ID-One™ ePass V2.2 on NXP In Supplemental Access Control (SAC) configuration

ID-One™ ePass V2.2 on NXP In Supplemental Access Control (SAC) configuration
ID-One™ ePass V2.2 on NXP
In Supplemental Access Control (SAC) configuration
With AA
Public Security Target
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Table of contents
1
SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 6
1.1
1.2
2
SECURITY TARGET IDENTIFICATION ....................................................................................... 6
OVERVIEW OF THE TOE..................................................................................................... 7
TOE DESCRIPTION ............................................................................................... 8
2.1
2.2
TOE USAGES................................................................................................................... 8
TOE ARCHITECTURE ......................................................................................................... 9
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
2.2.5
2.3
2.4
2.5
CHIP AND SOFTWARE COMPOSITION .....................................................................................13
TOE CONFIGURATIONS .....................................................................................................14
TOE LOGICAL STRUCTURE .................................................................................................14
2.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.6
2.7
3
Integrated Circuit (IC) ...........................................................................................10
Basic Input/Output System (BIOS) .........................................................................10
Cryptographic library .............................................................................................10
Resident application ..............................................................................................11
LDS application .....................................................................................................11
File structure of the TOE........................................................................................15
System files ..........................................................................................................15
Data files ..............................................................................................................16
NON EVALUATED FEATURES ................................................................................................16
TOE LIFE CYCLE..............................................................................................................17
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ..................................................................................... 19
3.1
3.2
3.3
4
COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE ......................................................................................19
PACKAGE CONFORMANCE ...................................................................................................19
PROTECTION PROFILE CONFORMANCE ...................................................................................19
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ..................................................................... 20
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
5
ASSETS .........................................................................................................................20
THREATS .......................................................................................................................21
ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ..................................................................................23
ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................24
SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................... 25
5.1
5.2
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE ...................................................................................25
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .....................................................26
5.2.1
5.2.2
6
Issuing State or Organization.................................................................................26
Receiving State or Organization .............................................................................28
EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................... 29
6.1
EXTENDED FAMILIES .........................................................................................................29
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.3
6.1.4
7
Extended family
Extended family
Extended family
Extended family
FAU_SAS - Audit data storage .......................................................29
FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers....................................29
FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability ...............................30
FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation ...........................................................31
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS .......................................................... 33
7.1
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................33
7.1.1
7.1.2
7.2
8
PP SAC .................................................................................................................33
Active Authentication (AA) .....................................................................................40
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS..................................................................................41
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION......................................................................... 42
8.1
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ...........................................................................................42
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9
RATIONALES ....................................................................................................... 45
9.1
SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ......................................................45
9.1.1
9.1.2
9.1.3
9.1.4
9.2
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES ...............................................................50
9.2.1
9.2.2
9.3
10.1
10.2
SFRs dependencies ...............................................................................................57
SARs dependencies ...............................................................................................59
EAL RATIONALE ..............................................................................................................60
EAL AUGMENTATIONS RATIONALE ........................................................................................61
9.5.1
9.5.2
10
Objectives ............................................................................................................50
Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs.....................................................53
DEPENDENCIES ...............................................................................................................57
9.3.1
9.3.2
9.4
9.5
Threats ................................................................................................................45
Organisational Security Policies ..............................................................................46
Assumptions .........................................................................................................47
SPD and Security Objectives ..................................................................................47
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis ...........................................61
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures ...........................................................61
PP CLAIMS .......................................................................................................... 62
PP REFERENCE ................................................................................................................62
PP ADDITIONS.................................................................................................................62
11
COMPOSITION WITH IC SECURITY TARGET...................................................... 63
12
REFERENCES....................................................................................................... 66
13
ACRONYMS ......................................................................................................... 68
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List of figures
Figure
Figure
Figure
Figure
1
2
3
4
TOE architecture .............................................................................................................. 9
Memory mapping of the TOE ...........................................................................................14
: Structure of the file system............................................................................................15
Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE ...........................................................................18
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List of tables
Tableau
Tableau
Tableau
Tableau
Tableau
Tableau
Tableau
Tableau
Tableau
Tableau
1 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage...................................................................48
2 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage...................................................................48
3 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage ......................................................................48
4 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage ......................................................................49
5 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment - Coverage...........49
6 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions - Coverage...........50
7 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage.......................................................................54
8 SFRs and Security Objectives........................................................................................56
9 SFRs dependencies ......................................................................................................58
10 SARs dependencies ....................................................................................................60
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1 Security Target introduction
1.1 Security Target identification
General identification:
Title:
Editor:
Hermès 2 Security Target SAC
Oberthur Technologies
CC version:
EAL:
PP(s):
3.1 revision 3
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/06
TOE technical identification:
Name:
ePass v2.2 on NXP P5CD081 in SAC configuration with AA
SAAAAR Rom
code:
075021
SAAAAR
Optional code:
076152
Chips identification:
IC Reference:
IC EAL:
IC Certificate:
P5CD081 V1A of NXP
EAL5 + ALC_DVS.2 + AVA_VAN.5
BSI-DSZ-CC-0555-2009
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1.2 Overview of the TOE
The current document aims at defining the functions and assurance security requirements which apply
to the ID-One™ ePass v2.2 on NXP smartcard.
It is composed of both an Integrated Circuit (IC) and an embedded software providing secure data
management following ePassport specifications (BAC, EAC, and SAC) and driving licence specifications
(BAP, EAP); this document is therefore a composite Security Target (ST).
In the following, the smartcard will be called “Target Of Evaluation” or TOE.
The TOE is a versatile device that can be easily configured in order to operate in different modes
including BAC ePassport, EAC ePassport, SAC ePassport, BAP driving licence and EAP driving licence.
It possesses a dual interface to perform contact and contactless communications to go beyond current
ePassport usages.
This device can be proposed as inlay to integrate in secure document booklet but can also be provided
in a regular credit card format especially in driving licence configurations.
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2 TOE Description
This part of the Security Target describes the TOE as an aid to the understanding of its security
requirements. It addresses the product type, the intended usage and the main features of the TOE.
2.1 TOE usages
State or organisation issues TOEs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming
associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an ePassport
configuration, verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the
holder or checking driving licence validity during a police control.
In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal TOE to the inspection
system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent
and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used
on the field.
The TOE in context of this security target contains:
• Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait
of the holder printed in the booklet
• A separate data summary (MRZ, CAN1 or keydoc
data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods
in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ, CAN or keydoc
area)
• And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for
contact-less machine reading.
The authentication of the holder is based on:
• The possession of a valid TOE personalized for a
holder with the claimed identity as given on the
biographical data page and
• The Biometric matching performed on the Inspection
system using the reference data stored in the TOE.
When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can performed extra
authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as
“driving licence penalty points”, “visa information”…
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine TOEs. The receiving
State trusts a genuine TOE of an issuing State or Organization.
•
The TOE can be viewed as the combination:
• A physical TOE in form of paper or plastic with an embedded
chip and possibly an antenna. It presents visual readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the TOE holder
(1) The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2) The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ), Card Acces Number (CAN) or
keydoc area that identifies the device and
(3) The printed portrait.
A logical TOE as data of the TOE holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO and extended in [R6], [R7], [R8], [R36] on the contactless integrated circuit. It
1
Card Access Number (CAN) is a number printed in the front side of the datapge equivalent to MRZ and that can
be easily typed manually. It’s a SAC related terminology.
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presents contact or contact-less readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
TOE holder
(4) The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, CAN or keydoc data, DG1),
(5) The digitized portraits,
(6) The optional biometric reference data of finger(s) or iris image(s) or both
(7) The other data according to LDS (up to DG24) and
(8) The Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the TOE to maintain the authenticity
and integrity of the TOE and its data. The TOE as the physical device and the
MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical TOE is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on
paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the TOE’s chip) and
organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalisation
procedures). These security measures include the binding of the TOE’s chip to the
physical support.
The logical TOE is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the TOE’s
chip.
2.2 TOE architecture
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a smartcard composed of the following components:
• An underlying P5CD081 chip of NXP,
• A native “BIOS FAT” allowing efficient access to chip functionalities,
• A dedicated highly secure cryptographic library,
• A personalisation application on top of the BIOS,
• An LDS application providing both the BAC/EAC and BAP/EAP/SAC features on top of the
BIOS.
TOE
Perso
(OT)
EAC/EAP/SAC/BAC/BAP
LDS application (Oberthur Technologies)
Cryptography library
(Oberthur Technologies)
Non-evaluated
features
BIOS FAT
(Oberthur Technologies)
P5CD081 (NXP)
Figure 1 TOE architecture2
2
OT is the acronym of Oberthur Technologies.
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2.2.1 Integrated Circuit (IC)
The TOE relies on the functional and security features of the P5CD081. This chip is designed to embed
the secure code of Oberthur Technologies for the production of smart cards.
This chip provides the following major features:
• Die integrity,
• Monitoring of environmental parameters,
• Protection mechanisms against faults,
• A FameXE Enhanced Pulbic key coprocessor especially for RSA and ECC,
• A 3DES coprocessor,
• An AES coprocessor,
• AIS-31 class P2 compliant Random Number Generator,
• A CRC calculation block.
For more details, see [R14].
2.2.2 Basic Input/Output System (BIOS)
The native BIOS of Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip features
from the applications. Indeed, it is based on services organized according to a multi-layer design
which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip.
The main features of the OS are the following:
• EEPROM management including secure data processing,
• Other memories management,
• Transaction management,
• APDU protocol management,
• Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management,
• Error processing,
• Advanced securities activation.
2.2.3 Cryptographic library
A dedicated cryptographic library is is designed and embedded on the TOE to provide the highest
security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms:
Feature
Embedded
SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA 256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 bits
RSA CRT from 1024, to2048 bits (by steps of 256 bits)
RSA SFM from 1024 to 2048 bits (by steps of 256 bits)
ECC with key sizes from 192 to 521bits
3DES with 112 bits key size
AES with 128, 192, 256 key sizes
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2.2.4 Resident application
This application manages the TOE in pre-personalisation, personalisation and use phase in order to
configure the card in the expected way.
It implements and control access to the following services:
• MSK management,
• File management including data reading and writing,
• Key generation,
• Key injection,
• PIN management,
• Locks management.
The resident application can be addressed:
• in clear mode for secure environment or non-sensitive commands,
• using a 3DES secure channel otherwise.
2.2.5 LDS application
The Logical Data Structure (LDS) application is a generic filesystem that can be configured to match
especially ICAO specifications for ePassports BAC, EAC and SAC and ISO specifications for IDL BAP
and EAP.
It also includes commands and protocol management specified in [R15] used to grant access to
sensitive data stored in the filesystem.
LDS application provides many features; the evaluation’s scope is SAC with AA (Active
Authentication).
Feature
Embedded
References
BAC
[R1],[R2], [R3], [R5]
SAC
[R36]
EAC
[R1],[R2], [R3], [R4],
[R5]
Active Authentication
(RSA CRT/SFM and ECC)
Cryptosystem migration
(Algorithm change during
certificate verification
transaction)
BAP
[R1],[R2], [R3], [R5]
R1],[R2], [R3], [R4],
[R5]
[R6], [R7], [R8]
EAP
[R6], [R7], [R8]
Basic Access Control (BAC)
The Basic Access Control (BAC) is a security feature that is supported by the TOE. The inspection
system
• reads the printed data in the MRZ (for ePassport),
• authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After
successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC
rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
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Basic Access Protection (BAP)
The Basic Access Protection (BAP) is especially used in the context of IDL as an alternative to BAC.
Indeed it is actually a generalisation of BAC allowing usage of extra algorithms and key length. It
exists in 4 modes:
• BAP1 - 3DES with key length of 128 bits (equivalent to BAC),
• BAP2 - AES with key length of 128 bits,
• BAP3 - AES with key length of 192 bits,
• BAP4 - AES with key length of 256 bits.
Following Secure messaging is performed using the algorithm used in the selected BAP mode.
Note that the term MRZ is specific to ICAO standard; [R36] and [R8] uses the term “CAN” and
“Keydoc” which refers to an equivalent unique identifier printed on the physical TOE as a random
number or barcode.
Supplemental Access Control (SAC)
The Supplemental Access Control (SAC) is an evolution of the BAC that allows to reach the
AVA_VAN.5 level independently of the entropy password used (MRZ or CAN).
The inspection system
• reads the printed data in the MRZ or CAN,
• authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ or CAN data.
After successful authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC rights by
means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
The strength of SAC is linked to the generic mapping function, depending on the MRZ or CAN data,
that computes domain in which a Diffie-Hellman key agreement will be performed. In this condition
sessions keys generated are totally independant of MRZ or CAN entropy and VAN.5 level can be
enforce at all time.
Note that SAC is also known as PACE V2. This name of PACE V2 is used in the following.
Active Authentication (AA)
The Active Authentication of the TOE is an optional feature that may be implemented. It ensures that
the TOE has not been substituted, by means of a challenge-response protocol between the inspection
system and the TOE. For this purpose the chip contains its own Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key
pair. A hash representation of Data Group 15 (DG15, see 2.5.1) Public Key is stored in the Document
Security Object (SOD, see 2.5.1) and therefore authenticated by the issuer’s digital signature. The
corresponding Private Key is stored in the TOE’s secure memory.
The TOE supports the loading and generation of the Active Authentication RSA or ECC Key pair.
Extended Access Control (EAC)
The Extended Access Control (EAC) enhances the later security features and ensures a strong
and mutual authentication of the TOE and the Inspection system. This step is required to access
biometric data such as fingerprints and iris stored in DG3 and DG4. In particular, the authentication
steps ensures a strong secure channel able to provide confidentiality of the biometric data that are
read and authentication of the Inspection system retrieving the date to perform a Match on Terminal
comparison. The Extended Access Control authentication steps the TOE implements may be
performed either with elliptic curve cryptography, or with RSA cryptography.
Extended Access Protection (EAP)
The Extended Access Protection (EAP) extends EAC to allow a more flexible protocol. It can protect up
to 16 DGs (from 1 to 16) and is no more restricted to DG3 and 4. There is also no prerequisite to
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perform A BAP before starting EAP. In addition, it is possible to send more than 2 certificates to the
TOE in order to gain extra access rights.
Following secure messaging can be either in 3DES or AES taking into account that if a BAP was
previously performed algorithm used must be stronger3.
Feature versus property ensured
Proves that the contents of the data stored
in the chip are authentic and unchanged
Prevents from an exact copy and chip
substitution
Prevents chip skimming and eavesdropping
on the communication between the chip
and the Inspection System
Prevents unauthorized access to biometric
data (fingerprint or iris)
Prevents password recovery (dictionary
attacks)
EAC/EAP
CA
TA
PA
AA
BAC/
BAP
SAC
x
-
-
-
-
-
-
x
-
-
x
-
-
-
x
x
-
-
-
-
-
x
-
-
-
x
-
-
x
PA: Passive Authentication (enforced by the TOE environment)
AA: Active Authentication
BAC (~ BAP): Basic Access Control
SAC: Supplemental Access Control
EAC (~ EAP): Extended Access Control
CA: Chip Authentication (part of the EAC/EAP)
TA: Terminal Authentication (part of the EAC/EAP)
2.3 Chip and software composition
The TOE contains an auto-programmable microcomputer (IC) with non-volatile EEPROM memory,
permitting the storing of secret or confidential data, and with associated circuits that ensure its
protection. The IC also integrates a ROM memory which embeds the code software of the smartcard.
In order to ensure a secure composition between IC and software, the chip is configured and used
according to the security requirements specified in the datasheet and associated guides. This
especially specifies the secure way to manage IC memory.
The optional code or “codop” is an executable code that is stored in the EEPROM of the chip. This
code is called by the Resident Application when needed. These data are loaded during the prepersonalisation phase after the authentication of the manufacturer. Once an optional code is loaded, it
is not possible to load any other optional code whether the TOE is in pre-personalisation phase or
personalisation phase. The TOE ensures the optional code’s integrity and that it can not be read from
the outside.
In order to configure the available features of the product a One-Time Programmable (OTP) area is
present (see 2.4). It can be written only once and cannot be erased afterward.
Memory adresses
3
AES 256 is stronger than AES 192 which is stronger than AES 128 which is stronger than 3DES.
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Data (File system)
Executable code
software
ROM
Codop area
EEPROM
Figure 2 Memory mapping of the TOE
2.4 TOE Configurations
The application locks are within a particular area of the EEPROM memory. It is called OTP (One
Time Programmable). When the TOE is delivered, all the bits of this area are set to ‘0’. Theses
bits may be set (to “1”) in pre-personalisation phase or personalisation phase after the agent
authentication (Manufacturer or Personnalizer). Once a bit is set to “1” in this area, it can not be
reset anymore. This area is used to select the configuration of the TOE, in particular:
• If the BAC/SAC/BAP is enforced in used phase (‘0’ = not enforced/’1’ = enforced)
• If the EAC is enforced in used phase (‘0’ = not enforced/’1’ = enforced)
• If the EAP is enforced in used phase (‘0’ = not enforced/’1’ = enforced)
• If the Get Data command is disabled (‘0’ = enabled/’1’ = disabled)
• If the Active authentication is activated (‘0’ = not activated/’1’ = activated)
• To indicate the TOE was pre-personalised (‘1’ = pre-personalised)
• To indicate the TOE was personalised (‘1’ = personalized)
These OTP bytes are protected in integrity as they are copied in EEPROM too.
Final configuration of the product is set by activating one or several of the five first locks. The product
is in use phase when the two last locks are activated. Since BAC is a BAP configuration, the two ones
have been merged into a unique lock. Nevertheless, usage of AES keys identifies BAP configuration.
The SAC configuration also sharing BAC lock can be identified by checking if EF.CardAccess is present
under the MF.
Note that in order to be functional, a correct and consistent personalisation of the TOE must be
performed.
2.5
TOE logical structure
Roughly, the embedded application, when powered, is seen as a master file, containing a Dedicated
file (DF) for the LDS.
This dedicated file is selected by means of the Application Identifier (AID) of the LDS application for
example in case of ePassport. Once the application dedicated files are selected, the file structure it
contains may be accessed, provided the access conditions are fulfilled.
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2.5.1 File structure of the TOE
Figure 3 : Structure of the file system
The TOE distinguish between two types of data
• System files,
• Data files that store data that are visible from the outside.
Basically, system files and data files are files handled by the Resident Application. The Resident
Application handles their creation and management. Both types have the following characteristics:
• Size, size reserved within the EEPROM for the content of this file,
• EF ID, Elementary File Identifier of the file within the file structure,
• SFI, Short File Identifier used for an easy file selection. It is only used for data files,
• Access conditions, it specify under which conditions the file may be accessed (read never,
read always...).
2.5.2 System files
System files are dedicated to store sensitive data that are used by the application. These data are
protected in integrity by means of a checksum. Theses files may be created and updated in prepersonalisation or personalisation phase. Files containing keys are never readable.
Once created, these files are used by the application to work properly. They have to be created before
any use of the application.
In particular, theses files are used to store:
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•
•
•
•
The
The
The
The
active authentication public key needed to perform the active authentication,
active authentication private key needed to perform the active authentication,
keys needed to perform BAC, BAP, SAC, EAC and EAP,
list of the application present on the card.
2.5.3 Data files
Data files also called Elementary files (EF) or Data Groups (DG) are dedicated to store data that may
be retrieved. They are protected in integrity by means of a checksum and can be created or updated
either in pre-personalisation or in personalisation phase. They are also created in such a way they can
only be read or write in use phase, provided authentications specified in access rights are performed.
All personalisation configurations are possible including BAC, EAC and SAC. Nevertheless, Data Files
usually considered are the following:
• EF.COM which describes which DGs are present in the file structure,
• EF.SOD which contains a certificate computed over the whole DGs. It ensures their integrity &
authenticity,
• DG1 up to DG24 which contains information about the holder (picture, name…) and key
required to perform authentications.
2.6
Non evaluated features
Some features of the product are put out of the evaluation scope and are therefore not part
of the TOE. Here is the complete list of those functionalities:
• Standard and biometric PIN management (therefore PIN associated commands are out
of scope),
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2.7 TOE life cycle
The Smart card life-cycle considered hereby, is the one described in [R13]. This protection profile is
decomposed into 7 phases, described hereafter, whose only first three ones defined the TOE
evaluation scope.
This life cycle is related to the different phases the designer/manufacturer/issuer has to go through to
get a smart card ready to use. It starts from the design till the end of usage of the card.
Note that [R10] and [R11] define an alternative lifecycle almost equivalent (phases in [R13] are steps
in [R10] and [R11]) except this only difference:
•
Step 4 in [R10] and [R11], correspond to phase 4 of [R10] and [R11] and blocks
‘Micromodule”, “testing” and “Embedding” in phase 5 of [R10] and [R11],
•
Step 5 in [R10] and [R11] correspond to the only next blocks “Personnalisation” and “Testing”
in phase 5 of [R10] and [R11].
It is depicted in the figure below:
Personalisation and Pre-personnalisation
TOE scope
TOE usage
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phase 1
Software development
of the mask
Levallois
Nanterre
Pessac
Software development
of the functional patch
phase 2
IC photomask
fabrication
IC database
construction
phase 3
IC
manufacturing
IC testing
TOE
Delivery
phase 4
phase 5
Card printing
Testing
micromodule
Embedding
Patch secure
loading
Pre-personalisation
phase 6
phase 7
Testing
Testing
Personalisation
Smartcard product
End-usage
Application
End-usage
Smartcard
End of life
Application
End of life
Figure 4 Smartcard product life-cycle for the TOE
Remark: the patch does not impact security; with or without it the TOE remains secure.
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3 Conformance claims
3.1 Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target (ST) is CC Part 2 extended [R35] and CC Part 3 conformant [R36] and written
according to the Common Criteria version 3.1 Part 1 [R34].
3.2 Package conformance
This ST is conformant to the EAL5 package as defined in [R36].
The EAL5 have been augmented with the following requirements to fulfill the Oberthur Technologies
assurance level:
Requirement
Name
Type
ALC_DVS.2
Sufficiency of security measures
Higher hierarchical component
AVA_VAN.5
Advanced methodical vulnerability
analysis
Higher hierarchical component
3.3 Protection Profile conformance
The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PP written in CC3.1 revision 3:
• PP “Machine Readable Travel Document SAC (PACE V2) Supplemental Access Control” [R10].
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4 Security problem definition
4.1
Assets
Logical MRTD data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different
security needs), and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These
data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with
the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD
holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by the inspection system
for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive
Authentication of the logical MRTD.
The Active Authentication Public Key Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for
Active Authentication of the chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection
system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
All these data may be sorted out in two different categories.
o If they are specific to the user, they are User data,
o If they ensure the correct behaviour of the application, they are TSF Data.
Note that EF.DG3 and 4 (biometric DGs) protection is not enforced by SAC and that those DGs are
not assets in the scope of the TOE.
User data
CPLC Data
Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as
user data as they enable to track the holder
Personnal Data of the MRTD
holder (EF.DGx, except
EF.DG3, 4 and 15)
Contains identification data of the holder
Document Security Object
(SOD) in EF.SOD
Contain a certicate ensuring the integrity of the file stored
within the MRTD and their authenticity. It ensures the data
are issued by a genuine country
Common data in EF.COM
Declare the data the travel document contains
Active Authentication Public
Key in EF.DG15
Contain public data enabling to authenticate the chip
thanks to an active authentication
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TSF data
TOE_ID
Data enabling to identify the TOE
Personalisation Agent
reference authentication
Data
Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalisation agent
PACE V2 access key
Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the
Supplemental Inspection System and the travel document
Active Authentication
private key
Private key the chip uses to perform an active authentication
Session keys for the
secure channel
Session keys used to protect the communication in
confidentiality and in integrity
Life Cycle State
Life Cycle state of the TOE
Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for
the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
4.2
Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration
with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
T.Chip_ID
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the
MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the communication
interface. The attacker cannot read and does not know the MRZ data nor the CAN printed
on the MRTD data page in advance.
T.Skimming
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker cannot read and does not
know the MRZ data nor the CAN printed on the MRTD data page in advance.
T.Eavesdropping
An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the MRTD’s chip and an
inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses the
MRZ data, or the CAN printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know
these data in advance.
Note in case of T.Skimming the attacker is establishing a communication with the MRTD’s
chip not knowing the MRZ data, nor the CAN printed on the the MRTD data page and
without a help of the inspection system which knows these data. In case of
T.eavesdropping the attacker uses the communication of the inspection system.
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T.Forgery
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of
the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter
the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed
MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may
alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the
inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face
recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated
biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine
data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker
writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference finger data read from the
logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged
to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete
unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
T.Abuse-Func
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase
"Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore,
bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose
or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the
personalization in the operational environment after delivery to MRTD holder.
T.Information_Leakage
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the
normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This
leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related
to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from
measurements of the interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the
chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific
operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
(DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively
to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF
Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may
physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of
the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software,
(iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE
User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g.
authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following
attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage
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through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s
chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse
engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and
layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design including
treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be
permanent or temporary.
T.Malfunction
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by
applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or
functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing
administration function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information
about the functional operation.
T.Counterfeit
An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a
genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the
authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a
MRTD. The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the
data from a genuine MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate
this genuine MRTD's chip.
4.3
Organisational Security Policies
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The
MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the
Personalization Agent Key.
P.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the
printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of
the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for
the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
P.Personal_Data
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s
chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the
MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be
used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD
is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the PACE V2 Access Control
to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based on
knowledge of the Document PACE V2 Access Keys as defined in [R36].
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P.Sensitive_Data_Protection
All the sensitive data are at least protected in integrity. The keys are protected in both
integrity and confidentiality.
P.Key_Function
All the cryptographic routines are designed in such a way that they are protected against
probing and do not cause any information leakage that may be used by an attacker.
4.4
Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be
used or is intended to be used.
A.MRTD_Manufact
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed
that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data
(to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
o Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and
storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage.
o Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have
got the required skill.
A.Pers_Agent
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of(i) the logical MRTD with respect to
the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document PACE V2 Access Keys derived from the MRZ or the
CAN, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and
(iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The
Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent
bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by
symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Supplemental Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of
the PACE V2 Access Control [R36]. The Supplemental Inspection System reads the logical
MRTD under PACE V2 Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify
the logical MRTD.
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5 Security Objectives
5.1
Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the
TOE.
OT.AC_Pers
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF
data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalization. The
Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in
the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
OT.Data_Int
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the inspection
system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
OT.Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully
authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Supplemental Inspection
System. The Supplemental Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the
PACE V2 Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The
TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to
the Supplemental Inspection System.
OT.Identification
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its
nonvolatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the
IC during Phase 2 "Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The
storage of the Pre- Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization Agent
Authentication Key(s). In Phase 4 "Operational Use" the TOE shall identify itself only to a
successful authenticated Supplemental Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test
and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii)
manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded IC
Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or
functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the
Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
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OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD's chip
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with high attack potential by means of
o measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
o measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
o manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
o controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
o reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside
the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been
proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include
external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency,
or temperature.
OT.Chip_Authenticity
The TOE must support the Inspection Systems to verify the authenticity of the MRTD's
chip. The TOE stores a RSA or ECC private key to prove its identity, and that is used in
chip authentication. This mechanism is described in [R1] as "Active Authentication".
5.2
5.2.1
Security objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
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During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through
phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its
manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including
the following objectives:
o non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
o identification of the element under delivery,
o meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
o physical protection to prevent external damage,
o secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
o traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
origin and shipment details,
reception, reception acknowledgement,
location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality
convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge
to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above
expectations.
OE.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on
behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the holder
and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference data of the
MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical
and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute
the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and Organizations
maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or Organization must (i)
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the
Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a
secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document
Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations. The digital signature in the
Document Security Object relates all data in the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in
the LDS according to [R2].
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5.2.2
Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Supplemental
Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key
and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii)
implements the terminal part of the PACE V2 Access Control [R36].
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the
traveler as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the
signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical
MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the
Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their
authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the
logical MRTD being under PACE V2 Access Control will use inspection systems which
implement the terminal part of the PACE V2 Access Control and use the secure
messaging with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e.
Supplemental Inspection Systems).
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
6 Extended requirements
6.1
6.1.1
Extended families
Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
Description
see [R10].
Extended components
Extended component FAU_SAS.1
Description
see [R10].
Definition
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to
store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale
see [R10].
Rationale
see [R10].
6.1.2
Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
Description
see [R10].
Extended components
Extended component FCS_RND.1
Description
See [R10].
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Definition
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale
See [R10].
Rationale
see [R10].
6.1.3
Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability
Description
See [R10].
Extended components
Extended component FMT_LIM.1
Description
See [R10].
Definition
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Rationale
See [R10].
Extended component FMT_LIM.2
Description
See [R10].
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Definition
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
Rationale
See [R10].
Rationale
See [R10].
6.1.4
Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
Description
See [R10].
Extended components
Extended component FPT_EMS.1
Description
See [R10].
Definition
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale
See [R10].
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Rationale
See [R10].
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7 Security Functional Requirements
7.1
7.1.1
Security Functional Requirements
PP SAC
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Document PACE V2 Access Key Derivation
Algorithm and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bits (for Triple-DES) and
128,192, 256 (for AES) that meet the following: [R36], normative appendix 5.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that
meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/ENC The TSF shall perform secure messaging (PACE V2) - encryption
and decryption
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode and
AES and cryptographic key sizes 112 bits (for Triple-DES) and 128,192, 256 (for
AES) that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [R27] and [R5] normative appendix 5,
A5.3.
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication, encryption
and decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES and
AES and cryptographic key sizes 112(for Triple DES) and 128, 192, 256 (for AES)
that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [R27] and FIPS 197 [R30].
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/MAC The TSF shall perform secure messaging - message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm 3DES in
Retail mode and AES in CMAC-mode and cryptographic key sizes 112(for Triple
DES) and 128, 192, 256 (for AES) that meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC
algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2)
and NIST Special publication 800-38B.
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
the requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte,
following AIS 31 [R31].
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive
integer within range of acceptable values 0 to 255 consecutive unsuccessful
authentication attempts occur related to PACE V2 authentication protocol.
FIA_AFL.1.2 [Editorially Refined] When the defined number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts has been met or surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an
increasing time between receiving of the terminal challenge and sending of
the TSF response during the PACE V2 authentication attempts.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o 1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 "Manufacturing",
o 2. to read the random identifier and the file CardAccess in Phase 3
"Personalization of the MRTD",
o 3. to read the random identifier and the file CardAccess in Phase 4
"Operational Use"
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
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FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow
o 1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 "Manufacturing",
o 2. to read the random identifier and the file CardAccess in Phase 3
"Personalization of the MRTD",
o 3. to read the random identifier and the file CardAccess in Phase 4
"Operational Use"
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
o 1. PACE V2 Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
o 2. Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES and AES.
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1 The TSF shall provide
o 1. PACE V2 Access Control Authentication Mechanism
o 2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES and AES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
o 1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent
by one of the following mechanism(s):
the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization
Agent Key,
o 2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Supplemental
Inspection System only by means of the PACE V2 Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document PACE V2 Access Keys .
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FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions: Failure of MAC
verification in a command received by the TOE .
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the PACE V2 Access Control SFP on terminals
gaining write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and Active Authentication private key of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the PACE V2 Access Control SFP to objects based
on the following:
o 1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Supplemental Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
o 2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
d. Active Authentication public key,
o 3. Security attributes
a. authentication status of terminals.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
o 1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to
write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD, including the Active Authenticate public Key,
o 2. the successfully authenticated Supplemental Inspection System is
allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and
EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD, including the Active
Authenticate public Key.
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
o 1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
of the logical MRTD,
o 2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of
the logical MRTD,
o 3. The Supplemental Inspection System is not allowed to read the data
in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the PACE V2 Access Control SFP to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the PACE V2 Access Control SFP to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and
replay errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
o 1. Initialization,
o 2. Personalization,
o 3. Configuration.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles
o 1. Manufacturer,
o 2. Personalization Agent,
o 3. Supplemental Inspection System.
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o 1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o 2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o 3. software to be reconstructed and,
o 4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks.
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
o 1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o 2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated,
o 3. software to be reconstructed and,
o 4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the the Initialization
Data and Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for
users to the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document
PACE V2 Access Keys and Active Authentication private key to Personalization
Agent.
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document PACE
V2 Access Keys , Personalisation Agent keys and Active Authentication private
key to none.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during
command execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to
Personalization Agent Authentication Keys and Active Authentication private
key.
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization
Agent Authentication Keys and Active Authentication private key.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
o 1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a
malfunction could occur,
o 2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests at the conditions
o At reset
o Before the first execution of the optional code,
o After the Active Authentication is computed,
o Before any cryptographic operation,
o When accessing a DG,
o Prior to any use of TSF data,
o Before execution of any command,
o When performing a PACE V2 authentication,
to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF executable code.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
7.1.2
Active Authentication (AA)
FDP_DAU.1/AA Basic Data Authentication
FDP_DAU.1.1/AA The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used
as a guarantee of the validity of the TOE itself.
FDP_DAU.1.2/AA The TSF shall provide any users with the ability to verify evidence of
the validity of the indicated information.
Refinement:
Evidence generation and ability of verfying it, constitute the Active Authentication
protocol.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1/SIG_MRTD The TSF shall perform digital signature creation in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA CRT, RSA SFM or ECDSA
with SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512 and cryptographic key sizes
o 1024 to 2048 bits for RSA (by steps of 256bits),
o 192 to 521 bits for ECDSA,
that meet the following:
o scheme 1 of [R20] for RSA,
o [R17], [R18], [R19] for ECC.
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
FDP_ITC.1/AA Import of user data without security attributes
FDP_ITC.1.1/AA The TSF shall enforce the PACE V2 Access Control
importing user data, controlled under the SFP, from outside of the TOE.
SFP when
FDP_ITC.1.2/AA The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data
when imported from outside the TOE.
FDP_ITC.1.3/AA The TSF shall enforce the following rules when importing user data
controlled under the SFP from outside the TOE: none.
FMT_MOF.1/AA Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1.1/AA The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable and enable the functions
TSF Active Authentication to Personalization Agent.
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/ASYM The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm RSA & ECC and specified cryptographic
key sizes
o 1024 to 2048 bits for RSA (by steps of 256 bits),
o 192 to 521 bits over characteristic p curves for ECC
that meet the following: [R20], [R21], [R22], [R23].
7.2
Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirement level is EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and
AVA_VAN.5.
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
8 TOE Summary Specification
8.1
TOE Summary Specification
Access Control in reading
This function controls access to read functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security
policy for data retrieval. Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to
access the data, and checks the access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle
state.
It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:
o PACE V2 keys
o Active Authentication private key
o Personalisation agent keys
It controls access to the CPLC data as well:
o It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase
o It ensures it can not be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization
step
Regarding the file structure:
In the operational use:
o The terminal can read user data, the Document Security Object, EF.COM only after
PACE V2 authentication and through a valid secure channel.
In the personalisation phase
o The personalisation agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is
authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
o The TOE is uniquely identified by a random number, generated at each reset. This
unique identifier is called (PUPI)
It ensures as well that no other part of the EEPROM can be accessed at anytime
Access Control in writing
This function controls access to write functions (in EEPROM) and enforces the security
policy for data writing. Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks the
access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written once in
personalization phase to be set to "1".
It ensures as well the CPLC data can not be written anymore once the TOE is
personalized and that it is not possible to load an optional code or change the
personnaliser authentication keys in personalization phase.
Regarding the file structure
In the operational use: It is not possible to create any files (system or data files).
Furthermore, it is not possible to update any system files. However
o the application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs
In the personalisation phase
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
o The personalisation agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all
the data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication
keys.
PACE V2 mechanism
This security functionality ensures the PACE V2 is correctly performed. It can only be
performed once the TOE is personalized with the symmetric PACE V2 keys the
Personalization Agent loaded beforehand during the personalization phase. Furthermore,
this security functionality ensures the session keys are destroyed at the beginning of each
PACE V2 session. A self-test on TDES and random generator is performed when a PACE
V2 session is requested.
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality & integrity of the channel the TOE
and the IFD are using to communicate. After a successful PACE V2 authentication, a
secure channel is established based on Triple DES algorithms. This security functionality
ensures
o No commands were inserted nor deleted within the data flow
o No commands were modified
o The data exchanged remain confidential
o The issuer of the incoming commands and the destinatory of the outgoing data is
the one that was authenticated (through PACE V2)
If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed
Personalisation Agent Authentication
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personnalization Agent,
demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a
symmetric Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES or AES algorithm.
Active Authentication
This security functionality ensures the Active Authentication is performed as described in
[R1] & [R2]. (if it is activated by the personnalizer). A self-test on the random generator
is performed priori to any Active authentication. Moreover, this security functionality is
protected against the DFA.
Self tests
The TOE performs self tests on the TSF data it stores to protect the TOE. In particular, it
is in charge of the:
o DFA detection for the Active authentication
o Self tests of the random generator before the PACE V2 and Active Authentication
o Self tests of the DES before the PACE V2 Monitoring of the integrity of keys, files
and TSF data Monitoring the integrity of the optional code (at start up) Protecting
the cryptographic operation
The integrity of the files are monitored each time they are accessed and the integrity of
the optional code is checked each time the TOE is powered on. The integrity of keys and
sensitive data is checked each time they are used/accessed.
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Safe state management
This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets bask to a secure state when
o an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS
o a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in EEPROM)
This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in
the state "kill card" or becomes mute.
Physical protection
This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
9 Rationales
9.1
9.1.1
Security objectives and Security Problem Definition
Threats
T.Chip_ID The threat T.Chip_ID "Identification of MRTD’s chip" addresses the trace of the
MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless
communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security objective
OT.Identification by PACE V2 Access Control.
T.Skimming The threat T.Skimming "Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait"
addresses the reading of the logical MRTD trough the interface or listening the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. This threat is countered by the
security objective OT.Data_Conf "Confidentiality of personal data" through PACE V2
Access Control.
T.Eavesdropping The threat T.Eavesdropping "Eavesdropping to the communication
between TOE and inspection system" addresses the reading of the logical MRTD trough
the interface or listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal.
This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf "Confidentiality of
personal data" through PACE V2 Access Control.
T.Forgery The threat T.Forgery "Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip" addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD" requires the TOE to limit
the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf.
OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering". The examination of the
presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD
passport book" shall ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive chip which
may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect
partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created
according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign "Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature" and
verified by the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif "Verification by
Passive Authentication".
T.Abuse-Func The threat T.Abuse-Func "Abuse of Functionality" addresses attacks using
the MRTD’s chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to
manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func "Protection
against Abuse of Functionality". Additionally this objective is supported by the security
objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization "Personalization of logical MRTD"
ensuring that the TOE security functions for the initialization and the personalization are
disabled and the security functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder
are enabled according to the intended use of the TOE.
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
T.Information_Leakage The threat T.Information_Leakage "Information Leakage from
MRTD’s chip" is typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with
high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the
directly related security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information
Leakage".
T.Phys-Tamper The threat T.Phys-Tamper "Physical Tampering" is typical for integrated
circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of
the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security objective
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against Physical Tampering".
T.Malfunction The threat T.Malfunction "Malfunction due to EnvironmentalStress" is typical
for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The
protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly related security
objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against Malfunctions".
T.Counterfeit The threat T.Counterfeit "MRTD's chip" addresses the attack of unauthorized
copy or reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by active
authentication proving the authenticity of the chip as required by OT.Chip_Authenticity
"Protection against forgery" using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing
State or Organization. The Public active Authentication Key has to be written into
EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects.
9.1.2
Organisational Security Policies
P.Manufact The OSP P.Manufact "Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip" requires a unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Prepersonalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
P.Personalization The OSP P.Personalization "Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State
or Organization only" addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization "Personalization of logical MRTD", and (ii) the access control for the
user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control
for Personalization of logical MRTD". Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the
Personalization Agent Key(s) according to OT.Identification "Identification and
Authentication of the TOE". The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of
TSF data and management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
P.Personal_Data The OSP P.Personal_Data "Personal data protection policy" requires the
TOE (i) to support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of
the PACE V2 Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by
the issuing State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives
OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" describing the unconditional protection of the
integrity of the stored data and during transmission. The security objective OT.Data_Conf
"Confidentiality of personal data" describes the protection of the confidentiality.
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection The OSP P.Sensitive_data_Protection requires data to be
protected in integrity as fullfilled by OT.Data_Int. Concerning keys, they must be
protected in confidentiality in any cases as ensured by OT.Prot_Inf_Leak.
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
P.Key_Function The OSP P.Key_function requires cryptographic algorithms to be protected
against tampering as it enforced for the whole TOE by OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper and also
designed in order to avoid data leakage as ensured by OT.Prot_Inf_Leak.
9.1.3
Assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact "MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to
6" is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact
"Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing" that requires to use security procedures during
all manufacturing steps.
A.MRTD_Delivery The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery "MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6" is
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery "Protection
of the MRTD delivery" that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps of
the MRTD.
A.Pers_Agent The assumption A.Pers_Agent "Personalization of the MRTD’s chip" is
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization
"Personalization of logical MRTD" including the enrolment, the protection with digital
signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
A.Insp_Sys The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys "Inspection Systems for global interoperability" is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD "Examination of the MRTD passport
book". The security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
"Protection of data from the logical MRTD" will require the Supplemental Inspection
System to implement the PACE V2 Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data
during the transmission and the internal handling.
9.1.4
SPD and Security Objectives
Threats
Security Objectives
Rationale
T.Chip_ID
OT.Identification
Section 6.1.1
T.Skimming
OT.Data_Conf
Section 6.1.1
T.Eavesdropping
OT.Data_Conf
Section 6.1.1
T.Forgery
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper,
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign, OE.Exam_MRTD,
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
Section 6.1.1
T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func, OE.Personalization
Section 6.1.1
T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Section 6.1.1
T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Section 6.1.1
T.Malfunction
OT.Prot_Malfunction
Section 6.1.1
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Threats
Security Objectives
Rationale
T.Counterfeit
OT.Chip_Authenticity
Section 6.1.1
Tableau 1 Threats and Security Objectives - Coverage
Security Objectives
Threats
OT.AC_Pers
T.Forgery
OT.Data_Int
T.Forgery
OT.Data_Conf
T.Skimming, T.Eavesdropping
OT.Identification
T.Chip_ID
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
T.Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
T.Information_Leakage
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper T.Forgery, T.Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfunction
T.Malfunction
OT.Chip_Authenticity
T.Counterfeit
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
OE.Personalization
T.Abuse-Func
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
T.Forgery
OE.Exam_MRTD
T.Forgery
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif T.Forgery
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
Tableau 2 Security Objectives and Threats - Coverage
Organisational Security Policies
Security Objectives
Rationale
P.Manufact
OT.Identification
Section 6.1.2
P.Personalization
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Identification,
OE.Personalization
Section 6.1.2
P.Personal_Data
OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
Section 6.1.2
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection
OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Section 6.1.2
P.Key_Function
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Section 6.1.2
Tableau 3 OSPs and Security Objectives - Coverage
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Security Objectives
Organisational Security Policies
OT.AC_Pers
P.Personalization
OT.Data_Int
P.Personal_Data,
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection
OT.Data_Conf
P.Personal_Data
OT.Identification
P.Manufact, P.Personalization
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection, P.Key_Function
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper P.Key_Function
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Chip_Authenticity
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
OE.Personalization
P.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
Tableau 4 Security Objectives and OSPs - Coverage
Assumptions
Security objectives for the Operational Environment
Rationale
A.MRTD_Manufact
OE.MRTD_Manufact
Section 6.1.3
A.MRTD_Delivery
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
Section 6.1.3
A.Pers_Agent
OE.Personalization
Section 6.1.3
A.Insp_Sys
OE.Exam_MRTD, OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
Section 6.1.3
Tableau 5 Assumptions and Security Objectives for the Operational Environment Coverage
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Security objectives for the Operational Environment Assumptions
OE.MRTD_Manufact
A.MRTD_Manufac
t
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
A.MRTD_Delivery
OE.Personalization
A.Pers_Agent
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Exam_MRTD
A.Insp_Sys
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
A.Insp_Sys
Tableau 6 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment and Assumptions Coverage
9.2
9.2.1
Security requirements and security objectives
Objectives
Security Objectives for the TOE
OT.AC_Pers The security objective OT.AC_Pers "Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD" addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write access to
the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only
the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the
groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be
authenticated either by using the PACE V2 mechanism (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC) with
the personalization key or for reasons of interoperability with the [R11] by using the
symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/AUTH).
In case of using the PACE V2 mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the reauthentication and FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by
means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as
well as FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the
Document PACE V2 Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as
authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to
the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
OT.Data_Int The security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" requires the
TOE to protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD
data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the
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FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed to modify any of the
data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR
FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists
the TSF management functions (including Personalization). The authentication of the
terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6 using either FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC or
FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int "Integrity of personal data" requires the TOE to
ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted
logical MRTD data by means of the PACE V2 mechanism. The SFR FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1
and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure
messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the
Personalization Agent to establish the Document PACE V2 Access Keys in a way that they
cannot be read by anyone in accordance to FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
OT.Data_Conf The security objective OT.Data_Conf "Confidentiality of personal data"
requires the TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before
identification respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In case of
failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the
necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The read access to the
logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful
authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD
(EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful authenticated Supplemental Inspection System is
allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Supplemental
Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization for the key management for the Document PACE V2 Access
Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the
authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the
authentication attempt as Supplemental Inspection System only by means of the PACE V2
Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document PACE V2 Access Keys.
Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful authentication
of the terminal with PACE V2 Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes
the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1 and
FDP_UIT.1). (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/ MAC for the
ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1
establish the key management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
prevents reading of the Document PACE V2 Access Keys.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires the
Personalization Agent to use the PACE V2 Access Control Authentication Mechanism or
secure messaging.
OT.Identification The
security
objective
OT.Identification
"Identification
and
Authentication of the TOE" address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely
51
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
identifying the MRTD's chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF
according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Supplemental
Inspection System in Phase 4 "Operational Use". The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows
only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data (including
the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization
Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the phase 4 "Operational Use" violates
the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow
reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD's chip before successful authentication
of the Supplemental Inspection System and will stop communication after unsuccessful
authentication attempt. In case of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces
additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute
force attack.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func "Protection against
Abuse of Functionality" is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used after TOE
Delivery.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak "Protection against Information
Leakage" requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
MRTD's chip against disclosure
o by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMS.1,
o by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
o by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
52
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper "Protection against
Physical Tampering" is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
OT.Prot_Malfunction The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction "Protection against
Malfunctions" is covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to
demonstrate the correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of
TSF data and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case
of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
OT.Chip_Authenticity The security objective OT.Chip_Authenticity "Protection against
forgery" is ensured by the Active Authentication Protocol activated by FMT_MOF.1/AA and
provided by FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 proving the identity and
authenticity of the TOE. The Active Authentication relies on FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1. It is performed using a TOE internally stored
confidential
private
key
as
required
by
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, this key being loaded during personalization phase as required
by FDP_ITC.1/AA or generated on-card by FCS_CKM.1/ASYM.
9.2.2
Rationale tables of Security Objectives and SFRs
Security Objectives
Security Functional Requirements
Rationale
OT.AC_Pers
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_RND.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,
FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ,
FPT_EMS.1, FPT_PHP.3, FPT_FLS.1
Section 6.2.1
OT.Data_Int
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/ENC,
FCS_COP.1/AUTH, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_RND.1,
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_ACC.1,
FDP_ACF.1, FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_SMR.1, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Section 6.2.1
OT.Data_Conf
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/ENC, FCS_COP.1/MAC, FCS_RND.1,
FIA_UID.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4,
FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,
FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Section 6.2.1
OT.Identification
FAU_SAS.1, FIA_UID.1, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA, FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Section 6.2.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
Section 6.2.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
FPT_EMS.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1, FPT_PHP.3
Section 6.2.1
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper FPT_PHP.3
Section 6.2.1
OT.Prot_Malfunction
Section 6.2.1
FPT_FLS.1, FPT_TST.1
53
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Security Objectives
Security Functional Requirements
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1,
FDP_DAU.1/AA, FDP_ACC.1, FDP_ACF.1,
FDP_ITC.1/AA, FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ, FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD,
FMT_MOF.1/AA
Rationale
Section 6.2.1
Tableau 7 Security Objectives and SFRs - Coverage
54
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Security Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
FAU_SAS.1
OT.Identification
FCS_CKM.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_CKM.4
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/SHA
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FCS_COP.1/ENC
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int
FCS_COP.1/MAC
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FCS_RND.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FIA_AFL.1
OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_UID.1
OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_UAU.1
OT.Data_Conf, OT.Identification
FIA_UAU.4
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.5
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FIA_UAU.6
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_ACC.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FDP_ACF.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FDP_UCT.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FDP_UIT.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FMT_SMF.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FMT_SMR.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf
FMT_LIM.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_LIM.2
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
OT.Identification
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FMT_MT1/KEY_READ
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Data_Int, OT.Data_Conf,
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FPT_EMS.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
FPT_FLS.1
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Prot_Malfunction
55
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Security Functional
Requirements
Security Objectives
FPT_TST.1
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Prot_Malfunction
FPT_PHP.3
OT.AC_Pers, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak,
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
FDP_DAU.1/AA
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FDP_ITC.1/AA
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FMT_MOF.1/AA
OT.Chip_Authenticity
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM
OT.Chip_Authenticity
Tableau 8 SFRs and Security Objectives
56
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
9.3
9.3.1
Dependencies
SFRs dependencies
Requirements
CC Dependencies
Satisfied Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1
No dependencies
FCS_CKM.1
(FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/ENC,
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_CKM.4
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_COP.1/ENC
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_COP.1/MAC
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_RND.1
No dependencies
FIA_AFL.1
(FIA_UAU.1)
FIA_UID.1
No dependencies
FIA_UAU.1
(FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UAU.4
No dependencies
FIA_UAU.5
No dependencies
FIA_UAU.6
No dependencies
FDP_ACC.1
(FDP_ACF.1)
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
(FDP_ACC.1) and
(FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UCT.1
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
and (FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_UIT.1
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
and (FTP_ITC.1 or
FTP_TRP.1)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMF.1
No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1
(FIA_UID.1)
FIA_UID.1
FMT_LIM.1
(FMT_LIM.2)
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2
(FMT_LIM.1)
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1
57
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Requirements
CC Dependencies
Satisfied Dependencies
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FPT_EMS.1
No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1
No dependencies
FPT_TST.1
No dependencies
FPT_PHP.3
No dependencies
FDP_DAU.1/AA
No dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD
(FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FCS_CKM.4, FDP_ITC.1/AA,
FDP_ITC.2) and (FCS_CKM.4) FCS_CKM.1/ASYM
FDP_ITC.1/AA
(FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1)
and (FMT_MSA.3)
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MOF.1/AA
(FMT_SMF.1) and
(FMT_SMR.1)
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM
(FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1)
and (FCS_CKM.4)
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD
Tableau 9 SFRs dependencies
58
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Rationale for the exclusion of dependencies
The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/SHA is
unsupported. The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need
any key material. Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import
(FDP_ITC.1/2) is necessary.
The dependency FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2 of FCS_COP.1/AUTH is
unsupported. The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key
permanently stored during the Pre-Personalization process (cf. FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by
the manufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to generate or import a key during
the addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC.
The dependency FCS_CKM.4 of FCS_COP.1/AUTH is unsupported. Since the key is
permanently stored within the TOE there is no need for FCS_CKM.4, too.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ACF.1 is unsupported. The access control TSF
according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are defined during the
personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No management of
these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UCT.1 is unsupported. The SFR
FDP_UCT.1 requires the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There
is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically
distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the
TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1
is not applicable here.
The dependency FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1 of FDP_UIT.1 is unsupported. The SFR
FDP_UIT.1 required the use of secure messaging between the MRTD and the BIS. There
is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require this communication channel to be logically
distinct from other communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the
TOE does not provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1
is not applicable here.
The dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_ITC.1/AA is unsupported. FMT_MSA.3
dependency is not required since this import does not involve any specific security
attribute.
9.3.2
SARs dependencies
Requirements CC Dependencies
Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_ARC.1
(ADV_FSP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_FSP.5
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4
ADV_IMP.1
(ADV_TDS.3) and (ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_TDS.4, ALC_TAT.2
ADV_INT.2
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(ALC_TAT.1)
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_TAT.2
59
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Requirements CC Dependencies
Satisfied Dependencies
ADV_TDS.4
(ADV_FSP.5)
ADV_FSP.5
AGD_OPE.1
(ADV_FSP.1)
ADV_FSP.5
AGD_PRE.1
No dependencies
ALC_CMC.4
(ALC_CMS.1) and (ALC_DVS.1) and
(ALC_LCD.1)
ALC_CMS.5
No dependencies
ALC_DEL.1
No dependencies
ALC_DVS.2
No dependencies
ALC_LCD.1
No dependencies
ALC_TAT.2
(ADV_IMP.1)
ADV_IMP.1
ASE_CCL.1
(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_ECD.1
No dependencies
ASE_INT.1
No dependencies
ASE_OBJ.2
(ASE_SPD.1)
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_REQ.2
(ASE_ECD.1) and (ASE_OBJ.2)
ASE_ECD.1, ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_SPD.1
No dependencies
ASE_TSS.1
(ADV_FSP.1) and (ASE_INT.1) and
(ASE_REQ.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ASE_INT.1,
ASE_REQ.2
ATE_COV.2
(ADV_FSP.2) and (ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, ATE_FUN.1
ATE_DPT.3
(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_TDS.4) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_TDS.4,
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1
(ATE_COV.1)
ATE_COV.2
ATE_IND.2
(ADV_FSP.2) and (AGD_OPE.1) and
(AGD_PRE.1) and (ATE_COV.1) and
(ATE_FUN.1)
ADV_FSP.5, AGD_OPE.1,
AGD_PRE.1, ATE_COV.2,
ATE_FUN.1
AVA_VAN.5
(ADV_ARC.1) and (ADV_FSP.4) and
(ADV_IMP.1) and (ADV_TDS.3) and
(AGD_OPE.1) and (AGD_PRE.1) and
(ATE_DPT.1)
ADV_ARC.1, ADV_FSP.5,
ADV_IMP.1, ADV_TDS.4,
AGD_OPE.1, AGD_PRE.1,
ATE_DPT.3
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2,
ALC_LCD.1
Tableau 10 SARs dependencies
9.4
EAL rationale
This Security Target chooses EAL5 because developers and users require a high level of
independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous
development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security
engineering techniques.
60
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
EAL5 represents a meaningful increase in assurance from EAL4 by requiring semiformal
design descriptions, a more structured (and hence analyzable) architecture, and improved
mechanisms and/or procedures that provide confidence that the TOE will not be tampered
during development.
The assurance components in an evaluation assurance level (EAL) are chosen in a way that
they build a mutually supportive and complete set of components. The requirements chosen
for augmentation do not add any dependencies, which are not already fulfilled for the
corresponding requirements contained in EAL5. Therefore, these components add additional
assurance to EAL5, but the mutual support of the requirements and the internal consistency
is still guaranteed.
9.5
9.5.1
EAL augmentations rationale
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Due to the definition of the TOE, it must be shown to be highly resistant to penetration
attacks. This assurance requirement is achieved by the AVA_VAN.5 component.
Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis is based on highly detailed technical information.
The attacker is assumed to be thoroughly familiar with the specific implementation of the
TOE. The attacker is presumed to have a high level of technical sophistication. AVA_VAN.5
has dependencies with ADV_ARC.1 "Security architecture description", ADV_FSP.4 "Complete
functional specification", ADV_IMP.1 "Implementation representation of the TSF",
ADV_TDS.3 "Basic modular design", AGD_PRE.1 "Preparative procedures" and AGD_OPE.1
"Operational user Guidance" and ATE_DPT.1 "Testing: basic design".
All these dependencies are satisfied by EAL5.
9.5.2
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
Development security is concerned with physical, procedural, personnel and other technical
measures that may be used in the development environment to protect the TOE. This
assurance component is a higher hierarchical component to EAL5 (only ALC_DVS.1). Due to
the nature of the TOE, there is a need for any justification of the sufficiency of these
procedures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.
ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
61
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
10 PP CLAIMS
10.1 PP reference
The PP SAC in CC3.1 [R10] is claimed.
10.2 PP additions
The additional functionalities are the Active Authentication (AA) based on the ICAO PKI V1.1 and the
related on-card generation of RSA and ECC keys. It implies some addition to the standard PP.
The following SFRs are added to the standard PP for the TOE:
• FCS_COP.1 / SIG_MRTD
• FDP_DAU.1 / AA
• FDP_ITC / AA
• FMT_MOF.1 / AA
• FCS_CKM.1 / ASYM
The following Objective for the TOE is added to the standard PP:
• OT.Chip_authenticity “Protection against forgery”
The following Threat is added to the standard PP:
• T.counterfeit
Moreover, the composition with the IC mandates to introduce complementary OSPs:
• P.Sensitive_Data_Protection “Protection of sensitive data”
• P.Key_Function “Design of the cryptographic routines in order to protect the keys”
62
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
11 Composition with IC Security Target
IC Elements
Consistent in ST with
Justification
P.Manufact
Security procedures are used
during TOE packaging, finishing
and pre-personalisation (During
Phase 2)
No
n/a
This assumption deals with the
development process and is
therefore covered by the
evaluation
A.Resp-Appl
Yes
P.Sensitive_Data_Protectio The Composite TOE ensure the
n
confidentiality of the cryptographic
keys it stores
A.Check-Init
Yes
P.Manufact
ICs are actually identified
uniquely
The Cryptographic routines are
designed in such a way that they
do not compromise key by any
leak of information
A.Process-Sec-IC
A.Plat-Appl
Relevant
Yes
A.Key-Function
Yes
P.Key_Function
P.Add-Components
Yes
The TOE ensure protection of
P.Sensitive_Data_Protectio
data using especially the 3DES
n
and AES algorithms
T.Leak-Inherent
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.Phys-Probing
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.Malfunction
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.Phys-Manipulation
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.Leak-Forced
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.Abuse-Func
Yes
(1)
(1)
T.RND
Yes
(1)
(1)
No
n/a
This assumption deals with the
development process and is
therefore covered by the
evaluation
Yes
P.Sensitive_Data_Protectio The Composite TOE ensure the
confidentiality of the cryptographic
n
keys it stores as well as the
integrity of all the sensitive data.
OE.Plat-Appl
OE.Resp-Appl
63
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
IC Elements
Relevant
Consistent in ST with
Justification
OE.Process-Sec-IC
Yes
P.Manufact
This objective is ensured by the
security procedures and
manufacturing guidelines of NXP
manufacturing site
OE.Check-Init
Yes
P.Manufact
ICs are actually identified
uniquely
O.Leak-Inherent
Yes
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
O.Phys-Probing
Yes
OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper
O.Malfunction
Yes
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
O.Phys-Manipulation
Yes
OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
O.Leak-Forced
Yes
OT.Prot_Phys_Tamper
O.Abuse-Func
O.Identification
Yes
Yes
Yes
Software is designed to be
protected against leakage with
the hardware support
OT.Identification
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Int
OT_Data_Conf
The Cryptographic routines are
designed in such a way that they
do not compromise random
values in order to ensure
confidentially, integrity and proof
of origin.
3DES algorithm is used to
enforce data integrity, data
confidentiality and
authentications.
OT.Data_Int
AES algorithm is used to enforce
the authentication of the
personalization agent.
OT.AC_Pers
O.HW_AES
Manipulation of the memory and
the execution is controlled by the
software. This is achieved with
the hardware support
Identification is fully handled
during whole lifecycle of the TOE
from IC manufacturing to use
phase.
OT.AC_Pers
Yes
Correct operation of the TOE is
controlled and malfunctions are
detected
Improper usage of the TOE is
controlled
OT_Data_Conf
O.HW_DES3
Objective require that memory
and execution cannot be probed
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.AC_Pers
O.RND
Software is designed to be
protected against leakage with
the hardware support
Yes
O.MF_HW
No
n/a
Mifare is not supported
O.MEM_ACCESS
No
n/a
Not used.
O.SFR_ACCESS
No
n/a
Not used.
64
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
IC Elements
Relevant
Consistent in ST with
Justification
FRU_FLT.2
Yes
(2)
(2)
FPT_FLS.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_LIM.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_LIM.2
Yes
(2)
(2)
FAU_SAS.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FPT_PHP.3
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_ITT.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FPT_ITT.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_IFC.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FCS_RNG.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
FCS_COP.1[DES]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FCS_COP.1[AES]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_ACC.1[MEM]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_ACC.1[SFR]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_ACF.1[MEM]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FDP_ACF.1[SFR]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_MSA.3[MEM]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_MSA.3[SFR]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_MSA.1[MEM]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_MSA.1[SFR]
Yes
(2)
(2)
FMT_SMF.1
Yes
(2)
(2)
(1) Since IC objectives are consistent with TOE objectives, IC Threats are also consistent with
TOE SPD
(2) Since IC SFRs are translations of IC objectives, IC SFRs are consistent with TOE SFRs
65
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
12 References
MRTD specifications
[R1]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable
Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01,
2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization
[R2]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable
Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R3]
Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion
technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a
Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –
1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[R4]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended
Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v1.11
[R5]
Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents
Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition –
2003
IDL specifications
[R6]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence —
Part 1:Physical characteristics and basic data set, ISO/IEC FDIS 18013-1:2005(E)
[R7]
Information Technology - Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence —
Part 2: Machine-readable technologies, ISO/IEC FDIS 18013-2:2007(E)
[R8]
Personal Identification — ISO Compliant Driving Licence — Part 3: Access control,
authentication and integrity validation, ISO/IEC FDIS 18013-3:2008(E)
Protection Profiles
[R9]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 - BSI-PP-0035 15/06/2007
[R10]
Machine readable travel documents SAC (PACE V2) Supplemental Access Control,
rd
ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/06, 3 October 2010
[R11]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control –
th
BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25 march 2009
[R12]
E-passport: adaptation and interpretation of e-passport Protection Profiles,
SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007
[R13]
Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations,
ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009
Security Target
[R14]
NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers P5CD016/021/041V1A and P5Cc081VIA Security
Target Lite, BSI-DSZ-0555, Rev. 1.3, 21 September 2009
Standards
[R15]
ISO7816-4 – Organization, security and commands for interchange
[R16]
Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TR-ECC, BSI
2006
[R17]
ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002
[R18]
ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002
66
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
[R19]
[R20]
[R21]
[R22]
[R23]
[R24]
[R25]
[R26]
[R27]
[R28]
[R29]
[R30]
Misc
[R31]
[R32]
CC
[R33]
[R34]
[R35]
SAC
[R36]
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
ISO/IEC 9796-2 (2002) - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature
schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+
Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998
Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003
RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories
Technical Note, 2002
ANSI X9.31 - Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998.
FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes
utilisant un cryptogramme bloc"
NIST SP 800-90 – Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators (Revised)
FIPS 197 – Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen
und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1,
25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
NOTE-10 - Interpretation with e-passport PP_courtesy translation-draft v0.1
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1 : Introduction and
general model, CCMB-2009-07-001, version 3.1 Revision 3 Final, July 2009
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2 : Security
Functional Components, CCMB-2009-07-002, version 3.1 Revision 3 Final, July 2009
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3 : Security
Assurance Components, CCMB-2009-07-003, version 3.1 Revision 3 Final, July 2009
Machine Readable Travel Documents, Technical Report, Supplemental Acces Control for
Machine Readable Travel Documents, version 1.01, ICAO, November 11,2010
67
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
13
AA
BAC
CC
CPLC
DF
DFA
DG
EAL
EF
EFID
DES
DH
I/0
IC
ICAO
ICC
IFD
LDS
MF
MRTD
MRZ
MSK
OS
PKI
PP
SAC
SFI
SHA
SOD
TOE
TSF
ACRONYMS
Active Authentication
Basic Access Control
Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 3
Card personalisation life cycle
Dedicated File
Differential Fault Analysis
Data Group
Evaluation Assurance Level
Elementary File
File Identifier
Digital encryption standard
Diffie Hellmann
Input/Output
Integrated Circuit
International Civil Aviation organization
Integrated Circuit Card
Interface device
Logical Data structure
Master File
Machine readable Travel Document
Machine readable Zone
Manufacturer Secret Key
Operating System
Public Key Infrastructure
Protection Profile
Supplemental Access Control
Short File identifier
Secure hashing Algorithm
Security object Data
Target of Evaluation
TOE Security function
68
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
Index
FPT_TST.1 .......................................................... 44
A
L
A.Insp_Sys ........................................................... 27
A.MRTD_Delivery .............................................. 26
A.MRTD_Manufact ............................................. 26
A.Pers_Agent ....................................................... 27
Access__Control__in__reading ........................... 47
Access__Control__in__writing............................ 47
Active__Authentication ....................................... 48
Authenticity__of__the__MRTD's__chip ............. 23
Logical__MRTD__data ....................................... 22
O
OE.Exam_MRTD ................................................ 31
OE.MRTD___Delivery........................................ 30
OE.MRTD_Manufact .......................................... 30
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign............................................. 31
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif....................................... 31
OE.Personalization............................................... 31
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD..................................... 32
OT.AC_Pers......................................................... 28
OT.Chip_Authenticity ......................................... 30
OT.Data_Conf...................................................... 28
OT.Data_Int ......................................................... 28
OT.Identification.................................................. 28
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func ........................................... 29
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak................................................ 29
OT.Prot_Malfunction........................................... 29
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper ......................................... 29
B
BAC__mechanism ............................................... 48
F
FAU_SAS.1 ......................................................... 37
FCS_CKM.1 ........................................................ 37
FCS_CKM.1/ASYM............................................ 46
FCS_CKM.4 ........................................................ 37
FCS_COP.1/AUTH.............................................. 38
FCS_COP.1/ENC................................................. 37
FCS_COP.1/MAC................................................ 38
FCS_COP.1/SHA................................................. 37
FCS_COP.1/SIG_MRTD..................................... 45
FCS_RND.1 ......................................................... 38
FDP_ACC.1 ......................................................... 40
FDP_ACF.1 ......................................................... 40
FDP_DAU.1/AA.................................................. 45
FDP_ITC.1/AA .................................................... 45
FDP_UCT.1 ......................................................... 41
FDP_UIT.1........................................................... 42
FIA_AFL.1........................................................... 38
FIA_UAU.1 ......................................................... 39
FIA_UAU.4 ......................................................... 39
FIA_UAU.5 ......................................................... 40
FIA_UAU.6 ......................................................... 40
FIA_UID.1 ........................................................... 39
FMT_LIM.1 ......................................................... 42
FMT_LIM.2 ......................................................... 43
FMT_MOF.1/AA................................................. 46
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS ........................................ 43
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA....................................... 43
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ ................................. 43
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE................................ 43
FMT_SMF.1 ........................................................ 42
FMT_SMR.1 ........................................................ 42
FPT_EMS.1 ......................................................... 44
FPT_FLS.1........................................................... 44
FPT_PHP.3 .......................................................... 45
P
P.Key_Function ................................................... 26
P.Manufact........................................................... 25
P.Personal_Data ................................................... 26
P.Personalization.................................................. 26
P.Sensitive_Data_Protection................................ 26
Personalisation__Agent__Authentication............ 48
Physical__protection............................................ 49
S
Safe__state__management................................... 49
Secure__Messaging ............................................. 48
Self__tests............................................................ 48
T
T.Abuse-Func ...................................................... 24
T.Chip_ID ............................................................ 23
T.Counterfeit........................................................ 25
T.Eavesdropping .................................................. 23
T.Forgery ............................................................. 24
T.Information_Leakage ....................................... 24
T.Malfunction ...................................................... 25
T.Phys-Tamper .................................................... 25
T.Skimming ......................................................... 23
69
FQR 110 6261 Ed1
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