ST-IC]..................................................... 26
4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................................ 27
4.1
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE .................................................................................................... 27
4.2
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................................................ 29
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION .......................................................................................... 31
5.1
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS ................................................................................................. 31
5.2
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND................................................................................................. 32
5.3
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API ................................................................................................... 33
5.4
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM................................................................................................. 33
5.5
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMS ................................................................................................. 35
6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................................ 37
6.1
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE ......................................................................... 39
6.1.1
Class FAU Security Audit.............................................................................................................. 39
6.1.2
Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) ............................................................................................. 39
6.1.3
Class FIA Identification and Authentication ................................................................................. 44
6.1.4
Class FDP User Data Protection .................................................................................................. 48
6.1.5
Class FMT Security Management ................................................................................................. 50
6.1.6
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions ........................................................................... 54
6.2
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE .......................................................................... 56
ST
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MultiApp v3: eTravel EAC on BAC Security Target
7.
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ....................................................................................................... 56
7.1
TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS ................................................................................................................... 56
7.1.1
TSFs provided by the MultiApp V3 Software ................................................................................ 56
7.1.2
TSFs provided by the M7820 chip ................................................................................................. 58
8. GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................... 59
FIGURES
Figure 1: TOE Boundaries .................................................................................................................................... 10
Figure 2: LC1: Initialization on module at Gemalto site ....................................................................................... 15
Figure 3: LC2 Init on module at Founder site ....................................................................................................... 16
Figure 4: LC3: Init on inlay at Gemalto site ......................................................................................................... 17
TABLES
Table 1: Card Production Life Cycle Data .............................................................................................................. 5
Table 2: Identification of the actors ...................................................................................................................... 14
Table 4: FCS_CKM.1/CA refinement .................................................................................................................. 40
Table 5: FCS_CKM.1/AA&CA refinement .......................................................................................................... 40
Table 6: FCS_CKM.1/Manuf refinement ............................................................................................................. 41
Table 7: FCS_COP.1/SYM refinements ............................................................................................................... 42
Table 8: FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER refinements ....................................................................................................... 42
Table 9: FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC refinements ....................................................................................................... 42
Table 10: FCS_COP.1/ PERSO refinements ........................................................................................................ 43
Table 11: FCS_COP.1/AA refinements ................................................................................................................ 43
Table 12: Overview on authentication SFR .......................................................................................................... 44
Table 13: FIA_AFL.1/PERSO refinements .......................................................................................................... 45
Table 14: FPT_TST refinements ........................................................................................................................... 56
Table 18: Security Functions provided by the MultiApp v3 Software .................................................................. 57
Table 19: Security Functions provided by the M7820 chip .................................................................................. 58
ST
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MultiApp v3: eTravel EAC on BAC Security Target
1. ST INTRODUCTION
1.1 ST IDENTIFICATION
Title:
MultiApp V3 Cyllene3 eTravel EAC on BAC Security Target
Version:
1.0p
ST reference:
ST_D1300313
Origin:
Gemalto
Product identification:
Etravel EAC V2.0 on MultiApp V3
Security Controllers:
M7820 A11
TOE identification:
Etravel EAC V2.0
TOE documentation:
Operational User Guidance [OPE_MRTD]
Preparative procedures [PRE_MRTD]
The TOE identification is provided by the Card Production Life Cycle Data (CPLCD) of the TOE,
located in OTP and in EEPROM. These data are available by executing a dedicated command.
The TOE and the product differ, as further explained in §1.4.1 TOE definition:
 The TOE is the eTravel EAC applicationon MultiApp V3.
 The MultiApp V3 product also includes other applets in ROM.
ST
CPLC field
Length
Value
IC Fabricator
2
IFX
IC Type
2
M7820 A11,
Operating System Identifier
3
n.a.
RFU
1
n.a.
Operating System release level
2
n.a.
IC Fabrication Date
2
n.a.
IC Serial Number
4
Unique identification of the chip written by
the ICC Manufacturer
IC Batch Identifier
2
n.a.
IC Module Fabricator
2
n.a.
IC Module Packaging Date
2
n.a.
ICC Manufacturer
2
‘Gemalto’
IC Embedding Date
2
n.a.
Applicable on
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MultiApp v3: eTravel EAC on BAC Security Target
CPLC field
Length
Value
IC Pre-personalizer
2
‘Gemalto’
IC Pre-personalization Date
2
n.a.
IC Pre-personalization Equipment
Identifier
4
n.a.
IC Personalizer
2
n.a.
IC Personalization Date
2
n.a.
IC Personalization Equipment Identifier
4
n.a.
Table 1: Card Production Life Cycle Data
IT Security Evaluation scheme
IT
Security
Certification
scheme
Serma Technologies
Agence Nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information
(ANSSI)
1.2 ST OVERVIEW
The ST is based on Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”,
Extended Access Control [PP-MRTD-EAC].
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact/contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable
travel documents (MRTD’s chip) based on the requirements of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). More specifically the TOE consists of operating system of MRTD’s chip with
ICAO application. The TOE is programmed according to Logical Data Structure as defined in [ICAO9303].
This Security Target defines the security requirements for the TOE. The main security objective is to
provide the secure enforcing functions and mechanisms to maintain the integrity and confidentiality of
the MRTD application and data during its life cycle.
The Multiapp V3 product is an open platform.[ST-Platform].
The main objectives of this ST are:
 To introduce TOE and the MRTD application,
 To define the scope of the TOE and its security features,
 To describe the security environment of the TOE, including the assets to be protected
and the threats to be countered by the TOE and its environment during the product
development, production and usage.
 To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its environment supporting in
terms of integrity and confidentiality of application data and programs and of
protection of the TOE.
 To specify the security requirements which includes the TOE security functional
requirements, the TOE assurance requirements and TOE security functions.
ST
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1.3 REFERENCES
1.3.1 External References
[CC-1]
[CC-2]
[CC-3]
[CEM]
[RGS-B1]
[ST-IC]
[ST-IC-M7820]
[CR-IC]
[CR-IC-M7820]
[FIPS180-2]
[FIPS46-3]
[ISO15946-1]
[ISO15946-2]
[ISO15946-3]
[ISO7816]
[ISO9796-2]
ST
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 1: Introduction and general model,
CCMB-2012-09-001, version 3.1 rev 4, September 2012
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 2: Security functional components,
CCMB-2012-09-002, version 3.1 rev 4, September 2012
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Part 3: Security assurance components,
CCMB-2012-09-003, version 3.1 rev 4, September 2012
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Methodology
CCMB-2012-09-004, version 3.1 rev 4, September 2012
Referentiel general de sécurité version 1.0
Annexe B1 Mechanismes cryptographiques…version 1.20 du 26 Janvier 2010
Either [ST-IC-M7820]
ST of M7820 A11 SLE78CLX1600P - Rev. 0.6 - 28 August 2012
Either [CR-IC-M7820]
Certification Report, BSI-DSZ-CC-0829-2012 (05-09-2012)
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH STANDARD
(+Change Notice to include SHA-224),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2002 August 1
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (DES),
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Reaffirmed 1999 October 25
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General,
2002
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital Signatures,
2002
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves – Part 3: Key establishment,
2002
ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4:
Organization, security and commands for interchange, FDIS2004
ISO/IEC 9797: Information technology – Security techniques – Digital Signature Schemes
giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based mechanisms,
2002
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[ISO9797-1]
[ICAO-9303]
[PKCS#3]
[PKI]
[PP-IC-0002]
[PP-IC-0035]
[PP-MRTD-EAC]
[PP-MRTDEACv2]
[PP-MRTD-SAC]
[PP-MRTD-BAC]
[PP-JCS-Open]
[SS]
[TR-ECC]
[TR-EAC-1]
[BIO]
ISO/IEC 9797: Information technology – Security techniques – Message Authentication Codes
(MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher,
1999
9303 Part 3 Vol 2 – ICAO Machine Readable Travel Document Third edition 2008
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard,
An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
MRTD Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC ReadOnly Access
International Civil Aviation Organization
Version 1.1, October 01 2004
Smartcard IC Platform protection Profile
BSI-PP-0002, version 1.0, July 2001
Smartcard IC Platform protection Profile
BSI-PP-0035
Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
th
BSI-PP-0056, Version 1.10, 25 March 2009
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with
PACE (EAC PP)
th
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 (Version 1.3.1, 22 March 2012)
Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE
PP)
BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011, Version 1.0, 2nd November 2011
Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application, Basic Access Control
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
th
BSI-PP-0055, version 1.10, 25 March 2009
Java Card System Protection Profile – Open Configuration
ANSSI-PP-2010-03M01, Version 3.0, May 2012
ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS,
Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1
Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946, Technical Guideline, TR-ECC, BSI, 2006
Technical Guideline – Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC),
Version 1.11, TR-03110
BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
Technical Report, Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric
Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine Readable Travel
Documents,
Version 2.0, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 21 May 2004
1.3.2 Internal References
[ST-EAC]
ST
D1300313 EAC on BAC Security Target - MultiApp V3
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MultiApp v3: eTravel EAC on BAC Security Target
[ST-EACv2]
[ST-SAC]
[ST-BAC]
[PRE_MRTD]
[OPE_MRTD]
[ST-Platform]
D1184309 EAC Security Target - MultiApp V3
D1191367 SAC Security Target - MultiApp V3
D1191368 BAC Security Target - MultiApp V3
D1191507 Preparative procedures - MultiApp V3 MRTD
D1191508 Operational User Guidance - MultiApp V3 MRTD
D1184308 JCS Security Target - MultiApp V3
1.4 TOE OVERVIEW
This Security Target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contact/contactless chip
of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Basic
Access Control and Extended Access Control as well as the advanced authentication mechanisms
Chip Authentication and Active Authentication.
1.4.1 TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contact/contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable
travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [ICAO9303] and providing the Basic Access Control and Extended Access Control according to the ‘ICAO
Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303] and BSI TR-03110 [TR-EAC-1], respectively.
In addition to [PP-MRTD-EAC], the TOE supports the active authentication as defined in [ICAO-9303].
The TOE comprises of at least

the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
 the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software,

the IC Embedded Software (operating system),

the MRTD application and

the associated guidance documentation.
1.4.2 TOE boundaries
Application note: The TOE is the module designed to be the core of an MRTD passport. The TOE is a
contact/contactless integrated circuit. The TOE is connected to an antenna and capacitors and is
mounted on a plastic film. This inlay is then embedded in the coversheet or datapage of the MRTD
passport and provides a contactless interface for the passport holder identification.
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure [ICAO-9303] and [TREAC-1] and providing:
 the Basic Access Control (BAC) according to the ICAO document [PKI]
 the Active Authentication (AA) mechanism according to the ICAO document [ICAO-9303]
 the Extended Access Control according to the BSI document [TR-EAC-1]
Application note: Additionally to the [PP-MRTD-EAC], the TOE has a set of administrative commands
for the management of the product during the product life.
The TOE comprises of:
 the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC),
 the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software,
 the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
 the MRTD application, and
ST
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MultiApp v3: eTravel EAC on BAC Security Target

the associated guidance documentation.
Application note: Components within the TOE boundary are refined in the following manner:
 the Integrated Circuit (IC),
 the IC Dedicated Test Software,
 the IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot Rom Software),
 the eTravel EAC on MultiApp V3 Embedded Software (ES),
 the NVM Embedded Software,
 part of the MRTD Logical Data Structure,
 the guidance documentation of the eTravel EAC on MultiApp V3 product:
o the preparation guide (assurance family AGD-PRE),
o the operational guide (assurance family AGD-OPE).
The eTravel EAC on MultiApp V3 Embedded Software (ES) is implemented in the ROM of the chip.
This ES provides mechanisms to load executable code into the non-volatile-memory of the chip
(EEPROM). These mechanisms are included in the TOE and are part of the evaluation.
The TOE is delivered to the Personalization Agent with data and guidance documentation in order to
perform the personalization of the product. In addition the Personalization Key is delivered from the
MRTD Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent or from the Personalization Agent to the MRTD
Manufacturer.
ST
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MultiApp v3: eTravel EAC on BAC Security Target
MOCA Server
IAS Classic V4
Application
TOE boundary
eTravel EAC
Native
Application
Applications
eTravel SAC
Native
Application
JavaCard API
Legend
Javacard platform Operating system
JKernel
Non-TSF
TSF
RESET
MEM
COM
SEC
CRY
Hardware
Drivers
IC
Legend
Non-TSF
TSF
Figure 1: TOE Boundaries
1.4.3 TOE usage and security features for operational use
A State or Organization issues MRTDs to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveler
presents an MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of this
security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a
separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the
Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for
contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveler is based on (i) the possession of a
valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data page
and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The
receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a) the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents visual
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
ST
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(3) the printed portrait.
(b) the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure
[ICAO-9303] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents contactless
readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both,
(4) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5) the Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the
MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the Document Number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [ICAO-9303]. These security measures include
the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s
chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional advanced
security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of the MRTD’s chip,
Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security
measure in the ICAO Doc 9303 [ICAO-9303]. The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data
Encryption are performed completely and independently of the TOE by the TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-only-once
access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Extended Access Control
Mechanism. This security target addresses the Chip Authentication described in [TR-EAC-1] as an
alternative to the Active Authentication stated in [ICAO-9303].
The confidentiality by Basic Access Control is a mandatory security feature that shall be implemented
by the TOE, too. Nevertheless this is not explicitly covered by this ST as there are known weaknesses
in the quality (i.e. entropy) of the BAC keys generated by the environment. Therefore, the MRTD has
additionally to fulfil the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [PP-BAC-MRTD]. Due to the fact that [PP-BAC-MRTD]
does only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access Control Mechanism (i.e.
AVA_VAN.3) the MRTD has been evaluated and certified separately according to [ST-BAC], claiming
[PP-BAC-MRTD].
For BAC, the inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection
system by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the inspection
system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of private
communication (secure messaging) with this inspection system [ICAO-9303], normative appendix 5.
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication defined in [TR-EAC-1].
The Chip Authentication prevents data traces described in [ICAO-9303], informative appendix 7,
A7.3.3. The Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps: (i) the inspection system
communicates by means of secure messaging established by Basic Access Control, (ii) the inspection
system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip
Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object, (iii) the inspection system generates
an ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the inspection system agree on two session keys for secure
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
No disclosure to a third party without prior written consent of Gemalto
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messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman Primitive and (v) the inspection system
verifies by means of received message authentication codes whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not
to run this protocol properly (i.e. the TOE proves to be in possession of the Chip Authentication Private
Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used for derivation of the session keys). The
Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment.
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined in [TREAC-1]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication Protocol and
(ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol. The Chip Authentication Protocol (i) authenticates the
MRTD’s chip to the inspection system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by
Terminal Authentication to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference
data during their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal
Authentication can only be performed if Chip Authentication has been successfully executed. The
Terminal Authentication Protocol consists of (i) the authentication of the inspection system as entity
authorized by the receiving State or Organization through the issuing State, and (ii) an access control
by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated
authorized inspection systems. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the receiving State by
means of certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection
System Certificates.
The security target also requires the TOE to implement Active Authentication as defined in [ICAO9303].
Keys for Chip authentication and Active Authentication can be generated in the card or loaded into it.
These operations take place at personalization time.
1.4.4 Toe Life-cycle
1.4.4.1 Four phases
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases. (With respect to the [PP-IC0035], the TOE life-cycle the life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)
Phase 1 “Development”:
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the
guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC
Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the Embedded
Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is securely delivered to the IC
manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable memories, the MRTD
application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”:
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip Dedicated
Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable
memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC
as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer.
The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacturer to the MRTD manufacturer.
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
No disclosure to a third party without prior written consent of Gemalto
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If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile
programmable memories (for instance EEPROM).
(Step4) The MRTD manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the
passport book
(Step5) The MRTD manufacturer (i) creates the MRTD application and (ii) equips MRTD’s chips with
pre-personalization Data.
The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the MRTD
manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant parts
of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”:
(Step6) The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical
data, (ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the
optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical MRTD,
(iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) configuration of the
TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not
limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii)
the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [5] finalizes the personalization of
the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together with appropriate guidance
for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for operational use.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the “Operational
Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or
Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never
be modified.
Application note: In this ST, the role of the Personalization Agents is strictly limited to the phase 3
Personalization. In the phase 4 Operational Use updating and addition of the data groups of the MRTD
application is forbidden.
1.4.4.2 Actors
Actors
Integrated Circuit (IC) Developer
Embedded Software Developer
Integrated Circuit (IC) Manufacturer
Module manufacturer
Pre-personalizer
Inlay manufacturer
Book manufacturer
Personalization Agent
ST
Applicable on
Identification
IFX
Gemalto
IFX
Gemalto or IFX
Gemalto or IFX
Gemalto or another Inlay manufacturer
Gemalto or another printer
The agent who is acting on the behalf of the issuing
State or Organization and personalize the MRTD for the
holder by activities establishing the identity of the holder
with biographic data.
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
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Actors
MRTD Holder
Identification
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing
State or Organization personalizes the MRTD.
Table 2: Identification of the actors
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
No disclosure to a third party without prior written consent of Gemalto
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1.4.4.3 Init on module at Gemalto site
Sites
Phase 1
Development
Step 1
Embedded Software
Development
Step 2
IC design and dedicated
software development
Development sites
Step 3
Integration
TOE under construction
Secured by Environment
Photomask fabrication
Phase 2
Manufacturing
IC manufacturing
Step 4
IC manufacturer
IC initialization
Step 5
MRTD module manufacturer
IC pre-personalization including
File System Creation
Inlay manufacturing
Inlay manufacturing
Inlay manufacturer
Inlay manufacturing
TOE operational
Secured by TOE
Phase 3
Personalization
Phase 4
Usage
Step 6
Personalization including
book manufacturing
Step 7
Usage
Personalizer
User
End of life
Figure 2: LC1: Initialization on module at Gemalto site
Figure 2: LC1 describes the standard Life Cycle. The IC is manufactured at the founder site. It is
then shipped to Gemalto site where it is initialized/pre-personalized. The transformation of wafers into
modules can be performed either at the founder site or at Gemalto site. The modules are then shipped
to the Personalizer or to the Inlay manufacturer. In the latter case, The Inlay manufacturer ships the
inlays to the Personalizer
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
No disclosure to a third party without prior written consent of Gemalto
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During the shipment from Gemalto to the Personalizer or the Inlay manufacturer, the module is
protected by a diversified key.
1.4.4.4 Init on module at Founder site
Sites
Phase 1
Development
Step 1
Embedded Software
Development
Step 2
IC design and dedicated
software development
Development sites
Step 3
TOE under construction
Secured by Environment
Integration
Photomask fabrication
Phase 2
Manufacturing
IC manufacturing
Step 4
IC initialization
Step 5
IC manufacturer
IC pre-personalization including
File System Creation
Inlay manufacturing
Inlay manufacturer
Inlay manufacturing
Phase 3
Personalization
Step 6
TOE operational
Secured by TOE
Personalization including
Book manufacturing
Phase 4
Usage
Step 7
Usage
Personalizer
Holder = End User
End of life
Figure 3: LC2 Init on module at Founder site
LC2 is an alternative to LC1. Figure 3, LC2 describes the Life Cycle when the customer whishes to
receive wafers directly from the founder. In this case, initialization and pre-personalization, which
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
No disclosure to a third party without prior written consent of Gemalto
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include sensitive operations such as the loading of patches, take place at the founder site. The
creation of files is started by the founder and completed by the personalizer.
During the shipment from the founder to the Personalizer, the module is protected by a diversified key.
1.4.4.5 Init on inlay at Gemalto site
Sites
Phase 1
Development
Step 1
Embedded Software
Development
Step 2
IC design and dedicated
software development
Development sites
Step 3
Integration
TOE under construction
Secured by Environment
Photomask fabrication
Phase 2
Manufacturing
Step 4
IC manufacturing
IC manufacturer
Inlay manufacturing
Inlay manufacturer
Inlay initialization
MRTD module manufacturer
Step 5
Phase 3
Personalization
Inlay pre-personalization including
File System Creation
Step 6
Personalization including
book manufacturing
TOE operational
Secured by TOE
Personalizer
Phase 4
Usage
Step 7
Usage
End of life
User
Figure 4: LC3: Init on inlay at Gemalto site
LC3 is another alternative to LC1. Figure 4, LC3 describes the Life Cycle when Gemalto whishes to
receive inlays instead of modules. In this case, the founder ships the module to the Inlay
manufacturer.
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
No disclosure to a third party without prior written consent of Gemalto
Rev :
Page : 17 / 65
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During the shipment from the founder to Gemalto, the module is protected by a diversified key.
1.4.5 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to perform its
claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the complete operating system
and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the
printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete MRTD; nevertheless these parts are not inevitable
for the secure operation of the TOE.
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
No disclosure to a third party without prior written consent of Gemalto
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2. CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1 CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM
This security target claims conformance to
 [CC-1]
 [CC-2]

[CC-3]
as follows
 Part 2 extended,
 Part 3 conformant.
The

[CEM] has to be taken into account.
2.2 PP CLAIM,
The MultiApp V3 - EAC security target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile [PP-MRTDEAC].
The MultiApp V3 EAC security target is a composite security target, including the IC security target
[ST-IC]. However the security problem definition, the objectives, and the SFR of the IC are not
described in this document.
The TOE also claims conformance to other Protection Profiles. This is described in other Security
Targets:
The MultiApp V3 - SAC security target claims strict conformance to [PP-MRTD-SAC].
The MultiApp V3 - BAC security target claims strict conformance to [PP-MRTD-BAC].
The MultiApp V3 - EAC security target claims strict conformance to [PP-MRTD-EACv2].
The MultiApp V3 - JCS security target claims demonstrable conformance to [PP-JCS-Open].
2.3 PACKAGE CLAIM
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
defined in CC part 3 [CC-3].
2.4 CONFORMANCE STATEMENT
This ST strictly conforms to [PP-MRTD-EAC].
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
No disclosure to a third party without prior written consent of Gemalto
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Page : 19 / 65
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3. SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.1.1 Assets
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD sensitive User Data
 Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Application note: Due to interoperability reasons the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303] requires that Basic
Inspection Systems must have access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16. As the BAC
mechanisms may not resist attacks with high attack potential, security of other Data Groups of the
logical MRTD are covered by another ST (cf. [ST-BAC]).
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD
holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
3.1.2 Subjects
This protection profile considers the following subjects:
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD Manufacturer
completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the
Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD
Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the
holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the holder for the
biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the
portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data on the
physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national
interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (v) signing the Document Security Object defined in
[ICAO-9303].
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State or
Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD.
The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are
distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect to the
protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems.
The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
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sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations in the form of
the Document Verifier Certificates.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the
MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets
the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the
MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System
(GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements
the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through
the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The
security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, (ii) to read sensitive
biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4) or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application note: Note that an attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s
chip remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD) is not considered by this
PP since this can only be averted by the BAC mechanism using the “weak” Document Basic Access
Keys that is covered by [PP-MRTD-BAC]. The same holds for the confidentiality of the user data
EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 as well as EF.SOD and EF.COM.
Application note: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent
on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful
attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.2 ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security
procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and
integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to
its objectives:
- Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process and storage.
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
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- Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill.
A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD
holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if
stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the
MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization
Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric
cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD
holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA
Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii)
implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO-9303]. The Basic Inspection System
reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify
the logical MRTD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s
chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection
System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric
reference data.
A.Signature_PKI PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or
Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the
Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is
recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States
maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands
over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer
Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document
Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document
Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
A.Auth_PKI PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities,
the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates
for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities
of the issuing States or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the
Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving
States or Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country
Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD’s chip.
3.3 THREATS
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its
IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment and
the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
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Application note: The threats T.Chip_ID and T.Skimming (cf. [PP-MRTD-BAC]) are averted by the
mechanisms described in the BAC PP [PP-MRTD-BAC] (cf. P.BAC-PP) which cannot withstand an
attack with high attack potential thus these are not addressed here. T.Chip_ID addresses the threat of
tracing the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or
listening to communications through the contactless communication interface. T.Skimming addresses
the threat of imitating the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless
communication channel of the TOE. Both attacks are conducted by an attacker who cannot read the
MRZ or who does not know the physical MRTD in advance.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data Read the sensitive biometric reference data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication interface of the MRTD’s chip.
The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [PP-MRTDBAC]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to
get data stored on the MRTD’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the
attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other
data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the
possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored
only on the MRTD’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data
and the portrait are visually readable on the physical MRTD as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in
possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset:
confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data,
T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by
means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may
alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the
printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The
attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual
inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication
mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to
defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The
attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged
MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference
finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving
their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The
attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless
chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset:
authenticity of logical MRTD data,
T.Counterfeit MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction
of a genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the
authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveler by possession of
a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data
from a genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate
this genuine MRTD’s chip.
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
D1300313_ST_EAC_MultiAppV3_Lite_pp56
V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
No disclosure to a third party without prior written consent of Gemalto
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Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset:
authenticity of logical MRTD data,
The TOE shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in “Operational
Use” phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass,
deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to
manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset:
confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in
the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements.
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely
related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived either from
measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by
contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related
to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection
(e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset:
confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data
T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose
TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An
attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features
or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of
TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF
Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the
TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct
interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC
failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the
hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may
also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security
function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset:
confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security
ST
Applicable on
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V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
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features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information
about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset:
confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF
3.4 ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES
The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations (see CC part 1,
sec. 3.2).
P.BAC-PP Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile.
The issuing States or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection Systems
have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303]
as well as to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is successfully evaluated and
certified in accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel
Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [PP-MRTD-BAC] in order to ensure the
confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data.
Application note: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the ‘ICAO Doc
9303’ [ICAO-9303] is addressed by the [PP-MRTD-BAC] (cf. P.BAC-PP). The confidentiality of the
personal data other than EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC
mechanisms may not resist attacks with high attack potential (cf. [PP-MRTD-BAC]). The TOE shall
protect the sensitive biometric reference data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 against attacks with high attack
potential. Due to the different resistance the protection of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 on one side and the
other EF.SOD, EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 are addressed separated
protection profiles, which is assumed to result in technically separated evaluations (at least for classes
ASE and VAN) and certificates.
P.Sensitive_Data Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private
personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by
inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the
inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the
Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within
the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRTD’s chip shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the
Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent
Key.
P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with
respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent
authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Activ_Auth Active Authentication
ST
Applicable on
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V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
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The TOE implements the active authentication protocol as described in [ICAO-9303].
3.5
COMPATIBILITY BETWEEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENTS OF [ST-EAC] AND [ST-IC]
3.5.1 Compatibility between threats of [ST-EAC] and [ST-IC]
T.Read_Sensitive_Data, is included in T.Phys-Probing.
T.Forgery is included in T.Phys-Manipulation.
T.Counterfeit is specific to the Java Card platform and they do no conflict with the threats of [ST-IC].
T.Abuse-Func of [ST-EAC] is included in T.Abuse-Func of [ST-IC].
T.Information_Leakage is included in T.Leak-Inherent and T.Leak-Forced.
T.Phys-Tamper is included in T.Phys-Manipulation
T.Malfunction of [ST-EAC] is included in T.Malfunction of [ST-IC].
We can therefore conclude that the threats of [ST-EAC] and [ST-IC] are consistent.
3.5.2 Compatibility between OSP of [ST-EAC] and [ST-IC]
P.BAC-PP, P.Sensitive_Data, P.Manufact, and P.Personalization are specific to the MRTD and they
do no conflict with the OSP of [ST-IC].
We can therefore conclude that the OSP of [ST-EAC] and [ST-IC] are consistent.
3.5.3 Compatibility between assumptions of [ST-EAC] and [ST-IC]
A.MRTD_Manufact and A.MRTD_Delivery are included in A.Process-Card
A.Pers_Agent, A.Insp_Sys, A.Signature_PKI, and A.Auth_PKI are assumptions specific to [ST-EAC]
and they do no conflict with the assumptions of [ST-IC].
We can therefore conclude that the assumptions for the environment of [ST-EAC] and [ST-IC] are
consistent.
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
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V1.docx
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4. SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives
for the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational
environment.
4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats
to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security
object according to LDS [ICAO-9303] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization
Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only
during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated
by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application note:The OT.AC_Pers implies that
(1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1
and EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
(2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and
(ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The support for adding data in
the “Operational Use” phase is optional.
OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization
of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful
authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier
Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their
transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric
reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile
memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
“Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The storage of the Pre-Personalization
data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication as defined in [ASM-EAC]. The authenticity proof provided by MRTD’s chip shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
Application note: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the MRTD’s chip to have (i) a unique identity as
given by the MRTD’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private
ST
Applicable on
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V1.docx
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authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The
terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a
certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of
the MRTD’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in
the LDS [ICAO-9303] and (ii) the hash value of the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Document
Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip
independent of the TOE environment.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support
functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii) manipulate critical User
Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or (iv) bypass,
deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features
provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed
in the MRTD’s chip

by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or
I/O lines and

by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or

by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal
processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details
correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data,
and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with high attack
potential by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges
(using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to
prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic)
fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
Application note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with
elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s internals.
OT.Activ_Auth_Proof Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity through AA
ST
Applicable on
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V1.docx
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The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active
Authentication as defined in [ICAO-9303]. The authenticity proof through AA provided by MRTD’s chip
shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5
and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_ Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following
objectives:
- non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
- identification of the element under delivery,
- meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment),
- physical protection to prevent external damage,
- secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
- traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
 origin and shipment details,
 reception, reception acknowledgement,
 location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery
process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all
non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with
the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure
requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the
issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical
data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the
encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder
together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key
Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer
Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Country
Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity.
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair
and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of
genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the
ST
Applicable on
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V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
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Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the
Document Security Object relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS
according to [ICAO-9303].
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD MRTD Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i)
generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip Authentication Public
Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of
receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD
by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to
limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to authorized receiving States
or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization
generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
OE.BAC_PP Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile.
It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally successfully
evaluated and certified in accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable
Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [PP-MRTD-BAC]. This is necessary
to cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the
traceability of the MRTD data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack potential the
addressed evaluation and certification is a technically separated process.
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by
the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes
the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or
Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [ICAO-9303].
Additionally General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as
MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document
Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The
receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing CA Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity
of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol.
Application note: The figure 2.1 in [ASM-EAC] supposes that the GIS and the EIS follow the order (i)
running the Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of the logical
MRTD that are necessary to know for the Chip Authentication Mechanism (i.e. Document Security
Object and Chip Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Chip Authentication Protocol, and (iv)
ST
Applicable on
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reading and verifying the less-sensitive data of the logical MRTD after Chip Authentication. The
supposed sequence has the advantage that the less-sensitive data are protected by secure
messaging with cryptographic keys based on the Chip Authentication Protocol which quality is under
control of the TOE. The inspection system will prevent additionally eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol. Note that reading the less sensitive data directly after Basic Access Control
Mechanism is allowed and is not assumed as threat in this PP. But the TOE ensures that reading of
sensitive data is possible after successful Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication Protocol
only.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems
by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the
logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip for
access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its
Inspection System Certificate.
OE.Activ_Auth_Sign Active Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to (i)
generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the MRTD’s Active
Authentication Private Key, sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active
Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG15 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or
organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of
the Active Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Activ_Auth_Verif Verification by Active Authentication
In addition to the verification by passive authentication, the inspection systems may use the
verification by active authentication, which offers a stronger guaranty of the authenticity of the MRTD.
5. EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
This security target uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these
components are defined in protection profile [PP-IC-0002]; others are defined in the protection profile
[PP-MRTD-EAC].
5.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the
Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the
storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not
necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific
details of the content of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
ST
Applicable on
1
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FAU_SAS.1
Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FAU_SAS.1.1
No other components
No dependencies
The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
5.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS_RND) of the
Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component
FCS_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1.
The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended
to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component levelling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
FCS_RND.1
Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined
quality metric.
Management:
Audit:
1
FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_RND.1.1
ST
No other components
No dependencies
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet [assignment: a
defined quality metric].
Applicable on
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5.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of the
Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity
where the other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by an
external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling:
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management:
Audit:
1
FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in
FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed
identity.
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_API.1.1
No other components
No dependencies
The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of the
[assignment: authorized user or role].
5.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management
of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other
class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the
capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behavior
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined
manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited capability of this
family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component leveling:
ST
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1
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
2
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine
purpose.
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to
Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by
removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management:
Audit:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of the Class
FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the
Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because
this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their
availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1.1
No other components
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction
with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited
capability and availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.2.1
ST
No other components
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction
with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited
capability and availability policy].
Applicable on
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Application note: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are
two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide
protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that
(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its
capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
(ii) the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in,
the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
5.5 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMS
The sensitive family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined
here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks
against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical
phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation,
simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family
describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly
addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [CC-2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS)” is specified as follows.
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation
1
FPT_EMS.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMS.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
Management:
FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_EMS.1.1
ST
No other components
No dependencies.
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified
limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
Applicable on
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FPT_EMS.1.2
ST
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface
[assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Applicable on
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6. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Pre-personalization Agent”, “Personalization Agent”,
“Extended Inspection System”, “Country Verifying Certification Authority”, “Document Verifier” and
“Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section 3.1. Note, that all these subjects are acting
for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined either in section 7 or in the following
table. The operations “write”, “modify”, “read” and “disable read access” are used in accordance with
the general linguistic usage. The operations “store”, “create”, “transmit”, “receive”, “establish
communication channel”, “authenticate” and “re-authenticate” are originally taken from [CC-2]. The
operation “load” is synonymous to “import” used in [CC-2].
Definition of security attributes:
security attribute
terminal
authentication status
values
none
(any
Terminal)
CVCA
meaning
default role (i.e. without authorisation after start-up)
DV (domestic)
roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as domestic
Document Verifier after successful CA and TA
roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as foreign
Document Verifier after successful CA and TA
roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as Extended
Inspection System after successful CA and TA
DV (foreign)
IS
Terminal
Authorization
roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[TR-EAC-1], A.5.1); Terminal is authenticated as Country
Verifying Certification Authority after successful CA and TA
none
DG4 (Iris)
DG3
(Fingerprint)
DG3 (Iris)
DG4
(Fingerprint)
Read access to DG4: (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1)
Read access to DG3: (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1)
/
Read access to DG3 and DG4: (cf. [TR-EAC-1], A.5.1)
The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used:
Name
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Private Key (SKCVCA)
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Public Key (PKCVCA)
ST
Applicable on
Data
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a private key
(SKCVCA) used for signing the Document Verifier Certificates.
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
(PKCVCA) as part of the TSF data to verify the Document Verifier
Certificates. The PKCVCA has the security attribute Current Date as the
most recent valid effective date of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority Certificate or of a domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
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Name
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Certificate (CCVCA)
Document Verifier
Certificate (CDV)
Inspection System
Certificate (CIS)
Chip Authentication
Public Key Pair
Chip Authentication
Public Key (PKICC)
Chip Authentication
Private Key (SKICC)
Country Signing
Certification Authority
Key Pair
Document Signer Key
Pairs
Document Basic Access
Keys
BAC Session Keys
Chip Session Key
Data
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be a selfsigned certificate or a link certificate (cf. [TR-EAC-1] and Glossary). It
contains (i) the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
(PKCVCA) as authentication reference data, (ii) the coded access control
rights of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii) the Certificate
Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country Verifying
Certification Authority. It contains (i) the Document Verifier Public Key
(PKDV) as authentication reference data (ii) identification as domestic or
foreign Document Verifier, the coded access control rights of the
Document Verifier, the Certificate
Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the Document
Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference data the Inspection
System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded access control rights of the
Extended Inspection System, the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used for Key
Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to RFC 2631 or Elliptic
Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO 15946.
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the EF.DG14
Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical MRTD and used by the
inspection system for Chip Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. It is part of
the user data provided by the TOE for the IT environment.
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE to
authenticate itself as authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF data.
Country Signing Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization
signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate with the Country Signing
Certification Authority Private Key and the signature will be verified by
receiving State or Organization (e.g. a Basic Inspection System) with the
Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key.
Document Signer of the issuing State or Organization signs the Document
Security Object of the logical MRTD with the Document Signer Private Key
and the signature will be verified by a Basic Inspection Systems of the
receiving State or Organization with the Document Signer Public Key.
The Document Basic Access Key is created by the Personalization Agent,
loaded to the TOE, and used for mutual authentication and key agreement
for secure messaging between the Basic Inspection System and the
MRTD’s chip.
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between
the TOE and a BIS in result of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Protocol.
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed between
the TOE and a GIS in result of the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Application note 20: The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as
“domestic” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs to the same State as the Country Verifying
Certification Authority. The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as
“foreign” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it does not belong to the same State as the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. From MRTD’s point of view the domestic Document Verifier belongs
to the issuing State or Organization.
ST
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6.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following the
main security functionality.
Refinements in this section are in underline font when the SFR’s refinement is already present in [PPMRTD-EAC], and in bold font when the refinement is done in this ST. When the SFR is refined in the
[PP-MRTD-EAC] and additionally refined in this ST then the font is bold and underline.
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FAU_SAS.1.1
No other components
No dependencies
The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC Identification Data
in the audit records.
6.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key generation
algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman for Chip Authentication session
keys
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.1.1
/CA
No other components
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] ]: fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the
following: [selection: based on the Diffie-Hellman key derivation protocol compliant to
[PKCS#3] and [TR-EAC-1] , based on an ECDH protocol compliant to [TR-ECC] ].
iteration
/TDESsession-DH
/AESsession-DH
ST
Applicable on
algorithm
DH Key Agreement Algorithm PKCS#3 – 1024, 1280, 1536 and
2048 bits
DH Key Agreement Algorithm -
Key size
112 bits
128, 192, and 256
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PKCS#3 – 1024, 1280, 1536 and
2048 bits
ECDH Key Agreement Algorithm /TDESsession-ECDH
ISO 15946 – 160, 192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512 and 521 bits
ECDH Key Agreement Algorithm /AESsession-ECDH
ISO 15946 – 160, 192, 224, 256,
320, 384, 512 and 521 bits
Table 3: FCS_CKM.1/CA refinement
bits
112 bits
128, 192, and 256
bits
FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair Cryptographic key generation for AA and CA Key Pair
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.1.1
/KeyPair
iteration
/RSA
/ECC
CA/DH
CA/ECDH
No other components
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]: fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/AA,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC and FCS_COP.1/SYM
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: not fulfilled, see application note
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
algorithm
RSA CRT Key
generation
ECC
Key
generation
DH
key
generation
ECDH
Key
generation
Key size
standard
1024, 1280, 1536 and 2048 none (generation of random numbers
bits
and Miller- Rabin primality testing)
160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, FIPS 186-3 Appendix B.4.1
512 and 521 bits
1024, 1280, 1536 and 2048
ANSI X9.42
bits
160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, [IEEE-P1363]
512 and 521 bits
Table 4: FCS_CKM.1/AA&CA refinement
Application notes:
 The dependency of FCS_CKM1/KeyPair on FCS_COP.1 is partly fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC and FCS_COP.1/SYM. This dependence is not direct:
FCS_CKM1/KeyPair generates a static key which in turn generate session keys, via
FCS_CKM1/CA. These session keys then use FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC and FCS_COP.1/SYM.
 The dependency of FCS_CKM1/KeyPair on FCS_CKM.4 is not fulfilled as these are
permanent keys used on the card during its life-time.
FCS_CKM.1/PERSO Cryptographic key generation for Session keys
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.1.1
/PERSO
ST
No other components
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]: fulfilled by FCS_COP.1/PERSO
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
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specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the
following: [assignment: list of standards].
iteration
/TDES
/GP
algorithm
TDES ISK key derivation
GP session keys
Key size
standard
112 bits
[ICAO-9303] normative appendix 5
112, 128 bits [GP211] SCP01, SCP02, or SCP03
(and 192 & 256
bits for SCP03)
Table 5: FCS_CKM.1/Manuf refinement
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.4.1
No other components
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by, FCS_CKM.1/CA, and
FCS_CKM.1/PERSO.
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
destruction method Secure erasing of the value that meets the following: None.
Application note: Secure erasing of data is performed by overwriting the data with random numbers.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 and cryptographic key
sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation – Symmetric Encryption / Decryption
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
ST
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1
/SYM
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Table 6: algorithm and
cryptographic key sizes Table 6: Key size that meet the following: Table 6: list
of standards.
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iteration
/ENC_TDES
algorithm
TDES in CBC mode
Key size
112 bits
/ENC_AES
AES in CBC mode
128, 192, 256
Table 6: FCS_COP.1/SYM refinements
List of standards
TR-03110
ISO 10116
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1
/SIG_VER
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm Table 7: algorithm and cryptographic key
sizes Table 7: Key size that meet the following: Table 7: list of standards.
iteration
/RSA_VER
algorithm
RSA (STD )
/ECC_VER
ECC
Key size
1024, 1280, 1536, 2048, 3072, and
4096
List of standards
[ISO9796-2]
RSA
SHA
PKCS#1
RSA SHA PKCS#1 PSS
160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, 512, 521 [TR-ECC] ECDSA SHA
Table 7: FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER refinements
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation – MAC
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1
/CA_MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Table 8 algorithm and
cryptographic key sizes Table 8 Key size that meet the following: Table 8 list of
standards.
iteration
/MAC_TDES
algorithm
TDES Retail MAC
Key size
112 bits
List of standards
/MAC_AES
AES CMAC
128, 192, 256 [NIST-800-38B]
Table 8: FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC refinements
TR-03110
Remark: this SFR is renamed FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC instead of FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_COP.1/PERSO Cryptographic operation – Symmetric encryption, decryption, and MAC
during manufacturing
ST
Applicable on
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Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/PERSO.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1
/PERSO
The TSF shall perform symmetric encryption and decryption in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES, AES and cryptographic key
sizes See table 10
iteration
/ENC_TDES
/ENC_AES
/MAC_TDES
/MAC_AES
algorithm
Key size
TDES encryption and decryption
112 bits
AES encryption and decryption
128, 192, 256
TDES Retail MAC
112 bits
AES CMAC
128, 192, 256
Table 9: FCS_COP.1/ PERSO refinements
List of standards
[SP 800-67]
[FIPS 197]
ISO 9797-1
[NIST-800-38B]
FCS_COP.1/AA Cryptographic operation – Active Authentication
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: not fulfilled, see application note.
FCS_COP.1.1
/AA
The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Table 10 algorithm and cryptographic key sizes Table
10 Key size that meet the following: Table 10 List of standards.
iteration
/AA_RSA
algorithm
RSA
Key size
1024, 1280, 1536, 2048, 3072,
and 4096 bits
ECDSA
160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384,
512 and 521
Table 10: FCS_COP.1/AA refinements
/AA_ECDSA
List of standards
ISO9796-2
[TR-ECC]
Application note:
 The dependency of FCS_COP.1/AA on FCS_CKM.4 is not fulfilled as these are permanent
keys used on the card during its life-time.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
ST
No other components
No dependencies
Applicable on
Ref:
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FCS_RND.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet RGS [RGSB1], and X931 with seed entropy at least 128 bits.
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the
authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4.
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Table 11 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
Name
SFR for the TOE
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism for FIA_UAU.4
Personalization Agents
Chip Authentication Protocol
FIA_API.1, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6
Terminal Authentication Protocol
FIA_UAU.5
Table 11: Overview on authentication SFR
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol as defined in this protection profile 19 includes
 the BAC authentication protocol as defined in ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [ICAO-9303] in order to gain
access to the Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
 the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys between the
TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key and the Terminal Public
Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol,
 the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code with
the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The BAC mechanism does not provide a security function on their own. The Chip Authentication
Protocol may be used independent of the Terminal Authentication Protocol. But if the Terminal
Authentication Protocol is used the terminal shall use the same public key as presented during the
Chip Authentication Protocol.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1/MRTD)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO Authentication
personalization phases
handling
during
pre-personalization
and
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication: fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1/PERSO
FIA_AFL.1.1
/Perso
The TSF shall detect when [Number in Table 12] unsuccessful authentication
attempts occurs related to authentication attempts using ISK key.
FIA_AFL.1.2
/Perso
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met, the TSF shall [Actions in Table 12].
Auth type
GP
ST
failure
Number
3
Applicable on
Actions
Block GP authentication.
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ISK key
3
Block ISK Key.
Table 12: FIA_AFL.1/PERSO refinements
FIA_UID.1/PERSO Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components.
No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1
/PERSO
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. to carry out the mutual authentication Protocol according to [GP]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
/PERSO
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.1/MRTD Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components.
No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1/MRTD
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2//MRTD
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1/PERSO Timing of authentication
ST
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification: fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PERSO
FIA_UAU.1.1
/PERSO
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. to carry out the mutual authentication Protocol according to [GP]
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
Applicable on
Ref:
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FIA_UAU.1.2
/PERSO
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note:
 FIA_AFL.1/PERSO and FIA_UID.1/PERSO are extensions to [PP-MRTD-EAC], in order to
deal with identification and authentication in pre-personalisation and personalisation phases.
FIA_UAU.1/MRTD Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification: fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/MRTD
FIA_UAU.1.1/MR
TD
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish a communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3.to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
4,to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/MR
TD
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the Terminal
by the TOE
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.4.1
No other components
No dependencies
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Terminal authenticate protocol,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES, AES
Application note: The authentication mechanisms use a challenge freshly and randomly generated
by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful authentication
attempt.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
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Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
3. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES, AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the following rules:
1. TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Pre-personalization Agent by the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Pre-personalization Agent Key.
2. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands
with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key
agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication mechanism..
3. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip
Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism
4. the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.6.1
No other components
No dependencies
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to the
TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent
by the GIS.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity – Chip Authentication
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1/CA
The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [TR-EAC-1] to prove
the identity of the TOE.
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication Mechanism
specified in [TR-EAC-1]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared secret using the Diffie-Hellman
Protocol (DH or EC-DH) and two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to
[ICAO-9303], normative appendix 5, A5.1. The terminal verifies by means of secure messaging
whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run his protocol properly using its Chip Authentication
Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
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FIA_API.1/AA Authentication Proof of Identity – Active Authentication
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies
FIA_API.1.1/AA
The TSF shall provide an Active Authentication Protocol according to [ICAO-9303] to
prove the identity of the TOE.
Application note: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Active Authentication Mechanism
specified in [ICAO-9303]. The terminal generates a challenge then verifies whether the MRTD’s chip
was able or not to sign it properly using its Active Authentication private key corresponding to the
Active Authentication public key (EF.DG15).
6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1.1
No other components
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control: fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read and
modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1.1
No other components
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control; fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1, FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialization
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Extended Inspection System
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16,
of the logical MRTD
b. data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
c. data in EF.COM,
d. data in EF.SOD
3. Security attributes:
a. authentication status of terminal,
b. Terminal Authorization
ST
Applicable on
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FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read
the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read access
to DG3 (Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding
is allowed to read the data of the EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD,
3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read access
to DG4 (Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is
allowed to read the data of the EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules:
1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3,
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4,
5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System
is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG3 to EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.
Application note: Note the BAC mechanism controls the read access of the EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. These security features of the MRTD are
not subject of this ST.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data
in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after Chip Authentication..
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to:
ST
No other components
Applicable on
Ref:
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Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data
in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors after Chip
Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification, deletion,
insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication.
Rationale for Refinement: Note that the Access Control SFP (cf. FDP_ACF.1.2) allows the Extended
Inspection System (as of [ICAO-9303] and [PP-MRTD-BAC]) to access the data EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. Nevertheless there is explicitly no
rule for preventing access to these data. More over their data integrity (cf. FDP_UIT.1) and
confidentiality (cf. FDP_UCT.1) is ensured by the BAC mechanism being addressed and covered by
[PP-MRTD-BAC]. The fact that the BAC mechanism is not part of the ST in hand is addressed by the
refinement “after Chip Authentication”.
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
Application note: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the
management of the TSF data.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1.1
No other components
No dependencies
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization ,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_SMR.1.1
ST
No other components
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification fulfilled by FIA_UID.1 /MRTD
The TSF shall maintain the roles
1.
Manufacturer,
2.
Personalization Agent,
3.
Country Verifying Certification Authority,
4.
Document Verifier,
Applicable on
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5.
6.
FMT_SMR.1.2
domestic Extended Inspection System,
foreign Extended Inspection System.
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note: The MRTD also maintains the role Basic Inspection System due to a direct
consequence of P.BAC-PP resp. OE.BAC-PP. Nevertheless this role is not explicitly listed in
FMT_SMR.1.1, above since the TSF cannot maintain the role with respect to the assumed high attack
potential due to the known weaknesses of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Application note : The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and
TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle phases.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1.1
No other components
FMT_LIM.2 Limited capabilities: fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2.
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in conjunction
with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1.
User Data to be manipulated,
2.
sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
3.
TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
4.
software to be reconstructed and
5.
substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.2.1
No other components
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities: fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1.
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in conjunction
with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1.
User Data to be manipulated,
2.
sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
3.
TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
4.
software to be reconstructed and
5.
substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks.
Application note: The term “software” in item 4 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both IC
Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.
ST
Applicable on
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Application note: The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data
(FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and different TSF
data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Prepersonalization
Data
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
to the Manufacturer.
Application note: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the authentication
reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization
Agent Key.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to Initialization Data
and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the Initialization Data to
the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA Certificate and Current
Date
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_INI
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifying Certification
Authority
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
ST
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
Applicable on
Ref:
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FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_UPD
The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority.
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1/
DATE
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current date to
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority,
2. Document Verifier,
3. domestic Extended Inspection System.
FMT_MTD.1/ KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Dependencies:
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
KEY_WRITE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic Access Keys to the
Personalisation Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CAPK
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load the Chip Authentication Private Key to
the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/AAK Management of TSF data – Active Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1/
AAK
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load the Active Authentication Private Key to
the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
ST
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
Applicable on
Ref:
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FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
1. Document Basic Access Keys,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Active Authentication Private Key
4. Personalization Agent Keys
to none.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Secure TSF data (FMT_MTD.3)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2):
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.3.1
No other components
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data: fulfilled by FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD,
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted for TSF
data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control.
Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
(1) the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with
the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the
Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
(2) the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with
the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the
expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the
TOE,
(3) the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country
Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended
Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated
Extended Inspection System.
Application note: The Terminal Authentication is used for Extended Inspection System as required
by FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Terminal Authorization is used as TSF data for access control
required by FDP_ACF.1.
6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF Data. The
security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With respect to the
forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security functional requirements
“Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one
hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)”
ST
Applicable on
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together with the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing,
deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended):
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1
The TOE shall not emit electromagnetic and current emissions in excess of intelligible
threshold enabling access to
Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip Authentication Private Key and Active
Authentication Key, EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
FPT_EMS.1.2
The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart card circuit
contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent Key(s) and Chip Authentication Private
Key and Active Authentication Key, EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information
leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_FLS.1.1
No other components
No dependencies.
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occurs.
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2).
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components
No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests Conditions under which self test should occur to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of stored
TSF executable code.
Conditions under which self test should occur
During initial start-up
ST
Applicable on
Description of the self test
RNG live test, sensor test, FA detection, Integrity
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Check of NVM ES
Periodically
RNG monitoring, FA detection
After cryptographic computation
FA detection
Before any use or update of TSF data
FA detection, Integrity Check of related TSF data
Table 13: FPT_TST refinements
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_PHP.3.1
No other components
No dependencies.
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by responding
automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Application note: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the
TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against
these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic
response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures
are provided at any time.
6.2 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
The SAR for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those
taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5) and augmented by taking the following
components: ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
Application note : The TOE shall protect the assets against high attack potential under the
assumption that the inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the
TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol
(OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD). Otherwise the confidentiality of the standard data shall be protected against
attacker with at least Enhanced-Basic attack potential (AVA_VAN.3).
7. TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS
TOE Security Functions are provided by the MultiApp V3 embedded software (including the optional
NVM ES) and by the chip.
7.1.1 TSFs provided by the MultiApp V3 Software
SF
SF.REL
SF.AC
SF.SYM_AUTH
SF.SM
ST
Applicable on
Description
Protection of data
Access control
Symmetric authentication
Secure messaging
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SF.CA
SF.TA_CER
SF.TA_AUT
SF.AA
Chip Authentication
Validity of the Certificate Chain
Terminal Authentication Mechanism
Active Authentication
Table 14: Security Functions provided by the MultiApp v3 Software
The SF.REL function provides the protection of data on the TOE. It encompasses:
 physical protection of the TOE as defined in FPT_PHP.3, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1,
 the test mechanisms as defined in FPT_TST.1,
 protection against misuse of tests as defined in FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2,
The SF.AC function provides the access control of the TOE. It encompasses:
 the access control by the terminal as defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1,
 the access control to specific data as defined in FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI,
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD,
FMT_MTD.1/DATE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,FMT_MTD.1/CAPK; FMT_MTD.1/AAK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
 the role management as defined in FMT_SMR.1 ,
 the management functions linked to the different states of the TOE as defined in FMT_SMF.1.
The SF.SYM_AUTH function provides the symmetric authentication functions to the TOE. It
encompasses:
 the
identification
and
authentication
as
defined
in
FIA_UID.1/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.1/MRTDFIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5
 the identification and authentication in personalisation phase as defined in
FIA_AFL.1/PERSO, FIA_UID.1/PERSO, and FIA_UAU.1/PERSO,
The role authentication as requested by FMT_SMR.1 .
The SF.SM function provides the secure messaging of the TOE. It encompasses:
,
 the secure transfer of data through SM as defined in FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1,
 the cryptographic mechanisms used for the authentication and the SM, as defined in
FCS_CKM.1/SYM, FCS_CKM.1/PERSO, FCS_COP.1/PERSO, and FCS_RND.1. Some
cryptographic mechanisms are used for both authentication and secure messaging. For
convenience, they are grouped in this function.
 the erasure of session keys as defined in FCS_CKM.4.
The SF.CA function provides the chip Authentication. It encompasses:
 the CA authentication as defined in FIA_API.1/CA, FIA_UAU.6
 the CA cryptographic algorithm as defined in FCS_CKM.1/CA, FCS_COP.1/SHA, and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC ,
 the generation and input of CA keys, as defined in FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair and
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK,
 The role authentication as requested by FMT_SMR.1 .
The SF.TA_CER function provides the validity of the Certificate Chain. It encompasses:
 the initialisation and update of data used for the validation, as defined in
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD, FMT_MTD.1/DATE, and FMT_MTD.3.
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
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V1.docx
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The SF.TA_AUT function provides the TA Mechanism. It encompasses:
 the cryptographic mechanisms used for the authentication,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER and FCS_COP.1/SHA,
 The role authentication as requested by FMT_SMR.1 .
The SF.AA function provides the active authentication. It encompasses:
 the AA protocol itself as defined in FIA_API.1/AA,
 the AA cryptographic algorithm as defined in FCS_COP.1/AA,
 the generation and input of AA keys, as defined in
FMT_MTD.1/AAK.
as
defined
in
FCS_CKM.1/KeyPair and
7.1.2 TSFs provided by the M7820 chip
The evaluation is a composite evaluation and uses the results of the CC evaluation provided by [CRIC]. The IC and its primary embedded software have been evaluated at level EAL 5+.
SF
Description
SF_DPM
Device phase management
SF_PS
Protection against snooping
SF_PMA
Protection against modifying attacks
SF_PLA
Protection against logical attacks
SF_CS
Cryptographic support
Table 15: Security Functions provided by the M7820 chip
These SF are described in [ST-IC].
ST
Applicable on
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8. GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
Glossary
Term
Active Authentication
Agreement
Application note
Audit records
Authenticity
Basic Access Control
(BAC)
Basic
Inspection
System
with
Basic
Access Control protocol
(BIS-BAC)
Basic
Inspection
System with PACE
protocol (BIS-PACE)
Biographical
(biodata)
Biometric
data
1
2
data
reference
Definition
Security mechanism defined in [PKI] option by which means the MTRD’s chip
proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the
MTRD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of
organization.
This term is used in the current PP in order to reflect an appropriate
relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Optional informative part of the ST containing sensitive supporting information
that is considered relevant or useful for the evaluation or use of the TOE.
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the travel document’s chip to
store the Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data.
Ability to confirm that the travel document itself and the data elements stored in
were issued by the travel document Issuer
Security mechanism defined in [PKI] by which means the travel document’s
chip proves and the basic inspection system (with BAC) protects their
communication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic Access
Keys (see there) based on MRZ information as key seed and access condition
to data stored on travel document’s chip according to LDS.
1
A technical system being used by an official organisation and operated by a
governmental organisation and verifying correspondence between the stored
and printed MRZ.
BIS-BAC implements the terminal’s part of the Basic Access Control protocol
and authenticates itself to the travel document using the Document Basic
Access Keys drawn form printed MRZ data for reading the less-sensitive data
(travel document details data and biographical data) stored on the travel
document.
See also par. 1.2.5; also [PKI].
2
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and verifying the
travel document presenter as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by
comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document presenter with
the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel document holder).
BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and
authenticates itself to the travel document using a shared password (PACE
password) and supports Passive Authentication. A technical system being
used by an inspecting authority and verifying the ePass presenter as the ePass
holder (for ePassport: by comparing the real biometrical data (face) of the
ePass presenter with the stored biometrical data (DG2) of the ePass holder).
The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PCT additionally
supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol.
The personalised details of the travel document holder appearing as text in the
visual and machine readable zones of and electronically stored in the travel
document. The biographical data are less-sensitive data.
Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document holder in the
travel document as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data
(e.g. finger and iris).
an inspecting authority; concretely, by a control officer
concretely, by a control officer
ST
Applicable on
Ref:
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Term
Card Access Number
(CAN)
Counterfeit
Country Signing CertA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Country
Certification
(CSCA)
Signing
Authority
Document Basic Access
Keys
Document Details Data
Document
Object (SOD)
Security
Document Signer (DS)
Eavesdropper
Enrolment
ePassport application
Forgery
Global Interoperability
ST
Applicable on
Definition
A short password that is printed or displayed on the document. The CAN is a
non-blocking password. The CAN may be static (printed on the Passport),
semi-static (e.g. printed on a label on the Passport) or dynamic (randomly
chosen by the electronic travel document and displayed by it using e.g.
ePaper, OLED or similar technologies), see [ICAO-TR-SAC]
An unauthorised copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by
whatever means [PKI].
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key
(KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority and stored in the
rightful terminals.
An organisation enforcing the policy of the ePass Issuer with respect to
confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in the ePass. The CSCA
represents the country specific root of the PKI for the ePasss and creates the
Document Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having to be
distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [PKI], 5.5.1.
Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with
encryption (key KBENC) and message authentication (key KBMAC) of data
transmitted between the TOE and an inspection system using BAC [PKI]. They
are derived from the MRZ and used within BAC to authenticate an entity able
to read the printed MRZ of the passport book; see [PKI].
Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document representing
the document details like document type, issuing state, document number,
date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority. The document details data are
less-sensitive data.
A RFC 3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups: A hash for each Data
Group in use shall be stored in the Security Data. It is stored in the ePassport
application (EF.SOD) of the travel document. It may carry the Document
Signer Certificate (CDS); see [PKI], sec. A.10.4.
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the Document
Security Object stored on the ePass for passive authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the Document
Signer Certificate (CDS)(CDS), see [PKI]. This role is usually delegated to a
Personalisation Agent.
A threat agent reading the communication between the travel document and
the terminal to gain the data on the travel document.
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that
person's identity; see [PKI].
A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data (incl.
biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl. MRZ); this
application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst other as a machine
readable travel document (MRTD). See [ICAO-TR-SAC].
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the
biographical data or portrait; see [PKI].
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different
States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
systems in other States, and to utilise that data in inspection operations in their
respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the
standardised specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine
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Term
IC Dedicated Software
IC Embedded Software
Impostor
Improperly documented
person
Initialisation Data
Inspection
Inspection system
Integrated circuit (IC)
Integrity
Issuing Organisation
Issuing State
Logical Data Structure
(LDS)
Machine readable zone
(MRZ)
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
Manufacturer
ST
Applicable on
Definition
readable data in all travel documents; see [PKI].
Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC
manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of the IC
hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing delivery procedures
between different players. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain life cycle phases.
Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC developer. The
IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life cycle phase and
embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life cycle phase of the TOE.
A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name
and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to
represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that
person’s document; see [PKI].
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel document
or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel document or visa;
(c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if
required; see [PKI].
Any data defined by the travel document manufacturer and injected into the
non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer. These data are,
for instance, used for traceability and for IC identification as travel document
material (IC identification data).
The act of an official organisation (inspection authority) examining an travel
document presented to it by an travel document presenter and verifying its
authenticity as the travel document holder. See also [PKI].
see BIS-PACE for this PP.
see also BIS-BAC for general information
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory
functions. The travel document’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements stored upon have
not been altered from that created by the travel document Issuer.
Organisation authorised to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organisation, issuer of the Laissez-passer); see [PKI].
The country issuing the travel document; see [PKI].
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology [PKI]. The capacity expansion technology used is the
travel document’s chip.
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the travel document or MRP
Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the travel document,
containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR
methods; see [PKI].
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived from the
machine readable zone and may be used for both PACE and BAC.
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern, fingerprint
or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that can be read
and verified by machine; see [PKI].
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit and the travel
document Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel document. The
Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the manufacturing life-cycle
phase. The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and
travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
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Term
PACE password
PACE Terminal (PCT)
Passive authentication
Passport (physical and
electronic)
Password Authenticated
Connection
Establishment (PACE)
Personalisation
Personalisation Agent
Personalisation Data
Pre-personalisation
Data
ST
Applicable on
Definition
A password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
A technical system verifying correspondence between the password stored in
the travel document and the related value presented to the terminal by the
travel document presenter.
PCT implements the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and authenticates
itself to the ePass using a shared password (CAN or MRZ).
Security mechanism implementing (i) verification of the digital signature of the
Card/Chip or Document Security Object and (ii) comparing the hash values of
the read data fields with the hash values contained in the Card/Chip or
Document Security Object. See [PKI].
An optically and electronically readable document in form of a paper/plastic
cover and an integrated smart card. The Passport is used in order to verify that
identity claimed by the Passport presenter is commensurate with the identity of
the Passport holder stored on/in the card.
A communication establishment protocol defined in [ICAO-TR-SAC]. The
PACE Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement
protocol providing implicit password-based authentication of the
communication partners (e.g. smart card and the terminal connected): i.e.
PACE provides a verification, whether the communication partners share the
same value of a password π). Based on this authentication, PACE also
provides a secure communication, whereby confidentiality and authenticity of
data transferred within this communication channel are maintained.
The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document.
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to personalise
the travel document for the travel document holder by some or all of the
following activities:
(i)establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the biographic data
in the travel document,
(ii)enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document holder,
(iii)writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document (optical
personalisation) and storing them in the travel document (electronic
personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined in [PKI],
(iv) writing the document details data,
(v) writing the initial TSF data,
(vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in [PKI] (in the role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among
several institutions according to the operational policy of the travel document
Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of this role.
A set of data incl. (i) individual-related data (biographic and biometric data,) of
the travel document holder, (ii) dedicated document details data and (iii)
dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Card/Chip Security Object, if installed, and
the Document Security Object). Personalisation data are gathered and then
written into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in
the life cycle phase card issuing.
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the
Manufacturer for traceability of the non-personalised travel document and/or to
secure shipment within or between the life cycle phases manufacturing and
card issuing.
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Term
Pre-personalised travel
document’s chip
Receiving State
Reference data
RF-terminal
Rightful
equipment
(rightful
terminal
or
rightful Card)
Secondary image
Secure messaging
combined mode
Skimming
Standard
Procedure
in
Inspection
Supplemental
Control
Terminal
Access
TOE tracing data
Travel document
Travel
document
(electronic)
Travel document holder
Travel document Issuer
(issuing authority)
Travel
document
presenter
TSF data
Unpersonalised
document
User Data
ST
travel
Applicable on
Definition
travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique
Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
The Country to which the travel document holder is applying for entry; see
[PKI].
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an authentication
attempt.
A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip according to
ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO14443]
A technical device being expected and possessing a valid, certified key pair for
its authentication, whereby the validity of the related certificate is verifiable up
to the respective root CertA. A rightful terminal can be either BIS-PACE (see
Inspection System).
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document
by whatever means; see [PKI].
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [ISO7816]
Imitation of a rightful terminal to read the travel document or parts of it via the
contactless/contact communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of
the printed MRZ and CAN dataPACE password.
A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document and a
terminal as required by [ICAO-TR-SAC], namely (i) PACE and (ii) Passive
Authentication with SOD. SIP can generally be used by BIS-PACE and BISBAC.
A Technical Report which specifies PACE v2 as an access control mechanism
that is supplemental to Basic Access Control.
A Terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through a
contactless / contact interface.
Technical information about the current and previous locations of the travel
document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document holder)
recognising the travel document
Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by the holder
for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and
which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate
mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine read; see [PKI] (there “Machine readable
travel document”).
The contactless/contact smart card integrated into the plastic or paper, optical
readable cover and providing the following application: ePassport.
A person for whom the ePass Issuer has personalised the travel document.
Organisation authorised to issue an electronic Passport to the travel document
holder
A person presenting the travel document to a terminal and claiming the identity
of the travel document holder.
Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE
(CC part 1 [CC-1]).
travel document material prepared to produce a personalised travel document
containing an initialised and pre-personalised travel document’s chip.
All data (being not authentication data)
(i)stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel document as
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MultiApp v3: eTravel EAC on BAC Security Target
Term
Definition
defined in [PKI]and
(ii)being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal acting as
Basic Inspection System with PACE (in the sense of [ICAO-TR-SAC]).
Verification data
ST
Applicable on
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF
(CC part 1 [CC-1]). Information stored in TOE resources that can be operated
upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and upon which the TSF places no
special meaning (CC part 2 [CC-2]).
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to
the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the
reference data known for the claimed identity.
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MultiApp v3: eTravel EAC on BAC Security Target
Acronyms
Acronym
AA
BAC
BIS-BAC
BIS-PACE
CAN
CC
CertA
MRZ
n.a.
OSP
PACE
PCD
PICC
PP
RF
SAC
Term
Active Authentication
Basic Access Control
Basic Inspection System with BAC (equivalent to Basic Inspection System as used in [9])
Basic Inspection System with PACE
Card Access Number
Common Criteria
Certification Authority
Machine readable zone
Not applicable
Organisational security policy
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
Proximity Coupling Device
Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
Protection Profile
Radio Frequency
SAR
SFR
SIP
TOE
TSF
TSP
Security assurance requirements
Security functional requirement
Standard Inspection Procedure, see [ICAO-TR-SAC]
Target of Evaluation
TOE security functionality
TOE Security Policy (defined by the current document)
ST
Supplemental Access Control
Applicable on
Ref:
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V1.docx
 Gemalto Public  Gemalto Private  Gemalto Restricted  Gemalto Confidential  Gemalto Secret .
No disclosure to a third party without prior written consent of Gemalto
Rev :
Page : 65 / 65
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