Certification Report: 0771a_pdf

Certification Report: 0771a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
for
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A,
P5CC012V1A each including IC Dedicated
Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
CC-Zert-327 V4.6
BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A each
including IC Dedicated Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance:
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version
1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 21 December 2011
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................10
1 Executive Summary......................................................................................................11
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................12
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................13
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................13
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................14
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................15
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................15
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................16
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................16
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................17
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................17
11 Security Target............................................................................................................18
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................18
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................18
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................19
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................20
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................23
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 5 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A each
including IC Dedicated Software, has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A,
P5CC012V1A each including IC Dedicated Software, was conducted by Brightsight BV.
The evaluation was completed on 16 December 2011. The Brightsight BV is an evaluation
facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
4
Certification Report
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A each
including IC Dedicated Software, has been included in the BSI list of the certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
Executive Summary
The TOE is named "NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A
each including IC Dedicated Software”. In short form the TOE is named
"P5CC008V1A/P5CC012V1A”.
The P5CC008V1A/P5CC012V1A basically provides a hardware platform for a Security IC
with functionality to calculate the Data Encryption Standard (Triple-DES) with up to three
keys, support for large integer arithmetic operations like multiplication, addition and logical
operations, which is suitable for public key cryptography and elliptic curve cryptography, a
Random Number Generator, cyclic redundancy check (CRC) calculation and an ISO/IEC
7816 contact interface with UART.
In addition, several security mechanisms are implemented to ensure proper operation as
well as integrity and confidentiality of stored data. For example, this includes security
mechanisms for memory protection and sensors, which allow operation under specified
conditions only.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSICC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 6.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality
Addressed issue
SS.RNG
Random Number Generator
SS.HW_DES
Triple-DES coprocessor
SF.OPC
Control of Operating Conditions
SF.PHY
Protection against Physical Manipulation
SF.LOG
Logical Protection
SF.COMP
Protection of the Mode Control
SF.MEM_ACC
Memory Access Control
SF.SFR_ACC
Special Function Register Access Control
SF.RECONFIG
Realizes the Post Delivery Configuration options
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 7.1.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
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Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE: Two major configurations
are present, which are denoted by name P5CC008V1A and P5CC012V1A. Both are
equipped with an EEPROM and the ISO/IEC 7816 contact interface. Their major difference
is related to the availability of EEPROM space. For details refer to chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A each including IC
Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
Name
Release
Form of delivery
P5CC008V1A/P5CC012V1A each
including IC Dedicated Software
V1A
wafer, module (dice have
nameplate T053A)
1
HW
2
SW Test-ROM Software
110
Test-ROM on the chip acc. to
tmfos_ 110_collected.ms3
3
SW Boot-ROM Software
110
Test-ROM on the chip acc. to
tmfos_ 110_collected.ms3
4
SW Resource Configuration Software
110
Test-ROM on the chip acc. to
tmfos_ 110_collected.ms3
5
Objective data sheet P5CC008V1A
DOC and P5CC012V1A family, Secure
contact PKI smart card controller
3.0
Electronic document
6
Objective data sheet addendum
P5CC008V1A and P5CC0012V1A
DOC
Post-Delivery-Configuration
Addendum, NXP Semiconductors
3.0
Electronic document
7
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family,
Secure and PKI Smart Card
DOC
Controller, Philips Semiconductors,
Document Number 084111
1.1
Electronic document
1.1
Electronic document
8
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DOC P5CC008V1A and P5CC012V1A,
Guidance, Delivery and Operation
Certification Report
No Type
BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
Name
Release
Form of delivery
Manual
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The provided user guidance describes the delivery of the TOE to the customer. As
explained in the user guidance, as part of the delivery procedure, the customer shall verify
the correctness of the delivered TOE by performing the two-step identification procedure
consisting of visual identification of the die markings and the reading of a special EEPROM
section containing further identification information. The customer then compares the
obtained information to reference values provided in the user guidance and data sheet.
The first step consists of checking the TOE chip surface. The TOE can be identified by the
presence of a nameplate with identification value “T053A”. This value indicates that the
chip is manufactured by SSMC in Singapore and is the TOE base type.
The second step consists of reading the Device Coding and ROM code number from the
TOE. The Device Coding is referred to as DC(0), DC(1), DC(2), DC(3). The ROM Code
Number is referred to as RCN. Once these values are read out, the values as read are
compared to the values as referred in the user guidance and data sheet. The ROM Code
Number is individual for each ROM content and is an indication of the ROM as loaded on
the TOE.
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The Security Policy is expressed
by the set of Security Functional Requirements and implemented by the TOE. It covers the
following issues: Symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm (Triple-DES), to ensure
the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication
protocols and it will provide a random number generation of appropriate quality. The TripleDES coprocessor supports single DES and Triple-DES operations. The FameXE
coprocessor supplies basic arithmetic functions to support implementation of asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms by the Security IC Embedded Software. The random generator
provides true random numbers without pseudo random calculation.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE provides
countermeasures against: leakage of information, physical probing, malfunctions, physical
manipulations, access to code, access to data memory, abuse of functionality. Hence the
TOE shall:
●
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
●
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
●
Usage of hardware platform
●
Treatment of User Data
●
Protection during composite product manufacturing
●
Check of initialisation data by the Security IC Embedded Software
Certification Report
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.2 and 4.3.
5
Architectural Information
The TOE is the “NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A each
including IC Dedicated Software”. The TOE consists of a hardware part with guidance
documentation.
The TOE consists of the IC hardware and IC Dedicated Software as composed of IC
Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated Support Software. All other software is called
Security IC Embedded Software and is not part of the TOE.
The hardware part consists of the P5CC012V1A/P5CC008V1A Secure Smart Card
Controller with IC Dedicated Software stored in the Test-ROM that is not accessible in the
System Mode or the User Mode after Phase 3. The hardware part of the TOE includes
dedicated guidance documentation. All configurations as defined in the Security Target
[ST] are covered by this evaluation.
The TOE hardware is described in Section 1.4.2.1 “Hardware Description” of the Security
Target [ST]. A Smartcard embedded Software developer may create Smartcard embedded
Software to execute on the TOE hardware. This software is stored in the User ROM of the
TOE hardware and is not part of the TOE.
The TOE provides DES functionality.
Two major configurations are present, which are denoted by name P5CC008V1A and
P5CC012V1A. Both are equipped with an EEPROM and the ISO/IEC 7816 contact
interface. Their major difference is related to availability of EEPROM space. Each major
configuration is provided with several minor configuration options. Each major
configuration also provides customers with several options for reconfiguration.
The figure below, taken from the Security Target of the TOE, shows the structure of the
functionality provided by the TOE:
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Figure 1: Block diagram of the TOE architecture (taken from the Security Target).
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into the following categories:
●
tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE,
●
characterisation and verification tests to release the hardware platform for production
including tests with different operating conditions as well as special verification tests for
security features of the hardware,
●
functional tests at the end of the production process using IC Dedicated Test Software.
These tests are executed for every chip to check its correct functionality as a last step of
phase 3,
●
design tool checks (layout versus schematic), and
●
verification tests carried out to verify the functionality and quality of the related property
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The developer tests cover all TSFI as identified in the functional specification as well as in
the test documentation.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer by sampling. A test protocol
of the tests provided by the developer was verified. In addition the evaluators performed
independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests performed by the
developer.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE provides the TOE
Security Functionality as specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct
implementation of the TOE Security Functionality.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all TOE Security Functionality into
consideration. Extensive penetration testing was performed to test the security
mechanisms used to provide the Security Services and Security Features. The penetration
tests considered both the physical tampering of the hardware platform and attacks which
do not modify the hardware platform physically. The penetration tests considered both the
physical tampering of the TOE and attacks which do not modify the TOE physically.
8
Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
The evaluated TOE is “NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A
each including IC Dedicated Software”. There is no additional version or other
identification and configuration characteristics.
The environment of the TOE is characterised by the general environment descriptions in
the Eurosmart Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile:
●
OE.Plat-Appl Usage of Hardware Platform
●
OE.Resp-Appl Treatment of User Data
●
OE.Process-Sec-IC Protection during composite product manufacturing
The TOE imposes one additional requirement on the environment:
●
OE.Check-Init Check of initialisation data by the Security IC Embedded Software To
ensure the receipt of the correct TOE, the Security IC Embedded Software shall check a
sufficient part of the prepersonalisation data. This shall include at least the FabKey Data
that is agreed between the customer and the TOE Manufacturer.
Users of the TOE may choose to disable a subset of the TOE functionality. The
inaccessibility of some components or parts of memories does not have any impact on the
secure use of the TOE. No dependencies are present on any of the TOE functionalities
that can be disabled.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
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The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii)
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
(iii)
Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation
(see [4], AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 37).
For RNG assessment the scheme interpretation AIS 31 was used (see [4]).
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
●
The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance: Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [10]
●
for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
–
the TOE Security functionality SS.HW_DES for Triple-DES.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks
with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for this
functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for
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the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionality 2-key Triple DES provided by the TOE achieves a security
level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10
Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
Assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Support Software and Embedded
Software on how to securely use the microcontroller chip and which measures have to be
implemented in the software in order to fulfil the security requirements of the Security
Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
The user of the TOE must implement the advices of the user guidance. Important to
mention are:
●
Section 4.2.2 explicitly states that the DES key loading process is not part of the
hardware evaluation. This means that effective countermeasures to prevent side
channel leakage must be implemented by the Security IC Embedded Software;
●
Section 4.5.4 explicitly states the conditions under which the DPA, SPA and timing attack
countermeasures are to be used. In any other case resistance to DPA attacks must be
retested and reconfirmed with the Security IC Embedded Software in a composite
evaluation
●
Section 5: Further requirements for the Software, with special attention paid to:
• Section 5.1: appropriate handling of sensor resets and exceptions, in particular the
implementation of an error counter mechanism;
• Section 5.3: design principles for the Security IC Embedded Software.
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11
BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AIS
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
CRC
Cyclic Redundancy Check
DES
Data Encryption Standard
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission
ISO
International Organization for Standardization
IT
Information Technology
ITSEC
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP
Protection Profile
ROM
Read Only Memory
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionalities
UART
Universal Asynchronous Receiver Transmitter
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
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Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
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13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 3, July 2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE8.
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011, NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A Security Target Rev. 1.0, NXP Semiconductors, May
24th, 2011 (confidential document)
[7]
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP0035-2007
[8]
Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011, NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A Security Target Lite Rev. 1.0, NXP Semiconductors,
May 24th, 2011 (sanitised public document)
[9]
Evaluation Technical Report, NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A,
P5CC012V1A each including IC Dedicated Software, v4.0, Brightsight, December
19th, 2011 (confidential document)
[10]
ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36, NXP Secure Smart Card
Controllers P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A each including IC Dedicated Software,
v4.0, Brightsight, December 19th, 2011 (confidential document)
[11]
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A, Configuration
List, Rev. 0.4, August 26, 2011 (confidential document)
8
specifically
•
AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
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Certification Report
[12]
P5CC008V1A and P5CC012V1A, Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual, NXP
Semiconductors Business Unit Identification, Rev. 1.1, July 14th 2011
[13]
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Document Number 084111, Revision 1.1, July 4th 2006
[14]
Objective data sheet P5CC008V1A and P5CC012V1A family, Secure contact PKI
smart card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Revision 3.0, June 21st 2011,
Documentation number 197130
[15]
Objective data sheet addendum P5CC008V1A and P5CC0012V1A Post-DeliveryConfiguration Addendum, NXP Semiconductors, Revision 3.0, June 21st 2011,
Documentation number 203130
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (Release 3, chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
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Assurance Class
Certification Report
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal highlevel design presentation
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Assurance Class
Assurance Components
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
D
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CC008V1A, P5CC012V1A each
including IC Dedicated Software, (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
(CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 21 December 2011, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2)
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site name and address
Activity
Germany (Hamburg)
NXP Semiconductors GmbH, Business Unit Identification,
Stresemannallee 101, 22505 Hamburg, Germany
Development (NXP)
Austria (Gratkorn)
NXP Semiconductors, Mikronweg 1, 8101, Gratkorn, Austria
Docu Distribution
(NXP)
India (Bangalore)
NXP Semiconductors India Private Limited Information
Technology Park Nagawara Village, Kasaba Hobli, Bangalore
560 045 India
Development,
analogue design (NXP)
Singapore (SSMC)
Systems on Silicon Manufactoring Co. Pte. Ltd. 8 (SSMC), 70
Pasir Ris Drive 1, Singapore 519527, Singapore
Waferfab
Korea (Toppan)
Toppan Photomasks Korea Ltd., 345-1, Sooha-Ri ShinDoonMyon, 467-840 Ichon, South Korea
Maskshop
Thailand (APB)
Module Production and Final Test Center, NXP Semiconductors
Thailand (APB), 303 Moo 3, Chaengwattana Rd., Laksi Bangkok
10210, Thailand
Testcenter, Assembly,
Delivery
Taiwan (APK)
NXP Semiconductors Taiwan Ltd., 10 Chin 5th Road, 811
Kaohsiung, Taiwan
Testcenter, Assembly,
Delivery
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Germany
NXP Semiconductors GmbH, NXP IC Test Center Hamburg,
Stresemannallee 101, 22529 ,Hamburg, Germany
BSI-DSZ-CC-0771-2011
Testcenter, Delivery
(TeCH,NXP)
Netherlands
Module assembly
NedCard Netherlands, Bijsterhuizen 25-29, NL-6604 LM Wijchen, (NedCard)
The Netherlands
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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