CONVENTI ON NUCLEAR SAFETY.

CONVENTI ON NUCLEAR SAFETY.
L
I
T
HUANI
A
C
ONVENTI
ONONNUCL
EARSAFETY
.
FOURTHNATI
ONALREPORT2007
Vi
l
ni
us2007
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
OBLIGATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
ON NUCLEAR SAFETY IN
LITHUANIA
THE FOURTH LITHUANIAN REPORT IN
ACCORDANCE
WITH ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION
2007
Vilnius
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introductory remarks
3
Article 6: EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS
4
Article 7: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
24
Article 8: REGULATORY BODY
30
Article 9: RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENSE HOLDER
35
Article 10: PRIORITY TO SAFETY
42
Article 11: FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES
54
Article 12: HUMAN FACTORS
65
Article 13: QUALITY ASSURANCE (QA)
68
Article 14: ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY
74
Article 15: RADIATION PROTECTION
81
Article 16: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
94
Article 17: SITTING
109
Article 18: DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
118
Article 19: OPERATION
125
ANNEXES
136
Introductory remarks
This report provides updated information as compared to the Lithuanian National Report issued in
2004. While reading this report the following aspects have to be taken into account:
1. At the end of each section, where appropriate, brief information identifying new issues, which are
included into this particular article of the report, is presented.
2. Information, taken from the Third Review Meeting recommendations, in the report is also
presented, i.e.,
• Safety measures following the shutdown of Unit 1 (in article 6);
• General Overview of INPP Safety Improvement Program during the Period of 2005-2007
(SIP-3) (in article 6);
• International arrangements, including those with neighboring countries (in article 16)
• Safety Assurance during the Operation of Unit 2 (with personnel motivation assessment), (in
article 6);
Information, indicated in item 2 above is also separately presented in the Appendix.
3
Article 6: EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS
Each Contracting Party shall undertake appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear
installations existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party is
reviewed as soon as possible. When necessary in the context of this Convention, the Contracting
Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made as a matter of urgency to
upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved, plans should
be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practically possible. The timing of
the shut-down may take into account the whole energy context and possible alternatives as well as
the social, environmental and economic impact.
6.1. List of existing Nuclear Installations as defined in Article 2 of the Convention
Ignalina NPP is the only nuclear installation in Lithuania. It contains two RBMK-1500 reactors
(Russian acronym for "Channel-type Large Power Reactor"). RBMK-1500 reactors of INPP have
their own design peculiarities. Fifteen RBMK reactors of three generation are currently in operation
in Russia, Lithuania and the Ukraine. INPP owns a number of unique features, which place it
between 2nd and 3rd generations of reactors.
Both reactors have one circuit, two cooling loops; fuel clusters are loaded into individual channels.
The neutron spectrum is thermalized by a massive graphite moderator block. The plant can be
refueled on line and uses slightly enriched nuclear fuel. Refueling is performed during reactor
operation.
The power plants were built as part of the Soviet Union's North-West Unified Power System. The
first unit of INPP was put into commission at the end of 1983, the second unit in August 1987.
Their design lifetime is projected out to 2014-2017 accordingly. A total of four units were originally
planned on this site. Construction of the third unit was terminated in 1988 because of political
pressure, and construction of the forth one had never been started.
Ignalina NPP is located in the north-eastern part of Lithuania, near the borders of Latvia and
Belarus.
Ignalina NPP belongs the category of "boiling water" channel-type reactors. The reactor cooling
water, as it passes through the core, is subjected to boiling and is partially evaporated. The steamwater mixture then continues to the drum-separators, the elevation of which is greater than that of
the reactor. Here the water settles, while the steam proceeds to the turbines. The remaining steam
beyond the turbines is condensed in the condenser, and the condensate is returned via the deaerator
by the feedwater pumps to the water of the same drum-separators. The coolant is returned by main
circulation pumps to the core, where part of it is again converted to steam.
This fundamental heat cycle is identical to the Boiling Water Reactor (BWR) cycle widely used
throughout the world, and is similar to the thermal cycle of the power plant using the carbonhydrogen fuel. However, compared to BWRs used in Western power plants, INPP and other plants
with the RBMK-type reactors have a number of unique features.
In the Table below presents the most important plant parameters.
Coolant
Heat cycle configuration
Power, MW:
• Thermal (design)
water (steam-water mixture)
single circuit
4800
4
• Thermal (actual)
• Electrical (design)
• Electrical (actual)
Core dimensions, m:
• height
• diameter
Thickness of reactor's graphite reflector, m:
• end
• side
Lattice pitch, m
Number of channels:
• fuel
• control and protect system
• reflector-cooling
4200
1500
1300
7
12
0.5
0.88
0.25 x 0.25
Fuel
Initial fuel enrichment for 235U, %
Enrichment for 235U, % with 0.41% of erbium used since 1995
Fuel enrichment for 235U, % with 0.5% of erbium, used since 2001
Fuel enrichment for 235U, % with 0.6% of erbium, used since 2005
Nuclear fuel burn up, MWday/kg
Uranium-erbium fuel with 0.41% of erbium addition burn-up,
MWday/kg
Nuclear fuel with 0.5% of erbium addition burn up, MWday/kg
Nuclear fuel with 0.6% of erbium addition burn up, MWday/kg
Temperatures, oC:
• maximum temperature in centre of fuel pellet
• maximum graphite stack temperature
• maximum fuel channel temperature
• coolant temperature at fuel channel inlet
• coolant temperature at fuel channel outlet
• feedwater temperature
Excessive pressure, Mpa:
• steam pressure at separators
• pressure in MCP pressure header
Coolant flow rate through reactor at normal power, kg/s
Steam produced in reactor at normal power, kg/s
Void fraction at reactor outlet, %
Maximum fuel channel parameters:
• fuel channel power, kW
• coolant flow rate through fuel channel, kg/s
• void fraction at fuel channel outlet, %
Number of main circulation pumps
Capacity of main circulation pumps, kg/s
1661
235
156
uranium dioxide, uranium
dioxide with erbium oxide
2.0
2.4
2.6
2.8
22.5
25.2
25.2
27.0
2100
760
360
260...266
284
177...190
6.38...6.87
8.6 (8.54)
8700...10550
11111….13333 (at 4800
MW)
2361...2444
23...29
4250
8.7 (11,1)
36.1
8
1944...3056
INPP belongs to the RBMK-type of reactors designed and constructed by the former USSR's
Ministry of Nuclear Power Industry. The development of the INPP design was implemented by the
5
All-Union Research and Development Institute for Energy Technology (Russian abbreviation VNIPIET), St. Petersburg, Russia, which was the principal designer. Metal structures of the main
building were designed by the Main Design Office "Leningrad Steel Design" (Russian translation "Leningradstalkonstrukcya"), St. Petersburg, Russia. The turbine hall and the open switch-yard
were developed by the Kiev branch of the Atomic Energy Design Institute (Russian abbreviation "Atomenergoproekt"), Kiev, Ukraine. It had been proposed, that INPP would be the pilot nuclear
power plant with the RBMK-1500 type reactors. The scientific supervisor of the RBMK-1500
project was the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute (often referred to as the Russian Research
Centre "Kurchatov Institute"), Moscow, Russia. The principal designer of the nuclear steam supply
system was the Research and Development Institute of Power Engineering (Russian abbreviation NIKIET), Moscow, Russia.
6.2. List of existing Nuclear Installations where significant corrective actions are
found necessary by assessment, as relevant, under Articles 10 through 19.
Similar to an item 6.1. No additional information is needed.
6.3. Overview of safety assessments performed for INPP and the major results of
those assessments for existing nuclear installations
In the previous report the main activities of State enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (below
refer to as INPP) in 2001-2004 for safety assessment and improvement were considered.
Safety requirements to nuclear facilities are continuously increasing. These requirements cover
reliability of all normal operation systems and safety systems, procedures and instructions of all
levels, administrative management of the plant, personnel qualification improvement, emergency
planning. Quality Assurance shall make integral part of any safety related activity. Given these
requirements the safety improvement activities are always in progress at INPP.
INPP activity for safety improvement is based upon priorities to meet the modern requirements of
national and international safety standards, upon results of the analysis, carried out in SAR-1, SAR2 and RSR scope, also it includes additional calculations, implementation of VATESI guidelines,
modifications, which improve the system reliability, thus providing the INPP safety. Managerially
this activity has been already and is fulfilled within the framework of Safety Improvement Program
SIP-1 (1993-1996), SIP-2 (1997-2005) and SIP-3 (2005 – till the Present time).
In 2004 INPP Unit 1 Safety Analysis Report (SAR-1) was upgraded. SAR-1 was upgraded on the
basis of available information received in result of completed modifications, analyses and updates
of INPP safety management system carried out during the period from 1996 to the beginning of
2004.
The operating license was renewed in July 2004 without restriction of its validity period.
According to the National Energy Strategy of Lithuanian Republic adopted in 1999, it was
scheduled to finally shut down INPP Unit 1 till 2005. According to the Law on Ignalina NPP Unit 1
decommissioning (2 May 2000, No. VIII-1661) Lithuania shall shutdown Unit 1 of Ignalina NPP by
2005 taking into account thee long-term support from the European Union, G7 countries, other
countries and international support. According to the Decree of the Government of the LR No. 1491
dated 2004-11-25, INPP Unit 1 was shut down on 31 December 2004. In December 2006 INPP
6
Unit 1 received the status of finally shutdown unit. Also, in December 2006 conditions of the
license were revised.
On 02 February 2005 the Government of the Republic of Lithuania approved INPP
Decommissioning Programme.
Technical aspects of INPP Unit 1 decommissioning are settled within the frames of INPP Unit 1
Decommissioning Fund and other individual technical projects executed under the
Decommissioning Program for Unit 1 of State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant.
One of the primary documents to obtain the license is the Safety Analysis Report for Unit 2 – SAR2.
SAR-2 was performed for Unit 2 as per Unit condition at the end of 2000 (in particular, the
following was taken into account: implementation of DAZ, additional reactor scram systems in the
event of low flow rate in one of the GDH, low reactivity margin, depressurization rate dP/dt in the
drum separators, new algorithm for ECCS, etc). Final SAR-2 meeting the comments of RSR experts
was submitted to VATESI in May 2004.
Safety analysis was purposed to define the actual status of Unit 2 safety taking into account all
implemented modifications and results of the previous analysis, identification of possible deviations
from the current regulation requirements and justification of adequacy and efficiency of undertaken
compensating measures.
SAR-2 was performed in format developed during SAR-1 project implementation, this format
meets VATESI requirements set forth for the safety analysis reports submitted for licensing
purposes. Scope of safety issues covered by the report is demonstrated via application of systematic
safety analysis techniques, such as deterministic, probabilistic, defence in-depth protection method
and other world practice techniques.
Accident analysis covers emergency situations in case of design initiating events. Initiating events
are grouped in compliance with the requirements of USA Nuclear Energy Committee Regulatory
Guide 1.70 and IAEA recommendations "Accident Analysis of RBMK Nuclear Power Plants"
RBMK-SC-52 with respect to potential effect on the main safety functions or parameters. Within
the scope of accident analysis the initiating events are considered for complete reactor power range,
including reactor start-up (entering to MCL or at MCL). Accidents during shutdown and on
shutdown reactor are reviewed as a separate part. Transients without ATWS are classified
separately. It includes a number of initiating failures accompanied with complete loss of functions
of emergency shutdown system AZRT. Within the frames of thermo-hydraulic analysis of
postulated accidents the transients were defined which may impact the integrity of the primary
circuit. Analysis of radiological consequences and irradiation dose rates are provided for such
accidents.
On the basis of SAR-2 recommendations a list of 126 safety improvement activities for INPP Uni2,
which have been included into INPP Safety Improvement Program (SIP-3), was prepared.
Results and conclusions of the Safety Analysis Report have provided the basis for decision-making
by VATESI on issuance of Operation License for INPP Unit 2 and for decision-making with respect
to investment priority for equipment upgrades, safety improvement and implementation of current
national and international regulations.
7
At present, the Safety Analysis Report for INPP Unit 2 (SAR-2) is being supplemented. This is
done on the basis of the available data, which has been gained as a result of a number of activities
that have been implemented during the period of 2001 – beginning of 2007. These activities
include: accomplished modifications, implemented analytical works and changes in the INPP safety
management system.
In September 2004, Ignalina NPP received a license for Unit 2 operation. The term of the license
validity is unrestricted.
According to VATESI requirements, in order to continue Unit 2 operation after the final shutdown
of Unit 1, INPP has prepared a Safety Justification for the only operating Unit 2.
The Safety Justification for the only operating Unit 2 was developed on the basis of Unit 2
condition at the end of December 2004, i.e. when the Unit 1 final shutdown was scheduled.
The Safety Justification is based on SAR-2 and RSR-2, it covers the safety issues related to changes
of operation conditions for Unit 2 process systems and common plant process systems and changes
of administrative structure of INPP following the Unit 1 final shutdown.
The Safety Justification also considers planned modifications of Unit 2 systems, which are affected
by the Unit 1 final shutdown, configurations of Unit 1 process systems during the decommissioning
of Unit 1.
The Safety Justification for the only operating Ignalina NPP Unit 2 has determined the high level of
INPP safety and demonstrated that Unit 2 will be safe enough after the decommissioning of Unit 1.
The following safety related recommendation of the Safety Justification for the only operating INPP
Unit 2 have been implemented:
• New powerful and secure Heat Only Boiler Station has been constructed and put into
operation.
• New powerful and secure Steam Power Plant has been constructed and put into operation.
• 10 regulating valves set in the Heat-supply Header have been replaced for the new ones;
also Pressure Drop regulator has been installed.
• The section of the pipeline, which is used to return Conditionally Clean Steam (CCS)
Condensate to the Condensate Drainage Tank (CDT) of the Turbo-installation - 2, has been
dismantled and the regulating valve has been installed in order to eliminate the possibility of
wrong CCS Condensate supply to the CDT of the Turbo-installation - 2. Also in order to
eliminate the possibility of wrong ICC Steam-generator drain supply to the CDT of the
Turbo-installation – 2, the section of the drain header has been dismantled from the ICC and
the regulating valve has been installed.
• Service Water supply to the Cooler of Steam Generator ICC water blow-down has been
assured in view of the decommissioning of Unit 1 Circulation Pumps.
• Drain discharge from Unit 1 CCS Header has been directed to the CDT of the Turboinstallation - 1 after the Drainage Expansion of the Turbo-installation – 2 was removed from
operation.
• The algorithm of the Unit 1 service water pump, which is set at automatic start up and
standby mode, activation has been changed. Reliable power supply of Unit 1 Service Water
Pumps, which are kept in stand-by mode, by means of Unit 1 Diesel Generators has been
preserved.
• Modifications of INPP Emergency Warning System have been implemented. The possibility
to control the Emergency Warning System from the Main Control Room – 2 has been
created.
8
•
•
•
•
•
The requirements (i.e. those that are established in the Safety Justification of the only INPP
operating Unit 2) for the operation of Unit 1 systems and equipment that had been left in
operation for Unit 2 safety assurance have been considered in the Unit 1 Decommissioning
Project.
The requirements (i.e. those that are established in the Safety Justification of the only INPP
operating Unit 2) for ensuring of the operating conditions of the Unit 1 premises that had
been left in operation for Unit 2 safety assurance have been considered in the Unit 1
Decommissioning Project.
New Technical Specification on INPP Unit 1 operation at the stage of fuel unloading from
the reactor has been developed.
New Technical Specification on operation of INPP Unit 2 with RBMK – 1500 reactor has
been developed.
The required changes have been made to Unit 2 operational documentation.
In 2004 October the Diverse Shutdown System (DSS) has been put into trial-industrial operation.
The requirement of the Regulations on the availability of two independent Shutdown Systems has
been implemented. Each system is aimed at ensuring the transfer of the reactor core into sub-critical
condition as well as maintaining the reactor core in sub-critical condition taking into account the
principle of single failure or the failure caused by personnel actions. Within the frames of the DSS
Project the safety justification of the DSS has been implemented with the usage of full-scope model
of the Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA). The model of Unit 2 PSA has been adjusted taking
into account the PSA full-scope model of the Diverse Shutdown System.
In order to prevent the evolution of the design accidents into the beyond design accidents and to
mitigate the consequences of the beyond design accidents the following Guidelines on the
management of the beyond design accidents (RUZA) have been developed at INPP:
• “RUZA -Р1. Assurance of the heat removal from the reactor. Power Unit 2.”
• “RUZA -Р2. Pressure reduction in the reactor space. Power Unit 2.”
• “RUZA -Р3. The ALS condition management. Power Unit 2.”
• “RUZA -РБ. Reduction of the Fission Products’ release. Power Unit 2.”
• “RUZA -Р. The Storage Pools’ condition management. Power Unit 2.”
For all above-mentioned Guidelines the appropriate Justifications, which have been developed by
the Lithuanian Energy Institute, are available. In 2007 it is planned to complete the implementation
of modifications related to the realization of RUZA strategies, also it is planned to coordinate
RUZA.
In 2007 the LBB concept has been introduced at INPP. This has assured the implementation of the
requirement set out by the appropriate Regulations.
The following Coolant Leakage Detection Systems have been introduced at INPP:
• Leakage detection in the premises of the lower water communication lines.
• Leakage detection in the premises of the ALS leek-tight confinements.
• Coolant leakage detection in the steam pipelines of the TG-3 and TG-4 vaults.
The introduction of the above-mentioned systems helps to improve the safety of the Unit since it
allows detecting small coolant leakages at the early stage of the equipment leak-tightness loss.
The Safety Justification for the only operating Unit 2 has demonstrated possibilities for Unit 2
operation continuation after the shutdown of Unit 1.
9
Thus, conditions of the license for operation of Unit 1 and 2 define the amount as well as the
implementation time of all activities necessary to assure INPP safety as based on the results of
Safety Analysis Reports.
From the organizational point of view, activities for INPP safety assurance are implemented within
the framework of Safety Improvement Program SIP-3.
6.4. Overview of INPP safety improvements programs
INPP activity for safety improvement is based upon priorities to meet the modern requirements of
national and international safety standards, upon results of the analysis, carried out in SAR-1, SAR2 and RSR scope, also it includes additional calculations, implementation of VATESI guidelines,
modifications, which improve the system reliability, thus providing the INPP safety. Managerially
this activity is fulfilled within the framework of Safety Improvement Program SIP-1 (1993-1996),
SIP-2 (1997-2004) and SIP-3 (2005 – 2009).
SAR-2, RSR-2 and Unit 2 safety justification report recommendations became the basis for the new
Safety Improvement Program (SIP-3) for the period of 2005-2009.
6.4.1. INPP Safety Improvement in 2004 (SIP-2/2004)
Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No.2 (SIP-2/2004) comprised 81 activities to be
implemented during the period from 2004 to 2009.
In 2004, 26 activities of Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No.2 (SIP-2/2004) were
implemented:
• Safety Analysis Report for Unit 2 (SAR-2).
• Replacement of 6kV switches at Unit 2.
• Additional PC safety case on assessment of loads on components of GDH and/or pipeline of
water supply from ECCS to GDH when cold water is supplied to GDH.
• Assessment of feeding pipeline vibration with determination of defect fatigue growth.
• Modernization of the full-scope MCR simulator.
• Implementation of the project on video camera installation to inspect condition of group 3
wastes in building 157 compartments.
• Updating of SAR for constructions 155, 157, 158 according to comments of IAEA experts.
• Application of the flame-retardant coating on the load-carrying metal structures.
• Repair of drainage system in cable compartments of building 101/1, block. D1.2
compartments 04, 05, 09, 010.
• Development of US-inspection technique for the branch pipes of discharge and pressure
headers of PC.
• Replacement of metal gates with a new design gates at buildings 101, blocks A-1,2, B-1,2,
V-1,2, G-1,2; D-0,1,2, bldg. 119.
• Arrangement of a protective covering for the slopes of process water discharge channel and
repair of the slopes’ covering and of the invert of process water discharge channel of the end
structure with the help of INKOMAT materials.
• Modernization of CH-2 cranes Q=50/12.5 t.
• Implementation of the alarm and video surveillance system in very significant and
significant compartments of INPP inner zone.
• Repair of external wall joints of buildings 157.
• Repair of the asphalt covering on SRW reloading area.
10
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Equipment of a temporary storing place of contaminated oil and rags.
Building 157 roof repair.
Installation of automatic fire alarm in compartments, indicated in FHA 1,2.
Reinforcement of hipped roof’s metal structures in Central Hall and Fuel Storage Pools Hall
of r Unit 2 in order to provide required seismic stability.
Applying of protective layer to condenser pipes of Unit 2 turbines.
Installation of fire retarding valves in rooms 330,336 block D-2 bldg.101/2.
Equipment of INPP waste registration and documentation system with additional functions.
Replacement of cable lines of power supply of electric motors 2YD22D01, OUJ21D01,
2UJ90D04.
Development of a procedure on preparation, safety review and modification of the
Operational Regulations.
Development of procedures and performance of an independent safety review of operating
procedures and their modifications.
Funding of SIP-2/2004
Safety Improvement Program is funded by different sources (see TABLE 2).
TABLE 2
Total
expenditures
(MLt)
2004
129.493
Own sources
26.397
Including:
National budget/
Loan
privatizations fund/
public concerns
49.157
15.349
EBRD/
PHARE
36.98
Foreign
assistance
1.592
6.4.2. General Overview of INPP Safety Improvement Program during the Period of 2005-2007
(SIP-3)
6.4.2.1. INPP Safety Improvement in 2005 (SIP-3/2005)
Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No.3 (SIP-3/2005) comprised 115 activities to be
implemented during the period from 2005 to 2009.
In 2005, 43 activities of Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No.3 (SIP-3/2005) were
implemented. The most significant activities are the following:
• Commissioning of the Safety Parameter Display System at Unit 2.
• Replacement of doors in the rooms containing the components of safety-related systems
with more than 1-hour fire resistant doors.
• Purchase of a new hauling unit for transportation of radioactive waste.
• Improvement of physical protection system of INPP perimeter.
• Implementation at Information computing System (ICS) of a program for diagnostics of
emergency protection ORM system.
• Implementation of control means of cars’ concealed cavities and difficult of access places at
the checkpoints.
• Re-equipping of checkpoint for oversized motor transport.
• Implementation of stationary means for explosives and drugs detection.
• Procurement of a new set of automatic equipment for welding under welding flux of
CONSTOR casks lids, containing spent fuel.
• Safety analysis of compacting device (bldg. 150 room 162).
11
•
•
•
Performance of analysis of 1346.00.00.000 container drop to the lid of the transfer canyon in
Reactor Hall.
Performance of additional analysis of computer codes of ALS thermal-hydraulic behaviour
during accident.
Additional analysis of calculation codes on the basis of calculation of heat conductivity of
ALS building units.
Total expenditures under SIP-3/2005 program amounted to 82 352 000 LT (or about 23.87 M€).
6.4.2.2. INPP Safety Improvement in 2006 (SIP-3/2006)
Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No.3 (SIP-3/2006) comprised 86 activities to be
implemented during the period from 2006 to 2009.
In 2006, 28 activities of Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No. 3 (SIP-3/2006) were
implemented. The most significant activities are the following:
• Implementation of facility of Unit 1 fuel afterburning in the reactor of Unit 2.
• Implementation of Leak before break (LBB) concept at INPP. Additional installation of
small leak detection systems in rooms where PC, feed water and direct steam lines are
located.
• Design, equipment purchase and installation of Cementation Facility for ion exchange resins
and slurry.
• Upgrading of Unit 2 radiation safety automatic control system.
• Implementation of the Second Diverse Shutdown System at Unit 2.
• Upgrading of factory waste segregation and measurement system for separation of
radioactive wastes.
• Implementation of protection signal on decreasing of flow rate in GDH in AZ-1.
• Development of the Program and Safety Justification of INPP Unit 1 reactor during SFA
unloading after the reactor decommissioning.
• Development and implementation of a new Technical Specification on Unit 1 operation.
• Development of Guidance on the management of beyond design accidents.
• Performances of calculations of ALS condense capacity during design basis accidents when
modelling ALT scheme with more than one condensation pool.
• Development, delivery and mounting of the SFA fuel element cladding integrity system at
Unit 1 and 2.
• Modernization of the compartment Nr. 8 in SRWS (build. 157/1) for its usage for interim
storage of SRW.
Total expenditures under SIP-3/2006 program amounted to 60 893 000 LT (or about 17.65 M€).
6.4.2.3. INPP Safety Improvement in 2007 (SIP-3/2007)
Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No. 3 (SIP-3/2007) comprised 90 activities to be
implemented during the period from 2007 to 2009.
Total expenditures under SIP-3/2007 program is planned to amount to 33 929 000 LT (or about
9.83 MEURO).
Funding of SIP-3
Safety Improvement Program is funded by different sources (see TABLE 3).
12
TABLE 3
Total
expenditures
(MLt)
2005
82.352
2006
60.893
2007
33.929
(planned)
Including:
Own sources
Public Interests
Loan
Unit 1
Decommissioning
Fund
32.592
42.597
7.163
31.056
29.419
0
0.418
21.091
(planned)
12.28 (planned)
0
0.558 (planned)
6.5. Decommissioning of INPP
6.5.1. The key events related to the decommissioning of the INPP
On 5 October 1999 the Seimas approved the National Energy Strategy in accordance with which
Unit 1 at INPP is to be shut down by 2005, given the long-term substantial financial support
conditions of the European Union, G-7 and other countries and international financial institutions.
On 31 December 2004 Unit 1 was shut down and Unit 2 is to be operated until the end of 2009.
On 19 February 2001 the Government of the Republic of Lithuania approved the Decommissioning
Program of INPP Unit 1 envisaging the measures for 2001-2004. On 2 February 2005 the
Government of the Republic of Lithuania approved the new Decommissioning Programme for both
Units of INPP. The main objectives of the Programme are:
• to ensure safe operation of Ignalina NPP during preparatory decommissioning phase and
during actual decommissioning activities;
• develop, modify and add to the legal acts related to Ignalina NPP decommissioning;
• ensure the work of Ignalina NPP Decommissioning Service and Unit 1 Surveillance
Service;
• in the order defined by the legal acts, evaluate both the preparatory decommissioning
projects and the decommissioning projects in respect to nuclear and radiation safety as well
as license them;
• to mitigate negative social and economic effects.
It also specifies necessary organizational, technical, economical and social measures to achieve the
above mentioned objectives.
Furthermore, on 25 February 2005 the plan was approved by the order of the Minister of Economy
on implementation of measures of the decommissioning program of INPP Units 1 and 2 envisaging
the measures for addressing environmental, social and economic problems, as well as the
consequences of premature decommissioning. The document is reissued once a year.
6.5.2. Documents and projects of the INPP Decommissioning
13
The Final Decommissioning Plan
Preparing for decommissioning and implementing the General requirements for decommissioning
the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, approved by the Head of VATESI in 1999 and supplemented in
2003, Ignalina NPP prepared the Final Decommissioning Plan (FDP). In 2005 this plan was
approved by the Ministry of Economy.
The plan includes the whole period of INPP decommissioning (both Units, auxiliary equipment and
interim storage facilities for spent fuel and waste). On basis of proposed strategy decommissioning
activities and projects are being planned. FDP describes principles, methods and technologies, as
well as general schedule, which will be necessary for ensuring safe, in respect to radiation,
ecological and efficient decommissioning process. The following information is presented in INPP
FDP:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Applied base of normative documents;
Accepted dismantling strategy;
Decommissioning plan and schedule;
Description of radioactive and hazardous materials;
Decommissioning activities;
Decontamination activities;
Dismantling methods and technologies;
INPP waste management strategy;
Safety and environmental impact evaluation;
Radiation safety program;
Organizational chart of INPP decommissioning;
Decommissioning expenses and financing;
Quality assurance;
Final radiological exploration and territory recultivation.
In respect to nuclear safety the activities connected with possible risk will be carried out for the first
ten years after final shutdown of the reactors (spent fuel treatment, decontamination, modification
and isolation of systems). The works will be prepared and performed by INPP qualified staff.
FDP describes the volumes of waste which are not finally treated and which shall be taken into
account while decommissioning preparation and realization. In order to summarize it can be
affirmed that as a result of INPP operation and decommissioning about 5900 m3 of spent resins,
perlite and sediments, as well as 130000 m3 of solid radioactive waste will be generated. This waste
shall be treated in the new cementation facility and in the future Solid Waste Management and
Storage Facility. After that waste, depending on the category, can be sent for free release (if
contamination levels are less than controlled), disposed in the near surface repository for very low
active short-lived waste or temporarily stored on the power plant site until the appropriate
repositories will be constructed (near surface or deep geological). Taking into account the envisaged
volumes of waste it is recommended to construct near surface repository for very low active shortlived waste with capacity 60000 m3 and near surface repository with capacity 100000 m3. The
volume of bituminized waste will be more than 24000 m3. After INPP empty buildings dismantling
and disassembling of their constructions 965000 m3 of concrete and 190000 tons of steel will be
generated additionally, and their level of contamination by radionuclides will be less than
controlled.
As the salary size will impact on the general decommissioning expenses, FDP considers two
scenarios of salary evolution. The first scenario is substantiated by evolution of the payment used
for modelling of pensions of the Ministry of social maintenance and labour: factual rate of growth
(i.e., excluding inflation) changes from 1,8 to 2,6 % taking into account the reviewed year. In this
case decommissioning expenses are 1337 M€. The second scenario envisages that after joining EU
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labour force expenses in Lithuania for enduring period shall reach the European level, i.e.,
progressively rise from today’s average value 6 €/hour at INPP to the average value 40 €/hour in
2026. According to this scenario estimated expenses are 2019 M€. Expenses estimated in FDP do
not cover the storage of the future possible waste (spent fuel, graphite, other radioactive waste not
applicable for near surface disposal) on INPP site after expenses of 2029, as well as expenses
related to disposal of this waste. It should be added that expenses related to maintenance and control
of repositories, which will remain on the INPP site after decommissioning, were also not taken into
account, however expenses on construction of repositories have been estimated. All these
decommissioning expenses will be allocated in time, beginning with 2003 and finishing with 2029,
when the power plant will be finally decommissioned.
Since INPP decommissioning is such economical activity for which the process of Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) is obligatory, in parallel with FDP the Program of Assessment of the
Planned Economical Activity Impact on the Environment was developed and approved. It is
specified in EIA programme what issues will be reviewed in EIA reports, as well as INPP
environment is described, since according to it the impact of decommissioning on the environment
will be evaluated later.
Decommissioning Project for INPP Unit 1 Final Shutdown and Defuelling Phase
Decommissioning Project for INPP Unit 1 Final Shutdown and Defuelling Phase including Safety
Justification (SAR) and Report on Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) was prepared in August
2004. Project and its SAR and EIA were accepted by State competent authorities.
In June 2006 VATESI approved the Decommissioning Project for INPP Unit 1 Final Shutdown and
Defuelling Phase and its safety analysis report. VATESI also arranged nuclear safety review of the
project and review’s conclusion submitted to the Ministry of Environment that arranged the State
Complex Expertise of the project. The conclusions of State Complex Expertise were issued in
October 2006.
Decommissioning Project covers works which will be performed within the frames of prolonged
operational license for INPP Unit 1. It is one of the documents substantiating the permission for
reactor final shutdown. The project has double purpose:
A) Process regulations, in which:
•
•
The systems (their parts) which are not needed any more are indicated, their further
isolation/modification is described, that allow reducing costs for the shutdown Unit
maintenance;
In-line decontamination of MCC and refuelling machine is described (with the aim to
reduce personnel irradiation during further dismantling works performance).
B) Guide on planning in which all expenses of the described period are estimated (related not
only to process activities, but to operation of remained systems, treatment of fuel and
radioactive waste, as well as other preparatory works), need in man power, personnel
irradiation, discharges into environment and radiation impact on the population.
The Project does not cover dismantling works, since they will be performed within the frames of
other dismantling and decontamination projects.
In 2004 VATESI and the INPP agreed as to what documents would have to be analyzed in order to
grant Unit 1 the status of a finally shutdown facility. In late 2006 having analyzed the last of the
submitted documents, VATESI granted this status to the INPP unit 1 and gave permission to carry
out operations envisaged in Decommissioning Project for INPP Unit 1 Final Shutdown and
Defuelling Phase.
15
In June 2007 VATESI and the INPP agreed as to what documents would have to be analyzed in
order to grant Unit 2 the status of a finally shutdown facility.
Environmental impact is analyzed in EIA report, on basis of which Ministry of Environment has
accepted affirmative solution regarding final shutdown of Ignalina NPP and possibilities of nuclear
defuelling in respect to environmental impact. In accordance with Espoo Convention EIA report is a
subject of consultations (see 17.1.3).
Project В1 “Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility for INPP ”
The project envisages construction and delivery of equipment for management of fuel assemblies
whose integrity has been damaged, removal of spent nuclear fuel (about 18000 fuel assemblies)
from INPP power Units 1 and 2, its transportation to a new storage facility and its temporary
storage for the period not less than 50 years.
On 12 January 2005 the Contract on the Project realization was signed. At present design
documentation is being developed and approved. The commissioning of the first line of storage
facility is planned by the end of 2008
.
The Project, its SAR and EIA should be accepted by State Competent Authorities. Appropriate
activities should bee licensed by VATESI. On April 2007 the licence for constructing the INPP
Interim Spent Fuel Storage Facility was issued by VATESI.
Project B2, 3, 4 “Solid Waste Management and Storage Facility”
Solid Waste Management and Storage Facility is a modern system of operational waste and
decommissioning waste management.
The Facility is intended for extraction, transport, preliminary classification, classification, treatment
(correspondingly), characterization and storage of:
• Long-lived and short-lived solid radioactive waste which are stored at present on INPP
site;
• Operational solid and combustible liquid radioactive waste which will be generated prior to
Unit 2 operation completion;
• Solid radioactive waste which will be generated during INPP decommissioning.
The Contract on Project В2,3,4 realization was signed on 30 November 2005. At present design
documentation is being developed. The planned completion of Contract works is November 2009.
The Project, its SAR and EIA should be accepted by State competent authorities. Licences for
appropriate activities should bee granted by VATESI.
Project B5 “Reliable Heat and Steam Source for INPP and Visaginas”
Contracts for construction of Steam Boiler Station and Heat Only Boiler Station were signed on 2
July 2003.
Steam Boiler Station was put in commission on 9 September 2005, Heat Only Boiler Station was
put in commission on 10 May 2006. At present Boiler Stations operate according to the projects.
On 27 October 2003 the contract for rehabilitation of supply pipeline from Heat Only Boiler Station
to INPP (about 7000 m) and for industrial pipeline and internal installations inside INPP was signed
within the frames of the same B5 project. The works related to rehabilitation of pipeline from Heat
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Only Boiler Station to INPP were completed in July 2005. Works related to rehabilitation of
industrial pipelines inside INPP were completed in October 2005.
The works on rehabilitation of INPP buildings heat substations were singled out into a separate
Project В5-5. Signing of Project В5-5 Contract is planned for 30 June 2007. Completion of works is
planned for late December 2008. At present evaluation of Tender proposals is carried on.
Project В6 “Modernisation of the Technical Documentation Archive at Ignalina NPP”
Two Contracts were awarded within the frames of this project. The contract for design and
construction of archive building was signed on 29 August 2003. The construction was completed
and the archive building was put in commission on 25 August 2004. The contract for design and
installation of archive system was signed on 21 January 2004. Installation of the System was put in
commission on 7 September 2005.
At present the archive operates according to the project.
Project В16 “Controlled Shunt Reactor at INPP 330kV Switchyard”
After closure of INPP Unit 1 and when INPP Unit 2 will be in outage due to reactive power that is
being generated by the energy system, excess, voltage in INPP AtS-330 kV buses can increase to
366-370 kV. This will exceed the maximum allowed voltage of 362 kV and might cause INPP’s
330 kV equipment, as well as other adjacent energy system substation equipment failure. When
Unit 2 generators will be connected to the power grid, they will be used to compensate when
operating in the reactor power utilization mode. However this will increase wear out and reduce
their reliability. Therefore one compensating reactor AtS-330 kV at INPP of 180 MVar need to be
installed at INPP’s substation as a measure consequential to the closure of INPP.
On 19 October 2006 the Contract was concluded for design, construction, equipment delivery,
installation and fettling of shunt reactor at INPP 330 kV switchyard. Main activities on preparation
of construction site for works execution have been completed by now, the stage of designing is in
its completion phase, the orders for manufacturing of high-voltage equipment, metal constructions
and relay protection devices have been located, manufacture of the reactor and its control system
has been started. According to the contract the object shall be put in commission in January 2008.
Project B17 “Decommissioning Management System and Database”
The solution of such tasks as inventory of decommissioning objects, forming of projects scopes and
schedules, assessment and planning of expenditures, as well as multilevel planning of works, taking
into account efficiency and amount of resources, and evaluation of technical, time and commercial
risks is required for effective decommissioning processes management. Strict requirements to
effective realization within the frames of planned budgets and terms dictate the necessity of up-tothe-minute control automation technologies application.
INPP Decommissioning Management System (В17) shall connect all sides of decommissioning
management process, including waste management, human resources planning, projects
management, material expenditures planning, documentation and submit unified interface of INPP
decommissioning processes, dismantling, decontamination management.
On October 2006 the services Supplier was selected. Financial proposal of the winner has exceeded
planned budget of Project В17. Additional evaluation of project budget was performed, which
confirmed financial proposal of the Tender winner. The letter about additional financing of Project
B17 from the saved money of Ignalina Programme was sent to the LR Ministry of Economy and
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EU Committee. On May 2007 the Contract on Project realization to the winner of Tender was
awarded.
Project B19 “Landfill Facility for Short-Lived Very Low Level Waste”
Segregation and disposal of Short-Lived Very Low Level activity (group A) waste in the Landfill
will reduce the volume of the near surface repository, and hence, the overall waste disposal costs.
Landfill availability will enable to dedicate the near-surface repository only for the disposal of Low
and Intermediate Level Waste (group B and C waste).
The availability of a Landfill disposal is a key pre-requisite to start the dismantling of the low
contaminated system. Timely availability of the Landfill facility is also an important interface for
cost-effective implementation of the solid waste management and storage facility.
On 13 December 2006 the Government of the Republic of Lithuania approved the Order On the
Designing of the INPP Buffer Storage and Disposal Facilities for Short-Lived Very Low Level
Waste.
At present the documents have been prepared (Procurement documents and Technical
Specification) and the Tender has been announced for design of the whole Landfill complex and
construction of the buffer storage. Conclusion of contract is expected in September 2007.
Buffer storage commissioning is planned for September 2009. As long as buffer storage shall
ensure waste accumulation for loading campaign realization during 2 years, construction of disposal
module (modules) is planned for the period 2009 – 2010. The facilities could be commissioned after
its safeties have been assessed and VATESI licenses have been granted.
Project В25 “Near Surface Repository (NSR)”
The Facility provides final disposal of conditioned Short Lived Low and Intermediate Level
radioactive waste (RAW). A 100000 m³ storage capacity is needed for the disposal of both the
operational and decommissioning waste.
In 2002-2004 RATA worked out the concept of radioactive waste disposal in a near surface
repository, and conducted a study on selection of sites suitable for a near surface repository.
Lithuanian scientists studied the geological structure of the proposed Galilauke and Apvardai sites
and assessed the environmental impacts of the repository. The sites are in the vicinity of the
Ignalina NPP, a short distance away from Lithuania’s border with Belarus and Latvia. Therefore the
issue gained considerable attention from the public of Lithuania and the two neighbouring
countries. In 2005, the decision was taken to study Stabatiške site, too. In 2006 the competent
authorities reviewed and assessed the environmental impact assessment study. On June 2007 the
Ministry of Environment took the decision regarding the sites on that the repository is to be
constructed.
At present Technical Specification and Tender documents are being developed. Conclusion of
contract is planned for 2009.
The facility could be commissioned around 2012, after its safety has been assessed and VATESI
license has been granted.
Project В20 “Upgrade of Bituminised Waste Vaults”
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The objective of the project is safe and reliable storage of bitumen compound (resulting from
treatment of liquid radioactive waste).
With this aim the development of feasibility study of the possibility of existing storage utilization as
a long-term one has been started.
Project В21 “Modernization of Training Centre for Personnel Training on Performance of
INPP Decommissioning Activities”
Decommissioning activities require new skills of the current operating INPP personnel.
Consequently retraining is needed. Also ensuring of high safety awareness and efficiency of plant
personnel utilization during decommissioning is mandatory.
At present project fiche has been prepared for financing of preparatory works on creation of
Training Centre at INPP for training of personnel on decommissioning issues. These works include
preparation of training programmes and materials, training of instructors, creation of projects for
existing Training Centre training infrastructure expansion. Preparatory stage includes the works that
will be carried out during the interval from 2007 to 2009.
В10 “Free Release Measurement Facility”
The decommissioning of nuclear power plants results in the production of great amount of materials
and equipment which contamination levels are below clearance levels. A significant part of these
materials and equipment could be reused, recycled or otherwise disposed without further regulatory
control. Final Decommissioning Plan of INPP gives quantity of such type waste as 17000 tons.
Huge quantity of building concrete debris to be produced during decommissioning should be also
noted.
Project B10 has been initiated for reduction of the amount of disposed waste as radioactive and
possibility of its further use at INPP.
In December 2006 the process of Tenderers proposals evaluation was completed. The Contract has
been awarded to the winner of Tender - Consortium of companies VF and ENVINET (Czech).
The planned date of facility commissioning is spring 2008.
В10-1 “Relocation of INPP Physical Protection Perimeter Section”
This project is necessary in order to include new objects into INPP controlled area such as Free
Release Measurement Facility and buffer storage facility, which are planned to be built for the
possibility of decommissioning process realization. According to this project it will be necessary to
change the existing Physical Protection Perimeter in the dismantled Unit 3 area. The project is being
financed from International Ignalina Decommissioning Support Fund. It is Tender period at present.
The completion of Project is planned in July 2008.
В11 “Supply and Installation of Tools and Equipment for Radiological Characterization of
INPP”
Equipment for radiological characterization of INPP is necessary for radiological characterization
of INPP equipment and getting necessary data about radionuclides content in the waste, which will
appear as a result of nuclear object decommissioning. These data are necessary for evaluation of the
19
future expenses and potential risk, connected with waste treatment, storage and especially disposal,
reduction of ionizing radiation impact on the personnel, as well as effective decommissioning
planning.
These tools and equipment also enable to pre-characterize the decommissioning waste (dismantled
components) at the place of the ware production, i.e. prior to its transportation to the conditioning
unit.
The Contract was awarded to the winner of Tender Company ENVINET (Czech) and was
completed in November 2006.
Equipment Dismantling & Decontamination Designs Development
After INPP Units 1 and 2 shutdown most of the systems and equipment of the shutdown power
units, which do not relate to the provision of fuel cooling, defuelling, transfer and safe storage at the
Units, can be dismantled. Only the systems having process connections with the systems, which
provide safe treatment of the fuel, remain in operation, as well as the systems providing normal
conditions of the systems remaining in operation and the building maintenance (systems of heating
and ventilation, lighting, fire-fighting, drainage system, etc.)
В9-0 “INPP Building 117/1 Equipment Decontamination and Dismantling Project
Development”
The objective of Project В9-0 is the development of engineering documentation (Basic Design and
Detailed Design) and licensing documentation that will allow INPP personnel dismantling of
Building 117/1 (ECCS) decommissioning equipment.
The Project Tender proposals were evaluated, and in August 2007 – the Contract awarded. The
execution of the dismantling and decontamination works is set for summer 2008.
В9-1 “INPP Unit 1 Turbine Hall Equipment Decontamination and Dismantling Project
Development”
The objective of Project В9-1 is the development of engineering documentation (Basic Design and
Detailed Design) and licensing documentation that will allow INPP personnel dismantling of INPP
Unit 1 Turbine hall decommissioning equipment.
Tender proposals evaluation and Project Contractor designation have been performed on September
2007. The planned date of Contract completion is the second half of 2009.
The objective of Projects В9-2,5,6,7,8 is the development of engineering documentation (Basic
Design and Detailed Design) and licensing documentation, that will allow INPP personnel
dismantling of INPP Units 1 and 2 decommissioning equipment.
At present PIS prepared on these projects are being reviewed in accordance with the comments
received from EBRD experts. The planned time for submission of these documents to EBRD for
approval is May 2007.
The package of these projects includes:
B9-2 “INPP Building V1 Equipment Dismantling & Decontamination Design Development”;
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B9-5 “INPP Boiler House Equipment Dismantling & Decontamination Design Development”;
B9-6 “INPP Building 117/2 Equipment Dismantling & Decontamination Design
Development”;
B9-7 “INPP Building G2 Equipment Dismantling & Decontamination Design Development”;
B9-8 “INPP Building V2 Equipment Dismantling & Decontamination Design Development”.
INPP Units 1 and 2 Reactors Dismantling & Decontamination Design Development.
After INPP Units 1 and 2 shutdown, Units 1 and 2 reactors cores defuelling and execution of PC inline decontamination Units 1 and 2 reactors become the candidates for dismantling. Dismantling of
reactors can be started only on condition that the equipment for radioactive waste treatment is
prepared and the license of appropriate state institutions is received. Taking into account that
dismantling of such type of the reactor has not been performed in the world, this project will start
with the study of reactor RBMK dismantling possibility – package of Projects В9-4.
B9-4/1 “INPP Units 1 and 2 Reactors Dismantling & Decontamination. Feasibility Study”
The objective of the project is the development of the possible reactor dismantling strategy,
development of waste, produced during reactor dismantling, management strategy, determination of
equipment for dismantling, preliminary evaluation of dismantling works cost. These data will be
initial ones for development of the Basic Design for reactor dismantling.
At present PIS prepared on this project is being reviewed in accordance with the comments received
from EBRD experts. The planned time for submission of this document to EBRD for approval is
May 2007.
Tools and Equipment for Dismantling & Decontamination of Systems/Equipment
Components
Tools and equipment for dismantling of systems/equipment components shall ensure safe
dismantling of this INPP equipment (turbines, steam generators, drum separators, etc.) and
preparation for the further treatment/storage.
Tools/equipment for decontamination of systems/equipment components shall ensure acceptable
level of contamination for further treatment and disposal, to reduce the impact on the personnel and
to assure that the release of radioactive contaminants to the environment will be maintained within
authorised limits during dismantling activities.
These projects will be initiated in the process of appropriate Projects В9-2,5,6,7,8, realization, in
which it will be specified what tools and equipment will be applied for dismantling in INPP Units 1
and 2 buildings.
The package of these projects includes:
B13 “Provision of Dismantling & Decontamination Tools for INPP Building 117/1”;
B14 “Provision of Dismantling Tools for INPP Building G1”;
B22 “Provision of Dismantling Tools for INPP Building V1”;
21
B29 “Provision of Dismantling & Decontamination Tools for INPP Buildings A1, B1, Boiler
House, 117/2, G2, V2”;
B30 “Tools for Project B9-4 (Unit 1 Reactor Decontamination and Dismantling)”;
B15 “Provision of Decontamination Tools for INPP Building G1”;
B23 “Provision of Decontamination Tools for INPP Building V1”;
B24 “Equipment and Consumables for In-line Decontamination at Unit 2”.
Presentation of the future equipment dismantling & decontamination projects package (PIS), as well
as decommissioning support projects, took place in February 2007 with participation of
international experts and EBRD representatives. It is planned that the solution apropos of the
submitted projects financing will be accepted during the next Assembly of Donors set for July 2007.
6.6. Safety measures following the shutdown of Unit 1
As long as nuclear fuel is still in the reactor or spent fuel storage pool (SFSP), Unit 1 is classified as
nuclear facility. All decommissioning activities during this stage shall be performed in accordance
with the design requirements, safe operation limits and conditions.
The safety case of Unit 1 decommissioning during the reactor and SFSP defuelling stages is
provided in ,,INPP Unit 1 Decommissioning Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) for Defuelling Stages
1 and 2“, which was developed by the Decommissioning Service and agreed with the Regulatory
Authority of the Republic of Lithuania in 2005. The 1st defuelling stage can be characterized as a
stage of fuel unloading from the reactor and the subsequent storage of spent fuel assemblies (SFA)
in SFSP or their transportation to Unit 2 for complete burn up. This stage started after the final
shutdown of Unit 1 (FRS) and covers all activities related to defuelling process until no fuel
elements are left in the reactor core. When this task is accomplished, some of the systems that were
necessary for the reactor defuelling, can be put out. The second stage – unloading of spent fuel
elements from SFSP - is performed after accomplishing of the 1st stage. The 2nd stage continues
until all fuel elements are transferred to the off-site interim storage facility and there is no fuel left
in Unit 1.
DSAR defined the safety systems and equipment that shall remain in operation during the Unit 1
decommissioning process.
,,Technological Regulation for Operation of INPP Unit 1 during the Reactor Defuelling Stage“ is
the main guiding document defining safe maintenance of Unit 1 and safe operation limits and
conditions. The Technological Regulation is developed for defuelling stage and is approved by
Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Lithuania. All procedures related to operation and
maintenance of systems and equipment of Unit 1 have been reviewed.
Safe maintenance of Unit 1 is financed from the Ignalina Program. Since 2005 January 1 Salaries
for main personnel involved in servising Unit 1 have been paid from the funds of European
Commission. Technical maintenance of Unit 1 is financed from the national fund.
22
New information
Section 6.3. Added information about recently performed safety assessments and implemented
safety measures.
Section 6.4. Included overview of INPP Safety Improvement Program during 2005-2007 (section
6.4.2).
Section 6.5. Presented recent information on INPP Unit 1 decommissioning issues.
Section 6.6. Added information about Safety measures following the shutdown INPP Unit 1.
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Article 7: LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to
govern the safety of nuclear installations.
2. The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:
i. the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations;
ii. a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the prohibition of the
operation of a nuclear installation without a license;
iii. a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to ascertain
compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of licenses;
iv. the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licenses, including
suspension, modification or revocation.
7.1. State Regulation of Nuclear Power utilization
Chart of interaction between regulatory bodies and operators as well as competence of national
authorities are presented in Annex to 7.1.
7.2. Summary of Laws, Regulations, Licensing System and the Inspection,
Assessment and Enforcement Process governing the safety of Nuclear
Installations
7.2.1. National legislative framework for nuclear safety regulations
Current legislation in nuclear field is based on the Law on Nuclear Energy from 1996. The Law
defines the principal objectives of state regulation of nuclear energy safety as well establishes basic
principles as following:
• the basic conditions and criteria for the safe use of nuclear energy including the possession,
transfer, handling, use, storage, transport of nuclear and radioactive materials and
radioactive wastes used in nuclear energy field, operation and decommissioning (including
its financing) of nuclear energy facilities, as well as export and import of nuclear materials
and equipment.
• the special conditions for the design and construction of nuclear facilities;
• basic requirements for the physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials;
• basic requirements for accounting and control of nuclear materials;
• basic requirements for the prevention of and response to nuclear and radiological accidents;
• the control and supervision the procedure of observance of these conditions and criteria;
• the base for sanctions for persons who violate the requirements for nuclear safety, radiation
protection, accounting and control of nuclear materials;
• the principles of liability for nuclear damage;
• legal basis for activities of legal entities and natural persons in the field of nuclear energy
• the specific features of labour relations in the sphere of nuclear energy;
• designates the competent authorities in the field of nuclear energy and outlines their
responsibilities.
24
More detailed conditions in the fields of radiation protection, of radioactive waste management and
of the NPP’s decommissioning are provided by specific laws on these issues, as following:
The Law on Radiation Protection establishes the legal basis for protection of people and the
environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. It also establishes a licensing system for
the use of radioactive materials and radiation-emitting devices, and prescribes general rules for their
use. The powers and responsibilities of the authorities are described in more detail in the Article 15.
Law on Radioactive Waste Management establishes the rights, duties and functions of the state
executive and supervisory authorities and of persons and legal entities involved in radioactive waste
management, including its export and transit. The Law is divided into ten chapters governing, inter
alia, licensing, responsibilities of waste generators, establishment of the Radioactive Waste
Management Agency and requirements concerning radioactive waste management facilities,
including their sitting, design, construction, commissioning, operation, decommissioning and
control after closure. The Law stipulates that the principal objective of the Radioactive Waste
Management Agency is to manage and dispose all radioactive waste transferred to it, assuring
nuclear and radiation protection and to act as the operator of storage facilities and repositories
assigned to it.
The Law on Environmental Protection in conjunction with the law on Environmental Impact
Assessment stipulates that installation of any nuclear facility must be accompanied by an
environmental impact assessment. The Law on Environmental Protection regulates all
environmental issues, whereas the Law on Nuclear Energy regulates only nuclear facilities safety
issues.
Law Regulating the Import, Export and Transport of Strategic Goods and Technology regulates the
import, export and transport of strategic goods and technologies that are considered as the activities
that could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thus ensuring the implementation of
international agreements that prohibit such proliferation. The Law establishes lists of goods subject
to control as well as lists of countries with which all import or export of goods subject to control is
prohibited. Licenses are necessary for all goods subject to control, and are issued by the Ministry of
Economy. The Ministries of the Environment, Defense, Finance and various other state entities
whose activities involve goods subject to control, must consult the Ministry of Economy on any
decisions concerning such goods.
The Law on the Nuclear Power Plant. The purpose and objective of this Law shall be to lay down
provisions and to create legal, financial and organizational preconditions for the implementation of
a new nuclear power plant project. A project implementing company shall be established, registered
and operated to implement this project. The project implementing company shall be responsible for
carrying out project implementation activities in compliance with the safety requirements imposed
on nuclear activities. Having fulfilled the requirements laid down in legal acts and having received
authorizations and licenses, the project implementing company shall become the operator of the
nuclear power plant
The Annex to 7.2 provides for laws, main regulations and international agreements aplicable in
nuclear energy sector. Other regulations in the respective fields are described in more detailed in
relevant articles.
Basic Licensing Conditions in Nuclear Energy of the Republic of Lithuania
The Republic of Lithuania Law on Nuclear Energy defines basic licensing conditions in nuclear
energy sector. Without a license issued in prescribed manner of the Government of the Republic of
Lithuania, it is prohibited:
25
1. to design, construct and reconstruct nuclear facilities, installations and equipment;
2. to operate nuclear facilities;
3. to store nuclear and radioactive materials and their waste;
4. to decommission a nuclear facility;
5. to dispose nuclear and radioactive materials and their waste;
6. to acquire, possess and transport nuclear materials;
7. to acquire, possess and transport radioactive materials;
8. to export, import and carry in transit in the territory of Lithuania nuclear, radioactive and
other materials used in the nuclear energy sector, nuclear equipment, and dual purpose
goods that may be used in nuclear technologies.
Licensing institutions:
• Licenses for the activities referred to in the item 1 of above paragraph are issued by
VATESI after co-ordination with the Ministry of the Environment, Radiation Protection
Centre and a local authority whose territory or its part is within the sanitary protection zone
of a nuclear facility.
• Licenses for the activities referred to in the items 2-5 of above paragraph are issued by
VATESI after co-ordination with the Ministry of the Environment and Radiation
Protection Centre. Licenses for the activities referred to in the item 6 of above paragraph
are issued by VATESI after co-ordination with Radiation Protection Center.
• Licenses for the activities referred to in the item 7 of above paragraph are issued by
Radiation Protection Centre after co-ordination with VATESI.
• Licenses for the activities referred to in the item 8 of above paragraph are issued by the
Ministry of Economy after co-ordination with VATESI and Radiation Protection Centre.
7.2.2. Developments of national legislative and regulatory framework (2005-2007)
National legislative framework in nuclear sector was amended mainly for the following:
• to take into account requirements from regulations of the European Union;
• to establish legal framework for construction of a new nuclear power plant in Lithuania;
• to improve framework for the decommissioning in order to facilitate the decommissioning
process.
Amongst several amendments that were performed in 2005-2007, some more significant peaces of
legislation could be mentioned as follows:
Safeguards application
The Trilateral Agreement on Safeguards Application between EU Member States which do not
possess nuclear weapons, Euratom and IAEA concluded pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty as well the Additional Protocol to the Agreement came into force in Lithuania in April 2007
by the Law on its ratification in the Parliament. The Law empowered VATESI to all the issues
related to this Agreement and the Protocol within the scope and responsibility of the State.
Radioactive waste management and radiation protection
Amendment to the law on Radioactive Waste Management was approved in 2005. The Law was
particularly amended in connection with the requirements of the Council Directive on the Control of
High Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (2003/122/Euratom) as well for extending the
competence of Radioactive Waste Management Agency in sitting of near surface repository of short
and intermediate radioactive waste.
26
As a consequence, the Government approved the Regulations on the Management of Illegal Sources
of Ionising Radiation and Objects Polluted with Radionuclide implementing the Directive (2005,
Nr. 36-1170).
The Regulations on Export, Import, Transit and Transportation within Lithuania of Radioactive
Material and Waste were developed to implement the EU legislation on the supervision and control
of shipments of radioactive waste (Council Directive on the supervision and control of shipments of
radioactive waste between Member States and into and out of the Community (92/3 Euratom),
Council Regulation on shipments of radioactive substances between Member States
(1493/93/Euratom) and Commission Decision establishing the standard documents for the
supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste referred to in Council Directive 92/3/
Euratom (93/552/Euratom)) and approved by the Minister of Health (26 Nov 2004, No V-834).
The Radiation Protection Centre is the main institution responsible for the implementation of the
Regulations.
Decommissioning and its financing issues
Main decommissioning trends for implementation of the decommissioning of the Ignalina NPP
were established by Decommissioning Programme for Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2
approved by the Government in 2005 (Government Resolution No117 of 2 February 2005). The
Programme was prepared to implement the provision contained in the Government Resolution No
573 on Approval of Directions of Addressing the Consequences of the Closure of Ignalina NPP
adopted on 8 May 2003 and the Law on Decommissioning of the First Unit 1 of Ignalina NPP. The
Programme is designed for the purpose of laying down measures for preparation for the dismantling
of the first unit and preparation for the decommissioning of the second unit, which are to be
implemented within four years (2005-2009). The implementation of the Programme is delegated to
the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy together with the Commission established under a
Resolution of the Government in 2000 for the purpose of coordinating the implementation of
Ignalina NPP-related provisions of the National Energy Strategy. The Ministry of Economy and the
aforesaid Commission coordinate the activities of institutions which take part in the Programme
implementation, assess the impact of the Programme implementation and duly inform the
Government on the progress of the Programme.
In accordance with the Treaty of Accession to EU, which establishes the Ignalina Programme as the
instrument for the EU financial assistance to INPP decommissioning activities, and following
procedures set up in relevant Commission decisions, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania
approved a Resolution on the Programme Administration in Lithuania (Government Resolution No
980 of 7 September 2005, as amended on 15 January 2007). Pursuant to this Resolution, the
Ministry of Economy was appointed the main institution responsible for the implementation of the
Ignalina Programme in Lithuania; the resolution establishes competences on this matter of the
Ministry of Finance and the Central Project Management Agency.
Developments regarding subordinate legislation are provided in relevant articles of the report.
International conventions
Lithuania joined the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism by
the law of its ratification (17 May 2007, Nr.X-1143). The State Security Department appointed the
responsible institution in Lithuania under article 7 of the Convention.
Governmental institutions of Lithuania approved the possibility to join the revised Convention on
Physical Protection. Draft documents for the ratification of the conventions are scheduled to be
adopted in 2007.
27
Continuity and development of safe nuclear power generation in nuclear power plants
One of the main working trends covering the developments of the nuclear energy sector in
Lithuania constitutes consideration of possibilities for construction of a new nuclear power plant.
To the main legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania, establishing the strategy of the development of
the nuclear energy in Lithuania and other documents relevant to the development of the nuclear
energy, the following documents could be attributed:
•
Resolution on the Republic of Lithuania on the Continuity of Nuclear Energy and
updating of the National Energy Strategy adopted by the Parliament on 29 September
2005
In the Resolution on the Continuity of Nuclear Energy and updating of the National Energy
Strategy, the Parliament stressed that recognizing the necessity of primary energy resources,
including nuclear energy, the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania will seek that Lithuania
would remain a nuclear power state and continue generating electricity in a nuclear power plant
which meets all modern requirements. In case of building a new reactor on the territory of the
Ignalina NPP, negative social and economic consequences of the final shut-down of the reactors
with regard to the development of the Ignalina NPP region and the competitiveness of Lithuanian
economy would be avoided.
•
Communiqué signed by the Prime Ministers of the Baltic States at their meeting in Trakai
on 27 of February 2006
The above-mentioned Communiqué raised the initiative for construction of a new power plant in
Lithuania and invited Baltic energy companies as the participating parties to invest in the
preparation and construction of the plant. On March 8, 2006, the chief executive officers of the
three national power utilities of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia signed a Memorandum of
Understanding on Preparation to Develop a New Nuclear Power Plant in Ignalina. As a first step
the preparation of a detailed and practical feasibility study was agreed upon. The said feasibility
study was finished in November 2006.
•
Revised National Energy Strategy adopted by the Parliament (18 January 2007, No. X1046).
Revised National Energy Strategy provides strategic development objectives in energy sector by
2025. Among the main objectives and state action trends, the Strategy contains the following:
without reducing attention focused on the other energy resources, on the basis of the existing
infrastructure, the strategy for the development of the Lithuanian power sector is based, inter alia,
on the continuity and development of the safe nuclear energy.
The Strategy highlights serious problems related to energy security, which would be difficult or
practically impossible to solve for Lithuania by itself – among them, the construction of a new
nuclear power plant. It is possible to solve the foregoing strategic task only in close cooperation
with the other states.
The Strategy raises the following issue – no later than in 2015 to start the operation of a new
nuclear power plant intended to satisfy the needs of the Baltic and other states.
•
Communiqué On Cooperation in the Energy Field signed by the Prime Minister of the
Republic of Lithuania and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland in Warsaw on 2
March in 2007
The Communiqué stresses, inter alia, that Lithuania and Poland, together with strategic partners Estonia and Latvia - would continue their constructive cooperation for the construction of a new
nuclear power plant in Lithuania. PSE SA as an energy company invited by the Government of
28
Poland would participate in the project along with incumbent energy companies of Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania on equal terms.
•
Law of the Republic of Lithuania on New Nuclear Plant adopted by the Parliament (28
June 2007 No X-1231)
The law enables to fulfil the following goals, which are necessary for construction of a new NPP:
¾ to establish a Project Implementing Company and the main requirements for participants in
the Project Implementing Company;
¾ to establish the main requirements for National Investor and the management of National
Investor;
¾ sitting of the new NPP;
¾ allotment of Land for the Construction of the New Nuclear Power Plant;
¾ provisions for decommissioning funding that shall be established by a separate law, and
other necessary provisions.
Expected changes in legislation
After enforcement of the Law on new NPP, some significant developments of the current
legislation will be required in Lithuania for a number of purposes. It is needed to authorise the
construction of the NPP at the relevant site, to clarify of the current regime for carrying out
environmental assessments, obtaining licences and revoking them, to establish the operation of the
decommissioning fund and the implementation of the decommissioning process, to establish a
specialist qualification programme, to provide for specific security measures in order to ensure that
national security interests are in place., and etc.
The new law allows the government to determine some of these more detailed matters and the
precise changes may not all be finalized at the same time.
International relations
Lithuania will seek understanding of the neighbouring countries regarding the decision to construct
a new nuclear power plant. According to the Governmental agreements with the said countries,
Lithuania has already been exchanging information in the field of nuclear energy with Poland and
Latvia for several years. In autumn 2006, the Governmental permanent working group for
cooperation and exchange of information with Byelorussia on nuclear energy issues was founded.
Lithuania has initiated the agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the
Government of the Republic of Belarus on early notification of nuclear accidents, exchange of
information and co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection. Draft agreement
was proposed to the Republic of Belarus.
New information
Section 7.2. Added information on Developments of national legislative and regulatory framework
(2005-2007)
National legislative framework in nuclear sector was amended mainly for the following:
• to take into account requirements from regulations of the European Union;
• to establish legal framework for construction of a new nuclear power plant in Lithuania;
• to improve framework for the decommissioning in order to facilitate the decommissioning
process.
29
Article 8: REGULATORY BODY
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with the
implementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 7, and provided
with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfil its assigned
responsibilities.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation
between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization concerned
with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.
8.1. Description of the mandate and duties of the Regulatory Body
In accordance with its national legislation, the Nuclear Safety Convention, other international
conventions and treaties the Republic of Lithuania undertakes appropriate measures to ensure the
safety of nuclear installations under its jurisdiction through the establishment of legal framework
and infrastructure necessary to maintain the effective nuclear safety regulatory system.
VATESI - State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate - was established by the Decree of Government
on 18 October 1991 to regulate and supervise the safety of nuclear power facilities within the
territory of Lithuania. On 21 October 1992, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania approved
the Statute of VATESI assigning its main duties, functions and rights. The Statute was amended in
1997 with provisions that established the Board of VATESI to advise the Government and the
Regulatory Body on matters related to the effective functioning of nuclear safety regulatory
infrastructure.
Since its establishment in 1991 VATESI has been acting as an independent governmental institution
subordinated directly to the Government. The Head of VATESI is appointed and dismissed by the
Prime Minister, he reports to the Office of Prime Minister on essential matters related to the
effective implementation of mission and mandate of VATESI. The new Head of VATESI was
appointed on 2 November 2006 succeeding the retired Head of VATESI.
According to its mission VATESI regulates and controls the nuclear safety and radiation protection
in nuclear facilities with the main objective to prevent incidents or accidents in nuclear facilities and
protect the population and environment from possible harmful effects in case of nuclear or
radioactive incident or accident. The mandate of VATESI stipulates following activities:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Development of national legislation in nuclear safety;
Licensing of nuclear installations, granting of necessary authorizations and applying of
enforcement measures to ensure compliance with regulations and licensing conditions;
Analysis and assessment of nuclear safety in nuclear facilities;
Regulatory control of nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste
management in nuclear facilities;
State control of safeguards implementation;
Regulatory control of physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials as
well as of radioactive materials located in nuclear facilities;
Operating of VATESI Emergency Preparedness Centre with 24-Hour on duty officer;
International cooperation on nuclear safety, radiation protection and radioactive waste
management within the competence of VATESI.
30
In performing its functions VATESI acts independently in accordance with the national legislation,
international conventions and treaties that are in force in Lithuania. According to its mandate
VATESI issues regulations and other legal acts, undertakes necessary enforcement measures to
avoid possible deterioration of safety at nuclear facilities and prevent nuclear incident or accident.
VATESI may apply necessary preventive measures within its competence, including a temporary
shutdown of a nuclear facility.
Seimas, the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, approved by its resolution of 18 January 2007
the new National Energy Strategy and adopted the Law on Nuclear Power Plant on 28 June 2007.
These legal acts envisage development of nuclear energy in Lithuania and construction of a new
nuclear power plant in partnership with Latvia, Estonia and Poland. Taking into account the tasks
stipulated in the new National Energy Strategy, VATESI undertakes necessary preparatory steps for
the licensing of new nuclear power plant. VATESI foresees following activities:
• Review and enhancement of national legislation;
• Reorganization of VATESI’s administrative structure;
• Recruitment of 30 additional staff over the period of years 2008-2011;
• Relocation of VATESI to the new premises with sufficient office space to accommodate
increased number of staff, emergency centre, training facilities, library and public
information centre and other necessary facilities;
• Allocation of adequate financial resources;
• Enhanced cooperation with Technical Support Organizations for assessment and
planning of necessary resources.
8.2. Basic document describing the authority and responsibilities of Regulatory
Body
The Law on Nuclear Energy (last amendment on 26 October 2006) provides for main legal
authority and responsibilities of Regulatory Body. Furthermore, the duties and responsibilities of
VATESI are stated in the Statute of VATESI - Regulations of the State Nuclear Power Safety
Inspectorate amended by the Government resolution No. 1014 of 1 July 2002.
VATESI is obliged to ensure the state regulation and supervision of nuclear safety and control
radiation protection at nuclear installations and other related organizations. VATESI’s activities
could be grouped as follows:
•
•
•
•
VATESI formulates the norms, principles and criteria for safe operation of nuclear
facilities, safe utilisation, transportation and storage of radioactive and nuclear materials,
establishes or participates, within its competence, in drafting of other safety norms and
regulations;
VATESI issues licenses for the operators of nuclear facilities and carriers of nuclear
materials, performs regulatory inspections and applies necessary enforcement measures;
VATESI prepares necessary legal acts and makes its proposals for development or
amendment of the IAEA safety standards, European Union and national legislation,
normative acts and other nuclear safety documentation in facilities under its control;
VATESI supervises the accounting of nuclear materials and physical protection of nuclear
materials and radioactive materials within its competence.
31
8.3. Structure of the Regulatory Body; its technical and support experts and
organizations if appropriate, and its human and financial resources
Since the last report the structure of VATESI has been revised as shown in Annex to 8.3, however,
the number and main functions of divisions remain unchanged.
Licensing Division (LD) is responsible for overall coordination of VATESI activities during
licensing activities. LD coordinates VATESI activities before it authorises the start up of unit after
annual maintenance outage. This division maintains licensing data, prepares necessary licensing
documents, drafts regulations and procedures for the licensing. LD makes necessary reviews before
VATESI gives its consent for transportation of radioactive materials. In addition, this division
performs overall coordination of VATESI’s inspection program and monitors its implementation.
LD inspectors perform necessary inspections and take part in safety assessment work as regards
reactor cooling, emergency core cooling and accident localisation systems, in-service inspection,
external event impact assessment, aging management, fire protection, reliability assessment and
other tasks.
Nuclear Material Control Division (NMCD) executes the regulatory supervision of nuclear
materials accounting and physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear materials. This
division maintains illicit trafficking and nuclear materials accounting data, drafts necessary
regulations on physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials. NMCD inspectors perform
inspections of physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. Head of this division
represents VATESI in interdepartmental committee on export control as regards export, import, and
transit of commodities used in nuclear activities. This division maintains cooperation with the
IAEA, other international organizations and institutions on accounting and control of nuclear
materials. NMCD retains contacts with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation.
Division of Decommissioning and Radiation Protection (DDRP) supervises the safety of radioactive
waste management and decommissioning of nuclear facilities. DDRP monitors the implementation
of emergency preparedness and radiation protection management at nuclear facilities. DDRP
inspectors take part in safety assessment of safe radioactive waste management and safety of spent
fuel, decommissioning, radiation protection, emergency preparedness and environmental protection.
DDRP inspectors carry out inspections at nuclear facilities, they draft safety regulations and
coordinate licensing of activities within the competence of division. Moreover, this division
maintains daily operation of VATESI Emergency Centre and coordinates the international
cooperation on emergency preparedness and environmental impact assessment.
Safety Assessment Division coordinates VATESI activities during safety assessment – its organizes
and performs the review of safety analysis reports, operational specifications, safety justifications as
regards to reactor and fuel safety, transient and accident analysis, operational safety and experience
feedback, instrumentation and control systems and probabilistic safety analysis. In addition, this
division assesses and maintains data on operational experience feedback and accommodates
VATESI’s Commission on analysis and assessment of operational events. Inspectors of this
division, within their competence, draft relevant safety regulations and perform inspections in
nuclear facilities.
On-site Division of VATESI at Ignalina NPP daily monitors the operation of nuclear power plant
through the direct supervision of operational compliance with approved technical specifications,
regulations and norms. Within the scope of their mandate, inspectors of this division issue
authorisations to operate equipment and implement certain technical decisions, when required in
accordance with regulations, they inspect safety systems and control technological processes during
32
operation and technical outages. Inspectors of this division represent VATESI during qualification
examination of operational staff.
Over reported period the maximum permissible number of VATESI staff remained unchanged and
agreeably is comprised of 59 positions. Currently VATESI has 52 employees and 3 employees are
on a maternity leave. However, in view of forthcoming licensing of new nuclear plant VATESI
foresees to recruit more staff, see Article 8.1. The budget of VATESI is approved annually within
the State Budget that is adopted by the Seimas, the Parliament of Lithuania. Over the reported
period VATESI budget was adequate to its needs.
VATESI cooperates with more than 10 departments, centres and laboratories of 8 Technical
Support Organisations - Institute of Physics, Lithuanian Energy Institute, Institute of Energy
Technologies, Kaunas University of Technology, Vilnius Gediminas Technical University, State
Institute of Information Technologies (SIIT), ITECHA Company and Institute of Chemistry.
Technical Support Organisations (TSOs) provide VATESI with expertise and necessary technicalscientific support during safety reviews, verification of safety justifications, drafting of norms and
regulations. Some TSOs of VATESI are involved in international projects implemented through
international and bilateral cooperation, coordinated by VATESI.
8.4. Position of the Regulatory Body in the governmental structure, including its
reporting obligations
Over reported period was no change of VATESI’s position in Governmental structure as shown in
Annex to 8.4.
VATESI reports its activities to the Government and accordingly informs other national and
international bodies. In accordance with national legislation, VATESI coordinates its activities with
other state bodies and institutions responsible for radiation protection and health care, emergency
preparedness, civil protection, environmental protection, industrial safety and supervision of
potentially dangerous industrial facilities.
National legislation provides for clear separation of competences between VATESI and other
regulatory bodies while implementing and supervising nuclear safety regulations. Supplementary to
the Law on Nuclear Energy, other laws and legislative acts state the duties and competence of other
state institutions and regulatory bodies, which provide VATESI with their respective statements
before the regulatory authorisation is granted by VATESI.
8.5. Relationship of the Regulatory Body to bodies responsible for the promotion
and utilization of Nuclear Energy
In accordance with the Law on Nuclear Energy the Ministry of Economy is the competent authority
responsible for the implementation of the Energy Policy. Article 9 of the said Law obliges the
Ministry of Economy to arrange means for development of nuclear energy infrastructure and, in
cooperation with the Ministry of Science and Education, to establish necessary scientific and
technical bodies to accommodate the needs of utilities operating nuclear power plants. The Article 4
of the said Law states that operating organizations bear responsibility for safety of nuclear facilities
they operate.
33
National legislation provides clear division between the responsibilities and functions of VATESI
and those organizations or bodies that are charged with the promotion or use of nuclear installations
or activities.
As indicated in Article 8.1., VATESI acts as independent governmental institution subordinated
directly to the Government. In accordance with Article 14 of the Law on Nuclear Energy, VATESI
acts independently while executing its mandated duties in accordance with national legislation, its
statute and other legislative acts. The Law authorises VATESI to apply any preventive measure it
considers necessary to preclude the nuclear accident, including ordering of temporary shut down of
nuclear facility operations.
New information
Section 8.1. The Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania approved the new National Energy
Strategy and adopted the Law on Nuclear Power Plant. These legal acts envisage development of
nuclear energy in Lithuania and construction of a new nuclear power plant in partnership with
Latvia, Estonia and Poland.
Section 8.2. The Law on Nuclear Energy has been amendment.
Section 8.3. The structure of VATESI has been revised.
34
Article 9: RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENSE HOLDER
Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear
installation rests with the holder of the relevant license and shall take the appropriate step to
ensure that each such holder meets its responsibility.
In accordance with the Law on Nuclear Energy of the Republic of Lithuania licences are issued for
those activities:
• to design, construct and reconstruct nuclear facilities, installations and equipment;
• to operate nuclear facilities;
• to store nuclear and radioactive materials and their waste;
• to retire a nuclear facility from service;
• to dispose nuclear and radioactive materials and their waste;
• to acquire, possess and transport nuclear materials;
• to acquire, possess and transport radioactive materials;
• to export, import and carry in transit in the territory of Lithuania nuclear, radioactive and
other materials used in the nuclear energy sector, nuclear equipment, and dual purpose
goods that may be used in nuclear technologies.
9.1. Description of the main responsibilities of the license holder
According to the amendments stated in the Law on Nuclear Energy of the Republic of Lithuania it
is prepared the new draft of Regulations for Licensing of Nuclear Power Related Activities. The
document is under approval by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania. The Regulations for
Licensing of Nuclear Power Related Activities determine these duties and responsibilities of license
holders.
The licensee:
• is responsible for the safety of the nuclear facility;
• must ensure radiation protection of staff and inhabitants during normal operation, and for
design basis and beyond design basis accidents not to exceed the allowed levels of
exposure for staff and inhabitants;
• must develop and maintain efficient measures to prevent and control accidents in nuclear
facilities;
• must unconditionally follow the conditions of licence validity;
• must promptly inform the licensing authority and other institutions of regulatory authority
about all deviations from the conditions of license validity;
• must prepare the annual safety assessment report for the nuclear facility in accordance with
the requirements of the nuclear safety regulations and submit it to the licensing authority;
• must follow the requirements of the legislation of The Republic of Lithuania, regulations of
nuclear power safety and general industrial regulations which are legalized in the
established order in nuclear energetic;
• must inform the licensing authority about the deviations from limits of the safe operation,
other safety relevant incidents related with its activity;
• must promptly inform the institution of regulatory authority and mass media about the
incidents which could cause the increased interest of society;
• is responsible for the quality of the licensed activity, proper management of
documentation, its storage during all time of nuclear facility activity, renewal in time and
approval by licensing authority when it is necessary;
35
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
must ensure a high level of safety culture in its activity, with safety the priority in
decisions;
must establish and maintain effective integrated management system of its activity;
must inform the institutions of regulatory authority about existing (possible) hazard for the
safety of the nuclear facility, incidents, accidents;
is responsible for the safety of the nuclear facility even if the validity of the license is
suspended or it is revoked;
must monitor the emission of radio nuclides into the environment in a systematic manner;
must monitor and investigate the contamination of the facility/site and environment in a
systematic manner;
present to the institutions of regulatory authority the data about emission of radio nuclides,
contamination of the facility/site and the environment in a systematic manner;
must follow the principle of ALARA, in accordance with which during the design and
usage of ionising radiation sources, as well as during the performance of related activities,
the exposure must be kept as low as is reasonably achievable, taking into account
economical and social factors.
The license validity conditions are established based on the following requirements to licensee:
• to perform only the activity for which the license is issued;
• to follow the requirements of safety regulations;
• to implement established integrated management programs;
• to inform promptly the institutions of regulatory authority about all changes made in
integrated management programs;
• to co-operate continuously with each contractor in order to get adequate information about
possible deficiencies of works performed or errors and(or) important events (accidents,
incidents, falls etc.) caused by the contractors activity;
• constantly and promptly to inform institutions of regulatory authority concerning all
incidents, accidents or similar events, indicated deficiencies of licensed activity and
preventive measures;
• to maintain the system of technical documentation to ensure appropriate storage of all
permissions, directives, acts, conclusions during all period of activities in nuclear
energetic;
• to maintain the system of accounting and reporting documentation;
• to submit to the competent institution of regulatory authority all the required
documentation of licensee;
• to prevent unauthorized usage of nuclear technologies;
• to submit the annual reports on licensee activity to the licensing authority, indicating the
works that have been performed or are being performed, results of authors works,
recommendations presented concerning the progress of mentioned works;
• licensee must ensure the free entrance into the territory and premises of the licensee for the
representatives of the licensing authority during supervision of licence conditions
fulfilment;
• to present the information to the licensee concerning scientific, technical and other
meetings aimed to discuss main safety issues of nuclear facility;
• to inform promptly the licensing authority about all changes of application documents.
The main responsibilities of the Nuclear Facility Operating Organization are also described (in
general) in the Law of Nuclear Energy of the Republic of Lithuania. The operator of a nuclear
facility is responsible for conducting nuclear activities in compliance with the provisions of this
Law and regulatory acts of the Republic of Lithuania. The safe operation of individual nuclear
facilities is the responsibility of their operators. The operator of the nuclear facility is fully
36
responsible for the adequate and safe operation of the facility in accordance with the requirements
stipulated in the laws and subordinate legislation of the Republic of Lithuania, in the norms and
regulations of nuclear safety and radiation protection, also in the regulations of the facility operator,
the rules of labour discipline and organization, and in the operation licence.
The Law states that the Nuclear Facility Operating Organization is obliged:
• to manage the accounting for nuclear materials belonging to the facility and exercise their
control in accordance with the requirements laid down in the safeguards agreement with
the IAEA;
• to analyze nuclear accidents and incidents in the manner prescribed by statutory acts;
• to notify VATESI and other interested bodies about all the violations of conditions and
requirements of operational safety and all failures of the facility safety systems and their
components;
• to ensure preparedness for the elimination of the consequences of a radiological accident.
The principal rights, duties and functions of the nuclear facility operator in the event of a nuclear
accident are set out in the incorporation documents and the facility operation license. The
implementing measures are established and specified in the plan of nuclear accident prevention and
of the response to the accident and mitigation of its consequences drafted by the operator and
approved by VATESI. Among other things, the plan indicates:
• the notification procedure of the Governmental Emergency Commission and other
competent authorities about the occurrence of the nuclear accident and the progress of
response to it;
• the organizational and technical measures for checking or reducing emission of radioactive
materials into the environment;
• procedure of co-ordination of actions with other institutions and services participating in
the response to the accident and mitigation of its consequences.
The operator of the facility is liable for the damage caused by radioactive effluent discharges from
the facility to the natural and legal persons, their property or to the natural environment. The
operator of the nuclear facility must insure the facility it is operating or procure in some other way
the funds necessary for the compensation of the nuclear damage. If the insurance and other funds
are not sufficient for the compensation of the damage, the payment of the balance is guaranteed by
the Government pursuant to the obligations assumed by the Republic of Lithuania according to the
Vienna Convention.
The Operating Organization is responsible for developing and implementing integrated management
system and implementing appropriate measures at all stages in the life of a nuclear plant. To this end
the Operating Organization prepares integrated management programme and control the activities of
companies (organizations) performing work or providing services for the nuclear plant (research
workers, designers, suppliers of systems and components, firms responsible for the installation of
equipment, assembly workers, builders, engineers responsible for final adjustments and so on).
The Operating Organization is responsible for ensuring the safety of the nuclear plant and bears full
responsibility for that safety, including measures designed to prevent and/or mitigate the
consequences of accidents, the accounting for and storage of nuclear materials and radioactive
substances, protection of the environment and monitoring of the state of the environment in the
sanitary-protection zone and in the observation zone, and also such controls as are required to ensure
that the nuclear plant is used only for the purposes for which it was designed and built. The overall
responsibility of the Operating Organization remains intact despite the independent activities and
responsibilities of companies, institutions, organizations and their unions, managing staff or other
persons performing work or providing services for the plant (designers, suppliers, firms responsible
37
for the installation of equipment, assembly workers, builders, engineers responsible for final
adjustments and so on) and despite the functions and responsibilities of the State Control and
Supervision Institutions.
Before a construction permit for plant or systems (components) of an NP is issued, the Operating
Organization creates the infrastructure (subdivisions) required for safe operation of the nuclear plant,
endowing those subdivisions with the necessary rights as well as financial, material and human
resources, imposing on them full responsibility for their activities, and monitoring the correct
implementation thereof.
The requisite quality of plant construction is ensured through the use of well-proven technology in
conjunction with quality assurance measures. Direct responsibility for quality assurance is borne by
the General Contractor for nuclear plant construction; final responsibility for quality of the
complete construction is borne by the Operating Organization.
The Operating Organization bears responsibility for creating the necessary organizational structures
for safe nuclear plant operation. It ensures that the plant has the necessary financial, material and
technical resources, norms and technical requirements, scientific support, quality assurance in the
all stages of lifetime of the NP. It also likewise organizes physical protection and fire protection of
the plant, as well as recruitment and training of operating personnel, safety culture and must provide
continuous monitoring of plant safety. The Operating Organization ensures continuous monitoring
and own supervision of all activities which have a bearing on plant safety. The results of safety
inspections and periodic reports on plant safety are to be submitted by the Operating Organization to
the State Control and Supervision Institutions.
Operating Organization is responsible for developing the technological reglament. Before the
Operating Organization will approve it the technological reglament is agreed with the organizations
that developed it and the State Control and Supervision Institutions. Any changes introduced in the
technological reglament must be approved in due form by the organizations that have taken part in
their drafting, acceptance and approving.
Accident situations and actual accidents which have taken place at a nuclear plant are carefully
investigated by commissions appointed in accordance with the norms and technical requirements in
force. The Operating Organization is responsible for ensuring that the investigations are performed
satisfactorily and in full, for reporting the results in good time to the State Control and Supervision
Institutions and other interested organizations for analyzing accidents with the operating personnel of
existing nuclear plants. Also, the Operating Organization is responsible for developing and
implementing measures designed to prevent any further infringement of normal operation or any
further accidents due to the same causes.
Information on equipment failures and personnel errors is routinely collected, processed, analyzed and
filed during plant operation. The Operating Organization is responsible for timely collection and
qualitative analysis of the information received as well as for its systematization and timely transfer to
the State Control and Supervision Institutions and other interested organizations.
The Operating Organization is responsible for developing and implementing a commissioning
programme, and this programme is agreed with the State Control and Supervision Institutions.
The plant administration is responsible for preparing the commissioning programmes and procedures
for physical and power start-up. These programmes are to be approved by the state regulatory body
and supervision institution and confirmed by the Operating Organization.
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A "Plan containing measures to protect personnel in the event of an NP accident" is devised by the
Operating Organization. The "Plan containing measures to protect personnel in the event of an NP
accident" provides for coordination of effort between the plant and external organizations (such as the
local fire department, civil security department, medical institutions, local authority institution, etc.)
within the limits of the site and in the sanitary protection zone. It also reflects the links with State
Control and Supervision Institutions. The plant administration is responsible for maintaining constant
readiness and for implementing the plan should the occasion arise.
9.2. Description of the mechanism by which the regulatory body will ensure that
the licence holder meets its primary responsibility for safety
The institutions issuing licences for a certain type of activity in the nuclear energy sector are
obliged to ensure that enterprises which have been issued licences guarantees:
• adequate standards of nuclear safety for the licensed activity;
• responsibility for nuclear safety;
• the system of internal control that would ensure the use of licensed nuclear materials and
wastes and would guarantee the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
• high professional qualifications of the executive personnel engaged in the licensed activity.
Competent authorities issuing licences for a specified activity in the sphere of nuclear energy
develop a system of requirements guaranteeing nuclear safety, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
and lawful usage of nuclear materials and waste handling. The licensing authority may establish
additional duties for the licensee, indicating that in the conditions of licence validity. By request of
the regulatory authority, the licensee and its contractors must provide all necessary information
relating to the licensed activity.
The State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) is the institution of the Government of the
Republic of Lithuania, responsible for regulation of nuclear safety. The most important tasks of
VATESI are:
• state regulation of nuclear safety at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant State Company and
other nuclear facilities;
• state regulation of the safety of radioactive waste management in nuclear facilities;
• state regulation of the safe use of nuclear materials;
• state regulation of the physical protection of nuclear facilities, nuclear and radioactive
materials used in nuclear energy;
• state regulation of radiation protection within its competence in the Ignalina Nuclear Power
Plant and other nuclear facilities.
In performing tasks delegated upon VATESI, it shall:
• draft laws, resolutions of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and other legal acts
on the issues of the safe use of nuclear energy, the use of nuclear materials, their
transportation, their accounting and control, as well as nuclear, radioactive materials used
in nuclear energy, as well as waste storage and disposal, within its competence co-ordinate
draft legal acts of the ministries, governmental institutions, county governors’
administrations, municipalities and other institutions, which may have an effect on the safe
use of nuclear energy;
• establish the principles, criteria, requirements and recommendations for safe operation of
nuclear facilities and their decommissioning, and monitor compliance with them;
39
•
establish the principles, criteria, requirements and recommendations for safe use, storage of
nuclear materials, disposal of their waste, and monitor compliance with them;
• establish the principles, criteria, requirements and recommendations for storage of
radioactive materials used in nuclear energy, disposal of their waste, and monitor
compliance with them;
• establish procedures for accounting for and control of nuclear materials, control their
compliance during import, export, reexport, transportation, use, storage and burying of
those materials;
• establish physical protection principles, criteria, requirements and recommendations of
nuclear facilities, nuclear as well as radioactive materials existing in nuclear facilities, and
monitor compliance with them;
• establish requirements for staff qualifications of nuclear facilities, regulate the organization
of the staff preparation, certification and requalification;
• within its competence control the fulfilment of radiation protection requirements for
nuclear facilities;
• within its competence control the fulfilment of nuclear safety requirements when
transporting nuclear materials;
• issue licences for activities, which are prescribed in the Law on Nuclear Energy of the
Republic of Lithuania, establish conditions for validity of licences and monitor compliance
with them;
• within its competence prepare inspection programmes and implement them;
• on the basis of the submitted safety analysis results, inspection conclusions and (or)
independent research, evaluate the condition of safety in nuclear facilities, prepare surveys
on the safety of nuclear facilities and submit them to the Government of the Republic of
Lithuania, local authorities and other bodies concerned;
• in the prescribed procedure organize and support expert examination work on nuclear
safety and radiation protection;
• participate in the work of commissions carrying out analysis of incidents or occurrences in
the facilities under VATESI control or perform independent research;
• co-ordinate measures for safety improvement of nuclear facilities and monitor their
implementation;
• assess the projects of nuclear facilities in terms of nuclear safety;
• co-ordinate and control preventive measures for the staff of nuclear facilities and the
population in the event of a nuclear facility accident, monitor the condition of accident
preparedness of the nuclear facility;
• in the event of a nuclear facility accident, evaluate the situation in the established
procedure and forecast the course of the nuclear accident, provide information on the
existing situation to the public and state institutions.
In implementing tasks delegated upon VATESI, it shall be entitled to:
• inspect at any time the state of safety of nuclear facilities and other facilities under
VATESI control, the compliance with the requirements of accounting and control of
nuclear materials;
• demand that the administration of nuclear facilities would eliminate the violations of
nuclear safety norms, suspend works, reduce power or stop the block (power plant) if the
safety norms are neglected, equipment defects are identified, the qualifications of the
specialists (staff) is insufficient or if the safe operation of nuclear facilities is endangered;
• require that persons disposing of nuclear materials would eliminate the violations of
accounting and control norms of the said materials;
• propose to the Government of the Republic of Lithuania in the procedure prescribed by
laws to suspend (stop) the operation of nuclear facilities prior to the time limit of their
operation, in the case of failing to ensure the safety of the said facilities;
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
demand that the administration of nuclear facilities and other facilities under VATESI
control would perform control tests of equipment and materials, operating medium
analysis, calculations for justification of the safety of nuclear facilities, reliability and
technical checking of equipment and systems;
control how investigation of violations of nuclear facilities is organized, obtain material of
the said investigation from the administration of nuclear facilities;
submit proposals to the Ministry of Economy or the administration of nuclear facilities
concerning the dismissal in the prescribed procedure of persons who have committed the
violations
prohibit preparation and execution of designing and construction documents of nuclear
facilities and equipment, after noticing violations of nuclear energy safety rules and norms
therein;
examine the heads of nuclear facilities in the issues of nuclear safety rules and norms,
control the procedure of verification of the knowledge of the staff of the indicated facilities
on these issues, participate in checking the knowledge of the heads of divisions,
engineering and technical staff, appoint extraordinary checking of knowledge;
control preparation of the staff of nuclear facilities and execution of permission for them to
work in the said facilities;
familiarize with operational and technical documents in-place, attend the meetings on the
issues of operation of the facilities organized by the administration of nuclear facilities,
obtain immediate information on the violations of the operation of nuclear facilities;
At the demand of VATESI, the administration of a nuclear facility must:
submit necessary documents (technical specifications, operating instructions, drawings,
diagrams, standards and other documents);
provide control measuring devices and appoint staff for performance of tests and works
related to the execution of supervision, as well as provide necessary laboratory analysis and
research data;
supply with special clothes, special footwear and other personal protection devices;
provide official premises, international and interurban telephone, facsimile communication
measures;
provide necessary scientific technical information and literature.
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Article 10: SAFETY PRIORITY
Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that all organizations engaged in
activities directly related to nuclear installations shall establish policies that give due priority to
nuclear safety.
10.1. Safety Policies
10.1.1. VATESI Policy Statement
VATESI Policy Statement was issued in May 2003 in the document called “VATESI Mission”. In
the said document VATESI competence, responsibility, principles of operations, policy and
functions are described.
VATESI mission reads as follows: “Taking into account risk of nuclear energy use as well as wish
of the society to avoid nuclear and radiological accidents and incidents, and understanding its
responsibility to society of Lithuania and worldwide, VATESI performs regulation and state
oversight of nuclear and radiation safety at nuclear power facilities with the aim to protect the
society and the environment against harmful impact of nuclear and radiological events and
accidents.”
Due to the set policy, VATESI activities must be strictly planned. Decisions must be based on the
documents and facts. State nuclear safety oversight has to be performed based on the specific,
clearly defined requirements. Every VATESI employee has to perform his (her) duties with
responsibility, using his (her) professional knowledge and experience, raising his (her) qualification
and sharing the knowledge with the colleagues. Systematic Approach to Training is used to raise
employees’ professional knowledge and skills.
VATESI seeks constructive dialogue and cooperation with other institutions. VATESI bases its
activities on the gained experience and international practice. VATESI management formulates and
apply principles, which integrate the quality assurance requirements into the everyday work, ensure
that the employees would receive the necessary information, assistance and help, would have
working tools to perform their tasks properly.
Heads of the divisions are responsible for the quality of work performed and services done by their
divisions. Each employee is responsible for the quality of work performed by him (her). VATESI
activities are based on the principals of honesty, openness and clarity. Only reliable and correct
information on nuclear safety in Lithuania shall be given to the society. This information should be
presented timely and in the proactive manner.
VATESI structure and number of stuff must correspond to the set goals and tasks. VATESI
performs safety review and assessment as well as inspection program to define if safety level of
nuclear power facilities corresponds to the set requirements. When needed, VATESI use assistance
of Technical Safety Organizations for independent safety assessment.
VATESI grants the licensees, formulates and check fulfillment of their conditions. VATESI takes
part in the emergency preparedness activities. Corporative and individual activities of VATESI
employees are subject of continuous self-assessment process. VATESI quality assurance system is
being improved using results of this process.
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10.1.2. Ignalina NPP Policy Statement
Ignalina NPP, being the Operating Organization is responsible for nuclear facility safety assurance,
in accordance with international practice undertakes fully responsibility for the plant safety and
establishes policy that gives the top priority to the plant safety.
10.2. Safety culture and its development
General
Activities on Safety Culture development are performed in order to increase constantly nuclear safety
by means of improvement of management and personnel attitude to safety, what provides safe and
correct execution of works and creation of atmosphere of openness and mutual respect.
According to the Law on Nuclear Energy of the Republic of Lithuania, article 27, the following
requirement is set forth: organization granted with the license on NPP operation must guarantee to the
regulating authority the high level of safety culture in the organization.
Similar requirement is defined also in Conditions of VATESI issued operating licenses for Unit 1 and
2.
The State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate of the Republic of Lithuania (VATESI) devotes specific
attention to the safety culture issues.
In November 2004 VATESI inspection on Safety Culture in light of Unit 1 decommissioning was
held at INPP. The main objective of the inspection was to evaluate the preparation of the plant for
management of Safety Culture related issues during the transition period from operation to
decommissioning of INPP.
Specific attention to the Safety Culture issues was devoted by VATESI during Quality
Management inspections held at Ignalina NPP in 2003 and 2006 years.
In October 2005 a meeting with representatives of Ignalina NPP was organized at VATESI in order
to discuss the Safety Culture and Organizational Issues specific during the transitional phase from
operation to decommissioning.
Currently, VATESI is in the stage of preparation of Guide for management of safety culture issues
specific to the pre-decommissioning phase of the Ignalina nuclear power plant.
Safety Culture Management Procedure and Procedure for collection and processing of data required
for calculation of Safety Culture indicators were implemented at Ignalina NPP within the frames of
Quality Assurance System.
Coordinators were appointed at Ignalina NPP officially in divisions in order to plan and coordinate
activities on Safety Culture.
General Director of Ignalina NPP annually approves Plan of activities on Safety Culture
development at INPP, where the specific measures on implementation of the INPP Safety Culture
development programme are determined.
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The main objective of the Programme is to orientate behaviour of personnel of the plant and
contractors, also plant management methods to the achievement of the highest priority – SAFETY.
Priority tasks on Safety Culture improvement at Ignalina NPP:
• The Safety Policy shall obtain support of the plant management and a commitment to this
Policy shall be demonstrated.
• Safety Culture shall become the key element of the plant activity management.
• To improve attitude of the plant employees to their work, to improve mentality and inner
critical position of the plant personnel, which would prevent negligence, develop selfregulation with regard to the safety matters.
• To provide the plant personnel with open and effective information about all works
performed at INPP in order to ensure understating of the common tasks and plant operation
perspectives by each employee of INPP, as well as to inform the plant personnel about
activities related to the decommissioning of both Units.
• Training of personnel on the Safety Culture principles using the examples of good practice,
operational experience in order to learn lessons.
• Performance of Safety Culture audits with further corrective actions and improvements.
At INPP monthly meetings are held on the initiative of the Director General and in light of the
suggestions provided by the representatives of the plant personnel. The aim of these meetings is to
exchange information about the status of the current affairs at the plant, to discuss the important
safety and organizational issues.
Programme of Safety Culture Development
Programme of Safety Culture development at INPP was implemented in accordance with measures
approved by INPP Director General. During the last three years the following measures were
foreseen and implemented:
10.2.1. Training of the personnel
The matters of Safety Culture concept, matters of the own and industrial experience and examples
from practice of performance of works related to Safety Culture were included into the training
process.
Within the last three years the specific work was performed concerning the conduction of the
Safety Culture seminars for plant employees. In order to conduct the seminars the monthly
schedules were developed, coordinators for each plant department were appointed, special training
tools were used.
During these seminars the problems in the Safety Culture area and their possible solutions were
discussed. The participants of the Seminars reviewed the reports on events at INPP related to the
disadvantages of Safety Culture.
Updated version of the Safety Culture Training Manual was issued.
During the period of 2004 - 2006 international IAEA and WANO seminars on safety of nuclear
plants operating RBMK type reactors were held at INPP.
In September 2004 the managers of INPP departments and representatives of the consolidated trade
unions participated in the VATESI initiated international conference on Safety Culture and
organizational issues specific during the pre-decommissioning phase of NPP.
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In March 2004 the seminar on Safety Culture was conducted for managers of contracting
organizations. The seminar was opened by the INPP Director General. 28 managers and 47
specialists of the contracting organizations attended three seminars. The seminar covered the
following issues:
1. Order and conditions for granting of 1st type permissions on execution of works;
2. Objectives of Safety Culture development at INPP;
3. IAEA report № 75-INSAG-4:
- Definition of Safety Culture;
- Universal features and elements of Safety Culture;
4. Implementation of Safety Culture management procedure QA-2-001,
5. Practical examples which are related to Safety Culture and operational experience gained
in the area of maintenance works and preparation of design documentation:
- Order and organization of repair works at INPP
- Application of STARK method.
10.2.2. Participation and input of the personnel in Safety improvement
Proposals of employees.
Guidelines on work with proposals on improvements was developed and implemented. In
accordance with these Guidelines the INPP employees have an opportunity to submit their
proposals to the divisions' managers. For this purpose there are special Logs for submission of
proposals in the plant divisions and post boxes with proposals-forms for submission of proposal to
the Director General, managers of the Directorates and Services. These boxes are equipped at the
plant checkpoint and in rooms for changing of clothes.
Posters “Examples of good standards” at INPP have been prepared and distributed to workplaces of
the personnel.
10.2.3. Independent Reviews, inspections and audits
World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) partnership check-up
In August 2002 WANO partnership check-up was performed at Ignalina NPP. Experts from eight
countries took part in the check-up. According to the results of the check-up the experts marked
positive practice in the development of Safety Culture at INPP and suggested WANO Moscow
Centre to distribute INPP experience to other Nuclear Power Plants.
In April 2007 a second check-up of measures on the results of recommendations obtained from the
WANO partnership check-up experts was held. A second check-up at INPP is planned in June
2007.
Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) mission
In June 2006, based on the request of the Government of the Republic of Lithuanian, IAEA mission
within the framework of OSART program was held at INPP. All in all, international experts have
highly evaluated safety and management of Unit 2 operation.
OSART team have concluded that both Ignalina NPP management and personnel aspire to execute
safe operation of the plant and to use safety related programs, accepted methods and personnel
attitude to safety at the stage of INPP decommissioning.
45
IAEA experts have appreciated works which were done in the area of Safety Culture: at INPP 2
Safety Culture monitoring and analysis systems have been developed and implemented.
Both systems function as effective management means during realization of safe operation and
Safety Culture indicators’ monitoring. This practice is recommended for other nuclear plants.
During the mission the team of experts has paid their attention to the areas, which have to be
improved, all remarks were registered in the form of recommendations and suggestions. A plan of
corrective measures has been prepared at INPP. Currently, work on implementation of the
corrective measures is in the progress.
Audit of the implementation process for management procedure QA-2-001 “Safety Culture”
The audit was performed in October 2004. The purpose of the audit was to assess the
implementation of management procedure QA-2-001 and the progress of safety culture
development in the main three departments under Technical Directorate. One of the main tasks was
to determine the influence of the forthcoming shutdown of Unit 1 on safety culture.
Conclusions of the audit:
The competence of managers and employees in the audited departments in the area of safety culture
has improved significantly. Apparently, the measures taken by the INPP during the previous years,
as well as developed and implemented management procedure QA-2-001, Safety Culture, allowed
achieving positive results in improvement of the INPP safety.
The second audit was performed in March 2006. Based on the results of the audit the management
procedure QA-2-001 “Safety Culture” was updated.
Safety indicators
A separate procedure for determining and evaluating of safety indicators was developed. During the
period from May till December 2004 a phase of this Procedure implementation was executed, a
working group consisting from INPP departments’ specialists was formed in order to perform this
work. A procedure for processing of data required for measurement of safety culture indicators was
prepared.
Till August 2006 a trial operation of safety indicators calculation system has been conducted. At
present, the procedure has been amended. Calculations of safety indicators are performed on a
monthly basis. The reports are submitted to VATESI and managers of INPP departments.
INPP Safety Committee
The Safety Committee performs an independent assessment of decisions, important from the safety
point of view.
The results of Safety Culture development programme were reviewed at INPP Safety Committee
Meetings as well; members of the Safety Committee recommended to INPP management staff to
pay attention to the personnel work motivation issues.
10.2.4. Motivation of personnel
46
INPP Director General developed INPP Policy in the area of personnel motivation. At the meeting
of INPP Safety Committee the Policy was approved by the Members of the Committee. Text of the
Policy is presented below:
INPP policy in the field of motivation of personnel
Adhering INPP policy in the field of safety and quality assurance, INPP management staff under
the leadership of Director General declares:
1. We have to motivate the personnel for good work, for making the contribution to the plant
safety improvement. The tendency to note well performed work has to become a priority
element of management. The work is considered to be well executed, when it is executed
safely and to high quality level.
2. Every manager has to create an atmosphere of such kind when the personnel avow problems
and own errors. The personnel mistakes are considered only as a possibility to refrain from
their repetition, not with the purpose to impose a penalty. It is necessary to learn lessons
from each error and thereby to help itself and others not to make this error again.
3. However, we must be intolerant to violation of safety, of internal regulations and hiding of
errors. Moreover, we have to make a decision on each penalty recovery applying weighted
approach in order not to impair atmosphere of openness.
Ignalina NPP management staff declares its adherence to the Policy in the field of personnel
motivation.
In accordance with the results of the performed outages of power units and for works related to
safety improvement many plant employees obtained honourable mentions from the plant
Management Staff. According to the results of the year an incentive was paid out. Every month
INPP employees get an incentive of 20-30 per cent of a monthly salary.
10.2.5. External and Internal information
In October 2003 Management Procedure "External and Internal information" was approved.
Activity on external and internal information is performed in order to timely inform the plant
personnel, public, mass media and state institutions by means of preparation and transmission of
information about INPP. Information about INPP operation, information about implementation of
important projects, information about organizational changes at INPP including those related to the
decommissioning process of INPP power units is presented by Information Center personnel
placing the constantly updated information at INPP outside web-site www.iae.lt.
Internal information includes regular editions of Information bulletins, broadcasting of weekly
news by the plant radio and placing of relevant information to the internal web-site.
10.2.6. Support to the personnel during the INPP transitional phase from operation to
decommissioning
In November 2003 INPP Director General and INPP Joint Trade Unions adopted Strategy of INPP
personnel social support for the period of INPP decommissioning. The Strategy was published in
INPP information bulletin. The Strategy will act till 2010 and will cover all employees of the plant.
Fulfilment of the Strategy will allow:
• to provide support to personnel in solving the social problems which can arise during this
period,
• to ensure safe operation of the plant,
• to maintain high level of Safety Culture during the operation of units and preparation to
decommissioning.
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10.2.7. Analysis of the root causes of events
The Human Factor Management Program has been developed by the Training Center. The Program
has been put into operation since 2007.
In May 2005 a seminar on “Human Factor” was organized by VATESI. The representatives of the
Training Center and Engineering Support Department took part in the seminar.
In 2006 “Procedure for additional analysis of events caused by the incorrect personnel actions
during unusual events” was issued.
Analysis of the root causes considering human factor influence to safety is performed in order to
increase INPP safety and reliability level. Analysis of the events related to the human factor
provides prevention of events in future by means of detection of direct root causes of the events,
development and realization of corrective measures directed to elimination of causes and
prevention of events.
10.2.8. Assessment of Safety Culture
Assessment of Safety Culture is based upon the plant personnel questioning and Safety Culture
indicators.
Assessments of Safety Culture at INPP were performed in 1998, 2000 and 2004. Assessment
method is based on the interview sheets – questionnaires which were developed considering the
Safety Culture features which are applied in world nuclear power production industry. The results
of Safety Culture assessment were developed on the basis of information presented in
questionnaires which were filled by key personnel of INPP seven divisions. The next assessment of
Safety Culture is planned for the end of 2007.
In 2005 the psychologist of the Training Center conducted an examination of the questions, which
are included in the questionnaire for assessment of INPP Safety Culture. Questionnaires and the DB
of the computer program were adjusted.
Since 2004 INPP has performed activities related to identification and application of safety culture
indicators. These indicators are necessary for in-depth assessment of the safety culture within the
enterprise and timely prevention of latent weaknesses in the area of operational safety, human
behaviour and organizational structure, as well as in cases of appearance of positive trends within
the organization. In 2004 a procedure for collection and processing of data required for
measurement of safety culture indicators was approved. At the beginning of 2007 additional
information has been added to the procedure based on the gained experience at INPP. Results of
safety indicators’ calculations are registered on a monthly basis. These results are presented in
reports, which were submitted to INPP departments and VATESI. Numerical values of safety
culture indicators are presented on the internal INPP web-site for notification of all INPP employees
Safety culture and its development
In 2006 “Procedure for additional analysis of events caused by the incorrect personnel actions
during unusual events” was issued. Analysis of the root causes considering human factor influence
to safety is performed in order to increase INPP safety and reliability level. Analysis of the events
related to the human factor provides prevention of events in future by means of detection of direct
root causes of the events, development and realization of corrective measures directed to
elimination of causes and prevention of events.
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10.3. Safety Commitment
INPP policy in the field of safety and quality assurance was adopted in 1988 and in 2000 and 2005
it was reissued. In accordance with this document the INPP management headed by Director
General bears full responsibility for the safety of the operating Unit 2 as well as Unit 1, which
undergoes the decommissioning procedure, and states that:
The main goal of INPP is to become the safest RBMK nuclear power plant and a competitive
performer in the nuclear industry in Lithuania. This also means that the decommissioning projects
will be implemented in a safe and effective manner.
To meet the above objectives, it is necessary to assure that:
• Activities at all levels are performed safely, with high level of quality, and plant safety
is considered an overriding priority. Good quality is achieved when INPP personnel
meet the requirements of the Owner and VATESI as well as expectations of the people,
and the people of Lithuania feel confident about the safety of INPP.
• All employees take an active part in safety and quality improvements. To ensure such
participation every employee must know the INPP objectives, his own functions and be
continuously informed about the results of activities performed at INPP.
• All INPP employees are properly qualified to perform their functions in accordance
with plant objectives. A level of every employee’s competence shall be improved to
strengthen both INPP and the individual.
• All INPP managers exhibit personal activity and leadership. The main task of every
manager is to formulate tasks and requirements facing his department, put them into an
assessable form, communicate to all employees, and to provide every employee with a
working environment consistent with the tasks to be accomplished.
• During the decommissioning of Unit 1 efficient cooperation between INPP managers
and employees was provided. It is important that cooperation between managers and
employees during the decommissioning of the plant should be as efficient as during its
operation. It is significant to show that we can not only provide safe operation of the plant
but also carry out the safe decommissioning of the Unit.
• Social protection is provided to INPP personnel. During the decommissioning process
the key personnel should be retained and the implementation of the Personnel Social
Support Strategy should be ensured.
• All INPP activities are continuously evaluated to improve their quality and efficiency.
The INPP and its personnel must make the use of their experience and that of others to
improve the organisation, operations and their competence.
• Each of INPP employees is responsible to society. All laws must be abided by and the
safety requirements must be met with a sufficient safety margin.
• Efficient and integrated quality assurance System was implemented at INPP.
If the INPP Director General can answer «YES» to all these items, the plant will implement all
activities at the required quality and safety level. If every employee can answer «YES» to all these
items, he performs his job to the required quality level.
To accomplish these tasks, the Safety and QA Department performs maintenance and improvement
of the INPP quality assurance system, evaluates its effectiveness and provides the necessary quality
training for personnel.
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10.4. Safety Assurance during the Operation of Unit 2 (with personnel
motivation assessment)
According to VATESI requirements in order to continue Unit 2 operation after Unit 1 final
shutdown, INPP has prepared a Safety Justification for the only operating Unit 2 (SJ).
The Safety Justification for the only operating Unit 2 was developed on the basis of Unit 2
condition at the end of December 2004 (the scheduled date of the Unit 1 final shutdown).
The Safety Justification is based on SAR-2 and RSR-2, it covers the safety issues related to changes
of operation conditions for Unit 2 process systems and common plant process systems and changes
of administrative structure of INPP following the Unit 1 final shutdown.
The Safety Justification for the only operating Unit 2 has been developed to cover two stages of the
Unit 1 decommissioning:
• From the Unit 1 final shutdown until the beginning of the fuel unloading from the reactor;
• From the start of the fuel unloading from the reactor of Unit 1 until the competition of the
fuel unloading procedure.
The Safety Justification also considers planned modifications of Unit 2 systems, which are affected
by the Unit 1 final shutdown, configurations of Unit 1 process systems during the decommissioning
of Unit 1.
A list of all Unit 2 systems as well as common plant systems was compiled in order to evaluate the
effect of the Unit 1 final shutdown on the safety of Unit 2 operation. After the analysis of all Unit 2
systems had been conducted, a list of Unit 2 systems, which have connections with Unit 1 and
common plant systems, was defined. Also, a list of Unit 2 systems with transit communications
going through Unit 1 premises to common plant facilities was made. Analysis of the Unit 1 final
shutdown effect on the safety of Unit 2 operation was conducted for all systems included into
above-mentioned lists. The Safety Justification for the only operating Unit 2 includes four Parts:
• Part 1 – Peculiarities of INPP operation with two and only one (Unit 2) units.
• Part 2 – Analysis of systems, which have technological communications with Unit 1
systems.
• Part 3 – List of failures.
• Part 4 – Analysis of failures and external events.
The effect of Unit 1 final shutdown on human factor (Safety Justification, Part 5) and INPP physical
protection (Safety Justification, Part 6) was considered.
As a result of the analysis, which had been conducted in Parts 1-4, a list of Unit 1 Safety Related
systems and elements was defined. This list also includes elements of common plant systems, which
are located at Unit 1 and the efficiency of which should be preserved after the Unit 1 final shutdown
in order to assure safe operation of Unit 2.
In addition, a list of systems and element, which are required for normal operation and which do not
affect the safety of Unit 1, was defined. The latter list also includes elements of common plant
systems, which are located at Unit 1 and which should be left in operation after the Unit 1 final
shutdown.
The amount of common plant systems’ equipment, which should be left in operation after the Unit 1
final shutdown, was assessed.
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Lists of Unit 1 premises where normal operation conditions should be assured after the Unit 1 final
shutdown were compiled with regard to each system. In addition, a list of operational
documentation, which should include all changes made after the Unit 1 final shutdown, was
defined.
Analysis of all initiating events, which had been considered in SAR-2 (Task 12, Part 4), was
conducted in order to determine the effect of Unit 1 and 2 communications on the consequences of
these events. Unit 1 systems are included into the analysis of the effect on Unit 2 safety under one
initiating event only – “loss of the Service Water Supply System”. In the Safety Justification of the
only operating Unit 2 Report (Part 1-4 “Service Water Supply System”) it is shown that the Service
Water Supply System, which will be left in operation at Unit 1, will provide the required amount of
service water to Unit 2 provided that the loss of Service Water Supply System at Unit 2 has
occurred. The consequences of other initiating events do not depend on the operation of Unit 1
systems.
The Safety Justification of the only operating INPP Unit 2 provides evidence that the continuation
of Unit 2 operation after the Unit 1 final shutdown is possible. Results and conclusions of the Safety
Justification of the only operating Unit 2 have provided the basis for decision-making by VATESI
on issuance of Operation License for INPP Unit 2 after the Unit 1 final shutdown.
Permission for the Unit 1 final shutdown was received from VATESI at the end of 2006 after the
completion of the following works:
• Construction of new Heat Only Boiler Station and Steam Boiler Station;
• Issuance of the “INPP Unit 1 Decommissioning Project for the 1st and 2nd stages of fuel
unloading;
• Issuance of new “Technological Regulations on the operation of Unit 1”, PTOed-0905-1;
• Preparation of Technical Order on “Joint operation of On-site Central Heating Plant (OCHP)
and Boiler Station” ТTRP-0931-1932;
• Conducting of personnel emergency training on assurance of safe operation of both units
during the only operating Unit 2 outage or OCHP failure;
• Implementation of Safety Justification of the only operating Unit 2 basic recommendations.
10.5. Regulatory Control
General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Safety VD-B-001-0-97 and Nuclear Safety
Regulations for Reactors of Nuclear Power Plants VD-T-001-0-97 provide the main principles
emphasizing overriding priority of safety and main issues to be implemented in that respect. In
accordance with above regulations safety culture is practical and psychological training of
individuals in which the assurance of nuclear plant safety is a priority goal and an inherent
requirement leading to individual awareness of responsibility and self-monitoring in the
implementation of all tasks which can affect safety.
The safety of a nuclear plant shall be guaranteed by applying the principle of "defence-in-depth",
i.e. by the sequential implementation of protection measures based on a system of barriers to
prevent the spread of ionising radiation and radioactive materials to the environment and a system
of technical and organizational measures to protect these barriers and retain their effectiveness, and
to provide direct protection for the population.
The system of barriers includes the fuel matrix, the fuel element cladding, the boundary of the
primary coolant circuit, and a hermetically sealed protective enclosure surrounding local safety
51
systems. The system of technical and organizational measures among other includes
implementation of safety culture at nuclear facilities.
Safety culture shall be inculcated to all personnel and organizations employed in the nuclear power
field through:
• Appropriate selection and training of personnel in each sphere of safety related activity;
• Creation and maintenance of a strict discipline with a clear distribution of personal
responsibility among managers and executives;
• Instructions preparation and strict observation the work performance, as well as their
periodical updating with consideration of experience.
All personnel involved in safety-related activities should fully understand the nature of their work
and the manner and degree in which it affects safety. They should be fully aware of the
consequences, which might follow the violation of rules or any deficient application of the
prevailing norms and technical requirements.
Ignalina NPP, being the Operating Organization is responsible for nuclear facility safety assurance
and bear full responsibility for safety including measures intended for prevention and/or mitigation
of incidents consequences during usage and storage of nuclear materials and radioactive substances,
environment protection and environmental condition control providing in controlled area and in
radiation-control area, and means of control necessary to ensure that the nuclear facility is used only
for purposes for which it was intended and constructed.
The Operating Organization bears responsibility for establishing the necessary organizational
structures for safe operation of nuclear installation of both Unit 2, which is currently operating, and
Unit 1, which was shutdown in 2004 and which is currently being decommissioned. The Operating
Organization ensures that the plant has the necessary financial, material and technical resources,
norms and technical requirements, scientific support, quality assurance in the all stages of lifetime.
The Operating Organization also has to organize the physical protection and the fire protection of
the plant, as well as recruitment and training of operating personnel, maintain safety culture and
must perform continuous monitoring of plant safety.
The Operating Organization ensures continuous monitoring and supervision of all activities related
to the plant safety. The results of safety inspections and periodic reports on plant safety are to be
submitted by the Operating Organization to the State Regulatory Institutions.
To perform above indicated requirements, the Division for Safety Supervision is established at
INPP as part of the Safety and Quality Assurance Department. It carries out safety inspections,
which audit the adherence to the requirements of the safety rules in accordance with the Annual
Plan, daily inspections of safety conditions, and inspections of work and modification
implementation. Inspection findings are recorded in reports. Annually INPP prepares an INPP
Safety Report. The Report is submitted to VATESI and to other interested organizations. In
accordance with national regulations, VATESI carry out the independent regulatory inspections of
Ignalina NPP, which cover an assessment of safety culture.
10.6. Voluntary activities and good practices
Adhering INPP policy in the field of safety and quality assurance, INPP management staff under the
leadership of Director General declares:
• We have to motivate the personnel for good work, for making the contribution to the plant
safety improvement. The tendency to note well performed work has to become a priority
52
element of management. The work is considered to be well executed, when it is executed
safely and to high quality level.
• Every manager has to create an atmosphere of such kind when the personnel avow
problems and own errors. The personnel mistakes are considered only as a possibility to
refrain from their repetition, not with the purpose to impose a penalty. It is necessary to
learn lessons from each error and thereby to help itself and others not to make this error
again.
• However we must be intolerant to violation of safety, of internal regulations and hiding of
errors. Moreover, we have to make a decision on each penalty recovery applying weighted
approach in order not to impair atmosphere of openness.
Ignalina NPP management staff declares its adherence to the Policy in the field of personnel
motivation.
New information
Section 10.2. Presented information about WANO and OSART missions.
Section 10.4. Presented information on Safety Assurance during the operation of Unit 2 (including
personnel motivation assessment).
53
Article 11: FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES
i.
ii.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate financial
resources are available to support the safety of each nuclear installation throughout its
life.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbers
of qualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are available for all
safety-related activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout its life.
11.1. Financing sources
State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (below referred to as INPP) is the main energy
generator in Lithuania. In compliance with the requirements of the European Union, Lithuania took
the obligation to end the plant operation in 2009. Unit 1 was shutdown in 2004 December 31,
nevertheless, the INPP is leading on the energy market of Lithuania by selling 70% of generated
electricity.
Up to the year 2002 all energy generated by INPP was supplied to “Lietuvos energija” JSC.
After Electricity Law came into force in 2002, the state controlled electricity monopoly was
reorganised to market relations, so since April 1, 2002 INPP has started electricity trade with public
and independent suppliers. Starting from 2003 INPP made electricity purchase and sale contracts
and sells electricity to the following companies: ,,Achema“ JSC, ,,Prekybos namai Giro“ CJSC,
,,Mazeikiu elektrine“ JSC (at present ,,Mazeikiu Nafta“ JSC), ,,Akmenes cementas“ JSC,
,,Visagino energija“ SE, ,,Korelita“ CJSC. About 70% of INPP electricity, sold to domestic market,
is purchased by public suppliers ,,Rytu skirstomieji tinklai“ JSC and ,,BCT“ JSC, about 20% is sold
to ,,Lietuvos energija“ JSC, which acts as electricity market operator. ,,Lietuvos energija“ JSC as
well exports electricity to other countries.
Moreover, since 2003 to 2005, INPP as an enterprise holding the independent supplier licence, was
trading with the independent customers: “Lifosa” JSC and “Dirbtinis pluostas” JSC (nowadays after
reorganisation “Korelita” CJSC). On average about 65 mln. KWh was sold to these customers per
annum. At present INPP has not got any contracts signed with independent consumers, however
considers dealing with them in the future.
No.
Years
Sold electrical
energy M/kWh
Income (K
Lt)
1.
2.
3.
2004
2005
2006
14 039
9 624
7 977
716 766
564 470
507 850
Rate
ct/ kWh
(according to report)
5,106
5,865
6,366
Profit, loss
(KLt)
22 799
13 585
19 090
At present the operation of Unit 1 is financed in the frame of the Ignalina Program from the funds
of European Union and National Fund.
54
11.2. Personnel employment and training for performance of safety-related
activities at Nuclear Facilities
INPP has a quantitatively high number of personnel in comparison with the other NNPs in the
world (except for the former Soviet plants). Firstly, operation and maintenance of INPP demands a
lot of efforts and manpower. Secondly, after Lithuania gained its independence, the restructuring of
then existing organizations dealing with the maintenance and repair of the nuclear installations on
nuclear facilities started. In order to preserve the experienced personnel recruited to perform outage
works and other activities, INPP had to incorporate all these external organizations into its structure.
When INPP became property of Lithuania, a huge work was commenced on nuclear facilities
targeted to the plant upgrade and safety improvement by applying nuclear experience gained by
Sweden, Germany, USA, Japan and other countries. Supported by the above countries, INPP safety
and reliability were upgraded sufficiently and the works are still ongoing. The relevant activities are
in progress in order to implement procedures, manuals, guidelines performed meeting the IAEA
standards.
It is because of the above-mentioned activities the INPP can be referred as the safest RBMK
Nuclear Power Plant.
Many INPP experts have been trained at the nuclear power plants of Sweden, USA, Canada, Japan
and other countries. Such training provides efficient tool to adopt the safety improvement
experience.
INPP personnel is very well educated and properly trained. More than 38% of personnel have
higher education, 26% – college education, 20% - vocational schools and the others have the
general secondary education.
The faculty of Nuclear Power and Thermal Engineering was established in Kaunas Technological
University to educate nuclear specialists.
Taking into consideration the peculiarities of the RBMK reactor, INPP placed an agreement with
the Obninsk Nuclear Power Energy Institute (Russia). 5-7 nuclear engineers per year sponsored by
INPP are trained there to operate nuclear facilities.
In the town, where INPP employees live, there is a Vocational School which trains qualified
workers to satisfy the INPP needs in electricians, welders, I&C and tool-makers.
Procedures on INPP Safety Culture development have been generated. They undergo continuous
upgrading in order to increase individual responsibility of the personnel in terms of work
implementation and to ensure reliable and safe operation of the plant.
In 1999 the National Energy Strategy was approved according to which closure of INPP Unit 1 is
due in 2005. Currently the technical designs of Unit 1 decommissioning and its dismantling are
being developed. A new Law of LR on additional social warranties and employment warranties for
INPP personnel was adopted on 29 April 2003. The Law provides additional employment
warranties, life insurance of personnel responsible for nuclear safety, whose work is significant to
ensure safe and uninterruptible operation of INPP, procedures on discharge payments, retirement
payment, and migration payment.
Within the frames of Unit 1 forthcoming decommissioning and in accordance with the decree of the
Government of LR five (5) departments of INPP, which are not involved in energy generation,
55
received the status of independent State Enterprises. Given these departments separation the number
of INPP personnel reduced for 808 employees.
The Power Unit 1 of Ignalina NPP was shutdown on 31 December 2004 in compliance with the
decree adopted by the Government of LR on 25 November 2004 on the date of Unit 1 shutdown.
After the shutdown of Unit 1 the Law on social warranties has been put in force.
The shutdown of Unit 1 resulted in the redundancy of personnel on the plant. In accordance with the
above-mentioned Law, lists of positions and employees to be released are approved annually. These
measures have allowed reducing the amount of personnel to 3230 employees by 1 April 2007 (by 1
January 2001 – 4680 employees). It is planned to continue the reduction of personnel amount taking
into account the optimal number of employees needed for the safe maintenance of Unit 2.
In view of Unit 2 shutdown on 31 December 2009, there are no persons left wishing to study
nuclear engineering specialities in Kaunas Technological University.
Currently a political decision on construction of a new nuclear power plant has been adopted. This
will give an opportunity for a definite number of INPP specialists to apply their knowledge and
experience for the construction and operation of the new NPP. Also this will motivate young people
to study specialities needed in the area of nuclear engineering.
11.3. Organization and structure of training at INPP
11.3.1. General Provisions
The Training Centre was founded on 1 August 1996 on the basis of the training unit.
The Training Centre is the structural department of the state enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power
Plant and is located at the same address – Druksiniu k., Visagino sav., Lithuanian Republic.
Activity of the Training Centre is regulated by the:
Laws of the Lithuanian Republic:
• Law of the Lithuanian Republic on nuclear energy № IX-586;
• General rules for nuclear plants safety provision, VD-B-001-0-97;
• Regulations on nuclear safety of reactor facilities of nuclear power plants, VD-T-001-0-97;
• General requirements for staff management of institutions operating nuclear energy
installations and companies rendering them services, VD-E-11-2001;
• Requirements to quality assurance system of nuclear power plants and other nuclear
energy installations, VD-KS-02-99;
• “Uniform regulations on employees training and qualification on safety and health issues”
approved by the Order No. A1-223/V-792 dated 2003-12-31 of the Minister of social
insurance and labor and Minister of public health;
• List of main laws regulating nuclear energy safety in the Lithuanian Republic, VD-VP-01,
section XIII.
IAEA documents:
•
•
•
•
Basic safety principles for nuclear power plants, IAEA INSAG-3;
Nuclear power plant personnel employment and selection, professional training and access
to work of the operation staff, IAEA 50-SG-01;
Safety Guidelines “Personnel recruitment, qualification and training for NPPs”, 2005,
IAEA NS-G-2.8;
Quality assurance at operation, IAEA 50-C/SG-Q13;
56
•
•
NPP personnel training and its evaluation: IAEA-TECDOC-380;
Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Operation, No. NS-R-2.
INPP procedures:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Training and qualification of the personnel. General requirements, QA-1-009, PTOed0108-13;
Personnel. Management procedure QA-2-014, PTOed-01411-1;
Regulation on operation personnel training, PTOed-1409-4;
Guidelines for work arrangement with INPP operation personnel, PTOed-1408-1;
Regulation on qualification of the operation personnel. PTOed-1409-3;
Regulation on Training Centre, PTOed-0109-27.
11.3.2. Activity of training center (TC)
Rights of TC
TC has the following rights purposed to performance of its activity within its competence frames:
•
To represent the plant on personnel training issues beyond its bounds;
•
To submit proposals of improvements in personnel training process to INPP Top
Management, in the written form and orally;
•
To manage the general process of assessment and feedback in course of training when
permanently supported by the plant departments (workshops) that the training is conducted
for and tightly interconnected with.
Responsibilities of TC
The Training Centre undertakes:
•
To arrange training of INPP employees, check their knowledge and skills;
•
To provide high technical and pedagogical competence of TC instructors, proper
qualification of other employees of TC;
•
To use training and methodological documentation and techniques purposed to effective
training conduction;
•
To ensure operative and proper condition of the full-scope simulator and other equipment
of TC;
•
To develop programmes of training, continuing and requalification training of INPP
personnel in tight co-operation with the plant departments involved;
•
To develop perspective and annual plans of INPP personnel training;
•
To develop training materials for training conduction for the plant personnel, to provide
monitoring of such training conduction.
11.3.3. Sequence of personnel training
All categories of operation personnel are trained in the Training Centre (irrespective of their age
and education), job positions of which are included in the “Position List of managers, experts and
qualified workers subject to the compulsory training at TC”, code PTOed-1416-1, as well as
employees servicing potentially dangerous equipment.
57
The basis for training of a specific employee shall be the order by the Technical Director.
In the order shall be appointed:
• A theoretical training instructor and an operational training instructor;
• Number of training programme;
• Form and location;
• Training period.
Expert from the corresponding plant department can be appointed as an operational training
instructor.
Basic provisions of personnel training
Personnel training system is purposed to provide knowledge and practical skills necessary for
work performance and process and equipment control, as well as the responsible attitude to
work which is required for implementation of the established tasks and allotted functions as
per the job description.
Personnel training system comprises the following components:
• Psycho-physiological examination of the candidates for training (for operation personnel);
• Input check of knowledge and development of individual training programme;
• Training in accordance with the training programme;
• Qualification;
• Development of technical training means and their appropriate maintenance by means of
organizational, training, procedural, technical and operational documentation;
• Preparation and archiving of training documentation.
At INPP the personnel training is conducted by means of initial training and continuing training.
Initial training
Initial training – training of a fresh-comer for the relevant position at INPP, as well as training of
INPP employee for promotion.
The initial training is conducted in the following sequence:
•
•
•
•
•
•
After the corresponding procedures are performed in the personnel department the
employee’s manager shall perform the primary on-the-job instructing of the employee;
To determine the input knowledge level and practical skills of the trainee the input
knowledge check shall be performed. It is performed by the TC instructor in form of
interview or written test in the presence of the trainee’s manager;
On the basis of the input knowledge check and in accordance with the approved and
registered training programme for the relevant position the individual training programme
shall be developed for the specific employee training;
Upon passing all training stages in accordance with the individual programme the
employee shall take internal exam at the TC or at shift (for operation personnel);
In case of the positive result of the internal exam the employee shall go through position
qualification procedure in the appropriate committee;
The initial training is completed in case the qualification procedure is successfully passed;
After the initial training is completed the employee on the basis of the qualification committee
conclusion is allowed to the doubling work performance under supervision and guidance of the
experienced employee (for operation personnel) and/or independent work performance.
58
Training of the personnel consists of the theoretical training and on-the-job training (probation).
Number of the theoretical training items and their contents is specified in accordance with the
specific activities performed at INPP.
Theoretical training of the personnel can be performed in form of courses or individually by the TC
instructors or the relevant experts of INPP departments.
Training using the full scope simulator or other technical means (training computer programmes,
equipment mock-ups, actual components and samples, etc.) shall be indicated in the promotion
training programme and is conducted by the TC instructor.
On-the-job training (probation) is purposed to the personnel to acquire practical skills and
attitudes in situ and is conducted by the on-the-job instructor.
In course of probation the employee studies and applies in his working area the rules, standards, job
description and operation manuals in accordance with his job description, obtains experience in
providing proper, safe and least-cost operation of the serviced equipment.
At the end of the on-the-job training (probation) and before the qualification by the appropriate
qualification committee the employee’s practical skills are checked in accordance with the
“Regulation on qualification of the INPP operation personnel”, PTOed-1409-3.
Continuing training of the operation personnel
Continuing training is purposed to maintaining and improvement of INPP operation personnel job
proficiency with respect to their knowledge, skills and attitude to work.
Continuing training is conducted on the routine basis. Personnel job proficiency maintenance and
improvement schedules are annually included into the document “Plan of INPP personnel
preparation”.
Continuing training is conducted in the following forms: operation personnel job proficiency
maintenance and improvement.
Job proficiency maintenance – activity intended for ensuring that the personnel professional
knowledge and skills necessary for implementation of tasks according to specific position and
profession requirements are maintained at the proper level. Job proficiency maintenance
procedures are conducted periodically over the whole labour activity.
Job proficiency maintenance includes:
•
Training in accordance with the programmes of job proficiency maintaining in TC or in
other training institutions;
•
Periodic instructions;
•
Studying of industry and in-house experience;
•
Qualification in the form of periodic knowledge check-up and re-qualification;
•
Performance of practice exercises (emergency and fire protection training, full-scale
simulator training);
•
Studying of changes on the basis of systems and equipment modifications.
59
Job proficiency maintenance of operation personnel at TC, job positions of which are included into
the “Position List of managers, experts and qualified workers subject to compulsory training at TC”
PTOed-1416-1, is performed in accordance with programs. Positions for which simulator training is
compulsory are highlighted in the above-mentioned List.
Performance of instructions is one of the forms aimed at maintaining the operation personnel job
proficiency. Instructions permit to recollect personnel knowledge of regulations and rules, job
descriptions and operation manuals. In addition, instructions permit to improve operation and
maintenance techniques used for equipment, systems and constructions of INPP.
Another form of job proficiency maintenance is studying of industry and in-house experience.
The relevant emergency and fire protection training is conducted in INPP departments in
compliance with the schedules. This training is aimed at maintaining the skills required for accident
mitigation, proper behavior in the emergency situation, verifying shift personnel interaction, skills
required for rendering the medical aid and using the individual protective and fire protective means.
Qualification improvement – activity aimed at improving the personnel current professional
theoretical knowledge and skills required for specific positions and profession. On the grounds of
qualification improvement the professional level or category may be increased.
Qualification improvement includes:
• Qualification and professional level increase at the specific-purpose courses, qualification
improvement courses at INPP TC, or at other organizations, specific institute faculties of the
Lithuanian Republic and abroad;
• Personnel experience exchange at foreign NPP;
• Training for professional level increase.
Qualification improvement training can be conducted either as an on-the-job process or as a specific
lesson course.
Personnel qualification improvement training is performed in TC in accordance with the
programmes which include training duration and sequence, improvement of technical knowledge
and knowledge on safety culture and industry safety.
Specific-purpose courses are intended for studying the new equipment, goods, materials, processes,
mechanical and automated tools used in operation process, rules and requirements of their safe
operation, technical documentation and economical issues relating to the operation.
Qualification improvement training is performed at plants, organizations, and special institute
faculties of the Lithuanian Republic and abroad on the contract basis.
MCR operators and Plant Shift Supervisors
During continuing training the MCR staff solves the follow main tasks:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Maintaining of the basic knowledge scope at the proper level;
MCR staff training with respect to the diagnostics skills and emergency situation
mitigation;
Complex training on the basis of modifications performed;
Training of organisational and managerial skills;
Training of operative work skills;
Improvement of team work methods.
60
Within the frames of personnel continuing training in accordance with the “Programme of MCR
staff qualification training in TC” the annual sessions are arranged consisting of lecture, seminars,
practice exercises on the full-scope simulator.
In course of these sessions the seminars and lectures are conducted involving INPP senior staff,
e.g.:
“Review of last modifications and changes in the operating and technical instructions of TD, RD,
I&C, CD”;
“Analysis of incidents at NPP with RBMK related to FC damage”;
“Reactor diverse shutdown system”;
“New directions in organisation of NPP with RBMK water chemistry”;
“Design and operation principle of CPS cluster-regulating device”;
“Safety justification of solely operating INPP Unit”;
“Some aspects of survey organization at INPP at present time and for the near-term outlook”.
Training using the full-scope simulator is conducted in accordance with scenarios of normal
operation, emergency situation and accidents.
In course of continuing training the new knowledge is given, relevant skills and interconnections
between operators are trained. Each lesson is analyzed upon its completion to:
•
•
•
•
•
Solidify the skills acquired;
Indicate good achievements throughout the exercise task performance;
Reach thorough understanding of technological process dynamics;
Work out ability of situation analysis;
Work out skills of teamwork.
While working out skills in the accident mitigation training it is taken into consideration that
operator can act in the following circumstances:
•
•
•
•
•
Time constraints;
Sudden increase of information flow in case of accident;
Possible stress of operator,
Lack of operational experience in accident conditions;
Probability of safety systems hidden failure to occur.
Technical support personnel (maintenance personnel)
Continuous training is conducted in the following forms of:
•
Preparation for the special types of work;
•
Seminars aimed to perform practical training for the equipment maintenance procedures
and experience exchange at the results of power units overhaul;
•
Periodical and additional instructions which are aimed at studying of modifications in
technological processes of equipment repair and introduction of additional requirements
regarding repair technique, as well as special-purpose instructions held before
implementation of repair works;
•
Qualification improvement at special-purpose courses held at special educational
institutions and other organisations of the Lithuanian Republic or abroad;
61
•
Training for professional level increase;
•
Maintenance of practical skills necessary for implementation of tasks before
commencement of works.
Preparation for the special types of work includes the training purposed to mastering of new
equipment, repair tool set and technological processes, such as:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Work with split pipe cutter Р5928М.00.00.00.00 for maintenance of weld seam of welding
pipeline DU800 to primary circuit to MPC sucker;
Work with machine for cutting of nib seam of FC with hydroblasting;
Works on remedial maintenance of the system regulating heat carrier consumption in
RBMK-1500 fuel channels;
Work with power tools Р5942, Р5947;
Remedial maintenance of pipeline fitting of a pump-heat exchanging installations division;
Works on remedial maintenance of block valves;
Maintenance of heat-exchange apparatus;
Work with manual pneumatic machines;
Performance of works on explosion-protected electrical equipment maintenance;
Work on single-shell hydraulic press.
Rights, obligations and responsibilities of personnel trained in TC
All rights, obligations and responsibilities of an employee trained are specified and authorized in the
job description of the corresponding employee.
Qualification requirements to instructors, their rights, obligations and responsibilities
Position of the TC instructor can be rendered to a person having higher technical education,
experience of INPP equipment operation or maintenance no less than 5 years. Position of the TC
instructor can be also rendered to a person having technical secondary education and work
experience for the required specialty no less than 8 years, having received favourable evaluation by
the Department of State Security on admission to work at the plant and having passed medical
examination in compliance with the established order for the given specialty.
Position of the MCR senior instructor can be rendered to a person having higher technical
education, experience of INPP equipment operation no less than 5 years with at least 3 of them
performing the relevant MCR job (PSS, DPSS, SUO, SRO, STO), having received favourable
evaluation by the Department of State Security on admission to work at the plant and having passed
medical examination.
Prior to the independent work performance the instructor shall be trained in accordance with the
program for job preparation, acquire the relevant psycho-physiological training in the TC or
corresponding educational institution and be qualified by the relevant plant committee for such a
position.
Qualification of instructors’ knowledge is performed in accordance with the test-papers, approved
by the General Director and endorsed by VATESI.
Further on, qualification procedure for the instructor position (senior instructor) is performed once
per 3 years. The instructor shall take an exam on nuclear power safety rules and regulations,
operating regulations and safety rules, fire fighting regulations, technological regulations, job
descriptions and operation manuals in accordance with the test-papers.
62
For the purpose of qualification maintenance instructors shall annually for the period of 2 weeks
work on probation at workplace in the appropriate departments.
All rights, obligations and responsibilities of the MCR senior instructor, TC instructor are listed and
authorized in the corresponding job descriptions.
Qualification organization
Qualification for position includes assessment of employee knowledge level and practical work, and
conclusion of qualification committee.
Knowledge check within the frames of qualification procedure is performed on the basis of testpapers or special questions by means of oral or written examination. During examination procedure
additional questions, which lie within the scope of the training program but not included into the
test-paper, could be asked to the examinee.
Knowledge of trainees during qualification is marked (checked) on the scale: GOOD,
SATISFACTORY, UNSATISFACTORY.
Checking of professional skills is a part of the qualification procedure. It is performed at the end of
the on-the-job training as a part of the initial training for the relevant position:
• For MCR personnel – full-scale simulator training, which is evaluated by a mark;
• For managers and experts of maintenance personnel, as well as operation personnel –
evaluative work that verifies knowledge of rules, regulations, job descriptions, operation
manuals and ability to use the above documentation at workplaces.
• For qualified workers of maintenance personnel – qualification (trial) work (qualification
(trial) work is considered to be successfully performed if no time limits were exceeded, no
spoilage is found caused by the examined person, no industrial safety rules are violated).
After an employee (operation personnel) has successfully passed over all qualification stages, he/she
is allowed either to the doubling work performance under supervision and guidance of the
experienced employee and/or independent work performance.
Further on, the qualification committee concludes on the employee’s compliance with the work
status in accordance with the results of the periodic knowledge check. The committee also evaluates
the efficiency of the employee’s practical activity during performance of his/her functions since the
last qualification.
Persons got unsatisfactory mark at the routine exam shall take reexamination in one month at the
latest.
Qualification of INPP personnel is performed by the qualification committee, which are appointed
by the order of the Director General.
Number of examination committees at INPP is determined considering the necessity of timely and
proper qualification.
Qualification committee shall consist, as minimum, of three members.
Training and qualification of employees on performance of dangerous works and works with the
potentially dangerous equipment shall be accomplished in accordance with the “Uniform regulations
on employees instruction, training and qualification on safety and health issues” approved by Order
No. A1-223/V-792 dated 2003 12 31 of the Minister of social insurance and labor and Minister of
public health.
63
Management of training center
The Training Center makes part of the Technical Directorate and directly reports to the Technical
Director (Chief Engineer).
The Training Center is guided by and the responsibility for its activity rests with the Head of TC.
Organization structure and manning table of the Training Center are approved by the General
Director when submitted by the Technical Director and Personnel Director.
The Training Center consists of the training service department and technical means department.
The Training Center departments are managed by and the responsibility for their activity rests with
the Deputy Heads of TC.
Resources of the training center
INPP personnel training in the TC is accomplished in accordance with the annual training plan.
Training costs are covered from INPP personnel training budget calculated in compliance with the
planned costs.
All TC buildings are covered by balance of Ignalina NPP.
TC archive and records
TC documentation on training and qualification of operation personnel is maintained in accordance
with the requirements of procedure “Documentation control and records”, code PTOed-0211-1.
Organizational documentation is maintained in accordance with the requirements of “Instruction on
development, registration and record of INPP organizational documentation” code SEKorg-021216B1.
TC Reorganization and wind-down
TC Reorganization and wind-down shall be performed within frames of the state enterprise Ignalina
Nuclear Power Plant and in compliance with provisions of Law of the Lithuanian Republic and
INPP Statute.
New information
Section 11.2. Added information concerning personnel employment issues in relation with Unit 1
shutdown.
Section 11.3. The lists of Lithuanian laws and International document are updated.
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Article 12: HUMAN FACTORS
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities and
limitations of human performance are taken into account thought the life of a nuclear installation.
The main regulatory requirements on human factor are set in “General Regulations for Nuclear
Power Plant Safety” (VD-B-001-0-97) and “Requirements for modifications in nuclear facilities”
(VD-E-08-2000).
The Human Factor Management program has been developed at INPP. The program sets out
actions on human factor management for the following INPP activities:
• Selection of staff;
• Personnel recruitment;
• Personnel training and qualification;
• Personnel motivation;
• Provision of information;
• Personnel reliability;
• Workplace organization;
• Documentation control;
• Modifications;
• Using internal and industrial experience;
• Operation organization.
INPP Safety and Quality Assurance Service carries out analysis of the human factor impact on
INPP safety.
The following documents regulate INPP staff management process that involves recruiting, primary
and continuous training, certification and access to independent work at the plant:
• Management Procedure, QA-2-014, “Personnel”;
• General Requirements, QA-1-009, Personnel Training and Certification;
• Regulation on Arrangement of Work with INPP Operating Personnel;
• Standing Order on Operating Personnel Training;
• Standing Order on the Training Center;
• List of positions of managers, experts and skilled workers who shall undergo compulsory
training in the Training Center;
• Regulation on Development and Implementation of Training Program and Examination
Papers for a Position;
• Standing Order on Certification of Operating Personnel;
• The Plant Schedule of Work with INPP Operating Personnel;
• The Advanced Program of Support and Improvement of INPP Personnel Qualification;
• The Training Program for Workers in the Areas of Ionizing Radiation;
• The Program of INPP Personnel Psycho-physiological Examination;
• The Instruction on Organization of Emergency Exercises at INPP.
The requirements and provisions settled out in above INPP documents correspond to IAEA
(International Atomic Energy Agency) recommendations as well as laws and legal acts currently in
force in the Republic of Lithuania.
These documents provide that INPP meets the following criteria:
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Recruiting and personnel training ensures INPP safe operation and maintenance. Personnel
state of health and their medical and psychophysical characteristics comply with the
functions performed.
Primary training provides personnel with sufficient skills to perform due tasks and
understand consequences of their activities with respect to safety.
Personnel certification makes it certain that the plant staff has enough qualification to fulfil
its duties in order to provide safe and reliable operation of the plant.
Planed and systematic conduct of work with the staff. System of continuous personnel
training is in place.
To maintain qualification and knowledge the personnel have periodical briefings.
The personnel providing safe operation of equipment shall have periodic training on
simulators and other technical means, undergo emergency preparedness and fire
preparedness training; the operation personnel shall pass periodic assessment of their
psychophysical state.
The training is conducted in accordance with written and approved procedures. The
procedures are systematically revised with consideration of operational experience,
implemented equipment modifications and experiences of other NPPs. The training
process is planned and monitored and the results are recorded.
The training programs contain objectives to be achieved as well as types and methods of
training.
The maintenance personnel shall have general training as for all INPP personnel, know
general parameters and functions of the systems they work with, and also be aware of
safety and quality assurance aspects as well as quality control issues.
The managers are experts in their area have had basic training and obtain required
knowledge and experience in nuclear energy.
The personnel related to safety are periodically certified.
Instructors, who work in the training department shall have enough qualifications to
provide training and sufficient competence of the trainees. They are aware of and can
provide basic training. They are chosen among the experienced staff. Instructors are
technically competent and have authority among plant personnel.
Working places of the personnel, responsible for the plant safety, meet current ergonomics
requirements.
The man-machine interface provides sufficient data about the plant and its systems status
as well as systems control and personnel attention in case of deviations from normal
operation.
The staff has all necessary means to carry on its duties: documentation, materials and
equipment.
The operating environment at the plant meets current standards and does not allow that
hazardous influence of physical, chemical, biological and other harmful factors exceed the
specified limits.
INPP safety and personnel health system is aimed at ensuring the plant safety and
personnel health by reducing the occurrence of accidents ant rate of personnel occupational
diseases.
The personnel activities are being monitored. A system is in place to record events and
incidents, caused by human error at INPP, investigate the causes and develop corrective
measures; perform probabilistic safety assessment considering human factor and monitor
psychophysical capabilities of personnel providing safe operation of the plant.
During the process of personnel training and qualification maintenance at INPP particular attention
is given to the personnel actions and interactions during accidents, as well as to practical skills
required for the control of the reactor installation and the plant as a whole.
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The personnel errors and actions, not defined in the instructions, are subject of analysis to identify
direct and indirect causes and contributors to the event. To eliminate causes of the event and
prevent further recurrence, the corrective actions are developed and implemented.
Event registration, reporting and analysis criteria, event analysis methodologies as well as
responsibilities of the staff in this area are established in corresponding INPP procedures
(“Instruction on Reporting about Unusual Events at INPP”, “Instruction on Analysis of Unusual
Events” and “Instruction on Analysis of Low-level Events”).
Event analysis methodology is based on ASSET methodology and is directed towards identification
of direct and indirect causes of the event. The events that have occured in the result of the
inconsistency of the personnel actions with the expected behavior the “Procedure for additional
analysis of events caused by the incorrect personnel actions” is used for additional in-depth
analysis. Other procedures related to regulation of activities on registration and analysis of events
related to human factor are in place at INPP (“Personnel Training and Qualification” (QA-1-009),
“Corrective Measures and Improvement Program” (QA-1-018), Management Procedure
“Assessment of Internal and Industrial Experience” (QA –2-003), and “Instruction on Assessment
and Usage of Internal and Industrial Experience”).
In order to provide a wide use of internal operating experience, the event analysis reports are placed
into the INPP`s Information System on Unusual Events which include reports on events, that
occured since the units commissioning.
The use of Internal and External Experience is regulated by the procedure “Assessment of Internal
and Industrial Experience”.
Aspects of staff motivation are highlighted in the “Policy” of the plant. In addition, the motivation
issues are considered during workshops on safety culture, which are conducted for the plant
personnel on a regular basis.
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Article 13: QUALITY ASSURANCE
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that quality assurance
programmes are established and implemented with a view to providing confidence that specified
requirements for all activities important to nuclear safety are satisfied throughout the life of the
nuclear installation.
13.1. Quality assurance (QA) policies
The INPP established clearly defined safety and quality assurance policy and objectives. The INPP
mission is providing safe, reliable and cost-effective operation of both power units and to
decommission them safely (Unit 1 was taken out of operation in December 2004, and the remaining
Unit 2 will produce power until the end of 2009), to ensure safety in all phases of lifecycle of the
units.
The main principles of the INPP Safety and Quality Assurance Policy are implementing safety
culture at all levels within the INPP organization; ensuring reliable, safe and cost-effective plant
performance; and providing clear distribution of functions, authorities and responsibilities within
the INPP organization in order to avoid plant management shortcomings. The Policy provides
necessary conditions for continual improvement of the organizational management, improvement of
the personnel and equipment; upgrading of the responsibility of each manager for specifying tasks
and requirements for the personnel under his/her authority. Additionally, the Policy makes
necessary provisions for encouragement of all INPP employees to actively participate in safety and
quality improvement process; in continual assessment of INPP performance for the purpose of
quality improvement.
Safety and Quality Policy of Ignalina NPP was updated on 2005-09-12 to include statements related
to decommissioning of the plant. Those new decommissioning related statements are:
• Managers and personnel of INPP will ensure effective interfaces in the process of
decommissioning Unit 1 of the plant. Within this process there should be ensured the level
of co-operation should be the same as during operation of Unit 1. We should demonstrate
that besides we can safely operate the unit, we also can safely take the unit out of operation
too.
• Social security should be provided to the personnel. We should preserve the core INPP
personnel and ensure unconditional implementation of Strategy for Social Support to
Personnel.
13.2. QA programmes relating to all aspects of safety throughout the life of the
nuclear installation
The INPP has established a three-level QA documentation system. The Quality Assurance Manual
is the main 1st level document applicable to development, implementation and improvement of the
Quality Assurance System. It specifies the Safety and Quality Assurance Policy and objectives, and
establishes the basis for effective management of all activities performed at INPP. The Quality
Assurance Manual includes the following sections:
• INPP Mission and Objectives;
• Legislative Framework of INPP Operations;
• Safety and Quality Codes and Standards;
• INPP Organization and Responsibilities;
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INPP Safety and Quality Policy;
Management Principles and Assessment of INPP Performance;
Management Self-assessment;
Description of INPP QA System;
Safety;
Planning;
Personnel Training and Competence;
Control of Non-conformities;
Corrective Actions and Improvements Program;
Control of Documents and Records;
Control of Work Processes;
Procurement;
Inspection and Testing;
Audits.
The 2nd level of QA system documents is the so-called management procedures. The INPP
developed, implemented and update 26 management procedures covering the following main
activity areas:
• Safety Culture;
• Control of Documents and Records;
• Evaluation of Internal and Industrial Experience;
• Environment Protection;
• Radiation Safety;
• Fire Safety;
• Industrial Safety;
• Emergency Preparedness;
• Operations;
• Software;
• Maintenance;
• Ageing Management;
• Inspection and Testing;
• Core and Fuel Management;
• Radioactive Waste Handling and House-keeping;
• Personnel;
• Chemistry Control;
• Plant Modifications;
• Procurement;
• Design Control;
• In-house Fabrication of Spare Parts and Items;
• Storage of Materials and Equipment;
• Physical protection;
• External and Internal Communications;
• Decommissioning;
• Construction.
The management procedure for decommissioning was approved on 2005-05-31.
3rd level documents are detailed work procedures, as other QA documents, they are developed in
accordance with the requirements of management procedures and specify how work shall be done.
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Safety and Quality Assurance Department is responsible for managing the development,
implementation and continual improvement of the Quality Assurance System at the INPP. This
department is independent from the production function and reports directly to INPP Director
General.
Manager of Safety and Quality Assurance Department is Deputy Director General for safety and
quality assurance, and possesses the delegated authority for development, implementation and
maintenance of the INPP Quality Assurance System, for assessment of its effectiveness and for
required personnel training in the area of quality.
The Quality Assurance Division, which is under the Safety and Quality Assurance Department,
performs the independent function of monitoring the effectiveness of the INPP Quality Assurance
System. Additionally, the Quality Assurance Division is responsible for auditing quality
management systems of the contractors supplying equipment, doing contract work or supplying
services to the INPP. This activity is performed in accordance with the Nuclear Safety
Requirements for the operating organization activity related to the purchase of goods, labour and
services (P-2004-03), which came into force on 31 July 2004. The Quality Assurance Division
personnel received the required training related to contractors’ changeover to ISO 9001:2000
quality management standard.
13.3. Methods used in implementing and assessing QA programmes
The Quality Assurance Division is responsible for planning, conduct and reporting on audits of the
INPP Quality Assurance System. Audits are planned in such way that each activity area is audited
once per three years; and each plant department be audited once per two years. Besides it, the
Quality Assurance Division conducts external audits of organizations supplying goods, work and
services to the INPP. There are work procedures specifying requirements for planning, preparation,
conduct and reporting on internal and external audits. Audit reports are distributed to respective
INPP top managers and to the managers of audited departments and to VATESI.
INPP specialists, who are in the list of qualified auditors and list of lead auditors, participate in
internal and external audits. There is a work procedure specifying requirements for auditors and
lead auditors competence. The list of qualified auditors and list of lead auditors are updated
annually.
INPP General Director exercises continuous control over quality assurance related activities.
Quality assurance issues are discussed at regular meetings chaired by General Director. Annual
reports on improvement of the INPP Quality Assurance System are submitted to VATESI.
13.4. Regulatory control activities
In accordance with the General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Safety, VD-B-001-0-97, the
safety of NPP must be ensured by the implementation of system of technical and organizational
measures, which includes also the implementation of quality assurance system at NPP.
The General Requirements for Quality Assurance at Nuclear Power Plant and other nuclear
facilities, VD-KS-02-99, were issued by VATESI on the basis of the Law on Nuclear Energy of the
Republic of Lithuania. The Regulations VD-KS-02-99 establishes regulatory requirements to the
organization operating nuclear power facilities with respect to their obligations to develop
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implement and maintain the efficient QA system. The requirements are of general type and concern
all types of activities, which have direct and indirect influence to the safety of nuclear power
facility. The requirements are obligatory for organizations, carrying out transportation, treatment
and storage of nuclear and radioactive materials and as well shall be considered by the
organizations, which activities can influence the safety of nuclear facility. According to VATESI
requirements, the INPP Quality Assurance System shall comply also with IAEA Safety Series QA
50-C/SG code and guides. New IAEA requirements – The Management System for Facilities and
Activities, GS-R-3 – will be introduced at INPP after new requirements of the national regulatory
body are implemented.
In accordance with national regulations, VATESI carry out regulatory inspections of Ignalina NPP,
which cover also an assessment of INPP quality management system. In July of 2003 VATESI
carried out special inspection of INPP quality system. Inspection was conducted with participation
of western nuclear safety experts from Sweden and France. 10 inadequacies were determined and 2
good practices were highlighted in the inspection report. The determined inadequacies were related
mainly with the quality management of activities connected to the decommissioning process.
As a result of the mentioned inspection, INPP performed corresponding corrective measures to
eliminate the determined inadequacies, including review of the Quality Assurance Manual, review
of corresponding and preparation of additional management procedures.
In November of 2004 VATESI carried out special inspection at Ignalina NPP. Ten inadequacies
were determined and five good practices were highlighted in the inspection report. 7 of the
inadequacies are I and II type that means that appropriate corrective measures have to be
implemented in order to solve the identified problematic issues. Three additional inadequacies are
classified level III that are relevant to “observations” with no compulsory implementation of
corrective measures.
Main inadequacies were related to the quality management issues of the decommissioning
activities. The QM documents in use at the INPP Decommissioning Department make up a standalone system, which is not interfaced with the overall INPP QM system. It was not properly
described decommissioning activities in INPP QM system: INPP quality policy does not include
decommissioning activities and INPP QM system does not have the decommissioning procedure.
Not a single internal audit was performed in order to evaluate compliance of INPP
Decommissioning Department activities with the requirements of INPP quality management
system. INPP did not have a proper system informing INPP personnel about the decommissioning
process. INPP has not provided substantiation and risk assessment for the phasing out of the
Technical Department and transferring the units to the responsibility of the Decommissioning
Department as described in the Final Decommissioning Plan. In accordance with the identified
inadequacies, INPP has prepared a plan of corrective measures. But, it has to be underlined that
VATESI and INPP usually reach common understanding on safety issues and it allows solving the
identified problems having a normal working dialog without using any strict sanctions. The
temporary shutdown for Unit 1 was used only one time. Mostly VATESI uses written requirements
for taking corrective actions.
As a result of VATESI inspection carried out in November 2004, INPP approved a plan of
measures in order to eliminate the identified inadequacies. It was foreseen concerning the quality
management inadequacies connected to the decommissioning process:
• to finalize and approve the Decommissioning Procedure,
• to review the Policy of Ignalina NPP in the area of Quality Management in order to include
in it also the decommissioning activities,
• to perform the internal audit of the Decommissioning Service (internal INPP department),
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to include requirements in the Decommissioning Procedure on providing information to the
personnel of INPP about the process of decommissioning.
Those INPP measures after the inspection were completed.
In October 2006 VATESI carried out special inspection of the quality system in activities of
Decommissioning Services of INPP. This inspection was conducted with participation of western
nuclear safety expert from Sweden. 13 inadequacies were determined within the inspection report.
The determined inadequacies mainly relate to management and improvement of projects and
organizational changes in the early stage of INPP decommissioning phase. As a result of this
inspection, INPP identified and started to implement the corresponding corrective measures to
eliminate the determined inadequacies, including personnel training policies in relation to INPP
decommissioning and improvement of ways information on decommissioning is presented to INPP
staff.
In October 2006 VATESI also carried out special inspection of the quality system implemented at
State Enterprise Radioactive Waste Management Agency (RATA). 10 inadequacies were
determined within the inspection report. They mainly relate to management and improvement of
agency’s activities by means of the newly implemented quality management system. As a result of
this inspection, RATA identified and started to implement the corresponding corrective measures.
13.4.1. VATESI quality management system
The official decision to establish VATESI quality management system was made on 5 October
2000 (order No. 21 of Head of VATESI). The general principles of quality management system
were defined; plans for preparation of individual documents were approved.
The implementation of VATESI quality management system is aimed at:
• Enhancing the efficiency of VATESI management, optimizing the planning and use of
VATESI resources;
• Assuring adequate licensing, safety assessment and supervision of nuclear power facilities;
• Assuring adequate management and control of other internal VATESI activities
(management of information, projects, training activities and other).
The following 2nd level VATESI quality management documents (procedures) were prepared and
approved:
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VATESI Mission;
VATESI Quality Manual (KU-I-01);
Regulations for strategic planning of VATESI activities (KU-II-02);
Regulations for preparation of nuclear safety regulatory documents (KU-II-03);
Regulations for the training of VATESI staff (KU-II-04);
Regulations for public information (KU-II-05);
Procedure of VATESI inspection activities (KU-II-06);
Licensing procedure (KU-II-07);
Rules of financial control (KU-II-08);
EU support project management procedure (KU-II-09);
Internal regulations for co-ordinating EU related issues (KU-II-10);
Manual for certification of safety important systems and elements of Ignalina NPP (KU-II12).
VATESI management procedure on sending and receiving of documents (KU-II-11)
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Accounting policy (KU-II-13).
The implemented quality assurance system of VATESI also includes nine detailed instructions
(the 3rd documents), such as:
• Instructions for drawing of nuclear safety regulations (KU-III-01);
• Instructions for registering inspections and monitoring corrective measures (KU-III-02).
The indicated VATESI quality management documents were prepared and approved. So, these
documents are valid. Using of these documents by VATESI personnel means implementation of the
defined QM procedures. Usually, practical use of the approved QM documents identifies some
deficiencies in the approved procedures. In this case, the QM documents are accordingly corrected
and improved. No separate Implementation program or plan for VATESI QM system was approved
after indicated QM documents were started to use. VATESI Quality Manual (KU-I-01) describes
principles for management of internal QM documents. It is determined that further development of
quality management system is performed in accordance with defined internal VATESI needs and
recommendations received from external institutions, organizations, enterprises or individual
experts. The mentioned external organizations can be, for example: IAEA (with services of IRRT
mission), Ministry of Economy, Ignalina NPP, VATESI Technical Support Organizations and
other.
The Ministry of Economy is indicated taking into account Lithuanian legislation concerning internal
audit of particular state institutions. Being relatively small institution, VATESI do not have a
separate employee (job position) to perform internal audit. In this case, VATESI uses services of
audit division that belongs to the Ministry of Economy. On the regular basis, competent auditor of
the Ministry of Economy performs audit of VATESI activities and presents report of audit with
appropriate recommendations. In future, effectiveness of the quality management system may also
be evaluated using Regulatory performance self-assessment tool (the document is under preparation
by IAEA).
VATESI QMS is to be further enhanced through preparing new and improving the already
approved quality management documents.
VATESI QM documents are reviewed in accordance with existing necessity. Responsible specialist
for the timely review of the document is indicated on the first page of it. VATESI Quality Manual
(KU-I-01) describes principles for management of internal QM documents. It is determined that
further development of quality management system is performed in accordance with defined
internal VATESI needs and recommendations received from external institutions, organizations,
enterprises or individual experts.
New information
Section 13.1. Revised in order to reflect INPP aims regarding decommissioning and for better
reflection of INPP main aim statement within Mission and the Main Aim, the 1st level INPP QA
document. Decommissioning related statements presented.
Section 13.2. Management procedures (“Software” and “Decommissioning”) added to the list.
Subsequent text bellow the list of 2nd level QA documents, explaining plans to prepare new
procedure on decommissioning. Reference to new VATESI regulatory document P-2004-03 is
added.
Section 13.4. Information about future introduction of new IAEA requirements “The Management
System for Facilities and Activities, GS-R-3” to the INPP QA system is included. Information about
inspections on quality management at INPP and RATA are added.
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Article 14: ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
i.
Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the construction
and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its life. Such assessments shall
be well documented, subsequently updated in the light of operating experience and
significant new safety information, and reviewed under the authority of the regulatory
body;
ii.
Verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to ensure that
the physical state and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in accordance
with its design, applicable national safety requirements, and operational limits and
conditions.
14.1. Licensing process and Safety Analysis Reports for different stages of a
Nuclear Installation project (e.g. sitting, design, construction, operation)
Lithuania has established basic criteria of safety, and also the main principles and character of the
technical and organizational measures aimed at ensuring safety. The detailed application of these
principles and measures is laid down in norms and technical requirements.
It is stated in the Law on Nuclear Energy (Articles 25 and 26) that it is prohibited to construct,
reconstruct, operate and decommission nuclear facilities without a license issued by VATESI.
Article 27 of the Law says that VATESI may establish additional requirements for the licensed
activity. One of such principal requirements of VATESI to the applicants is a submission of safety
analysis reports for getting a license.
Article 31 of the Law says that designs for the construction or reconstruction, upgrading, expansion,
dismantling and decommissioning of nuclear facilities are subject to a comprehensive state expert
evaluation. The expert evaluation organized by the Ministry of the Environment upon receiving the
design.
These statements are further specified and developed in the "Regulations for Licensing of Nuclear
Power Related Activities", "Regulations for Procedures for Issuing a License for Unit Operation at
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant", "General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Safety", "Nuclear
Safety Regulations for Reactor Installations of Nuclear Power Plants" and in the other norms and
standards.
The "Nuclear Safety Regulations for Reactor Installations of Nuclear Power Plants" in their turn say
that the “Technical Justification of Nuclear Power Plant Safety” should contain the chapter "The
Reactor Plant Technical Safety Justification". "The Reactor Plant Technical Safety Justification”
shall be prepared by competent organizations and approved by Operating Organization. The shape
and content of the reactor plant Safety Justification Report should conform with the current
normative technical document. The indicated regulations also set a number of specific requirements
to the content of safety justification (safety analysis) reports.
Safety Assessment is part of licensing procedure before issue of licence for construction, operation
or decommissioning of a nuclear facility. In the case of safety related modification when the licence
is not required to issue, technical justifications shall be performed based on highest scientific and
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technical knowledge. In both cases, Safety Assessment and Technical justifications have to have an
independent expertise review, be approved by the Operating Organization and presented to the State
Control and Supervision Institutions for review.
Before a construction permit for plant or systems (components) of an NP is issued, the Operating
Organization shall create the infrastructure (subdivisions) required for safe operation of the nuclear
plant, endowing those subdivisions with the necessary rights as well as financial, material and
human resources, imposing on them full responsibility for their activities, and monitoring the
correct implementation thereof.
The State Control and Supervision Institution require additional documents or conduct inspections,
if it finds out that after review of the submitted documents the information is not sufficient to assess
the documents following the valid criteria. It also assess the safety culture in the applicant
organization and assess its technical and organizational measures, verify the effectiveness of the
quality assurance system of the applicant and check if the requirements of the quality assurance
system at the nuclear facility for purchased services or goods are kept.
The licence is liable to develop the annual report for the nuclear facility in accordance with the
requirements of the nuclear safety regulations and submit it to the State Control and Supervision
Institution. Periodic safety assessment is required to perform under licence condition in period of 10
years.
Before start of operation shall be submitted assessment of tests results and confirmation of their
acceptability. Information concerning radiation protection at the nuclear facility has to be presented.
Radiation sources shall be described in detail, analysis and assessment of possible effects shall be
performed in accordance with the requirements of radioactive protection regulations, organizational
and technical means and methods of radiation protection, and measurement methods and means
shall be indicated. Shall be presented the description of the means, equipment, technologies, work
processes, which will be used during the dismantling of equipment, assessment of the radiological
status, ensuring the radiation protection of personnel and inhabitants during decommissioning
activities.
The following permissions are issued by State Control and Supervision Institution at the beginning
of operation of a nuclear facility:
• to bring nuclear fuel onto the site of a nuclear facility;
• to load the nuclear fuel into the reactor for the first time;
• to perform the physical start-up (experiments) of the reactor;
• to perform the industrial start-up of the reactor;
• to perform the functional experiments of systems;
• to use the natural resources;
• to perform emissions of radionuclides into the environment.
In the case of non-routine operation, test or experiment the licensee is required to establish the
programme for such operation and agree it with State Control and Supervision Institution. The
licensee has established quality assurance procedure QA-2-016 “Modifications of NPP” to ensure
proper design, review, control and implementation of modifications. The State Control and
Supervision Institution review and assess modifications, which are safety related.
The following documents shall be submitted for review, assessment and decision about License,
such as:
Administrative
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”Application letter” in which the Operator presents the request to be licensed
Certificate of state registration of entity
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Document certifying that the Operator is in charge of NPP property Statute of the Operating
organisation (Operator)
Plant organisation for operation and safety management arrangements
QA manual and procedures
Plant personnel qualification and training program
Technical (Safety validation)
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Technical Safety Justification of Nuclear Plant and of the Reactor Unit with updating
Justification of the plant safety status
The Safety Analysis Report (SAR)
Probabilistic Safety Assessment Report (PSA)
Status of implementation of the remedial measures (including commissioning program and
test results) and plan for the future Compliance demonstration with the yearly permits
conditions
Operator position on international recommendations and status of their implementation
Preliminary decommissioning program
Commissioning program and test results
Description and verification of current plant state
History of safety performance
Operating experience evaluation (analysis of safety significant events occurred in the plant
and lessons learned from experience of similar plants and world-wide plants)
Assessment of plant systems design and capability
Improvements and updating of safety analysis (considering assumptions and data consistent
with the actual status of the plant and with an enlarged spectrum of reference events)
Modifications (design, implementation and commissioning) and repairs
Backbiting from technical developments (including research findings)
Management of equipment ageing
Equipment qualification
Human factors
Radiation protection
Emergency planning and preparedness
Fire protection
Waste and spent fuel management
List of modifications since unit commissioning etc
Operation
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Technical Specifications
List of operating procedures
Emergency and accidents management’s procedures
Emergency planning
Long term in-service inspection program
Provisions of Physical security.
76
14.2. Summary of essential generic results of continued monitoring and periodic
Safety Assessments of INPP using deterministic and Probabilistic Analyses
As to the deterministic safety assessment of INPP, it was performed initially by the designers of
reactor plant and INPP as a whole and was documented in so called "Technical Justification of
Safety". The first in-depth safety analysis of INPP using Western methodology was completed in
1997. Main results of this analysis were presented in the first Lithuanian report on NSC.
In-depth safety analysis for Unit 2 was finished in 2004. The Safety Analysis Report (SAR-2) for
Ignalina NPP Unit 2 was one of the key documents for obtaining the license. The principal
objectives of the report were to identify the current safety level of the Unit 2, to assess the factors
that may affect its operating safety, and to recommend compensatory measures that would improve
safety. SAR-2 and its review conclusions confirmed that the technical condition and operation of
Unit 2 meet the key nuclear and radiation safety requirements set forth in standard documents of the
Republic of Lithuania and international regulations. No major deficiencies were revealed that would
necessitate shutting the Unit 2 down immediately or reducing its power.
Based on the results of SAR-2 and its review a new safety improvement program (SIP-3) was
initiated. More details on safety improvement programs are presented in section 6 of this report.
Following the closure of Unit 1 at Ignalina NPP, the necessity arose of substantiating safety of the
single operating Unit 2. For this purpose the Safety case for single operating Unit2 of INPP was
prepared. It had to confirm possibility of continued Unit 2 operation following the Unit 1 final
shutdown. After completion of review activities VATESI stated the safety level of single operating
Unit 2 to be acceptable.
Both Level 1 and 2 PSA studies were completed for INPP. The main results are presented in chapter
6 of this report.
A wide range of additional safety analyses was performed in the frames of Safety Improvement
Program. These analyses are described in chapter 6 of this report. Implementation of safety
improvement measures allows further safe operation of the plant.
14.3. Verification programmes (preventive maintenance, in-service inspection of
main components, evaluation of ageing process, etc.)
VATESI performs the supervision of preventive maintenance, in-service inspection of main
components, ageing management processes at INPP in accordance with General Requirements for
Nuclear Power Plant Safety (VD-B-001-0-97) issued by VATESI in 1997, General Maintenance
Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants (VD-E-01-98) issued by VATESI in 1998 and
Requirements for Ageing Management of Systems and Components Important to Safety of Nuclear
Facilities (VD-E-05-99) issued by VATESI in 1999.
In compliance with the Quality Management Programme and Documentation control system acting
at INPP all works relating to preventive maintenance, in-service inspection of main components and
ageing management shall be performed only on the basis and in accordance with the approved
documents.
Operational staff of INPP performs preventive maintenance during walk down with control
condition of equipment and environment. Also during operation INPP engineering support staff
carries out the diagnostic activities of system and components, vibration and failures analysis of
77
equipment, which are important to safety. The results of preventive maintenance are the basis to
prepare the plans for repair or replace the components, to carry out modifications.
In-service inspection is carried out in according to INPP regulations for systems, equipment and
pipework important for safety. These regulations have been developed in accordance with the
requirements for in-service inspection [PNAE G-7-008-89] and experience of in-service inspection
in other nuclear power plants, and IAEA Guidelines [NS-G-2.6, IAEA-TECDOC-1400]. They
determine the in-service inspection requirements for all safety-related systems, except for the metal
components of the active zone, which are inspected in accordance with the requirements of other
regulations.
Much importance is attached to the condition of the plant and pipework, and both destructive and
non-destructive checks this testing, carried out according to regulations for RBMK-1500 reactors.
These detail the objectives, activities, methods, quantity, frequency, and the organizational and
administrative arrangements. The manager of the INPP Safety and Quality Assurance Service is
responsible for this.
Non-destructive testing is carried out by the INPP Department of Metals and Technical Inspection
and, if necessary, by certified organisations. The regulations list the plant that must be inspected,
and the areas and volumes for defined non-destructive testing. They also present the programme for
checking the state of the corrosion samples, and describe the main inspection methods used for
metals, such as non-destructive surface and volumetric methods, and the destructive methods and
inspection using samples. All inspections are carried out according to existing standards or
instructions, agreed by VATESI.
The regulations define the methods for assessing the results, consistent with the IAEA Guidelines,
and the recording requirements. Personnel carrying out inspections are certified, in accordance with
the regulations [PNAE G-7-010-89], to carry out inspections according to specified methods. Staff's
performing non-destructive testing is certified according to the European Standard EN473.
Personnel supervising the inspections are also certified.
In accordance with Requirements for Ageing Management of Systems and Components Important
to Safety of Nuclear Facilities (VD-E-05-99) INPP prepared the ageing management program for
safety related systems, components and structures. The main task of this programe is to select
components, which are important from safety point of view, to assess the condition of these
components, tendencies of degradation and, if it is nesseccary, to take corrective measures – repaire
or replace them, to perform modifications. It is continuously work and INPP constantly provide the
faults analyse, the maitinence and in-service inspections programs analysis to ensure the reliability
of systems and components important to safety of nuclear facilities.
14.4. Regulatory control activities
Lithuanian nuclear power safety inspectorate (VATESI) in accordance with the established
responsibilities and the national regulations for the verification of the safety of nuclear installations
is performing combined day to day and year to year supervision and systematic safety reassessment
through the inspection program with consideration of cumulative effects of modifications, changes
to procedures, the aging of components, operating experience and technological developments so
that the regulatory body can determine whether the operator has a functional self-assessment system
of high quality and is conducting its activities in accordance with its own established procedures for
ensuring that regulatory objectives and requirements are met, all activities at the plant have been
executed safely and meet the safety objectives and licence conditions.
78
Regulatory control covers such activities:
• Application of quality assurance principles at all stages;
• Assessment of the safety of the design (particularly design modifications)
• Review of tests;
• Continuing monitoring and inspection of the installation during operation, including
environmental monitoring;
• Assessment of the need for and control of modifications.
Regulatory supervision of ISI at INPP includes:
• Review and approval of Standard ISI program of INPP;
• Review of annual ISI programs of INPP;
• Review and assessment of annual ISI results of INPP;
• Review, development and approval of ISI regulations;
• Review and approval of ISI methodologies and procedures;
• Review of the results of materials investigations of INPP components and pipelines;
• Review and consideration of safety justifications in case of deviations from ISI acceptance.
Also, maintenance of safety-related systems and equipment in good operating condition through the
implementation of preventive maintenance measures and replacement of worn-out components of
nuclear power plants is required by [VD-B-001-0-97].
As stated in the [VD-E-01-98], maintenance is a complex activity of planned and systematically
executed measures, with the purpose of ensuring the reliable functioning of systems (elements)
consistent with the design assumptions, in particular those of safety. The maintenance activity
includes routine service, overhaul, planned maintenance, breakdown maintenance, and replacement
of obsolete components, plant modifications and the proving of plant by tests, calibration and
inspections. The basic tasks of maintenance are thus:
• prevention of damage to, and failure of, NPP systems (components) by means of condition
monitoring and preventive maintenance;
• replacement of worn systems (components) prior to their failure;
• restoration of the function of systems (components) in the event of failure and/or damage
during operation;
• improvements to systems (components) by means of modifications;
• reduction of dose levels to ones that are As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA
principle).
The management of the maintenance activity is carried out in accordance with the “Maintenance
and repair” procedure [QA-2-010]. This document is consistent with the requirements of QA, [VDE-01-98] and takes into account the Guidelines of the IAEA [50-SG-Q]. The procedure covers the
following aspects:
• general principles;
• planning;
• standards, repair procedures and other documentation;
• personnel training;
• means of provision;
• stored backlog;
• permission to carry out the work;
• protection and safety of work;
• criteria of quality;
• preparation of work and its control;
79
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
isolation of equipment and control of its acceptance for repair;
control of the execution of repair work;
acceptance after repair;
quality control of the repair work, meeting the production plans;
inspections and tests;
documents;
self-estimation of maintenance activities;
elimination of discrepancies;
responsibilities and powers.
Maintenance is organised on the principles of precaution, specialisation, control and co-ordination.
The plant maintenance service has the following resources:
• specialised workshops that carry out the maintenance and repair of equipment and
structures in accordance with their function (e.g. reactor workshop, electrical workshops,
etc.);
• workshops carrying out special kinds of work (e.g. a workshop for centralised repair,
decontamination workshop, etc.);
• functional departments (departments for the planning and preparation of repairs, and a
design department).
Workshop maintenance services have specialised workplaces arranged in accordance with the needs
of the equipment being maintained. The INPP administration is responsible for the quality of work
carried out by both INPP divisions and contractors. For co-ordination of the INPP divisions,
procedures are reviewed annually. The permission of VATESI for restart units of INPP after annual
outage is obligatory in accordance with “P-2004-02”.
80
Article 15: RADIATION PROTECTION
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational states the
radiation exposure to the workers and the public caused by a nuclear installation shall be kept as
low as reasonably achievable and that no individual shall be exposed to radiation doses which
exceed prescribed national dose limits.
15.1. Summary of Laws, Regulations and Requirements Dealing with Radiation
Protection as Applied to Nuclear Installations
Changes in the legislation dealing with radiation protection of the general public, the workers of
nuclear installations and the environment at the period of 2004-2008 are following:
•
Law on Radiation Protection (No. VIII-1019, 1999, last amended 2004)
•
Law on Nuclear Energy (No I-1613, 1996, last amended 2006)
•
Law on the Management of Radioactive Waste (No. VIII-1190, 1999, last amended 2005)
•
Law on Environmental Protection (No. I-2223, 1992, last amended 2005)
•
Law on Environmental Monitoring (No. VIII-529, last amended 2006)
•
Governmental Resolution No 461 On the Regulation on Providing of Data Concerning
Activities Related with the Disposal of Radioactive Waste to the Commission of the
European Communities (2007)
•
Order of the Minister of Health No. V-834 On Regulations on the Import, Export, Transit
and Transportation of Radioactive Materials and Radioactive Waste (2004)
•
Order of the Minister of Health No. V-136 On Approval of Risk Categories of Potentially
Dangerous Installations with Sources of Ionizing Radiation and Their State Radiation
Protection Supervision and Control (2005)
•
Order of the Minister of Health No. V-687 On Approval of the Rules of Safety of the
Sources of Ionizing Radiation (2005)
•
Order of the Minister of Health No. V-1020 On Approval of the Rules of the Control of
Orphan Sources and Sealed Sources of High Activity (2005)
•
Lithuanian Hygiene Standard HN 83:2004 "Radiation Protection of Outside Workers"
(2004)
•
Lithuanian Hygiene Standard HN 52:2005 "Radiation Protection in Industrial
Radiography" (2005)
•
Lithuanian Hygiene Standard HN 86:2005 "Non Medical Nuclear and X-rays Equipment"
(2005)
•
Normative Document LAND 34 – 2000 “Clearance Levels of Radionuclides, Conditions of
Reuse of Materials and Disposal of Waste” (2000, amended in 2005)
•
Normative Document LAND 36 – 2000 “Measurement of Radionuclide Content in
Environmental Components – Gamma Spectroscopic Analyze of Samples by Spectrometer
with Semiconductor Detector” (2000, amended in 2005)
81
•
Normative Document LAND 37 – 2000 “Measurement of Radionuclide Content in
Environmental Components – Concentration of Caesium Dissolved in Water Employing
Absorbing Filters and Estimation of Water Activity Concentration” (2000, amended in
2005)
•
Normative Document LAND 42 – 2001 “Limitation of Radioactive Discharges from
Nuclear Facilities, Permitting of Discharges and Radiological Monitoring” (2001, amended
in 2005)
•
Normative Document LAND 64 – 2005 “Determination of Strontium-90 in Environmental
Samples. Radiochemical Method” (2005)
•
Order of the Director of the Radiation Protection Centre No. 46 On Approval of Danger
Categories for Radiation Sources and on Approval of Rules for their Assignment (2004).
A new wording of the Regulation on Providing of Data Concerning Activities Related with the
Disposal of Radioactive Waste to the Commission of the European Communities was adopted by
the Governmental Resolution No 461 on 9 May 2007 (in compliance with the Article 37 of the
Euratom Treaty). The purpose is to clarify procedure on data inventory preparation and
coordination with the competent authorities. The responsibility to submit the data about planned
activity to the European Commission was delegated to the State Nuclear Safety Authority
(VATESI). Environmental Protection Agency under the Ministry of Environment is obliged to
submit the annual data on the radioactive liquid and atmospheric discharges and inform the
Commission about discharges permissions and licenses issued for activities related with radioactive
waste disposal.
15.2. Implementation of National Laws, Regulations and Requirements relating
to Radiation Protection
15.2.1. Dose Limits
The basic standards and safety requirements for occupational and public exposure (including dose
limits) in practices with sources of ionizing radiation are established in Lithuanian Hygiene
Standard HN 73:2001 "Basic Standards of Radiation Protection". The basic regulation which sets
out requirements for radiation protection of workers working at the nuclear facilities and for
radiation protection of members of the public during the nuclear facilities operation and
decommissioning is the Lithuanian Hygiene Standard HN 87:2002 ,,Radiation Protection in Nuclear
Facilities" (2002). The requirements of the Hygiene Standards are in compliance with International
Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for the Safety of Radiation
Sources, BSS No. 115, Vienna, IAEA, 1996, and the Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM of 13
May 1996 Basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general publics
against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation.
The license holder shall ensure that doses of nuclear facilities workers do not exceed limits of
occupational exposure determined by HN 73:2001 "Basic Standards of Radiation Protection":
Application
Effective dose
Dose limit
Occupational
100 mSv in a consecutive 5
year period, subject to a
maximum effective dose of 50
82
Public
1 mSv in a year, in special
circumstances - up to 5 mSv in
a single year provided that the
Equivalent dose in a
year:
• for the lens of the eye
• for the skin
• for the extremities
(hands and feet)
mSv in any single year
average dose over 5
consecutive years does not
exceed 1 mSv per year
150 mSv
500 mSv
15 mSv
50 mSv
500 mSv in a year
-
Establishing the investigation levels and dose constraints shall ensure the radiation protection of
workers. The investigation levels are established in order to fix the achieved real level of exposure
and to ensure optimal measures for protection of workers against the dangers of sources, used
during the NPP operation. Investigation levels shall be regularly reviewed taking into account the
radiation protection conditions at the NPP. The daily effective dose constraint established by the
license holder for Ignalina NPP workers is 0.2 mSv.
According to the HN 73:2001 "Basic Standards of Radiation Protection" the value of 100 mSv per a
five-year period is adopted as a limit effective dose for workers. Annual limit effective dose cannot
exceed 50 mSv/year. An average annual dose for INPP personnel and outside workers should not
exceed 20mSv/year for any 5 years.
This requirement is met for INPP personnel and there are no recorded cases of a dose 100 mSv/year
exceeding for any 5 years. The number of INPP workers with individual exposure dose higher than
20 mSv was not recorded in 2001. There were 40 people in 2002 and 3 people in 2003. During the
period from 2004 to 2006 the individual annual dose did not exceed 20 mSv/year. An average
individual dose does did not exceed 20 mSv/year for the last 5 years.
The highest individual exposure dose for outside workers has not exceeded 20 mSv from 2000 to
2006. The only exception was 2004, when 43 workers had maximum individual dose higher than 20
mSv/year. Exceeding the highest individual exposure dose for more than 20 mSv/year was related
to works with contaminated equipment during scheduled maintenance of Unit 2 on repairing the
joints of the pipes and restoring the insulation in exceeding gamma emission conditions. The INPP
management gave permission and confirmed with Radiation Protection Centre the increase of
maximum individual dose for 2004 more than 20 mSv/year for those workers provided that the total
individual dose for 5 years (2000-2004) would not exceed 100 mSv.
Individual monitoring of internal and external exposure of the INPP personnel is carried out with the
help of the individual dosimetry control computer-based system, which includes:
•
•
•
•
•
Thermo luminescence dosimetry system RADOS;
Direct-reading electronic dosimetry system RAD-51, RAD-52, RAD-62, RAD-80;
Gamma spectrometric system WBC ACCUSCAN 2260-G2KG (Whole Body Counter);
Local net;
Software support for collecting, storing, processing and displaying the information of
individual personnel radiation monitoring from individual dosimetry control system RADOS
and WBC ACCUSCAN 2260-G2KG.
Individual monitoring of personnel exposure aims at assessing and ensuring radiation protection of
workers in the INPP protected area, obtaining the information about internal and external exposure
doses, timely identification of cases of increased radionuclide content level in organism, and as a
proof of the fact that the dose limits are not exceeding both in normal plant operation and in
possible emergency conditions.
83
Individual monitoring of external exposure of INPP personnel and outside workers is set for a
period of one month. In the period of the plant preventive maintenance an extraordinary exposure
dose monitoring is conducted for personnel whose total individual dose is reaching 2,0 mSv (based
on the results of shift-time measurements). The results of individual monitoring of the INPP
personnel and outside workers for 2004-2006 are shown in the Tables below:
Exposure and collective dose dynamics of the INPP workers 2004 – 2006
Year
Number of
workers
2004
2005
2006
2916
2794
2492
Average/highest
individual exposure
dose, mSv
1.53/19.16
0.68/13.55
0.87/16.96
Collective dose
ManSv
4.47
1.91
2.18
Exposure and collective dose dynamics of the outside workers 2004 – 2006
Year
Number of
workers
2004
2005
2006
1483
1403
1513
Average/highest
individual exposure
dose, mSv
1.59/29.41
0.40/13.16
0.81/19.91
Collective dose
ManSv
2.35
0.56
1.23
In the chart below the collective doses of Ignalina NPP and outside workers (per one unit) from
1997 to 2006 are presented in graphic form:
10
9
Collective dose (man Sv)
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Years
Ignalina NPP and outside workers
Ignalina NPP workers
Outside workers
Individual monitoring of internal exposure of INPP personnel and outside workers is conducted by
gamma spectrometric measuring system WBC ACCUSCAN with the aim of obtaining the
information about internal exposure doses, timely identification of cases of increased radionuclide
content level in organism and prevention of fixed annual exposure dose exceeding. Personnel
internal exposure control is realized in accordance with the “Time Schedule for Radiation
Protection Monitoring at INPP”.
In 2004 the individual dosimetry control computer-based system (ASIDK) and database of
personnel individual dosimetry control were upgraded. The upgrade of the systems enabled to
estimate the value of effective dose of internal exposure in mSv. The values of personnel internal
84
exposure effective dose estimated during the period from 2004 to 2006 are shown in the Table
below:
RLWBC0.1 mSv
0.1-0.2
mSv
0.2-0.3
mSv
0.3-0.4
mSv
over 0.4
mSv
Number of
people
measured with
WBC, man
185
167
115
32
19
11
11
5
6
3
1
1
5
–
–
2439
2446
2239
Year
The internal exposure effective dose of INPP personnel and outside workers, man
2004
2005
2006
Less than minimal
registration level of
WBC (RLWBC=
0.001 mSv)
2203
2254
2106
The highest internal exposure value of INPP worker was registered in 2004, which amounted to
0,665 mSv. The highest measured activity of Co-60 radionuclide equals 1460 Bq.
The following kinds of personnel internal exposure monitoring are provided according to the “Time
Schedule for Radiation Protection Monitoring at INPP”: confirmative, target, permanent, special,
incoming, and outlet.
The confirmative monitoring of personnel internal exposure is carried out once a year for all
personnel in order to ensure the sufficiency of radiation protection of personnel. The target
monitoring of internal exposure is carried out during and after plant preventive maintenance for the
INPP personnel and outside workers depending on radiation conditions at working places and
results of external exposure individual dose measurement when performing volume-dose jobs.
Permanent monitoring of personnel internal exposure is carried out basing on results of worker
confirmative monitoring in case when annual effective internal exposure dose is expected to be
higher than 5 mSv/year. The special monitoring is performed for workers whose individual external
exposure dose is higher that 20 mSv. The incoming monitoring is aimed at identifying individual
background level of internal exposure of personnel employed to work in the protected area. The
outlet monitoring is aimed at identifying internal exposure of personnel after finishing works in
INPP protected area due to leaving the job or changing the area.
As regards the limitation of public exposure that might cause the nuclear facilities operation and
decommissioning, HN 87:2002 establishes the dose constraints for the members of public. The
annual effective dose constraint for the members of public because of operation and
decommissioning of NPP is 0.2 mSv. The annual dose constraint is a basis for calculation of
maximum permitted activity levels of radionuclides released to atmosphere or discharged into the
water.
15.2.2. Fulfilment of conditions for the discharges of radionuclides into environment
Requirements of Normative Document LAND 42 – 2001 limiting discharge of radionuclides into
environment are applied in order to protect humans, other living organisms, natural resources (the
land, forest, water) and other environmental entities from harmful influence of ionising radiation
and contamination by radionuclides from nuclear installations. The requirements of this document
are obligatory to nuclear facilities when designing, constructing and operating them as well as to
nuclear facilities during decommissioning. This normative document regulates operation of nuclear
facilities under normal conditions, including short-time anticipated operational transient, and it is
not applicable for accidents.
The new radioactive discharges authorization for period 2006-2010 was issued to Ignalina Nuclear
Power Plant in December 2005. The Ignalina NPP airborne and liquid discharges limits were
established considering the requirements of the Normative Document LAND 42 – 2001 “Limitation
of Radioactive Discharges from Nuclear Facilities, Permitting of Discharges and Radiological
85
Monitoring”. Authorised discharges limits and data on airborne and liquid discharges into
environment from Ignalina NPP are provided in the tables below:
Discharge limits of Ignalina NPP
Type of discharges
Discharge limits, Bq/year
Airborne discharges
1,41·1016 (including: noble radioactive gases – 1,39·1016; radioactive
aerosols – 9,4·1011; I-131 – 9,87·1011)
Liquid discharges
8,811·1012
Discharges of radioactive noble gases, radioactive aerosols and I-131 from INPP during 20042006
Year
Noble radioactive gases,
1013 Bq
Sum
% from
DL*
2004
6,16
0,44
2005
7,44
0,54
2006
3,12
0,22
*DL – Discharge limit
Radioactive aerosols,
108 Bq
Sum
% from
DL
8,42
0,09
5,59
0,06
6,91
0,07
I-131, 109 Bq
Sum
10,63
6,81
7,7
% from
DL
1,07
0,69
0,78
Activity of noble gas release was basically determined by the following isotopes (% from total
release per 2006):
•
Xe-133 (56,98%), Ar-41 (30,79%), Xe-135 (10,64%), Kr-85m (1,59%).
Activity of radioactive aerosols release was basically determined by the following nuclides (% from
total release per 2006):
•
I-131 aerosol (17,87%); I-133 (15,92%), Cs-137 (14,79%), Co-60 (14,78%), Sr-90
(8,57%), Mn-54 (8,099%), Cr-51 (5,27%), Sr-89 (4,15%), Zn-65 (3,38%), Fe-59 (3,266%),
Nb-95 (2,02%), Mo-99 (0,596%), Co-58 (0,574%), Zr-95 (0,379%), Cs-134 (0,328%).
Discharges of radionuclides into the lake Drukshiai during 2004-2006
Year
Discharges, Bq
2004
9,2·1011
2005
3,24·1012
2006
5,76·1011
No exceeding of limits in discharges was fixed.
Annual dose for critical group of public during normal operation of Ignalina NPP did not exceed
dose constraint value (0,2 mSv):
• in 2004 (two units was operated) – 1,89·10-3 mSv and 6,1·10-4 mSv due to the airborne and
liquid discharges respectively, in total 2,5·10-3 mSv per year;
• in 2005 (one unit was operated) – 1,13·10-3 mSv and 9,59·10-4 mSv due to the airborne and
liquid discharges respectively, in total 2,09·10-3 mSv per year;
• in 2006 (one unit was operated) – 1,39·10-3 mSv and 1,47·10-4 mSv due to the airborne and
liquid discharges respectively, in total 1,54·10-4 mSv per year.
86
15.2.3. Steps taken to ensure that radiation exposure are kept as low as reasonably achievable
According to the requirements of HN 87:2002, the radiation protection programme is established at
the plant. Following items shall are included in the programme:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
classification of working areas and access control;
local rules, measures of supervision of safety at work and order of organisation of work;
procedures of monitoring of workplaces and individual monitoring of workers;
individual protective equipment and rules for their application;
main premises, control systems for assurance of radiation protection;
application of optimisation principle (ALARA) and measures on exposure reduction;
programs of health surveillance;
mandatory training of workers and their instructions.
Implementation of the ALARA Program at the Ignalina NPP was started in 1996. The aim of the
ALARA Program at INPP for 2006 and subsequent years is to make the personnel exposure dose
as low as reasonable achievable and to provide maintaining of individual exposure limit within 20
mSv/year for 5 years, as well as to reduce the personnel collective annual dose.
The following principles are considered to be the basis of the ALARA Program:
• Any exposure can be authorized if the assumed advantage is higher than the exposure risk;
• The exposure level shall be as low as reasonably achievable considering all social and
economic conditions
• Certain regulations and instructions shall be to restrict the exposure level in order to make
the exposure risk as low as possible.
The ALARA Program has the following basic directions at the Ignalina NPP:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Proper organization of the activities.
Personnel learning and training.
Improvement of working conditions.
Perfection of engineering process.
Quality maintenance.
Safety culture.
Human element impact.
The ALARA foundations are applied and adapted in all operation stages related to radiation.
Application of new principles of activity organisation, performance of scaled works on equipment
upgrading, dose reduction for personnel of Unit 1, which was shutdown in 2005, enabled reducing
the INPP personnel and outside workers collective dose from 10,71 mSv (in 2000) to 3,41 mSv (in
2006).
Under normal operation the collective dose is 12-30% and during maintenance it is 70-88% of
annual personnel exposure collective dose.
Since 1997 Ignalina NPP has been implementing the Quality Assurance Program. The procedures of
the first and second levels have been prepared and their main purpose was the implementation of the
ALARA Program at the Ignalina NPP.
Responsibility for radiation protection is sharply defined at the Ignalina NPP in accordance with a
Control Procedure of the second level “Radiation Protection” QA 2-005:
87
•
•
•
•
•
•
Director General is responsible for radiation protection of INPP, distribution of authority
and allocation of responsibility, implementation ALARA foundations at INPP as well as
financing of radiation protection activity.
Technical Director is responsible for organization of activities on INPP radiation protection
according to ALARA rules, standards and principles.
Heads of subdivisions are responsible for organization of activities on radiation protection
in their subdivisions in accordance with rules and standards, for training and professional
skills of their stuff, for making such working conditions when personnel exposure doses
will be maintained as low as reasonable achievable.
Head of the Radiation Protection Department is responsible for INPP radiation protection
program management.
Head of the Safety and Quality Assurance Service is responsible for organization and
conducting of audits on radiation protection activity as well as coordination and corrective
actions in this document.
Every worker is responsible for fulfillment of radiation protection requirements.
The staff that works in radiation exposure conditions is trained according to the programs on radiation
protection preparation in INPP Training Centre.
Radiation protection skill content is included in a worker’s Job Description as well as a program for
a post preparation. The course duration is 30 hours for workers dealing with the ionising exposure
sources and 60 hours for those responsible for radiation protection with retraining every 5 years and
270 hours for first course for those responsible for radiation protection in potentially dangerous
facilities of I, II and III risc categories.
The personnel engaged in works related to high exposure doses shall undergo additional training
course before they can start working. The training is arranged on a regular basis, and special
training simulators are applied.
Outside workers are also trained and examined on radiation protection according to the same
programs in the Ignalina NPP Training Centre before they are left for work in a protected area.
Radiation protection and ALARA foundation training is realized in accordance with a Control
Procedure QA-2-014.
According to the Lithuanian Hygiene Standard HN 87:2002 "Radiation Protection in Nuclear
Facilities” the INPP territory and its premises are divided into the protected area and the monitored
area. The premises in the INPP protected area are subdivided into three categories according to their
radiation condition.
Classification of INPP protected areas
Room
category
I
II
III
•
Colour of
the area
Frequency
of service
Red
Yellow
Green
No service
Periodic
Permanent
Surface beta
Dose rate Surface alpha
mSv/h
contamination contamination
Bq ⋅cm-2
Bq ⋅cm-2
>56
>20
>266
12-56
4-20
40-266
<12
<4
<40
Total aerosol
activity
Bq ⋅cm-3
>1110
185-1110
<185
The first category premises are unmanned ones, closed and sealed when the unit operates at
power. The doors of these premises are painted in red and marked with radiation danger
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•
•
marks additionally. These premises are among the most radiation dangerous ones. It is
forbidden to enter the first category premises when the unit operates at power. The
entrance into premises is permitted only by special permission in exceptional cases.
The second category premises are those, the entrance into which is only permitted for
periodic maintenance of the equipment located in them (for example, a Central Hall, a
Spent Fuel Storage Pools Hall, a sample cutting room). The doors of these premises are
painted in yellow. Radiation danger level in these premises is lower than for those of the
fist category. The entrance into premises is permitted only by special permission.
The third category premises are those of personnel permanent residence (for example,
operator rooms, control panels, workshops, laboratories, corridors, etc.). The doors of these
premises are painted in green.
The entrance into premises painted in yellow and red is strictly regulated. Activities in this area are
permitted only if there is an order or a special permission. The activities in strictly regulated area
are carried out according to the following order:
•
•
•
•
people responsible for radiation protection and safety shall assess the radiation condition of
working places and develop the principles of requirements to safety;
operators shall prepare the working place;
workers get appropriate instructions;
workers shall be followed by a person responsible for dose monitoring, who assess the
radiation conditions.
In order to reduce the personnel expose dose the working area or object is decontaminated before
the activities can be started, for example, the exposure dose in the primary circuit can be reduced
by means of decontamination of pipes. The activities with increased exposure are usually carried
out with the following radiation protection means: lead screens, distance safety equipment, videomonitoring systems.
To provide radiation protection a system of job confirmation procedures has been developed at the
plant, a system of permission issue for carrying out of radiation dangerous works is being efficiently
used. All activities under ionising exposure conditions are carried out in accordance with “Direction
on Radiation Accident Prevention during Work Performance in Controlled Area” requirements.
Medical examination of the personnel who works in a protected area includes an initial medical
examination and a subsequent annual health control. According to the Order No 561 issued by the
Ministry of Health the plant personnel shall pass medical examination once a year. In case doctors
find any contraindications, this person is not allowed to work with sources of ionising radiation.
The license holder once per year shall provide reports on implementation of ALARA principle to
the Radiation Protection Centre and to the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate.
Internal Control of Radiation Protection and Safety
The Radiation Protection Department of the Ignalina NPP, which is in direct subordination to the
Technical Director, carries out an internal control of radiation protection and safety. The department
is responsible for the organization, control and implementation of the requirements ensuring the
radiation protection and safety. The tasks, duties, coordination of the activities between the
subdivisions of the department are laid down in “The Standing Orders of the Department”.
According to the laws of the Lithuanian Republic, requirements of the rules and standards of
industrial and radiation protection, environment protection and Quality Assurance Program, the
Radiation Protection Department is made responsible for the following functions:
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•
•
•
•
•
Organization of works on radiation protection assurance and personnel exposure reduction.
Carrying out of dosimetric monitoring in the protected and monitored areas. Individual
dosimetric monitoring of personnel exposure. Monitoring of INPP radioactive substance
emissions and discharging into environment, control of emission and discharging
permissible quota observance.
Carrying out of environment objects radiation and chemical monitoring. Performance of
meteorological watches. Control of norms observance specifying radio nuclide and
hazardous chemical substance content in environmental objects. Assessment of impact to
environment and assessment of a population critical group exposure dose. Control of plant
subdivisions to fulfill the requirements of normative documents in the field of
environmental protection.
Providing of continuous work of radiation protection control and ecological monitoring
equipment by means of timely and qualitative repair works. Upgrading and modernization
of radiation protection control devices and equipment. Supervising and installation of new
systems of radiation protection control and ecological monitoring. Organization of
assembling works and production of optional equipment and auxiliaries. Organization of
repair work by contractors.
Conformance inspection of plant means of labour, working places, man-to-man defense
means, production areas and accommodation spaces, buildings and labour management to
industrial safety normative standards. Participation in trial boards on equipment, working
places, production divisions, production areas and accommodation spaces acceptance into
operation. Conducting of entrance training for persons, who are given an employment.
Carrying out hygienic inspections of working places with the help of laboratory
instrumental samples and ergonomic investigations for conformance reveal of working
places to sanitation standards and measurement development in case of infringement.
15.2.4. Environmental radiological monitoring
To evaluate Ignalina NPP impact to environment and population permanent radiation monitoring is
carried out on the Ignalina NPP site and within a radius of 30 km. Radionuclide concentration
measurements in foodstuffs, drinking water and soil have been conducting since the moment the
Ignalina NPP had been put into operation. The investigation data show that the Caesium and
Strontium radionuclide activities in foodstuffs and drinking water do not considerably differ from
the activity level in other regions of Lithuania and do not exceed those laid out in the Lithuanian
normative documents.
137
Cs concentration in fish and soil in the Ignalina NPP region in 2004
Name of sample
Average values of the Ignalina NPP region, (Bq/kg)
Fish
Soil
137
1,10
4,98
Cs concentration in fish and soil in the Ignalina NPP region in 2005
Name of sample
Average values of the Ignalina NPP region, (Bq/kg)
Fish
Soil
1,15
3,38
90
137
Cs concentration in fish and soil in the Ignalina NPP region in 2006
Name of sample
Average values of the Ignalina NPP region, (Bq/kg)
Fish
Soil
90
0,99
3,38
Sr and 137Cs activity in the different fish of Druksiai lake in 2004
90
Sample type
Sr activity,
(Bq/kg)
137
Cs activity,
(Bq/kg)
Bream (fillet)
0,84
0,60
Crucian (fillet)
5,23
0,88
Perch (fillet)
1,23
1,87
Pike (fillet)
0,18
1,56
Roach (fillet)
1,16
0,77
Tench (fillet)
0,46
0,89
90
Sr and 137Cs activity in the different fish of Druksiai lake in 2005
Sample
type
90
Sr activity
(Bq/kg)
137
Cs activity
(Bq/kg)
Bream (fillet)
0,89
0,72
Crucian (fillet)
0,20
0,72
Perch (fillet)
1,03
2,48
Pike (fillet)
0,20
1,77
Roach (fillet)
2,50
0,78
Tench (fillet)
0,19
0,43
90
Sr and 137Cs activity in the different fish of Druksiai lake in 2006
90
Sample type
Sr activity,
(Bq/kg)
137
Cs activity,
(Bq/kg)
Bream (fillet)
0,98
0,60
Crucian (fillet)
0,46
0,59
91
90
Sample type
Perch (fillet)
137
Sr activity,
(Bq/kg)
0,86
Cs activity,
(Bq/kg)
2,18
Pike (fillet)
0,21
1,25
Roach (fillet)
0,44
0,84
Tench (fillet)
0,42
0,46
The monitoring of the population exposure in the zone of 30 kilometres is carried out. It was
determined that the annual exposure dose of the population does not exceed the fixed limit of 0.2
mSv.
All release pathways at the Ignalina NPP are monitored. The ventilation stacks of NPP are
monitored (activities of noble gases, particles, iodine and aerosol) continuously. The water is
checked every time before the content is discharged into the lake and also the water from intake and
outlet channel is tested for laboratory measurements every day.
On the site and in the vicinity there are TL dosimeters set out for measurements of accumulated
dose, which are evaluated by power plant not less than twice a year. Also, on- line monitors of insitu dose rate measurement are set around the Ignalina NPP. The monitor readings permanently can
by made available to the authority.
In order to control the influence of the Ignalina NPP to environment sampling of aerosols and
atmospheric precipitation (continuously), water, bottom sediments, grass and other environmental
samplings are performed. The results of measurements are reported to the authority.
The automatized system AKRB-06 for control of assurance of radiation protection of workers and
environment is in operation at the Ignalina NPP. System operates in the territory of INPP and in the
monitoring area of potential radioactive contamination.
AKRB-06 registers all parameters (levels of radioactive discharges into environment, levels of
gamma radiation and air contamination in the INPP rooms, contamination of technological media),
characterizing radiological situation in the INPP and environment, for all the modes of operation.
Information with signaling or alarming devices is automatically presented to the radiation situation
supervision desk by the system of radiation control.
Modernization of the system AKRB-06 began in 2003 and continued up to 2006.
15.3. Regulatory Control Activities
The main law establishing the legal basis for radiation protection allowing to protect people and the
environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation is the Law on Radiation Protection
(1999). According to this Law the regulatory body coordinating the activities of executive and other
bodies of public administration and local government in the field of radiation protection, monitoring
and expert examination of public exposure is the Radiation Protection Centre (RPC). Among other
responsibilities the RPC is responsible for the radiation protection of workers and the general public
from negative impact which may cause the ionizing radiation, including ionizing radiation, arising
from nuclear facilities in operation and decommissioning.
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RPC annually conducts 5-6 inspections at Ignalina NPP. The radiation situation (levels of ionizing
radiation, surface radioactive contamination etc.) is assessed during inspections. It is also inspected,
how the radiation protection requirements for practices with sources, during the management of
radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, measures for optimization of occupational radiation
protection are implemented, occupational exposure results, monitoring of work places and workers’
individual exposure, effectiveness of training in radiation protection and other issues important
from radiation protection viewpoint are also inspected. The results of assessment of occupational
doses of Ignalina NPP workers show, that the main part of occupational doses (up to 80%) is
governed by the works carried out during outages. Therefore, during inspections serious
consideration is paid to assessment of radiation protection measures and implementation of
radiation protection optimization (ALARA) principle during the outages. RPC also inspects how the
outside workers follow the radiation protection requirements during their work in the controlled
area of Ignalina NPP and keeps under the control the occupational doses of ouside workers as well
as the occupational doses of Ignalina NPP workers.
RPC is responsible for dose assessment to public (in the vicinity of NPP as well) on the results of
environmental monitoring, including foofstuffs, drinking water, gamma dose equivalent etc. For
this purpose data from other state institutions involved in the environmental monitoring network are
delivered to RPC, the data from the Ignalina NPP environmental monitoring as well.
According to the Law on Nuclear Energy (1996) the functions of control of safety of nuclear
facilities are performed by the State Nuclear Safety Inspectorate of the Republic of Lithuania
(VATESI). In implementing state regulation of nuclear safety, radiation protection within its
competence, accounting for and control of nuclear materials in the sphere of nuclear energy,
VATESI approves standards and rules of operation of nuclear facilities, in those radiation protection
issues are always taken into account, and performs surveillance over compliance with radiation
protection regulations, standards and procedures during operation and maintenance of these
facilities.
The Ministry of Environment approves requirements on radiation protection of environment and
issues permits for radioactive discharges into the environment. The implementation of these
requirements is controlled by Environmental Protection Agency under the Ministry of Environment.
Environmental Protection Agency provides environmental radiological control within the sanitary
protection zone of the nuclear facility. There are four automatic gamma dose rate measurement
stations around Ignalina NPP. Renovation of automatic gamma dose rate measurement stations was
done in 2006 with the aim to improve radiation and nuclear safety control system. There is a station
of aerosol sampling in 60 km distance from Ignalina NPP. Environment samples are periodically
taken within the zone of Ignalina NPP: water and bottom sediments of Druksiai Lake, including
water samples from release canal. Control of Ignalina NPP laboratory is provided for ensuring of
reliability of results.
New information
The content of the Article 15 “Radiation Protection” was renewed. In Chapter 15.1 the list of legal
laws and regulations changed at the period of 2004-2008 was updated and the summary of changes
in some of them was given. Information and considerations concerning implementation of national
laws, regulations and requirements relating to radiation protection were renewed and the data about
doses, monitoring activities, discharges, radionuclide concentration measurements in foodstuffs,
drinking water and soil at the period 2004-2008 were updated. In Chapter 15.3 “Regulatory Control
Activities” activities of regulatory authorities were presented more properly.
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Article 16: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
1. Each Contacting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are on-site and offsite emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and cover the activities to be
carried out in the event of an emergency.
For any new nuclear installation, such plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences
operation above a low power level agreed by the regulatory body.
2. Each Contacting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as they are likely
to be effected by a radiological emergency, its own population and competent authorities of the
States in the vicinity of the nuclear installation are provided with appropriate information for
emergency planning and response.
3. Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear installation on their territory, insofar as they
are likely to be effected in the event of a radiological emergency at a nuclear installation in the
vicinity, shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of emergency plans for
their territory that cover the activities to be carried out in the event of such an emergency.
16.1. General description of laws, regulations and requirements for on-site and
of-site emergency preparedness
The main document that regulates development of defense and national security system of the
Republic of Lithuania is the Law on the Fundamentals of National Security accepted in Seimas
(Parliament) on 19 December, 1996. The system of national security in Lithuania consists of the
basic resolutions, principles and methods confirmed by this purpose activities of the State and
population, the whole complex of means directed towards the country integration into Europe and
Transatlantic Unions, laws and other legal acts, activities of state institutions founded for this
purpose and ways of their interaction. There are civil protection and rescue institutions among them.
Government manages all national security means implementation and obligates all civil protection
institutions and Lithuanian economy infrastructure objects to execute compulsory rescue and civil
protection tasks.
Atomic Energy Law, accepted in Seimas (Parliament) on 14 November, 1996, defines allocation of
functions for responsible institutions in the field of nuclear accident prevention and management of
accidents and their consequences.
The Civil Protection Law (15 December, 1998). The Law says how the Civil Protection and Rescue
System activities must be organized in Lithuania, provides the basics for legislative and
organizational matters and describes responsibilities which lie on state and municipal authorities,
public and private organizations and population of Lithuania.
The procedure of stockpile, storage, renewal and usage of the national reserves of civil protection
means is defined by the Law State Reserve, approved by Seimas on 31 August 2000.
National Emergency Response Plan in the Event of a Radiological Accident at Ignalina Nuclear
Power Plant verified by the order No. 371 of Ministry of National Defense, dated April 11, 2000,
provides means of protecting the population, their scope, terms, assignment of responsibilities, and
implementation procedure.
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Governmental Resolution No. 578 “On the approval of general provisions of dosimetric control in
case of radiological accident” approved by the Government of the Lithuania on 12 May 1998 is the
main document co-ordinating dosimetric control of the workers at the accident site, population and
environment. In case of an radiological accident dosimetric control should be organised and carried
out according to this Resolution and following to the approved instructions of the Fire protection
and rescue services. Radiation Protection Centre and Environmental Protection Agency under the
Ministry of Environment are responsible institutions for organising, co-ordinating and control of
dosimetric procedures within the limits of its competence.
General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Safety. Order of VATESI No. 56, June 9, 1997
establishes the purpose, reference points and basic criteria of safety, and also the main principles and
character of the technical and organizational measures aimed at ensuring safety including on-site
emergency response planning.
The General requirements for Nuclear Installations’ Emergency Response Plan. Order of Head of
VATESI No. 22.3-74 December 31, 2003. Based on IAEA TECDOC-953. Establishes general
requirements for Emergency Response Plan content and main criteria for decision making in
approval process.
There are other normative legitimate acts which, inter alia, covers emergency preparedness issues
such as Hygiene Standards of the Republic of Lithuania HN 73-1997 “Basic Standards of Radiation
Protection”, HN 99:2000”Protective actions of public in case of radiological or nuclear accident”
etc. Numerous legitimate acts regulating specific fields exist at the district and local levels.
The responsibilities for various governmental or other institutions are stated in legal acts approved
by the Government.
16.2. Implementation of emergency preparedness measures, including the role of
the regulatory body and other entities
16.2.1. Classification of emergency situations
A radiological accident is an infringement of planned operation due to the equipment damage,
erroneous behaviour of the Plant’s personnel, transgression from the technological processes,
natural disasters or other causes, during which an unforeseen irradiation of the personnel and
inhabitants beyond the normal operation limit may occur.
In accordance with the requirements of the main documents on radiation protection and safety of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the legislation of the EU, levels of emergency
interventions at INPP are determined, during which mitigation measures of the plants operational
disorders are taken and which are enabled while there are no technical or radiological indications of
the accident, but its occurrence is forecasted.
A Plan for Protection of The Population of the Republic of Lithuania in Case of an Emergency in
the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (hereinafter referred to as “the Plan”) provides for the
population’s protection measures, their volume, schedule, executors in charge and operational
procedure.
The Plan for sets forth measures for three emergency classes:
95
•
•
•
Alert – in the event of the infringement of NPP’s operations, likely to cause danger for the
staff members and population. Countermeasures are prepared to be applied outside the
zone of sanitary protection.
Local accident – in the event of the amount of radioactive materials and ionizing radiation,
exceeding values of normal operation limits, being released out to the zone of sanitary
protection, but remaining within the limits of it.
General accident – in the event of radioactive materials, released during disordered
operations of the NPP, being spread outside the territory of the zone of sanitary protection,
and the amount of the radioactive materials exceeds the values of normal operation limits.
Criteria for radioactive protection applied in the Plan correspond to hygienic standards developed in
compliance with requirements of IAEA and the EU documents regulating radioactive protection and
safety.
The following accident classes are defined at the INPP respectively:
Alert – it is a nuclear power plant status involving failures resulting in significant or unknown
decrease in the level of plant safety. At the emergency of this class ERO is put into the state of
readiness and additional assessment of the situation is performed.
Site Emergency – failures in the operation of nuclear power plant resulting in reduction of facility
personnel safety level. The events might be the following:
• considerable decrease in the level of protection provided to the core or spent fuel;
• situations when any additional work failures can cause spent fuel or core disturbance;
• large irradiance dozes on the facility.
At the emergency of this class measures should be taken to perform protective actions off-site and
to limit exposure of radiation on-site personnel.
General Emergency – failures resulting in release or substantial risk of radioactivity release beyond
the controlled area requiring urgent protective actions. The indicated failures include:
• actual or projected damage to the core or large amounts of spent fuel;
• radioactivity releases beyond the controlled area resulting in the course of several hours in
doses exceeding intervention levels for urgent protective actions.
In case of declaring this accident class urgent protective actions are recommended for the public
residing in the vicinity of the plant.
Accident classification at the INPP is carried out on the basis of INPP Accident Classification
Procedure.
16.2.2. Overall national emergency preparedness scheme
The Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of Interior is an integrated part of the civil
protection and rescue system and is responsible for the organising disaster prevention coordination
the civil protection activities of public institutions and economic entities and ensuring the
preparedness to implement the planed civil protection measures in emergency situations during
peacetime or war. The Ministry of the Interior in conjunction with other institutions is responsible
for the elaboration and implementation of the governmental policy in the field of civil protection in
peacetime. It also coordinates the activities of the institutions of the civil protection and rescue
system regarding the implementation of tasks prescribed to their scope of responsibility.
96
On January 1, 2005 the Civil Protection Department was merged into the Fire and Rescue
Department under the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter – FRD). Now
FRD has all the duties and responsibilities that initially both institutions have in case of nuclear and
radiological emergency as well.
FRD functions in the field of civil protection are as follows:
• Planning
• Management and coordination
• Warning and information
• Fire extinguishing and rescue
FRD coordinates the implementation of emergency planning process specially in case of accident at
Ignalina NPP. Of course special attention is paid to municipalities close to the Ignalina NPP.
Based on the principles and requirements defined in international agreements, Lithuania has created
the national legal system for regulating nuclear safety. As nuclear safety requirements are becoming
more stringent, the legal system has been continuously improved.
Objectives of the civil protection and rescue system are as follows:
• creation of conditions for public establishments, economic entities and individuals to shift
from regular life (work) conditions to those prevailing in the event of an emergency;
• keeping quiet, preserving human lives, health, property, protecting environment against
emergency effect;
• guaranteeing optimal consumption of public resources to ensure public safety, keep the
national economy vivid, localize emergency centers and liquidate their consequences;
• having the general public prepared for practical actions, encouraging its initiatives in the
mentioned areas, reinforcing trust in proper functioning of civil protection and rescue
system.
The Civil Protection and rescue system is comprised off FRD, Emergency Committee, Emergency
Management Centre, Ministerial, other state and municipal civil protection offices, fire protection
offices, searching and rescue groups, Other territorial offices involved in warning, rescue, support
to and evacuation of the population.
National management of emergencies is carried out on three levels: state (governmental), regional
(district or county) and municipal, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania taking general
management of the national preparedness in the country.
The state level comprises the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the Emergency
Commission, the Emergency Management Centre, the FRD, ministries, other governmental
institutions, including VATESI, the Fire Protection Department under the Ministry of Interior.
The regional (county) level comprises the County Head Administration, the County Emergency
Response Centre, the Population Warning and Notification Services, as well as other Civil Security
divisions.
The municipality level comprises the Municipal Administration, the Municipal Emergency
Response Centre, the Fire Protection Service, the Population Warning and Notification Services, as
well as other institutions, economic entities. Preparations for likely emergencies are carried out by
means of planning related activities on each level of the civil protection system.
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant is one of the most risk-bearing objects in the Republic of
97
Lithuania, requiring most of attention from side of the civil protection system.
16.2.3. On-site and off-site emergency plans of nuclear intallations, including supporting
agencies and systems
16.2.3.1. Off-site emergency plan
A Plan for Protection of the Population of the Republic of Lithuania in Case of an Emergency in the
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant, approved by the Minister of the National Defence of the Republic of
Lithuania on April 11, 2000, provides for the population’s protection measures, their volume,
schedule, executors in charge and operational procedure.
The Plan is designated for proper organization and co-ordination of actions taken by municipal,
ministerial and governmental offices for implementation of civil protection measures, organization
of operations related to rescue activities and liquidation of the emergency consequences.
Main goals of development of the Plan for protection of the population are the following:
• maximal emphasize of a risk of the emergency spreading outside the territory of the NPP
and restriction of consequences of the accident on the site;
• prevention of fatal health injuring effects;
• maximal emphasize of the population risk of getting seriously sick.
As a result of joining ‘Harmonization of Regional Emergency Preparedness’ – a Project led by
IAEA, - the Plan took into consideration methodology developed by IAEA, i.e., technical
documents – TECDOC. The Plan is a product of integrated planning, comprised of: a plan for
emergency preparedness in the Ignalina NPP and actions of the staff members of NPP; action plans
for district and local municipal establishments in the event of an emergency in the Ignalina NPP and
actions of the staff members in district and local municipal establishments; action plans for
ministries and actions of the staff members of ministries.
Composition of The Plan.
General provisions. Concepts, definitions, legal bases of the Plan, development concept of the Plan,
linkage with other plans, layout data for the Plan’s development (Ignalina NPP’s characteristics,
characteristics of Ignalina NPP’s region, climatic and meteorological characteristics of the region,
characteristics of radioactive danger and criteria for radioactive protection of the population).
Preparedness for an emergency. There are preset lists all governmental establishments involved in
preparation for a likely emergency, simultaneously establishing their responsibilities and functions.
It also includes the procedure for reviewing and updating of the Plan, the procedure of preparation
of the population for an emergency and related actions in the event of an emergency.
Organization of civil protection management and distribution of functions. This chapter describes a
system for warning and interrelations among responsible establishments and organization of
management on the local and governmental level. Nuclear energy management on governmental
level is carried out in routine activities by the respective authorities in the limits of their
competence.
In the event of a nuclear accident in the Ignalina NPP, ministries and governmental authorities are
engaged to execute the functions carried out by the ministries and governmental authorities in their
daily routine. Concerning the FRD it means: organization of warning, fire protection and rescue and
public information and inspection of contaminated territory.
98
In the case of an emergency actions of ministries and government authorities shall be coordinated
by the Emergency Committee. The Emergency Committee is comprised of ministerial and
governmental officers entitled to decisions making. Operation body of the Emergency Committee is
the Emergency Management Centre comprised of ministerial officers and the headquarters of the
FRD.
In the event of an emergency the Emergency Management Centre shall:
• forthwith inform the Prime Minister on likely or de facto nuclear accident, its forecast
consequences and the applied preventive measures;
• manage rescue operations and liquidation of consequences of the general emergency,
aggregate the existing national forces and material resources, if the accident covered
territories of more than one district;
• organize aggregation and co-ordination of assistance required for rescue operations and
liquidation of the consequences of the emergency;
• if necessary, prepare and submit the Government proposals and drafts of decisions related
to liquidation of the consequences of the emergency, organization of related operations and
provision of assistance;
• prepare and submit the Government a report on material resources required for liquidation
of the consequences of the emergency and proposals concerning compensations to victims;
• inform the general public on the accident and related actions according to issues delegated
under authority of the Emergency Committee.
In the event of an emergency the personnel of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant shall inform about
emergency in the NPP and the existing situation in compliance with approved scheme for
preliminary information on a radiation emergency in the Ignalina NPP. Such kind of notices shall be
given to: municipalities situated in the zones of preventive and urgent protection measures and
administration of territorial units in neighboring countries: Daugavpils Region in Latvia and Braslav
Region in Byelorussia.
FRD shall pass information on the emergency to the ministries, District Managers’ Administrations,
municipalities of cities/towns and regions. For this purpose it shall use automatic system for the
national managing bodies and warning of the population, public means of communication
(subscribers’ telegraph, telephone, fax for general purposes) and direct telephone, telegraph and
radio communication channels additionally arranged by FRD. In addition, the FRD also transmits
information on the emergency to state civil protection management bodies in the neighboring
countries. International notification and information issues lays on VATESI.
In order to minimize the consequences of an emergency, the Plan provides for a number of
preventive measures against radiation effects: prevention of the population from being exposed to
radioactive release in open areas by means of providing shelters or staying at home, regular usage
of iodine preparations, application of individual prevention measures, evacuation, limitation or
prohibition of consumption of contaminated foodstuffs, regulation of the population entering the
contaminated zones, elementary cleaning of contaminated foodstuffs, organization of health care,
deactivating of the contaminated area.
Radiation surveillance in the contaminated area is arranged and actively implemented during early
phase of a nuclear accident. As for the late phase, radioactive contamination is constantly observed,
while inspection of radiation is carried out only if this is required. Radiation surveillance is planned
and coordinated by the FRD on the basis of information provided by administration of the Ignalina
Nuclear Power Plant on characteristics of the accident, dose-metric data, forecasts of
Hydrometeorological Service, needs and recommendations of the Ministry of Environment,
99
Ministry of Health Care and other authorities. First of all radiation surveillance is to be carried out
in the zone of 30 km in four different routes. For this purpose, forces of units of FRD shall be used.
Decisions concerning regular prophylactic application of iodine preparations in the event of an
emergency in the Ignalina NPP shall be made by district Emergency management centers.
Population in the zones of long-term protection measures (in radius of 50 km from the Ignalina
NPP) shall be supplied with stabile iodine preparations in advance by local municipalities of cities
and regions. The latter shall acquire such preparations on their own account, consequently
distributing iodine preparations for the population and replacing them prior to the date of expiration.
The remaining population of the Republic of Lithuania shall by themselves acquire regular iodine
preparations and ensure their stocks in advance. Iodine preparations should be supplied to
drugstores enabling the population to acquire them for regular usage.
In the event of the general emergency in the INPP a decision to evacuate the population exposed to
radioactive contamination as well as the process of evacuation itself shall be managed on the
highest level by a head official for civil protection operations assigned by the Prime Minister.
Proposals concerning evacuation shall be given by municipal emergency management centers in
districts, regions (cities/towns) on the basis of the situation analysis and likely future forecasts.
Evacuation might be implemented in the urgent procedure, if a territory has already been
contaminated, or in the planned procedure through population collecting posts, taking into
consideration a particular situation and specific features of the area. In the event of urgent
evacuation from the territory contaminated with radioactive materials, the population is evacuated
right from their places of residence or/and work. The population collecting points serve for
evacuation of people from the territory, which, according to forecasts, might be contaminated with
radioactive materials and therefore might be dangerous for work or living. Taking into
consideration meteorological conditions (direction of the wind), evacuation might be carried out in
two directions.
In the early phase of the accident, what is of the most importance, is sanitary cleaning of the
population, deactivation of transport modes, buildings and roads. Initial sanitary cleaning of the
population shall be carried out in the interim evacuation posts. If the level of radioactive
contamination detected in clothes and footwear of the evacuated population is within the permitted
limits, further sanitary cleaning shall be carried out in the places provided for acceptance and
settlement of the evacuated individuals. In the event of higher level of contamination of the
evacuated population and being it impossible to carry out sanitary cleaning in intermediate
evacuation point, the evacuated individuals might be asked to get off and be provided with
uncontaminated cloths from the state reserve for civil protection measures. Sanitary cleaning of the
evacuated individuals shall be carried out in the places of their acceptance and settlement by means
of showers existing in hostels, sports halls and other places.
16.2.3.2. On-site emergency plan
Emergency planning and preparedness.
In order to protect Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (further INPP) personnel, population of the
Republic of Lithuania from potential consequences of the radiological accident, emergency
planning and preparedness are carried out at the INPP.
Emergency planning process at the INPP includes:
• analysis of credible emergency situations and assessment of their consequences to the
personnel, population, environment taking into account the worst conditions;
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
establishment of Emergency Response Organization (further ERO) capable to eliminate
potential emergency situations and their consequences;
formation of Emergency Response Organization management structure capable to manage
different emergency situations;
concern for continuous operability of technical devices ensuring emergency prevention,
limitation and elimination;
accumulation of essential material assets, technical recourses allotted for functioning of
Emergency Response Organization;
keeping in constant readiness for functioning ERO Emergency Operation Centres;
training of ERO managers and personnel;
drafting of documents prescribed by VATESI and recommended by IAEA;
timely update of Emergency Response Plan considering results of tabletop drills and full
scale exercises, conclusions of inspections performed by VATESI and INPP Safety and
Quality Assurance Service.
Director General leads emergency planning process via Emergency Response Organization Staff.
INPP Emergency Response Organization structure (Heads of Emergency Response Organization
Services and their subordinate personnel) is formed on the basis of production principle out of
departments and divisions personnel considering the specific tasks that are dealt by the power plant
divisions under the normal operation.
In order to ensure constant preparedness of Emergency Response Organization to act it is necessary
to have not less than 3 specially instructed persons for each position in Emergency Response
Organization meeting the requirements of that position.
Emergency Response Organization personnel should be adequately instructed and trained to meet
the requirements of those positions.
INPP Emergency Response Plan.
INPP Emergency Response Plan is the main operative procedure to carry out organizational,
technical, medical, evacuation and other activities related to protection of the plant, personnel, and
the environment from accident consequences, natural calamities, man made events.
The requirements of Emergency Response Plan (further ERP) are applied to Emergency Response
Organization Management and personnel, also to all INPP personnel in case of an emergency at
INPP.
ERP is drafted on the basis of various national legal acts as well as international recommendations
and requirements.
INPP Emergency Response Plan consists of two parts:
• General Part with Appendices;
• Operative Part.
The General Part of the Plan with Appendices contains:
• policy, objectives, tasks set by INPP management for Emergency Response Organization;
• responsibility of INPP management for emergency planning;
• INPP Emergency Response Organization organizational structure;
• tasks set for INPP Emergency Response Organization Services and subdivisions;
• notification and preparedness of INPP Emergency Response Organization;
• measures applied in the event of an emergency at INPP;
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•
•
•
•
•
•
premises and technical means necessary for execution of emergency preparedness
functions;
co-operation with local, regional, state authorities while rending assistance in the event of
an emergency;
resources available at the plant during an emergency;
radiation dose limits;
training of Emergency Response Organization managers and personnel, also INPP
personnel in the field of emergency preparedness;
appendices.
Operative part of the Plan contains:
• Emergency Planning Instruction;
• Notification Procedure in Case of an Emergency at INPP;
• Emergency Response Organization Management Assembly and Preparedness Procedure in
Case of an Emergency at INPP;
• Personnel not Included into ERO Services Assembly and Order of Acting in Case of an
Emergency at INPP Instruction;
• Managing Emergency Activities from Emergency Operation Centre;
• INPP Accident Classification Procedure;
• Instruction for Facility Personnel Protection and Activities against Impact of Harmful
Toxic Materials in the Event of an Emergency at the Plant and Neighbouring Installations;
• Instruction on Cooperation of ERO Services Personnel and Fire Rescue Service for
Visaginas Town and INPP Regarding Fire Extinguishing on the Equipment Owned by the
INPP Structural Subdivisions.
• Emergency Response Services Instructions.
INPP Emergency Response Plan is applied to:
• Emergency Response Organization management and personnel;
• INPP personnel (not involved in Emergency Response Organization);
• Staff of Fire Rescue Service for Visaginas Town and the INPP;
• INPP Protection Team Staff;
• Contractor organizations personnel carrying out works at INPP;
• Personnel detached for service.
ERP is updated once in three year.
Premises and resources ensuring functioning of Emergency Response Organization.
For carrying out tasks Emergency Response Organization is provided with:
• premises;
• personal protective means;
• dosimetric control devices and radiation monitoring equipment;
• communication and notification means;
• necessary tools, equipment and machinery;
• foodstuffs supply and water.
Transport to ERO Services is provided by State Enterprise ,,Visagino transporto centras” in
accordance with previously made agreement.
Emergency Response Organization Operation Centres.
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Emergency Response Organization Emergency Operation Centre equipped with necessary accident
management and information communication devices.
Technical Support Centre provided with equipment essential for work of experts.
Premises for operations personnel allotted for accident management:
• unit control room - 1, 2 - main 1-st and 2-nd units control boards;
• auxiliary shutdown room - 1, 2 – remote 1-st and 2-nd units scram and cooling control
boards;
• central control board of INPP electric part;
• radiation protection main control board;
• environmental laboratory (auxiliary board of radiation control).
Emergency preparedness signals are predefined at the INPP that are communicated to the plant
management and personnel by appropriate technical communication means.
In case of activation INPP Emergency Response Plan Plant Shift Supervisor notifies:
• the plant management;
• the plant personnel;
• central dispatcher office of joint-stock company “Lithuanian Energy”;
• Fire Rescue Service for Visaginas town and INPP;
• VATESI officer on duty in Vilnius;
• VATESI Supervision group at INPP;
• INPP Protection Team;
• Municipality of Visaginas town;
• Officer on duty of Civil Protection Department of Utena County;
• Senior Operations Manager of Control Centre of Fire and Rescue Department under the
Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania.
After assembly of Heads of Emergency Response Organization Services at Emergency Operation
Centre and approval of accident class INPP management makes further notification:
• Director General notifies Ministry of Economy, Director of Fire and Rescue Department
under the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania, SKI (Sweden) (“Inmarsat”);
• Technical Director notifies Head of VATESI;
• Heads of Emergency Response Services notify Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Health
Care, State Security Department.
When data of off- site radiation monitoring are available and after processing the received data and
projecting the development of the radiological situation ERO Staff fill in Plant Status Assessment
Form and send it out to state, regional, local authorities.
In case of general emergency, after the Government Emergency Commission has assembled and
started to work, head of civil protection operations on the state level presents decisions regarding
the nuclear power plant to the head of ERO in form of appropriate instructions obligatory for all
executors in case of emergency situation.
Accident management is performed in accordance with corresponding strategies. Accident
management activities are aimed at reaching the following safety objectives:
• prevent further development of accident in case of the reactor core damage;
• ensure continuous cooling of the reactor core;
• make effort to ensure the of accident localization system integrity.
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The concept of defence in depth is determined to provide two goals of the strategy – accident
prevention and mitigation of consequences.
Co-operation with local organizations involved in activities in case of emergency at the INPP, is
documented in the form of pre-signed agreements between the INPP and appropriate local
organizations.
16.2.4. Measures for informing the public
A central concern of civil protection is to warn and alert the population as quickly as possible. To
warn and notify the population in case of an accident the state warning and notification system
“Signalas” has been created as the network of 513 centralised electric sirens. Centrally controlled
sirens can be triggered by the Fire and Rescue Department’s Situations Coordination Centre and to
reach 1,8 million or 50% of the population living in cities and district centres. The 547 local electric
sirens supplement this system. If case of a major accident or large scale threat The Fire and Rescue
Department under the Ministry of the Interior shall notify the population through the first and the
second Lithuanian radio and TV channels, most of commercial broadcasting companies (which
work in FM), as well as through the wire radio communication network. For informing the public
some additional means such, manual sirens, special cars with sound amplifying equipment and
couriers can be used according to schemes prepared and approved with town and municipal boards
in advance.
At the Situations Coordination Centre of the Department twenty-four hours duty officer gathers
operative information concerning threats or accidents and keeps in touch with all managing units
and key members of the community as well.
Population of the state is being provided permanently with information on civil protection issues via
mass media, furthermore, special booklets including recommendations on behaviour during
different emergency situations are being published.
16.3. Training and exercises
16.3.1. General scheme
The following groups of persons involved in the civil protection training:
• Employees of the enterprises, institutions and organizations of all types (they are being
trained without leaving their job duties);
• Kindergartners, students of the general education, higher and (high depends on its good will
and Rectors decision) schools (they get fundamental knowledge on the civil protection and
practical actions in the mentioned schools);
• Heads, deputy heads, subdivisions heads and civil protection specialists of the governmental
and local authorities, enterprises and organizations, members of emergency management
centres and specialists of other institutions (being trained in training sections of the civil
protection departments in counties and in the Fire fighters Training School’s Civil
Protection Training Centre of the Fire and Rescue Department);
• The unemployed (discussions, lectures, TV, booklets, etc.).
The Civil Protection training is performed in the Fire fighters Training School’s Civil Protection
Training Centre of the Fire and Rescue Department and in civil protection departments training
sections in every of 10 counties.
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The training for each selected person, depending on his/her position, is to be performed once in 3 5 years. The training courses adjusted to every specific purpose, duration from 35 to 70 hours.
Officers of the fire-prevention service are trained in the Fire Fighters Training School in Vilnius.
Training sessions and exercises are organized at three levels.
The Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the
organization of training sessions and exercises at the national level.
Governors of the regions (counties) organizes training sessions and exercises at the regional level.
Mayor of municipality organizes training sessions and exercises at the municipal level.
The Fire and Rescue Department under the Ministry of the Interior controls planning, organization
and implementation of all training and exercises at all levels:
• Training sessions at the national level are organized once a year, exercises – once in 3
years;
• Training sessions at the regional level are organized twice a year, exercise – once in 3
years;
• Training sessions at the municipal level are organized twice a year, exercise – once in 2
years.
In case of needs training sessions and exercise can be organized more frequently.
The main task of the training sessions and exercise is to check the procedures described in the
“National Emergency Response Plan in the Event of a Radiological Accident at the Ignalina
Nuclear Power Plant” and to continue to improve it. It would help counties, municipalities,
ministries and other governmental institutions organize and coordinate all actions during an
accident in the INPP on appropriate way.
16.3.2. Training of heads and personnel of Emergency Response Organization to act in case of
an emergency at the INPP
Training of heads and personnel of Emergency Response Organization to act in case of an
emergency at the INPP is organized as follows:
• Director General as the Head of Emergency Response Organization is trained according to
a special program once per three years at Training Centre of the Fire and Rescue
Department (further on FRD) under the Ministry of Interior.
• Director General conducts:
• annual training for managers of subordinate group in accordance with 6-hours training
programme.
• tabletop drills for heads of Emergency Response Organization Services not less than once
per year;
• full scale exercises once per three years.
Technical Director as Plant Operation Manager is trained once per three years at Training Centre of
FRD under the Ministry of Interior in accordance with the same training programme as for Director
General.
Technical Director conducts annual training for managers of subordinate group in accordance with
6-hours training programme.
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Head of Civil Protection and Emergency Situations Staff, as a Manager of Emergency Response
Organization, once per five years is trained at Training Centre of FRD under the Ministry of Interior
in accordance with a special programme.
Head of Civil Protection and Emergency Situations Staff conducts annual training for managers not
included into ERO Services in accordance with 6-hours training programme.
Heads of structural divisions as Heads of Emergency Response Services conduct training for subheads of subordinate services teams, groups.
All the INPP personnel should be trained to act in case of an emergency.
Once per three years Emergency Response Organization Services personnel (part of personnel)
participate in full scale exercises for checking emergency preparedness level of personnel and its
ability to work in complicated conditions while carrying out the set tasks.
All the INPP personnel should be trained to act in case of an emergency. The training of personnel
includes:
• initial instructing in accordance with requirements for held position while assigning to
work;
• improvement of practical skills during exercises and drills;
Training of Emergency Response Organization Services personnel is conducted by heads of
corresponding teams and groups.
After completion of theoretical course Emergency Response Organization Services personnel (part
of personnel) participate in functional exercises for improvement of practical skills of carrying out
the set tasks.
Once per three years Emergency Response Organization Services personnel (part of personnel)
participate in full scale exercises for checking emergency preparedness level of personnel and its
ability to work in complicated conditions while carrying out the set tasks.
16.3.3. Training and exercises of Regulatory Authorities’ staff
Main regulating institutions, such as VATESI, Radiation Protection Centre, has established its own
emergency staff training and exercising programs. In accordance with internal procedures on ERC
staff functional training, all VATESI’s Emergency response centre staff has to pass initial and
refreshing training permanently. Each key staff members or groups have personal set of issues to be
covered. Training consists from theoretical and practical parts and, depending on position in ERC,
could last from few to few tens of hours. Training programs are based on Systematic Approach to
Training (SAT) philosophy.
Key Authorities also actively participate in various international training courses and exercises,
such as Convex, ECURIE, CBSS, FALKEN/DEMOEX (Sweden, 2006), PSI Air Interdiction
Exercise (Lithuania, 2007) etc., organized by the IAEA, EC, NATO and other international
organizations. Lithuania is one of very few countries, which participated in all IAEA exercises up to
now.
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16.4. International arrangements, including those with neighbouring countries
In 1994 Lithuania has joined to Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and in
2000 to Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.
VATESI and Fire and Rescue Department are responsible authorities respectively. According to
IAEA’s EPR-ENATOM requirements, VATESI is National Warning Point, National Competent
Authority for events abroad and, together with Fire and Rescue Department - National Competent
Authority for domestic events.
After joining EU in 2005, Lithuania became a part of ECURIE system. VATESI is contact point in
these arrangements as well as CoDecS station operator.
A great attention in Lithuania is paid to the development of bilateral co-operation with the
neighbouring countries. Mutual assistance policy between Lithuania and the neighboring countries
is based on bilateral agreements. Bilateral agreement between Lithuania and Denmark On
information exchange and co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection has
been signed on 26 March 1993. The bilateral agreement between Lithuania and Norway On Early
Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Information exchange about Nuclear Objects has been
signed on 13 February 1995. The Arrangement between Lithuania and Poland On information
exchange and co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection has been signed
on 2 June 1995. The Agreement between Lithuania and Latvia On Early Notification of Nuclear
Accidents, Exchange of Information and Co-operation in the Field of Nuclear Safety and Radiation
Protection has been signed on 3 October 2003.
New issues
Section 16.2.2. On January 1, 2005 the Civil Protection Department was merged into the Fire and
Rescue Department under the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter – FRD).
Now FRD has all the duties and responsibilities that initially both institutions have in case of
nuclear and radiological emergency as well.
In March 2006 the FRD prepared and the Government approved (resolution No. 241) The Criteria
of the Emergency Events. It reflects the position and the perception of threat in the Republic of
Lithuania. The Criteria related the nuclear and radiological accidents are included.
In April 20, 2006 issued FRD directors order (No. 1-160). The essentials of the activities in the
event of radiological emergency. Guidelines for fire brigades.
In May 2006 was arranged the top-table exercises at the national level. Administrative personnel
from Ignalina, Zarasai, Visaginas, Molėtai Utena, Švenčionys municipalities and Utena and Vilnius
counties administration Civil Protection Departments have attended.
Participation in various international emergency exercises.
The main task of the top table exercises was the evaluation the new prepared plan for protection of
the population of the Republic of Lithuania in case of an emergency in the Ignalina Nuclear Power
Plant
New version of the INPP Emergency response plan was drafted and reviewed by Authorities. Will
be approved in 2007.
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Section 16.4. Added information about International arrangements, including those with
neighbouring countries
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Article 17: SITTING
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate procedures are
established and implemented:
•
•
•
•
for evaluating all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear
installation for its projected lifetime;
for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on individuals,
society and the environment;
for re-evaluating as necessary all relevant factors referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii)
so as to the continued safety acceptability of the nuclear installation;
for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear installation,
insofar as they are likely to be affected by that installation and, upon request providing
necessary information to such Contracting Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate and
make their own assessment of the likely safety impact on their own territory of the nuclear
installation.
17.1. Description of licensing process, including summary of nationals laws,
regulations and requirements relating to the sitting of nuclear installations
17.1.1. Criteria for evaluating all site-related factors affecting safety
Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, by the advice of the Government, adopts a law on the
construction of a new nuclear plant and its site. In making a decision on the construction of a
specific nuclear facility, the Government of the Republic of Lithuania takes into consideration:
• economic and public needs;
• the principal characteristics of the use of natural resources and their impact on the
environment;
• nuclear safety and radiation protection guarantees;
• the opinion of the local authority on whose territory the intended facility will be sited.
Ministry of Economy organise the drafting of a special project for the choice of the site for a new
nuclear power plant or other state nuclear facilities, exploring several alternative sites. Information
about the site of nuclear facility shall be presented as follows:
• geographical location of the nuclear facility, topographical and demographic situation on
site area (taking into account the density of population and distribution in site area and its
approaches);
• characteristics of site (data of meteorological, hydrological and geological research prevailing winds, lightning, tornadoes, cyclones, precipitation, floods, geological structures,
seismic activity, status of radioecology, ambient radioactivity, description of possible
consequences in case of accident, possible effects on food production);
• situation of other industrial facilities around the nuclear facility, consequences to the safety
of the nuclear facility caused by possible accidents in these facilities;
• other parameters of the site, which can be important to ensure the safety of the nuclear
facility and minimise risk to the inhabitants from radiation;
Evaluations of site-related geotechnical aspects that may affect safety are required by national
regulation STR “Geological and engineering survey”. They are also considered in accordance of
IAEA recommendations (Safety Standard Series No. NS-G-3.6). Such factor are as follows:
earthquakes, surface faulting, floods and water waves, slope instability, collapse, subsidence or
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uplift of surface, soil liquefaction, behaviour of foundation materials. Site specific micro seismic
and geological data are used for site investigation.
Evaluating site-related factors (population distribution, dietary habits, use of land and water,
radiological impacts of other releases of radioactive material in the region) from radiological point
of view was made according IAEA recommendations (Safety Standard Series No. NS-R-3, Site
Evaluation for Nuclear Installations, IAEA, 2003) and requirements of national regulations.
Potential radiological impact on the region for operational states and accident conditions was
determined and estimated.
Analysis of explosion and aircraft crashes impact are required by national regulation “Requirements
of impact analysis for nuclear facilities due to explosion and aircraft crash”. They are also
considered in accordance of IAEA recommendations (Safety Standard Series No. NS-G-3.1).
17.1.2. Criteria for evaluating the nuclear safety impact of the nuclear installation on the
surrounding environment and population.
According to the Law on Environmental Impact Assessment of the Republic of Lithuania, it is
possible to decide whether the proposed economic activity by virtue of its nature and environmental
impacts may be carried out on the chosen site only after having performed environmental impact
assessment.
A proposed nuclear activity (nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors, including
decommissioning of power stations or reactors; production, processing, enrichment, storage and
disposal of nuclear fuel) is included in Annex I, the List of the Types of Proposed Economic
Activities that shall be Subject to the Environmental Impact Assessment according to the Law on
Environmental Impact Assessment of the Republic of Lithuania, it means that environmental impact
assessment for such activities is obligatory.
Some legal acts were amended since 2004. For the present Environmental impact assessment is
carried out in accordance with the revised versions of the Law on Environmental Impact
Assessment of the Proposed Economic Activity (1996, last amended in 2005, Official Journal No.
84-3105); Governmental Resolution No. 900 On Empowering the Ministry of Environment and the
Subordinate Institutions (2000, last amended in 2003, Official Journal No. 14-582 ); the Order of
the Minister of Environment on Approval of Regulations on Preparation of the Environmental
Impact Assessment Program and Report (2000, revised 2006, Official Journal No. 6-225); the
Order of the Minister of Environment on Informing the Public and Public Participation in the
Process of Environmental Impact Assessment (2000, revised 2006, Official Journal No. 93-3472);
the Order of the Minister of Environment on Approval of Guidelines on the Quality Control of
Environmental Impact Assessment of a proposed Economic Activity (Official Journal, 2000, No.
93-3472); the Order of the Minister of Environment on Investigating the Environmental Impact
Assessment Document at the Ministry of Environment and Subordinate institutions (2000 revised
2006 No. 75-2882).
Participants of the environmental impact assessment shall be as follows:
• Competent authority – The Ministry of Environment as competent authority coordinates
the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process. This institution also investigates and
approves EIA programs, examines the proposals of the public, the EIA reports and
conclusions issued by other relevant parties and makes justified decisions if the proposed
economic activity, taking into account it's nature and size, may be carried in a chosen site.
The Ministry of Environment also has the right to require amendments or correction of EIA
documents, if the quality of EIA documents is not satisfactory, or some topics are not
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•
•
•
•
adequately covered.
Relevant parties of the EIA – governmental institutions, responsible for health protection,
fire-prevention, protection of cultural heritage, development of economy and agriculture,
and municipal administrations. In some cases, assistance of additional governmental
institutions might be required. As regards radioactive waste management facilities State
Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate and Radiation Protection Centre participate in the EIA
process as relevant parties. The relevant parties of EIA, in accordance with their
competence review the EIA programs and reports and provide conclusions regarding the
EIA programs, reports and the feasibility of the proposed economic activity. They also
have the right to require for amendment or corrections of the EIA documents if the topics
within the scope of their competence are not investigated sufficiently.
Organiser of the proposed nuclear activity (developer).
Preparer of EIA documentation that is obliged by organiser (developer).
The public.
The preparer of EIA documentation obliged by the organiser (developer) shall carry out EIA
procedures and prepare EIA documentation:
• EIA program shall include at least the following information: short description of the
main alternatives studied by the preparer of the EIA documents; short description of the
technical characteristics, technological process and materials planned to be used, as well as
needed amount of natural resources and land use (during the construction and operation
phases); short description of the territories that could be significantly affected; information
about what components of the environment and what impacts will be analysed during the
environmental impact assessment; information on what aspects the impacts of the proposed
economic activity on public health will be analysed; methods that will be used to predict
and assess the effects on the environment, measures envisaged to avoid, reduce or offset
negative environmental effects; information whether proposed economic activity may
cause a significant negative impact on the environment of any foreign State; other
important information.
The prepared program is submitted to the relevant parties of EIA that examine EIA program and
provide conclusions in accordance with their competence. Relevant parties also have right to require
for amendment or corrections of the program if the topics within the scope of their competence are
not investigated sufficiently. Then the conclusions from all relevant parties of EIA and EIA
program are submitted to the competent authority (Ministry of Environment), which reviews these
documents and approves EIA program, however competent authority also has right to require for
amendments and correction of the program.
•
EIA report is prepared by the preparer of EIA documents. The report shall include at least
the following information: information about the organizer (developer) of the proposed
economic activity; information about the preparer of EIA documents; detailed information
according to the topics of the EIA program and also additional information: description of
the expected pollutants (names, calculations, hazardousness, risk group, etc.); description
of waste generation and management; components of the environment that could be
affected by the proposed economic activity; description and assessment of potential
impacts of the proposed economic activity on public health, fauna and flora, soil, earth
surface and underground, water, environmental air, climate, landscape, biodiversity,
economic conditions, cultural heritage and the interaction of these components; methods
that were used to predict and assess the effects on the environment; a description of
measures envisaged to avoid, reduce or offset negative environmental effects or to alleviate
their consequences; analysis of the alternatives and the indication of the reasons for the
choice, taking into account the best available modes and production of potential
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environmental impact, at least several alternatives (e.g. Alternative locations, timings,
technical and technological solutions, environmental impact mitigation measures) shall be
investigated in the report, including the “zero” alternative, that refers to the environmental
conditions and natural changes in the environment if the activity is not carried out and is
used as the environmental baseline evaluation and a base for assessment and comparisons;
identification of possible emergencies and accident-avoidance and emergency measures;
analysis of environmental monitoring data (if available) and plan for environmental
monitoring; a summary of all information considered in the report; other information that
shall be included in the report (a description of technical or practical problems encountered
by the preparer of the EIA documents in performing the EIA).
The developer informs the public about its completion and the forthcoming public hearing. Public
hearing is organized by the developer. The public may submit motivated proposals regarding the
environmental impact assessment and EIA report. According to the justified proposals of the public,
amended report is provided to EIA relevant parties, which make conclusions regarding the report
and the possibilities to carry out the proposed economic activity. Then the report, conclusions of the
EIA parties, a justified evaluation of the public proposals are provided to the competent authority.
After examination of the EIA documents Competent authority makes justified decision if the
proposed economic activity, taking into account its nature and size, may be carried in a chosen site.
Competent authority also informs the public about its decision and the reasons and considerations.
A positive decision adopted by the competent authority regarding the possibilities of carrying out a
proposed economic activity shall be valid for 5 years following its adoption. If the competent
authority decides that the proposed economic activity cannot be carried out on the chosen site
because of its potential negative environmental impacts, the proposed economic activity may not be
carried out.
17.1.3. Transboundary co-ordination (participation in environmental impact assessment process)
A proposed nuclear activity (nuclear power stations and other nuclear reactors, including
decommissioning of power stations or reactors; production, processing, enrichment, storage and
disposal of nuclear fuel) shall be subject to the transboundary EIA according to 1991 United
Nations Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo
convention).
For other projects the transboundary impacts are analysed through screening procedure. If
competent authority decides that project might have significant transboundary effects national and
transboundary EIA procedure will be applied.
In 1994 Lithuania signed an Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and
the Government of the Republic of Poland on the implementation of the Convention on
Environment Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context.
Lithuania has intention to sign bilateral agreements with Latvia and Belarus. The draft Agreement
between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of the Republic of
Belarus on the implementation of the Convention on Environment Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context was prepared and sent to Belarus.
Decisions made during 2004-2007 on EIA of proposed nuclear activities:
In August 2006, the Ministry of Environment made a decision regarding the Decommissioning of
Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant from environmental point of view: “To approve Ignalina Nuclear
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Power Plant Unit 1 decommissioning project for defuelling phase according to the presented EIA
Report”. Latvia was informed about the project in October 2004. Latvia had no intentions to
participate in EIA procedure. Belarus was not the Party of the Espoo Convention at that time.
In July 2004, the Ministry of Environment approved the EIA program of the construction of The
Near Surface Repository of the Radioactive Waste. The draft EIA report was sent to Latvia in
December 2004. Party responded that it will participate in the EIA process and provided comments
on EIA documentation. Then on request of the developer the EIA procedure was stopped. The
supplemented EIA report (additional alternative site was analysed) was submitted to Latvia and also
to Belarus for comments (because Belarus ratified Espoo convention on February 9, 2006) in
October 2006. The comments from the Parties were received in January 2007. The Ministry of
Environment in accordance with Espoo Convention requirements organised final transboundary
consultation meeting with Latvian experts on the 16th of March, 2007 (in Vilnius). The final
transboundary consultation meeting with Belarusian experts was organised on the 19th of April,
2007 (in Vilnius). During the consultation meetings the received comments from these countries
were discussed. In June 2007 the Ministry of Environment, taking into account the results of
transboundary consultations as well as the conclusions of relevant EIA parties made a justified
decision that the proposed activity may be carried in 2 chosen sites. The Government taking into
account the decision of Ministry of Environment will choose one site.
In December 2005, the Ministry of Environment approved the EIA program for the Construction of
the Facility for Interim Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel From Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant Units I
and II. Latvia and Belarus were notified and provided with draft EIA program in December 2005.
Parties responded that they will participate in EIA process and provided their comments. The draft
EIA report was submitted to Latvia and Belarus for comments in January 2007. The comments were
received at the beginning of April 2007. Final transboundary consultation meetings were organised
at the beginning of September. It is planned that Ministry of Environment will make a justified
decision regarding this activity in October, 2007.
In February 2007, the Ministry of Environment approved the EIA program for the Construction of
the Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Storage facilities at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant.
Latvia and Belarus were notified and provided with draft EIA program in July 2006. Parties
responded that they will participate in EIA process and provided their comments in August 2006.
In July 2007, environmental impact assessment for the construction of nuclear power plant in
Lithuania has begun. Ministry of Environment according to Espoo Convention has sent notification
and environmental impact assessment program to the countries which may be affected by the
proposed activity.
17.2. Implementing provisions for fulfilment of the above mentioned criteria
The structural components of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant are designed in accordance with the
specification set forth in "Design Safety Regulations of Nuclear Power Plants (OPB-83)". The generic
requirement of this document is that safety-related systems and elements of nuclear power plants have
to be able to fulfill their functions under all conditions. This implies that they have to accommodate
stresses imposed by natural phenomena as well as mechanical, thermal, chemical and other impacts
which may arise during design basis accidents.
The term "external events" (relative to a nuclear power plant) covers such natural phenomena as a
earthquakes, flooding, strong winds, lightning, snow and ice, and such man-made events as aircraft
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crashes, industrial explosion, sabotage and terrorist action. On site fire and flooding are usually also
considered as external events.
The mentioned site-related factors likely to affect the safety of nuclear installation were evaluated
partly during the design stage of Ignalina NPP in accordance with existed requirements. The site was
originally selected taking into account relevant factors like the above-mentioned and the population
density at various distances. Present legal provisions to maintain the environmental conditions of the
sites include restrictions for building activities close to the site. There are no chemical installations, gas
pipelines and other facilities and human activities that might endanger the plant safety.
Safety analysis of nuclear power plants requires the consideration of an "Aircraft crash on the reactor
hall". The consideration of this event is proposed in a list of hypothetical accidents defined in 1990 by
the Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute, Moscow, Russia. This requirement was imposed after
completion of the Ignalina NPP.
The requirements for considering an aircraft crash therefore were not imposed on any RBMK plant.
This was due mainly to three major considerations:
• There were no such regulatory requirements at the time when the plants were developed and no
such requirements were introduced by the regulatory bodies;
• Such events are sufficiently unlikely, besides, the RBMK sites are situated reasonably far from
airports;
• Until recently, there were no reliable statistics on flight incidents and fatal accidents involving
both civil and military aircraft, which could be used when considering such events regarding
nuclear power plants.
The fist comprehensive study of seismic activity of Lithuania was carried out in 1988 as a part of reexamination of safety of Ignalina NPP. The experts came to the conclusion that seismic hazard was not
sufficiently assessed when designing INPP although local and international regulations insisted on it.
In order to improve the situation the experts proposed to install a seismic network and monitor local
seismicity.
The group of industrialised states G-7 approved the plan of actions for improving the safety of Soviet
nuclear reactors in 1992. A fund named "Account of Nuclear Safety" provided an irrevocable loan for
Lithuania to renovate safety systems of INPP in 1994. One of the projects considered installation of a
Seismic Alarm System (SAS). This system was designed to issue alarm when damaging seismic wave
approaches the INPP. The SAS was complemented with the Seismic Monitoring System (SMS). The
SMS was designed to collect data of local seismicity and dynamic behaviour of structures of INPP.
The SMS consists of six vertical short period seismometers installed in boreholes with at the depth of
30 m located at a distance of ~30 km from the INPP. The signals of the seismometers are transformed
to digital form and telemetered continuously to the control center in INPP. The server records data of
seismometers if a local or teleseismic event is detected.
SAS and SMS including four outside seismic stations on territory of Lithuania were installed in June of
1999. Two more seismic stations had to be installed on the territory of Latvia and Belarus. However,
no construction has been started in 2007. Seismic alarm and monitoring system has been put into trial
operation in 1999. Since 2006 seismic alarm and monitoring system is under modification in order to
improve its reliability.
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17.3. Activities related to maintaining the continued safety acceptability of the
Nuclear Installation, taking account of site-related factors
A study of available catalogues of historical earthquake observations in Latvia and Lithuania
indicates that the average seismicity of those regions does not deviate significantly from the
seismicity of southern Fennoscandia. Furthermore, there is no indication that the seismicity in the
near-field of the Ignalina NPP deviates from the average. Therefore, in the first approach, the
average occurrence frequencies of earthquakes of various magnitudes in southern Sweden are
adopted for expressing the seismicity in the Ignalina near-field and far-field. The distribution of
focal depths is also assumed to be the same as in Sweden. Since the sedimentary rock cover below
Ignalina is similar to the sedimentary rock cover in parts of Scania (e.g. Barsebäck), transformation
of seismic waves, coming from the harder basement rock, is assumed to be the same in Ignalina as
in this part of Scania (southern-most Sweden).
Thus, the uniform hazard response spectra for outcropping sedimentary rock in southern Sweden
are adopted to define a reference seismic hazard level. It should be observed that the amplification
of the seismic waves when propagating from the hard basement rock through the sedimentary
layers, of the order of 50 per cent, is included in the spectra (as well as the doubling of incoming
waves due to reflection, of course). Possible additional soil amplification in Ignalina has to be
considered. Such effects cannot be assessed with any good precision without detailed information of
the soil properties. However, issues of wave amplification in soft rock and soil and de-amplification
with embedment depth can be treated approximately, leading to a further amplification of the
Swedish spectra as described below.
Historical data and recent instrumental measurements refute the conventional opinion of Lithuania
as a non-seismic territory. In comparison to Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania is the most quiet territory
in terms of seismic activity. Only one strong event was registered in the Lithuanian territory in
1909. However, dozens of hazardous historical earthquakes shuttered the earth close to the
Lithuanian border in Belarus and Latvia. A rapture of the ground was reported close to the eastern
border of Lithuania, resulting from a strong earthquake in the beginning of 20th century. Its traces
are recognizable until now, presenting a spectacular geoindicator of earthquake danger.
Seeking to assess the modern seismic activity in Lithuania and the adjacent Baltic Sea area,
registration data by the Scandinavian seismic network were collected, for there were no goodquality seismic stations available in Lithuania until recently. More than a hundred low-intensity
(M<3) seismic events were recorded by seismic stations since seventies. Because of low magnitude
and long distance from the epicentres to the registration stations, uncertainty determining the
epicentres remains, as well as the recognition of the nature of the source of events, which can be
either of natural or artificial origin. The program EXFILTER (SEISAN program suite) has been
used to refine the data set. Against the background of unevenly scattered events, some regular
clusters were recognised, which mark areas of enhanced tectonic activity. This particularly concerns
the Baltic Sea territory.
The territory of Lithuania is not very seismically active, being in a stable, intraplate tectonic setting,
but historical data show that earthquakes of destructive character have occurred in the past. During
the last several years, stations of the Scandinavian seismologic system fixed a number of weak
seismic events in the territory of Lithuania. Other studies during the last decade show that much of
the Earth’s crust is affected by horizontal tectonic stresses. Most deformation (about 90%) is related
to tectonic faults, an abundant system of which characterizes the territory of Lithuania.
Seismological studies in other countries show that only 2% of seismic deformation energy
discharges by earthquakes whose intensity in less than 5 (using the MSK-64 scale). Thus, the
occurrence of strong, though rare, earthquakes in the territory of Lithuania may be a natural and
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unavoidable phenomenon. That is, the Earth’s crust in Lithuania may be considered to be in a
“seismic” condition.
In soviet time a governmental commission evaluated the seismic hazard level of INPP (Conclusions
of the Governmental commission for seismic hazard assessment in INPP on the seismic hazard level
in Ignalina NPP region. Moscow, 1988). The evidences are too scarce to enable evaluation of the
periodicity of the earthquakes in the Ignalina INPP area. Still, the listed evidences of the location of
the Druksiai lake at the intersection of faults showing recent activity, the location of INPP close to
the active fault zone of the Druksiai graben, and the occurrence of the earthquakes of intensity 7 not
far away from INPP demonstrates that there is high probability of recurrence of the seismic event of
similar intensity in the future.
The Russian company Hydroprojekt performed a seismic potential analysis of the INPP. Based on
historical data and soil properties, it was concluded that the maximum possible earthquake is
MSK64=7, maximum magnitude 4, epicentral distance 5-10 km, maximum acceleration 0.1g. It was
recommended to perform general seismic zoning and microseismic zoning.
The microseismic zoning was performed for INPP in 1988. The study was conducted by the
Institute of the Building Geotechnical Investigations of the joint enterprise "Building
investigations". The seismic micro-zoning was based on the results of the geotechnical, geophysical
and seismic-engineering multidisciplinary studies. Also, the modeling technique was applied. It was
observed that INPP site is quazy-homogeneous with respect to the seismic properties of the soil.
The top 10 meters soil is of 3rd class (according to Russian norms SNiP II-7-81). At the depth of
the base of the structure the maximum calculated seismic intensity was estimated at 7 grades and
the project seismicity 6 grades. The seismic acceleration was estimated at amax=100 cm/s2=0.1 g
(assuming Tmax=0.15-0.4 s) and 75 cm/s2=0.075 g for the base depth of 10 m.
Integrated geological mapping was performed in the INPP area and surroundings in 1988-1995. It
comprised seismic profiling, potential field, hydogeological, geotechnical studies, drilling activities.
No additional seismological information was collected. However, the studies resulted in detailed
identification of the tectonic structures (faults), sedimentary layers and crystalline basement. The
geotechnical soil properties were studied. The measurement was performed in a few deep wells that
provide information on P-wave velocities from the near-top of the sedimentary cover to the
crystalline basement. Two types of faults are distinguished in the Ignalina area, i.e. the oldest preplatform and younger platform ones. The former does not dissect the sedimentary cover, whereas
the latter penetrates into the sediments overlying the crystalline basement. The faults detected in the
sedimentary cover are oriented N-S, W-E, NW-SE and NE-SW. The faults exceed 20 km in length.
The amplitudes are in the range of 10-55m.
The tectonic activity of the faults is evidenced by geodetic measurements of recent movements of
the ground surface in the polygon established around the INPP area (Druksiai lake). The data
collected during 1989-1998 indicates that the vertical movements of the ground are related to the
activity of the tectonic blocks bounded by the faults of the crystalline basement and sedimentary
cover. The relative magnitude of the vertical movements of the blocks reaches 0.5 mm per year.
Maps of the Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) with 10 % probability of transcendence in 50 years
and 100 years were compiled for the Baltic region in 1998. The values of the INPP are range in
order of 50-60 cm/s2.
In 2004-2006 were reviewed documents, related to sitting of a near surface repository for low and
intermediate level short-lived radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel interim storage facility. It were
assessed the possibilities of sitting of geological disposal facility for long-lived radioactive waste.
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Evaluation of the results of first stage of geological and engineering survey of new NPP was
performed in 2006.
17.4. Internationals arrangements, including those with neighboring countries,
as necessary
Information about nuclear facilities and activities on territory of Lithuania shall be submitted to
neighboring countries according the bilateral agreements (as in paragraph 16.4.) and The Regulation
on Providing of General Data Concerning Plans for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste to the
Commission of the European Communities (as in paragraph 15.1.).
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Article 18: DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
•
•
•
the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several reliable levels
and methods of protection (defence in depth) against the release of radioactive materials,
with a view to preventing the occurrence of accidents and to mitigating their radiological
consequences should they occur;
the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear installation are
proven by experience or qualified by testing or analysis;
the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable
operation, with specific consideration of human factors and the man-machine interface.
18.1. Description of licensing process, including summary of national laws,
regulations and requirements related to design and construction of Nuclear
Installations
A nuclear power plant or a nuclear reactor may be designed only subject to a resolution adopted by
the Government of the Republic of Lithuania on the basis of the law on the construction of such a
power plant or a nuclear reactor. Other nuclear facilities may be designed, and the nuclear power
plant may be reconstructed subject to a resolution adopted by the Government of the Republic of
Lithuania on the recommendation by the Ministry of Economy. A particular design of a nuclear
facility is prepared subject to:
• the drafting and approval of a special site selection scheme after consideration of several
alternative construction sites in a manner prescribed by the Law on Territorial Planning;
• the approval of a detailed plan of the territory;
• legally effected in a prescribed manner taking over of the land intended for the construction
site for public needs.
In the manner prescribed by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, the construction or
reconstruction design of a nuclear facility is co-ordinated with the following state institutions: the
Ministry of the Environment; the Ministry of Economy; the Ministry of National Defence; the
Ministry of Social Security and Labour; the Ministry of the Interior; the State Security Department;
the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI); the local authority, whose territory or its
part is within the sanitary protection zone of the facility.
Designs for the construction, reconstruction, upgrading, expansion, dismantling and
decommissioning of nuclear facilities is subject to a comprehensive state expert evaluation. The
expert evaluation is organized by the Ministry of the Environment upon receiving the design
submitted by the client. The construction designs of nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors may
be submitted for additional international expert evaluation organized by the client. The findings of
the expert evaluation are incorporated into the comprehensive state expert evaluation findings. The
evaluation expenses are borne by the client.
The Government or an institution authorized by it issues an authorization for the construction or
reconstruction of a nuclear facility in the prescribed manner. The builder/client seeking to obtain an
authorization to construct or reconstruct a nuclear facility must submit:
• an application of the prescribed form;
• a licence issued by VATESI to construct a nuclear facility;
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•
•
•
•
•
•
a document certifying the builder's/client's title or other rights to the plot of land;
the design of the nuclear facility with the prior official approval following the established
procedure;
findings of expert examination of the nuclear facility design;
a decision of a competent institution that the intended economic activity is permitted on the
chosen site from the point of view of environmental impact;
a document on the appointment of the chief technical supervision officer of the
construction of the nuclear facility;
a certificate of cadastral measurements of the nuclear facility and its formal registration (in
the event of reconstruction of the nuclear facility).
An authorization for construction or reconstruction of a nuclear facility is issued within 20 days
after the day of filing of the documents, at the latest, after examining them and ascertaining that
construction of the nuclear facility conforms to the requirements of the regime of the building site
as laid down by the document of territorial planning.
Where an authorization for the construction or reconstruction of a nuclear facility is not issued the
Government or an institution authorized by it within 20 days informs the builder/client about it in
writing, by giving a reasoned justification for refusal to issue an authorization. An authorization for
construction or reconstruction of a nuclear facility becomes invalid:
• by a court decision;
• by a decision of the Ministry of the Environment when it is discovered that it was issued
unlawfully;
• where, within 10 years after the date of issue of the authorization the nuclear facility was
not commissioned.
The rules for issuing authorizations for construction or reconstruction of a nuclear facility are
defined by the Government. The institution authorized by the Government manages records of issue
of authorizations for the construction or reconstruction of nuclear facilities, their list and statistical
reports.
State control and supervision of the construction of nuclear facilities is exercised during all the
major stages of work - design and construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning.
During all the stages of work, compliance with the conditions and requirements set for nuclear
safety, radiation protection regulations and other statutory acts is controlled and supervised by the
following institutions within their competence: VATESI, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of the
Environment, the Ministry of Social Security and Labour, the Ministry of the Interior, the State
Security Department, the Radiation Protection Centre and the county Governor.
Sanitary protection and monitoring zones are established around nuclear facilities. The size of the
area depends on the purpose of the facility and the requirements of operation safety rules and
standards. The boundaries of the sanitary and monitoring zones are fixed in the documentation of
the facility construction design.
Prior to the commissioning of the facility, all the populations are resettled from the sanitary
protection zone in the manner prescribed by the Government. Any activities as well as construction
of installations and buildings unrelated to the operation or service of the facility are prohibited
therein. Land, woods and water bodies on the territory of the sanitary protection zone may be used
only subject to an approval of the Operating Organization and permits of the Ministry of
Environment and the Ministry of Health. The basic requirements for the sanitary protection and
monitoring zones of a nuclear power plant or a nuclear reactor, and the conditions for
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decommissioning conditions are stipulated by the law on nuclear power plants or on nuclear
reactors.
Organizations, involved in design, construction, installation and adjustment work, as well as
companies which manufacture nuclear plant equipments, has prepared quality assurance programs of
their own relating specifically to the activities in which they are engaged.
18.2. Implementation of the "defense-in-depth" concept
A necessity to implement the "defence-in-depth" concept at all stages of safety related activities
(including design and construction) is stated in the "General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant
Safety", item 1.2.3 of which reads: "1.2.3. The safety of a nuclear plant shall be guaranteed by
applying of the principle of "defence-in-depth", i.e. by the sequential implementation of protection
measures based on a system of barriers to prevent the spread of ionizing radiation and radioactive
materials to the environment, and systems of technical and organizational measures to protect these
barriers and retain their effectiveness, and also to provide direct protection for the population.
The system of barriers includes:
• the fuel matrix;
• the fuel element cladding;
• the boundary of the primary coolant circuit;
• the hermetically sealed protective enclosure surrounding localizing safety systems.
The system of technical and organizational measures includes:
• the selection of an appropriate site for the nuclear plant;
• the establishment of a sanitary-protection zone and a monitoring zone around the plant;
• a conservative approach to plant design incorporating fail-safe characteristics in the reactor
itself and specific safety systems;
• quality assurance designed to guarantee the requisite systems (components) of plant and of
all work carried out at the plant;
• nuclear plant operation in accordance with norms and technical requirements;
• maintenance of safety-related systems in good operating conditions through the
implementation of preventive maintenance measures and replacement of worn-out
components;
• timely diagnosis of defects, detection of any deviations from normal functioning, and
implementation of measures to remove their causes;
• organization of an effective system for registration of the operational results and monitoring
measures;
• implementation of measures designed to prevent initiating events from developing into
design-basis accidents, and design-basis accidents from developing into beyond-designbasis accidents;
• mitigation of the consequences of accidents which could not be effectively forestalled
through localization of the radioactive materials released;
• measures designed to protect localizing safety systems against destruction during beyonddesign-basis accidents and to maintain them in a functional state;
• preparation, and scrupulous implementation when required, of emergency plans for the site
itself and the area surrounding the site;
• selection and training of operating personnel for the actions required in both normal and
emergency conditions;
• inculcation of safety culture.
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The principle of "defence-in-depth" is activated at all stages of safety-related activities. During
normal operation all barriers and all means designed to protect them must be in good operating
condition. If any of the barriers provided in the plant design or any of the means intended to protect
those barriers (in the frames of justified conditions of safe operation) are found to be out of order,
operation at power is not permitted.
The extent, to which the various safety functions are to be implemented, is specified in norms and
technical requirements, and for each individual plant shall be stated and justified in the technical
design" (The end of item 1.2.3).
The INPP safety is provided by engineering devices and organizational activities, which ensure that
the internal and external exposure of staff and public, pollution of environment by radioactive
products under normal and design accidents do not exceed the prescribed limits.
The immediate cross rupture of Dy 900 pressure header resulted in a primary circuit leakage is
taken as a maximum design accident. In accordance with the General Regulations for Nuclear
Power Plant Safety the safety systems are designed in such way, which allows ensuring the plant
safety in the event of any design accident.
The key safety design principles appear as follows:
• Ensuring of reliable core cooling both under normal and emergency conditions;
• Ensuring of full localization of the coolant released from the circuit in the event of the
accidents resulted in disconnecting or putting the process equipment out of order;
• Ensuring of full localization of the active core releases in the event of primary circuit tube
rupture which is regarded as the most severe from the radiological point of view;
• Ensuring of premise protection from collapse under emergency conditions in the event of
overpressure in rooms and a primary circuit tube rupture;
• Ensuring of equipment and pipelines protection from breaking in emergency conditions in
the event of overpressure in the primary circuit.
The Plant safety is provided by:
• Primary Circuit design, which ensures the satisfactory conditions for natural coolant
circulation;
• Designing of the Circulation Pump with additional excursion, which ensures the availability
of extra pump force in the event of disconnection for the time required to change over to the
reactor core cooling mode with natural circulation;
• Locating pipelines and equipment with core coolant in protected rooms;
• Locating the Primary Circuit pipelines in the tight compartments, which are designed to
withstand the overpressure in the event of a pipeline rupture;
• Using hermetically sealed pipe ducts which penetrate the rooms with different design
pressure;
• Installing leakage belts on pipes which enable to reduce the coolant flow rate in the event of
a pipe rupture;
• Backing up safety devices and equipment for normal operation;
• Implementing activities to ensure integrity of ECCS pipes in the event of Primary Circuit
pipe rupture;
• Installing the required number of process control devices;
• Supplying reliable amount of power to the users who provide reactor control, operation and
cooling;
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•
•
Inspecting metal state and welds of pipes and equipment first while installing and then
regularly while operating;
Providing activities to improve quality of normal operation and safety devices while
manufacturing.
18.3. Prevention of accidents and their mitigation
In accordance with the "General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Safety" (items 1.2.12 and
1.2.14) the following measures should be taken for prevention of accidents and their mitigation:
Reactor and nuclear plant designs shall provide for technical means and organizational measures to
prevent design-basis accidents and to limit their consequences and to ensure safety in the face of
any of the initiating events anticipated in the design, with the assumption of one additional failure
(independent of the initiating event) among any of the following safety system elements: an active
element or a passive element having mechanical moving parts, or a personnel error independent of
the initiating event.
In addition to the single failure (independent of the initiating event) of one of the elements
mentioned above, account must be taken of undetected failures among elements which are not
monitored during plant operation and which can also lead to a violation of safe operating
conditions, thereby influencing the development of the accident.
Reactor and nuclear plant designs shall provide measures to control beyond-design-basis accidents,
if such accidents are not excluded by virtue of the fail-safe characteristics of the reactor installation
and the principles of its construction.
The design of the reactor facility and NPP includes engineering arrangements and organizational
measures to prevent design accidents and to mitigate their consequences. The design allows
ensuring safety at any single designed initial event with overlapping of one event which is
independent on the initial event of the failure of any of the following safety system element: an
active or passive element having mechanical moveable parts or caused by a human error which does
not depend on the initial event.
In addition, the design allows to account not only the failure of one of the above elements which
does not depend on the initial event, but a number of unidentified failures of the elements which are
not controlled in the course of operation but the failure of which has some impact on the accident
generation.
18.4. Measures for ensuring the application of technologies proven by experience
or qualified by testing or analysis
"General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Safety" require (item 1.2.4) that the technical and
organizational arrangements made to ensure plant safety must be proven by prior experience or
testing, experimental investigations and operational tests on prototypes, and must conform to the
norms and technical requirements adopted for the nuclear power sector. This approach is to be taken
not only in the design of equipment and of the plant as a whole, but also in the actual manufacture
of equipment and in the construction and operation (decommissioning) of the plant.
The engineering and organizational decisions taken to ensure INNP safety have been proven and
checked by previous practice or tests, appropriate studies, operational experience of the prototypes.
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It means that they are in full conformity to the nuclear codes and regulations as defined in the
Feasibility Report for Reactor Facility.
When the first plants with RBMK-1000 were being designed, the initial emergency events were
listed. Besides, the most dangerous ways of their generation were considered.
The original list of initial events has been sufficiently extended on the basis of experience gained
from the reactor facilities operated at Leningrad, Kursk and Chernobyl NNPs and to meet the NPP
safe operation requirements which lately have been tightened to meet the international nuclear
excellence requirements in general and to implement INPP SAR recommendations in particular.
Applying the proven technology while performing civil work, which is to be supported by
appropriate QA activities, provides the required quality of construction.
18.5. Requirements on reliable, stable and easily manageable operation with
specific consideration of human factors and man-machine interface
In the above mentioned “The General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Safety" (VD-B-001-0-97)
is stated that NPP design should provide means to eliminate single personnel errors or lessen their
consequences, including those during the maintenance.
The “Nuclear Safety Regulations for the Reactor’s of Nuclear Power Plants” (VD-T-001-0-97)
define in detail the requirements of the "General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Safety" as to
ensuring nuclear safety. In general terms the above mentioned regulations require that design of the
NPP’s (their systems and structures) shall be optimal for operator performance.
It is required that:
• the working areas and working environment of the site personnel shall be designed according
to ergonomic principles;
• systematic consideration of human factors and the human-machine interface shall be included
in the design process at an early stage and shall continue throughout the entire process, to
ensure an appropriate and clear distinction of functions between operating personnel and the
automatic systems provided;
• the human-machine interface shall be designed to provide the operators with comprehensive
but easily manageable information, compatible with the necessary decision and action times;
• verification and validation of aspects of human factors shall be included at appropriate stages
to confirm that the design adequately accommodates all necessary operator actions;
• as equipment operator, the operator shall be provided with sufficient information on
parameters associated with individual plant systems and equipment to confirm that the
necessary safety actions can be initiated safely;
• the design shall be aimed at promoting the success of operator actions with due regard for the
time available for action, the physical environment to be expected and the psychological
demands to be made on the operator. The need for intervention by the operator on a short
time-scale shall be kept to a minimum. It shall be taken in to account in the design that the
necessity for such intervention is only acceptable provided that the designer can demonstrate
that the operator has sufficient time to make the decision and to act; that the information
necessary for the operator is simply and unambiguously presented.
Summary of the regulations and requirements relating to the design and construction of nuclear
installation:
1. General Safety Regulations for Nuclear Power Plants;
2. Nuclear Safety Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Reactor Installations;
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
General Regulations for the Development of Regulatory Documents on Nuclear Power
Safety;
Regulations for the Organization Operating Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant;
Regulations for Licensing of Nuclear Power Related Activities;
Requirements for Licensing of Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant Unit;
Constructions of Exceptional Significance the Design and Construction Process of which
can be Performed by the Design and Construction Enterprises which have Received a
Qualification Certificate for such Activities from the Ministry of Environment;
Attesting of Design and Construction Enterprises;
Procedure for the Construction Design Process;
Structure of a Construction Project;
Procedure for the Establishment of Construction Works Design Conditions, Co-Ordination
and Approval of Construction Projects;
Expert Examination of the Construction Project and of the Construction;
Procedure for the State Supervision over the Compliance with Special Requirements for
Construction Works;
Procedure for the Acceptance of Constructions as Fit for Use;
Estimation of the Failure Conditions in Construction Works;
Justification of Construction Process;
The Issues of Environmental Protection in the Construction Design Project;
Procedure for Issuing of Permissions to Build and Demolish Constructions;
The Essential Requirements Pertaining to Construction Works. Mechanical Steadiness and
Strength;
The Essential Requirements Pertaining to Construction Works. Safety in Case of Fire;
The Essential Requirements Pertaining to Construction Works. Hygiene, Health,
Environmental Protection;
The Essential Requirements Pertaining to Construction Works. Safety in Use;
The Essential Requirements Pertaining to Construction Works. Protection Against Noise;
The Essential Requirements Pertaining to Construction Works. Energy Economy and Heat
Retention;
Seismic Design Standards for Nuclear Power Plants;
Technical Safety Justification for Nuclear Power Plants;
Technical Justification of Reactor Installation RBMK-1500.
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Article 19: OPERATION
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
The initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon an appropriate
safety analysis and a commissioning program demonstrating that the installation, as
constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;
Operational limits and conditions derived from the safety analyses, tests and operational
experience are defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for
operation;
Operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are conducted
in accordance with approved procedures;
Procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational occurrences and
to accidents;
Necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields is available
throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation;
Incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the
relevant license to the regulatory body;
Program to collect and analyze operating experience are established, the results
obtained and the conclusions drawn are acted upon and the existing mechanisms are
used to share important experience with international bodies and with other operating
organizations and regulatory bodies;
The generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear
installation is kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both in
activity and in volume, and necessary treatment and storage of spent fuel and waste
directly related to the operation and on the same site as that of the nuclear installation
take into consideration conditioning and disposal.
19.1. Description of licensing process, including summary of national laws,
regulations and requirements related to operation of Nuclear Installations
According to the laws and regulations acting in the Lithuanian Republic any activity relating to the
nuclear energy is allowed if the state control and supervision authorities have issued the relevant
license (Law of the Republic of Lithuania on Nuclear Energy; General Regulation on Safety of
Nuclear Power Plants; Rules of Nuclear Safety of Reactor Facilities at Nuclear Power Plants; NPP
Operating Organization. General Requirements; Standing Order on INPP Operating Organization;
General Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants Maintenance; Provision on Licensing of Nuclear
Related Activities in Energy Sector; Requirements on Procedure of Issue of License for Operation
of INPP; Provision on State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate - VATESI).
Construction of a new nuclear power plant or a new nuclear reactor, as well as decommissioning of
any nuclear installation can be commenced only if the relevant Law proposed by the Government
has been enacted by the Seimas (Parliament). Construction of a new nuclear power plant or a new
nuclear reactor, as well as decommissioning of any nuclear installation can be commenced only if
the technical design has been duly approved and relevant license (permit) has been issued by the
state control and supervision authorities.
Nuclear Power Plant is put to operation in accordance with the programs of physical, energy startup and commissioning of NPP. The state control and supervision authorities shall endorse the
programs. The license for industrial operation of each Unit of NPP can be granted to the NPP
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operating organization by the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) energy on the
basis of positive results of commissioning works, availability of updated technical safety
justification of reactor facility and NPP and statement on NPP Unit acceptance to industrial
operation and endorsement of other state control and surveillance authorities.
License for operation of Unit 1 meeting the Western practice was granted to Ignalina NPP in 1999
for 5 years period. On 29 July 2004 the License was reviewed and extended for unlimited time.
According to the Resolution of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania No 1491, dated 2004
11 25, INPP Unit 1 was shutdown on 31 December 2004 and it will no longer produce electricity.
However, its operation license is to remain valid until nuclear fuel has been unloaded from the Unit.
Unit 1 was granted a status of permanently shutdown unit in December 2006 and the license
conditions were reviewed on 6 March 2007.
The process of licensing INPP Unit 2 began in mid – 1999 and was finished in 2004 – VATESI,
having analyzed the application documents and assessed safety of INPP Unit 2, issued on 15
September 2004 license empowering Ignalina NPP to operate Unit 2.
Following the decommissioning of Unit 1 at INPP, the necessity arose of substantiating safety of
single operational Unit. Therefore the Ignalina NPP submitted to VATESI Safety case for single
operating power Unit 2 of INPP in which assessed the safety level of Unit 2 with Unit 1 shut down,
conducted the analysis of the factors that may negatively affect Unit 2 safety, and identified
corrective measures aimed at mitigating negative effects of the factors. VATESI reviewed these
documents by the end of 2005 and stated the safety level of single operating INPP Unit 2 following
the final closure of Unit 1 to be acceptable.
Operational organization bears complete responsibility for safe operation of Ignalina NPP in
accordance with the requirements established by the corresponding legislation of the Lithuanian
Republic, regulations and standards of nuclear safety and radiation protection, operational
organization procedures, discipline and organizational norms, as well as License for operation
including measures towards accident prevention and reduction of accident consequences, recording
and storage of the nuclear materials and radioactive substance, environment protection and
environmental monitoring in the sanitary-protective zone and surveillance zone and monitoring of
the Ignalina NPP operation purpose, i.e. its operation shall meet the objectives it was designed and
constructed for.
Operational organization responsibility can not be reduced due to the independent activity and
responsibility of enterprises, institutions, organizations and their co-operations, officials and other
persons performing works or providing services to the Operational organization (designers,
suppliers, civil organizations, commissioning and repair organizations, etc.), as well as due to the
independent activity and responsibility of state control and surveillance authorities.
At present, in the frame of the availability of the Operation License, The Regulatory Authority
grants a separate permit for restarting of the unit after each scheduled outage and unplanned
stopping.
19.2 Description of steps undertaken by the Contracting Parties to perform their
obligations under Article 19 of Convention:
19.2.1. The initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation
The commissioning program was developed prior to Ignalina NPP start-up. The Program was
agreed with the General Designer of INPP, General Designer of Reactor, Scientific Adviser and
endorsed by the regulating body and approved by the Operating organization. Pre-commissioning
tests gave the evidence that the whole INPP and its individual units, safety systems and
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components, normal operation systems, safety-related systems operate as designed. Each Unit of
Ignalina NPP was brought to first criticality and power in accordance with the statuary procedures
upon receipt of the corresponding permit from the regulating authority.
When implementing each INPP unit commissioning program, the physical parameters of the
reactor, safety systems and all components were determined, as well as the operating parameters of
the safety-related systems and components, and the limits and conditions of safe operation. The
operation procedures were corrected on the basis of start-up work performance. Following the fullscale tests of the systems and components, each unit was accepted to put into commercial operation.
The Regulatory Authority granted an operating permit for each plant unit. In accordance with the
Operation Licenses conditions, annual permits shall be obtained after each outage.
19.2.2. Operational limits and conditions
It is stated in clause 5.1.2 of "General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Provision" that
the principal document defining safe operation is the technical specification, which lays down main
modes and functions of safe operation as well as general sequence the performance of all operations
related to plant safety, and also specifies the limits and conditions of safe operation. The limits and
conditions of safe operation shall be justified by design and/or other relevant documents”.
For Ignalina, limits and conditions of safe operation was set and justified in the Technical Safety
Justification prepared by the plant Main Designer (NIKIET, Moscow) and Scientific Adviser (RNC
KI, Moscow) and the General Designer (St-Petersburg, Russia). In the frames of in-depth safety
assessment (Safety Analysis Report of Western style, SAR-1) the limits and conditions of safe
operation were reviewed and their correctness was confirmed.
Technical Specification - The basic document specifying the safety of Ignalina NPP and
determining the limits and conditions of safe operation - shall be reviewed every three years. If
necessary, the relevant corrections are incorporated to the Technical Specification in case the
norms, standards and regulations have changed in course of system and equipment modifications or
operation experience of INPP enrichments. Each new issue of the Technical Specification or after
each update of the Technical Specification it shall be endorsed by the Regulating authority of the
Lithuanian Republic. The last version of the Technical Specification entered into force on 9
September 2004.
In case the established limits and conditions of safe operation can not be met at any Unit of INPP
for reactor power operation, reactor shall be shutdown.
19.2.3. Operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation
In accordance with the Quality Assurance Program and Documentation control system acting at
INPP all works relating to operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of all systems and
equipment, including nuclear facility and safety related-systems shall be performed only on the basis
and in accordance with the approved documents.
Document preparation, approval of its acceptability and support is performed in accordance with the
established procedures.
Normal and emergency operating procedures, as well as testing procedures are developed in the
operation-by-operation manner. There are the stops provided to assess results. The most important
operations are performed under the direct supervision of another person. All actions of both the
executors and their supervisors are recorded and signed in the relevant reports. The application area,
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limitations, responsibilities and actions of the personnel to detect normal operation failures are
determined in each procedure.
Any testing at Ignalina NPP not covered by the Technical Specification and operation procedures
shall be performed in accordance with the special programmes presenting measurers to provide
testing safety.
Prior to the document entering into force (including testing programs) the applicability, usability of
the documents shall be confirmed (review, endorsement and approval). Confirmation of
applicability shall be based on the critical analysis of adequacy of the measures providing safe and
correct operation and shall be performed in compliance with the established procedures. The most
important documents shall be agreed with the State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI).
All documents and records are registered in special electronic system (ARKI). These systems, on
one hand, provide storage of documentation electronic copies and, on the other hand, access of all
INPP users to the corresponding documents.
In course of preparation and registration of the documents each document shall be provided with the
relevant identification according to the priority of each document with regard to safety.
Plant personnel use only the documents passed review, approval and registration. All key personnel
are provided with access to ARKI system purposed to search of any necessary document.
Results of all works, first of all related to the safety shall be recorded in report documentation and
records (reports, check-lists, statements, logs, etc.), which are made on the material providing their
safe storage within the required time. Documents and records related to the safety shall be kept all
operation life-period of the plant and subsequently handed over to the State archive for storage.
In order to supply personnel with correct, currently acting at Ignalina NPP documentation the
maintaining of documentation is provided. The maintaining process covers the following stages: to
put the document to operation, to determine commencement/completion dates of document using, to
multiply the relevant numbers of copies, to distribute among the personnel, to analyse the existing
documents referred to the new documentation, to incorporate corrections, to mark the uncontrolled
copies in due way, to review and replace the obsolete documentation, to hand over the
documentation to the State archive and to destroy the documentation not subject to storage.
Replacement and incorporation of corrections to the document do not require the corresponding
document to be taken from the personnel.
Documents developed by external organizations (design, etc.) are subject to review and their
applicability is subject to approval prior to their using at Ignalina NPP.
All copies of the documents availability of which is currently sustained shall be taken away
(eliminated) from the personnel.
The originals of the documents and records are stored in within the established storage time.
Documents and records, related to safety are stored for the period of operation. Elimination of the
documents and records not in action anymore and their archiving shall be performed in accordance
with the established procedures.
Access to the archive documents and records shall be provided in accordance with the relevant
procedures.
Reproduction of the records is ensured considering any and all changes of the documentation
preparation which may take place in the future in course of information system modifications.
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Following the expiration of the validity and storage term of all the documentation at INPP, it is
reviewed by the expert committee in order to make a decision regarding the documentation either to
be handed over to the State archive for its permanent storage or discarding. The Director General of
the INPP approves the above-mentioned decision. The documentation containing the decisions of
the expert committee shall be stored permanently.
Documentation that considers having scientific and practical value for the Lithuanian Republic shall
be handed over to the State archive. As a rule, these are safety-related documents and records.
In compliance with the Quality Assurance Program and Documentation control system acting at
INPP all works relating to operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of all systems and
equipment, including nuclear facility and safety related-systems shall be performed only on the
basis and in accordance with the approved documents. Document preparation, approval of its
acceptability and support is performed in accordance with the established procedures.
Normal and emergency operating procedures, as well as testing procedures are developed in the
operation-by-operation manner. There are the stops provided to assess results. The most important
operations are performed under the direct supervision of another person. All actions of both the
executors and their supervisors are recorded and signed in the relevant reports. The application area,
limitations, responsibilities and actions of the personnel to detect normal operation failures are
determined in each procedure.
Any testing at Ignalina NPP not covered by the Technical Specification and operation procedures
shall be performed in accordance with the special programmes presenting measurers to provide
testing safety.
Prior to the document entering into force (including testing programs) the applicability, usability of
the documents shall be confirmed (review, endorsement and approval). Confirmation of
applicability shall be based on the critical analysis of adequacy of the measures providing safe and
correct operation and shall be performed in compliance with the established procedures. The most
important documents shall be agreed with the State regulating authority (VATESI).
All documents and records are registered in special electronic system (ARKI). These systems, on
one hand, provide storage of documentation electronic copies and, on the other hand, access of all
INPP users to the corresponding documents.
In course of preparation and registration of the documents each document shall be provided with the
relevant identification according to the priority of each document with regard to safety. Plant
personnel use only the documents passed review, approval and registration. All key personnel are
provided with access to ARKI system purposed to search of any necessary document.
Results of all works, first of all relating to the safety shall be recorded (reports, check-lists,
statements, logs, etc.). Records are made on the material providing their safe storage within the
required time. Records relating to the safety shall be kept all operation life-period of the plant and
subsequently handed over to the State archive for storage.
In order to supply personnel with correct, currently acting at Ignalina NPP documentation the
maintaining of documentation is provided. The maintaining process covers the following stages: to
put the document to operation, to determine commencement/completion dates of document using, to
multiply the relevant numbers of copies, to distribute among the personnel, to analyze the existing
documents referred to the new documentation, to incorporate corrections, to mark the uncontrolled
copies in due way, to review and replace the obsolete documentation, to hand over the
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documentation to the State archive and to destroy the documentation not subject to storage.
Replacement and incorporation of corrections to the document do not require the corresponding
document to be taken from the personnel.
Documents developed by external organizations (design, etc.) are subject to review and their
applicability is subject to approval prior to their using at Ignalina NPP. All copies of the documents
availability of which is currently sustained shall be taken away (eliminated) from the personnel.
The originals of the documents and records are stored in within the established storage time.
Documents and records, related to safety are stored for the period of operation. Elimination of the
documents and records not in action anymore and their archiving shall be performed in accordance
with the established procedures.
Access to the archive documents and records shall be provided in accordance with the relevant
procedures. Reproduction of the records is ensured considering any and all changes of the
documentation preparation, which may take place in the future in course of information system
modifications.
Documentation with the expired validity term of storage at INPP and which considers having
scientific and practical value for the Lithuanian Republic shall be handed over to the State archive.
As a rule, these are safety-related documents and records. Selection of documentation to be handed
over to the State archive shall be performed by the expert committee in accordance with the acting
regulation on Expert Committee of scientific and technical documentation at INPP.
19.2.4. Emergency operating procedures
The previous practice in emergency situations (accidents) control either at Ignalina NPP or other
NPPs in the formal USSR was based on so called event-oriented emergency procedures, the
documents, which are necessary for control of emergency situations. However, according to item
5.1.4 of “General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Safety”, VD-B-001-0-97, an operating
organization and NPP administrative management have developed and issued special symptombased emergency operating procedures in order to improve safety.
According to the procedures mentioned, the actions of the plant personnel are based on criteria of
events, condition of the reactor as well as on forecast of conditions as they are expected to evolve
during the accident. The personnel actions are aimed to restore essential safety functions of NPP
and limit the radiation consequences of the accident.
Symptom-based emergency operating procedures sufficiently compensate the drawbacks of the
event-based emergency operating procedures providing maximum achievable safety of the plant
within the project.
Efficiency of symptom based emergency operating procedures is defined through fail-safety of the
main safety systems. It shall be done by development of special emergency procedures like
Emergency Procedures of Support and Procedures of Support.
The documents have been developed under international safety improvement project “Lisbon
Initiative” with participation of experts from Lithuania, Russia, Sweden and the USA. These are the
basic materials used for symptom based emergency operating procedures development:
• The standards of the Republic of Lithuania;
• IAEA Guidelines;
• Reports from NIKIET;
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•
USA standards, series NUREG, NUREG/CR, as well as INPO and DOE Guidelines
(Institute Nuclear Power Operations, Department of Energy)
The complete package of documents including symptom-based emergency operating procedures,
emergency procedures of support and procedures of support was developed, verified and validated
in 2000, and after the personnel had a training on the full-scale simulator, it was put in force in
2001.
Maximum efficiency while operation of an emergency situation (accident) can be achieved by
integrated application of event-based and symptom-based Emergency Operating Procedures.
In order to prevent development of any deviations from normal operation into emergency situation
Ignalina NPP has developed and implemented special procedures for an operator’s actions in case of
alarm (reaction to alarm signal). These documents define the high priority actions of an operator
after the deviation has been revealed. The documents are located on alarm panels that inform the
operator about deviation from normal operation.
All instructions and procedures including emergency operating procedures and “reaction to alarm
signal” procedures are periodically reviewed. After any systems or equipment has been modified the
procedures are changed without delay.
On the basis of the item 1.2.14 of "General Regulations for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Provision"
(VD –B-001-0-97), in 2003 work on the project “Development of a guidance to control beyond
design basis accidents in Ignalina NPP” by the organizations JEL, VOLIAN enterprises (England),
Lithuanian Energy Institute with the participation of INPP were started. Works performed under the
mentioned project are divided into 5 tasks:
1. Development of the list of INPP beyond design basis accidents;
2. Performance of the beyond design basis accidents analysis;
3. Selection of high level management strategies and determination of necessary changes in
instrumentation and equipment of the plant;
4. Determination of strategies of accidents beyond design basis management and
development/validation of accidents beyond design basis management manual;
5. Preparation of personnel training specialists and carrying out of training of the personnel to
work with the accidents beyond design basis management manual.
The final report on Task 1 ,,Development of the list of INPP beyond design basis accidents“ was
drafted in 2003. The list of 18 beyond design basis accidents resulting in the reactor core damage is
justified and characterized in this report on the basis of INPP PSA and substantiation of symptombased emergency procedures. The final report on Task 2 ,,Performance of the beyond design basis
accidents analysis“, containing the analysis of the accident sequence and possible consequences for
more than 50 accident scenarios, was issued in 2005. The final report on Task 3 ,,Selection of high
level management strategies and determination of necessary changes in instrumentation and
equipment of the plant“ was developed and approved in the same year. Strategies for mitigation of
severe accidents in the reactor and the spent fuel storage pool are defined and characterized in this
report. As well, the requirements for measuring devices detecting the beginning of the reactor core
damage, its further control and the efficiency of applied strategies are defined. Specific equipment
modifications required for detection, control and monitoring of beyond design basis accidents are
foreseen. The characteristics and location of devices for their application in procedures in case of
beyond design basis accidents are documented. INPP Beyond Design Basis Accidents Management
Manual (RUZA) was developed as a result of implementation of Task 4. The above-mentioned
manual contains five strategies:
• RUZA-R1. Provision of heat removal from the reactor;
• RUZA-R2. Pressure reduction in the reactor cavity:
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•
•
•
RUZA-R3. Control of accident localization system condition.
RUZA-RB. Reduction fission products release;
RUZA-B. Control of spent fuel storage pools condition.
Technical evaluation has been developed for each RUZA in order to support decision making for
selection and performance of actions regarding beyond design basis accidents management. Beyond
Design Basis Accidents Management Manual was validated and verified in 2006.
At present Beyond Design Basis Accidents Management Manual is submitted to VATESI for
approval. Preliminary material dedicated for preparation of trainers carrying out training of the
personnel to be working with the Beyond Design Basis Accidents Management Manual has been
received regarding Task 5. The works on the project are planned to be finished in 2007.
19.2.5 Necessary engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields
In 1991, when Lithuania gained its independence, the country lacked the national infrastructure
(design and research institutes) to support safe operation of nuclear facilities. VATESI has made
special efforts to establish the national Technical Support Organizations (TSO).
The first TSO was established in 1992. It was the Ignalina Safety Analysis Group (ISAG), formed by
the Resolution of the Government of Lithuania at the Lithuanian Energy Institute. The experts from
ISAG performed modeling and analysis of thermal and hydraulic processes in the Primary Circuit
during transient and emergency situations, modeling of physical processes in the core, thermal and
hydraulic calculations of the Accident Confinement System, assessment of INPP constructions
reliability and other activities. Experts of Lithuanian TSO were involved in RSR teams. At present
ISAG is a Lithuanian TSO with great experience in the area of nuclear safety.
In 1992 VATESI initiated co-operation with the Department of Mechanics at Kaunas University of
Technology. On VATESI request the experts of the department together with Lithuanian Energy
Institute have prepared a safety analysis report for the spent fuel storage casks and provided their
conclusions.
VATESI sought advice from the specialists of the Department of Welding and Materials in Vilnius
Gedimino Technical University. In 1995 VATESI granted to the State Information Technology
Institute (VITI) for design of information systems, software, automatic control system elements
related to updating of the TITAN computer system at INPP.
The Construction Reliability Center was established according to VATESI requirements in 1994.
The experts of the Center deal with assessment of remaining life of INPP equipment. The specialists
of Ultrasonic Test Laboratory have designed and manufactured devices for measurement of
thickness of the fuel channel walls.
To co-ordinate TSOs activities and to promote the growth of nuclear safety infrastructure in
Lithuania, special TSOs’ Council for co-ordination was founded in 1997. PHARE/LI/TSO/02
project “Assistance in the enhancement of Lithuanian TSO’s capabilities to support the Nuclear
Safety Regulatory Authority” started in 1998. The project is aimed to improve Lithuanian TSO
capabilities in NDT, structural integrity and welding areas.
At the same time technical and scientific support is provided by INPP designers (INPP General
Designer, St’ Petersburg, Russia) and by the designers of the reactor (reactor General Designer –
NIKIET and Research Manager – Kurchatov Institute, Moscow).
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There are several special departments at Ignalina NPP that provide engineering support to the plant
departments:
• Nuclear Safety Department that curates all issues related to nuclear safety, fuel and the
reactor core;
• Technical Documentation Control Department (in accordance with the changes in
management structure of INPP the specialists from former Engineering Support Department
moved to Technical Documentation Control Department) provides assistance to the plant
departments in the area of thermal and hydraulic processes, PSA (Probabilistic Safety
Analysis) calculations, reliability and diagnostics and monitoring of rotating machinery
vibration, solving of engineering problems related to operation and repair of technological
systems, spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste management, preparation for
decommissioning and decommissioning of the INPP. Also this department provides support
to the plant departments in the area of technical documentation management;
• Design Department supports the plant departments in the area of equipment repair
technologies development and design works;
• Planned Preventive Maintenance Department ensures the support of the departments of the
station during preparation and planning of maintenance of the Units and main facilities of the
plant, co-ordination of preparation and planning of maintenance and technical reorganization
of the equipment and constructions.
19.2.6-7 Incident Reporting and Feedback
System for reporting of unusual events at INPP is established in Lithuania in accordance with
international practice and based on IAEA recommendations. INPP has all necessary administrative
and technical measures to fulfill the task.
In accordance with the requirements of Lithuanian Regulatory Authority VATESI all categorized
events that happen at INPP shall be reported to VATESI in a timely manner. The information shall
be delivered in accordance with the procedure, which is now in force and is approved by VATESI.
VATESI shall be informed about the events verbally as soon as possible, and not later than in an
hour after the event has happened. Written reports about the event shall be delivered to VATESI in a
special format within 24 hours.
In accordance with the plant event analysis procedure, the events shall be investigated according to
ASSET technique developed by IAEA. As well as events related to human factor are analyzed in
accordance with the Methodology of Additional Analysis of Human-Error-Related Events. The
investigation considers all possible causes including the root ones and defines activities that will
prevent the causes in future. The detailed reports that include event investigation and preventive
actions are transferred to VATESI and operators-members of WANO within 30 days. If an event
leads to the unit shut down, then the unit cannot be put in operation until the causes of the event have
been revealed and eliminated.
INPP personnel gains and uses information related to safety, operating experience and valuable
practice either from the plant departments or from other NPPs and international organizations. Main
sources of such information are event investigation reports from NPPs with RBMK reactors as well
as WANO and IAEA/NEA IRS database.
19.2.8. The generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear installation
is kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both in activity and in volume,
and necessary treatment and storage of spent fuel and waste directly related to the operation and
on the same site as that of the nuclear installation take into consideration conditioning and
disposal
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Radioactive Waste Management Strategy was approved by the Government of Lithuania in 2002
that includes detailed plans for short-term and long-term perspectives. It encompasses management
of all types of radioactive waste, taking into account a new radioactive waste classification,
introduced by VATESI at the end of July 2001 in the document Regulation on the Pre-disposal
Management of Radioactive Waste at the Nuclear Power Plant. Strategy takes into account
interdependencies between different steps of radioactive waste management and disposal of this
waste. For this moment Strategy is under revision.
New classification system is used for new radioactive waste management facilities at Ignalina NPP.
Other waste from old storage facilities will be retrieved, classified according new classification
system and then conditioned. After storage these waste will be disposed of in disposal facilities. It is
envisaged to construct two disposal facilities for very low level and for low and intermediate level
radioactive waste. Technical specification for very low level waste disposal facility is prepared and
reviewed by VATESI. For low and intermediate level waste disposal facility (near surface) siting
process is undergoing. Disposal of high level waste is not resolved yet.
INPP has developed activities on implementation of the Regulation on the Pre-disposal Management
of Radioactive Waste at the Nuclear Power Plant. Thus, implementation of those activities enables
INPP to modernize radioactive waste management to treat radioactive waste considering new
requirements, which take into account interdependence of all radioactive waste management phases.
Hence, radioactive waste disposal requirements shall be considered in waste processing phase. It is
assumed that the modernization of radioactive waste management system could be completed in
2009-2010.
Decommissioning waste of Ignalina NPP will be managed at new waste treatment and storage
facilities which will be constructed in 2009-2010 as a part of modernization of radioactive waste
management system.
Operational radioactive waste at INPP consists of solid and liquid waste, ion-exchange resins and a
small amount of spent lubricant materials. Spent nuclear fuel is considered as high level radioactive
waste.
Solid radioactive waste at INPP is segregated into three groups by the surface dose rate, according to
standards that were applied in a former USSR and applicable at INPP. The solid waste at INPP is
dumped into reinforced concrete compartments in storage buildings No. 155, 155/1, 157, 157/1
located on INPP site. There is no reprocessing of solid waste before it is dumped. All the waste from
these facilities will be retrieved, characterized and conditioned according new requirements
mentioned before.
Liquid radioactive waste at Ignalina NPP is collected in special tanks, from where it is directed to
evaporating facilities. The concentrate is processed and conditioned in the bitumen solidification
facility, i.e. mixed with bitumen. The bitumen compound then is pumped into a special storage
(build. 158). The building is also located on INPP site. According to the Plan of Transfer of
Bitumenised Waste Storage Facility (build. 158) to Final Disposal Facility INPP shall perform long
term safety assessment. If an outcome of this assessment is negative, build. 158 will remain as a
storage facility and INPP would develop actions plan of facility decommissioning. If positive then
this storage facility will be transferred to disposal facility.
Spent ion-exchange resins are stored in special tanks. In 2006 the cementation facility and storage
facility for cemented waste started operation. The ion-exchange resins from Ignalina NPP water
purification and liquid waste treatment systems together with filter aid (Perlite) as one waste mixture
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type and solid particle sediments from evaporator concentrate also with filter aid (Perlite) as another
waste mixture type is to be solidified in cement which is poured into drums and put in storage
container (waste packages) in order to reduce any further risk associated with the liquid waste
storage in tanks and to assure safe storage and management of solidified waste. A new storage
facility for cemented waste is designed for 60 years storage. Conditioned waste will be disposed in
near surface disposal facility.
19.2.8.1. Waste minimization
According new regulation on predisposal management of radioactive waste, Ignalina NPP shall
keep the generation of radioactive waste to the minimum practicable, in terms of both activity and
volume, using best available technology without involving excessive costs. For this moment
Ignalina optimized processes o waste generation which allowed reduce amount of waste.
For minimization purpose was constructed installation for free release of solid operational
radioactive waste. It started operation in 2006. After measurements in this installation part of the
waste can be treated as non-radioactive and can be stored in ordinary refuse tip for non-hazardous
waste.
Another free release facility will be constructed for decommissioning waste, which should start
operation in 2008.
19.2.8.2. Spent fuel
Due to the fact that the issue of spent nuclear fuel reprocessing had been closed, it was decided to
build interim spent nuclear fuel storage facilities at INPP. The intermediate fuel storage facility is
located on the Ignalina NPP site in the distance of 1 km of the available plant units and 400 meters
of Drūkščiai Lake. It is a dry storage facility where the spent fuel is stored in the same casks it is
transported to the facility CASTOR RBMK and CONSTOR RBMK of GNB (Germany). The
storage facility was designed for allocation of 20 CASTOR RBMK casks and 52 CONSTOR RBMK
casks. The modernization performed in 2003 and later in 2006 allowed extending the capacity of the
storage facility enabling to store 26 more CONSTOR casks. Now the storage facility can
accommodate 20 CASTOR casks and 78 CONSTOR casks.
It is obvious that existing spent fuel storage facility is not sufficient. It was decided to construct
another storage facility which could store all the rest spent fuel. It is foreseen to construct it until
2009-2010.
Lithuania shall also consider the issue of final repository for high-level radioactive waste. The final
repository for spent nuclear fuel will be required in 50 years.
New information
General information. Radioactive Waste Management Strategy is under revision; in 2006 the
cementation facility and storage facility for cemented waste started operation; for minimization
purpose was constructed installation for free release of solid operational radioactive waste. It started
operation in 2006; the modernization performed in 2003 and later in 2006 allowed extending the
capacity of the storage facility for spent fuel enabling to store 26 more CONSTOR casks; it was
decided to construct another storage facility which could store all the rest spent fuel. It is foreseen to
construct it until 2009-2010; it is assumed that the modernization of radioactive waste management
system could be completed in 2009-2010.
Section 19.2.4. Added information about beyond design basis accidents control procedures.
135
ANNEXES
136
Annex to 7.1
Chart of interaction between regulatory bodies and INPP
The Nuclear Energy Law (the main law in nuclear energy sector) provides following competence
set for national authorities:
In exercising state powers in the sphere of nuclear energy the Seimas (the Parliament) of the
Republic of Lithuania shall:
•
formulate state policy in the sphere of nuclear energy;
•
solve the principal issues of development of nuclear energy in Lithuania;
•
by the advice of the Government, adopt a law on the construction of a new nuclear plant
and its site or on the mounting of a new nuclear reactor, also on the decommissioning of a
nuclear facility. The law shall establish the principal requirements for a nuclear plant or a
nuclear reactor and for the zones of sanitary protection and monitoring.
The Government of the Republic of Lithuania shall:
• in the manner prescribed by law, adopt decisions on the construction of individual nuclear
facilities;
• form a commission for the commissioning of a nuclear facility;
• prepare the nuclear safety and radiation protection regulatory system and the mechanism of
its functioning;
• establish nuclear energy control and supervision institutions and approve their regulations;
• approve regulatory enactments for the acquisition, storage, transport and disposal of nuclear
and radioactive materials and submit them to the ministries referred in the Law on Nuclear
Energy and the Government institutions for approval in cases specified in the above articles;
• establish the procedure of licensing of nuclear activities;
• establish the specific conditions and requirements for the zones of sanitary protection and
monitoring and the course of their development;
• coordinate the activities of ministries and other state institutions in drafting nuclear accident
prevention and management plans.
In adopting a decision on the construction of a specific nuclear facility, the Government of the
Republic of Lithuania shall take into consideration:
• the economic and public needs;
• the principal characteristics of the use of natural resources and their impact on the
environment;
• nuclear safety and radiation protection guarantees;
• the opinion of the local authority on whose territory the intended facility will be sited.
The Ministry of Economy shall:
• perform the functions of the founder of operating organizations of nuclear facilities (this
issue should be revised taking into account the provisions of the Law on New Nuclear
Power Plant);
• implement state policy in the sphere of nuclear energy;
• organize bilateral and multilateral international co-operation in the area of nuclear energy;
• organize nuclear accident prevention, accident management, investigation and elimination
of the consequences of the accident in the nuclear facilities under its control;
• within the scope of its competence represent the Republic of Lithuania in international
nuclear energy organizations and conferences;
• organize the drafting of a special scheme for the choice of the site of a new nuclear power
plant and other state nuclear facilities, exploring several alternative sites;
• after the approval of a detailed site plan, proceed in an established manner with the legal
formalities of the acquisition for the public needs of the site for the construction of a nuclear
power plant or other state nuclear facilities;
• organize the development of the nuclear energy infrastructure in the Republic of Lithuania;
establish institutions of design, research and technology (together with the Ministry of
Education and Science) to meet the needs of the operating organizations of nuclear facilities;
•
perform the functions established by this Law and those assigned by the Government.
Local authorities in the territories under their jurisdiction which are within the sanitary protection or
monitoring zones of a nuclear facility, within the framework of their competence, shall:
• take part in controlling the activities of nuclear power plants, nuclear reactors and other
nuclear energy installations for which sanitary protection zones have been established;
• control the compliance with the landscape and architectural requirements of a nuclear
facility, also with the sanitary, hygienic and nature protection requirements of a nuclear
facility and its territory;
• take part in decision making about the construction of nuclear facilities in their territory, the
reconstruction of the facilities or their decommissioning;
• obtain information from the facility operator about the failure, shut-down, release of
radioactive materials and other incidents;
• prepare the population protection plans, implement them in the event of nuclear accidents;
• inform the population about the radiological situation in the area where nuclear plants and
other nuclear facilities are sited and about the radiation protection measures which are being
implemented.
The Governmental Emergencies Commission shall:
• direct the activities of management of a nuclear accident and elimination of its
consequences;
• mobilize material and other resources necessary for the containment of a nuclear accident;
• perform other tasks and functions provided in its regulations.
In implementing state regulation of nuclear safety, radiation protection and accounting for nuclear
materials in the sphere of nuclear energy State Nuclear Power Safety Inspectorate (VATESI) shall:
• together with the Ministry of Environment approve technical regulations of the design and
construction of nuclear facilities, and of maintenance of the structures;
• approve standards and rules of operation of nuclear facilities, standards and rules of storage
and disposal of radioactive materials used in nuclear energy and establish the procedure for
their drafting;
• control the compliance with the requirements stipulated in licenses and safety regulations;
• implement state control for the accounting for and control of nuclear materials;
• inform the mass media about the radiation and safety situation in nuclear facilities;
• prepare surveys on the safety of nuclear facilities and submit them to the Government, local
authorities and other authorities concerned;
• organize and support research into and expert analysis of nuclear safety and radiation
protection, independently carry out the analysis of incidents and occurrences;
• co-ordinate and control the preventive measures for the staff and the population in the event
of a nuclear facility accident, monitor the state of accident preparedness of the facility;
• impose sanctions established in statutory acts on violators of safety rules;
• organize bilateral and multilateral international co-operation in the sphere of nuclear safety
and radiation protection.
• In performing its functions VATESI shall act independently, in accordance with laws, its
own regulations and other legal acts. To prevent a possible nuclear accident, VATESI may
resort to any preventive measures within its competence, a temporary shutdown of a nuclear
facility included.
• According the Statute of VATESI, that approved by the Governmental Resolution No. 1014
of 1 July 2002, VATESI is ruled by the Head of Institution and has a consultative body Board of VATESI. The Board is comprised of 7 members: two members of Parliament, two
representatives of ministries (the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Environment), two
nuclear experts and the Head of VATESI. The Head of VATESI can’t be Chairperson of the
Board. The Board is empowered to consult the Government of the Republic of Lithuania
and VATESI on nuclear safety issues.
The Ministry of Health shall:
• prepare and approve standard acts and rules on the health of the personnel of nuclear
facilities and the population residing in the monitored zones of the facility and control
compliance thereof;
• undertake environmental health studies of radiation impact on people and their environment
and establish health protection requirements;
• agree on the sitting for nuclear facilities and undertake state environmental health analysis
of their construction;
• take part in the authorization of the constructed or reconstructed nuclear facilities, issue the
environmental health passport for work with radioactive materials and other sources of
ionizing radiation;
• establish the standards for medical examination for the personnel working with radioactive
materials and the sources of ionizing radiation, the frequency of the examination,
contraindications and control the compliance with the standards;
• undertake monitoring of the health of the nuclear facility personnel and the residents of the
monitored zone of the facility;
• ensure the preparedness of medical institutions for the elimination of the consequences of
the accident;
• establish the radiation protection norms for the population and control compliance with
them;
• organize medical examination of the containment forces of a nuclear accident and the
population affected by radiation exposure and submit findings and proposals for the
reduction of radiation exposure;
• determine occupational diseases for the personnel in the sphere of nuclear energy and study
the causes of the diseases;
• carry out population education on radiation protection.
Most of these functions are delegated to Radiation Protection Centre, which was established in
1997.
The Ministry of Environment shall:
• after co-ordination with the Ministry of Health, determine the limits of radioactive emissions
into the environment and the permitted pollution norms, monitor compliance with them, and
establish the procedure of emission licensing;
• jointly with the Ministry of Health establish radiation protection standards and monitor
compliance with them;
• co-ordinate in the manner prescribed by law assessment of the impact on the environment;
• together with VATESI approves technical regulations for the design and construction of
nuclear facilities;
• co-ordinate the projects for sitting, reconstruction and expansion of nuclear facilities and
facilities related to their operation;
• take part in state monitoring of design and construction of nuclear facilities (structures) in
the manner prescribed by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania;
• issue licenses for the use of natural resources, organize state radio-ecological monitoring,
co-ordinate and control radiological monitoring nuclear facilities;
• organize and co-ordinate scientific research of the impact of nuclear facilities on the
environment;
• prepare and approve methodology of assessment of radiation damage to the environment
and its compensation;
• periodically inform the public, national and local authorities about the radiation situation in
the country and in the environment of nuclear facilities;
•
on the recommendation of the institutions exercising state control and supervision of
construction of nuclear facilities or at its own initiative shall cancel the authorization to
construct or reconstruct a nuclear facility when it is discovered that the authorization was
issued unlawfully.
The Ministry of Social Security and Labour shall:
• The Ministry of Social Security and Labour is responsible for the supervision of the
potentially dangerous technical installations. According to the Law on the Supervision of
Potentially Dangerous Installations, the services for technical verification shall supervise
potentially dangerous technical installations with the exception of those under the control of
VATESI;
• The State Labour Inspectorate at the Ministry of Social Security and Labour shall control
compliance with the requirements of labour, safety at work and related statutory acts.
The Ministry of Transport and Communications shall:
• takes part in drafting laws and secondary legislation regulating transportation of nuclear and
radioactive materials;
• participates in training and certification of the personnel involved in transportation of
nuclear and radioactive materials;
• organises railway transport for the evacuation of the population from the danger zone in the
event of a nuclear accident.
The Ministry of National Defense shall:
• takes part in drafting and implementing coordinated interdepartmental anti-terrorist and antipenetration protection plans of the nuclear power plant and other nuclear facilities;
The Ministry of the Interior shall:
• ensures fire protection of the nuclear power plant and other nuclear facilities, conduct the
state fire protection examination of their construction and reconstruction designs, coordinate the fire protection systems of those facilities;
• set forth fire protection requirements for nuclear facilities, exercise compliance with them
and apply sanctions laid down in statutory acts for violators of fire protection regulations;
• promptly extinguish fires breaking out at nuclear facilities, participates in the management
of a nuclear accident and its consequences, organize radiation monitoring of a contaminated
area;
• exercise and ensure physical safety of a nuclear power plant;
• drafts, co-ordinate and implement interdepartmental anti-terrorist and anti-penetration action
plans;
• analyze and control the crime situation in the regions with nuclear facilities;
• investigate the cases of theft and illegal possession of nuclear and radioactive materials, also
of other dual-purpose commodities;
• ensure the security of transportation of nuclear and radioactive material cargoes across the
territory of the country.
The Ministry of the Interior through the Fire-prevention and Rescue Department:
• draws up a population radiation protection plan in the event of a nuclear accident which
shall be a model for other institutions authorized in a prescribed manner;
• within the framework of its competence implements the measures for the elimination of the
accident and its consequences;
• jointly with other state institutions organizes training sessions of population protection in the
event of nuclear accidents.
The State Security Department shall:
•
•
•
•
•
exercise prevention of subversive, sabotage and terrorist acts as well as other offences aimed
at damaging the interests of state security at nuclear facilities, in their environment, and on
transportation routes of nuclear and radioactive materials;
in keeping with the state security interests, undertake operations and inquiries to detect and
investigates actions constituting a threat to nuclear facilities, nuclear installations, equipment
and technologies.
decide upon the credibility of persons working at nuclear facilities or those who are
appointed to transport nuclear and radioactive materials;
control the effectiveness of physical safety and emergency preparedness of the nuclear
power plant and other nuclear facilities;
take part in drafting and implementing the nuclear power plant and other nuclear facilities
interdepartmental anti-terrorist and anti-subversive co-coordinated action plans.
The County Governor on the territory whereof the construction of a nuclear facility is planned or
has already started, in exercising supervision and control of the facility, acts within the limits of the
powers delegated to him by the Law on the County Government, this Law and other laws and
subordinate legislation of the Republic of Lithuania.
The Local Authorities in the territories under their jurisdiction takes part in controlling the activities
of nuclear power plants, nuclear reactors and other nuclear energy installations for which sanitary
protection zones have been established; controls the compliance with the landscape and
architectural requirements of a nuclear facility, also with the sanitary, hygienic and nature
protection requirements of a nuclear facility and its territory; takes part in decision-making about
the construction, reconstruction or decommissioning of nuclear facilities in their territory; prepares
the population protection plans, and implement them in the event of nuclear accidents; inform the
population about the radiological situation in the area where nuclear facility is sited and about the
radiation protection measures which are being implemented.
Advisory body in the field of nuclear safety established by national legislation:
The Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee, which includes nuclear experts from Lithuania, Germany,
Finland, France, the USA, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom, advises the Government in
resolving problems in the field of nuclear energy. The Committee works with the Government,
VATESI, the Ministry of Economy and managers of the state enterprise Ignalina NPP, state
enterprise RATA and provides advice on upgrading nuclear safety and on the development of an
efficient regulatory infrastructure.
Annex to 7.2
List of Legislative Regulations Dealing with or concerning to Nuclear Energy
and Radiation Protection and Related Documents
I. The Laws of the Republic of Lithuania
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The Law on Environmental Protection (21 January 1992, No I-2223);
The Law on State Enterprises (21 Dec 1994, No I-722);
The Law on Nuclear Energy (14 Nov 1996, No I-1613);
The Law on Construction (19 March 1996; new version 8 Nov, 2001, No IX-583);
The Law on the Assessment of the Impact on the Environment of the Planned Economic
Activities (15 August, 1996, new version of 21 June 2005, No X-258);
The Law on Environmental Monitoring (20 Nov 1997, new version of 4 May 2006, No X595);
The Law on Waste Management (16 June 1998, No IX-1004);
The Law on Civil Protection (15 Dec 1998, No VIII-971)
The Law on Energy (16 May 1995, No IX-884);
The Law on Transit and Export of Strategic Goods and Technologies (5 July 1995, new
version of 29 April 2004 No IX-2198);
The Law on Occupational Health Care (18 March 1999, No VIII-1095);
The Law on Radiation Protection (12 January 1999; No VIII-1019);
The Law on Radioactive Waste Management (20 May 1999, No VIII-1190);
The Law on the Supervision of Potentially Dangerous Installations (2 May 1996; new
version of 2 Oct, 2000, No VIII-1972);
The Law on the Decommissioning of Unit 1 at the State Enterprise of Ignalina Nuclear
Power Plant (12 July 2001, No IX-466);
The Law on Enterprises and Installations Possessing Strategic Influence for National
Security (10 Oct 2002, No IX-1132);
The Law on Additional Employment and Social Guarantees for the Employees of the State
Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (29 April 2003, No IX-1541);
The Law on State Enterprise Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant’s Fund for Decommissioning (12
July 2001, new version of 22 June 2006, No X-710);
The Law on the Nuclear Power Plant (28 June 2007 No X-1231).
II. Multilateral international treaties and conventions
and treaties with international organizations
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The Convention on Nuclear Safety, (in force by the Resolution of the Parliament of 17 Oct
17 1995, No. I-1063);
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (in force by the Resolution
of the Government 16 Nov 1993 No. 778p);
The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident (ratified on 18 Nov 1997 No
VIII-523);
The Joint Convention on Safety in Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and in Radioactive
Waste Management (ratified on 18 Dec, 2003, No IX-1921);
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (ratified on 30 Nov, 1993, No I314);
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The Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna and Paris Conventions on
Liability for Nuclear Damage (ratified on 30 Nov, 1993, No I-314);
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency;
1986 Sept 26 , ratified 20 July, 2000, No VIII-1882);
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (ESPOO,
1991) (ratified on 7 Oct, 1999, No VIII-1351);
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International
Lakes (ratified on 2 Dec, 2003, No IX-1863);
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the International
Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (not valid from 13 March, 2007);
Protocol Additional to the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania
and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in
Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (in force by the
law of the ratification of 21 March, 2000, No VIII-1578) (not valid from 13 March, 2007);
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed on 1 July 1968 in London,
Moscow and Washington (in force by the Resolution of the Parliament of 26 June, 1991, No
I-1492);
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (ratified on 28 Oct, 1999, No VIII-1372);
The 1957 European Agreement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods
by Road (ADR); (ratified on 16 June, 1998, No VIII-788);
The Trilateral Agreement on Safeguards Application between EU Member States which do
not possess nuclear weapons, EURATOM and IAEA concluded pursuant to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty signed on 5 April, 1973, Brussels, as well the Additional Protocol
to the Agreement Implementation signed 22 Sept, 1998, Vienna (ratified on 13 March, 2007,
No X-1051);
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005, New
York (ratified on 17 May, 2007, No X-1143);
The Protocol on Amendment to the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage (signed by the Republic og Lithuania in 1998, however has not been ratified);
The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (signed by the the
Republic of Lithuania in 1998, however has not been ratified).
III. Bilateral Agreements
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Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Denmark and the Government of
the Republic of Lithuania concerning information exchange and co-operation in the fields of
nuclear safety and radiation protection, 16 March 1993;
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of
the Kingdom of Norway on early notification of nuclear accidents and on the exchange of
information on nuclear facilities, 13 February 1995;
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of
the Republic Poland on early notification of a nuclear accidents, and on co-operation in the
field of nuclear safety and radiation protection, 2 June 1995;
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government of
the Republic Latvia on early notification of nuclear accidents, exchange of information and
co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection, 3 October 2003;
Decree of the Premier Minister on establishment of a permanent Governmental working
group for cooperation and exchange of information with Byelorussia on nuclear energy
issues, 30 May, 2006;
•
Draft Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Government
of the Republic Belarus on early notification of nuclear accidents, exchange of information
and co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and radiation protection.
Annex to 8.3
Annex to 8.4
Measures to Improve Safety (Follow up the Third Review meeting
recommendations)
1. Safety measures following the shutdown of Unit 1
2. Safety Assurance during the Operation of Unit 2 (with personnel motivation assessment)
3. General Overview of INPP Safety Improvement Program during the Period of 2005-2007
(SIP-3)
4. International arrangements, including those with neighbouring countries
1. Safety measures following the shutdown of Unit 1
As long as nuclear fuel is still in the reactor or spent fuel storage pool (SFSP), Unit 1 is
classified as nuclear facility. All decommissioning activities during this stage shall be
performed in accordance with the design requirements, safe operation limits and conditions.
The safety case of Unit 1 decommissioning during the reactor and SFSP defuelling stages is
provided in ,,INPP Unit 1 Decommissioning Safety Analysis Report (DSAR) for Defuelling
Stages 1 and 2“, which was developed by the Decommissioning Service and agreed with the
Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Lithuania in 2005. The 1st defuelling stage can be
characterized as a stage of fuel unloading from the reactor and the subsequent storage of spent
fuel assemblies (SFA) in SFSP or their transportation to Unit 2 for complete burn up. This
stage started after the final shutdown of Unit 1 (FRS) and covers all activities related to
defuelling process until no fuel elements are left in the reactor core. When this task is
accomplished, some of the systems that were necessary for the reactor defuelling, can be put
out. The second stage – unloading of spent fuel elements from SFSP - is performed after
accomplishing of the 1st stage. The 2nd stage continues until all fuel elements are transferred to
the off-site interim storage facility and there is no fuel left in Unit 1.
DSAR defined the safety systems and equipment that shall remain in operation during the
Unit 1 decommissioning process.
,,Technological Regulation for Operation of INPP Unit 1 during the Reactor Defuelling
Stage“ is the main guiding document defining safe maintenance of Unit 1 and safe operation
limits and conditions. The Technological Regulation is developed for defuelling stage and is
approved by Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Lithuania. All procedures related to
operation and maintenance of systems and equipment of Unit 1 have been reviewed.
Safe maintenance of Unit 1 is financed from the Ignalina Program. Since 2005 January 1
Salaries for main personnel involved in servising Unit 1 have been paid from the funds of
European Commission. Technical maintenance of Unit 1 is financed from the national fund.
2. Safety Assurance during the Operation of Unit 2 (with personnel
motivation assessment)
According to VATESI requirements in order to continue Unit 2 operation after Unit 1 final
shutdown, INPP has prepared a Safety Justification for the only operating Unit 2 (SJ).
The Safety Justification for the only operating Unit 2 was developed on the basis of Unit 2
condition at the end of December 2004 (the scheduled date of the Unit 1 final shutdown).
The Safety Justification is based on SAR-2 and RSR-2, it covers the safety issues related to
changes of operation conditions for Unit 2 process systems and common plant process
systems and changes of administrative structure of INPP following the Unit 1 final shutdown.
The Safety Justification for the only operating Unit 2 has been developed to cover two stages
of the Unit 1 decommissioning:
• From the Unit 1 final shutdown until the beginning of the fuel unloading from the
reactor;
• From the start of the fuel unloading from the reactor of Unit 1 until the competition
of the fuel unloading procedure.
The Safety Justification also considers planned modifications of Unit 2 systems, which are
affected by the Unit 1 final shutdown, configurations of Unit 1 process systems during the
decommissioning of Unit 1.
A list of all Unit 2 systems as well as common plant systems was compiled in order to
evaluate the effect of the Unit 1 final shutdown on the safety of Unit 2 operation. After the
analysis of all Unit 2 systems had been conducted, a list of Unit 2 systems, which have
connections with Unit 1 and common plant systems, was defined. Also, a list of Unit 2
systems with transit communications going through Unit 1 premises to common plant
facilities was made. Analysis of the Unit 1 final shutdown effect on the safety of Unit 2
operation was conducted for all systems included into above-mentioned lists. The Safety
Justification for the only operating Unit 2 includes four Parts:
• Part 1 – Peculiarities of INPP operation with two and only one (Unit 2) units.
• Part 2 – Analysis of systems, which have technological communications with Unit 1
systems.
• Part 3 – List of failures.
• Part 4 – Analysis of failures and external events.
The effect of Unit 1 final shutdown on human factor (Safety Justification, Part 5) and INPP
physical protection (Safety Justification, Part 6) was considered.
As a result of the analysis, which had been conducted in Parts 1-4, a list of Unit 1 Safety
Related systems and elements was defined. This list also includes elements of common plant
systems, which are located at Unit 1 and the efficiency of which should be preserved after the
Unit 1 final shutdown in order to assure safe operation of Unit 2.
In addition, a list of systems and element, which are required for normal operation and which
do not affect the safety of Unit 1, was defined. The latter list also includes elements of
common plant systems, which are located at Unit 1 and which should be left in operation after
the Unit 1 final shutdown.
The amount of common plant systems’ equipment, which should be left in operation after the
Unit 1 final shutdown, was assessed.
Lists of Unit 1 premises where normal operation conditions should be assured after the Unit 1
final shutdown were compiled with regard to each system. In addition, a list of operational
documentation, which should include all changes made after the Unit 1 final shutdown, was
defined.
Analysis of all initiating events, which had been considered in SAR-2 (Task 12, Part 4), was
conducted in order to determine the effect of Unit 1 and 2 communications on the
consequences of these events. Unit 1 systems are included into the analysis of the effect on
Unit 2 safety under one initiating event only – “loss of the Service Water Supply System”. In
the Safety Justification of the only operating Unit 2 Report (Part 1-4 “Service Water Supply
System”) it is shown that the Service Water Supply System, which will be left in operation at
Unit 1, will provide the required amount of service water to Unit 2 provided that the loss of
Service Water Supply System at Unit 2 has occurred. The consequences of other initiating
events do not depend on the operation of Unit 1 systems.
The Safety Justification of the only operating INPP Unit 2 provides evidence that the
continuation of Unit 2 operation after the Unit 1 final shutdown is possible. Results and
conclusions of the Safety Justification of the only operating Unit 2 have provided the basis for
decision-making by VATESI on issuance of Operation License for INPP Unit 2 after the Unit
1 final shutdown.
Permission for the Unit 1 final shutdown was received from VATESI at the end of 2006 after
the completion of the following works:
• Construction of new Heat Only Boiler Station and Steam Boiler Station;
• Issuance of the “INPP Unit 1 Decommissioning Project for the 1st and 2nd stages of
fuel unloading;
• Issuance of new “Technological Regulations on the operation of Unit 1”, PTOed0905-1;
• Preparation of Technical Order on “Joint operation of On-site Central Heating Plant
(OCHP) and Boiler Station” Ттрп-0931-1932;
• Conducting of personnel emergency training on assurance of safe operation of both
units during the only operating Unit 2 outage or OCHP failure;
• Implementation of Safety Justification of the only operating Unit 2 basic
recommendations.
3. General Overview of INPP Safety Improvement Program during the
Period of 2005-2007 (SIP-3)
3.1. INPP Safety Improvement in 2005 (SIP-3/2005)
Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No.3 (SIP-3/2005) comprised 115 activities to be
implemented during the period from 2005 to 2009.
In 2005, 43 activities of Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No.3 (SIP-3/2005) were
implemented. The most significant activities are the following:
• Commissioning of the Safety Parameter Display System at Unit 2.
• Replacement of doors in the rooms containing the components of safety-related
systems with more than 1-hour fire resistant doors.
• Purchase of a new hauling unit for transportation of radioactive waste.
• Improvement of physical protection system of INPP perimeter.
• Implementation at ICS of a program for diagnostics of EP ORM system.
• Implementation of control means of cars’ concealed cavities and difficult of access
places at the checkpoints.
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Re-equipping of checkpoint for oversized motor transport.
Implementation of stationary means for explosives and drugs detection.
Procurement of a new set of automatic equipment for welding under welding flux of
CONSTOR casks lids, containing spent fuel.
Safety analysis of compacting device (bldg. 150 room 162).
Performance of analysis of 1346.00.00.000 container drop to the lid of the transfer
canyon in Reactor Hall.
Performance of additional analysis of computer codes of ALS thermal-hydraulic
behavior during accident.
Additional analysis of calculation codes on the basis of calculation of heat
conductivity of ALS building units.
Total expenditures under SIP-3/2005 program amounted to 82 352 000 LT (or about 23.87
MEURO).
3.2. INPP Safety Improvement in 2006 (SIP-3/2006)
Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No.3 (SIP-3/2006) comprised 86 activities to be
implemented during the period from 2006 to 2009.
In 2006, 28 activities of Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No.3 (SIP-3/2006) were
implemented. The most significant activities are the following:
• Implementation of facility of Unit 1 fuel afterburning in the reactor of Unit 2.
• Implementation of LBB concept at INPP. Additional installation of small leak
detection systems in rooms where PC, feed water and direct steam lines are located.
• Design, equipment purchase and installation of Cementation Facility for ion exchange
resins and slurry.
• Upgrading of Unit 2 radiation safety automatic control system.
• Implementation of the Second Diverse Shutdown System at Unit 2.
• Upgrading of factory waste segregation and measurement system for separation of
radioactive wastes.
• Implementation of protection signal on decreasing of flow rate in GDH in AZ-1.
• Development of the Program and Safety Justification of INPP Unit 1 reactor during
SFA unloading after the reactor decommissioning.
• Development and implementation of a new Technical Specification on Unit 1
operation.
• Development of Guidance on the management of beyond design accidents.
• Performances of calculations of ALS condense capacity during design basis accidents
when modeling ALT scheme with more than one condensation pool.
• Development, delivery and mounting of the SFA fuel element cladding integrity
system at Unit 1 and 2.
• Modernization of the compartment Nr.8 in SRWS (build. 157/1) for its usage for
interim storage of SRW.
Total expenditures under SIP-3/2006 program amounted to 60 893 000 LT (or about 17.65
MEURO).
3.3. INPP Safety Improvement in 2007 (SIP-3/2007)
Ignalina NPP Safety Improvement Program No.3 (SIP-3/2007) comprised 90 activities to be
implemented during the period from 2007 to 2009.
Total expenditures under SIP-3/2007 program is planned to amount to 33 929 000 LT (or
about 9.83 MEURO).
3.4. Funding of SIP-3
Safety Improvement Program is funded by different sources (see TABLE 3).
TABLE 3
Total
expenditures
(MLt)
2005
82.352
2006
60.893
2007
33.929 (planned)
Including:
Own
sources
32.592
31.056
21.091
(planned)
Public
Interests
42.597
Loan
7.163
29.419
12.28 (planned)
Unit 1
Decommissioning
Fund
0
0
0.418
0.558 (planned)
4. International arrangements, including those with neighboring countries
In 1994 Lithuania has joined to Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and
in 2000 to Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency. VATESI and Fire and Rescue Department are responsible authorities
respectively. According to IAEA’s EPR-ENATOM requirements, VATESI is National
Warning Point, National Competent Authority for events abroad and, together with Fire and
Rescue Department - National Competent Authority for domestic events.
After joining EU in 2005, Lithuania became a part of ECURIE system. VATESI is contact
point in these arrangements as well as CoDecS station operator.
A great attention in Lithuania is paid to the development of bilateral co-operation with the
neighbouring countries. Mutual assistance policy between Lithuania and the neighbouring
countries is based on bilateral agreements. Bilateral agreement between Lithuania and
Denmark On information exchange and co-operation in the field of nuclear safety and
radiation protection has been signed on 26 March 1993. The bilateral agreement between
Lithuania and Norway On Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Information exchange
about Nuclear Objects has been signed on 13 February 1995. The Arrangement between
Lithuania and Poland On information exchange and co-operation in the field of nuclear safety
and radiation protection has been signed on 2 June 1995. The Agreement between Lithuania
and Latvia On Early Notification of Nuclear Accidents, Exchange of Information and Cooperation in the Field of Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection has been signed on 3
October 2003.
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