Security Target: st_vid10372

Security Target: st_vid10372
McAfee Network Security Platform (NSP) Security Target
Network Security Platform (NSP)
Intrusion Detection System Security Target
EAL 2 augmented ALC_FLR.2
Release Date:
May 5, 2010
Document ID:
09-1904-R-0053
Version:
1.0
Prepared By:
M. McAlister
InfoGard Laboratories, Inc.
Prepared For:
2010 McAfee® Inc.
McAfee, Incorporated
3965 Freedom Circle
Santa Clara, CA 95054
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McAfee Network Security Platform (NSP) Security Target
Table of Contents
1
INTRODUCTION.............................................................................................................................................. 5
1.1 IDENTIFICATION ............................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 ORGANIZATION ................................................................................................................................................ 5
1.3 DOCUMENT TERMINOLOGY ............................................................................................................................. 6
1.3.1
ST Specific Terminology ........................................................................................................................ 6
1.3.2
Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................. 10
1.4 COMMON CRITERIA PRODUCT TYPE............................................................................................................... 11
1.5 OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................................................................... 11
1.6 PRODUCT TYPE .............................................................................................................................................. 12
1.7 PRODUCT DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................................. 12
1.8 PRODUCT FEATURES ...................................................................................................................................... 13
1.9 PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES ................................................................................................................................. 14
1.10
ARCHITECTURE DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................................... 15
1.11
HARDWARE: SENSOR APPLIANCES ............................................................................................................ 16
1.11.1
Collection Subsystem ...................................................................................................................... 18
1.11.2
Manager Subsystem ........................................................................................................................ 20
1.12
MCAFEE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT SUPPORT SERVICES .................................................................... 21
1.12.1
Update Server ................................................................................................................................. 21
1.13
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT RESOURCES ............................................................................................... 22
1.13.1
Hardware Components ................................................................................................................... 22
1.13.2
Software Components ..................................................................................................................... 23
1.13.3
Guidance Documents ...................................................................................................................... 23
1.14
LOGICAL BOUNDARIES.............................................................................................................................. 25
1.14.1
Security Audit .................................................................................................................................. 26
1.14.2
Identification and Authentication.................................................................................................... 26
1.14.3
Security Management...................................................................................................................... 26
1.14.4
Protection of TSF ............................................................................................................................ 27
1.14.5
Cryptographic Operations .............................................................................................................. 28
1.14.6
System Data Collection ................................................................................................................... 30
1.14.7
System Data Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 31
1.14.8
System Data Review, Availability and Loss .................................................................................... 32
1.15
FEATURES EXCLUDED FROM THE COMMON CRITERIA EVALUATED CONFIGURATION .............................. 32
2
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS .......................................................................................................................... 34
2.1 THREATS AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES NOT APPLICABLE ................................................................................ 34
2.1.1
Scanner not applicable ........................................................................................................................ 34
2.1.2
No Transfer of IDS data to non-TOE components............................................................................... 34
2.2 ADDED ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................................... 35
2.3 ADDED ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ............................................................................................. 35
2.4 SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................................................... 35
3
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION ......................................................................................................... 37
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4
ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................................................ 37
TOE THREATS ............................................................................................................................................... 37
IT SYSTEM THREATS ..................................................................................................................................... 38
ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES .......................................................................................................... 39
SECURITY OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................................................. 40
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................................ 40
MAPPING OF SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO SECURITY OBJECTIVES................................................................ 42
RATIONALE FOR IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................ 43
RATIONALE FOR ASSUMPTION COVERAGE ..................................................................................................... 46
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EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION ............................................................................................... 48
6
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ..................................................................................................................... 54
6.1 CONVENTIONS ............................................................................................................................................... 54
6.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................................... 56
6.2.1
SECURITY AUDIT (FAU) ................................................................................................................... 56
6.2.2
Cryptographic Operations (FCS) ........................................................................................................ 58
6.2.3
Identification and Authentication (FIA)............................................................................................... 59
6.2.4
SECURITY MANAGEMENT (FMT) .................................................................................................... 60
6.2.5
PROTECTION OF THE TSF (FPT) .................................................................................................... 61
6.2.6
TOE Access (FTA) ............................................................................................................................... 62
6.3 EXTENDED TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS............................................................................. 62
6.3.1
IDS COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS (IDS) ...................................................................................... 62
6.4 RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................ 64
6.5 RATIONALE FOR TOE SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................... 65
6.5.1
TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale .............................................................................. 66
6.6 RATIONALE FOR IT SECURITY REQUIREMENT DEPENDENCIES ...................................................................... 68
6.7 RATIONALE FOR TOE DEPENDENCIES NOT SATISFIED .................................................................................. 68
6.8 TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ................................................................................................ 69
6.9 RATIONALE FOR TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS................................................................................................. 70
7
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ............................................................................................................ 72
7.1 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS ........................................................................................................................... 72
7.1.1
Security Audit ...................................................................................................................................... 72
7.1.2
Identification and Authentication ........................................................................................................ 75
7.1.3
Security Management .......................................................................................................................... 75
7.1.4
Protection of the TSF ........................................................................................................................... 78
7.1.5
Cryptographic Operations ................................................................................................................... 79
7.1.6
System Data Collection........................................................................................................................ 80
7.1.7
System Data Analysis ........................................................................................................................... 80
7.1.8
System Data Review, Availability and Loss ......................................................................................... 85
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List of Tables
Table 1: Hardware Components ................................................................................................... 22
Table 2: Software Components ..................................................................................................... 23
Table 3: Summary of Mappings between Threats and IT Security .............................................. 42
Table 4: Functional Requirements ................................................................................................ 56
Table 5: Audited Events................................................................................................................ 57
Table 6: TSF Data/Operations by Access Role ............................................................................ 61
Table 7: System Events ................................................................................................................. 62
Table 8: Summary of Mappings between Security Functions and IT Security Objectives .......... 65
Table 9: SFR Dependencies .......................................................................................................... 68
Table 10: Assurance Requirements: EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2 ......................................................... 69
Table 11: TOE Security Function to SFR Mapping ..................................................................... 71
Table 12: NSM Access by Authenticated Role ............................................................................ 78
List of Figures
Figure 1: Network Architecture (example) ................................................................................... 11
Figure 2: Internal Architecture Concept ....................................................................................... 15
Figure 3: Default Rule Sets ........................................................................................................... 31
Figure 4: IDS: Intrusion Detection System Class Decomposition................................................ 48
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1 Introduction
This section identifies the Security Target (ST), Target of Evaluation (TOE), conformance
claims, ST organization and terminology. It also includes an overview of the evaluated product.
1.1 Identification
TOE Identification:
McAfee Network Security Platform Release 5.1
ST Identification:
McAfee Network Security Platform (NSP) Intrusion Detection System
Security Target EAL 2 augmented ALC_FLR.2
The TOE is identified as one or more of these sensors:
1. McAfee Incorporated NSP Sensors:
M2750 v. 5.1
I-4010 v. 5.1
M1450 v. 5.1
I-4000 v. 5.1
M1250 v. 5.1
I-3000 v. 5.1
M6050 v. 5.1
I-2700 v. 5.1
M4050 v. 5.1
I-1400 v. 5.1
M3050 v. 5.1
I-1200 v. 5.1
M8000 v. 5.1
-- plus -2. Network Security Manager Version 5.1
3. Sensor Software Version 5.1
ST Version:
1.0
ST Publish Date:
May 5, 2010
ST Author:
InfoGard Laboratories, Inc., McAfee, Inc. et al.
PP Identification:
U.S. Government Protection Profile Intrusion Detection System for Basic
Robustness Environments, Version 1.7
1.2 Organization
Security Target Introduction (Section 1) – Provides identification of the TOE and ST,
an overview of the TOE, an overview of the content of the ST and relevant terminology.
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The introduction also provides a description of the TOE security functions as well as the
physical and logical boundaries for the TOE, the hardware and software that make up the
TOE, and the physical and logical boundaries of the TOE.
Conformance Claims (Section 2) – Provides applicable Common Criteria (CC)
conformance claims, Product Profile (PP) conformance claims and Assurance Package
conformance claims.
Security Problem Definition (Section 3) – Describes the threats, organizational security
policies, and assumptions pertaining to the TOE and the TOE environment.
Security Objectives (Section 4) – Identifies the security objectives for the TOE and its
supporting environment as well as a rationale that objectives are sufficient to counter the
threats identified for the TOE.
Extended Components Definition (Section 5) – Presents components needed for the ST
but not present in Part II or Part III of the Common Criteria Standard.
Security Requirements (Section 6) – Presents the Security Functional Requirements
(SFRs) met by the TOE and the security functional requirements rationale. In addition
this section presents Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) met by the TOE as well as
the assurance requirements rationale. Provides pointers to all other rationale sections, to
include the rationale for the selection of IT security objectives, requirements, and the
TOE summary specifications as to their consistency, completeness, and suitability.
Summary Specification (Section 7) – Describes the security functions provided by the
TOE that satisfy the security functional requirements, provides the rationale for the
security functions. It also describes the security assurance measures for the TOE as well
as the rationales for the assurance measures.
1.3 Document Terminology
Please refer to CC v3.1 Part 1 Section 4 for definitions of commonly used CC terms.
1.3.1
ST Specific Terminology
Alert
An alert is a notification of a system event, attack, or other incident
that triggers the intrusion Detection System.
Authorized Administrator(s) A general term used in this ST to refer to administrative users
holding the Super User, System Administrator or Security Expert
roles.
Attack
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A set of actions performed by an attacker that poses a threat to the
security state of a protected entity in terms of confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, availability, authorization, and access
policies.
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CIDR
(Classless Inter-Domain Routing) A scheme which allocates
blocks of Internet addresses in a way that allows summarization
into a smaller number of routing table entries. A CIDR address
contains the standard 32-bit IP address but includes information on
how many bits are used for the network prefix. For example, in the
CIDR address 123.231.121.04/22, the “/22” indicates the first 25
bits are used to identify the unique network leaving the remaining
bits to identify the specific host.
Denial of Service
In a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, the attacker attempts to crash a
service (or the machine), overload network links, overload the
CPU, or fill up the disk. The attacker does not always try to gain
information, but to simply act as a vandal to prevent you from
making use of your machine. Ping floods and Smurf attacks are
examples of DoS attacks.
Distributed DDoS
These attacks usually consist of standard DoS attacks Denial of
orchestrated by attackers covertly controlling many, sometimes
hundreds, of different machines.
HTTPS
The secure hypertext transfer protocol (HTTPS) is a
communications protocol designed to transfer encrypted
information between computers over the World Wide Web.
HTTPS is http using Secure Socket layer (SSL) or Transport Layer
Security (TLS) encryption.
Intrusion
Unauthorized access to, and/or activity in, an information system,
usually for the purpose of tampering with or disrupting normal
services. See also Attack.
Intrusion Detection
The process of identifying that an intrusion has been attempted, is
occurring, or has occurred.
NTP
Network Time Protocol provides a mechanism to synchronize time
on computers across an internet. The specification for NTP version
3 is defined in RFC 1305. Such synchronization can be very useful
for multi-machine activities that depend upon accurate time
stamps.
Policy
A user-configured security rule that determines the permission of
traffic across a network. Policies can set rules for protocols (HTTP,
UDP), machines (NT, Solaris), operating systems (Unix), and other
types of network information. A policy also defines what actions
should be taken in the event of non-permissible activity.
Policy Violations
All activities for which the underlying traffic content may not be
malicious by itself, but are explicitly forbidden by the usage
policies of the network as defined by a security policy. These can
include “protocol violations” wherein packets do not conform to
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network protocol standards. (For example, they are incorrectly
structured, have an invalid combination of flags set, or contain
incorrect values.) Examples might include TCP packets with their
SYN and RST flags enabled, or an IP packet whose specified
length doesn’t match its actual length. A protocol violation can be
an indication of a possible attack, but can also be triggered by
malfunctioning
software,
hardware
or
could
be
applications/protocols forbidden in the network (e.g. Peer to Peer
(P2P)).
Port Cluster
Port Cluster is a more intuitive term for an Interface Group.
Interface Group An interface group enables multiple sensor ports
to be grouped together for the effective monitoring of asymmetric
environments. Interface groups normalize the impact of traffic
flows split across multiple interfaces, thus maintaining state to
avoid information loss. Once configured, an interface group
appears in the Resource Tree as a single interface node (icon)
under the sensor where it is located. All of the ports that make up
the interface are configured as one logical entity, keeping the
configuration consistent.
MySQL Database
A Relational database. Allows the definition of data structures,
storage/retrieval operations, and integrity constraints. The data and
relations between them are kept in organized tables, which are
collections of records and each record in a table contains the same
fields.
Roles
A class of user privileges that determines the authorized activities
of the various users in the system.
Sensor
The sensor is a network device containing the intrusion detection
engine. It analyzes network traffic, searching for signs of
unauthorized activity.
Signature
Activities or alterations to an information system indicating an
attack or attempted attack, detectable by examination of audit trail
logs.
Span Mode
One of the monitoring modes available for an NSP sensor.
Functions by mirroring the packet information on a switch or hub
and sending the information to a sensor for inspection, while
continuing the transmission of traffic with negligible latency.
SPAN mode is typically half-duplex, and works through a
connection of a sensor to a port on a hub or the SPAN port of a
switch.
SPAN Port
On a switch, SPAN mirrors the traffic at one switched segment
onto a predefined port, known as a SPAN port.
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Threat Analyzer
A graphical user interface for viewing specific attack information
in the NSM System. The Threat Analyzer interface is part of the
NSM component, and focuses on alert forensic analysis.
TLS
A secure socket layer (TLS) is an encryption protocol invoked on a
Web server that uses HTTPS.
Tap
A tap is hardware device that passes traffic unidirectionally from a
network segment to the IDS. Traffic is mirrored as it passes
through the tap. This mirror image is sent to the IDS for inspection.
This prevents traffic passing from being directed at the IDS.
Tap Mode
One of the monitoring modes available for an NSP sensor.
Functions by mirroring the packet information and sending the
information to a sensor for inspection, while continuing the
transmission of traffic with negligible latency. Tap mode works
through installation of an external wire tap, a port on a hub, the
SPAN port of a switch, or through an internal tap when deploying
the I-2600. Also known as passive monitoring mode.
Trojan Horse
A computer program that has a useful function, but which also
contains additional hidden, typically malicious functions.
Virtual IDS
An NSM feature that enables you to logically segment a sensor
into a large number of virtual sensors, each of which can be
customized with its own security policy. Virtual IDS (VIDS) are
represented in the NSM as interfaces and sub-interfaces.
VLAN
Virtual Local Area Network. A logical grouping of two or more
nodes which are not necessarily on the same physical network
segment, but which share the same network number. This is often
associated with switched Ethernet networks.
Vulnerability
Any characteristic of a computer system that will allow someone to
keep it from operating correctly, or that will let unauthorized users
take control of the system.
Exclusive OR
A logical operator that results in true if one of the operands (not
both) is true.
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1.3.2 Acronyms
ACM
Access Control Management
AGD
Administrator Guidance Document
CC
Common Criteria
CM
Control Management
CSP
Critical Security Parameters
DAC
Discretionary Access Control
DO
Delivery Operation
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
FIPS
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication
GB
Gigabyte
IDS
Intrusion Detection System
IPS
Intrusion Prevention System
I/O
Input/Output
MIB
Management Information Base
NIST
National Institute of Standards and Technology
NSM
Network Security Manager
NSP
Network Security Platform (TOE system)
OCSP
Online Certificate Status Protocol
PP
Protection Profile
SF
Security Functions
SFR
Security Functional Requirements
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
VLAN
Virtual Local Area Network
XOR
Exclusive OR
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1.4 Common Criteria Product type
The TOE is classified as an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) for Common Criteria purposes.
The TOE is made up of hardware and software components. The TOE consists of two main
components that are: the NSP sensor(s) appliance and the Network Security Manager.
1.5 Overview
Update
Server
TOE
Network
S
e
n
s
o
r
TLS AES128SHA
Collection
OCSP
NSM
Manager
Browser
TLS AES128SHA
( Administrator
and user
Browser
interface)
Client
Console browser client
Figure 1: Network Architecture (example)
NSP sensors are content processing appliances that perform stateful inspection on a packet basis
to discover and prevent intrusions, misuse, denial of service (DoS) attacks, and distributed denial
of service (DDoS) attacks. McAfee Incorporated offers various types of sensor appliances
providing different bandwidth and deployment strategies. These include the following organized
by aggregate performance:
M-Series
I-Series
M8000 v. 5.1 - 10Gbps
I-4010 v. 5.1 - 2 Gbps
M6050 v. 5.1 - 5Gbps
I-4000 v. 5.1 - 2 Gbps
M4050 v. 5.1 - 3Gbps
I-3000 v. 5.1 - 1 Gbps
M3050 v. 5.1 - 1.5Gbps
I-2700 v. 5.1 - 600 Mbps
M2750 v. 5.1 - 600Mbps
I-1400 v. 5.1 - 200 Mbps
M1450 v. 5.1 - 200Mbps
I-1200 v. 5.1 - 100 Mbps
M1250 v. 5.1 - 100Mbps
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All sensor types provide the same security functions.
The Network Security Manager consists of software that is used to configure and manage an
NSP deployment. The NSM is a set of applications coupled with an embedded MySQL
Database. The MySQL Database is installed during NSM installation and is configured so that it
can be accessed only by the NSM application. The MySQL Database must reside on the same
platform as does the NSM. The Network System Manager (NSM) is available in three versions:
NSM Global Manager, NSM Standard Manager, and NSM Starter Manager. All versions of the
NSM are part of the TOE and part of the same core software release. All versions of the NSM
operate within an Operational Environment composed of an Intel-based hardware platform with
a Windows Server 2003/2008 operating system (OS). The difference between the three versions
is one of scalability. The NSM Starter Manager supports up to 2 NSP Sensors, the NSM
Standard Manager supports up to 6 NSP sensors and the NSM Global Manager supports an
unlimited number of NSP sensors.
The McAfee Incorporated Update Server is a McAfee-owned and operated file server that
provides updates to the signature files and software of NSP sensors in customer installations. The
Update Server resides at McAfee Incorporated facilities. Note: Software updates beyond
signature updates, such as those to update the core NSP software suite, are excluded for the CC
Evaluated Configuration.
1.6 Product Type
The NSP system from McAfee Incorporated is a network Intrusion Detection System (IDS) that
offers real-time network intrusion detection and prevention against the following types of attacks
for enterprise networks:
network traffic
detected known vulnerabilities
1.7 Product Description
The NSP IDS product is a combination of network appliances and software built for the
detection of intrusions, denial of service (DoS) attacks, distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks, and network misuse.
The NSP IDS system is composed of a family of sensor appliances and an NSP management
platform referred to as an NSM. The sensor appliances are stand-alone appliances from McAfee
Incorporated. All other components of the product are software only components that run on a
Windows workstation. The NSM management platform is an IDS management solution for
managing NSP sensor appliance deployments for large and distributed enterprise networks.
Access to the NSM is supported through a McAfee thick client application installed on a Console
Machine. Access to the NSM is authenticated using certificate credentials obtained from a
Common Access Card (CAC) in the Operational Environment. Certificates presented are
checked for revocation status using an OCSP server in the Operational Environment. The NSM
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operates with a MySQL Database to persist configuration information and alert data. NSM for
Windows Server 2003/2008 includes the MySQL database.
The product software and documentation is provided to the customer through a secure download
process.
1.8 Product Features
The TOE implements the following features:
The Sensor Subsystem performs:
Traffic Capture captures packets into a data store for review.
Load balancing and protocol verification makes security decisions such that it can filter
packets of no interest.
Denial of Service detection and response detects DoS attacks and provides an alert
capability and the capability to drop packets identified that are part of the DoS attack.
Signature detection and anomaly detection performs anomaly detection, logs attack
information, and performs response functions. The response functions include the
following: alert generation, packet logging, TCP reset, ICMP host unreachable, forward
blocking (Quarantine), alert filtering and dropping of packets.
Sensor management is the interface between the sensor and the NSM. It has the
responsibility to push policies that have been defined in the Management Subsystem to
the appropriate sensor module.
The NSM provides management functions to manage NSP sensor appliance deployments for
large and distributed enterprise networks. The NSM is a web-based security management system
that manages NSP sensors. It offers features to define, distribute, enforce, and audit security
policies to protect critical servers, data centers, individual departments, and distributed branch
and remote offices of a global business. The NSM provides a Web-based interface to the sensor
referred to as the NSM console. The NSM console is a web-enabled ―thick client‖ application
that runs on a client platform. The Threat Analyzer performs real-time alert analysis. This
analysis provides intelligent management and analysis of alerts in real time with granular drilldown capabilities and color-coding that enable the administrators to quickly pinpoint the target,
source, and severity of network attacks.
The management features provided by the NSM include the following:
Threat Updates: An Update Server controlled by McAfee Incorporated delivers signature
updates without requiring sensor reboots, providing protection against newly-discovered
attacks.
Granular Security Policy Management: Flexible and custom policy management per
sensor — from multiple network segments to individual hosts — delivers improved
attack detection and prevention.
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Administrative Domains: Scalable security policy administration with role-based access
control allows delegation of administrative responsibilities.
Forensic Analysis: Analysis tools, including enable detailed historical and real-time
forensic analysis to determine network attack patterns.
Response management: A set of response actions — including user-defined responses
and notification capabilities — provide proactive attack notification and prevention.
The McAfee Incorporated Update Server is a McAfee Incorporated owned and operated file
server that updates the signature files of NSP sensors in McAfee Incorporated customer
installations. McAfee Incorporated uses the Update Server to provide signature updates. McAfee
Incorporated develops and releases signature updates as they are developed. Since new
vulnerabilities are discovered almost daily, signature updates are released on a regular basis.
These new signatures are made available to customers through the Internet via the McAfee
Incorporated Update Server. Alternatively, signature files may be obtained separate from the
NSM platform and manually installed on the NSM to avoid the NSM connecting to the internet.
The TOE also includes a User Defined Signature (UDS) feature in the form of an editor utility
that allows Administrative users to create attack instances with signatures for implementation in
the Network Security Platform (NSP) policy enforcement process. This allows for the
development of custom signatures based on deployment particular threats and circumstances.
Note that other product updates and patches can also be made available via the Update Server.
However, such changes to the product would serve to take the product out of its evaluated
configuration since it would subsequently be running code that has not been subject to evaluation
per this Security Target. As such, automatic patch updates must be disabled in the evaluated
configuration so that the administrator can selectively apply only signature updates.
1.9 Physical Boundaries
The components of the Network Security Platform are the Collection Subsystem and the NSM
Subsystem. An Update Server subsystem is also available, but since it is neither delivered to nor
operated by the TOE users, it is outside the TOE boundary. Each subsystem performs dedicated
functions. The following figure provides a high-level depiction of the NSP subsystem
architecture.
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1.10 Architecture Description
Update Server
Manager Sub System
Home
Page
Alert
Manager
System
Health
Crypto
Module
System Data
Storage
Threat
Manager
UDS
Editor
Thick Client Component incl.
Threat Analyzer
Collection Sub System
Sensor:
Monitor and
Analyze
Home Page
Sys. Health monitor
Sys. Config.Tool
Reporting Component
Detection
Mechanism
Response
Mechanism
Crypto
Module
Figure 2: Internal Architecture Concept
The TOE software components are made up of the following Architectural Subsystems:
Collection Subsystem
Manager Subsystem (executing on the NSM Server and Console platforms)
Direct TOE support is provided from the following McAfee service in the Operational
Environment:
McAfee Update Server
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1.11 Hardware: Sensor Appliances
The following sensor appliances may be configured as part of the NSP TOE based on the
individual deployment. Sensor hardware platforms are differentiated by scalability and
throughput characteristics.
M-Series Appliance
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I-Series Appliance
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1.11.1 Collection Subsystem
The Collection Subsystem is provided by the NSP sensor appliance. The primary function of the
NSP sensor is to analyze traffic on selected network segments and to respond when an attack is
detected. The sensor examines the header and data portion of every network packet; scanning for
patterns and behavior in the network traffic that indicates malicious activity. The sensor
examines packets according to user-configured policies, or rule sets, which determine what
attacks to watch for, and how to react with countermeasures if an attack is detected. If an attack
is detected, the sensor raises an alert to describe the event, and responds according to its
configured policy. Sensors can perform many types of attack responses, including generating
alerts and packet logs, resetting TCP connections, ―scrubbing‖ malicious packets, and dropping
packets entirely before they reach their target. Rule sets are described through a series of Access
Control Lists that implement the policies described above.
The NSP system is a network-based Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) that combines network
sensor appliances and management software for the accurate detection and prevention of known
attacks using signature detection, unknown (first strike) attacks using anomaly detection, denial
of service (DoS) attacks, and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. The NSP IPS couples
real-time IDS with prevention—the ability to block attacks before they reach their target.
Once the packet is captured, it is analyzed into its corresponding protocol fields. The sensor
analyzes a frame completely and thoroughly from OSI layers two through seven, and interprets
and evaluates the semantics of the protocol fields; including those at the Application Layer. After
it analyzes the protocols, it verifies that the packet conforms to the protocol specification. NSP
then passes the parsed packet through its DoS, Signature, and Anomaly detection engines. This
enables NSP to be very efficient in terms of packet processing because the packet is
deconstructed only once and then forwarded to the corresponding detection engines.
Signature detection techniques systematically scan network traffic looking for signature traffic
patterns of known attacks, comparing these patterns against an extensive database of traffic
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pattern signatures. Anomaly detection determines a baseline of normal behavior of network
traffic, and then attempts to detect intrusions by noting significant departures from normal
behavior. Signature-based detection concentrates on known attack patterns, while anomaly
detection is best at picking up new or unknown attacks. Denial of Service (DoS) attack detection
characterizes normal traffic using pre-programmed thresholds or real-time, self-learning
distributions, and then using this data to detect what might constitute a maliciously excessive
consumption of network bandwidth, host processing cycles or other resources.
The sensor can operate in three modes:
Inline: The product is installed as an appliance within the network that applicable traffic
must flow through.
Tap: The network traffic flows between the clients and servers and the data is copied by
the tap to the sensor which is essentially invisible to the other network entities. Note that
the TOE cannot inject response packets back through an external tap, so NSP sensors
offer Response ports through which a response packet (such as a TCP reset) can be
injected to close a malicious connection.
Span: The traffic is spanned off either the server side or the client side of a router or
switch, copying both the incoming and outgoing traffic from any one of the ports. This
requires a special network device that has a span port capability. Note that SPAN mode is
also a ―sniffing‖ mode, which—unlike inline mode—does not enable the TOE to prevent
attacks from reaching their targets. However, while the TOE can issue response packets
via the sensor’s response ports, some switches allow response packets to be injected by
an IPS back through the SPAN port.
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Unlike single-port sensors, a single multi-port NSP sensor can monitor many network segments
in any combination of operating modes—that is, the monitoring or deployment mode for the
sensor —SPAN mode, tap mode, or in-line mode. Additionally, NSP’s Virtual IDS (VIDS)
feature enables you to further segment a port on a sensor into many ―virtual sensors‖. A VIDS
can be dedicated to a specific network port with monitoring rules appropriate for that segment
which might be different than the rules used to monitor other segments. Alternately, if a
monitored network segment includes the use of Virtual LANs (VLANs) or Classless InterDomain Routing (CIDR); one or more VIDS can be directed at monitoring them with VIDS each
configured with distinct monitoring rules. Note that VIDS are not particularly security relevant in
and of themselves, but rather serve to organize and distinguish monitoring rules.
1.11.2 Manager Subsystem
The NSM is the Manager Subsystem and includes the thick client software for the console
platform. The NSM is a dedicated Windows Server 2003/2008 platform running the NSM
software. The NSM is also referred to as “The Manager”. There are three versions of the NSM:
1. NSM Global Manager supports unlimited number of sensors and is best suited for global
IDS deployments.
2. NSM Standard Manager that supports deployments of up to six sensors.
3. NSM Starter Manager that supports up to 2 sensors.
Functionally, the products are otherwise identical. This Security Target uses the term ―NSM‖ to
describe any of the three versions which may be deployed.
The NSM software includes a Web-based user interface for configuring and managing the NSP
Sensors.
The NSM includes the following components:
Home Page (formerly known as Network Console): Is the first screen displayed after the
user logs on to the system. The Home Page displays system health—i.e., whether all
components of the system are functioning properly, the number of unacknowledged alerts
in the system and the configuration options available to the current user. Options
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available within the Network Console are determined by the current user’s assigned
role(s).
System Health Viewer: Displays the status of the NSM, database, and any deployed
sensors, including all system faults.
System Configuration Tool: Provides all system configuration options, and facilitates the
configuration of sensors, administrative domains, users, roles, attack policies and
responses, user-created signatures, and system reports. Access to various activities, such
as user management, system configuration, or policy management is based on the current
user’s role(s) and privileges.
Reporting Component: Reporting component within the Client application JSP which
includes the home page, system health viewer, system configuration tool and reporting
functions.
Threat Analyzer: Displays detected security events that violate your configured security
policies. The Threat Analyzer provides powerful drill-down capabilities to enable you to
see all the details on a particular alert, including its type, source and destination
addresses. The Threat Analyzer is deployed as part of the Thick Client.
UDS Editor: User Defined Signature (UDS) editor allows customers to define custom
user defined signatures. Similar to the Threat Analyzer, it is a thick client running on the
client machine in the operational environment.
Access to the NSM is solely via a thick client application installed on the Console Machine for
the CC Evaluated Configuration; local access is excluded.
The keyboard, mouse and screen used for NSM access are customer provided and are not
included in the CC Evaluated Configuration.
The NSM operates with a MySQL Database (relational database management system) for storing
persistent configuration information and event data. The NSM for Windows Server 2003
SP3/2008 SP1 includes a MySQL Database that is installed during NSM software installation.
1.12 McAfee Operational Environment Support Services
1.12.1 Update Server
As stated in Section 2.3, the Update Server is a McAfee Incorporated owned and operated file
server that updates the signature files of NSP sensors in customer installations. McAfee
Incorporated uses the Update Server to securely provide signature updates at the request of the
NSM (i.e., per administrator direction). When initiated, the NSM polls the McAfee Incorporated
Update Server, and compares the file on the Update Server with what is already available in the
NSM to determine what it needs to download. Once it has received the update, the NSM then
determines what signatures need to be pushed out to sensors based on the policy applied to the
sensor.
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1.13 Operational Environment Resources
The TOE requires the following support mechanisms in the Operational Environment:
1. McAfee Update Server
2. Console machine running Internet Explorer 6 or later and underlying operating system
1.13.1 Hardware Components
This table identifies hardware components and indicates whether or not each component is in the
TOE.
TOE Component
or
Env.
Description
TOE
McAfee Network Security Sensor
appliance
Sensor Models:
M2750, v.5.1, M1450 v 5.1, M1250 v5.1,
M6050 v5.1,M4050 v.5.1, M3050 v5.1,
M8000 v5.1, I-4010 v.5.1, I-4000 v.5.1,
I-3000 v.5.1, I-2700 v.5.1, I-1400 v.5.1,
I-1200 v.5.1
Env.
NSM Hardware Platform
Hardware Platform for NSM
Management Platform capable of
running Windows Server 2003/2008;
minimum two network interface cards
(nic) available
Env.
Console Workstation
Console Platform supporting browser
interface used for accessing NSM GUI
sessions
Env.
McAfee Update Server hardware
Hardware platform hosting the McAfee
threat signature update service
Env.
Common Access Card (CAC) reader
hardware
Reader hardware for use with CAC as
applicable based on deployment
Env.
OCSP Server hardware
OCSP server hardware used to support
certificate revocation checking
Table 1: Hardware Components
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1.13.2 Software Components
This table identifies software components and indicates whether or not each component is in the
TOE.
TOE Component
or
Env.
Description
TOE
NSM Management Platform
software Release 5.1
Software for NSM Management Platform includes
(includes FIPS validated OpenSSL object module
v1.1.2), client-thick application and threat
manager
TOE
Sensor software Release 5.1
Software package release 5.1 for Sensor (includes
FIPS validated OpenSSL object module v1.1.2)
Env.
Windows Server 2003
SP3/2008 SP1
Underlying OS for NSM Console platform
including RSAENH cryptographic module for
TLS session support
Env.
Internet Explorer 6 or later
Browser support for establishing Console sessions
with NSM
Env.
McAfee Update Server
software
Software running on the McAfee update server
supporting the TOE with threat signature updates
Env.
Common Access Card
software/drivers
Software to support CAC authentication from the
NSM Console as applicable based on deployment.
Env.
OCSP Server software
OCSP server used to support certificate revocation
checking
Table 2: Software Components
1.13.3 Guidance Documents
The following guidance documents are provided for download with the TOE software in
accordance with EAL 2 requirements and apply to the CC Evaluated configuration:
1.13.3.1 Common Criteria Supplement
1. Network Security Platform (NSP) Common Criteria Supplement EAL2 + ALC_FLR.2
09-1904-R-0077 Version 1.0
1.13.3.2 System Level Guides
1. Getting Started Guide revision 5.0 McAfee® Network Security Platform
Version 5.1 700-1803-00/ 6.0
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2. IPS Configuration Guide McAfee® Network Security Platform Network Security
Manager Version 5.1 700-1810-00/ 8.0
3. IPS Deployment Guide Revision 3.0 700-1804-00/ 3.0
4. System Status Monitoring Guide McAfee® Network Security Platform Network Security
Manager version 5.1 Revision 5.0 700-1813-00/ 5.0
5. Addendum I to 5.1 Documentation 700-1873-00/ 1.0
6. Addendum II to 5.1 Documentation 700-1874-00/ 1.0
1.13.3.3 Applicable Sensor Quick Start Guides
1. Network Security Platform® M-6050 Quick Start Guide 700-2078-00-G
2. Network Security Platform® M-8000 Quick Start Guide 700-2080-00-G
3. Network Security Platform M-1250/M-1450 Quick Start Guide 700-1880-00
4. Network Security Platform M-2750 Quick Start Guide 700-1879-00
5. Network Security Platform® M-3050/M-4050 Quick Start Guide 700-2079-00-G
6. Intrushield I-2700 Quick Start Guide 700-1063-03-G
7. Intrushield I-4010, I-3000 Quick Start Guide 2.1 700-1013-03-G
8. Intrushield I-4000 Quick Start Guide 2.1 700-1261-00-G
9. Intrushield I-1200, I-1400 Quick Start Guide 2.1 700-1259-00-revB
1.13.3.4 Applicable Product Guides
1. Administrative Domain Configuration Guide revision 5.0 700-1806-00/ 5.0
2. Best Practices Guide revision 4.0 700-1817-00/ 4.0
3. Manager Configuration Basics Guide revision 1.0 700-1805-00/ 1.0
4. Reports Guide revision 3.0 700-1814-00/ 3.0
5. Special Topics Guide-Virtualization revision 3.0 700-1829-00/ 3.0
6. Troubleshooting Guide revision 10.0 700-1818-00/ 10.0
7. User-Defined Signatures Guide revision 2.0 700-1815-00/ 2.0
8. M-1250/M-1450 Sensor Product Guide revision 2.0 700-2395-00/ 2.0
9. M-2750 Sensor Product Guide revision 2.0 700-2391-00/ 2.0
10. M-3050/M-4050 Sensor Product Guide revision 2.0 700-2393-00/ 2.0
11. M-6050 Sensor Product Guide revision 2.0 700-2937-00/ 2.0
12. M-8000 Sensor Product Guide revision 2.0 700-2399-00-G/ 2.0
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13. NSP Sensor I-4010 Product Guide revision 2.0 700-2390-00/ 2.0
14. NSP Sensor I-4000 Product Guide revision 1.0 700-2389-00/ 1.0
15. NSP Sensor I-3000 Product Guide revision 2.0 700-2388-00/ 2.0
16. NSP Sensor I-2700 Product Guide revision 1.0 700-2387-00/ 1.0
17. NSP Sensor I-1400 Product Guide revision 2.0 700-2386-00/ 1.0
18. NSP Sensor I-1200 Product Guide revision 2.0 700-2385-00/ 2.0
19. Sensor CLI Guide Version 7.0 700-1808-00/7.0
20. Sensor Configuration Guide Version 6.0 700-1809-00/6.0
21. Manager Installation Guide revision 5.0 700-1801-00/ 5.0
22. Manager Server Configuration Guide revision 4.0 700-1807-00/ 4.0
1.14 Logical Boundaries
This section contains the product features and denotes which are within the logical boundaries of
the TOE. The following Security Functions are supported by the Network Security Platform
(NSM) TOE:
Security Audit
Identification and Authentication
Security Management
Protection of the TSF
Cryptographic Operations
System Data Collection
System Data Analysis
System Data Review, Availability, and Loss
The logical boundaries of the TOE are divided into two broad groups, one related to the
administration and security attributes associated with the TOE (Security Audit, Identification and
Authentication, Security Management, and Protection of Security Functions), and the other
related to the collection and analysis of the network traffic (System Data Collection, Data
Analysis and Data Review, Availability, and Loss).
Automatic updates must be disabled in the evaluated configuration to ensure that the evaluated
version of the product is not modified or replaced while in operation. As such, the TOE
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administrators are expected to configure and use the TOE such that the automatic software
update feature will not be used.
1.14.1 Security Audit
The NSP generates audit records related to the administration/management of the TOE and
traffic logs for IDS information using the NSM component. The NSM management platform
records both the audit and traffic log information into a data store, which is part of the TOE. The
data store employed is MySQL. The MySQL Database provides storage and retrieval for audit
and traffic log information. This function records attempts to access the system itself, such as
successful and failed authentication, as well as the actions taken by the user once authenticated.
Auditable actions include changes to the IDS rules and viewing the audit records of both the
system access and the IDS traffic log.
The NSP Sensor generates audit records relating to Sensor operation and forwards these logs to
the NSM for integration and storage. This includes IDS related events local to the Sensor.
Only Authenticated users holding the Super User or System Administrator roles can view audit
records.
1.14.2 Identification and Authentication
The NSM provides an external user interface protected by identification and authentication
mechanism. The NSM requires users to provide unique identification and authentication data
using Common Access Cards before any access to the TOE is granted.
NSM is compatible with Common Access Card (CAC) authentication systems that are used in
conjunction with the NSM browser client installed on the console machine. Upon initiating the
TLSv1 based session, the NSM can be configured to request a certificate from the Console
browser and the NSM browser client will involve the CAC software to extract the required
certificate from the CAC smartcard and send it to the NSM for validation. Revocation checks are
performed externally through the use of an OCSP server in the Operational Environment. The
NSM does not support the ability to manage certificate revocation internally and depends on the
OCSP server in the Operational Environment for this function.
The NSM determines if the certificate has been configured as ―trusted‖ and if valid per
revocation checking, the session is successfully established. In the event the certificate is not
validated or returns as revoked from the OCSP check, the session request is rejected and a log
entry is generated by NSM.
The Sensor component is authenticated by the NSM component through a shared secret that is
configured during the initial installation and setup process.
1.14.3 Security Management
The NSM provides a web-based (using https) management interface for all administration,
including the IDS rule set, user accounts and roles, and audit functions. This GUI based interface
allows for TOE configuration and Intrusion Protection System (IPS) management including
Policies, Access Control Lists (ACL), Cryptographic settings, Alert and Quarantine
Management, and Database Management/Archiving Utilities.
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The Network Security Manager management interface is accessed using an NSP thick client that
is downloaded via a session with the Console machine during the initial setup processes. The
thick client component, running within a browser session, provides a GUI interface to the NSM
and allows management of the NSP system. This client component also includes the Threat
Analyzer (TA) application and the User Defined Signature (UDS) editor that allows the creation
of threat signatures by administrative users. These sessions are secured using TLSv1.0 as
described in Section 1.14.5, Cryptographic Operations.
Once communication can be securely established between the Sensors and the NSM,
configuration data can pass between them and they can both be managed using the browser
based thick client installed on the console machine. Sensors must initiate communications with
the NSM before configuration is complete as the NSM does not detect or search for Sensor
appliance presence.
SNMPv3 is supported for NSM monitoring of deployed NSP sensors in the deployed
environment by the NSM. These sessions are authenticated using a shared secret.
1.14.4 Protection of TSF
The TOE protects the security functions it provides through a variety of mechanisms. One of the
primary protections is that users must authenticate before any administrative operations can be
performed on the system.
The Sensor implements multiple configuration, and performance MIB objects. NSM does an
SNMP ‖GET‖ on read-only objects while SNMP ‖GET/SET‖ on read/write objects. The MIB
configuration between the NSM and the sensor is implemented via SNMPv3. The AES
encrypted data (signature and profile files) transferred between the NSM and NSP sensor(s) uses
a TLS implementation.
The data communicated between the Update Server and the NSM is also encrypted using TLS
Version 1.0.
The NSP sensors components are protected on the monitored network by ―hiding‖ the fact that
they are there. This is done primarily by using a non-TCP/IP network stack on the sensors, which
prevents it from being accessed as a device on the network. Also, the signature files are protected
doubly as the system is configured to not accept any management requests or input from the
monitored network.
The NSM management component is installed on a dedicated Windows Server 2003/2008
platform running the NSM software. The NSM software component contains a MySQL Database
implementation in which NSM stores the traffic logs as well as the audit of human interaction
with the User/Admin interface. The MySQL Database resides on the same platform as does the
Network Security Manager (NSM). All MySQL Database tables used for IDS system data are
dynamically allocated so that the limit on the recording capacity of the collected information is
the limit of the physical disk partition on the platform that is not dedicated to the operating
system, the MySQL Database, and the Network Security Manager (NSM). This assures there is
always adequate disk space to record current and new data that has been found to match the
current rule set. However, as a safety feature, if the IDS system data could not be written to a
MySQL Database table, an alarm is presented at the NSM console.
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Audit records have an allocated 50,000 row table within the MySQL database that allows for
storage of audit records in a circular buffer type arrangement. In the event the allocated rows are
exhausted, the older audit records are overwritten and an alarm is presented at the NSM console.
A new alarm is presented upon the initial overwrite and all subsequent overwrites.
Note that audit records include time stamps that need to be reliable. The TOE depends on the
underlying Operating System of the NSM component (e.g., Windows Server 2003/2008) to
provide time information. The TOE ensures reliability by not only obtaining time information
from the presumed reliable operating system source, but also by sharing that time information
with its associated NSP sensors, so that all parts of the TOE share the same relative time
information.
The MySQL Database within NSM can only be accessed through the local host and is further
protected by a separate username and password for the MySQL DB which is set up during
installation and stored in an obfuscated form within the NSM configuration. The obfuscation is
done by performing an ―XOR‖ function on the username/password using a shared secret key. As
a result, MySQL is accessible only to the NSM application within the evaluated configuration.
1.14.5 Cryptographic Operations
Cryptographic services are used by the NSP TOE for securing Console to NSM sessions, NSM
to Sensor sessions and McAfee Update server to NSM sessions through encryption. These
cryptographic functions are supported through an OpenSSL cryptographic module within the
Sensor Component; an OpenSSL implementation as the NSM Application Crypto Module and an
OpenSSL implementation as the NSM Secure UI Crypto Module.
Cryptographic services within the Sensor component are provided by a Level 2 FIPS 140-2
validated cryptographic module that includes an OpenSSL implementation.
The NSM component utilizes RSA BSafe cryptographic libraries and the NSP Sensor component
includes XySSL cryptographic libraries.
In FIPS mode, the cryptographic module within the NSP Sensor supports the following FIPS
algorithms based on the referenced certificates:
AES CBC mode with 128 bits for encryption and decryption (Cert. #880) – TLSv1.0
RSA with 1024 and 2048 bit keys for signature generation/verification (Cert. #425) –
TLS
SHA-1 and SHA-256 for hashing (Cert. #871)
ANSI X9.31 RNG with 2-Key Triple-DES ECB (Cert. #505) – TLS
XYSSL RSA with 2048 bit keys for image verify (Cert. #486)
XYSSL SHA-1 for hashing (Cert. #970)
In FIPS mode, the NSM Application cryptographic module within the NSM Component of the
TOE supports the following FIPS approved algorithms based on the referenced certificates:
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BSafe TLSv1: AES – 128 bits CBC and CFB (Cert. #1237)
BSafe TLSv1: RSA Verify 1024 bits (Cert. #593)
BSafe TLSv1 and elsewhere: SHA-1 (Cert. #1135)
BSafe TLSv1 and elsewhere: RNG FIPS 186-2 –SHA-1 G function. (Cert. #684)
BSafe TLSv1 and elsewhere: HMAC SHA-1 (Cert. #721)
In FIPS mode, the NSM UI cryptographic module within the NSM Component of the TOE
supports the following FIPS approved algorithms based on the referenced certificates:
Open SSL TLSv1: AES 128 CBC mode (Cert. #1238)
Open SSL TLSv1: HMAC - SHA-1 (Cert. #722)
Open SSL TLSv1: SHA-1 (Cert. #1136)
Open SSL TLSv1: RSA Sign/Verify 1024, 2048 (Cert. #594)
Open SSL TLSv1 and elsewhere: RNG ANSI X9.31 (Cert. #685)
BSAFE: HMAC-SHA-1 (Cert. #721)
BSAFE: SHA-1 (Cert. #1135)
With the cryptographic modules running in FIPS mode, the NSP TOE uses the following FIPS
allowed algorithms and protocols:
RSA with 1024 bit keys for key wrap decryption only (of bulk channel
encryption/decryption key) – key wrapping; key establishment methodology provides 80
bits of encryption strength
NDRNG for seeding the ANSI X9.31 RNG
TLS v1.0 (with algorithm tested ciphers)
All sessions between TSF components and with the McAfee Update Server in the Operational
Environment are conducted over encrypted channels using TLS v1.0. All sessions are
symmetrically encrypted using the AES algorithm with 128 bit keys.
Symmetric keys utilized for secure sessions are generated on demand using an OpenSSL based
software random number generator (RNG) on board the NSM and NSP Sensor platforms using
the 3DES algorithm. Cryptographic operations are also supported by RSA BSafe Cryptographic
libraries that are part of the NSM and NSP sensor components within the TOE.
Signature files are signed with a McAfee private key and the NSM uses its corresponding public
key to verify the signature is trusted and unmodified. Image integrity checking within NSM is
done by the RSA BSafe module cryptographic libraries using RSA 1024.
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Once stored within the TOE, Signature .ivu files are processed by ―XORing‖ the data using a
shared secret key for the purposes of protecting intellectual properly aspects associated with the
signature files.
Keys generated for NSM console browser sessions are generated in the Operational Environment
using the Microsoft RSAENH CSP as part of the underlying Windows Server 2003/2008
Operating System.
1.14.6 System Data Collection
The TOE has the ability to set rules to govern the collection of data regarding potential
intrusions. While the signatures available on the Update Server contain default rules to detect
currently known vulnerabilities and exploits, new rules can be created to detect new
vulnerabilities as well as specific network traffic, allowing the administrator complete control
over the types of traffic that will be monitored.
The TOE provides many pre-configured rule sets and policies for immediate application in a
number of different network areas. Each pre-configured policy is matched with an identically
named rule set designed to address the common attacks targeting specific network environments.
Existing rule sets cannot be modified but they may be ―cloned‖ and then modified to create a
custom rule set.
Attacks coverage by rule sets are managed by the following categories:
Denial of Service (DoS), including DDoS
Exploit
Policy Violation
Reconnaissance
The following pre-configured rule sets are included:
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Figure 3: Default Rule Sets
1.14.7 System Data Analysis
The TOE provides tools at the NSM console for menu selection to analyze both IDS traffic log
data as well as audit information. The TOE provides two methods of reviewing traffic log
information, one is a real-time viewer. The real-time viewer is a ―tab‖ selection at the NSM
console. Audit information is reviewed from the console through the user Activities Audit
Report.
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Data Analysis is conducted using threat signatures that contain characteristics known to be
representative of malicious traffic, malware, virus or worm infections. A series of threat
signatures are provided and regularly updated to allow the NSP TOE to identify potentially
malicious traffic. In addition, the User Defined Signature feature allows Security Expert users to
develop custom signatures and use them for traffic analysis.
Logs are generated automatically when traffic matches a threat signature. These are stored in the
traffic log repository where authorized users can evaluate the traffic and determine appropriate
action.
The Threat Analyzer program, as part of the thick client running on the NSM console, allows
Security Experts to perform analysis on alerts generated by NSP Sensors. Using traffic details
and the analytical tools within the Threat Analyzer, the user can review data over various time
periods to detect patterns that could be indicative of an attack. Also, through analysis of data
patterns and characteristics, custom threat signatures can be developed for earlier detection and
preventative action.
Report Generation
The TOE allows administrative users holding the Super User, IPS Administrator, System
Administrator, Security Expert or Report Generator roles to generate a range of reports for both
the alert information reported to the NSM, as well as information pertaining to the Network
Security Platform configuration settings.
IPS reports are summaries of alert information, such as severity, impact category,
source/destination IP, time of alert, alert trends, etc.
Configuration reports detail information such as the current Manager and Sensor software
versions, proxy server settings, policy configuration, etc.
Scheduled reports generate reports at a configured time, and optionally email the reports
to specific individuals and/or save them for later viewing.
1.14.8 System Data Review, Availability and Loss
IDS Audit data can only be viewed by authorized users (specific roles). The NSM console
provides a user interface for menu selectable data review. The data stores of the raw collection
data are limited only by the storage capacity of the platform and table management of the
MySQL Database. The TOE monitors the data store to determine when storage is exhausted and
alerts are sent to the local console and data is no longer collected.
1.15 Features Excluded from the Common Criteria Evaluated Configuration
The following features are excluded from the Common Criteria Evaluated configuration and
therefore are not included in the evaluation:
1. Update of TOE Software (other than threat signature updates)
2. Incident Generator
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3. Sensor Failover Functionality; Sensor/Port Clustering (including associated interface groups)
4. Features associated with e-Policy Orchestrator Integration (Host Intrusion Prevention (HIP))
5. Features associated with McAfee Virus Scan (MVS) Integration
6. Network Access Control (NAC) features & integration with MNAC agents/server
components
7. TACACS
8. N-450 Sensor Appliance as this model pertains to the (excluded) NAC feature/deployment
option
9. Multiple NSM configuration deployments: Manager Disaster Recovery (MDR), hierarchical
NSM (Network Security Central Manager)
10. Decrypting SSL for IPS inspection
11. NSM: XML converter tool for ACL rules
12. Sensor Auxiliary Port
13. The Sensor CLI interface is excluded for use from the CC Evaluated configuration.
14. External Authentication server (LDAP/RADIUS) and username/password
authentication to the NSM (CAC only allowed for CC Evaluated configuration)
based
15. Compact Flash Readers and/or PCMCIA/CardBus interfaces on Sensor Appliances (based
on model)
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2 Conformance Claims
The TOE is Conformant with Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1 Revision 3 Part 2 Extended.
The TOE is Common Criteria (CC) Version 3.1 Revision 3 Part 3 Conformant at EAL 2 +
augmented ALC_FLR.2.
The TOE is compliant with International Interpretations with effective dates on or before 24
August 2009.
This Security Target is conformant with the following Protection Profile:
U.S. Government Protection Profile Intrusion Detection System For Basic Robustness
Environments, Version 1.7
This Security Target includes all applicable assumptions, organizational policies, security
objectives, and threats statements described in the PP, verbatim with the following exceptions:
2.1 Threats and Security Objectives not applicable
The following Threats and Security objectives included in the applicable PP are not applicable to
the TOE based on the following rationale:
2.1.1
Scanner not applicable
The following threats and security objectives were excluded due to the TOE not having scanner
component:
T.SCNCFG
T.SCNMLC
T.SCNVUL
O.IDSCAN
2.1.2
No Transfer of IDS data to non-TOE components
The following Security Objective is excluded from this Security Target:
O.EXPORT When any IDS component makes its data available to another IDS component; the
TOE will ensure the confidentiality of the System data.
Since the TOE only provides these functions between TOE components, no external IT products
are necessary, and therefore this requirement is not applicable.
This requirement applies to the transfer of information between trusted products. There is no
such transfer with the NSP TOE.
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2.2 Added Assumptions
The following assumptions are additional to the referenced Protection Profile requirements:
A.OCSP
A.OCSP/OE.OCSP requires that an OCSP Server is provided in the Operational Environment for
the purpose of verifying the revocation status of certificates on behalf of the TOE. This provides
an additional requirement on the environment from that of the PP, but does not reduce or
otherwise affect the existing requirements placed on the TOE by the applicable PP.
2.3 Added Organizational Security Policies
The following OSPs were added to the ST in addition that those reflected in the applicable PP:
P.SYSADMIN/OE.SYSADMIN
P.SYSADMIN/OE.SYSADMIN places a requirement on the deployment of the NSM platform
to assure that only the System Admin user holds credentials allowing access to the underlying
OS file system. This requirement simply adds additional deployment instructions to the PP
requirement: A.LOCATE which requires that unauthorized access to the platform is prevented.
In preventing access to unauthorized persons, the credentials established for the NSM platform in
the Operational Environment limit the underlying OS access to a single, highly privileged role, in
order to better prevent unauthorized access.
2.4 Security Functional Requirements
This Security Target includes all of the Security Functional Requirements from the PP, except
those exclusively related to authenticating external IT products. Specifically:
FPT_ITA.1 – This requirement is intended to specify how audit and System data are
made available to external (trusted) IT products that would provide audit and data
services. Since the TOE provides these functions as internally, no external IT products
are necessary, and therefore this requirement is not applicable. This SFR is associated
with the O.EXPORT exclusion above.
This requirement applies to the transfer of information between trusted products. There is no
such transfer with NSP. This requirement was replaced with FPT_ITT.1 of the transfer of
information between the TOE components.
Refinement
FMT_MOF.1.1a – This requirement was refined to include the required administrative
roles that have permissions to modify the behavior of the functions of System data
collection, analysis and reaction. The permission is limited to authorized administrator
known as Super User, Security Expert, and System Administrator.
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Iterations
FAU_STG.2.3 - This requirement is intended to satisfy the need for the TSF to ensure
that all “already recorded” audit records will be maintained when failure, attack occurs
and that “newly generated” audit records will be maintained when the storage exhaustion
occurs.
Exclusions
As included and refined within the referenced Protection Profile, the FIA_AFL.1.1 and
FIA_AFL.1.2 security requirements were intended to detect attempts by untrusted
external IT products to access the TOE. The TOE does not allow access to itself from
external IT products; only authorized users may access the TOE. Therefore, this
requirement is not applicable.
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3 Security Problem Definition
The TOE is intended to be used either in environments in which, at most, sensitive, but
unclassified information is processed. This section contains assumptions regarding the security
environment and the intended usage of the TOE and threats on the TOE and the Operational
Environment.
U.S. Government Protection Profile Intrusion Detection System for Basic Robustness
Environments Version 1.7
3.1 Assumptions
This section contains assumptions regarding the security environment and the intended usage of
the TOE.
A.ACCESS
The TOE has access to all the IT System data it needs to perform its functions.
A.DYNMIC The TOE will be managed in a manner that allows it to appropriately address
changes in the IT System the TOE monitors.
A.ASCOPE
The TOE is appropriately scalable to the IT System the TOE monitors.
A.PROTCT
The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will be
protected from unauthorized physical modification.
A.LOCATE
The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled access
facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
A.MANAGE There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the TOE and
the security of the information it contains.
A.NOEVIL
The authorized administrators are not careless, willfully negligent, or hostile, and
will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE documentation.
A.NOTRST
The TOE can only be accessed by authorized users.
A.OCSP
An OCSP Server will be available in the Operational Environment for the purpose
of verifying the revocation status of certificates on behalf of the TOE.
3.2 TOE Threats
The threats discussed below are addressed by the McAfee NSP TOE. The threat agents are either
unauthorized persons or external IT entities not authorized to use the TOE itself.
T.COMINT
An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the integrity of the data
collected and produced by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism.
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T.COMDIS
An unauthorized user may attempt to disclose the data collected and produced
by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism.
T.LOSSOF
An unauthorized user may attempt to remove or destroy data collected and
produced by the TOE.
T.NOHALT
An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the continuity of the
System’s collection and analysis functions by halting execution of the TOE.
T.PRIVIL
An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and exploit system privileges
to gain access to TOE security functions and data.
T.IMPCON
An unauthorized user may inappropriately change the configuration of the TOE
causing potential intrusions to go undetected.
T.INFLUX
An unauthorized user may cause malfunction of the TOE by creating an influx
of data that the TOE cannot handle.
T.FACCNT
Unauthorized attempts to access TOE data or security functions may go
undetected.
T.EAVESDROP A malicious user or process may observe or modify TSF data transmitted
between a separate part of the TOE or between the TOE and a trusted IT Entity.
3.3 IT System Threats
The following identifies threats to the IT System that may be indicative of vulnerabilities in or
misuse of IT resources.
T.FALACT
The TOE may fail to react to identified or suspected vulnerabilities or
inappropriate activity.
T.FALREC
The TOE may fail to recognize vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity based on
IDS data received from each data source.
T.FALASC
The TOE may fail to identify vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity based on
association of IDS data received from all data sources.
T.MISUSE
Unauthorized accesses and activity indicative of misuse may occur on an IT
System the TOE monitors.
T.INADVE
Inadvertent activity and access may occur on an IT System the TOE monitors.
T.MISACT
Malicious activity, such as introductions of Trojan horses and viruses, may
occur on an IT System the TOE monitors.
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3.4 Organizational Security Policies
P.DETECT
Static configuration information that might be indicative of the potential for a
future intrusion or the occurrence of a past intrusion of an IT System or events
that are indicative of inappropriate activity that may have resulted from misuse,
access, or malicious activity of IT System assets must be collected.
P.ANALYZ
Analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about intrusions
(past, present, or future) must be applied to IDS data and appropriate response
actions taken.
P.MANAGE
The TOE shall only be managed by authorized users.
P.ACCESS
All data collected and produced by the TOE shall only be used for authorized
purposes.
P.ACCACT
Users of the TOE shall be accountable for their actions within the IDS.
P.INTGTY
Data collected and produced by the TOE shall be protected from modification.
P. PROTCT
The TOE shall be protected from unauthorized accesses and disruptions of TOE
data and functions.
P. SYSADMIN The NSM platform shall be configured such that only the System Admin user
has access to the underlying Operating System file system.
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4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE and the TOE’s operating Environment.
The security objectives are divided between TOE Security Objectives and Security Objectives
for the Operating Environment.
The following are the IT security objectives for the TOE:
O.CRYPTO
The TOE shall provide cryptographic functions (i.e., encryption/decryption) to
maintain the confidentiality and allow for detection of modification of TSF
data that is transmitted between physically separated portions of the TOE, or
between the TOE and trusted IT Entities.
O.PROTCT
The TOE must protect itself from unauthorized modifications and access to its
functions and data.
O.IDSENS
The Sensor must collect and store information about all events that are
indicative of inappropriate activity that may have resulted from misuse,
access, or malicious activity of IT System assets and the IDS.
O.IDANLZ
The Analyzer must accept data from IDS Sensors or IDS Scanners and then
apply analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about
intrusions (past, present, or future).
O.RESPON
The TOE must respond appropriately to analytical conclusions.
O.EADMIN
The TOE must include a set of functions that allow effective management of
its functions and data.
O.ACCESS
The TOE must display an advisory warning message upon startup and allow
authorized users to access only appropriate TOE functions and data.
O.IDAUTH
The TOE must be able to identify and authenticate users prior to allowing
access to TOE functions and data.
O.OFLOWS
The TOE must appropriately handle potential audit and System data storage
overflows.
O.AUDITS
The TOE must record audit records for data accesses and use of the System
functions.
O.INTEGR
The TOE must ensure the integrity of all audit and System data.
4.1 Security Objectives for the Environment
The following security objectives apply to the Operational Environment and are satisfied by
technical means by Operational Environment hardware/software:
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OE.AUDIT_PROTECTION The Operational Environment will provide the capability to protect
audit information.
OE.TSF_PROTECTION
The Operational Environment will provide the capability to protect
TSF data in transit between distributed TOE components.
OE.AUDIT_SORT
The Operational Environment will provide the capability to sort
the audit information
OE.TIME
The Operational Environment will provide reliable timestamps to
the TOE.
OE.INTROP
The TOE is interoperable with the IT System it monitors.
OE.OCSP
The Operational Environment will provide an OCSP Server in the
Operational Environment for the purpose of verifying the
revocation status of certificates on behalf of the TOE.
These non-IT security objectives, in addition to corresponding assumptions, are to be satisfied
without imposing technical requirements on the TOE. These objectives are satisfied through the
application of procedural or administrative measures:
OE.INSTAL
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that the TOE is
delivered, installed, managed, and operated in a manner which is
consistent with IT security.
OE.PHYCAL
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that those parts of the
TOE critical to security policy are protected from any physical
attack.
OE.CREDEN
Those responsible for the TOE must ensure that all access
credentials are protected by the users in a manner which is
consistent with IT security.
OE.PERSON
Personnel working as authorized administrators shall be carefully
selected and trained for proper operation of the System.
OE.SYSADMIN
The TOE must be configured such that only the System Admin
users hold credentials necessary to access the underlying Operating
System file system on the NSM platform.
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4.2 Mapping of Security Environment to Security Objectives
OE.SYSADMIN
OE.TSF_PROTECTION
OE.AUDIT_PROTECTION
X
X
X
OE.AUDIT_SORT
X
OE.TIME
OE.INTROP
OE.CREDEN
OE.OCSP
OE.PHYCAL
OE.INSTAL
O.INTEGR
O.AUDITS
O.OFLOWS
O.IDAUTH
O.ACCESS
O.EADMIN
O.RESPON
O.IDANLZ
O.IDSENS
O.IDSCAN
OE.PERSON
A.ACCESS
A.DYNMIC
A.ASCOPE
A.PROTCT
A.LOCATE
A.MANAGE
A.NOEVIL
A.NOTRUST
A.OCSP
T.EAVESDROP
T.COMINT
T.COMDIS
T.LOSSOF
T.NOHALT
T.PRIVIL
T.IMPCON
T.INFLUX
T.FACCNT
T.SCNCFG
T.SCNMLC
T.SCNVUL
T.FALACT
T.FALREC
T.FALASC
T.MISUSE
T.INADVE
T.MISACT
P.DETECT
P.ANALYZ
P.MANAGE
P.ACCESS
P.ACCACT
P.SYSADMIN
P.INTGTY
P.PROTCT
T.MISUSE
O.PROTCT
O.CRYPTO
The following table represents a mapping of the threats to the security objectives defined in this
ST.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 3: Summary of Mappings between Threats and IT Security
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4.3 Rationale for IT SECURITY OBJECTIVES
T.EAVESDROP
A malicious user or process may observe or modify TSF data transmitted
between separate part of the TOE or between the TOE and a trusted IT
Entity.
O.CRYPTO mitigates this threat by providing for the use of cryptographic functions to detect
when information has been modified.
T.COMINT
An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the integrity of the data
collected and produced by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism.
The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE data access. The
O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users
to access TOE data and providing an advisory message upon session startup. The O.INTEGR
objective ensures no TOE data will be modified. The O.PROTCT objective addresses this threat
by providing TOE self-protection.
T.COMDIS
An unauthorized user may attempt to disclose the data collected and
produced by the TOE by bypassing a security mechanism.
The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE data access. The
O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users
to access TOE data. The O.PROTCT objective addresses this threat by providing TOE selfprotection.
T.LOSSOF
An unauthorized user may attempt to remove or destroy data collected and
produced by the TOE.
The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE data access. The
O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users
to access TOE data. The O.INTEGR objective ensures no TOE data will be deleted. The
O.PROTCT objective addresses this threat by providing TOE self-protection.
T.NOHALT
An unauthorized user may attempt to compromise the continuity of the
System’s collection and analysis functions by halting execution of the TOE.
The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE function
accesses. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting
authorized users to access TOE functions. The O.IDSCAN, O.IDSENS, and O.IDANLZ
objectives address this threat by requiring the TOE to collect and analyze System data, which
includes attempts to halt the TOE.
T.PRIVIL
An unauthorized user may gain access to the TOE and exploit system
privileges to gain access to TOE security functions and data.
The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE function
accesses. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting
authorized users to access TOE functions. The O.PROTCT objective addresses this threat by
providing TOE self-protection.
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T.IMPCON
An unauthorized user may inappropriately change the configuration of the
TOE causing potential intrusions to go undetected.
The OE.INSTAL objective states the authorized administrators will configure the TOE properly.
The O.EADMIN objective ensures the TOE has all the necessary administrator functions to
manage the product. The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any
TOE function accesses. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only
permitting authorized users to access TOE functions.
T.INFLUX
An unauthorized user may cause malfunction of the TOE by creating an
influx of data that the TOE cannot handle.
The O.OFLOWS objective counters this threat by requiring the TOE handle data storage
overflows.
T.FACCNT
Unauthorized attempts to access TOE data or security functions may go
undetected.
The O.AUDITS objective counters this threat by requiring the TOE to audit attempts for data
accesses and use of TOE functions.
T.SCNCFG
Improper security configuration settings may exist in the IT System the TOE
monitors.
The O.IDSCAN objective counters this threat by requiring a TOE that contains a Scanner, collect
and store static configuration information that might be indicative of a configuration setting
change. The ST will state whether this threat must be addressed by a Scanner.
T.SCNMLC
Users could execute malicious code on an IT System that the TOE monitors
which causes modification of the IT System protected data or undermines
the IT System security functions.
The O.IDSCAN objective counters this threat by requiring a TOE that contains a Scanner, collect
and store static configuration information that might be indicative of malicious code. The ST will
state whether this threat must be addressed by a Scanner.
T.SCNVUL
Vulnerabilities may exist in the IT System the TOE monitors.
The O.IDSCAN objective counters this threat by requiring a TOE that contains a Scanner, collect
and store static configuration information that might be indicative of vulnerability. The ST will
state whether this threat must be addressed by a Scanner.
T.FALACT
The TOE may fail to react to identified or suspected vulnerabilities or
inappropriate activity.
The O.RESPON objective ensures the TOE reacts to analytical conclusions about suspected
vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity.
T.FALREC
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The O.IDANLZ objective provides the function that the TOE will recognize vulnerabilities or
inappropriate activity from a data source.
T.FALASC
The TOE may fail to identify vulnerabilities or inappropriate activity based
on association of IDS data received from all data sources.
The O. IDANLZ objective provides the function that the TOE will recognize vulnerabilities or
inappropriate activity from multiple data sources.
T.MISUSE
Unauthorized accesses and activity indicative of misuse may occur on an IT
System the TOE monitors.
The O.AUDITS and O.IDSENS objectives address this threat by requiring a TOE, that contains a
Sensor, collect audit and Sensor data.
T.INADVE
Inadvertent activity and access may occur on an IT System the TOE
monitors.
The O.AUDITS and O.IDSENS objectives address this threat by requiring a TOE, that contains a
Sensor, collect audit and Sensor data.
T.MISACT
Malicious activity, such as introductions of Trojan horses and viruses, may
occur on an IT System the TOE monitors.
The O.AUDITS and O.IDSENS objectives address this threat by requiring a TOE, that contains a
Sensor, collect audit and Sensor data.
P.DETECT
Static configuration information that might be indicative of the potential for
a future intrusion or the occurrence of a past intrusion of an IT System or
events that are indicative of inappropriate activity that may have resulted
from misuse, access, or malicious activity of IT System assets must be
collected.
The O.AUDITS, O.IDSENS, and O.IDSCAN objectives address this policy by requiring
collection of audit, Sensor, and Scanner data.
P.ANALYZ
Analytical processes and information to derive conclusions about intrusions
(past, present, or future) must be applied to IDS data and appropriate
response actions taken.
The O.IDANLZ objective requires analytical processes are applied to data collected from
Sensors and Scanners.
P.MANAGE
The TOE shall only be managed by authorized users.
The OE.PERSON objective ensures competent administrators will manage the TOE and the
O.EADMIN objective ensures there is a set of functions for administrators to use. The
OE.INSTAL objective supports the OE.PERSON objective by ensuring administrator follow all
provided documentation and maintain the security policy. The O.IDAUTH objective provides for
authentication of users prior to any TOE function accesses. The O.ACCESS objective builds
upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting authorized users to access TOE functions. The
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OE.CREDEN objective requires administrators to protect all authentication data. The
O.PROTCT objective addresses this policy by providing TOE self-protection.
P.ACCESS
All data collected and produced by the TOE shall only be used for
authorized purposes.
The O.IDAUTH objective provides for authentication of users prior to any TOE function
accesses. The O.ACCESS objective builds upon the O.IDAUTH objective by only permitting
authorized users to access TOE functions. The O.PROTCT objective addresses this policy by
providing TOE self-protection.
P.ACCACT
Users of the TOE shall be accountable for their actions within the IDS.
The O.AUDITS objective implements this policy by requiring auditing of all data accesses and
use of TOE functions. The O.IDAUTH objective supports this objective by ensuring each user is
uniquely identified and authenticated.
P.INTGTY
Data collected and produced by the TOE shall be protected from
modification.
The O.INTEGR objective ensures the protection of data from modification.
P. PROTCT
The TOE shall be protected from unauthorized accesses and disruptions of
TOE data and functions.
The O.OFLOWS objective counters this policy by requiring the TOE handle disruptions. The
OE.PHYCAL objective protects the TOE from unauthorized physical modifications. The
OE.TSF_PROTECTION objective protects TSF data in transit between distributed TOE
components.
4.4 Rationale for Assumption Coverage
This section provides a justification that for each assumption and the security objectives for the
environment which cover that assumption.
A.ACCESS
The TOE has access to all the IT System data it needs to perform its
functions.
The OE.INTROP objective ensures the TOE has the needed access.
A.DYNMIC
The TOE will be managed in a manner that allows it to appropriately
address changes in the IT System the TOE monitors.
The OE.INTROP objective ensures the TOE has the proper access to the IT System. The
OE.PERSON objective ensures that the TOE will be managed appropriately.
A.ASCOPE
The TOE is appropriately scalable to the IT System the TOE monitors.
The OE.INTROP objective ensures the TOE has the necessary interactions with the IT System it
monitors.
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A.PROTCT
The TOE hardware and software critical to security policy enforcement will
be protected from unauthorized physical modification.
The OE.PHYCAL provides for the physical Protection of the TSF hardware and software.
A.LOCATE
The processing resources of the TOE will be located within controlled
access facilities, which will prevent unauthorized physical access.
The OE.PHYCAL provides for the physical Protection of the TSF.
A.MANAGE
There will be one or more competent individuals assigned to manage the
TOE and the security of the information it contains.
The OE.PERSON objective ensures all authorized administrators are qualified and trained to
manage the TOE.
A.NOEVIL
The authorized administrators are not careless, willfully negligent, or
hostile, and will follow and abide by the instructions provided by the TOE
documentation.
The OE.INSTAL objective ensures that the TOE is properly installed and operated and the
OE.PHYCAL objective provides for physical Protection of the TSF by authorized
administrators. The OE.CREDEN objective supports this assumption by requiring protection of
all authentication data.
A.NOTRST
The TOE can only be accessed by authorized users.
The OE.PHYCAL objective provides for physical Protection of the TSF to protect against
unauthorized access. The OE.CREDEN objective supports this assumption by requiring
protection of all authentication data.
A.OCSP
An OCSP Server will be available in the Operational Environment for the
purpose of verifying the revocation status of certificates on behalf of the
TOE.
The OE.OCSP security objective requires that an OCSP Server is provided in the Operational
Environment for the purpose of verifying the revocation status of certificates on behalf of the
TOE.
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5 Extended Components Definition
The following Extended Component Class/Family is derived from has been based on the
Extended Components Requirements contained in the applicable Protection Profile in order to
conform to Common Criteria 3.1 R2 requirements.
Class IDS: Intrusion Detection Systems
IDS_SDC - System Data Collection
1
IDS_ANL - Analyser analysis
1
IDS_RCT – Analyser React
1
IDS_RDR - Restricted Data Review
1
IDS_STG - Guarantee of System Data
Availability
1
2
Figure 4: IDS: Intrusion Detection System Class Decomposition
System Data Collection (IDS_SDC)
Family Behavior
This family defines the collection of data from a system monitored by an IDS system.
Component Leveling
At IDS_SDC.1 the TSF shall be able to collect information from targeted IT Resource(s) and a
list is specified for what information is collected by an IDS system based on a selection; referred
to collectively as ―System Data‖.
Management: IDS_SDC.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
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a) Modifications made to the manner in which the TOE Collects IDS data – TSF behavior
(FMT_MOF.1)
Audit: IDS_SDC.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to:
No other components
Dependencies:
None
IDS_SDC.1 System Data Collection (EXT)
IDS_SDC.1.1
The System shall be able to collect the following information from the
targeted IT System resource(s):
a) [selection: Start-up and shutdown, identification and authentication
events, data accesses, service requests, network traffic, security
configuration changes, data introduction, detected malicious code, access
control configuration, service configuration, authentication configuration,
accountability policy configuration, detected known vulnerabilities]; and
b) [assignment: other specifically defined events]. (EXT)
IDS_SDC.1.2
At a minimum, the System shall collect and record the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) [assignment]: other information (EXT)
System Data Analysis (IDS_ANL)
Family Behavior
This family defines the analysis functions performed on data collected from a system monitored
by an IDS system.
Component Leveling
At IDS_ANL.1 analysis functions are specified and analytical records are defined.
Management: IDS_ANL.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Modifications made to the manner in which the TOE Analyzes IDS data – TSF behavior
(FMT_MOF.1).
Audit: IDS_ANL.1
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The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to:
No other components
Dependencies:
None
IDS_ANL.1
Analyzer Analysis (EXT)
IDS_ANL.1.1
The System shall perform the following analysis function(s) on all IDS
data received:
a) [selection: statistical, signature, integrity]; and
b) [assignment: other analytical functions].
IDS_ANL.1.2
The System shall record within each analytical result at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the result, type of result, identification of data source;
and
b) [assignment: other security relevant information about the result].
(EXT)
System Analyzer React (IDS_RCT)
Family Behavior
This family defines the Analyzer React (alarm) functions performed based on System Data
Analysis performed by an IDS system.
Component Leveling
At IDS_RCT.1 alarm functions are specified and conditions by which alarms are triggered are
defined.
Management: IDS_RCT.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) Modifications made to the manner in which the TOE reacts to analyzed IDS data (alarms) –
TSF behavior (FMT_MOF.1).
Audit: IDS_RCT.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to:
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Dependencies:
None
IDS_RCT.1 Analyzer React (EXT)
IDS_RCT.1.1
The System shall send an alarm to [assignment: alarm destination] and
take [assignment: appropriate actions] when an intrusion is detected.
(EXT)
Family Application Note: Available results from any component evaluation may
be applicable to this requirement.
Restricted Data Review (IDS_RDR)
Family Behavior
This family defines the controls implemented to restrict access to IDS data.
Component Leveling
At IDS_RDR.1 access to IDS is restricted to the listed roles and the ability for the IDS system to
present IDS data is specified.
Management: IDS_RDR.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit: IDS_RDR.1
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
None
IDS_RDR.1 Restricted Data Review (EXT)
IDS_RDR.1.1
The System shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the
capability to read [assignment: list of System data] from the System data.
(EXT)
IDS_RDR.1.2
The System shall provide the System data in a manner suitable for the user
to interpret the information. (EXT)
IDS_RDR.1.3
The System shall prohibit all users read access to the System data, except
those users that have been granted explicit read-access. (EXT)
Family Application Note: Available results from any component
evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. Each component must
protect its data while it controls the data. Additional analysis would be
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required to address any new data, beyond that previously defined in
individual components.
Guarantee of System Data Availability (IDS_STG)
Family Behavior
This family defines the measures taken to protect IDS System Data from deletion, modification
and to specify metrics for the availability of IDS System Data under specified conditions.
Component Leveling
At IDS_STG.1 System IDS data must be protected from deletion, modification and must be
preserved to the assigned availability metric under the selected conditions. At IDS_STG.2, the
IDS System specifies the selected action and sends an alarm if the storage capacity has been
reached.
Management: IDS_STG.1, IDS_STG.2
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a) There are no management actions foreseen.
Audit: IDS_STG.1, IDS_STG.2
The following actions should be auditable if FAU_GEN Security audit data generation is
included in the PP/ST:
a) There are no auditable events foreseen.
IDS_STG.1
Guarantee of System Data Availability (EXT)
Hierarchical to:
No other components
Dependencies:
None
IDS_STG.1.1
The System shall protect the stored System data from unauthorised
deletion. (EXT)
IDS_ STG.1.2
The System shall protect the stored System data from modification. (EXT)
IDS_ STG.1.3
The System shall ensure that [assignment: metric for saving System data]
System data will be maintained when the following conditions occur:
[selection: System data storage exhaustion, failure, attack]. (EXT) _
IDS_STG.2
Prevention of System data loss (EXT)
Hierarchical to:
No other components
Dependencies:
None
IDS_STG.2.1
The System shall [selection: 'ignore System data', 'prevent System data,
except those taken by the authorized user with special rights', 'overwrite
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the oldest stored System data '] and send an alarm if the storage capacity
has been reached.
Family Application Note: Available results from any component
evaluation may be applicable to this requirement. However, the System
must take into account the relationships between components and address
how the reaction of any given IDS component may affect any other in the
System context.
Note from the referenced PP:
A family of IDS requirements was created to specifically address the data collected and analyzed
by an IDS. The audit family of the CC (FAU) was used as a model for creating these
requirements. The purpose of this family of requirements is to address the unique nature of IDS
data and provide for requirements about collecting, reviewing and managing the data. These
requirements have no dependencies since the stated requirements embody all the necessary
security functions.
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6 Security Requirements
The security requirements that are levied on the TOE are specified in this section of the ST.
These security requirements are defined in Sections 6.2.
6.1 Conventions
The CC defines four operations on security functional requirements. The conventions below
define the conventions used in this ST to identify these operations.
Assignment:
indicated with bold text
Selection:
indicated with underlined text
Refinement:
additions indicated with bold text and italics
deletions indicated with strike-through bold text and italics
Iteration:
indicated with typical CC requirement naming followed by a lower case letter
for each iteration (e.g., FMT_MSA.1a)
The explicitly stated requirements claimed in this ST are denoted by the IDS class prefix in the
unique short name for the explicit security requirement.
TOE Security Functional Requirements
Audit
FAU_GEN.1
Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1
Audit review
FAU_SAR.2
Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.3
Selectable audit review
FAU_SEL.1
Selective audit
FAU_STG.2a
Guarantees of audit data availability - “already recorded”
FAU_STG.2b
Guarantees of audit data availability - “newly generated”
FAU_STG.4
Prevention of audit data loss
Cryptographic Operations
FCS_CKM.1a
Cryptographic Key Generation - Symmetric Keys
FCS_CKM.1b Cryptographic Key Generation - Asymmetric Keys
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FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic Key Destruction
FCS_COP.1a
Cryptographic Operations - Console Sessions
FCS_COP.1b
Cryptographic Operations- Update Server Sessions
FCS_COP.1c
Cryptographic Operations - Sensor to NSM Management Platform sessions
FCS_COP.1d
Cryptographic Operations - Hashing
FCS_COP.1e
Cryptographic Operations - RSA Key Wrapping/Digital Signature verification
Identification and Authentication
FIA_UAU.1
Timing of authentication
FIA_ATD.1
User attribute definition
FIA_UID.1
Timing of identification
Security Management
FMT_MOF.1a Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1b Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MTD.1
Management of TSF data
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
Protection of the TSF
FPT_ITC.1
Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission
FPT_ITI.1
Inter-TSF detection of modification
FPT_ITT.1
Basic internal transfer protection
FPT_STM.1
Reliable Time Stamps
TOE Access
FTA_TAB.1
Default TOE Access Banner
Intrusion Detection System (EXT)
IDS_SDC.1
System Data Collection (EXT)
IDS_ANL.1
Analyzer analysis (EXT)
IDS_RCT.1
Analyzer react (EXT)
IDS_RDR.1
Restricted Data Review (EXT)
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IDS_STG.1
Guarantee of System Data Availability (EXT)
IDS_STG.2
Prevention of System data loss (EXT)
Table 4: Functional Requirements
6.2 TOE Security Functional Requirements
The SFRs defined in this section are taken from Part 2 of the CC.
6.2.1
SECURITY AUDIT (FAU)
6.2.1.1 FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable
events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;*
b) All auditable events for the basic level of audit; and
c) Access to the System and access to the TOE and System data.
*The audit function cannot be shutdown
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the
outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of
the functional components included in the ST, the additional information
specified in the Details column of Table 5: Audited Events
Component
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SEL.1
FCS_CKM.1a, b
FCS_COP.1a, b, c, d, e
FCS_CKM.4
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Event
Access to System
Access to the TOE and System data
Reading of information from the audit
records
Unsuccessful attempts to read
information from the audit records
All modifications to the audit
configuration that occur while the
audit collection functions are operating
Success/Failure of Key Generation
function
Success/Failure of the Cryptographic
operation
Zeroization of Cryptographic CSPs
Details
Object IDS, Requested access
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FIA_UAU. 1
FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1a,b
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_ITI.1
All use of the authentication
mechanism
All use of the user identification
mechanism
All modifications in the behavior of the
functions of the TSF
All modifications to the values of TSF
data
Modifications to the group of users that
are part of a role
Action taken upon detection of
modification of transmitted TSF data.
User identity, location
User identity, location
User identity
Table 5: Audited Events
6.2.1.2 FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide Super User (authorized administrator), Systems
Administrator (authorized system administrator) with the capability to
read all Audit data from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user
to interpret the information.
6.2.1.3 FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1
The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except
those users that have been granted explicit read-access.
6.2.1.4 FAU_SAR.3 Selectable audit review
FAU_SAR.3.1
The TSF shall provide the ability to perform sorting of audit data based
on date and time, subject identity, type of event, and success or failure
of related event.
6.2.1.5 FAU_SEL.1 Selective audit
FAU_SEL.1.1
The TSF shall be able to include or exclude auditable events from the set
of audited events based on the following attributes:
a) event type;
b) threat signature type
6.2.1.6 FAU_STG.2a Guarantees of audit data availability – “already recorded”
FAU_STG.2.1a
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from
unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.2.2a
The TSF shall be able to prevent modifications to the audit records in the
audit trail.
FAU_STG.2.3a
The TSF shall ensure that all “already recorded” audit records will be
maintained when the following conditions occur: failure, attack.
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6.2.1.7 FAU_STG.2b Guarantees of audit data availability – “newly generated”
FAU_STG.2.1b
The TSF shall protect the newly generation stored audit records from
unauthorized deletion.
FAU_STG.2.2b
The TSF shall be able to prevent modifications to the “newly generated”
audit records.
FAU_STG.2.3b
The TSF shall ensure that “newly generated” audit records will be
maintained when the following conditions occur: audit storage exhaustion.
6.2.1.8 FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
FAU_STG.4.1
6.2.2
The TSF shall overwrite the oldest stored audit records and generate and
present an alarm at the NSM console if the audit trail is full.
Cryptographic Operations (FCS)
6.2.2.1 FCS_CKM.1a
FCS_CKM.1.1a
Cryptographic key generation – Symmetric Keys
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm software DRNG and specified
cryptographic key 168 bits (3DES), 128 bits (AES) that meet the
following: ANSI X9.31 (Sensor), FIPS 140-2 FIPS 186-2 (NSM).*
*provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic modules within the Sensor components and the OpenSSL and
Bsafe cryptographic modules within the NSM.
FCS_CKM.1b
FCS_CKM.1.1b
Cryptographic key generation – Asymmetric Keys
The TSF shall generate asymmetric cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm software DRNG and
specified cryptographic key sizes 1024, 2048 that meet the following:
ANSI X9.31 (RSA), FIPS 140-2.
6.2.2.2 FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4.1
The Sensor component of the TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in
accordance with a specified key destruction method cryptographic key
zeroization method that meets the following: The Key Zeroization
Requirements in FIPS PUB 140-2 Key Management Security Level 2.
6.2.2.3 FCS_COP.1a
FCS_COP.1.1a
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Cryptographic operation – Console Sessions
The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption of NSM Console TLS
Sessions in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES
using RSA key exchange and cryptographic key sizes (AES) 128 bits;
1024/2048 bits (RSA) that meet the following: FIPS 140-2.
6.2.2.4 FCS_COP.1b
FCS_COP.1.1b
Cryptographic Key Destruction
Cryptographic operation – Update Server Sessions
The TSF shall perform Update Server TLS based sessions in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES using RSA key exchange
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and cryptographic key sizes (AES) 128 bits; 1024/2048 bits (RSA) that
meet the following: FIPS 140-2.
6.2.2.5
FCS_COP.1c
Cryptographic operation: Sensor to NSM Management
Platform sessions
FCS_COP.1.1c
The TSF shall perform encryption/decryption of NSP Sensor to NSM
TLS sessions in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES
using RSA key exchange and cryptographic key sizes (AES) 128 bits;
1024/2048 bits (RSA) that meet the following: FIPS 140-2.
6.2.2.6 FCS_COP.1d
FCS_COP.1.1d
Cryptographic operation: Hashing
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA256, SHA1 and cryptographic key message
digest sizes 160 bits SHA1, 256 bits SHA256 that meet the following:
FIPS 140-2 (SHA1, SHA256).
*SHA1 used for TLS integrity checking,
6.2.2.7 FCS_COP.1e
Cryptographic operation – RSA Key Wrapping/Digital
Signature Verification
FCS_COP.1.1e
6.2.3
The TSF shall perform RSA Key Wrapping/Digital Signature
verification in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA
and cryptographic key sizes 1024, 2048 bits that meet the following: FIPS
140-2.
Identification and Authentication (FIA)
6.2.3.1 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow no action on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.2.3.2 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_ATD.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging
to individual users:
a) User identity (Common Name);*
b) Authentication data (Trusted CAs);*
c) Authorizations;
*Since the TOE supports only CAC based authentication, the user identity refers to the Common Name
and the authentication data refers to the certificate trusted status.
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6.2.3.3 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall allow no action on behalf of the user to be performed
before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
6.2.4
SECURITY MANAGEMENT (FMT)
6.2.4.1 FMT_MOF.1a Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1a
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the behavior of the functions of
System data collection, analysis and reaction to Super User
(authorized administrator), Security Expert, IPS Administrator and
Systems Administrator.
6.2.4.2 FMT_MOF.1b Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MOF.1.1b
The TSF shall restrict the ability to determine the behavior of, disable,
enable, modify the behavior of functions listed in Table 6 to Roles
defined in Table 6.
6.2.4.3 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to operations listed in Table 6 to Roles
defined in Table 6.
TSF Data Access Privileges
IPS
Admin
Configure Device List RW
Configure Manager RW
Operational Status RW
Reports IPS RW
TA Summary Dashboard
Configure Integration RO
Configure IPS Settings RO
General RO
Operational Status RO
TA Alerts RO
TA Hosts RO
Configure Admin Domain RW
User Creation RW
Configure Guest Portal
Configure Integration RW
Configure IPS Settings RW
General RW
TA Alerts RW
TA Hosts RW
Manually update NSM
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X
X
Super
User
X
X
X
X
X
Report
Generator
X
System
Admin
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
NOC
Operator
Security
Expert
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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signatures
Backup/restore audit records
Configure Admin User
Accounts RO
Configure Admin User
Accounts R/W
Configure Device List RO
IPS RW
IDS System Data R/W
IDS System Data RO
(NSM) OCSP Server
Configure R/W
Sensor Configure Password
policy settings R/W
Configure NSM banner RW
Configure Sensor banner RW
Configure Sensor banner RO
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 6: TSF Data/Operations by Access Role
6.2.4.4 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the following roles:
Super User (authorized administrator)
Systems Administrator (authorized system administrator)
Security Expert
NOC Operator
Report Generator
IPS Administrator
FMT_SMR.1.2
6.2.5
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
PROTECTION OF THE TSF (FPT)
6.2.5.1 FPT_ITC.1 Inter-TSF confidentiality during transmission
FPT_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall protect all TSF data transmitted from the TSF to a remote
trusted IT product from unauthorized disclosure during transmission.
6.2.5.2 FPT_ITI.1 Inter-TSF detection of modification
FPT_ITI.1.1
The TSF shall provide the capability to detect modification of all TSF data
during transmission between the TSF and a remote trusted IT product
within the following metric: a single failed integrity check.
FPT_ITI.1.2
The TSF shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of all TSF data
transmitted between the TSF and a remote trusted IT product and perform
resend affected packets if modifications are detected.
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6.2.5.3 FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
FPT_ITT.1.1
The TSF shall protect TSF data from modification when it is transmitted
between separate parts of the TOE.
6.2.5.4 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FPT_STM.1.1
6.2.6
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps for its own use.
TOE Access (FTA)
6.2.6.1 FTA_TAB.1
FTA_TAB.1.1
Default TOE access banners
Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory
warning message regarding unauthorized use of the TOE.
6.3 Extended TOE Security Functional Requirements
The SFRs defined in this section are explicitly stated and are derived from similar requirements
in Part 2 of the CC.
6.3.1
IDS COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS (IDS)
6.3.1.1 IDS_SDC.1 System Data Collection (EXT)
IDS_SDC.1.1
The System shall be able to collect the following information from the
targeted IT System resource(s):
a) network traffic, detect known vulnerabilities; and
b) No other events.
IDS_SDC.1.2
At a minimum, the System shall collect and record the following
information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and
the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
b) The additional information specified in the Details column of
Table 7: System Events
Component
Event
Details
IDS_SDC.1
IDS_SDC.1
Network traffic
Detect vulnerabilities
Protocol, source address, destination address
Identification of known vulnerability
Table 7: System Events
6.3.1.2 IDS_ANL.1 Analyser analysis (EXT)
IDS_ANL.1.1
The System shall perform the following analysis function(s) on all IDS
data received:
a)
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b)
IDS_ANL.1.2
configured thresholds, statistical based anomaly, protocol
anomaly-based detection (parameter length check), authorized
administrator created rules/signatures
The System shall record within each analytical result at least the following
information:
a) Date and time of the result, type of result, identification of data
source; and
b) none
6.3.1.3 IDS_RCT.1 Analyser react (EXT)
IDS_RCT.1.1
The System shall send an alarm to the administrator and take log an
alert and perform one or more of the following:
drop packet
send TCP reset
Quarantine the host (block)
send ICMP host unreachable
log packet
Filter alert
when an intrusion is detected.
6.3.1.4 IDS_RDR.1 Restricted Data Review (EXT)
IDS_RDR.1.1
The System shall provide Super User (authorized administrator),
Systems Administrator (authorized system administrator), Security
Expert, NOC Operator, IPS Administrator with the capability to read
captured IDS data from the System data.
IDS_RDR.1.2
The System shall provide the System data in a manner suitable for the user
to interpret the information.
IDS_RDR.1.3
The System shall prohibit all users read access to the System data, except
those users that have been granted explicit read-access.
6.3.1.5 IDS_STG.1 Guarantee of System Data Availability (EXT)
IDS_STG.1.1
The System shall protect the stored System data from unauthorised
deletion.
IDS_ STG.1.2
The System shall protect the stored System data from modification.
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IDS_ STG.1.3
The System shall ensure that all “already recorded” System data will be
maintained when the following conditions occur: failure, attack, storage
exhaustion.
6.3.1.6 IDS_STG.2 Prevention of System data loss (EXT)
IDS_STG.2.1
The System shall ignore System data and send an alarm if the storage
capacity has been reached.
6.4 Rationale for Extended Security Requirements
As the extended Security Functionality Requirements were derived from the following reference
PP:
U.S. Government Protection Profile Intrusion Detection System for Basic Robustness
Environments, Version 1.7
The applicable rationale from the PP is listed below:
RATIONALE FOR EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS
―A family of IDS requirements was created to specifically address the data collected and
analyzed by an ID. The audit family of the CC (FAU) was used as a model for creating these
requirements. The purpose of this family of requirements is to address the unique nature of IDS
data and provide for requirements about collecting, reviewing and managing the data. These
requirements have no dependencies since the stated requirements embody all the necessary
security functions.‖
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FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.3
FAU_SEL.1
FAU_STG.2a
FAU_STG.2b
FAU_STG.4
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UID.1
FCS_CKM.1a
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1a,b,c,d,e
FMT_MOF.1a,b
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_ITC.1
FPT_ITI.1
FPT_ITT.1
FTA_TAB.1
ADV_ARC.1
FPT_STM.1
IDS_SDC.1
IDS_ANL.1
IDS_RCT.1
IDS_RDR.1
IDS_STG.1
IDS_STG.2a,b
OE.AUDIT_PROTECTION
OE.AUDIT_SORT
OE.TIME
O.INTEGR
O.AUDITS
O.OFLOWS
O.IDAUTH
O.ACCESS
O.EADMIN
O.RESPON
O.IDANLZ
O.IDSENS
O.IDSCAN
O.PROTCT
O.CRYPTO
6.5 Rationale for TOE Security Requirements
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 8: Summary of Mappings between Security Functions and IT Security Objectives
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6.5.1 TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The security requirements are derived according to the general model presented in Part 1 of the
Common Criteria. Specifically, Table 8: Summary of Mappings between Security Functions and
IT Security Objectives illustrates the mapping between the security requirements and the security
objectives and Table 3: Summary of Mappings between Threats and IT Security demonstrates
the relationship between the threats, policies and IT security objectives. The functional and
assurance requirements presented in this Security Target are mutually supportive and their
combination meets the stated security objectives.
Security Objective
Mapping Rationale
O.CRYPTO
The TOE is required to protect TSF data from Eavesdropping when TSF data is sent
between separate parts of the TOE or to a trusted IT Entity.
FCS_CKM.1a is a requirement that a crypto module generate symmetric keys. Such
keys are used by the AES encryption/decryption functionality specified in
FCS_COP.1a, b, c.
FCS_CKM.1b is a requirement that a crypto module generate asymmetric keys
(public/private keypairs) for use in FCS_COP.1c
FCS_COP.1a specifies that AES be used to perform encryption and decryption
operations for TLS based sessions between the Console and the NSM TOE
component.
FCS_COP.1b requires that the TSF perform encryption/decryption of TLS sessions
between the NSM and the McAfee Update Server in accordance with the referenced
algorithms/standards.
FCS_COP.1c requires that the TSF perform encryption/decryption of TLS sessions
between the Sensor and the NSM TOE components in accordance with the
referenced algorithms/standards.
FCS_COP.1d requires that the TSF provide hashing services using a NIST-approved
implementation of the Secure Hash Algorithm.
FCS_COP.1e requires that the TSF provide RSA key wrap/unwrap services using the
RSA algorithm and key sizes 1024, 2048 bits.
FCS_CKM.4 provides the functionality for ensuring key and key material is
zeroized. This applies not only to key that resides in the TOE, but also to
intermediate areas (physical memory, page files, memory dumps, etc.) where key
may appear.
The TOE is required to protect the audit data from deletion as well as guarantee the
availability of the audit data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack
[FAU_STG.2a, b]. The System is required to protect the System data from any
modification and unauthorized deletion, as well as guarantee the availability of the
data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack [IDS_STG.1]. The TOE is
required to provide the ability to restrict managing the behavior of functions of the
TOE to authorized users of the TOE [FMT_MOF.1a, b]. Users can read, write or
create TSF data based on the type of data and assigned role. [FMT_MTD.1].
A System containing a Scanner is required to collect and store static configuration
information of an IT System. The type of configuration information collected must
be defined in the ST [IDS_SDC.1].
A System containing a Sensor is required to collect events indicative of inappropriate
activity that may have resulted from misuse, access, or malicious activity of IT
System assets of an IT System. These events must be defined in the ST
[IDS_SDC.1].
The Analyzer is required to perform intrusion analysis and generate conclusions
[IDS_ANL.1].
The TOE is required to respond accordingly in the event an intrusion is detected
[IDS_RCT.1].
O.PROTCT
O.IDSCAN
O.IDSENS
O.IDANLZ
O.RESPON
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O.EADMIN
O.ACCESS
O.IDAUTH
O.OFLOWS
O.AUDITS
O.INTEGR
OE.TIME
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The TOE must provide the ability to review and manage the audit trail of the System
[FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SEL.1]. The System must provide the ability for authorized
administrators to view all System data collected and produced [IDS_RDR.1]. The
TOE must ensure that all functions are invoked and succeed before each function
may proceed.
The TOE is required to restrict the review of audit data to those granted with explicit
read-access [FAU_SAR.2]. The System is required to restrict the review of System
data to those granted with explicit read-access [IDS_RDR.1]. The TOE is required to
protect the audit data from deletion as well as guarantee the availability of the audit
data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack [FAU_STG.2a, b]. The
System is required to protect the System data from any modification and
unauthorized deletion [IDS_STG.1]. Users authorized to access the TOE are defined
using an identification and authentication process [FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1]. The
TOE is required to provide the ability to restrict managing the behavior of functions
of the TOE to authorized users of the TOE [FMT_MOF.1a, b]. Only authorized
administrators of the System may query and add System and audit data, and
authorized administrators of the TOE may query and modify all other TOE data
[FMT_MTD.1] The TOE presents an advisory message when starting a user session
[FTA_TAB.1].
The TOE is required to restrict the review of audit data to those granted with explicit
read-access [FAU_SAR.2]. The System is required to restrict the review of System
data to those granted with explicit read-access [IDS_RDR.1]. The TOE is required to
protect the stored audit records from unauthorized deletion [FAU_STG.2a, b]. The
System is required to protect the System data from any modification and
unauthorized deletion, as well as guarantee the availability of the data in the event of
storage exhaustion, failure or attack [IDS_STG.1]. Security attributes of subjects use
to enforce the authentication policy of the TOE must be defined [FIA_ATD.1]. Users
authorized to access the TOE are defined using an identification and authentication
process [FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1] The TOE is required to provide the ability to
restrict managing the behavior of functions of the TOE to authorized users of the
TOE [FMT_MOF.1a, b]. Users can read, write or create TSF data based on the type
of data and assigned role [FMT_MTD.1]. The TOE must be able to recognize the
different administrative and user roles that exist for the TOE [FMT_SMR.1].
The TOE is required to protect the audit data from deletion as well as guarantee the
availability of the audit data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack
[FAU_STG.2a, b]. The TOE must prevent the loss of audit data in the event its audit
trail is full [FAU_STG.4]. The System is required to protect the System data from
any modification and unauthorized deletion, as well as guarantee the availability of
the data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack [IDS_STG.1]. The
System must prevent the loss of audit data in the event the audit trail is full
[IDS_STG.2a, b].
Security-relevant events must be defined and auditable for the TOE [FAU_GEN.1].
The TOE must provide the capability to select which security-relevant events to audit
[FAU.SEL.1]. The TOE must prevent the loss of collected data in the event its audit
trail is full [FAU_STG.4]. Time stamps associated with an audit record must be
reliable [FPT_STM.1].
The TOE is required to protect the audit data from deletion as well as guarantee the
availability of the audit data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack
[FAU_STG.2a, b]. The System is required to protect the System data from any
modification and unauthorized deletion [IDS_STG.1]. Specified roles can read, write
or create TSF data based on the type of data [FMT_MTD.1]. The TOE encrypts and
integrity checks TSF data sent from the McAfee update server to the TOE when
receiving threat signature updates [FPT_ITC.1, FPT_ITI.1].
The Operational Environment will provide reliable time stamps to the TOE and the
TOE shall provide accurate time stamps to the application for use in audit records.
Time stamps associated with an audit record must be reliable [FPT_STM.1].
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OE.AUDIT_SORT
OE.AUDIT_PROTECTION
The Operational Environment must provide the ability to review and manage the
audit trail of the System to include sorting the audit data [FAU_SAR.3].
The TOE is required to protect the audit data from deletion as well as guarantee the
availability of the audit data in the event of storage exhaustion, failure or attack
[FAU_STG.2a, b].
6.6 Rationale For IT Security Requirement Dependencies
This section includes a table of all the security functional requirements and their dependencies
and a rationale for any dependencies that are not satisfied.
Functional
Component
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.3
FAU_SEL.1
FAU_STG.2a
FAU_STG.2b
FAU_STG.4
FCS_CKM.1a,b
Dependency
Included/Rationale
FPT_STM.1
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_GEN.1, FMT_MTD.1
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_STG.2
FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1a,b,c,d,e
FCS_CKM.4
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1a,b
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_ITC.1
FPT_ITI.1
FPT_ITT.1
FPT_STM.1
FTA_TAB.1
IDS_SDC.1
IDS_ANL.1
IDS_RCT.1
IDS_RDR.1
IDS_STG.1
IDS_STG.2
FCS_CKM.1a,b
FCS_CKM.1a,b
FIA_UID.1
None
None
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_UID.1
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes, except FCS_CKM.4 not met
for NSM
Yes
Yes
Yes
None
None
Yes
Yes
Yes
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
Table 9: SFR Dependencies
6.7 Rationale for TOE Dependencies Not Satisfied
The dependency for FCS_CKM.4 associated with FCS_CKM.1a, b is not satisfied on the NSM
component of the TOE. Key material on this platform may be destroyed by ―by uninstalling the
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application, formatting the hard drive and power cycling the device‖ as described in the
following FIPS-140-2 Security Policy for the applicable NSM cryptographic module: NSM
Application Cryptographic Module Security Policy Version 1.2.
6.8 TOE Security Assurance Requirements
EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2 was chosen to provide a ―basic‖ level of independently assured security.
The chosen assurance level is consistent with the threat environment. Specifically, that the threat
of malicious attacks is not greater than ―enhanced basic‖ and the product will have undergone a
search for obvious flaws and a focused vulnerability analysis.
The assurance security requirements for this Security Target are taken from Part 3 of the CC.
These assurance requirements compose an Evaluation Assurance Level 2 augmented (EAL 2 +
ALC_FLR.2) as defined by the CC. The assurance components are summarized in the following
table.
Table 10: Assurance Requirements: EAL 2 + ALC_FLR.2
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6.9 Rationale for TOE Security Functions
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.3
FAU_SEL.1
FAU_STG.2a
FAU_STG.2b
FAU_STG.4
FCS_CKM.1a,b
FCS_COP.1a,b,c,d,e
FCS_CKM.4
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1a,b
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_SMR.1
FPT_ITC.1
FPT_ITI.1
FPT_ITT.1
FPT_STM.1
FTA_TAB.1
IDS_SDC.1
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System Data Review, Availability and Loss
System Data Analysis
System Data Collection
Cryptographic Operations
Protection of the TSF
Security Management
Identification and Authentication
Security Audit
This section provides a table demonstrating the tracing of TOE security functions back to aspects
of the security functional requirements (SFRs).
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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IDS_ANL.1
IDS_RCT.1
IDS_RDR.1
IDS_STG.1
IDS_STG.2a,b
X
X
X
X
X
Table 11: TOE Security Function to SFR Mapping
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7 TOE Summary Specification
7.1 TOE Security Functions
The TOE’s security functionality is characterized through the following Security Functions:
Security Audit
Identification and Authentication
Security Management
Protection of the TSF
Cryptographic Operations
System Data Collection
System Data Analysis
System Data Review, Availability and Loss
7.1.1
Security Audit
FAU_GEN.1
The NSM management platform generates audit records for Console Administrative sessions and
stores them into the MySQL database, running on the same dedicated platform as does the NSM
management software. The MySQL Database provides storage and retrieval for audit log
information. This function records attempts to access the system itself, such as successful and
failed authentication, as well as the actions taken by the user once authenticated. Auditable
actions include changes to the IDS rules and viewing the audit records.
The NSP Sensor also generates audit records based on Sensor detected events and forwards these
logs to the NSM platform where they may be integrated into a single (NSP) log resource stored
on the MySQL database platform.
Auditing is the recording of events within the system. The NSM records the audit information
into a data store within the MySQL database. Events logged in audit records include the items
listed in Table 5: Audited Events and are categorized by the following event types:
Admin Domain Action
User Action
Manager Action
Sensor Action
Policy Action
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Report Action
Update Server Action
System Health Action
Alert Action
The following information about an audited event is stored in the audit log whenever that audited
event is recorded in the audit information:
a) Date and time of the event,
b) Type (i.e., category and action) of event,
c) Subject (i.e., user and domain) identity,
d) Result (success or failure) of the event, and
e) Description (where applicable access mode, target object, etc.).
The actions that can be performed at the NSM Management Console are audited. This includes
the following:
a) Startup and shutdown of the audit function (modification of audit settings and NSM
startup and shutdown);
b) Access to the TOE and System data that includes the object ID’s and the requested
access (starting the audit , attempts to read the audit log, and alert acknowledgement
and deletion);
c) All modification to the audit configuration that occur during collection (modification
of audit settings);
d) All authentication attempts, including the user and location where authentication was
attempted (all login attempts as well as user logoff events);
e) All modification to the behavior of the TSF (modification of audit settings, creation
of policies, updating signatures, and NSM startup and shutdown)
f) All modifications to TSF data values (modification of audit settings, creation of
policies, and updating signatures); and,
g) Modification of user accounts, creation, deletion, and modifications (create user,
delete user, assign roles, and update roles).
h) Cryptographic Operations relating to establishing secure sessions between TOE
components or the McAfee update server.
Audit records may be backed up in the form of a file through the NSM console. This invokes a
MySQL database backup routine that places these records in a backup file on a storage resource.
Files can also be restored to the NSM through the console using a database restore function.
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Cryptographic functions within the NSM and Sensor components are audited including
cryptographic operations, cryptographic key generation and destruction of cryptographic keys.
Review of Audit Records FAU_SAR.1
The NSM provides the ability for the authenticated users to view security audit data for the
system. The TSF enforces that only the Super User and System Administrator have access to
read information from the audit records. The audit logs are viewable through the standard webbased management interface provided by the NSM and accessed via the Console Browser client.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted Audit Review
No security related actions can be taken without a successful user authentication therefore only
authorized users who have been authenticated to an NSM role can view the audit records.
FAU_SAR.3 Selectable Audit Review
While viewing the security audit records from the NSM resource, it is possible to sort and filter
the data based upon the following properties:
Date and time
User
Type of event
Success or failure of the event
FAU_SEL.1 Selectable Audit
The NSM allows a user with the Super User role to set the types of auditable events by their
type. The NSM allows the Super User to include or exclude auditable events from the set of
audited events based on the event type.
Similarly, a person assigned to the Security Expert role can include or exclude recorded events in
the traffic log that match a specific signature.
FAU_STG.2a, b Guarantees of Data Availability
Access to audit records is limited to authenticated NSM console TLS sessions. Local access to
the NSM platform is excluded from the CC Evaluated Configuration. The TOE provides
protection for the security audit records primarily by TSF interface identification and
authentication mechanisms. There are no TSF interface options available to disable audit or
delete/modify audit records. The audit function starts automatically when the TOE is installed.
Once recorded, audit data cannot be modified except, in the case where the audit log reach its
capacity. Under these circumstances new audit data will overwrite the oldest audit data. This
occurrence will also cause a system fault message to be posted to the system fault log. Only TSF
interfaces to the audit mechanism allow the creation of an audit log, viewing audit information,
backing up and restoring audit log information.
The TSF ensures that all “already recorded” audit records will be maintained when the following
conditions occur: failure or attack. It does so by protecting the existing audit trail from
unauthorized access.
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The TSF ensures that ―newly generated‖ audit records will be maintained when the following
conditions occurs storage exhaustion. It does so by deleting the oldest audit records as necessary
to make space in order to store new audit records.
Note that the NSM relies on the underlying Windows Server 2003/2008 operating system to
protect the files as a storage repository for the TOE audit records.
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of Audit Data Loss
The NSM records the audit log information into a data store. The data store employed is a part of
the NSM.
The data store within the NSM database allocates 50,000 rows for the purposes of storing audit
records. In the event that the audit log storage resources are exhausted, an alarm is presented at
the NSM console and the oldest data stored in the audit log is overwritten with the newest data.
7.1.2
Identification and Authentication
FIA_ATD.1 User Attribute Definition
User accounts in the TOE have the following attributes:
A X.509 certificate (derived from a CAC) that is passed to the NSM during the session
negotiation process and, within that certificate, a Common Name that is extracted and checked
against a user list on the NSM. The certificate also is required to be signed by a trusted CA as
configured during NSP system setup.
User Identification and Authentication – FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1
Identification and authentication is required for access to the NSM by requiring the user to
provide a certificate derived from their CAC.
When a Common Access Card (smartcard) is presented for NSM user authentication, a digital
certificate is required by NSM prior to establishing the user session. NSM requests the certificate
from the NSM browser client which invokes the necessary CAC software calls to extract the
certificate from the smartcard. Once the certificate is obtained by the browser client, it is sent to
NSM which verifies that the certificate is signed by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA). If the
CA is verified successfully, NSM parses the x.509 formatted certificate, extracts the Common
Name and performs a lookup to verify the Common Name is included in the user database as
holding a valid account. If successful, the user’s session is initiated under the assigned role. If
unsuccessful, the authentication attempt fails and connection is immediately terminated.
TOE Access Banners – FTA_TAB.1
The TOE NSM and Sensor components both present an advisory access banner prior to
establishing a user session that may be configured to include a custom deployment specific
warning about unauthorized access and use of resources and organizational graphics.
7.1.3
Security Management
The NSM provides a detailed security management interface used to configure and manage the
NSP TOE as well as provide a report and analysis utility for investigating traffic events.
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The GUI based interface is divided into tabs based on the service available on respective pages
of the display. The following tab categories are provided:
IPS Settings – Allows the configuration of IPS policies, Alert filters, Access Control Lists
(ACL), Cryptographic settings, Quarantine configuration and Alert notifications
Summary – Provides a detailed view of all configured policies and their status
Policies – Provides a Policy Editor and Reconnaissance Policy editor for policy
development, Policy Assignment section, HTTP response scanning settings.
Advanced Policies – Allows the configuration of policy rule sets, User Defined Signature
editor
Alert Filters – Provides for Editing, Managing, Importing/Exporting Alert Filters
ACLs – Allows for viewing and management of Access Control Lists, including
import/export options
IPS Quarantine – Allows configuration of IPS Quarantine within Policy Editors, Access
Domains, IPS Sensors and Threat Analyzer.
Archiving – Supports Data Archive functions including auto archive scheduling
Maintenance – Provides an interface for Database management
Alert Notification – Allows the user to view/manage Alert settings
NSP Sensor SNMPv3 Interface
The NSP Sensor SNMPv3 interface facilitates the exchange of management information between
itself and the NSM platform. Performance statistics, configuration data and management
information can be queried through this interface.
Communications between the NSM and the Sensor are made via the secure channel using
TLSv1-AES128-SHA1.
NSM SNMPv3 Interface
The NSM provides an SNMP interface for the purpose of reporting trap related information to
devices in the Operational Environment. This interface is configured to be read-only for the CC
Evaluated configuration. SNMPv3 traps are sent over the secure TLSv1 session.
FMT_MOF.1a, b - Management of Security Functions Behavior
The NSM requires user authentication before any actions can be performed (other than
identification and authentication) on the TOE, security-related or otherwise. Therefore only
authorized users can access any functions on the system. Signatures are updated by McAfee
Incorporated on a protected server with a controlled space and/or by an administrative user with
the Security Expert role. Only users with ―System Administrator‖ privileges can implement rules
on the NSP TOE. System Administrators can also create, delete, and modify existing rules on the
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system. System Administrator is the only role that can manage the security settings on the
system, such as user accounts and audit settings.
FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMR.1 Management of TSF Data & Security Roles
The TSF is capable of maintaining the following roles: Super User, IPS Administrator, Report
Generator, System Administrator, NOC Operator, and Security Expert.
The Authorized administrator role as defined in the applicable PP is also known within this ST as
the Super User role and the authorized System Administrator (PP reference) is known as System
Administrator within this ST.
The following table describes the NSM roles supported for management of the NSP TOE and the
applicable access level to data objects:
Role
General Description
Specific Read/Write Access
Super User
NSM Full Access User: Super Users
must manage themselves within the
domain(s) they reside. They can read,
modify, delete and push policy. Super
Users can also administer other
administrators and their roles, adding,
maintaining, and deleting users and role
assignments.
IPS
Administrator
Administers the Intrusion Prevention
Environment
An IPS Administrator has read-only
access to Threat Analyzer data. They
cannot read configuration information.
System
Administrator
Administer the Manager and Device
List:
Manager, Sensors, Sensor_Name, and
Failover Pairs node actions (interfaces
and sub-interfaces included). System
Administrators do not control Super
Users, and can change own role to
anything but Super User. System
Administrators can add, maintain, and
delete admin domains, read Alert data,
read Audit data.
NOC
Operator
Reporting only. Run and analyze
reports.
Configure Admin Domain RW
Configure Admin User Accounts RW
Configure Manager RW
Configure Integration RW
Configure Device List RW
Configure IPS Settings RW
Configure Guest Portal User Creation RW
Reports IPS RW
Operational Status RW
TA Summary Dashboard IPS RW
TA Summary Dashboard General RW
TA Alerts RW
TA Hosts RW
Configure IPS Settings RW
Reports IPS RW
Operational Status RW
TA Summary Dashboard IPS RW
TA Summary Dashboard General RW
TA Alerts RW
TA Hosts RW
Configure Admin Domain RW
Configure Admin User Accounts RO
Configure Manager RW
Configure Integration RO
Configure Device List RW
Configure IPS Settings RO
Reports IPS RW
Operational Status RW
TA Summary Dashboard IPS RO
TA Summary Dashboard General RO
TA Alerts RO
TA Hosts RO
Reports IPS RO
Operational Status RO
TA Summary Dashboard IPS RO
TA Summary Dashboard General RO
TA Alerts RO
TA Hosts RO
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Security
Expert
Responsible for Policy configuration
and application, software/signature
updates, and alert monitoring (Threat
Analyzer).
Configure Integration RW
Configure Device List RO
Configure IPS Settings RW
Reports IPS RW
Operational Status RW
TA Summary Dashboard IPS RW
TA Summary Dashboard General RW
TA Alerts RW
TA Hosts RW
Table 12: NSM Access by Authenticated Role
7.1.4
Protection of the TSF
FPT_ITT.1 Basic internal TSF data transfer protection
The McAfee Incorporated Sensors and NSM management platform all protect TSF data from
disclosure and modification, when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE, by
communicating using TLS version 1.0 connections.
The Sensor communicates with the NSM management platform through its dedicated
10M/100M/1G Ethernet, out-of-band management port using TCP/IP. This communications uses
secure channels; providing link privacy using encryption and mutual authentication using public
key authentication. The ciphers suites used for this communications are TLSv1 (AES 128
SHA1). It is recommended that NSM use a separate, dedicated management subnet to
interconnect with the sensor.
FPT_ITC.1, FPT_ITI.1 TSF data confidentiality and integrity protection
Sessions between the McAfee Update Server and the NSM component of the TOE are secured
using AES, 128 bit encryption over a TLS tunnel. Message integrity checking is provided by a
SHA1 hash. Further, the Threat Signature payload is secured using a McAfee Update Server
private key and is unwrapped upon receipt using the corresponding public key, held by the NSM.
There is no communication between the sensor and Update Server.
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Stamps
The TOE uses Windows Time Services provided by the Windows Server 2003/2008 operating
system to provide time stamps for the TSF to write time stamps for audit records, both the
security records and the System Data records. The NSM receives time stamps from the Windows
Server 2003/2008, which is part of the operational environment, ensuring they are reliable by
consistently obtaining time information from the well-defined and presumed trusted and reliable
source.
Each Sensor receives a time reference from the NSM management platform. The NSM
management platform periodically passes a timestamp reference to the sensors. This occurs: On
power up when establishing the crypto channels to NSM and upon every re-establishment due to
link/network issues to NSM. Regardless, time is updated every 2 minutes post establishment.
Each Sensor uses this timestamp to synchronize its own independent timing mechanism
synchronizing at regular intervals per the timestamps sent from the NSM management platform.
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7.1.5
Cryptographic Operations
FCS_COP.1a, b, c, d, e; FCS_CKM.4
The NSP system utilizes symmetric key cryptography to secure communications between TOE
components and with the McAfee Update Server in the Operational Environment. All sessions,
except SNMPv3, are conducted using TLSv1 and leverage an OpenSSL Module. Key exchange
between the Console browser client and the NSM and the NSM and NSP Sensor is performed
using RSA public/private key exchange. Cryptographic library support is provided for the NSM
by an RSA BSafe cryptographic library and for the NSP Sensor by XySSL library. OpenSSL and
both cryptographic libraries are contained within NSP software release packages. When TLS
Administration sessions are closed, the OpenSSL module within the Sensor component zeroizes
all cryptographic keys used for the sessions.
SNMPv3 sessions are secured using the AES algorithm 128 bit key size.
Key Generation FCS_CKM.1a, b
Symmetric keys utilized for TSL based secure sessions between TSF components are generated
on demand using an OpenSSL based deterministic software random number generator (DRNG)
using the 3DES algorithm.
The NSM and NSP Sensor components generate asymmetric (public/private) keypairs using an
OpenSSL based software RNG and either the RSA or DSA algorithm and 1024/2048 bit key
sizes.
The OpenSSL implementation used for the TOE utilizes a software based DRNG that is
compliant with ANSI X9.31.
Console Sessions – FCS_COP.1a
Administrative User browser sessions between the NSM Console and the NSM Server platform
are symmetrically encrypted using the AES algorithm and 128 bit keys. These sessions are
conducted using Transport Layer Security (TLSv1). NSM hosts user console sessions using an
Apache web server and cryptographic support is provided through an OpenSSL module
interacting with an RSA BSafe cryptographic library.
NSP Sensor to NSM Sessions- FCS_COP.1c
All TSF data passed between NSP sensors and the NSM platform are secured using TLSv1
sessions. The AES algorithm is used for these sessions with 128 bit symmetric keys. Message
integrity is assured using a SHA1 hash. A shared secret is configured between the NSP Sensor
and NSM components during initial configuration to establish a trust relationship.
NSM to McAfee Update Server Sessions– FCS_COP.1b
The McAfee Update Server provides threat signature updates to the NSM platform for the
purpose of providing the most up to date threat knowledge for use in detection processes. These
sessions are secured over TLSv1 sessions using AES, 128 bit keys. The Update Server
authenticates to the NSM Server using a certificate prior to establishing the session.
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Hashing – FCS_COP.1d
The TOE performs hashing for integrity checking of TLSv1 session data between TOE
components and the McAfee Update server using the SHA1 hashing algorithm.
RSA Key Wrap/Unwrap – FCS_COP.1e
The NSP Sensor unwraps MIB objects passed to it during SNMPv3 session using RSA.
RSA key wrap is also used as part of the RSA key exchange that takes place during the TLSv1
negotiation process for Console sessions with NSM and for NSM to NSP Sensor
communications.
7.1.6
System Data Collection
IDS_SDC.1 System Data Collection
The collection subsystem is used to detect events while monitoring the target network. Upon
detection of such events, the collection subsystem shall generate data, which is then sent to the
NSM for storage in the system database. The types of events that can be detected are shown in
the table below. For each event detected the collection subsystem records and the NSM stores
date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity, and the outcome (success or failure) of
the event along with additional details for each event.
The Update Server stores default signatures to detect currently known vulnerabilities and
exploits of interest in network traffic. The NSM component allows the Security Expert role to
establish new rules to detect new vulnerabilities as well as specific network traffic, allowing the
Security Expert complete control over the types of traffic that will be monitored and to set rules
to govern the collection of data regarding potential intrusions. For Network Traffic Events
Protocol, Source Address and Destination Addressed are collected in audit records. For
Vulnerability Detection Events the identifier of the known vulnerability is listed in the audit
records.
7.1.7
System Data Analysis
IDS_ANL.1 Analyzer Analysis
To analyze the data collected by the McAfee Incorporated Sensor, the NSM management
platform uses signatures, protocol standards criteria, and configured rules to identify potential
malicious activity. A signature is the protection profile term for a rule as defined by the TOE.
They are patterns of traffic that can be used to detect attacks or exploits.
The TOE comes with default signatures for known exploits, and the administrator can add new
signatures or detection rules at any time. New signatures are obtained from the Update Server as
they are created and are downloaded. New signatures also can be manually created by an
administrator authenticated in the Security Expert role. This gives the administrator control over
the detection of traffic, allowing customization for the intended environment.
Exploit detection may include “protocol violations” where packets do not conform to network
protocol standards. (For example, they are incorrectly structured, have an invalid combination of
flags set, or contain incorrect values.) Examples might include TCP packets with their SYN and
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RST flags enabled, or an IP packet whose specified length doesn’t match its actual length. This
determination is done through parameter checking techniques such as parameter length checks.
When a pattern of traffic has been matched to a signature, protocol anomaly or detection rule, the
specific event is recorded in the traffic log where it can be viewed and analyzed by users
authenticated in the Security Expert role. The events are logged with the following information:
the category of event and signature match, the time of the event, the data source and a copy of
the packets used to identify the pattern.
A pattern of traffic that meets a signature is called an “alert.” The graphical interface to view
alerts and alert analysis is the “Threat Analyzer.” The Threat Analyzer is used for the analysis of
the alerts detected by NSP Sensors. Alert details include transmission information such as source
and destination IP addresses in the packet, as well as security analysis information (performed by
the sensor) such as attack severity and type. Alerts are backed up to the database and archived in
order of occurrence.
For detailed analysis of alert information, the Threat Analyzer provides a “Drill Down” graphical
administrative interface. Drill Down provides the administrator with the capability to review
statistical, signature, threshold, and anomaly-based functions by port scan. Alert information is
organized by category of alert as follows:
Severity: by severity,
Attack: by attack name,
Source IP: by source IP addresses,
Destination IP: by destination (target) IP addresses,
Interface: by the sensor interface where alerts were captured,
Domain: by admin domain where alerts were captured,
Type: by attack type,
Sensor: by the sensors where alerts were captured, and
Application Protocol: by the application protocol of the detected attack
For each category of alert, the administrator may continue to drill down to get more detailed
information. Drill Down allows the administrator to review alert category information by time,
or details.
The “Time View” provides a view of the alert count during a specific time period. Time periods
are expressed in date/time range. Threat Analyzer provides an interface to view alerts in real
time, as they occur, as well as a historical view. The historical view sets the filter to retrieve
information for both acknowledged and unacknowledged alerts archived in the database during a
specified time. The historical view does not refresh with new alerts as they occur, thus you can
focus on analyzing all alerts within the time frame you requested.
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The Threat Analyzer provides a view to analyze an individual alert called the “Alert Details.”
The Alert Details interface lists all of the alerts for the selected time span in order of occurrence,
with most recent being listed first. Alert details are presented in multiple named columns, known
as attributes. The attributes represent packet fields such as source and destination IP, as well as
sensor analysis fields such as attack severity and type.
The attributes in the Alert Details are as follows:
Acknowledged: for Historical View, indicates state of recognition. If unchecked by an
administrator, then the alert has not been manually acknowledged,
Deleted: for Historical View, indicates if the alert has been selected for deletion during
current analysis session,
Time: time when the alert occurred. Alerts are listed from most (top of the list) to least
(bottom) recent,
Severity: system impact severity posed by the attack,
Attack: specific name of the attack that triggered the alert,
Source IP: IP address where the attack originated,
Source IP Port: port on source machine where attack originated,
Destination IP: IP address the attack was targeting,
Destination IP Port: port on target machine where attack was destined,
Domain: admin domain in which the attack was detected,
Sensor: ID (name) of the sensor from where the alert was generated,
Interface: sensor interface where the attack was detected, and
Type: the type of attack. The choices are:
o Exploit: an attack matching a known exploit attack signature.
o Host Sweep: a reconnaissance attack attempting to see which IP addresses have
live systems attached to them.
o Port Scan: a reconnaissance attack attempting to see what services a particular
system is offering.
o Simple Threshold: denial of service attack against a set threshold limits.
o Statistical: denial of service attack based on a learning statistical traffic profile.
Throttle: a number of the same Signature attack occurring that exceeded an established
limit suppression threshold in a designated period.
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Report Generator Application
The Report Generator is an application that runs on the NSP console machine and is part of the
thick client package that is uploaded from the NSM during initial configuration. Read/Write
access is limited to authenticated users holding the Super User, IPS Administrator, System
Administrator, Security Expert or Report Generator roles Report Generator role. All
authenticated users can read reports.
IPS Reports
The Report Generator’s IPS reports detail the network alerts generated by NSP Sensors. Alert
reports are summaries based on specific types of information such as the source/destination IP of
an attack, attack name, or time of alert. The TOE includes several pre-formatted reports for
simple information gathering, including an Executive Summary report, which provides a highlevel view of alert activity.
These IPS reports provide information on the alerts generated from the installed NSP Sensors.
The generated alert information can include source and destination IP of the attack, time when
attack occurred, the Sensor that detected the attack. The multiple reports in this category provide
various, concentrated views according to the specific parameters of each report. Each report lists
alerts from most to least common detected.
All IPS reports can be viewed in either HTML or PDF format. Specific reports can also be
viewed in bar graph or pie chart format.
Configuration Reports
Configuration reports provide information on the settings configured using the Configuration
page. The Report Generator role user can generate reports to view your current software and
signature versions, the status of a Sensor, policy and rule set configurations, or your proxy server
settings. These reports provide a snapshot of the system’s current configuration.
Scheduled Reports
Scheduled reports automate IPS report generation for convenient forensic analysis of the alerts
generated by your Sensors. Report can be scheduled to be generated and emailed on a daily or
weekly basis. The tool allows templates to be created consisting of the information to include
and the schedule can be configured to run either weekly or daily. When the scheduled time
arrives, a report is generated based on the template and mailed to the configured recipient list.
IDS_RCT.1 Analyzer React
When signature matches are found, they can either be logged for later use or set to trigger an
alarm. Current log entries can be viewed in real time by setting the ―Real-time Log Viewer‖
values at the NSM console. Real-time viewing displays a limited number of entries as logged to
the database. The number of entries to view can be selected as well as the refresh rate to refresh
the console screen.
The NSM provides an interface to establish IDS security policies. A security policy, or IDS
policy, is a set of rules that governs what traffic is permitted across your network, and how to
respond to misuse of the network. An NSM policy is a set of rules/instructions defining the
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malicious activity that can be detected and the response. Creating a policy enables an
administrator in the Security Expert role to define an environment to protect by the different
operating systems (OSs), applications, and protocols in the network. These environment
parameters, or rules, relate to all of the well-known attacks defended against by NSM.
All activities for which the underlying traffic content can violate an NSM policy may not be
malicious, but may be explicitly forbidden by the usage policies of the network as defined by a
security policy. A protocol violation can be an indication of a possible attack, but can also be
triggered by malfunctioning software or hardware. Policy violations trigger alerts that are
displayed on the NSM console.
Alerts are asynchronous notifications sent when a system event or attack triggers the IDS. When
a transmission violating a security policy is detected by a sensor, the sensor compiles
information about the offending transmission and sends the information to the NSM in the form
of an alert. An alert contains a variety of information on the incident that triggered it—such as
the type of attack, its source and destination IP addresses, its source and destination ports, as well
as security analysis information (performed by the sensor) such as attack severity and type. In
addition to the alert that is generated, the IDS policy may be configured to ensure that the sensor
responds by doing one or more of the following:
Drop further packets (In-line mode only) — Dropping the specific attack packets is a key
advantage of in-line mode. When detecting in-line (real time), the packets that trigger
signatures and (optionally) all subsequent packets related to that connection are dropped
before they reach the intended target system.
Send an alert (default) — When traffic violates a Sensor policy, an alert is generated and
sent to the NSM to be viewed using the Threat Analyzer. Alerts can be examined for
content and sorted by key fields such as severity level, source and destination IP
addresses etc.
Host Quarantine action — Sensor performs the quarantine of infected host, by isolating
the host for a specified period of time. Received packets from this host are dropped.
Packet log — Sends a log, or copy, of the packet information to the NSM; this
information acts as a record of the actual flow of traffic that triggered the attack and can
be used for detailed packet analysis using Threat Analyzer.
TCP reset — For TCP connections only. TCP uses the RST (Reset) bit in the TCP header
to reset a TCP connection. Resets are sent in response to a connection that carries traffic
which violates the security policy of the domain. The user can configure reset packets to
be sent to the source and/or destination IP address.
Alert filters — Alert filtering enables you to filter out alerts based on the source or the
destination of the security event.
ICMP host unreachable — ICMP Host Unreachable packets can be sent in response to
the source of UDP or ICMP attacks.
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7.1.8
System Data Review, Availability and Loss
IDS_RDR.1 Restricted Data Review
The NSM provides an interface where only successfully authenticated users can access the TOE,
and then those users that have access to the Threat Analyzer (i.e., all except NOC Operator) can
view the traffic log data collected and analyzed by sensor as indicated in the table for
FMT_SMR.1 above. The data gathered by a sensor is transferred to the NSM and then saved in a
MySQL Database table. The NSM provides a Graphical User Interface (GUI) menu driven tool
to interpret and review log data based on specific search criteria.
IDS_STG.1 Guarantee of System Data Availability
IDS system data collected and analyzed by the NSP system is stored in a data store within the
MySQL database and is protected from unauthorized deletion through the role based
authentication functionality as described in Section 7.1.2. All authenticated users may read IDS
system data, however, only authorized users holding the Super User, Security Expert or IPS
Administrator role may delete IDS data. TSF mechanisms prohibit any user from modifying IDS
data stored with the NSM.
IDS_STG.2 Prevention of System Data Loss
The NSM records the system data into a data store. The data store employed is running on the
same dedicated platform as does the NSM. The MySQL Database provides storage and retrieval
for the system data.
All MySQL Database tables used for TSF data are dynamically allocated so that the limit on the
recording capacity of the information is the limit of the physical disk partition on the platform
dedicated to the MySQL Database data store. This assures there is always adequate disk space to
record current and new data that has been found to match the current rule set. Storage capacity
monitors do not monitor actual disk space but rather a percentage of the configured value as
noted below.
When the storage capacity reaches 50%, 70%, and 90% of the configured IDS data monitoring
limit (default 30M lines), an alarm is presented at the NSM console. The authorized
administrator may then take action by using a graphical interface to copy the IDS data to another
storage media. Read/Write access to IDS system data is limited to the Super User, Security
Expert and IPS Administrator roles, all other roles have Read-Only access. This monitor
registers the percentage of the configured ―allocation‖ and not the actual drive space available
which may be dynamically adjusted to make more storage available to the database.
If the MySQL Database tables on a dedicated disk partition that stores the system data ever
becomes exhausted, new system data will be ignored and an alert is generated to the Console.
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