Security Target: XSMART e-Passport V1.4_ASE(EAC with SAC)_ENG_V1.5

Security Target: XSMART e-Passport V1.4_ASE(EAC with SAC)_ENG_V1.5
XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC
on M7892
Security Target
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XSMART_ASE
[ Table of Contents ]
REFERENCED DOCUMENTS ...................................................................................................................... 3
1.
2.
3.
4.
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1.
SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE ....................................................................................................... 5
1.2.
TOE REFERENCE .............................................................................................................................. 5
1.3.
TOE OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................... 6
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ................................................................................................................. 18
2.1.
CC CONFORMANCE CLAIM............................................................................................................. 18
2.2.
PP CLAIM ....................................................................................................................................... 18
2.3.
PACKAGE CLAIM ............................................................................................................................. 18
2.4.
CONFORMANCE RATIONALE ........................................................................................................... 19
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINEION ................................................................................................ 20
3.1.
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................................. 20
3.2.
ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................................ 26
3.3.
THREATS ......................................................................................................................................... 28
3.4.
ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ....................................................................................... 33
SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................... 37
4.1.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE .......................................................................................... 37
4.2.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT................................................. 41
4.3.
SECURITY OBJECTIVE RATIONALE ................................................................................................ 45
5.
EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEfiNITION ..................................................................................... 49
6.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................... 55
7.
8.
6.1.
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE .............................................................. 58
6.2.
SECURITY ASSUARANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE ............................................................. 87
6.3.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE........................................................................................ 87
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION. ................................................................................................. 98
7.1.
TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS BY THE SOFTWARE ............................................................................ 98
7.2.
TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS BY IC CHIP ....................................................................................... 98
GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS ....................................................................................................... 101
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Referenced Documents
[CC]
Common Criteria for Evaluation of IT Security, Version 3.1r4, CCBM-2012-09-0041
[CEM]
Common Criteria Methodology for Evaluation of IT Security , Version 3.1r4, CCBM-2012-09-004
[CCMB]
CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation
[PACE-PP-
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
0068]
Inspection Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011, Version 1.0, November
2011
[EAC-PP-
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application
0056]
Extended Access Control with PACE (EAC PP), BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012(Version 1.3.0, 20th
January 2012)
[ICPP]
Security IC Platform Protection Profile; registered and certified by BSI (Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik) under the reference BSI-PP-0035-2007, Version 1.0,
June 2007
[BAC-PP-
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
0055]
Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0055, Version 1.10, 25th March 2009
[ICST]
Security Target Lite M7892 B11 Recertification including optional Software Libraries RSA - EC SHA-2 - Toolbox, Version 0.3, October 13, 2015
[GPCS]
GlobalPlatform Card Specification, Version 2.1.1, GlobalPlatform Inc., March 2003
[MRTD]
Civil Aviation Organization, ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents – Machine
Readable Passports, 2006 (this includes the latest supplemental for ICAO Doc 9303 which also
should be considered)
[EAC]
Technical Guideline TR-03110, Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents
–Extended
Access
Control
(EAC),
Password
Authenticated
Connection
Establishment (PACE), and Restricted Identification (RI), October 2010
[SAC]
ICAO MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS, TECHNICAL REPORT, Supplemental Access
Control for Machine Readable Travel Documents, Version 1.00, November 2010
[KM]
ISO/IEC 11770-3: Information technology . Security techniques . Key management -- Part 3:
Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques, 2008
[ISO14443]
ISO/IEC 14443 Identification cards -- Contactless integrated circuit cards -- Proximity cards,
2008-11
[ISO7816]
ISO/IEC 7816: Identification cards . Integrated circuit cards, Version Second Edition, 2008
[PKCS]
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4, Revised, November 1, 1993
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[ECC-TR]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Technical Guideline TR-03111
Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TR-03111, 17.04.2009
[AIS31]
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number generators
AIS31, Version 2.1, 2011-12-02
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1. Introduction
This section provides the information necessary for identifying security target and TOE.
1.1. Security Target Reference
Subject
XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on M7892 Security Target
ST Identification
XSMART e-Passport V1.4_ASE(EAC with SAC)_V1.5.docx
Version
V1.5
Author
LG CNS
Evaluation
Information Protection System Common Criteria V3.1r4
Criteria
Evaluation
EAL5+ (ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.3, AVA_VAN.5)
Assurance Level
Protection Profile
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 (Version 1.3.2, 05th December 2012)
Keywords
MRTD, ICAO, BSI,e-Passport
Table 1 Reference of Security Target
1.2. TOE Reference
TOE Name
Component
XSmart e-Passport V1.4 EAC with SAC on M7892
of
TOE
- XSmart e-Passport V1.4
-User Guide for Management ( XSmart e-Passport V1.4_AGD(EAC with SAC)_V1.4 )
-Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC
v1.02.013,SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated
software (firmware)
TOE
code
identification
Hex code
-e-Passport_V14_CLFX2400P.hex (implemented on 78CLFX2400P)
-e-Passport_V14_CLFX3000P.hex(implemented on 78CLFX3000P)
-e-Passport_V14_CLFX4000P.hex(implemented on 78CLFX4000P)
IC Chip
Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC
v1.02.013,SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with specific IC dedicated
software (firmware)
IC Chip reference
BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015
Table 2 Reference of TOE
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1.3. TOE Overview
This document is the security target regarding the XSmart e-Passport V1.4 on Infineon
SLE7892 IC Chip(referred to as “XSmart e-Passport V1.4” hereafter), which is the
composite TOE composed of a COS in charge of the chip operating system and an IC chip
as a part of hardware. TOE supports Basic Access Control and Active Authentication
according to [MRTD].
XSmart e-Passport V1.4 is the composed of HAL(Hardware Abstraction Layer),
AML(Application Middle Layer), LDS layer and IC Chip H/W.

HAL(Hardware Abstraction Layer) actually performs I/O handling according to
ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 14443 and memory management through the chip
interface. It supports the DES/RSA/AES/ECC security function using H/W Crypto
Library.

AML(Application Middle Layer) that lies in the middle of HAL and LDS layer
provides useful function required for key management, transaction, encryption
mechanism.

LDS layer supports [MRTD],[EAC],[SAC] functions defined in each spec. After the
first e-passport program is loaded in FLASH area, it is activated through the
installation and issuance process.

SLE 78CLFX2400P/3000P/4000P are the contact/contactless IC chips from
Infineon Technologies that have been certified by the Common Criteria from BSI.
- Protection Profile: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, June 2007,
BSI-PP-0035-2007
- TOE : Infineon Security Controller M7892 B11 with optional RSA2048/4096
v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2 v1.01 and Toolbox v1.02.013 libraries and with
specific IC dedicated software(firmware)
- Certification Number : BSI-DSZ-CC-0782-V2-2015
- Assurance level: CC EAL 6+ (ALC_FLR.1)
- Certified cryptography library: RSA2048/4096 v1.02.013, EC v1.02.013, SHA-2
v1.01
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1.3.1. TOE definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is an electronic travel document representing a contactless
smart card programmed according to ICAO Technical Report “Supplemental Access Control”
[SAC] (which means amongst others according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS)
defined in [MRTD])and additionally providing the Extended Access Control according to
the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [MRTD] and BSI TR-03110 [EAC], respectively. The communication
between terminal and chip shall be protected by Password Authenticated Connection
Establishment(PACE) according to Electronic Passport using Standard Inspection
Procedure with PACE (PACE PP), BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2 [PACE-PP-0068].
The TOE comprises of at least

the circuitry of the contactless/contact chip incl. all IC dedicated software
•
Hardware abstraction layer for IC chip (HAL)

The Application middle layer for MRTD application (AML)
• the MRTD application (LDS)
• the associated guidance documentation
1.3.2. TOE usage and security features for operational
A State or Organisation issues travel documents to be used by the holder for international
travel. The traveller presents a travel document to the inspection system to prove his or
her identity. The travel document in context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye
readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ
data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone
(MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the travel document’s chip according to LDS in case of
contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the
possession of a valid travel document personalised for a holder with the claimed identity
as given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored
in the travel document. The issuing State or Organisation ensures the authenticity of the
data of genuine travel documents. The receiving State trusts a genuine travel document of
an issuing State or Organisation
For this security target the travel document is viewed as unit of
(i) the physical part of the travel document in form of paper and/or plastic and
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chip. It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data
of the travel document holder
(a) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the travel document
surface,
(b) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(c) the printed portrait.
(ii)
the logical travel document as data of the travel document holder stored
according to the Logical Data Structure as defined in [MRTD] as specified by ICAO
on the contact based or contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact based /
contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel
document holder
(a) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(b) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(c) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both1
(d) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(e) the Document Security Object (SOD).
The issuing State or Organisation implements security features of the travel document to
maintain the authenticity and integrity of the travel document and their data. The physical
part of the travel document and the travel document’s chip are identified by the Document
Number.
The physical part of the travel document is protected by physical security measures (e.g.
watermark, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the travel document’s
chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalisation
procedures) [MRTD]. These security measures can include the binding of the travel
document’s chip to the travel document.
The logical travel document is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature
created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organisation and the
security features of the travel document’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel document, Active
Authentication of the travel document’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data
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Encryption of sensitive biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Doc 9303
[MRTD], and Password Authenticated Connection Establishment [SAC]. The Passive
Authentication Mechanism is performed completely and independently of the TOE by the
TOE environment.
This security target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in integrity
by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the
Extended Access Control Mechanism. This security
target
addresses the Chip
Authentication Version 1 described in [EAC] as an alternative to the Active Authentication
stated in [MRTD].
The confidentiality by Basic Access Control is a mandatory security feature that shall be
implemented by the TOE, too. Nevertheless this is not explicitly covered by this security
target as there are known weaknesses in the quality (i.e. entropy) of the BAC keys
generated by the environment. Therefore, the MRTD has additionally to fulfill
the ’Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control’ BSI-CC-PP-0055 [BAC-PP-0055]. Due to the fact that
[BAC-PP-0055] does only consider extended basic attack potential to the Basic Access
Control Mechanism (i.e. AVA_VAN.3) the MRTD has to be evaluated and certified
separately.
The confidentiality by Password Authenticated Connection Establishment (PACE) is a
mandatory security feature of the TOE. The travel document shall strictly conform to the
‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE (EAC PP)’ [EAC-PP-0056]. Note that [EAC-PP-0056]
considers high attack potential.
For the PACE protocol according to [SAC], the following steps shall be performed:
(i)
the travel document's chip encrypts a nonce with the shared password, derived
from the MRZ resp. CAN data and transmits the encrypted nonce together with
the domain parameters to the terminal.
(ii)
The terminal recovers the nonce using the shared password, by (physically)
reading the MRZ resp. CAN data.
(iii)
The travel document's chip and terminal computer perform a Diffie-Hellmann
key agreement together with the ephemeral domain parameters to create a
shared secret. Both parties derive the session keys KMAC and KENC from the
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shared secret.
(iv)
Each party generates an authentication token, sends it to the other party and
verifies the received token.
After successful key negotiation the terminal and the travel document's chip provide
private communication (secure messaging) [EAC], [SAC].
The security target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined
in [EAC]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) the Chip Authentication
Protocol Version 1 and (ii) the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1 (v.1). The Chip
Authentication Protocol v.1 (i) authenticates the travel document’s chip to the inspection
system and (ii) establishes secure messaging which is used by Terminal Authentication v.1
to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during
their transmission from the TOE to the inspection system. Therefore Terminal
Authentication v.1 can only be performed if Chip Authentication v.1 has been successfully
executed. The Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 consists of (i) the authentication of the
inspection system as entity authorized by the receiving State or Organisation through the
issuing State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive
biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems.
The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the receiving State by means of certification
the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System
Certificates
1.3.3. TOE life-cycle
The TOE life-cycle is described in terms of the four life-cycle phases. (With respect to the
[ICPP], the TOE life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)
Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit,
the IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components.
(Step2) The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated
circuit and the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software
and develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the e-Passport application
and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
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The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the
Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories is securely delivered
to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable
memories, the e-Passport application and the guidance documentation is securely
delivered to the travel document manufacturer.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel
document’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the travel document’s chip
Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC
manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel
document material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the travel
document manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the
travel document manufacturer.
If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the nonvolatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM).
(Step4 optional) The travel document manufacturer combines the IC with hardware for
the contact based / contactless interface in the travel document unless the travel
document consists of the card only.
(Step5) The travel document manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of
it in the non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM or FLASH) if
necessary, (ii) creates the e-Passport application, and (iii) equips travel document’s chips
with pre-personalization Data
The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered
from the travel document manufacturer to the Personalisation Agent. The travel document
manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the
Personalisation Agent.
Phase 3 “Personalisation of the travel document”
(Step6) The personalisation of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the travel
document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document holder
biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference
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data), (iii) the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the
travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel
document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the
Personalisation Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ
data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document security object.
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [MRTD] finalizes the
personalisation of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The
personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if
necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection
systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the
security policy of the issuing State or Organisation and can be used according to the
security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.
1.3.4. Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware required by the TOE
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to
perform its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and the
complete operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as well as the
antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to represent a complete
travel document, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for the secure operation of
the TOE.
1.3.5. TOE SCOPE
This security target includes native e-passport program and IC chip hardware with
firmware and crypto library
1.3.5.1.
Physical scope of TOE
This picture illustrates the physical scope of TOE.
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Figure. Physical scope of TOE
The physical scope of TOE includes the IC chip in the passport booklet, e-Passport
application with user data and TSF data.
The components of IC chip as are CPU, Crypto Co-Processor, I/O, Memory (RAM,
FLASH), and various H/W functions.
This security target address the Extended Access Control and Supplemental Access
Control.
In IC Chip’s flash area, after e-Passport application is installed, flash area is changed to
locked state.(non-programmable state)
Also, e-passport data like biometric data (face, fingerprint) and TSF data (keys for
authentication, seed key for BAC, CA private key) are saved in the flash area
Infineon SLE 78CLFX2400P/3000P/4000P which is the composition element of the IC chip,
is a product certified with CCRA EAL 6+ assurance level, and the composition elements
included in the authentication are IC chip hardware and cryptographic calculation software
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library as shown in the following.
IC Chip hardware
•
16 bit microprocessor(CPU)
•
8KB RAM
•
ROM : Not user available, H/W only)
•
FLASH : 240KB(2400P), 300KB(3000P), 404KB(4000P)
•
Memory Protection Unit(MPU), Random Number Generator(RNG), Timer(TIM),
Crypto co-processor
•
RF interface, address and data bus(ADBUS)
Software library for cryptographic operation
•
3DES , AES, RSA/ECC library
•
True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
•
Hash function( SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)
Figure. IC Chip H/W diagram
The IC chip hardware provide SCP module used in the symmetric key encryption
according to DES and AES standards, Crypto 2304T Crypto module used in the
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asymmetric key encryption, physical security measures such as shield, temperature sensor,
voltage sensor, and filter, and non-determinant hardware random number generator.
The firmware provides IC chip hardware management function such as flash download or
hardware testing. The cryptographic calculation software library provides calculations such
as digital signature generation/verification for hash value, ECDH key exchange, ECC/RSA
key pair generation, and ECC/RSA public key verification.
SCP(Symmetric Crypto)
•
TDES encryption and decryption
•
Retail MAC and Full Triple DES MAC generation/verification
•
AES encryption and decryption
[email protected]
•
Big Number calculation
•
Key distribution calculation for EAC session key distribution in EAC process
•
Digital signature verification calculation for certificate verification in EAC process
•
Digital signature generation calculation using chip authentication private key in AA
process
SHA-2 library
This library provides SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.
1.3.5.2.
Logical scope of TOE
TOE communicates with the inspection system according to the communication protocol
defined in ISO/IEC 14443-4. TOE implements the security mechanism EAC and SAC
defined in [EAC],[SAC]
This picture illustrates the logical scope of TOE.
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Figure. Logical scope of TOE
e-Passport application(LDS)
e-passport application program is an IC chip application program which implements the
function for storing/processing e-passport identity information and the security
mechanism to securely protect it according to the LDS (Logical Data Structure) format in
[MRTD]. e-passport application program provides security management function for epassport application program to the authenticated Personalization agent through SCP02
security mechanism provided in the card manager, and permits access to e-passport user
data through SAC and EAC secure messaging only when the access rights were acquired
through BAC secure messaging.
Application Middle Layer(AML)
AML is a middle layer for electronic passport application, in conjunction with HAL, to
support the functions of logic necessary for the key management, transaction and
encryption operations.
Hardware Abstraction Layer(HAL)
HAL is the hardware-dependent IC chip implementation like IC chip booting, hardware
resource management, algorithm operation using crypto library, security configuration
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setting of the IC chip. For SHA-1, it is implemented as a separate software, only the
portion that is used as part of the electronic passport is the TOE scope.
Physical attack countermeasures
To prevent a variety of physical attack from the outside, IC Chip protection is enabled.
Upon detecting a security violation, OS responds as card response stop, delay of card
response, card termination.
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2. Conformance Claims
2.1. CC Conformance Claim
This security target claims conformance to
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September
2012 [CC-1]
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012
[CC-2]
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security
Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1 Revision 4, September 2012
[CC-3]
as follows

Part 2 extended,

Part 3 conformant
The Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1 Revision 4, July 2012[CEM] has to be
taken into account.
2.2. PP Claim
The conformance of this ST to the Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable
Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PAC(EAC PP),
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012 (Version 1.3.2, 05th December 2012)[EAC-PP-0056] is claimed.
2.3. Package Claim
This security target is conforming to assurance package EAL5 augmented with
ALC_DVS.2 , AVA_VAN.5. defined in defined in [CC-3].
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2.4. Conformance rationale
This ST claims strict conformance to the [EAC-PP-0056].
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3. Security Problem Definition
3.1. Introduction
Asset
The primary assets to be protected by the TOE as long as they are in scope of the TOE
are (please refer to the glossary in PP [PACE-PP-0068], chap. 7)
Object
Asset
Definition
No.
Generic security property to
be maintained by the current
security policy
1
user data stored
on the TOE
2
user
data
transferred
between
the
TOE and the
terminal
connected (i.e.
an
authority
represented by
Basic Inspection
System
with
PACE)
All data (being not authentication
data) stored in the context of the
e-Passport application of the
travel document as defined in
[SAC] and being allowed to be
read
out
solely
by
an
authenticated terminal acting as
Basic Inspection System with
PACE (in the sense of [SAC]).
This asset covers ‘User Data on
the MRTD’s chip’, ‘Logical MRTD
Data’ and ‘Sensitive User Data’ in
[BAC-PP-0055].
All data (being not authentication
data) being transferred in the
context
of
the
e-Passport
application of the travel document
as defined in [SAC] between the
TOE
and
an
authenticated
terminal
acting
as
Basic
Inspection System with PACE (in
the sense of [SAC]).
User data can be received and
sent (exchange Û
{receive,
send}).
Confidentiality1
Integrity
Authenticity
Confidentiality2
Integrity
Authenticity
1
Though not each data element stored on the TOE represents a secret, the specification [SAC] anyway
requires securing their confidentiality: only terminals authenticated according to [SAC] can get access to the
user data stored. They have to be operated according to P.Terminal.
2
Though not each data element being transferred represents a secret, the specification [SAC] anyway
requires securing their confidentiality: the secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode is required for
all messages according to [SAC].
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3
travel document
tracing data
Technical information about the
current and previous locations of
the travel document gathered
unnoticeable
by
the
travel
document holder recognising the
TOE not knowing any PAC E
password.
TOE tracing data can be provided
/ gathered.
Unavailability3
Logical travel document sensitive User Data
: Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3,EF.DG4)
All these primary assets represent User Data in the sense of the CC
Application note : Due to interoperability reasons the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [MRTD] requires
that Basic Inspection Systems may have access to logical travel document data DG1, DG2,
DG5 to DG16. The TOE is not in certified mode, if it is accessed using BAC [MRTD]. Note
that the BAC mechanism cannot resist attacks with high attack potential (cf. [BAC-PP0055]). If supported, it is therefore recommended to used PACE instead of BAC. If
nevertheless BAC has to be used, it is recommended to perform Chip Authentication v.1
before getting access to data (except DG14), as this mechanism is resistant to high
potential attacks
The secondary assets also having to be protected by the TOE in order to achieve a
sufficient protection of the primary assets are:
Object
Asset
Definition
No.
Generic security property to
be maintained by the current
security policy
4
5
3
Accessibility to
the
TOE
functions
and
data only for
authorised
subjects
Genuineness of
the TOE
Property of the TOE to restrict
access to TSF and TSF-data
stored in the TOE to authorised
subjects only.
Availability
Property of the TOE to be
authentic in order to provide
claimed security functionality in a
proper way.
Availability
represents a prerequisite for anonymity of the travel document holder
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6
7
8
TOE
internal
secret
cryptographic
keys
TOE
internal
non-secret
cryptographic
material
travel document
communication
establishment
authorisation
data
This
asset
also
covers
‘Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip’
in [BAC-PP-0055].
Permanently or temporarily stored
secret cryptographic material used
by the TOE in order to enforce its
security functionality.
Permanently or temporarily stored
non-secret cryptographic (public)
keys
and
other
non-secret
material
(Document
Security
Object SOD containing digital
signature) used by the TOE in
order to enforce its security
functionality.
4
Restricted-revealable
authorisation information for a
human user being used for
verification of the authorisation
attempts as authorised user
(PACE password). These data are
stored in the TOE and are not to
be send to it.
Confidentiality
Integrity
Integrity
Authenticity
Confidentiality
Integrity
The secondary assets represent TSF and TSF-data in the sense of the CC.
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
Authenticity of the travel document’s chip
The authenticity of the travel document’s chip personalised by the issuing State or
Organisation for the travel document holder is used by the traveller to prove his
possession of a genuine travel document.
Due to strict conformance to PACE PP, this ST also includes all assets listed in [PACE-PP0068], chap 3.1 Subjects and external entities
External Subject
Entity
Role
Definition
No.
No.
1
1
travel
holder
document
A person for whom the travel document Issuer has
personalised the travel document 5.
4
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of CAN and MRZ to an
authorised person or device who definitely act according to respective regulations and are trustworthy.
5
i.e. this person is uniquely associated with a concrete electronic Passport
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2
-
travel
document
presenter
(traveller)
3
2
Terminal
4
3
Basic
Inspection
System with PACE
(BIS-PACE)
-
Document
(DS)
-
Country
Signing
Certification
Authority (CSCA)
5
6
6
7
Signer
This entity is commensurate with ‘MRTD Holder’ in
[BAC-PP-0055].
Please note that a travel document holder can also be
an attacker(s. below)
A person presenting the travel document to a terminal6
and claiming the identity of the travel document
holder.
This external entity is commensurate with ‘Traveller’ in
[BAC-PP-0055].
Please note that a travel document presenter can also
be an attacker (s. below).
A terminal is any technical system communicating with
the TOE through the contactless/contact interface.
The role ‘Terminal’ is the default role for any terminal
being recognised by the TOE as not being PACE
authenticated (‘Terminal’ is used by the travel
document presenter).
This entity is commensurate with ‘Terminal’ in [BACPP-0055].
A technical system being used by an inspecting
authority7 and verifying the travel document presenter
as the travel document holder (for e-Passport: by
comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel
document presenter with the stored biometric data
(DG2) of the travel document holder).
BIS-PACE implements the terminal’s part of the PACE
protocol and authenticates itself to the travel
document using a shared password (PACE password)
and supports Passive Authentication.
See also par. 1.2.5 above.
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and
signing the Document Security Object stored on the
travel document for passive authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA
issuing the Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see
[MRTD].
This role is usually delegated to a Personalisation
Agent.
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel
document Issuer with respect to confirming
correctness of user and TSF data stored in the travel
document. The CSCA represents the country specific
root of the PKI for the travel document and creates
the Document Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate
(CCSCA) having to be distributed by strictly secure
diplomatic means, see. [MRTD], 5.5.1.
In the sense of[SAC]
concretely, by a control officer
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7
8
9
10
8
4
Personalisation
Agent
5
Manufacturer
-
-
Attacker
Country
Verifying
Certification
Authority
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel
document Issuer to personalise the travel document
for the travel document holder by some or all of the
following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the
travel document holder for the biographic data in the
travel document, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference
data of the travel document holder, (iii) writing a
subset of these data on the physical travel document
(optical personalisation) and storing them in the travel
document (electronic personalisation) for the travel
document holder as defined in [MRTD], (iv) writing the
document details data, (v) writing the initial TSF data,
(vi) signing the Document Security Object defined in
[MRTD] (in the role of DS). Please note that the role
‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed among
several institutions according to the operational policy
of the travel document Issuer.
This entity is commensurate with ‘Personalisation
agent’ in [BAC-PP-0055].
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing
integrated circuit and the travel document
Manufacturer completing the IC to the travel
document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the
TOE during the manufacturing life cycle phase 8. The
TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC
Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using
this role Manufacturer.
This entity is commensurate with ‘Manufacturer’ in
[BAC-PP-0055].
A threat agent (a person or a process acting on his
behalf) trying to undermine the security policy defined
by the current PP, especially to change properties of
the assets having to be maintained. The attacker is
assumed to possess an at most high attack potential.
Please note that the attacker might ‘capture’ any
subject role recognised by the TOE.
This external entity is commensurate with ‘Attacker’ in
[BAC-PP-0055].
The Country Verifying Certification Authority
(CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State
or Organisation with respect
to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data
stored in the travel document. The
CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of
Inspection Systems and creates
the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The
updates of the public key of the
cf. also par. 1.2.3 in sec. 1.2.3 above
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11
-
-
-
-
Document Verifier
-
Terminal
-
Inspection
system(EIS)
-
Attacker
CVCA are distributed in the form of Country Verifying
CA Link-Certificates
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy
of the receiving
State with respect to the protection of sensitive
biometric reference data to be handled by
the Extended Inspection Systems. The Document
Verifier manages the authorization of
the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data
of the travel document in the limits
provided by the issuing States or Organizations in the
form of the Document Verifier
Certificates.
A terminal is any technical system communicating with
the TOE either through the contact interface or
through the contactless interface
travel document presented by the traveller and
verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller
as travel document holder.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) performs the
Advanced Inspection Procedure and therefore (i)
contains a terminal for the communication with the
travel document’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals
part of PACE and/or BAC; (iii) gets the authorization to
read the logical travel document either under PACE or
BAC by optical reading the travel document providing
this information. (iv) implements the Terminal
Authentication and Chip Authentication Protocols both
Version 1 according to [EAC] and (v) is authorized by
the issuing State or Organisation through the
Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the
sensitive biometric reference data. Security attributes
of the EIS are defined by means of the Inspection
System Certificates. BAC may only be used if
supported by the TOE. If both PACE and BAC are
supported by the TOE and the BIS, PACE must be
used.
Additionally to the definition from PACE PP [PACE-PP0068], chap 3.1 the definition of an attacker is refined
as followed: A threat agent trying (i) to manipulate the
logical travel document without authorization, (ii) to
read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3,
EF.DG4), (iii) to forge a genuine travel document, or
(iv) to trace a travel document.
Subjects and external entities9
9
This table defines external entities and subjects in the sense of [CC]. Subjects can be recognised by the
TOE independent of their nature (human or technical user). As result of an appropriate identification and
authentication process, the TOE creates . for each of the respective external entity . an ‘image’ inside and
‘works’ then with this TOE internal image (also called subject in [CC]). From this point of view, the TOE itself
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Advanced Inspection System
3.2. Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the
TOE will be used or is intended to be used.
A.Insp_Sys (Inspection Systems for global interoperability)
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [SAC] and/or BAC
[BAC-PP-0055]. be used. The EIS reads the logical travel document under PACE or BAC
and performs the Chip Authentication v.1 to verify the logical travel document and
establishes secure messaging. EIS supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 in
order to ensure access control and is authorized by the issuing State or Organisation
through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric
reference data.
perceives only ‘subjects’ and, for them, does not differ between ‘subjects’ and ‘external entities’. There is no
dedicated subject with the role ‘attacker’ within the current security policy, whereby an attacker might ‘capture’
any subject role recognised by the TOE
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Justification:
The assumption A.Insp_Sys does not confine the security objectives of the [PACE-PP-0068]
as it repeats the requirements of P.Terminal and adds only assumptions for the Inspection
Systems for handling the the EAC functionality of the TOE.
A.Auth_PKI (PKI for Inspection Systems)
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for
card verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold
authentication key pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control
rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or
Organisations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document
Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving
States or Organisations. The issuing States or Organisations distribute the public keys of
their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their travel document’s chip.
Justification:
This assumption only concerns the EAC part of the TOE. The issuing and use of card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control is neither relevant for the PACE part
of the TOE nor will the security objectives of the [PACE-PP-0068] be restricted by this
assumption. For the EAC functionality of the TOE the assumption is necessary because it
covers the pre-requisite for performing the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1.
This ST includes the assumption from the PACE PP [PACE-PP-0068], chap 3.4, namely
A.Passive_Auth.
A.Passive_Auth (PKI for Passive Authentication)
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for
passive authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical travel
document. The issuing State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which
securely generates, stores and uses the Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the
Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to distribute the Country
Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document
Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document
Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key
secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document
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Security Objects of the travel documents. The CA creates the Document Signer
Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving
States and Organizations. It is assumed that the Personalization Agent ensures that the
Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user data according to
[MRTD].
3.3. Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in
collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method
of use in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the
TOE.
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as
specified below.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data (Read the sensitive biometric reference data)
Adverse action:
An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication
interface
of
the
travel
document’s
chip.
The
attack
T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [8]) in respect of
the attack path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored
on the travel document’s chip) but differs from those in the asset under the attack
(sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other
data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing the PACE Password) and therefore the
possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are
stored only on the travel document’s chip as private sensitive personal data
whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical part
of the travel document as well.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, knowing the PACE Password, being in possession of a
legitimate travel document
Asset:
confidentiality of logical travel document sensitive user data (i.e. biometric
reference)
T.Counterfeit (Counterfeit of travel document chip data)
Adverse action:
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An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine travel document’s chip to be used as part of a
counterfeit travel document. This violates the authenticity of the travel
document’s chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a travel
document.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the
data from a genuine travel document’s chip and copy them to another
appropriate chip to imitate this genuine travel document’s chip.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel
documents
Asset:
authenticity of user data stored on the TOE
This ST includes all threats from the PACE PP [PACE-PP-0068], chap 3.2, namely T.Skimming,
T.Eavesdropping, T.Tracing, T.Abuse-Func, T.Information_Leakage, T.Phys-Tamper, T.Forgery and
T.Malfunction, below :
T.Skimming
(Skimming
travel
document
/
Capturing
Card-Terminal
Communication)
Adverse action :
An attacker imitates an inspection system in order to get access to the user data
stored on or transferred between the TOE and the inspecting authority connected
via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent :
having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of
the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset:
confidentiality of logical travel document data
Application Note : MRZ is printed and CAN is printed or stuck on the travel document.
Please note that neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restrictedrevealable, cf. OE.Travel_Document_Holder.
T.Eavesdropping (Eavesdropping on the communication between the TOE and
the PACE terminal)
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Adverse action:
An attacker is listening to the communication between the travel document and
the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE in order to gain the user data transferred
between the TOE and the terminal connected.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of
the shared password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset:
confidentiality of logical travel document data
T.Tracing (Tracing travel document)
Adverse action:
An attacker tries to gather TOE tracing data (i.e. to trace the movement of the
travel document) unambiguously identifying it remotely by establishing or
listening to a communication via the contactless/contact interface of the TOE.
Threat agent:
potential, cannot read and does not know the correct value of the shared
password (PACE password) in advance.
Asset:
privacy of the travel document holder
Application Note : This Threat completely covers and extends “T.Chip-ID” from BAC PP
[MRTD].
Application Note: Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any uniquesecret-based authentication of the travel document’s chip (no Chip Authentication or
Active Authentication), a threat like T.Counterfeit (counterfeiting travel document) 10
cannot be averted by the current TOE.
T.Forgery (Forgery of Data)
Adverse action:
An attacker fraudulently alters the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel
document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected in
10
Such a threat might be formulated like: ‘An attacker produces an unauthorised copy or reproduction of a
genuine travel document to be used as part of a counterfeit Passport: he or she may generate a new data set
or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine travel document and copy them on another
functionally appropriate chip to imitate this genuine travel document. This violates the authenticity of the
travel document being used for authentication of an travel document presenter as the travel document holder’ .
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order to outsmart the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE by means of changed travel
document holder’s related reference data (like biographic or biometric data). The
attacker does it in such a way that the terminal connected perceives these
modified data as authentic one.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential
Asset:
integrity of the travel document
T.Abuse-Func (Abuse of Functionality)
Adverse action:
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE
operational phase in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data stored in
the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE or (iii) to
manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the
TOE. This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialisation and
personalisation in the operational phase after delivery to the travel document
holder.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel
documents
Asset:
integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of
the travel document
Application Note: Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the
capabilities of the test features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software being not
specified here.
T.Information_Leakage (Information Leakage from travel document)
Adverse action:
An attacker may exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel
document or/and exchanged between the TOE and the terminal connected. The
information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the
attacker.
Threat agent:
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having high attack potential
Asset:
confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel document
Application Note: Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power
consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time
requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission, but is
more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may be derived
either
from
measurements
of
the
contactless
interface
(emanation)
or
direct
measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can
then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are Differential
Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the
attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential
Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper (Physical Tampering)
Adverse action:
An attacker may perform physical probing of the travel document in order (i) to
disclose the TSF-data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the TOE’s Embedded
Software. An attacker may physically modify the travel document in order to alter
(I) its security functionality (hardware and software part, as well), (ii) the User
Data or the TSF-data stored on the travel document.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel
documents
Asset:
integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of
the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel
document
Application Note: Physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or
manipulation of the user data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system)
or the TSF data (e.g authentication key of the travel document) or indirectly by
preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features
(e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires
a direct interaction with the travel document’s internals. Techniques commonly employed
in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that,
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hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of the user data and the TSF data
may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security
function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
T.Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action:
An attacker may cause a malfunction the travel document’s hardware and
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or
modify security features or functionality of the TOE’ hardware or to (ii) circumvent,
deactivate or modify security functions of the TOE’s Embedded Software. This
may be achieved e.g. by operating the travel document outside the normal
operating conditions, exploiting errors in the travel document’s Embedded
Software or misusing administrative functions. To exploit these vulnerabilities an
attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent:
having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate travel
documents, having information about the functional operation
Asset:
integrity and authenticity of the travel document, availability of the functionality of
the travel document, confidentiality of User Data and TSF-data of the travel
document
Application note: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction
with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the
threat T.Phys-Tamper) assuming a detailed knowledge about TOE’s internals.
3.4. Organizational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations
P.Sensitive_Data (Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data)
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive
private personal data of the travel document holder. The sensitive biometric reference
data can be used only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the
time the travel document is presented to the inspection system (Extended Inspection
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Systems). The issuing State or Organisation authorizes the Document Verifiers of the
receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the limits
defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The travel document’s chip shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission
to the Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication Version 1.
P.Personalisation (Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State
or )Organisation only
The issuing State or Organisation guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of
the logical travel document with respect to the travel document holder. The
personalisation of the travel document for the holder is performed by an agent authorized
by the issuing State or Organisation only.
This ST includes all OSPs from the PACE PP [PACE-PP-0068], chap 3.3, namely P.PreOperational, P.Card_PKI, P.Trustworthy_PKI, P.Manufact and P.Terminal.
P.Manufact (Manufacturing of the travel document’s chip)
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
travel document Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalisation Data which contains at least
the Personalisation Agent Key.
P.Pre-Operational (Pre-operational handling of the travel document)
1.) The travel document Issuer issues the travel document and approves it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations.
2.) The travel document Issuer guarantees correctness of the user data (amongst other
of those, concerning the travel document holder) and of the TSF-data permanently
stored in the TOE.
3.) The travel document Issuer uses only such TOE’s technical components (IC) which
enable traceability of the travel documents in their manufacturing and issuing life
cycle phases, i.e. before they are in the operational phase.
4.) If the travel document Issuer authorises a Personalisation Agent to personalise the
travel document for travel document holders, the travel document Issuer has to
ensure that the Personalisation Agent acts in accordance with the travel document
Issuer’s policy.
P.Card_PKI (PKI for Passive Authentication (issuing branch))
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Application Note: The description below states the responsibilities of involved parties and
represents the logical, but not the physical structure of the PKI. Physical distribution ways
shall be implemented by the involved parties in such a way that all certificates belonging
to the PKI are securely distributed / made available to their final destination, e.g. by using
directory services.
1.) The travel document Issuer shall establish a public key infrastructure for the passive
authentication, i.e. for digital signature creation and verification for the travel
document. For this aim, he runs a Country Signing Certification Authority (CSCA).
The travel document Issuer shall publish the CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) .
2.) The CSCA shall securely generate, store and use the CSCA key pair. The CSCA shall
keep the CSCA Private Key secret and issue a self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA)
having to be made available to the travel document Issuer by strictly secure means,
see [MRTD], 5.5.1. The CSCA shall create the Document Signer Certificates for the
Document Signer Public Keys (CDS) and make them available to the travel document
Issuer, see [MRTD], 5.5.1.
3.) A Document Signer shall (i) generate the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hand over
the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iii) keep the
Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) securely use the Document Signer
Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of travel documents.
P.Trustworthy_PKI (Trustworthiness of PKI)
The CSCA shall ensure that it issues its certificates exclusively to the rightful organisations
(DS) and DSs shall ensure that they sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to
be stored on the travel document
P.Terminal (Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals)
The Basic Inspection Systems with PACE (BIS-PACE) shall operate their terminals as
follows:
1.) The related terminals (basic inspection system, cf. above) shall be used by terminal
operators and by travel document holders as defined in [MRTD].
2.) They shall implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [SAC], of the Passive
Authentication [MRTD] and use them in this order11. The PACE terminal shall use
randomly and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for
generating ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
11
This order is commensurate with [SAC]
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4.) They shall also store the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public
Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to perform Passive
Authentication (determination of the authenticity of data groups stored in the travel
document, [MRTD]).
5.) The related terminals and their environment shall ensure confidentiality and integrity
of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of PACE passwords,
integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure operation of
the TOE according to the current ST.
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4. Security Objectives
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for
the TOE environment.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the TOE
independent of TOE environment
OT.Sens_Data_ConfConfidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3
and EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems.
The authorization of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System
Certificate used for the successful authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the
authorization defined in the Document Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the
Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organisation. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical travel document data during their transmission to
the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference
data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof Proof of the travel document’s chip authenticity
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
the travel document’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organisation by
means of the Chip Authentication Version 1 as defined in [EAC]. The authenticity proof
provided by travel document’s chip shall be protected against attacks with high attack
potential.
Application note: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the travel document’s chip to have (i) a
unique identity as given by the travel document’s Document Number, (ii) a secret to prove
its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall
protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data
to verify the authentication attempt of travel document’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip
Authentication Public Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the travel
document’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG14) in the LDS defined in [MRTD] and (ii) the hash value of DG14 in the Document
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Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
OT.Data_Integrity (Integrity of Data)
The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by
protecting these data against unauthorised modification (physical manipulation and
unauthorised modifying).The TOE must ensure integrity of the User Data and the TSFdata during their exchange between the TOE and the terminal connected (and
represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the PACE Authentication.
OT.Data_Authenticity (Authenticity of Data)
The TOE must ensure authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data stored on it by
enabling verification of their authenticity at the terminal-side 12 .The TOE must ensure
authenticity of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE
and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the
PACE Authentication. It shall happen by enabling such a verification at the terminal-side
(at receiving by the terminal) and by an active verification by the TOE itself (at receiving
by the TOE)13.
OT.Data_Confidentiality (Confidentiality of Data)
The TOE must ensure confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data by granting read
access only to the PACE authenticated BIS-PACE connected. The TOE must ensure
confidentiality of the User Data and the TSF-data during their exchange between the TOE
and the terminal connected (and represented by PACE authenticated BIS-PACE) after the
PACE Authentication.
OT.Tracing (Tracing travel document)
The TOE must prevent gathering TOE tracing data by means of unambiguous identifying
the travel document remotely through establishing or listening to a communication via the
contactless/contact interface of the TOE without knowledge of the correct values of
shared passwords (PACE passwords) in advance.
Application note: Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not support any uniquesecret-based authentication of the travel document’s chip (no Chip Authentication), a
security objective like OT.Chip_Auth_Proof (proof of travel document authenticity) 14
12
Verification of SOD
13
Secure messaging after the PACE authentication, see also[SAC]
14
Such a security objective might be formulated like: ‘The TOE must enable the terminal connected to verify
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cannot be achieved by the current TOE.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func (Protection against Abuse of Functionality)
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE, which may not be used in TOE
operational phase, can be abused in order (i) to manipulate or to disclose the User Data
stored in the TOE, (ii) to manipulate or to disclose the TSF-data stored in the TOE, (iii) to
manipulate (bypass, deactivate or modify) soft-coded security functionality of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak (Protection against Information Leakage)
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential User Data or/and TSFdata stored and/or processed by the travel document

by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines

by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or

by a physical manipulation of the TOE
Application note: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal
processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker.
OT.Prot_Phys-TamperProtection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF-data and the travel document’s Embedded Software by means of

measuring through galvanic contacts representing a direct physical probing on the
chip’s surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring
voltage and current) or

measuring not using galvanic contacts, but other types of physical interaction
between electrical charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC
failure analysis)

manipulation of the hardware and its security functionality, as well as

controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF-data)
with a prior

reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functionality.
the authenticity of the travel document as a whole device as issued by the travel document Issuer (issuing PKI
branch of the travel document Issuer) by means of the Passive and Chip Authentication as defined in [MRTD]’.
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OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation have not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent functional errors in the TOE. The environmental
conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any
contacts), clock frequency or temperature.
The following TOE security objectives address the aspects of identified threats to be
countered involving TOE’s environment.
OT.Identification Identification of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store Initialisation15 and Pre-Personalisation Data in its
non-volatile memory. The Initialisation Data must provide a unique identification of the IC
during the manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases of the travel document.
The storage of the Pre-Personalisation data includes writing of the Personalisation Agent
Key(s).
OT.AC_PersAccess Control for Personalisation of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the
Document Security Object according to LDS [MRTD] and the TSF data can be written by
authorized Personalisation Agents only. The logical travel document data in EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after
personalisation of the document.
Application note: The OT.AC_Pers implies that the data of the LDS groups written during
personalisation for travel document holder (at least EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be
changed using write access after personalisation.
Application Note:
The cryptographic processor and RSA / ECC cryptographic library that is mounted on the
IC chip must implement countermeasures to prevent abuse of information leakage while
cryptographic processings.
15
Amongst other, IC Identification data
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4.2. Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organisation
The issuing State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document (Travel document Authentication Key)
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to (i) generate the travel document’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and
store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in
EF.DG14 and (iii) support inspection systems of receiving States or Organisations to verify
the authenticity of the travel document’s chip used for genuine travel document by
certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by means of the Document Security
Object.
Justification:
This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those
from [PACE-PP-0068] in order to counter the Threat T.Counterfeit as it specifies the prerequisite for the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 .
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
(Authorization
for
Use
of
Sensitive
Biometric
Reference Data)
The issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure
in order to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of travel document
holders to authorized receiving States or Organisations. The Country Verifying Certification
Authority of the issuing State or Organisation generates card verifiable Document Verifier
Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
Justification:
This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those
from [PACE-PP-0068] in order to handle the Threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the
Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it
specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the
need of an PKI for this protocol and the responsibilities of its root instance. The Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1 is one of the additional features of the TOE described only in
this Protection Profile and not in [PACE-PP-0068].
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Receiving State or Organisation
The receiving State or Organisation will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_Travel_Document (Examination of the physical part of the travel
document)
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation must examine the travel
document presented by the traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical
security measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel
document. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or
Organisation, and (ii) implements the terminal part of PACE [SAC] and/or the Basic Access
Control [MRTD]. Extended Inspection Systems perform additionally to these points the
Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel
document’s chip.
Justification:
This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those
from [PACE-PP-0068] in order to handle the Threat T.Counterfeit and the Assumption
A.Insp_Sys by demanding the Inspection System to perform the Chip Authentication
protocol v.1. OE.Exam_Travel_Document also repeats partly the requirements from
OE.Terminal in [PACE-PP-0068] and therefore also counters T.Forgery and A.Passive_Auth
from [PACE-PP-0068]. This is done because a new type of Inspection System is introduced
in this ST as the Extended Inspection System is needed to handle the additional features
of a travel document with Extended Access Control
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document (Protection of data from the logical travel
document)
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical travel document. The inspection system will
prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is
successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
Justification:
This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those
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from [PACE-PP-0068] in order to handle the Assumption A.Insp_Sys by requiring the
Inspection System to perform secure messaging based on the Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems (Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems)
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organisations authorizes Extended
Inspection Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive
biometric reference data of the logical travel document. The Extended Inspection System
authenticates themselves to the travel document’s chip for access to the sensitive
biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its Inspection
System Certificate.
Justification:
This security objective for the operational environment is needed additionally to those
from [PACE-PP-0068] in order to handle the Threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data, the
Organisational Security Policy P.Sensitive_Data and the Assumption A.Auth_PKI as it
specifies the pre-requisite for the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 as it concerns the
responsibilities of the Document Verifier instance and the Inspection Systems.
This ST includes all Security Objectives of the TOE environment from the PACE PP [PACE-PP0068], chap. 4.2.
Travel document Issuer as the general responsible
The travel document Issuer as the general responsible for the global security policy
related will implement the following security objectives for the TOE environment:
OE.Legislative_Compliance Issuing of the travel document
The travel document Issuer must issue the travel document and approve it using the
terminals complying with all applicable laws and regulations
Travel document Issuer and CSCA: travel document’s PKI (issuing) branch
The travel document Issuer and the related CSCA will implement the following security
objectives for the TOE environment (see also the Application Note 20 above):
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign (Authentication of travel document by Signature)
The travel document Issuer has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure as
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follows: the CSCA acting on behalf and according to the policy of the travel document
Issuer must (i) generate a cryptographically secure CSCA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy
of the CSCA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational
environment, and (iii) publish the Certificate of the CSCA Public Key (CCSCA). Hereby
authenticity and integrity of these certificates are being maintained. A Document Signer
acting in accordance with the CSCA policy must (i) generate a cryptographically secure
Document Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Key, (iii)
hand over the Document Signer Public Key to the CSCA for certification, (iv) sign
Document Security Objects of genuine travel documents in a secure operational
environment only. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all hash
values for each data group in use according to [MRTD]. The Personalisation Agent has to
ensure that the Document Security Object contains only the hash values of genuine user
data according to [MRTD]. The CSCA must issue its certificates exclusively to the rightful
organisations (DS) and DSs must sign exclusively correct Document Security Objects to be
stored on travel document.
OE.Personalisation (Personalisation of travel document)
The travel document Issuer must ensure that the Personalisation Agents acting on his
behalf (i) establish the correct identity of the travel document holder and create the
biographical data for the travel document, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the
travel document holder, (iii) write a subset of these data on the physical Passport (optical
personalisation) and store them in the travel document (electronic personalisation) for the
travel document holder as defined in [MRTD], (iv) write the document details data, (v)
write the initial TSF data, (vi) sign the Document Security Object defined in [MRTD] (in
the role of a DS).
Terminal operator: Terminal’s receiving branch
OE.TerminalTerminal operating
The terminal operators must operate their terminals as follows:
1.) The related terminals (basic inspection systems, cf. above) are used by terminal
operators and by travel document holders as defined in [MRTD].
2.) The related terminals implement the terminal parts of the PACE protocol [SAC], of
the Passive Authentication [SAC] (by verification of the signature of the Document
Security Object) and use them in this order16. The PACE terminal uses randomly
and (almost) uniformly selected nonces, if required by the protocols (for generating
16
This order is commensurate with [SAC]
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ephemeral keys for Diffie-Hellmann).
3.) The related terminals need not to use any own credentials.
4.) The related terminals securely store the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key (in form of CCSCA and CDS) in order to enable and to
perform Passive Authentication of the travel document (determination of the
authenticity of data groups stored in the travel document, [MRTD]).
5.) The related terminals and their environment must ensure confidentiality and
integrity of respective data handled by them (e.g. confidentiality of the PACE
passwords, integrity of PKI certificates, etc.), where it is necessary for a secure
operation of the TOE according to the current ST.
Travel document holder Obligations
OE.Travel_Document_HolderTravel document holder Obligations
The travel document holder may reveal, if necessary, his or her verification values of the
PACE password to an authorized person or device who definitely act according to
respective regulations and are trustworthy.
4.3. Security Objective Rationale
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
T.Counterfeit
X
X
X
X
X
T.Eavesdropping
X
X
X
X
X
T.Tracing
X
T.Abuse-Func
X
X
T.Information_Leakage
X
T.Phys-Tamper
X
T.Malfunction
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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X
OE.Legislative Compliance
OE.Travel_Document_Holder
OE.Terminal
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
OE.Personalisation
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
OE.Exam_Travel_Document
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document
X
T.Skimming3
T.Forgery
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Tracing
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.AC_Pers2
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage
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P.Sensitive_Data
X
P.Personalisation
X
X
P.Manufact
X
X
X
X
P.Pre-Operational
X
X
X
X
P.Terminal
X
X
P.Card_PKI
X
P.Trustworthy_PKI
X
A.Insp_Sys
A.Auth_PKI
X
X
A.Passive_Auth
X
X
X
X
security objectives rationale
The OSP P.Personalisation “Personalisation of the travel document by issuing State or
Organisation only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical travel document by the
Personalisation Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalisation “Personalisation of logical travel document”, and (ii) the access
control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers
“Access Control for Personalisation of logical travel document”. Note the manufacturer
equips the TOE with the Personalisation Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification
“Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits
the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalisation Agent.
The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and
the threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is
countered by the TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive
biometric reference data” requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the
sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted to authorized inspection systems.
Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures the data’s
confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the
issuing State or Organisation as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for
use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving State
has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System
certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”.
The OSP P.Terminal “Abilities and trustworthiness of terminals” is countered by the
security objective OE.Exam_Travel_Document additionally to the security objectives
from PACE PP [pace-pp-0068]. OE.Exam_Travel_Document enforces the terminals to
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perform the terminal part of the PACE protocol.
The threat T.Counterfeit “Counterfeit of travel document chip data” addresses the attack
of unauthorized copy or reproduction of the genuine travel document's chip. This attack is
thwarted
by
chip
an
identification
and
authenticity
proof
required
by
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip authentication” using an
authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organisation. The Public
Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of
Documents Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document “Travel
document Authentication Key”. According to OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination
of the physical part of the travel document” the General Inspection system has to perform
the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 to verify the authenticity of the travel
document’s chip.
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data” addresses the fraudulent, complete or partial
alteration of the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the TOE or/and exchanged between
the TOE and the terminal. Additionally to the security objectives from PACE PP [PACE-PP0068] which counter this threat, the examination of the presented MRTD passport book
according to OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the
travel document” shall ensure its authenticity by means of the physical security measures
and detect any manipulation of the physical part of the travel document.
The examination of the travel document addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for
the TOE environment OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of
the travel document” which requires the inspection system to examine physically the
travel document, the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control, and
the Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication
Protocol Version 1 to verify the Authenticity of the presented travel document’s chip. The
security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document
“Protection of data from the logical travel document” require the Inspection System to
protect the logical travel document data during the transmission and the internal handling.
The assumption A.Passive_Auth “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Passive_Auth_Sign “Authentication
of travel document by Signature” from PACE PP [PACE-PP-0068] covering the necessary
procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The
implementation
of
the
signature
verification
procedures
is
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covered
by
XSMART_ASE
OE.Exam_Travel_Document “Examination of the physical part of the travel document”.
The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of
sensitive biometric reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive
biometrics by issuing Document Verifier certificates for authorized receiving States or
Organisations only. The Document Verifier of the receiving State is required by
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems” to authorize
Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the necessary public key
infrastructure.
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OE.Plat-Appl (Usage of Hardware Platform)
This security objective for environment supports the assumption of A.Plat-Appl and A.KeyFunction by requiring Embedded S/W developer to implement while satisfying TOE
guidance documents and findings of IC chip evaluation report.
.
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5. Extended Components Definition
This protection profile uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Most of them
are drawn from [MRTD].
Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
To describe the security functional requirements of the TOE, the family FAU_SAS of
the class FAU (Security audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than
FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be generated by the
TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content of the audit
records.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
his family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component leveling:
FAU_SAS.1
Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management: FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the
capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit
records.
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Definition of the Family FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FIA_API) of the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This
family describes the functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for
the authentication verification by an external entity where the other families of the
class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and
to be verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling:
FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management: FIA_API.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in
FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed
identity.
Audit:
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1
The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to
prove the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
Definition of the Family FCS_RND
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE, the family FCS_RND
of the class FCS (Cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic
purposes. The component FCS_RND.1 is not limited to generation of cryptographic
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keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1.
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random
numbers which are intended to be used for cryptographic purpose.
Component levelling:
FCS_RNG.1
Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a
defined quality metric.
Management : FCS_RNG.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit :
FCS_RNG.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RNG.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that
meet [assignment: a defined quality metric].
Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the test features of the
TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this
class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the
technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to
address the specific issues of preventing abuse of functions by limiting the
capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
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This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of
functions in a combined manner. Note, that FDP_ACF restricts access to
functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the functions
themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling:
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its
genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions
(refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for
instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of
the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management : FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit :
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so
that in conjunction with ‘Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)’ the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
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FMT_LIM2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so
that in conjunction with ‘Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)’ the
following policy is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and
availability policy].
Application note:
The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume existence
of two
types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together
shall provide protection in order to enforce the related policy. This also allows that
(i)
the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user
environment, but its capabilities are so limited that the policy is
enforced
or conversely
(ii)
the TSF is designed with high functionality, but is removed or disabled
in the product in its user environment.
The combination of both the requirements shall enforce the related policy.
Definition of the Family FPT_EMS
The family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE
shall prevent attacks against secret data stored in and used by the TOE where the
attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of
such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple power
analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family
describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations
being not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 .
FPT_EMS TOE emanation
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMS.1
emanation has two constituents:
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FPT_EMS.1.1
Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling
access to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMS.1.2
Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation
enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Management : FPT_EMS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit :
FPT_EMS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_EMS.1.1
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess
of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list
of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use
the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain
access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment:
list of types of user data].
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6. Security Requirements
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part 1 [CC] of the CC.
Each of these operations is used in this ST.
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further
restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word
“refinement” in bold text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where
words from a CC requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words
that were removed.
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in
stating a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as
underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections
to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that a
selection is to be made, [selection:], and are underlined text with “<” like <this >.
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter,
such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors
are denoted by showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is given
by a footnote. Assignments to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with
an indication that an assignment is to be made [assignment:], and are italicized. In some
cases the assignment made by the PP authors defines a selection to be performed by the
ST author. Thus this text is underlined and italicized with “<”
like <this>.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations.
Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the
component identifier.
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalisation Agent”, “Extended
Inspection System”, “Country Verifying Certification Authority”, “Document Verifier” and
“Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section 3.1. Note, that all these
subjects are acting for homonymous external entities. All used objects are defined either
in section 7 or in the following table. The operations “write”, “modify”, “read” and “disable
read access” are used in accordance with the general linguistic usage. The operations
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“store”, “create”, “transmit”, “receive”, “establish communication channel”, “authenticate”
and “re-authenticate” are originally taken from [CCMB] part 2. The operation “load” is
synonymous to “import” used in [CCMB] part 2.
Definition of security attributes:
Security attribute
Values
meaning
terminal
none (any
Terminal)
default role (i.e. without authorisation after start-up)
CVCA
roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[EAC]); Terminal is authenticated as Country Verifying
Certification Authority after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
DV
(domestic)
roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[EAC]); Terminal is authenticated as domestic Document
Verifier after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
DV (foreign)
roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[EAC]); Terminal is authenticated as foreign Document
Verifier after successful CA v.1 1 and TA v.1
IS
roles defined in the certificate used for authentication (cf.
[EAC]); Terminal is authenticated as Extended Inspection
System after successful CA v.1 and TA v.1
authentication status
Terminal
none
Authorization
DG4 (Iris)
Read access to DG4: (cf. [EAC])
DG3
(Fingerprint)
Read access to DG3: (cf. [EAC])
DG3
(Fingerprint)
/ DG4 (Iris)
Read access to DG3 and DG4: (cf. [EAC])
The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used. Further keys
and certificates are listed in [PP-PACE-0068].
Name
Data
Public Key (PKCVCA)
Document Verifier Certificates. The PK CVCA has the security
attribute Current Date as the most recent valid effective date of
the Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate or of a
domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
Country Verifying Certification
Authority Certificate (CCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be
a self-signed certificate or a link certificate (cf. [EAC] and
Glossary). It contains (i) the Country Verifying Certification
Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as authentication reference data,
(ii) the coded access control rights of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority, (iii) the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Document
(CDV)
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i) the Document
Verifier Public Key (PKDV) as authentication reference data (ii)
Verifier
Certificate
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identification as domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the
coded access control rights of the Document Verifier, the
Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as
security attributes.
Inspection
(CIS)
Chip
System
Certificate
Authentication
Public The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used
for Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to
RFC 2631 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO
11770-3 [KM].
Key Pair
Chip
Authentication
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the
Document Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference
data the Inspection System Public Key (PK IS), (ii) the coded
access control rights of the Extended Inspection System, the
Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as
security attributes.
Public The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the
EF.DG14 Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical
travel document and used by the inspection system for Chip
Authentication Version 1 of the travel document’s chip. It is part
of the user data provided by the TOE for the IT environment.
Key (PKICC)
Chip Authentication Private Key
(SKICC)
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE
to authenticate itself as authentic travel document’s chip. It is
part of the TSF data
Country Signing
Authority Key Pair
Country Signing Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organisation signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate
with the Country Signing Certification Authority Private Key and
the signature will be verified by receiving State or Organisation
(e.g. an Extended Inspection System) with the Country Signing
Certification Authority Public Key.
Certification
Document Signer Key Pairs
Document Signer of the issuing State or Organisation signs the
Document Security Object of the logical travel document with
the Document Signer Private Key and the signature will be
verified by an Extended Inspection System of the receiving
State or
Organisation with the Document Signer Public Key.
Chip
Keys
Secure messaging encryption key and MAC computation key
agreed between the TOE and an Inspection System in result of
the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
Authentication
PACE Session Keys
Session
Secure messaging encryption key and MAC computation key
agreed between the TOE and an Inspection System in result of
PACE
Application note:
The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as “domestic”
in the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs to the same State as the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a
Document Verifier as “foreign” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it does not belong to
the same State as the Country Verifying Certification Authority. From travel document’s
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point of view the domestic Document Verifier belongs to the issuing State or Organisation
6.1. Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section
following the main security functionality.
6.1.1. Class FCS Cryptographic Support
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by
the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/CA Cryptographic key generation - Diffie-Hellman for Chip
Authentication session keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <ECDH> and
specified cryptographic key sizes <224, 256, 320, 384> that
meet the following: <based on an ECDH protocol compliant to
[ECC-TR]>
Application note:
FCS_CKM.1/CA implicitly contains the requirements for the hashing functions used for key
derivation by demanding compliance to [EAC].
Application note:
The TOE generates a shared secret value with the terminal during the Chip Authentication
Protocol Version 1, see [EAC]. This protocol may be based on the ECDH compliant to TR03111 (i.e. an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm) (cf. [ECC-TR], for details). The
shared secret value is used to derive the Chip Authentication Session Keys used for
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encryption and MAC computation for secure messaging (defined in Key Derivation
Function [EAC]).
Application note:
The SHA-1 function is supported by OS, not by H/W library.
It is for the cryptographic primitive to derive the keys for secure messaging from any
shared secrets of the Authentication Mechanisms. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
may use SHA-1 (cf. [EAC]). The TOE may Protocol v.1 (cf. [EAC] for details).
Application note:
The TOE shall destroy any session keys in accordance with FCS_CKM.4 from [PACE-PP0068] after (i) detection of an error in a received command by verification of the MAC and
(ii) after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1. (iii) The TOE shall destroy
the PACE Session Keys after generation of a Chip Authentication Session Keys and
changing the secure messaging to the Chip Authentication Session Keys. (iv) The TOE
shall clear the memory area of any session keys before starting the communication with
the terminal in a new after-reset-session as required by FDP_RIP.1. Concerning the Chip
Authentication keys FCS_CKM.4 is also fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE Cryptographic key generation - Diffie-Hellman for PACE
session keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]: fulfilled by FCS_CKM.2/DH.
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.2/DH.
Justification: A Diffie-Hellman key agreement is used in order to
have no key distribution, therefore FCS_CKM.2 makes no sense
in this case.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by CS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1.1/DH_PACE The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm <ECDH comp
liant to [ECC-TR]>and specified cryptographic key sizes <224,
256, 320, 384, 512 > that meet the following: [SAC]
Application note :
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The TOE generates a shared secret value K with the terminal during the PACE protocol,
see [SAC]. This protocol may be based on the ECDH compliant to TR-03111 [ECC-TR] (i.e.
the elliptic curve cryptographic algorithm ECKA, cf. [SAC] and [ECC-TR] for details). The
shared secret value K is used for deriving the AES or DES session keys for message
encryption and message authentication (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc) according to [SAC] for
the TSF required by FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC and FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC.
Application note:
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE implicitly contains the requirements for the hashing functions used
for key derivation by demanding compliance to [SAC].
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction- Session keys
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes,
orFCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method <overwriting with
zero or new key value> that meets the following: <none >
Application note:
The TOE shall destroy the PACE session keys after detection of an error in a received
command by verification of the MAC. The TOE shall clear the memory area of any session
keys before starting the communication with the terminal in a new after-reset-session as
required by FDP_RIP.1.
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
Cryptographic
operation
-
Symmetric
Encryption
Decryption
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
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/
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FCS_COP.1.1/CA_ENC
The TSF shall perform <secure messaging - encryption and
decryption > in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm <see table below> and cryptographic key sizes <see
table below> that meet the following: <see table below >
algorithm
key size
standard
3DES in CBC mode
112
FIPS PUB 197
AES in CBC mode
128, 192, 256
ISO/IEC 18033-3
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitives (e.g. Triple-DES
and/or AES) for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are
agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Chip Authentication Protocol
Version 1 according to the FCS_CKM.1/CA..
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC Cryptographic operation -MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC The TSF shall perform <secure messaging - message
authentication code> in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm <see table below> and cryptographic
key sizes <see table below> that meet the following: <see table
below>
algorithm
key size
standard
3DES Retail-MAC
112
ISO/IEC 9797-1
AES CMAC
128, 192, 256
NIST 800-38B
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging
with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is
agreed between the TSF by Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 according to the
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FCS_CKM.1/CA. Furthermore the SFR is used for authentication attempts of a terminal as
Personalisation Agent by means of the authentication mechanism.
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC Cryptographic operation - Encryption / Decryption AES
/ 3DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.4.
FCS_COP.1.1/
The TSF shall perform <secure messaging - encryption and
PACE_ENC
decryption> in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm <see table below > in CBC mode and cryptographic
key sizes <see table below>
bit that meet the following:
compliant to [SAC]
algorithm
key size
3DES
112
AES
128, 192, 256
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive AES or 3DES for
secure messaging with encryption of transmitted data and encrypting the nonce in the
first step of PACE. The related session keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal
as part of the PACE protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (PACE-KEnc)..
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC Cryptographic operation - MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
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FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction: fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.4..
FCS_COP.1.1/
The TSF shall perform <secure messaging - message
PACE_MAC
authentication code> in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm <see table below> and cryptographic
key sizes <see table below>
bit that meet the following:
compliant to [SAC] .
algorithm
key size
Retail-MAC
112
CMAC
128, 192, 256
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure messaging
with message authentication code over transmitted data. The related session keys are
agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of either the PACE protocol according to
the FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE (PACE-KMAC). Note that in accordance with [SAC] the (two-key)
Triple-DES could be used in Retail mode for secure messaging.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation - Signature verification by travel
document
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG-VER The TSF shall perform <digital signature verification>
in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
<ECDSA_SHA1, ECDSA_SHA224, ECDSA_SHA256>
and
cryptographic key sizes <224, 256, 320, 384> that meet the
following: <[ECC-TR] >
Application note:
The ST writer shall perform the missing operation of the assignments for the signature
algorithms key lengths and standards implemented by the TOE for the Terminal
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Authentication Protocol v.1 (cf. [EAC]). The signature verification is used to verify the card
verifiable certificates and the authentication attempt of the terminal creating a digital
signature for the TOE challenge.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FCS_RND.1.1
No dependencies
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet : <[AIS31] >
Application note:
This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers (random nonce) used for the
authentication protocol (PACE) as required by FIA_UAU.4/PACE.
6.1.2. Class FIA Identification and Authentication
The Table below provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used
Name
SFR for the TOE
Authentication Mechanism for Personalisation Agents
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
Chip Authentication Protocol v.1
FIA_API.1,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE,
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
PACE protocol
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
Passive Authentication
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
Overview on authentication SFR
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 as defined in this security target includes

the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys
between the TOE and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key
and the Terminal Public Key used later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol
Version 1,
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
the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication
code with the expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 may be used independent of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol v.1. But if the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 is used the
terminal shall use the same public key as presented during the Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1/PACE Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FCS_UID.1.1/PACE
No dependencies
The TSF shall allow
1.to establish the communication channel,
2.carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [SAC] ,
3.to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
4.to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 according to
[EAC]
5.to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according
to [EAC]
6. <to select e-Passport Application by SELECT COMMAND>.
FCS_UID.1.2/PACE
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Application note:
The SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE in the current ST covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP0068] and extends it by EAC aspect 4. This extension does not conflict with the strict
conformance to PACE PP.
Application note:
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In the Phase 2 “Manufacturing of the TOE” the Manufacturer is the only user role known
to the TOE which writes the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data in the audit
records of the IC. The travel document manufacturer may create the user role
Personalisation Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalisation of the travel
document”. The users in role Personalisation Agent identify themselves by means of
selecting the authentication key. After personalisation in the Phase 3 the PACE domain
parameters, the Chip Authentication data and Terminal Authentication Reference Data are
written into the TOE. The Inspection System is identified as default user after power up or
reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will run the PACE protocol, to gain access to the Chip
Authentication Reference Data and to run the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1.
After successful authentication of the chip the terminal may identify itself as (i) Extended
Inspection System by selection of the templates for the Terminal Authentication Protocol
Version 1 or (ii) if necessary and available by authentication as Personalisation Agent
(using the Personalisation Agent Key).
Application note:
User identified after a successfully performed PACE protocol is a terminal. Please note that
neither CAN nor MRZ effectively represent secrets, but are restricted revealable; i.e. it is
either the travel document holder itself or an authorised other person or device (Basic
Inspection System with PACE).
Application note:
In the life-cycle phase ‘Manufacturing’ the Manufacturer is the only user role known to the
TOE. The Manufacturer writes the Initialisation Data and/or Pre-personalisation Data in
the audit records of the IC. Please note that a Personalisation Agent acts on behalf of the
travel document Issuer under his and CSCA and DS policies. Hence, they define
authentication procedure(s) for Personalisation Agents. The TOE must functionally support
these authentication procedures being subject to evaluation within the assurance
components ALC_DEL.1 and AGD_PRE.1. The TOE assumes the user role ‘Personalisation
Agent’, when a terminal proves the respective Terminal Authorisation Level as defined by
the related policy (policies).
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1/PACE Timing of identification
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FCS_UAU.1.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. carrying out the PACE Protocol according to [SAC] ,
3. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
4. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
5. to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol Version according
to [EAC]
6. to carry out the Terminal Authentication Protocol Version 1
according to [EAC]
7. < to select ePassport Application by SELECT COMMAND>.
FCS_UAU.1.2/PACE
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Application note:
The SFR FIA_UAU.1/PACE. in the current ST covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP0068] and extends it by EAC aspect 5. This extension does not conflict with the strict
conformance to PACE PP.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
Single-use
authentication
mechanisms
-
Single-use
authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FCS_UAU.4.1/PACE
No dependencies
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1.PACE Protocol according to [SAC] ,
2.Authentication Mechanism based on <Triple- DES and AES>
3.Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [EAC] .
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Application note:
The SFR FIA_UAU.4.1 in the current ST covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP-0068]
and extends it by the EAC aspect 3. This extension does not conflict with the strict
conformance to PACE PP. The generation of random numbers (random nonce) used for
the authentication protocol (PACE) and Terminal Authentication as required by
FIA_UAU.4/PACE is required by FCS_RND.1 from [PACE-PP-0068].
Application note:
The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly and randomly
generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a
successful authentication attempt. However, the authentication of Personalisation Agent
may rely on other mechanisms ensuring protection against replay attacks, such as the use
of an internal counter as a diversifier.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2)..
FIA_UAU.5/PACE Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FCS_UAU.5.1/PACE
No dependencies
The TSF shall provide
1.PACE Protocol according to [SAC] ,
2.Passive Authentication according to [MRTD]
3.Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode according to [SAC] ,
4.Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on <Triple-DES,
AES>
5.Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 according to [EAC] ,
to support user authentication.
FCS_UAU.5.2/PACE
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according
to the following rules:
1. Having successfully run the PACE protocol the TOE accepts
only received commands with correct message authentication
code sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed
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with the terminal by means of the PACE protocol.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalisation
Agent by < SCP02 Mutual Authentication [GPCS ] E.2>.
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1 the
TOE accepts only received commands with correct message
authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with
key agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip
Authentication Mechanism v1.
4. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1 only if the terminal uses
the public key presented during the Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1 and the secure messaging established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism v.1 19.
5. <none>.
Application note:
The SFR FIA_UAU.5.1/PACE in the current ST covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP0068] and extends it by EAC aspects 4), 5), and 6). The SFR FIA_UAU.5.2/PACE in the
current ST covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP-0068] and extends it by EAC
aspects 2), 3), 4) and 5). These extensions do not conflict with the strict conformance to
PACE PP.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6/PACE Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FCS_UAU.6.1/PACE
No dependencies
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the PAC E
protocol shall be verified as being sent by the PACE terminal.
Application note:
The PACE protocol specified in [SAC] starts secure messaging used for all commands
exchanged after successful PACE authentication. The TOE checks each command by
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secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode based on CMAC or Retail-MAC,
whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any command with
incorrect message authentication code. Therefore, the TOE re-authenticates the terminal
connected, if a secure messaging error occurred, and accepts only those commands
received from the initially authenticated terminal.
FIA_UAU.6/EAC Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FCS_UAU.6.1/EAC
No dependencies
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol Version 1 shall be verified as being sent
by the Inspection System.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
The TSF shall provide a <Chip Authentication Protocol Version 1
FIA_API.1.1
according to [EAC]> to prove the identity of the <TOE>.
FIA_AFL.1/PACE Authentication failure handling - PACE authentication using
non-blocking authorisation data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication: fulfilled by
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
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FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE
The TSF shall detect when <1> unsuccessful authentication
attempt occurs related to authentication attempts using the PACE
password as shared password .
FIA_AFL.1.1/PACE
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been met, the TSF shall <accumulates the delay
time>.
6.1.3. Class FDP User Data Protection
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1/TRM Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining access to the User Data and data stored in EF.SOD of the
logical travel document.
Application note:
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1/TRM Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM
The TSF shall enforce the < Access Control SFP> to objects
based on the following:
1.Subjects:
a.Terminal,
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b.BIS-PACE
c.Extended Inspection System
2.Objects:
a.data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16, EF.SOD
and EF.COM of the logical travel document ,
b.data in EF.DG3 of the logical travel document ,
c.data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel document ,
d.all TOE intrinsic secret cryptographic keys stored in the travel
document
3.Security attributes:
a.PACE Authentication
b.Terminal Authentication v.1
c.Authorisation of the Terminal.
FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: A BIS-PACE is allowed to read data objects from
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM according to [SAC] after a successful PACE
authentication as required by FIA_UAU.1/PACE.
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the following additional rules:
1.Any terminal being not authenticated as PACE authenticated
BIS-PACE is not allowed to read, to write, to modify, to use
any User Data stored on the travel document.
2.Terminals not using secure messaging are not allowed to read,
to write, to modify, to use any data stored on the travel
document.
3.Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended
Inspection System with the Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint)
granted by the relative certificate holder authorization
encoding is not allowed to read the data objects 2b) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
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4.Any terminal being not successfully authenticated as Extended
Inspection System with the Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted
by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is not
allowed to read the data objects 2c) of FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
5.Nobody is allowed to read the data objects 2d) of
FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM.
6.Terminals authenticated as CVCA or as DV are not allowed to
read data in the EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
Application note:
The SFR FDP_ACF.1.1/TRM in the current ST covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP0068] and extends it by additional subjects and objects. The SFRs FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM and
FDP_ACF.1.3/TRM in the current ST cover the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP-0068]. The
SFR FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM in the current ST covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP-0068]
and extends it by 3) to 6).These extensions do not conflict with the strict conformance to
PACE PP.
Application note :
The relative certificate holder authorization encoded in the CVC of the inspection system is
defined in [EAC]. The TOE verifies the certificate chain established by the Country
Verifying Certification Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection
System Certificate (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The Terminal Authorization is the intersection of the
Certificate Holder Authorization in the certificates of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate in a
valid certificate chain.
Application note:
Please note that the Document Security Object (SOD) stored in EF.SOD (see [MRTD])
does not belong to the user data, but to the TSF data. The Document Security Object can
be read out by Inspection Systems using PACE, see [SAC].
Application note:
FDP_UCT.1/TRM and FDP_UIT.1/TRM require the protection of the User Data transmitted
from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and message
authentication codes after successful Chip Authentication Version 1 to the Inspection
System.
The
Password
Authenticated
Connection
Establishment,
and
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the
Chip
XSMART_ASE
Authentication Protocol v.1 establish different key sets to be used for secure messaging
(each set of keys for the encryption and the message authentication key).
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_RIP.1.1
No dependencies
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a
resource is made unavailable upon the <deallocation of the
resource from> the following objects:
1.Session Keys (immediately after closing related communication
session) ,
2.the ephemeral private key ephem - SKPICC- PACE (by having
generated a DH shared secret K ),
3.<none>.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1/TRM Basic data exchange confidentiality -MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UCT.1.1/TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
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FDP_UIT.1/TRM Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path] fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1.1/TRM
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2/TRM
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
6.1.4. Class FTP Trusted Path/Channels
FTP_ITC.1/PACE Inter-TSF trusted channel after PACE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FTP_ITC.1.1/PACE
No dependencies
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification
or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2/PACE
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE
The TSF shall initiate enforce communication via the trusted
channel for any data exchange between the TOE and the
Terminal.
Application note:
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The trusted IT product is the terminal. In FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE, the word
“initiate” is
changed to ‘enforce”, as the TOE is a passive device that can not initiate the
communication. All the communication are initiated by the Terminal, and the TOE enforce
the trusted channel.
6.1.5. Class FAU Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FAU_SAS.1.1
No dependencies
The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store the Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in the audit
records.
Application note:
The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the life cycle
phase ‘manufacturing’. The IC manufacturer and the travel document manufacturer in the
Manufacturer role write the Initialisation and/or Pre-personalisation Data as TSF-data into
the TOE. The audit records are usually write-only-once data of the travel document (see
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS). Please note that there could also be such
audit records which cannot be read out, but directly used by the TOE.
6.1.6. Class FMT Security Management
The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE provide basic requirements on the
management of the TSF data
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2)
FMT_SMR.1/PACE Security roles
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification:
The TSF shall maintain the roles
1.Manufacturer ,
2.Personalisation Agent,
3.Terminal,
4.PACE authenticated BIS-PACE,
5.Country Verifying Certification Authority,
6.Document Verifier,
7.Domestic Extended Inspection System
8.Foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2/PACE
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note:
The SFR FMT_SMR.1.1/PACE in the current ST covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP0068] and extends it by 5) to 8). This extension does not conflict with the strict
conformance to PACE PP.
Application note:
The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and TSF data to
prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life-cycle phases.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1.1
No dependencies
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization,
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4. Configuration.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1.1
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with ‘Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)’ the following policy is enforced:
<Deploying test features after TOE delivery do not allow>
1.User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2.TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
3.software to be reconstructed,
4.substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks and
5.sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.2.1
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capailability
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability
so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced:
<Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:>
1.User Data to be manipulated and disclosed,
2.TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3.software to be reconstructed,
4.substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks and
5.sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed.
Application note:
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The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little bit
misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or
removing the respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and
FMT_LIM.2 is introduced to provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy.
Note that the term “software” in item 4 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both
IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.
Application note:
The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1).
The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management
functions and different TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data - Initialization of CVCA
Certificate and Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
The TSF shall restrict the ability to <write> the
CVCA_INI
1.initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2.initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
3.initial Current Date,
4.<none>
To <the Personalization Agent>.
Application note:
The
ST
writer
shall
perform
the
missing
operation
in
the
component
FMT_MTD.1.1/CVCA_INI. The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
may be written by the Personalisation Agent (cf. [EAC]). The initial Country Verifying
Certification Authority Public Keys (and their updates later on) are used to verify the
Country Verifying Certification Authority Link-Certificates. The initial Country Verifying
Certification Authority Certificate and the initial Current Date is needed for verification of
the certificates and the calculation of the Terminal Authorization.
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FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
Management
of
TSF
data
-
Country
Verifying
Certification Authority
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_UPD
The TSF shall restrict the ability to <update> the
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifying Certification Authority
Application note:
The Country Verifying Certification Authority updates its asymmetric key pair and
distributes the public key be means of the Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates (cf.
[EAC]). The TOE updates its internal trust-point if a valid Country Verifying CA LinkCertificates (cf. FMT_MTD.3) is provided by the terminal (cf. [EAC]).
FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data - Current date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/DATE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to <modify> the <Current
date> to
1.Country Verifying Certification Authority,
2.Document Verifier,
3.Domestic Extended Inspection System.
Application note:
The authorized roles are identified in their certificate (cf. [EAC]) and authorized by
validation of the certificate chain (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The authorized role of the terminal is
part of the Certificate Holder Authorization in the card verifiable certificate provided by the
terminal for the identification and the Terminal Authentication v.1 (cf. to [EAC]).
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FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data - Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to < load> the <Chip
Authentication Private Key > to <the Personalization Agent>.
Application note:
The verb “load” means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key is generated
securely outside the TOE and written into the TOE memory.
FMT_MTD.1/ KEY_READ Management of TSF data - Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/
The TSF shall restrict the ability to <read> the
KEY_READ
1.PACE passwords ,
2.Chip Authentication Private Key,
3.Personalisation Agent Keys
to none.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Secure TSF data (FMT_MTD.3)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2):
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data - Writing Initialisation and Prepersonalisation Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
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FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialisation Data
and Pre-personalisation Data to the Manufacturer.
Application note:
Manufacturer means integrated circuit and the travel document Manufacturer completing
the IC to the travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE during the
manufacturing life cycle phase . The TOE itself does not distinguish between the IC
Manufacturer and travel document Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
This entity is commensurate with 'Manufacturer' in [BAC-PP-0055].
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Management
of
TSF
data
-
Reading
and
Using
Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to read out the Initialisation Data
and the Pre-personalisation Data to the Personalisation Agent.
Application note:
The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialisation Data and the Pre-personalisation
Data by (i) allowing writing these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer at
the end of the manufacturing phase. The Manufacturer may write the Initialisation Data
(as required by FAU_SAS.1) including, but being not limited to a unique identification of
the IC being used to trace the IC in the life cycle phases ‘manufacturing’ and ‘issuing’, but
being not needed and may be misused in the ‘operational use’. Therefore, read and use
access to the Initialisation Data shall be blocked in the ‘operational use’ by the
Personalisation Agent, when he switches the TOE from the life cycle phase ‘issuing’ to the
life cycle phase ‘operational use’.
FMT_MTD.1/PA Management of TSF data - Personalisation Agent
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions: fulfilled by
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles: fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
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FMT_MTD.1.1/PA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Security
Object (SOD) to the Personalisation Agent.
Application note:
By writing SOD into the TOE, the Personalisation Agent confirms (on behalf of DS) the
correctness and genuineness of all the personalisation data related. This consists of userand TSF- data.
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.3.1/
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate
chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol v.1 and the Access Control.
Refinement:
The certificate chain is valid if and only if
1 the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the
expiration date of the Inspection System Certificate is not before the
Current Date of the TOE,
2 the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as
correct with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority and the expiration date of the Certificate of the
Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of
the TOE and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not
before the Current Date of the TOE,
3 the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country
Verifying Certification Authority known to the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System
Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication
reference data of the Extended Inspection System.
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The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the
certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal
Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection System.
Application note:
The Terminal Authentication Version 1 is used for Extended Inspection System as required
by FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. The Terminal Authorization is used as TSF
data for access control required by FDP_ACF.1/TRM..
6.1.7. Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and
TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMS.1 addresses the inherent leakage.
The SFRs “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” together
with the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing,
deactivation and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended):
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FPT_EMS.1.1
No Dependencies
The TOE shall not emit <Power consumption of IC chip> in
excess of <unnecessary information> enabling access to
1.Chip Authentication Session Keys
2.PACE session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc),
3.the ephemeral private key ephem SKPICC-PACE,
4. <Transport key>17,
5.Personalisation Agent Key(s),
17
For delivery to Personalization Agent safely, Transport key is stored during pre-personalization by
Manufacturer. It is used to protect TOE from being abused without authentication of Personalization Agent
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6.Chip Authentication Private Key and
7.<EF.DG3, EF.DG4>
FPT_EMS.1.2
The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following
interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
1.Chip Authentication Session Keys
2.PACE Session Keys (PACE-KMAC, PACE-KEnc),
3.the ephemeral private key ephem SKPICC-PACE,
4.<Transport key>,
5.Personalisation Agent Key(s) and
6.Chip Authentication Private Key and
7.<EF.DG3, EF.DG4>.
Application note:
The SFR FPT_EMS.1.1 in the current ST covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP-0068]
and extends it by EAC aspects 1., 5. and 6. The SFR FPT_EMS.1.2 in the current ST
covers the definition in PACE PP [PACE-PP-0068] and extends it by EAC aspects 4) and 5).
These extensions do not conflict with the strict conformance to PACE PP.
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit
information leakage including physical manipulation
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FPT_FLS.1
No Dependencies
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
1.Exposure to operating conditions causing a TOE malfunction,
2.Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1,
3.<none>.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
No Dependencies
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FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests < during initial start-up , at
reset> to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of the TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Application note:
If the travel document’s chip uses state of the art smart card technology, it will run some
self tests at the request of an authorised user and some self tests automatically. E.g. a
self test for the verification of the integrity of stored TSF executable code required by
FPT_TST.1.3 may be executed during initial start-up by the ‘authorised user’ Manufacturer
in the life cycle phase ‘Manufacturing’. Other self tests may automatically run to detect
failures and to preserve the secure state according to FPT_FLS.1 in the phase ‘operational
use’, e.g. to check a calculation with a private key by the reverse calculation with the
corresponding public key as a countermeasure against Differential Failure Analysis
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies:
FPT_TST.1.1
No Dependencies
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to
the TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are
always enforced.
Application note:
The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially
manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore,
permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be
violated at any time. Hence, ‘automatic response’ means here (i) assuming that there
might be an attack at any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time
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6.2. Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
The assurance requirements for the evaluation of the TOE, its development and operating
environment are to choose as the predefined assurance package EAL5 augmented by the
following components:

ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures),

AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
6.3. Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1. Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage
(SFRs from PACE PP [PACE-PP-0068] are marked in italic letters and SFRs from PACE PP
X
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.4
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_RND.1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
X
X
X
X
X
X
FIA_API.1
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
X
X
X
X
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OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Tracing
X
X
X
X
X
FIA_UAU.6/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
X
X
X
X
X
FIA_AFL.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1/PACE
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
X
X
X
X
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
OT.Identification
OT.Data_Confidentiality
OT.Data_Authenticity
OT.Data_Integrity
OT.AC_PersAccess
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
[PACE-PP-0068] which are extended in EAC PP are marked in bold letters)
XSMART_ASE
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
X
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
X
X
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
X
X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
X
X
X
X
X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_REA
D
X
X
FMT_MTD.3
X
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1/PA
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FPT_EMS.1
X
X
X
X
FPT_TST.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification of the TOE” addresses the
storage of Initialisation and Pre-Personalisation Data in its non-volatile memory, whereby
they also include the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the TOE’s chip. This will be
ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only
the Manufacturer to write Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data (including the
Personalisation Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires the Personalisation
Agent to disable access to Initialisation and Pre-personalisation Data in the life cycle
phase ‘operational use’. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the functions
and roles related.
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalisation of logical travel
document” addresses the access control of the writing the logical travel document. The
justification for the SFRs FAU_SAS.1, FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA and FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
arises from the justification for OT.Identification above with respect to the Prepersonalisation Data. The write access to the logical travel document data are defined by
the SFR FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE, FDP_ACC.1/TRM and FDP_ACF.1/TRM in the
same way: only the successfully authenticated Personalisation Agent is allowed to write
the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document only once.
FMT_MTD.1/PA covers the related property of OT.AC_Pers (writing SOD and, in generally,
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personalisation data). The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles (including Personalisation
Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalisation). The SFRs FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ and FPT_EMS.1 restrict the access to
the Personalisation Agent Keys and the Chip Authentication Private Key.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalisation Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE and FIA_UAU.5/PACE. If the Personalisation Terminal
want to authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol
v.1 (after Chip Authentication v.1) with the Personalisation Agent Keys the TOE will use
TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for
the
derivation of the new
session keys after
Chip Authentication
v.1), and
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging),
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol v.1) and
FIA_UAU.6/EAC (for the re-authentication. If the Personalisation Terminal wants to
authenticate itself to the TOE by means of the Authentication Mechanism with
Personalisation Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1 (for the
generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC (to verify the authentication
attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The security objective OT.Data_Integrity “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE
to protect the integrity of the logical travel document stored on the travel document’s chip
against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. Physical manipulation is
addressed by FPT_PHP.3. Logical manipulation of stored user data is addressed by
(FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM): only the Personalisation Agent is allowed to write the
data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical travel document (FDP_ACF.1.2/TRM, rule 1) and
terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
travel document (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4/TRM). FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD containing
signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive Authentication is
allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to be considered as
trustworthy. The Personalisation Agent must identify and authenticate themselves
according to FIA_UID.1/PACE and FIA_UAU.1/PACE before accessing these data.
FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific
properties of the protocols used. The SFR FMT_SMR.1/PACE lists the roles and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
Unauthorised modifying of the exchanged data is addressed, in the first line, by
FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. For PACE secured data exchange, a
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prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful PACE Authentication
(FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE and possessing the
special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. The trusted
channel is established using PACE, Chip Authentication v.1, and Terminal Authentication
v.1. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC).
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical
travel document data after Chip Authentication v.1. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and
FDP_UIT.1/TRM requires the integrity protection of the transmitted data after Chip
Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret and for the
derivation of the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for
the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to
FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards. The SFR
FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for cryptographic operations needed.
The security objective OT.Data_Authenticity aims ensuring authenticity of the Userand TSF data (after the PACE Authentication) by enabling its verification at the terminalside and by an active verification by the TOE itself. This objective is mainly achieved by
FTP_ITC.1/PACE using FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted
channel is a successful PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA and possessing the
special properties FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1
requires erasing the values of session keys (here: for KMAC). FIA_UAU.4/PACE,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE and FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the
protocols used. The SFR FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the access to the PACE
passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA requires that SOD
containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for the Passive
Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and, hence, is to
be considered as trustworthy. The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents a general support for
cryptographic operations needed. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support the
functions and roles related.
The security objective OT.Data_Confidentiality aims that the TOE always ensures
confidentiality of the User- and TSF-data stored and, after the PACE Authentication resp.
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Chip Authentication, of these data exchanged. This objective for the data stored is mainly
achieved by (FDP_ACC.1/TRM, FDP_ACF.1/TRM). FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and
FCS_CKM.4 represent some required specific properties of the protocols used.
This objective for the data exchanged is mainly achieved by FDP_UCT.1/TRM,
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
and
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
using
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
resp.
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC. A prerequisite for establishing this trusted channel is a successful
PACE or Chip and Terminal Authentication v.1 (FIA_UID.1/PACE, FIA_UAU.1/PACE) using
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE resp. FCS_CKM.1/CA and possessing the special properties
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE resp. FIA_UAU.6/EAC. FDP_RIP.1 requires erasing the
values of session keys (here: for Kenc). The SFR FMT_MTD.1./KEY_READ restricts the
access to the PACE passwords and the Chip Authentication Private Key. FMT_MTD.1/PA
requires that SOD containing signature over the User Data stored on the TOE and used for
the Passive Authentication is allowed to be written by the Personalisation Agent only and,
hence, is to be considered trustworthy .The SFR FCS_RND.1 represents the general
support for cryptographic operations needed. The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE
support the functions and roles related.
The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric
reference data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1/TRM and
FDP_ACF.1/TRM allowing the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully
authenticated Extended Inspection System being authorized by a valid certificate
according FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The
SFRs
FIA_UID.1/PACE
and
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
require the
identification
and
authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/PACE requires the
successful Chip Authentication (CA) v.1 before any authentication attempt as Extended
Inspection System. During the protected communication following the CA v.1 the reuse of
authentication data is prevented by FIA_UAU.4/PACE. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/EAC and
FDP_UCT.1/TRM requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after Chip
Authentication v.1 by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_RND.1 (for the generation of the terminal authentication
challenge), FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the generation of shared secret and for the derivation of
the new session keys), and FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC and FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to
FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires
that the Chip Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
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To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and
certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorized identified role as
of FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of travel document’s chip
authenticity” is ensured by the Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 provided by FIA_API.1
proving the identity of the TOE. The Chip Authentication Protocol v.1 defined by
FCS_CKM.1/CA is performed using a TOE internally stored confidential private key as
required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication
Protocol v.1 [EAC] requires additional TSF according to FCS_CKM.1/CA (for the derivation
of
the
session
keys),
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
and
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
(for
the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).The SFRs FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1/PACE support
the functions and roles related.
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”
is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test
functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE Delivery.
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”
requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the travel
document’s chip against disclosure
-
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or
the
time
between
events
found
by
measuring
signals
on the
electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines which is
addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
-
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1, and/or
-
by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Tracing aims that the TOE prevents gathering TOE tracing data
by means of unambiguous identifying the travel document remotely through establishing
or listening to a communication via the contactless interface of the TOE without a priori
knowledge of the correct values of shared passwords (CAN, MRZ).This objective is
achieved as follows:(i) while establishing PACE communication with CAN or MRZ (nonblocking authorisation data) . by FIA_AFL.1/PACE;(ii) for listening to PACE communication
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(is of importance for the current PP, since SOD is card-individual) . FTP_ITC.1/PACE.
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered
by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation
and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the
SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating
conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
6.3.2. Dependency Rationale
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for
mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is
satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components are analysed, and
non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately explained
The following Table shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
SFR
FCS_CKM.1/CA
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC
Dependencies
Support of the Dependencies
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or
justification 1 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
Fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/CA_ENC,
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC,
and
and
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
FCS_CKM.1/CA
Fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/CA,
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and
XSMART_ASE
FCS_COP.1/CA_MAC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_ENC
FCS_COP.1/PACE_MAC
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_COP.1/HASH
FCS_RND.1
FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE
FIA_UAU.5/PACE
FIA_UAU.6/EAC
FIA_API.1
FIA_AFL.1
FDP_ACC.1/TRM
FDP_ACF.1/TRM
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation], FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
No dependencies
No dependencies
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
No dependencies
No dependencies
No dependencies
No dependencies
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/DH_PACE
fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1/CA,
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
F
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
n.a
n.a.
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1/PACE
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1/TRM
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM,
justification 2 for non-satisfied
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FMT_MTD.3
initialization
No dependencies
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control]
[FTP ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel,
or
FTP TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP ACC.1 Subset access
control, or
FDP IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
No dependencies
No dependencies
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
management
functionsFMT_SMR.1 Security
roles
FMT_MTD.1
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_PHP.3
No
No
No
No
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_UCT.1/TRM
FDP_UIT.1/TRM
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
FAU_SAS.1
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/ PA
dependencies
dependencies
dependencies
dependencies
dependencies
n.a.
Fulfilled by FTP_ITC.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1/TRM
Fulfilled by FTP ITC.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FDP ACC.1/TRM
n.a.
n.a.
Fulfilled
Fulfilled
Fulfilled
Fulfilled
by
by
by
by
FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1/PACE
Fulfilled by
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI and
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
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FPT_EMS.1
No dependencies
n.a.
Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No.1 : Because a Diffie-Hellman key agreement has no key distribution function, it has not
support of dependency in case FCS CKM.2
No. 2: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1/TRM uses security attributes which
are defined during the personalisation and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE.
No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is
necessary here.
6.3.3. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL5 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL5
is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing
product line. EAL5 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require
a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity
TOEs and are prepared to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of
the travel document’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling
of the travel document’s material.
The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an
attacker possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfil
the security objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof.
The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
The component AVA_VAN.5 has the following dependencies:

ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
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
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification

ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design

ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF

AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance

AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL5 assurance package.
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7. TOE Summary Specification.
7.1. TOE security functions by the software
SF
Description
SF_READ_ACC
Data access control
SF_AUTH
Authentication
SF_SM
Data Secure Messaging
SF_WIRTE_MGT
Card Write Management
SF_EAC_TA
Extended Access Control
SF_CRYPTO
Cryptographic operation
SF_PROTECTION
Counter Measure by IC Chip
TOE security function
7.2. TOE security functions by IC Chip
7.2.1. IC chip SFR
SF
Description
SF_DPM
Device phase management
SF_PS
Protection against snooping
SF_PMA
Protection against modifying attacks
SF_PLA
Protection against logical attacks
SF_CS
Cryptographic support (3DES, AES, RSA, EC, SHA-2,TRNG)
Security Function provided by IC Chip
These SF are described in [ICST]
SF_DPM
:Device Phase Management
The life cycle of the IC chip TOE is split-up in several phases. Chip development and
production (phase 2, 3, 4) and final use (phase 4-7) is a rough split-up from IC chip TOE
point of view. These phases are implemented in the IC chip TOE as test mode (phase 3)
and user mode (phase 4-7). In addition a chip identification mode exists which is active in
all phases. The chip identification data (O.Identification) is stored in a in the not
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changeable configuration page area and non-volatile memory. In the same area further IC
chip TOE configuration data is stored. In addition, user initialization data can be stored in
the non-volatile memory during the production phase as well. During this first data
programming, the TOE is still in the secure environment and in Test Mode.
SF_PS
:Protection against Snooping
All contents of all memories of the IC chip TOE are encrypted on chip to protect against
data analysis on stored data as well as on internally transmitted data. There is no plain
data on the chip. In addition the data transferred over the busses, the SFRs and the
peripheral devices (CRC, RNG and Timer) are encrypted as well.
The memory content and bus encryption is done by the MED using a complex key
management and by the memories, RAM, CACHE and the bus are entirely encrypted.
Therefore, no data in plain are handled anywhere on the IC chip and thus also the two
CPUs compute entirely masked. The symmetric cryptographic co-processor is entirely
masked as well.
SF_PMA
: Protection against Modifying Attacks
The IC chip TOE is equipped with an error detection code (EDC) which covers the memory
system of RAM, ROM and EEPROM and includes also the MED, MMU and the bus system.
Thus introduced failures are detected and in certain errors are also automatically
corrected. In order to prevent accidental bit faults during production in the ROM, over the
data stored in ROM an EDC value is calculated.
SF_PLA
: Protection against Logical Attacks
The memory access control of the IC chip TOE uses a memory management unit (MMU)
to control the access to the available physical memory by using virtual memory addresses
and to segregate the code and data to a privilege level model. The MMU controls the
address permissions of the privileged levels and gives the software the possibility to define
different access rights. The address permissions of the privilege levels are controlled by
the MMU. In case of an access violation the MMU will trigger a reset and then a trap
service routine can react on the access violation. The policy of setting up the MMU and
specifying the memory ranges, to a certain extend, for the privilege levels . with the
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exception of the IFX level - is defined from the user software (OS).
SF_CS
: Cryptographic Support
The IC chip TOE is equipped with several hardware accelerators and software modules to
support the standard symmetric and asymmetric cryptographic operations. This security
function is introduced to include the cryptographic operation in the scope of the evaluation
as the cryptographic function respectively mathematic algorithm itself is not used from the
IC chip TOE security policy. On the other hand these functions are of special interest for
the use of the hardware as platform for the software. The components are a co-processor
supporting the DES and AES algorithms and a combination of a co-processor and software
modules to support RSA cryptography, RSA key generation, ECDSA signature generation
and verification, ECDH key agreement and EC public key calculation and public key testing.
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8. Glossary and Acronyms
Term
Definition
Accurate
Terminal
Certificate
A Terminal Certificate is accurate, if the issuing Document Verifier is
trusted by the travel document’s chip to produce Terminal
Certificates with the correct certificate effective date, see [EAC].
Advanced
Inspection
Procedure (with PACE)
A specific order of authentication steps between a travel document
and a terminal as required by [SAC], namely (i) PACE, (ii) Chip
Authentication v.1, (iii) Passive Authentication with SOD and (iv)
Terminal Authentication v.1. AIP can generally be used by EIS-AIPPACE.
Agreement
This term is used in the current PP in order to reflect an appropriate
relationship between the parties involved, but not as a legal notion.
Active Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [MRTD] option by which means the
travel document’s chip proves and the inspection system verifies the
identity and authenticity of the travel document’s chip as part of a
genuine travel document issued by a known State of Organisation.
Application note
Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction,
evaluation, or use of the TOE.
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the travel document's
chip to store the Initialization Data and Pre-personalisation Data.
Authenticity
Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the
travel document’s chip were created by the issuing State or
Organisation
Basic Access Control (BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [MRTD] by which means the travel
document’s chip proves and the inspection system protects their
communication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic
Access Keys (see there).
Basic
Inspection
System
A technical system being used by an inspecting authority and
with PACE protocol (BIS-
operated by a governmental organisation (i.e. an Official Domestic or
PACE)
Foreign Document Verifier) and verifying the travel document
presenter as the travel document holder (for ePassport: by
comparing the real biometric data (face) of the travel document
presenter with the stored biometric data (DG2) of the travel
document holder).
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The Basic Inspection System with PACE is a PACE Terminal
additionally supporting/applying the Passive Authentication protocol
and is authorised by the travel document Issuer through the
Document Verifier of receiving state to read a subset of data stored
on the travel document.
Basic
Inspection
System
(BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the
Basic Access Control Mechanism and authenticates itself to the travel
document’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from
the printed MRZ data for reading the logical travel document.
(biodata).
The personalised details of the travel document holder of the
document appearing as text in the visual and machine readable
zones on the biographical data page of a travel document. [MRTD]
Biometric reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document
holder in the travel document’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii)
optional biometric reference data.
Card Access Number (CAN)
Password derived from a short number printed on the front side of
the data-page.
Certificate chain
A sequence defining a hierarchy certificates. The Inspection System
Certificate is the lowest level, Document Verifier Certificate in
between, and Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates
are on the highest level. A certificate of a lower level is signed with
the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of
the next higher level.
Counterfeit
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security
document made by whatever means. [MRTD]
Country
Signing
CA
Certificate (CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key
(KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority stored in
the inspection system.
Country
Certification
(CSCA)
Signing
An organisation enforcing the policy of the travel document Issuer
Authority
with respect to confirming correctness of user and TSF data stored in
the travel document. The CSCA represents the country specific root
of the PKI for the travel documents and creates the Document
Signer Certificates within this PKI.
The CSCA also issues the self-signed CSCA Certificate (CCSCA) having
to be distributed by strictly secure diplomatic means, see. [MRTD],
5.5.1.
The Country Signing Certification Authority issuing certificates for
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Document Signers (cf. [MRTD]) and the domestic CVCA may be
integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country Certification Authority.
However, even in this case, separate key pairs must be used for
different roles, see [EAC].
Country
Verifying
An organisation enforcing the privacy policy of the travel document
Certification
Authority
Issuer with respect to protection of user data stored in the travel
(CVCA)
document (at a trial of a terminal to get an access to these data).
The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI for the
terminals using it and creates the Document Verifier Certificates
within this PKI. Updates of the public key of the CVCA are distributed
in form of
CVCA Link-Certificates, see [EAC].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any
certificate-based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot
recognise a CVCS as a subject; hence, it merely represents an
organizational entity within this PP.
The
Country
Signing
Certification
Authority
(CSCA)
issuing
certificates for Document Signers (cf. [MRTD]) and the domestic
CVCA may be integrated into a single entity, e.g. a Country
Certification Authority. However, even in this case, separate key pairs
must be used for different roles, see [EAC].
Current date
The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the
validate card verifiable certificates.
CV Certificate
Card Verifiable Certificate according to [EAC].
CVCA link Certificate
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new
key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the
old key.
Document Basic Access Key
The [MRTD] describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Derivation Algorithm
Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access
Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
PACE passwords
Passwords used as input for PACE. This may either be the CAN or
the SHA-1-value of the concatenation of Serial Number, Date of Birth
and Date of Expiry as read from the MRZ, see [SAC],
Document Details Data
Data printed on and electronically stored in the travel document
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representing the document details like document type, issuing state,
document number, date of issue, date of expiry, issuing authority.
The document details data are less-sensitive data.
Document Security Object
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document
(SOD)
Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is
stored in the travel document’s chip. It may carry the Document
Signer Certificate (CDS). [MRTD]
Document Signer (DS)
An organisation enforcing the policy of the CSCA and signing the
Document Security Object stored on the travel document for passive
authentication.
A Document Signer is authorised by the national CSCA issuing the
Document Signer Certificate (CDS), see [EAC]and [MRTD]. This role is
usually delegated to a Personalisation Agent.
Document Verifier (DV)
An organisation enforcing the policies of the CVCA and of a Service
Provider (here: of a governmental organisation / inspection
authority)
and
managing
terminals
belonging
together
(e.g.
terminals operated by a State’s border police), by – inter alia –
issuing Terminal Certificates. A Document Verifier is therefore a
Certification Authority, authorised by at least the national CVCA to
issue certificates for national terminals, see [EAC].
Since the Standard Inspection Procedure does not imply any
certificate-based terminal authentication, the current TOE cannot
recognise a DV as a subject; hence, it merely represents an
organisational entity within this PP.
There can be Domestic and Foreign DV: A domestic DV is acting
under the policy of the domestic CVCA being run by the travel
document Issuer; a foreign DV is acting under a policy of the
respective foreign CVCA (in this case there shall be an appropriate
agreement between the travel document Issuer und a foreign CVCA
ensuring enforcing the travel document Issuer’s privacy policy).
Eavesdropper
A threat agent with high attack potential reading the communication
between the travel document’s chip and the inspection system to
gain the data on the travel document’s chip.
Enrolment
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person's identity. [MRTD]
Travel
document
The contact based or contactless smart card integrated into the
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(electronic)
plastic or paper, optical readable cover and providing the following
application: ePassport.
ePassport application
A part of the TOE containing the non-executable, related user data
(incl. biometric) as well as the data needed for authentication (incl.
MRZ); this application is intended to be used by authorities, amongst
other as a machine readable travel document (MRTD). See [EAC].
Extended Access Control
Security mechanism identified in [MRTD] by which means the travel
document’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of the inspection
systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii)
controls the access to the optional biometric reference data and (iii)
protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric
reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by
secure messaging.
Extended Inspection
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in
addition
System (EIS)
to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or
Organisation to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or the portrait. [MRTD]
Global Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process
data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in
inspection
operations
in
their
respective
States.
Global
interoperability is a major objective of the standardized specifications
for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all
travel documents. [MRTD]
IC Dedicated Software
Software developed and injected into the chip hardware by the IC
manufacturer. Such software might support special functionality of
the IC hardware and be used, amongst other, for implementing
delivery procedures between different players. The usage of parts of
the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain life phases.
IC
Dedicated
Support
Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which
provides functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC
Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is
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used to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide
any functionality thereafter.
IC Embedded Software
Software embedded in an IC and not being designed by the IC
developer. The IC Embedded Software is designed in the design life
phase and embedded into the IC in the manufacturing life phase of
the TOE.
IC Identification Data
The IC manufacturer writes a unique IC identifier to the chip to
control the IC as travel document material during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the travel document
manufacturer.
Impostor
A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a
false name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical
appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the
purpose of using that person’s document. [MRTD]
Improperly
documented
person
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired
travel document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or
altered travel document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document
or visa; or (d) no travel document or visa, if required. [MRTD]
Initialisation
Process of writing Initialisation Data (see below) to the TOE (cf. sec.
1.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 3).
Initialisation Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the nonvolatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2).
These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC
identification as travel document’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection
The act of a State examining an travel document presented to it by a
traveller (the travel document holder) and verifying its authenticity.
[MRTD]
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an travel document presented by the traveller
and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as travel
document holder.
Integrated circuit (IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The travel document’s chip is an integrated
circuit.
Integrity
Ability to confirm the travel document and its data elements on the
travel document’s chip have not been altered from that created by
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the issuing State or Organisation
Issuing Organisation
Organisation authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [MRTD]
Issuing State
Logical
The Country issuing the travel document. [MRTD]
Data
Structure
(LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [MRTD]. The capacity expansion
technology used is the travel document’s chip.
Logical travel document
Data of the travel document holder stored according to the Logical
Data Structure [MRTD] as specified by ICAO on the contact
based/contactless
integrated
circuit.
It
presents
contact
based/contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
1.personal data of the travel document holder
2.the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data,
EF.DG1),
3.the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
4.the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
5.the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
6.EF.COM and EF.SOD
Machine
readable
travel
document (MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organisation which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended
for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being
machine read. [MRTD]
Machine
readable
(MRZ)
zone
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the travel document
or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the travel
document, containing mandatory and optional data for machine
reading using OCR methods. [MRTD]
The MRZ-Password is a restricted-revealable secret that is derived
from the machine readable zone and may be used for PACE.
Machine-verifiable
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
biometrics feature
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a
form that can be read and verified by machine. [MRTD]
Manufacturer
Generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing integrated circuit
and the travel document Manufacturer completing the IC to the
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travel document. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE
during the manufacturing life phase. The TOE itself does not
distinguish between the IC Manufacturer and travel document
Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Metadata
of
a
CV
Certificate
Data within the certificate body (excepting Public Key) as described
in [EAC].
The metadata of a CV certificate comprise the following elements:
- Certificate Profile Identifier,
- Certificate Authority Reference,
- Certificate Holder Reference,
- Certificate Holder Authorisation Template,
- Certificate Effective Date,
- Certificate Expiration Date.
ePassport application
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating
system on the IC as the travel document’s chip. It includes
•the file structure implementing the LDS [MRTD],
•the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data
itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16, EF.COM and
EF.SOD) and
•the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but
except the authentication data itself.
Optional
biometric
reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the travel document
holder in the travel document’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s)
(EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note,
that the European commission decided to use only fingerprint and
not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
Passive authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security
Object and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data
fields with the hash values contained in the Document Security
Object.
Password
Authenticated
A communication establishment protocol defined in [SAC],. The PACE
Connection
Establishment
Protocol is a password authenticated Diffie-Hellman key agreement
(PACE)
protocol providing implicit password-based authentication of the
communication
connected):
i.e.
partners
PACE
(e.g.
smart
provides
a
card
and
verification,
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the
terminal
whether
the
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communication partners share the same value of a password π).
Based on this authentication, PACE also provides a secure
communication, whereby confidentiality and authenticity of data
transferred within this communication channel are maintained.
PACE Password
A password needed for PACE authentication, e.g. CAN or MRZ.
Personalisation
The process by which the Personalisation Data are stored in and
unambiguously, inseparably associated with the travel document.
This may also include the optional biometric data collected during
the “Enrolment” (cf. sec. 1.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 3, Step 6).
Personalisation Agent
An organisation acting on behalf of the travel document Issuer to
personalise the travel document for the travel document holder by
some or all of the following activities:
(i)establishing the identity of the travel document holder for the
biographic data in the travel document,
(ii)enrolling the biometric reference data of the travel document
holder,
(iii)writing a subset of these data on the physical travel document
(optical personalisation) and storing them in the travel document
(electronic personalisation) for the travel document holder as defined
in [EAC],
(iv)writing the document details data,
(v)writing the initial TSF data,
(vi)signing the Document Security Object defined in [MRTD] (in the
role of DS).
Please note that the role ‘Personalisation Agent’ may be distributed
among several institutions according to the operational policy of the
travel document Issuer.
Generating signature key pair(s) is not in the scope of the tasks of
this role.
Personalisation Data
A set of data incl.
(i)individual-related data (biographic and biometric data) of the
travel document holder,
(ii)dedicated document details data and
(iii)dedicated initial TSF data (incl. the Document Security Object).
Personalisation data are gathered and then written into the non-
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volatile memory of the TOE by the Personalisation Agent in the lifecycle phase card issuing
Personalisation
Agent
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Authentication Information
Personalisation Agent.
Personalisation Agent Key
Cryptographic authentication key used (i) by the Personalisation
Agent to prove his identity and to get access to the logical travel
document and (ii) by the travel document’s chip to verify the
authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalisation Agent
according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/PACE, FIA_UAU.5/PACE and
FIA_UAU.6/EAC.
Physical part of the travel
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
document
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
1.biographical data,
2.data of the machine-readable zone,
3.photographic image and
4.other data.
Pre-Personalisation
Process of writing Pre-Personalisation Data (see below) to the TOE
including the creation of the travel document Application (cf. sec.
1.2, TOE life-cycle, Phase 2, Step 5)
Pre-personalisation Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by
the travel document Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of nonpersonalised travel document’s and/or to secure shipment within or
between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to)
the Personalisation Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalised
travel
travel document’s chip equipped with a unique identifier.
document’s chip
Receiving State
The Country to which the traveller is applying for entry. [MRTD]
Reference data
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check
the verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
RF-terminal
A device being able to establish communication with an RF-chip
according to ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO14443].
Secondary image
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means. [MRTD]
Secure
messaging
in
encrypted/combined mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication
code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4 [ISO7816]
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Service Provider
An official organisation (inspection authority) providing inspection
service which can be used by the travel document holder. Service
Provider uses terminals (BIS-PACE) managed by a DV.
Skimming
Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical travel
document or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of
the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Standard
Inspection
Procedure
A specific order of authentication steps between an travel document
and a terminal as required by [SAC], namely (i) PACE or BAC and (ii)
Passive Authentication with SOD. SIP can generally be used by BISPACE and BIS-BAC.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE
either through the contact based or contactless interface. A technical
system verifying correspondence between the password stored in the
travel document and the related value presented to the terminal by
the travel document presenter.
In
this
PP
the
role
Terminal may implement the terminal’s part of the PACE protocol and
‘Terminal’ corresponds to
thus authenticate itself to the travel document using a shared
any
password (CAN or MRZ).
terminal
being
authenticated by the TOE.
Terminal Authorization
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the
Inspection System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and
Country Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for
the Current Date.
Terminal
Authorisation
Level
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorisations defined by the
Terminal Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country
Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the
Current Date.
TOE tracing data
Technical information about the current and previous locations of the
travel document gathered by inconspicuous (for the travel document
holder) recognising the travel document.
Travel document
Official document issued by a state or organisation which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official
document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye
readable) data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended
for global use, reflecting essential data elements capable of being
machine read; see [MRTD] (there “Machine readable travel
document”).
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Travel Document Holder
The rightful holder of the travel document for whom the issuing
State or Organisation personalised the travel document.
Travel document’s Chip
A contact based/contactless integrated circuit chip complying with
ISO/IEC 14443 [ISO14443] and programmed according to the Logical
Data Structure as specified by ICAO, [MRTD], sec III.
Travel
document’s
Chip
Embedded Software
Software embedded in a travel document’s chip and not being
developed by the IC Designer. The travel document’s chip Embedded
Software is designed in Phase 1 and embedded into the travel
document’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Traveller
Person presenting the travel document to the inspection system and
claiming the identity of the travel document holder.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of
the TOE (CC part 1 [CC]).
Unpersonalised
document
travel
The travel document that contains the travel document chip holding
only Initialization Data and Pre-personalisation Data as delivered to
the Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data
All data (being not authentication data)
(i) stored in the context of the ePassport application of the travel
document as defined in [EAC] and
(ii) being allowed to be read out solely by an authenticated terminal
acting as Basic Inspection System with PACE .
CC give the following generic definitions for user data:
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation
of the TSF (CC part 1 [CC]). Information stored in TOE resources
that can be operated upon by users in accordance with the SFRs and
upon which the TSF places no special meaning (CC part 2 [CC]).
Verification
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrollee whose identity is
being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s
template. [MRTD]
Verification data
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove
their identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the
verification data match the reference data known for the claimed
identity.
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Acronyms
Acronyms
Term
BIS
Basic Inspection System
BIS-PACE
Basic Inspection System with PACE
CA
Chip Authentication
CAN
Card Access Number
CC
Common Criteria
EAC
Extended Access Control
EF
Elementary File
ICCSN
Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number.
MF
Master File
MRZ
Machine readable zone
n.a.
Not applicable
OSP
Organisational security policy
PACE
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PCD
Proximity Coupling Device
PICC
Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip
PP
Protection Profile
PT
Personalisation Terminal
RF
Radio Frequency
SAR
Security assurance requirements
SFR
Security functional requirement
SIP
Standard Inspection Procedure
TA
Terminal Authentication
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy (defined by the current document)
HAL
Hardware Abstract Layer
AML
Application Middle Layer
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