Certification Report: 0344a

Certification Report: 0344a
Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
for
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 and
SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24
both with RSA2048 V1.4
and specific IC Dedicated Software
from
Infineon Technologies AG
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 and
SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24
both with RSA2048 V1.4
and specific IC Dedicated Software
from
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
Infineon Technologies AG
The IT products identified in this certificate have been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1
Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for
compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
Evaluation Results:
PP Conformance:
Functionality:
Protection Profile BSI-PP-0002-2001
BSI-PP-0002-2001 conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL5 augmented by:
ALC_DVS.2 (Life cycle support - Sufficiency of security measures),
AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states),
AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 11. November 2005
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no
warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December
1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
Certification Report
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
•
BSIG 2
•
BSI Certification Ordinance 3
•
BSI Schedule of Costs 4
•
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
•
DIN EN 45011 standard
•
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
•
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1 5
•
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)
•
Part 1, Version 0.6
•
Part 2, Version 1.0
•
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
•
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,
Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of
the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common
Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria
recognition arrangement committees.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundesanzeiger p. 19445
A-1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
2
Certification Report
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2
CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components ACM_SCP.3, ADV_FSP.3,
ADV_HLD.3, ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.1, ADV_RCR.2, ADV_SPM.3, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4 that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions
of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance
families are relevant.
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3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The
product
Infineon
Smart
Card
IC
(Security
Controller)
SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 and SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24 both with
RSA2048 V1.4 and specific IC Dedicated Software has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI. For this evaluation specific results from the
evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0322-2005 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 and SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24 both with
RSA2048 V1.4 and specific IC Dedicated Software was conducted by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 6
recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, and vendor and distributor is:
Infineon Technologies AG, Security & Chipcard ICs, P.O. Box 80 09 49, 81609
München, Germany
The certification is concluded with
•
the comparability check and
•
the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 11. November 2005.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
•
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
•
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
4
Certification Report
Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-30 and D1 to D-4.
The product Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 and SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24 both with
RSA2048 V1.4 and specific IC Dedicated Software has been included in the
BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor 7 of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the abovementioned website.
.
7
A-4
Infineon Technologies AG
Security & Chipcard ICs
P.O. Box 80 09 49,
81609 München, Germany
Certification Report
B
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
•
the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
•
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
•
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
Contents of the certification results
1
Executive Summary
2
Identification of the TOE
11
3
Security Policy
13
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
14
5
Architectural Information
14
6
Documentation
15
7
IT Product Testing
15
8
Evaluated Configuration
17
9
Results of the Evaluation
17
10 Comments/Recommendations
20
11 Annexes
24
12 Security Target
24
13 Definitions
24
14 Bibliography
27
B-2
3
Certification Report
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) are the products Infineon Smart Card IC
(Security Controller) SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 and SLE66CX80PE/m1533a24 both with RSA2048 V1.4 and specific IC Dedicated Software. These
products provide a hardware platform for a smart card to run smart card
applications executed by a smart card operating system.
For this evaluation specific results from the evaluation process based on BSIDSZ-CC-0322-2005 were re-used. The changes of the TOE compared to the
chip SLE66CX680PE are modified memory sizes and a few modifications on
module and implementation level. The security policy is unchanged. The
Security Target [6] was updated.
The TOE is manufactured in Infineons IC fabrication in Dresden, Germany,
indicated by the production line indicator “2” (see part D, Annex A of this report).
The SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 and SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24
identically from hardware perspective. The difference is that
SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24 is blocked to smaller memory sizes.
are
the
The hardware part of the TOE is the complete chip, composed of
•
Microcontroller type ECO 2000 (CPU) (including the sub-components
memory encryption and decryption unit (MED), memory management unit
(MMU) and 256 bytes of internal RAM (IRAM)),
•
External
memory
comprising
(SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24
/
SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24): 4 / 4 kBytes extended RAM (XRAM), 96 / 96
kBytes user ROM, including the routines for chip management (RMS), 12 /
12 KB test ROM containing the test routines (STS), and a total of 16 / 8
kBytes non-volatile memory (EEPROM) with error detection and error
correction,
•
Security logic, Memory Control Unit (MCU), True random number generator,
Checksum module, Interrupt module, Input Logic, Timer, Address and data
busses, Advanced Crypto Engine (ACE) for long integer modulo
calculations, DES accelerator, Extended configuration and extended SFR
registers for general purposes and chip configuration.
The firmware part of the TOE consists of the RMS (Resource Management
System) routines for EEPROM programming and security function testing and
the STS (Self Test Software) which consists of test and initialisation routines.
The RMS is part of the IC Dedicated Support Software and the STS is part of
the IC Dedicated Test Software as defined in Protection Profile [9]. The RMS
routines are stored by the TOE manufacturer in a reserved area of the normal
user ROM. The STS routines are stored in the protected test ROM, used for
testing purposes during production only and are not accessible for the user
software.
The software part of the TOE consists of the RSA2048 library to provide a high
level interface to RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) cryptography implemented on
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Certification Report
the hardware component ACE. The routines are used for the generation of RSA
key pairs, the RSA signature verification, the RSA signature generation and the
RSA modulus recalculation. The RSA2048 library is delivered as source code
as part of the Infineon Software Development Kit and is to be integrated into the
users embedded software.
The smart card operating system and the application stored in the User ROM
and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE.
The TOE provides an ideal platform for applications requiring non-volatile data
storage. The TOE is intended for use in a range of high security applications,
including high speed security authentication, data encryption or electronic
signature. Several security features independently implemented in hardware or
controlled by software will be provided to ensure proper operations and integrity
and confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for
memory protection, leakage protection and sensors to allow operations only
under specified conditions.
The Security Target is written using the Smartcard IC Platform Protection
Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9]. With
reference to this Protection Profile, the smart card product life cycle is described
in 7 phases. The development, production and operational user environment
are described and referenced to these phases. TOE delivery is defined at the
end of phase 3 as wafers or phase 4 as modules.
The assumptions, threats and objectives defined in this Protection Profile [9] are
used. To address additional security features of the TOE (e.g cryptographic
services), the security environment as outlined in the PP [9] is augmented by an
additional policy, an assumption and security objectives accordingly.
The IT products Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 and SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24 both with
RSA2048 V1.4 and specific IC Dedicated Software was evaluated against the
claims of the Security Target [6] by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle
IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was completed on 10.11.2005. The TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF) 8 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor, vendor and distributor is Infineon Technologies AG.
1.1
Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL5+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 5 augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
8
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Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
Requirement
Identifier
EAL5
TOE evaluation: Semiformally designed and tested
+: ALC_DVS.2
Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
+: AVA_MSU.3
Vulnerability assessment - Analysis and testing for insecure
states
+: AVA_VLA.4
Vulnerability assessment - Highly resistant
Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2
Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
FCS
Cryptographic support
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FCS_COP.1 [3DES] Cryptographic operation
ST
FCS_COP.1 [RSA]
Cryptographic operation
ST
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
ST
FDP
User data protection
FDP_ACC.1
Subset access control
ST
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based access control
ST
FDP_IFC.1
Subset information flow control
PP
FDP_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer protection
PP
FDP_SDI.1
Stored data integrity monitoring
ST
FDP_SDI.2
Stored data integrity monitoring and action
ST
FMT
Security Management
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
ST
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialisation
ST
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of management functions
ST
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
PP
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
PP
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
PP
FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain separation
PP
FRU
Resource utilisation
FRU_FLT.2
Limited fault tolerance
PP
Table 2: SFRs taken from CC Part 2
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Certification Report
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security
Functional
Requirement
Identifier
Source
from PP or
added in ST
FAU
Security Audit
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
FMT
Security management
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
PP
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
PP
FPT
Protection of the TOE Security Functions
FPT_TST.2
Subset TOE testing
PP / ST
9
PP / ST
ST
Table 3: SFRs CC part 2 extended
Note: Only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 5.1.1 and 7.2.
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security
Functions
Description
SF1
Operating state checking
SF2
Phase management with test mode lock-out
SF3
Protection against snooping
SF4
Data encryption and data disguising
SF5
Random number generation
SF6
TSF self test
SF7
Notification of physical attack
SF8
Memory Management Unit (MMU)
SF9
Cryptographic support
Table 4: TOE Security Functions
SF1: Operating state checking
Correct function of the TOE is only given in the specified range. To
prevent an attack exploiting that circumstance, it is necessary to detect if
the specified range is left.
9
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PP/ST: component is described in the PP but operations are performed in the ST.
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
All operating signals are filtered to prevent malfunction and the operation
state is monitored with sensors for the operating voltage, clock signal,
frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation. This function
includes also mechanisms to detect and correct specific EEPROM
memory errors.
SF2: Phase management with test mode lock-out
During start-up of the TOE the decision for the user mode or the test
mode is taken depending on several phase identifiers. If test mode is the
active phase, the TOE requests authentication before any action (test
mode lock-out).
The phase management is used to provide the separation between the
security enforcing functions and the user software. The TOE is set to
user mode before TOE delivery.
SF3: Protection against snooping
Several mechanisms, like topological design measures for disguise,
protect the TOE against snooping the design or the user data during
operation and even if it is out of operation (power down).
SF4: Data encryption and data disguising
The memory contents of the TOE is encrypted on chip to protect against
data analysis on stored data as well as on internally transmitted data.
Only the key owner has the possibility to read out data. To prevent
interpretation of leaked information, randomness is inserted in the
information. This function is specifically effective to prevent DPA during
Triple DES calculations.
SF5: Random number generation
Random data are essential for cryptography as well as for physical
security mechanisms. The TOE is equipped with a true random generator
based on physical probabilistic effects. The random data can be used
from the user software as well as from the security enforcing functions.
SF6: TSF self test
As part of the TSF, a hardware controlled self-test can be started from
the user software or is started directly to test SF1, SF5 and SF7. Any
attempt to modify the sensor devices will be detected from the test.
SF7: Notification of physical attack
The entire surface of the TOE is protected with the active shield. Attacks
over the surface are detected when the shield lines are cut or get
contacted.
SF8: Memory Management Unit (MMU)
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The MMU in the TOE gives the user software the possibility to define
different access rights for memory areas. In case of an access violation
the MMU will generate a non maskable interrupt (NMI). Then an interrupt
service routine can react on the access violation. The policy of setting up
the MMU and specifying the memory ranges is defined by the user
software.
SF9: Cryptographic Support
Cryptographic operations are provided by the TOE. The TOE is equipped
with several hardware accelerators to support the standard cryptographic
operation. The components are a hardware DES encryption and
decryption unit and a combination of software and hardware unit to
support RSA cryptography and RSA key generation.
As the final transition from test mode to user mode is performed before
TOE delivery, all TOE Security Functions are applicable from TOE
delivery at the end of phase 3 or 4 (depending on when TOE delivery
takes place in a specific case) to phase 7. The RSA functionality as part
of SF9 is only available, if the embedded software developer implements
the RSA2048 library into the embedded software.
1.3
Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6, chapter 6]. The rating of the
strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2) (see
Chapter 9 of this report).
1.4
Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs)
addressed by the evaluated IT product
The threats which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE
and the organisational security policies defined for the TOE are specified in the
Security Target [6] and can be summarised as follows.
It is assumed that the attacker is a human being or a process acting on behalf
of him.
So-called standard high-level security concerns defined in the Protection Profile
[9] were derived from considering the end-usage phase (Phase 7 of the life
cycle as described in the Security Target) as follows:
•
manipulation of User Data and of the smart card Embedded Software (while
being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories),
•
disclosure of User Data and of the smart card Embedded Soft-ware (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories) and
•
deficiency of random numbers.
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These high-level security concerns are refined in the Protection Profile [9] and
used by the Security Target [6] by defining threats on a more technical level for
•
Inherent Information Leakage,
•
Physical Probing,
•
Physical Manipulation,
•
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress,
•
Forced Information Leakage,
•
Abuse of Functionality and
•
Deficiency of Random Numbers.
Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 are
covered by assumptions (see below).
The development and production environment starting with Phase 2 up to TOE
Delivery are covered by an organisational security policy outlining that the IC
Developer / Manufacturer must apply the policy “Protection during TOE
Development and Production (P.Process-TOE)” so that no information is
unintentionally made available for the operational phase of the TOE. The Policy
ensures confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its related design
information and data. Access to samples, tools and material must be restricted.
A specific additional security functionality Triple-DES and RSA-encryption and
decryption must be provided by the TOE according to an additional security
policy defined in the Security Target.
Objectives are taken from the Protection Profile plus additional ones related to
the additional policy.
1.5
Special configuration requirements
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode. The
TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the IC manufacturing process
(Phase 3) or at the end of IC Packaging (Phase 4). At this point in time the
operating system software including the RSA2048 library (IC dedicated SW part
of the TOE) is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the chip and the
test mode is disabled.
The Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24
and SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24 both with RSA2048 V1.4 and specific IC
Dedicated Software are identically from hardware perspective. The difference is
that the SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24 is blocked to smaller memory sizes. This
configuration is done before TOE delivery.
Thus, there are no special procedures for generation or installation that are
important for a secure use of the TOE. The further production and delivery
processes, like the Smart Card Finishing Process, Personalisation and the
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Certification Report
delivery of the smart card to an end user, have to be organised in a way that
excludes all possibilities of physical manipulation of the TOE.
There are no special security measures for the start-up of the TOE besides the
requirement that the controller has to be used under the well-defined operating
conditions and that the requirements on the software have to be applied as
described in the user documentation and chapter 10 of this Report.
1.6
Assumptions about the operating environment
Since the Security Target claims conformance to the Protection Profile [9], the
assumptions defined in section 3.2 of the Protection Profile are valid for the
Security Target of this TOE. With respect to the life cycle defined in the Security
Target, Phase 1 and the Phases from TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6
are covered by these assumptions from the PP:
The developer of the smart card Embedded Software (Phase 1) must ensure:
•
the appropriate “Usage of Hardware Platform (A.Plat-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. Therefore, it has to be ensured, that the software
fulfils the assumptions for a secure use of the TOE. In particular the
assumptions imply that developers are trusted to develop software that fulfils
the assumptions.
•
the appropriate “Treatment of User Data (A.Resp-Appl)” while developing
this software in Phase 1. The smart card operating system and the smart
card application software have to use security relevant user data of the TOE
(especially keys and plain text data) in a secure way. It is assumed that the
Security Policy as defined for the specific application context of the
environment does not contradict the Security Objectives of the TOE. Only
appropriate secret keys as input for the cryptographic function of the TOE
have to be used to ensure the strength of cryptographic operation
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalisation (A.Process-Card) is
assumed after TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6, as well as during the
delivery to Phase 7.
The following additional assumption is assumed in the Security Target:
•
Key-dependent functions (if any) shall be implemented in the smart card
Embedded Software in a way that they are not susceptible to leakage
attacks (A.Key-Function).
1.7
Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
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product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The following TOE deliverables are provided for a customer who purchases the
TOE:
No
Type
Identifier
Release
Date
Form of Delivery
1
HW
SLE66CX162PE Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1531a24 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
Wafer or packaged
module
SLE66CX80PE Smart
Card IC
GDS-file-ID:
m1533a24 with
production line
indicator: “2”
(Dresden)
Wafer or packaged
module
55.0B.07
Stored in Test ROM
on the IC
2
SW
STS Self Test Software
(the IC Dedicated Test
Software)
3
SW
RMS Resource
V2.5
Management System (the
IC Dedicated Support
Software)
Stored in reserved
area of User ROM on
the IC
4
SW
RSA2048 library
Source code in
electronic form
V1.40
Table 5: Delivered hardware and software of the TOE
No
Type
Identifier
Release
Date
Form of Delivery
5
DOC
SLE66CxxxPE, MicroSlim 07.05
Security Controller
Family, Data Book [10]
July 2005 Hardcopy and
pdf-file
6
DOC
Security Programmers’
Manual, SLE66xxxP
(Superslim) and SLE
66CxxxPE (Microslim)
Controllers [11]
03.05
March
2005
7
DOC
Security & Chip Card ICs
– SLE 66CxxxPE –
Instruction Set [12]
07.04
July 2004 Hardcopy and
pdf-file
8
DOC
Security &Chip Card Ics
SLE 66CxxxPE –
Instruction Set and
Special Function
Registers – Quick
Reference [13]
07.04
July 2004 Hardcopy and
pdf-file
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
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No
Type
Identifier
Release
Date
Form of Delivery
9
DOC
RSA 2048 bit Support,
07.05
SLE66CXxxxPE, RSA
Interface Specification for
Library V1.40 [14]
July 2005 Hardcopy and
pdf-file
10
DOC
RSA 2048 bit Support for
SLE66CXxxxPE,
Arithmetic Library for
V1.40 [15]
07.05
July 2005 Hardcopy and
pdf-file
11
DOC
Application Notes
[16] – [28]
See chapter 14
below
Hardcopy and
pdf-file
Table 6: Delivered documents of the TOE
The hardware part of the version of the TOE is identified by Infineon Smart Card
IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 resp. SLE66CX80PE /
m1533-a24 and the GDS-file. For identification of a specific chip, the Chip
Identification Number stored in the EEPROM can be used (see [10, chapter 7
and table 2-33]):
•
The chip type byte identifies the different versions in the following manner:
94 hex for version m1531a2(x).
96 hex for version m1533a2(x).
Using the additional detailed production parameter bytes, one can
reconstruct the last character (x) of the version number of a specific chip via
a data base system at Infineon Logistic Department.
•
The STS is identified by its unique version number which is stored in three
additional control bytes of the Chip Identification Number.
•
The RMS is identified by its unique version number. As the RMS is part of
the ROM mask, one can get the RMS version number for a specific chip by
using the ROM type bytes and asking the data base system at Infineon
Logistic Department.
•
The first nibble of the batch number gives the production line indicator which
is “2” for both chips manufactured in Infineons IC fabrication in Dresden,
Germany.
The RSA2048 library, as a separate software part of the TOE is identified by its
unique version number.
The delivery process from Infineon to their customers (to Phase 5 or Phase 6 of
the life cycle) guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of
the different parts of the TOE as outlined above.
To ensure that the customer receives the evaluated version of the chip, either
•
he has to personally pick up the TOE (IC on Wafers or as Modules) at the
Infineon Warehouse in Regensburg (VKL-Rgb) or Wuxi (see part D, annex A
of this report) or
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•
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
the TOE (IC on Wafers or as Modules) is sent as a secured transport by
specific haulage companies from the Infineon Warehouse in Regensburg
(VKL-Rgb) or from Wuxi directly or via one of three distribution centers (DC
E for Europe, DC A for Asia and DC U for the United States) to the
customer. The sender informs the receiver that a delivery was started; after
the delivery was received it has to be checked according to the consignment
notes and the sender is to be informed immediately about result of the
check.
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted)
according to defined mailing procedures.
The TOE RSA2048 software is delivered as softcopy (encrypted source code)
to the embedded software developer according to defined mailing procedures
usually as part of the Infineon Software Development Kit for this chip. After
implementation of the RSA2048 functionality into the embedded software, this is
delivered back as part of the customers deliverables (e.g. ROM-code) into the
chip production of Infineon.
Defined procedures at the development and production sites guarantee that the
right versions of the RMS and STS are implemented into a specific ROM mask
for a TOE IC.
3
Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used
by the smart card operating system and the smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement a
symmetric cryptographic block cipher algorithm to ensure the confidentiality of
plain text data by encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and
it will provide a random number generator. Additionally, a combination of
software and hardware parts of the TOE implement RSA cryptography and RSA
key generation.
As the TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is
also to provide protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the
confidentiality of cryptographic keys during Triple-DES and RSA cryptographic
functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing, against
malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality.
Hence the TOE shall:
•
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of
the TOE and
•
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security
Functions (security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the
TOE.
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4
Certification Report
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smart card operating system and the application software stored in the
User ROM and in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test
ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by the TOE
manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the chip manufacturing
process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging into
modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the
operating system software is already stored in the non-volatile memories of the
chip and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smart card applications need the Security Functions of the smart card
operating system based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to
security the composition of this TOE, the operating system, and the smart card
application is important. Within this composition the security functionality is only
partly provided by the TOE and causes dependencies between the TOE
Security Functions and the functions provided by the operating system or the
smart card application on top. These dependencies are expressed by environmental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE several aspects were specifically considered
to support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smart
card application software (i.e. smart card operating system and application).
This was necessary as Infineon Technologies AG is the TOE developer and
manufacturer and responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded
smart card application software in its development and production environment.
For those aspects refer to part B, chapter 9.2 of this report.
The full evaluation results are applicable only for TOE chips from the
semiconductor factory in Dresden, labelled by the production line indicator „2“.
5
Architectural Information
The Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24
and SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24 both with RSA2048 V1.4 and specific IC
Dedicated Software are integrated circuits (IC) plus supporting software for RSA
calculations providing a platform to a smart card operating system and smart
card application software. A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems
can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target. The complete
hardware description and the complete instruction set of the TOE is to be found
in the Data Book [10] and other guidance documents delivered to the customer,
see table 6.
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components
processing unit (CPU) with memory management unit (MMU), RAM, ROM,
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EEPROM, security logic, interrupt module, bus system, Random Number
Generator (RNG) and the two modules (ACE and DDC) for cryptographic
operations of the chip are used. Security measures for physical protection are
realised within the layout of the whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers, the CPU instructions and the various on-chip
memories provide the interface to the software using the Security Functions of
the TOE. The TOE software for RSA calculations uses the defined TOE
hardware interfaces and is to be implemented by the embedded software
developer as outlined in the RSA Interface Specification [14]. It provides a high
level software interface to the users operating system and application.
The TOE IC Dedicated Test Software (STS), stored on the chip, is used for
testing purposes during production only and is completely separated from the
use of the embedded software by disabling before TOE delivery.
The TOE IC Dedicated Support Software (RMS), stored on the chip, is used for
EEPROM programming and Security Function testing. It is stored by the TOE
manufacturer in a reserved area of the normal user ROM and can be used by
the users embedded software.
6
Documentation
The documentation [10] – [28] is provided with the products by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target.
Note that the customer who buys the TOE is normally the developer of the
operating system and/or application software which will use the TOE as hardware computing platform to implement the software (operating system /
application software) which will use the TOE.
To support a composite evaluation as defined in AIS 36 [4], the document ETRlite [8] is provided for the composite evaluator.
7
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer were divided into six categories:
(i)
tests which are performed in a simulation environment for analogue and
for digital simulations;
(ii)
unctional production tests, which are done as a last step of the
production process (phase 3) and, in case TOE delivery is at the end of
phase 4, additionally done as a last step of IC Packaging. These tests
are done for every chip to check its correct functionality;
(iii)
qualification tests to release the TOE to production to determine the
behaviour of the chip with respect to different operating conditions (often
also referred to as characterisation tests);
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(iv)
special verification tests on functionality of the chip which were done with
samples of the TOE in user mode;
(v)
special verification tests on Security Functions which were done with
samples of the TOE in user mode;
(vi)
layout tests as part of the design and release process by testing the
implementation by optical control, in order to verify statements
concerning the layout design.
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms
as identified in the functional specification, the high level design and the low
level design. Chips from the production site in Dresden (see part D, annex A of
this report) were used for tests.
The evaluators confirmed test results from the previous certification procedure
BSI-DSZ-CC-0322-2005 where they could repeat the tests of the developer
either using the library of programs and tools delivered to the evaluator or at the
developers site and where they performed independent tests to supplement,
augment and to verify the tests performed by the developer by sampling.
Besides repeating exactly the developers tests, test parameters were varied
and additional analysis was done. Security features of the TOE realised by
specific design and layout measures were checked by the evaluators during
layout inspections at that time.
The RSA 2048 library was tested via the external interfaces of the security
functions (TSFI) for RSA verification / encryption, RSA signature generation /
decryption and RSA key generation (APIs: RsaKeyGen, RsaSign, RsaVerify,
RsaModulus, RsaVersion and RsaUserBreak). Basic routines of the library,
which implement modular calculations were tested implicitly as far as they are
used by the security functions. Direct API calls of these basic routines were not
considered.
For this evaluation, the developer provided test evidence for chips from the
production site Dresden. The test results confirm the correct implementation of
the TOE Security Functions.
The evaluators supplied evidence that the actual version of the TOE with
production line indicator “2” (Dresden) provides the Security Functions as
specified.
For this re-evaluation the evaluators re-assessed the penetration testing and
confirmed the results from the previous certification procedure BSI-DSZ-CC0322-2005 where they took all Security Functions into considera-tion. Intensive
penetration testing was performed at that time to consider the physical
tampering of the TOE using highly sophisticated equipment and expertised
know-how. Specific additional penetration attacks were performed in the course
of this evaluation.
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Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is identified by the version Infineon Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 and SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24 both
with RSA2048 V1.4 and specific IC Dedicated Software with production line
indicator “2” (Dresden). The TOE has only one fixed evaluated configuration at
the time of delivery.
All information of how to use the TOE and its Security Functions by the software
is provided within the user documentation.
The TOE has two different operating modes, user mode and test mode. The
application software being executed on the TOE can not use the test mode.
Thus, the evaluation was mainly performed in the user mode. For all evaluation
activities performed in test mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid
for the user mode, too.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1 Evaluation of the TOE
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [7] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in coordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). For smart card IC specific
methodology the CC supporting documents
(i)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii)
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(see [4, AIS 25 and AIS 26]) and [4, AIS 31] (Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology for physical random number generators) were used.
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL5
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components
Security Target evaluation
Verdict
CC Class ASE
PASS
TOE description
ASE_DES.1
PASS
Security environment
ASE_ENV.1
PASS
ST introduction
ASE_INT.1
PASS
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Assurance classes and components
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.1
PASS
PP claims
ASE_PPC.1
PASS
IT security requirements
ASE_REQ.1
PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
ASE_SRE.1
PASS
TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
Configuration management
CC Class ACM
PASS
Partial CM automation
ACM_AUT.1
PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_CAP.4
PASS
Development tools CM coverage
ACM_SCP.3
PASS
Delivery and operation
CC Class ADO
PASS
Detection of modification
ADO_DEL.2
PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADO_IGS.1
PASS
Development
CC Class ADV
PASS
Semiformal functional specification
ADV_FSP.3
PASS
Semiformal high-level design
ADV_HLD.3
PASS
Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2
PASS
Modularity
ADV_INT.1
PASS
Descriptive low-level design
ADV_LLD.1
PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration
ADV_RCR.2
PASS
Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_SPM.3
PASS
Guidance documents
CC Class AGD
PASS
Administrator guidance
AGD_ADM.1
PASS
User guidance
AGD_USR.1
PASS
Life cycle support
CC Class ALC
PASS
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2
PASS
Standardised life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2
PASS
Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.2
PASS
Tests
CC Class ATE
PASS
Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2
PASS
Testing: low-level design
ATE_DPT.2
PASS
Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1
PASS
Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.2
PASS
Vulnerability assessment
B-18
Verdict
CC Class AVA
PASS
Covert channel analysis
AVA_CCA.1
PASS
Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_MSU.3
PASS
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
Assurance classes and components
Verdict
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_SOF.1
PASS
Highly resistant
AVA_VLA.4
PASS
Table 7: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
•
the TOE is conform to the Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, BSI-PP0002-2001 [9]
•
Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
•
the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
•
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
SF 2 (Phase management with test mode lock-out),
SF 3 (Protection against snooping),
SF 4 (Data encryption and data disguising) and
SF 5 (Random number generation)
The scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
(i)
the TOE Security Function SF9 -- which is
a) Triple DES encryption and decryption by the hardware co-processor
and
b) RSA encryption, decryption and key-generation by the combination
of hardware co-processor and RSA2048 Software -- and
(ii)
for other usage of encryption and decryption within the TOE.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex A in part D of this report.
The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC Dedicated Test Software) is used by
the TOE manufacturer to check the chip function before TOE delivery. This was
considered as part of the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for
relevant procedures and under ATE for testing.
The RSA2048 library was evaluated and tested from the view of its defined
security functions. Direct API calls of basic library routines were not considered.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as identified in table
5, produced in the semiconductor factory in Dresden, labelled by the production
line indicator „2“ within the chip identification number in the EEPROM, and the
firmware and software versions as indicated in table 5 and the documentation
listed in table 6.
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The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product or to
chips from other production and manufacturing sites, provided the sponsor
applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the
modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
9.2 Additional Evaluation Results
•
The evaluation confirmed specific results of a previous smart card IC
evaluation regarding assurance aspects for the development and production
environment. This is outlined in part D of this report, annex A.
•
To support a composite evaluation of the TOE together with a specific smart
card embedded software additional evaluator actions were performed during
the TOE evaluation. The results are documented in the ETR-lite [8]
according to [4, AIS 36]. Therefore, the interface between the smart card
embedded software developer and the developer of the TOE was examined
in detail.
10
Comments/Recommendations
1 The operational documents [10] - [28] contain necessary infor-mation about
the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
2 In the following, specific items are listed:
B-20
•
In the operational environment of the TOE the following assumptions
about the environment as outlined in the Security Target have to be
fulfilled:
“Protection during packaging, finishing and personalisation” resulting
from the assumption A.Process-Card of the Security Target: It is
assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the TOE
by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-user to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and
test data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft
or unauthorised use). This means that the Phases after TOE Delivery
are assumed to be protected appropriately.
In addition the development environment of the operating system
developer has to be protected adequately, in order to be able to
guarantee the security of the TOE on the whole.
The assumptions on the usage of the hardware platform (A.PlatAppl), treatment of user data (A.Resp-Appl) and on usage of keydependent functions (A.Key-Function) have to be fulfilled (see part B,
chapter 1.6 of this report). For measures important for A.KeyFunction refer to [26] and [27].
•
The functional requirements for the environment defined in the
Security Target [6, chapter 5.2] have to be taken into consideration
by the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer.
Certification Report
•
BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
The Embedded Software:
- has to activate Wait states and FCURSE functionality for all
operations of the Embedded Software critical for side channel
attacks (e.g. SPA / DPA),
- has to use parameters for memory encryption E0ADR, E2ADR
and XKEY which configure the ranges of encryption,
-
has to configure the MMU correctly,
- has to call the self tests of the TSF implemented in the RMS
routines in order to detect failures of the sensors. The self test
shall be executed at least once during security relevant operation
(e.g. key generation). Depending on the application (e.g. time
between possible resets) the developer of the Smartcard
Embedded Software has to decide how often this function has to
be executed during normal operation to avoid attacks on the
composite product.
•
It is possible to store data in the EEPROM without encryption, which might
constitute a risk in case an attacker is given the possibility to read out this
data. The operating system developer is responsible for the use of all
security functionality made available by the TOE and controllable by him in
such a way, that secure operation is guaranteed. These are the parameters
for memory encryption determining areas for the encryption. In the data
book [10, chapter 19] it is pointed out to the operating system developer,
which effects on the security not proper use of this functionality might have,
and it is described in detail, how to use effectively the security mechanisms
made available by the TOE.
•
In case an alarm is triggered, the content of the XRAM is not being deleted.
In order to prevent an attacker from reading out this data, the embedded
software has to delete explicitly the XRAM after each reset (see [10, chapter
7]).
•
The delivered MMU is set thus, that the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security
Controller) SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 resp. SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24 is
compatible with SLE66CX160S, i.e. all ROM areas are mapped. Since the
MOVC blockade of the SLE66CX160S is no longer implemented, in this
setting reading out of the ROM by a program in the EEPROM is possible. In
order to avoid this, the operating system developer has to programme the
MMU in a way that reading out is impossible. This fact is pointed out in the
data book [10, chapter 19].
•
ROM contents of chips, being manufactured with the same user mask are
identically encrypted. This leads to the possibility to carry out ROM read out
attacks using as many samples as available and combining all results.
Therefore, it is recommended to store security critical data (e.g. identification
and authentication data) not in the ROM, but in the EEPROM (this is
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encrypted chip individually). This fact is pointed out to the operating system
developer in application note [19].
•
The TOE has implemented a hardware DES accelerator. In case the keys
necessary for the calculation of the DES are transferred into the DES
accelerator, these keys might be observable by means of a SPA/DPA. In
order to prevent this, the transfer of the keys have to be protected using the
measures described in application note [26] and [27].
•
The TOE has an active shielding for the identification of attacks by means of
physical probing. It is possible for the operating system developer to
configure the active shielding (see application note [25]). Moreover he has to
change this current pattern before any security critical operation and
compare the returned values with the expected values accordingly
frequently with regard to the software.
•
The TOE is protected by light sensors against DFA light attacks. Within the
delivered RSA2048 library countermeasures against DFA attacks are
implemented, but the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer has to
implement additional countermeasures in his software to counter such
attacks effectively. An example of a possible implementation of such a
countermeasure is given in application note [11]. Furthermore the Smartcard
Embedded Software Developer has to calculate DES encryption and
decryption or decryption and encryption respectively and compare the
results as described in application note [26] and [27].
•
In order to protect the TOE against attacks on power consumption (e.g.
DPA), the wait states functionality in connection with the random number
generator and additional features to modify the current profile have to be
used by the operating system developer, together with additional software
measures, as described in [10, chapter 19].
•
For the fulfilment of the Strength of Function “medium” or "high" for the
Random Number Generator according to [4, AIS31] specific guidance has to
be followed by the Smartcard Embedded Software Developer:
In [10, chapter 16.3.6] the user of the TOE (the Smartcard Embedded
Software Developer) is recommended to perform the online test via the RMS
function SleRngAIS31AnalogTest at start-up or at least before using the
RNG for security relevant operation.
In [10, chapter 6.15.22], [22, chapter 2.2] and [14] it is stated that the
operating system should generate one ore more keys and then perform the
online test via the RMS function SleRngAIS31AnalogTest until the final test
results are obtained (SLE_AIS31_PASS). This online test is mandated and
the keys can be used if the test has passed, but must be discarded if the test
fails.
In addition the evaluator came to the conclusion that a RNG live test (one
call of SleRngAIS31AnalogTest) shall be executed at least once after power
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up and latest before usage of the RNG data for security relevant operation
(e.g. key generation).
Furthermore, it is strongly recommended to call the live test (one call of
SleRngAIS31AnalogTest) latest before any operation is executed that shall
be protected by chip internal randomisation mechanisms (FCURSE,
Random Wait States, Bus Confusion).
Random numbers used for RNG tests performed by the Embedded Software
shall be kept confidential by the application software.
For further advice see data book [10, chapter 16 and 6.11.21] and
application note [22].
•
When the chip is set with PLL=0 (free running) the frequency detector is not
in operation. Even with very low external frequency the chip is still operating
(with maximum internal frequency). The frequency used by the timers can
be set independently from the PLL mode by the Smartcard Embedded
Software. If the frequency is set to be equal the external frequency an
attacker can easily slow down the operation of the timer. Therefore the
Smartcard Embedded Software developer shall never use the timer for
security critical operations in this situation.
3 Because of the possibility to overwrite functions of the RSA2048 library
(delivered to the smart card embedded software developer in form of source
code), it is pointed out that only the usage of the original RSA library
RSA2048 V1.4 is evaluated. For example, the function AceGetRnd_sec
could be overwritten with another function which uses not the true random
number generator of the TOE but pseudo-random numbers. Thus, any
modification of the evaluated code has to be re-evaluated by the software or
composite evaluator.
4 Depending on the security policy of the complete smart card product and on
the specific usage of the RSA-Functionality of this TOE in combination with
RSA supporting functionality provided by the environment (see Security
Target [6, chapter 5.2]) SPA/DPA analysis for RSA-Functionality must be
part of the smart card composite product evaluation.
5 As an outcome of this evaluation, the customer has to follow the evaluated
delivery procedures (see chapter 2 above). In case of differing delivery
procedures, these have to be evaluated in the course of the operating
system evaluation or the smart card composite product evaluation.
In the following, specific items regarding delivery are listed:
-
As the TOE is under control of the user software, the chip
manufacturer can only guarantee the integrity up to the delivery
procedure. It is in the responsibility of the Smartcard Embedded
Software Developer to include mechanisms in the implemented
software which allows detection of modifications after the delivery.
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11
Certification Report
The Smartcard Embedded Software Developer should not accept
deliverables from Infineon he had not requested. Deliverables send in
electronic form (i.e. guidance documents, RSA library) have to be
send and accepted only in encrypted form.
Annexes
Annex A: Evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment (see part D of this report).
12
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document.
13
Definitions
13.1
Acronyms
ACE
Advanced Crypto Engine
API
Application Programming Interface
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA
Differential Power Analysis
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB
Electrical Code Block
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
EMA
Electro magnetic analysis
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
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ROM
Read Only Memory
RSA
Rivest, Shamir, Adleman – a public key encryption algorithm
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
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13.2
Certification Report
Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
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TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.1, August 1999
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,
August 1999
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE. specifically
-
AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, - The
Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July 2002
-
AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July 2002
-
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 for: Functionality classes and
evaluation methodology of physical random number generators
-
AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter
CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungs-schema.
-
AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC
Assurance Classes for EAL5+
-
AIS 36 Version 1, 29 July 2002 for CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A Composite
smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2, March 2002
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6]
Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs, Security Target,
SLE66CX162PE/m1531a24, SLE66CX80PE/m1533a24 both with
RSA2048 V1.40, 5. November 2005, Version 1.1
[7]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, 9. November 2005, for the
Product Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX162PE/m1531a24,
SLE66CX80PE/m1533a24 both with RSA2048 V1.40 (confidential
document)
B-27
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Certification Report
[8]
ETR-lite for composition, according to AIS 36, Version 2, 9. November
2005, for the Product Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX162PE/m1531a24, SLE66CX80PE/m1533a24 both with
RSA2048 V1.40 (confidential document)
[9]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[10]
Infineon Technologies AG, Security and Chipcard ICs, SLE66CxxxPE,
MicroSlim Security Controller Family, Data Book, Version 07.05
(confidential document)
[11]
Security Programmers’ Manual, SLE66xxxP (Superslim) and SLE
66CxxxPE (Microslim) Controllers, Version 03.05, (confidential
document)
[12]
Security & Chip Card ICs – SLE 66CxxxPE – Instruction Set, 07.04,
(confidential document)
[13]
Security &Chip Card ICs SLE 66CxxxPE – Instruction Set and Special
Function Registers – Quick Reference, 07.04, (confidential document)
[14]
RSA 2048 bit Support, SLE66CXxxxPE, RSA Interface Specification for
Library V1.40, Version 07.05, (confidential document)
[15]
RSA 2048 bit Support for SLE66CXxxxPE, Arithmetic Library for V1.40,
Version 07.05 (confidential document)
[16]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxS, SLE66CxxxP, Using the
CRC, Version 03.01
[17]
Application Note, SLE66CXxxP, Infineon Chipcard Crypto API, Version
05.02
[18]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, Using the MicroSlim NVM, Version
05.05
[19]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP/PE, Memory Encryption Decryption,
Version 11.04
[20]
Application Note SLE 66CxxxPE, MMU-Memory Management Unit,
Version 12.04
[21]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, MMU Security Issues, Version 01.02
[22]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxP and SLE66CxxxPE, Testing the Random
Number Generator, Version 11.04
[23]
Application Note SLE66CxxxPE, Security Advice, Version 05.04
[24]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxS, Secure Hash Algorithm SHA1, Version 01.98
[25]
Application Note, SLE66CxxxPE, Using the active shield security feature,
Version 12.04
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[26]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66xxxP, DDES – EC2, Accellerator,
Version 02.04
[27]
Application Note, SLE66xxxPE, DDES, Accellerator, Version 07.05
[28]
Confidential Application Note, SLE66CxxxP, UART, Version 10.03
[29]
Infineon Technologies AG, Secure Mobile Solutions, Configuration
Management
Scope
(ACM_SCP),
SLE66CX162PE/m1531a24,
SLE66CX80PE/m1533a24 both with RSA2048 V1.40, Version 1.1,
9. November 2005 (i.e. TOE Configuration List, confidential document)
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008
The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance
requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,
Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2
Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in Part 2
plus one of the following:
Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3
Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part
of the conformance result.
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)
"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 2.1."
Assurance Class
Class ACM: Configuration
management
Class ADO: Delivery and
operation
Class ADV: Development
Class AGD: Guidance
documents
Class ALC: Life cycle support
Class ATE: Tests
Class AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
Assurance Family
CM automation
CM capabilities
CM scope
Delivery
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
Installation, generation and start-up
Functional specification
High-level design
Implementation representation
TSF internals
Low-level design
Representation correspondence
Security policy modeling
Administrator guidance
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
User guidance
Development security
Flaw remediation
Life cycle definition
Tools and techniques
Coverage
Depth
Functional tests
Independent testing
Covert channel analysis
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
Misuse
Strength of TOE security functions
Vulnerability analysis
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Table 1.1: Assurance family breakdown and map
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)
"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility."
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)
Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“
is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the
obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with
explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class
Assurance
Family
Configuration
management
ACM_AUT
EAL1
Delivery and
operation
Development
Guidance
documents
Life cycle
support
Tests
Vulnerability
assessment
ACM_CAP
ACM_SCP
ADO_DEL
1
ADO_IGS
ADV_FSP
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
ADV_SPM
AGD_ADM
AGD_USR
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
AVA_SOF
AVA_VLA
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6
1
1
2
2
1
3
1
1
4
2
2
4
3
2
5
3
2
5
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
3
2
1
1
2
3
1
1
3
4
3
2
2
2
3
1
1
4
5
3
3
2
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
2
3
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
2
1
3
3
1
4
3
1
4
1
1
Table 6.1: Evaluation assurance level summary
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)
"Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.“
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)
"Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.“
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 6.2.3)
"Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial reengineering.“
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)
"Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional securityspecific engineering costs.“
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 6.2.5)
"Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 6.2.6)
"Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.“
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 6.2.7)
"Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)
AVA_SOF
Strength of TOE security functions
"Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.“
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)
AVA_VLA
Vulnerability analysis
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.“
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“
"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4)
attack potential.“
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D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex A of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0344-2005
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT products Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)
SLE66CX162PE/m1531-a24 and SLE66CX80PE/m1533-a24 both with
RSA2048 V1.4 and specific IC Dedicated Software (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
have been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1 Version 0.6,
Part 2 Version 1.0, extended by advice of the Certification Body for components
beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance, for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC15408: 1999)
and including final interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version
2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 11. November 2005, the following
results regarding the development and production environment apply. The
Common Criteria assurance requirements
• ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.3),
•
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
•
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Infineon Technologies AG, Königsbrücker Str. 180, 01099 Dresden,
Germany
(semiconductor factory)
b) Infineon TechnologiesAG, St.-Martin-Straße 76, 81541 München,
Germany
(development center)
c) Infineon Technologies AG, Leibnizstraße 6, D-93055 Regensburg,
Germany
(IC packaging into modules and warehouse and delivery center)
d) Infineon Technologies AG, Development Center Graz, Babenbergerstr.
10,
A-8020 Graz, Austria (development center)
e) Infineon Technologies Asian Pacific, Exel Singapure Pte. Ltd., 81 ALPS
Avenue, Exel Supply Chain Hub, Singapore 498803
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Certification Report
f) Du Pont Photomasks France S.A., 224, bd John Kennedy, F-91105
Corbeil Essonnes, France (mask shop)
g) Infineon Technologies AG, Alter Postweg 101, D-86159 Augsburg
(development center)
Infineon Technologies (Wuxi) Co. Ltd., No. 118, Xing Chuang San Lu, WuxiSingapore Industrial Park, Wuxi 214028, Jiangsu P.R. China
The hardware part of the TOE produced in the semiconductor factory in
Dresden is labelled by the production line indicator „2“.
For all sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied for
each site and in accordance with the Infineon Technologies AG, Security and
Chipcard ICs, Security Target, SLE66CX162PE/m1531a24,
SLE66CX80PE/m1533a24 both with RSA2048 V1.40, 5. November 2005,
Version 1.1 [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats are countered and the
security objectives for the life cycle phases 2, 3 and 4 up to delivery at the end
of phase 3 or 4 as stated in the TOE Security Target are fulfilled by the
procedures of these sites.
D-4
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