Security Target: XSMART Openplatform V1.1_ASE_LITE(ENG)_V1.1

Security Target: XSMART Openplatform V1.1_ASE_LITE(ENG)_V1.1
XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
Security Target Lite V1.1
문서 ID: XSMART Openplatform V1.1_ASE_Lite_V1.1
Copyright ⓒ 2013 – LG CNS Co., Ltd. All rights reserved
XSMART_ASE
[ Revised history ]
Version
Revised
Revised contents
item
1.0
All
1.1
Partial
Date of
issue
Approval
Initial Version
2014.08.21
LMH
OR apply
2014.09.16
LMH
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[ List of Contents ]
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................. 5
TERMS AND DEFINITION .......................................................................................................................... 6
1.
SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 7
1.1.
SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE ....................................................................................................... 8
1.2.
TOE REFERENCE .............................................................................................................................. 8
1.3.
TOE OVERVIEW ............................................................................................................................... 9
1.4.
TOE DESCRIPTION ......................................................................................................................... 10
RUNTIME ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................................................................... 15
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ............................................................................................................. 16
1.5.
SECURITY TARGET ORGANIZATION.................................................................................................... 24
2.
3.
4.
5.
WRITING RULES ............................................................................................................................ 23
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS ................................................................................................................. 26
3.1.
CC COMFORMANCE CLAIM ............................................................................................................ 26
3.2.
PP CONFORMANCE CLAIM............................................................................................................. 26
3.3.
PACKAGE CLAIM ............................................................................................................................. 28
3.4.
RAIONLAE OF CONFORMANCE CLAIM ........................................................................................... 28
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION .............................................................................................. 34
4.1.
THREATS ......................................................................................................................................... 36
4.2.
ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ....................................................................................... 39
4.3.
ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................................ 40
SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................... 41
5.1.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE .......................................................................................... 41
5.2.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .................................................. 43
5.3.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE .............................................................................................. 44
6.
EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION .................................................................................... 47
7.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................... 49
7.1.
8.
SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMETNS ...................................................................................... 50
TOE SUMMARY ................................................................................................................................... 72
8.1.
TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONS .......................................................................................................... 72
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8.2.
TSF OF IC CHIP USED IN TOE ..................................................................................................... 73
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References
[CC]
Common Criteria for Evaluation of IT Security, Version 3.1r4, CCBM-201209-001
[CEM]
Common Criteria Methodology for Evaluation of IT Security, Version 3.1r4,
CCBM-2012-09-004,
[OSCPP]
Smart Card Open Platform Protection Profile V2.2, 2010.12.20
[GPCS]
GlobalPlatform Card Specification, Version 2.1.1, GlobalPlatform Inc., March
2003.
[GPST]
GlobalPlatform Smart Card Security Target Guidelines, Version 1.0,
GlobalPlatform Inc., October 2005.
[GPSR]
GlobalPlatform Card Security Requirements Specification, Version 1.0, May
2003.
[VGP]
VISA GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 Card Implementation Requirements, Version 2.0,
VISA, July 2007.
[VGPG]
VISA GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 Card Production Guide, Version 1.0, VISA,
February 2004.
[JCVM]
Java Card Platform 2.2.2, Virtual Machine Specification, Sun Microsystems,
October 2005.
[JCRE]
Java Card Platform 2.2.2, Runtime Environment Specification, Sun
Microsystems, October 2005.
[JCAPI]
Java Card Platform 2.2.2, Application Programming Interface, Sun
Microsystems, October 2005.
[ICST]
Security Target Lite of Samsung S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 16-bit RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Card with optional Secure RSA and ECC Library
including specific IC Dedicated Software, Version 2.2, 2012. 09. 26
[JCSPP]
Java Card Protection Profile – Open Configuration
ANSSI-CC-PP-2010/03-M01
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Terms and Definition
Terms that are used in this document follow the meaning defined in the CC if they also
defined in the CC.
EEPROM(Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory)
This is non-volatile memory device that stably remembers memory over a long period of
time without requiring power. As a modified version of EPROM (Electrically Programmable
Read-only Memory), EEPROM can electrically erase and re-record data.
IC Chip(Integrated Circuit Chip)
As an important semiconductor to process the functions of Smart Card, IC chip is a
processing device that includes the four functional units of mask ROM, EEPROM, RAM and
I/O port.
RAM(Random Access Memory)
RAM is a storage that maintains operating system application program and the currently
used data in order to enable quick access by computer processor
ROM(Read-Only Memory)
As a semiconductor memory device, ROM can read, but cannot change contents.
Applet
The name given to any Java Card technology-based application
Application Protocol Data Unit(APDU)
Application Protocol Data Unit, an ISO 7816-4 defined communication format between the
card and the off-card applications
Card Manager
A generic term that refers to the entity that performs the card from the card management
function
Card Production Life Cycle(CPLC) Data
Data to identify the manufacturer and the smart card issuer information
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Cardholder Verification Method(CVM)
Method for proving that the person issuing the card is the person who presents the card
GlobalPlatform(GP) Registry
Storage for managing the applications installed in the card and information
Issuer Security Domain(ISD)
Substance on the card that performs the management, security and communication on
behalf of the Issuer
Open Platform Environment(OPEN)
Software entity that manages the card GlobalPlatform Registry
Secure Channel
Communication mechanisms to ensure the security on the card to communicate with
entities outside of the card process,
Personalization
The process of mounting the platform and the application data for the user
Personalization Agent
Authority to issue and collect personal information with your application and personal data
MAC Key (Key for Message Authentic Code)
Key for the symmetric key encryption algorithm in accordance with ISO 9797 in order to
generate a message authentication code for the data to prevent forgery
RMI (Remote Method Invocation)
Technique of calling the remote object on the card in the terminal
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section provides the information necessary for identifying and controlling security
target and TOE.
1.1. Security Target Reference
Subject
XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 Security Target
Lite
Version
V1.1
Author
LG CNS
Evaluation
EAL4+ (ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.4)
Assurance Level
Date
2014.09.16
IC Chip
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
Keywords
Smartcard, cos, ic chip, smartcard acceptance device, openplatform, javacard
ST Identification
XSMART Openplatform V1.1_ASE_LITE_V1.1
1.2. TOE Reference
Subject
XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1 on S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
Version
V1.1
Author
LG CNS
Component of TOE
-Embedded Software(Operating System): XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1
-User’s Guide for managent (XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1_AGD_V1.0 )
-Platform
TOE:
Samsung
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
16bit
RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Card, Revision 2 with optional Secure RSA/ECC
V2.2 Library including specific IC Dedicated Software
TOE code identification
- ROM CODE identification:
XSMART_OPEN110_KW_m01.rom
XSMART_OPEN110_KC_m01.rom
XSMART_OPEN110_K9_m01.rom
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- EEPROM CODE identification:
XSMART_OPEN110_KW_m01.eep
XSMART_OPEN110_KC_m01.eep
XSMART_OPEN110_K9_m01.eep
IC Chip
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
Reference of IC Chip
ANSSI-CC-2012/70
Authentication
1.3. TOE Overview
The type of TOE is a smartcard consisting of embedded S/W(Open Platform
COS) and IC Chip, and is composite TOE.
The TOE is complaint with JavaCard Specification(Java Card 2.2.2 Runtime Environment
Specification[JCRE], Java Card 2.2.2 Virtual Machine Specification[JCVM], Java Card 2.2.2
Application Programming Interfaces[JCAPI], referred to as ‘JavaCard Spec’ hereafter ),
GlobalPlatform Specification(GlobalPlatform Card Specification 2.1.1[GPCS], referred to as
‘GP Spec’ hereafter ), and Visa GlobalPlatform - Configuration 3 Specification(Visa
GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 Card Implementation Requirements[VGP] - Configuration 3, referred
to as ‘VGP Spec’ hereafter ). TOE does not support the Multiple Security Domain of VGP
Configuration 3
In order to make TOE to be operated correctly as a product, non only the physical
interface of IC chip, which is the scope of the composite TOE, is required, but also the
contact and the contactless interfaces are required in the case of manufactured as a
smartcard type. However, this feature is not included in the TOE scope.
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 is a contact/contactless IC chip of Samsung Electronics and
it is certified by CC from BSI.

Protection Profile : Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, June 2007,
BSI-PP-0035

TOE identity : Samsung S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 16bit RISC Microcontroller
for Smart Card, Revision 2 with optional Secure RSA/ECC V2.2 Library including
specific IC Dedicated Software

Certification Number : ANSSI-CC-2012/70
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
Assurance Level : CC EAL 5+ (AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2)

Certified cryptography library : TORNADO 2MX2 Secure RSA/ECC library v2.2
To protect TOE itself, TOE data and important user data from unauthorized access and
exposure, TOE provides smart card platform functions related with Managemet of
application, Separation execution area between applications, Life cycle management of
smart cards and applications, user identification and authentication., etc
TOE conforms to EAL 4+ and provides a function to install/delete a variety of applications
through the secured communication channel. Depending on applications installed and
issued, TOE is used as a credit card, a transportation card, and identity card., etc.
1.4. TOE description
1.4.1. TOE operational environment
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Figure 1 Smart Card Operational Environment
The Figure1 shows the structure of the open platform smart cards in which the TOE is
included and the smart card operational environment.
Smart card holder and issuer do the task through the communication with the smartcard
terminal.
The card issuer performs the TOE management tasks such as the application installation
and the card holder uses the function of the application installed in TOE by using a
smartcard terminal.
In order to run an application installed on the TOE, first of all select must be executed
from terminal commands. The selected application to be executed, receives the command
from a smartcard terminal and performs its function.
Card issuer can perform the management tasks such as the installation or deletion of
applications, the personalization of applications and changing the life cycle of the
application by using a smartcard terminal.
Even if the card holder or application provider, without explicit authentication they can not
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install or delete application in TOE. And Authentication is necessary for card holder to use
application’s service installed by the card issuer.
Because a card holder’s PIN(Personal Identification Number) is saved, it is impossible for
others to use TOE, the card issuer’s encryption key and the algorithm embedded in
smartcard prevent attacks from outer environment. Also since the encryption algorithm is
performed by the unique number of the smart card, it is impossible to clone and The high
security system can be designed based on the International Standard security architecture
1.4.2. TOE Scope
TOE is composed of Smart Card Platform based on Open Platform and Global Platform, OS
embedded in IC chip, IC chip H/W, Firmware, RSA/ECC crypto library.
The Open Platform based on Java Card is masked in ROM area of IC chip, is complaint
with Java Card 2.2.2 and Visa GlobalPlatform 2.1.1-Configuration 3, and includes API
interface for Java Card applications.
For extending functions of Open Platform based on Java Card, all application is not in TOE
scope but user data.
Physical scope of TOE
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Figure 2 Scope and boundary of TOE
The TOE code, which is .rom file is masked in ROM area and .eep file is used for
manufacture’s initialization during chip manufacturing.
The IC chip, SAMSUNG’s S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 has a CCRA EAL5+ assurance level,
and consists of IC chip H/W, firmware in ROM, crypto S/W library with certificate scope.
IC chip H/W
•
16 bit micro processor(CPU)
•
6KB RAM(RAM), 2.5KB Crypto RAM, 384KB ROM, 144/80/36KB EEPROM
(S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9)
•
Memory protection unit(MPU), random generator(RNG), timer(TIM), DES
calculation engine(DES), method calculation engine (TORNADO 2Mx2)
•
RF interface, address and data bus(ADBUS)
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S/W library for crypto calculation
•
RSA/ECC library
ECDSA key generation
ECDSA sign/verify
ECDH key sharing
RSA key generation
RSA sign/verify
Hash function( SHA-1,SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)
•
True random generator (TRNG)
IC chip H/W design is below.
Figure 3 IC chip H/W design
The IC chip hardware among the IC chip composition elements provides DES module used
in the symmetric key encryption according to DES and TDES standards, Tornado 2MX2
Crypto module used in the asymmetric key encryption, physical security measures such as
shield, temperature sensor, voltage sensor, and filter, and non-determinant hardware
random number generator. The firmware provides IC chip hardware management
function such as EEPROM recording and the function for hardware testing, and the
cryptographic calculation software library provides calculations such as digital signature
generation/verification for hash value, ECDH key exchange, ECC/RSA key pair generation,
and ECC/RSA public key verification
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RSA/ECC Library V2.2
The ECC/RSA library certified with CCRA EAL5+ assurance level is a part of IC chip
composition elements and the IT environment of TOE are not included in TOE scope.
ECC Library
The ECC library provides functions such as ECDSA digital signature generation and
verification, ECDH key exchange, ECC key pair generation, and ECC public key verification.
In TOE, however, only the functions of ECDSA digital signature generation and verification
and ECDH key exchange are used. The ECC library includes countermeasures against SPA,
DPA, EMA, DFA and such
RSA Library
The RSA library provides functions such as RSA digital signature generation, verification,
and key pair generation. The RSA library also includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA,
EMA, DFA and so on.
In addition, this library includes functions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.
The final distributions of TOE are same below,
Classification
TOE
SW
HW
manual(file)
TOE
Name
ROM code
XSMART_OPEN110_XX_m01.rom (XX means KW, KC, K9)
EEPROM code
XSMART_ OPEN110_XX_m01.eep (XX means KW, KC, K9)
Chip identity
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
manual
User manual (XSmart OpenPlatform V1.1_AGD_V1.2 )
Logical scope of TOE
The card manager provides management functions of open platform described in ‘GP
Spec’ and ‘VGP Spec’. The card manager provides load, installation, deletion, management
of issued data and authentication information, management life cycle of application and
OS by issuer authentication using SCP02 security mechanism.
Runtime Environment
The runtime environment provides Java Card platform’s JCRE, JCVM, JCAPI functions
described in ‘Java Card Spec’. For normal execution of application on smart card, the
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runtime environment provides TSF protection function like firewall, transaction, deletion
residual information and crypto calculation to application on smart card.
Operational Environment
Operational Environment includes development as to a part of the Java Card platformdependent hardware and ic chip operation, H/W resource management, native OS for high
performance.
Logically, TOE is composed of card manager to perform smartcard’s management
functions, runtime environment to provide application’s runtime environment, operating
system to support access to H/W resource and asset.
As the card manager is a component to perform smartcard’s manager function, it forces
security policy of card issuer and provides functions like management of card and
application’s life cycle, of logical channel between terminal, of secure channel between
card manager, of APDU command delivery to applications (currently active applet), of PIN
for holder authentication shared by all applications.

Administration Command Control
The only card command specified in [VGP] is processed, for commands that do not
conform to the specifications it returns the appropriate error message. Also It controls
whether the card management commands can be processed according to the state of
card.

Card Content Management
Is Charge of load, installation, deletition an application.

Life Cycle Management
Controls the life cycle of an application installed on the card and the card defined on
the GlobalPlatform

Open Platform Enviironment(OPEN)
Enable and select a application, transmit received command. For developing card
management service, it initializes internal data structure and manages them.

Host Authentication (SCP02)
Using host authentication by secure channel, it provides card manager’s authentication
function. This function guarantees message integrity exchanged over a secure channel
and message security by message encryption for secure data. When secure channel is
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closed, this function deletes session key used and initialize security level.
Runtime Environment interpretes application’s execution code and provides execution area
to each application for executing application. it does support functions related to
application load, installation, deletion and supports transaction, application’s PIN
management, encryption, communication, remote method invocation.

Resource Quotas
Manage the limitations of the use of resources granted to the application

Java Card Firewall
Controls the sharing of Java objects between different applications or between
applications and runtime environment.

Remote Access Control
Controls remote terminal access to Java objects over RMI

Clearing Sensitive Information
At the time of resource allocation and return, the remaining data do not exist.

Atomic Transactions
Supports to allow only return to the previous state of the execution of all operations or
succeeds of all operations on a sequential task related to allocation and modification
to EEPROM.
Operating System supports management functions for underlying H/W resource. Also, it
provides low level crypto calculation using crypto co-processor like memory allocation and
free RAM/EEPROM, access to IO device, low level transaction.

CVM
Provides PIN validation and management for security property of Global PIN shared by
all applications in the platform. This function supports management of Owner PIN
defined in application’s itself.

Crypto function
Supports for the signature generation and verification, encryption and decryption, the
hash value generation, the random number generation .

Native API
The TOE provides native APIs for data group creation and access (supporting
development of e-Passport in accordance with “ICAO Doc 9303” and Driving License
in accordance with “ISO/IEC 18013”), and the TOE provides native APIs for data
integrity verification of secure transaction.
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
Crypto algorithms
The supported algorithms are table below
Table 1 TOE algorithm and usage
Algorithm
Usage
AES (128,192,256 bits) in ECB/CBC
DATA En/Decryption, MAC generation/verification
ARIA (128,192,256 bits) in ECB/CBC
DATA En/Decryption, MAC generation/verification
SEED (128 bits) in ECB/CBC
DATA En/Decryption, MAC generation/verification
TDES (128, 192 bits) in ECB/CBC
DATA En/Decryption, MAC generation/verification
DATA En/Decryption,
RSA(1408, 1984, 2048 bit)
digital signature generation and verification
ECDSA (192, 224, 256 bit)
digital signature generation and verification
ECDH (192, 224, 256 bit)
Key Agreement protocol
SHA 224/256/384/512
HASH value generation
In composite TOE, SHA1 is implemented separatly by S/W. SHA1 performing alone is NON-TSF
but RSA with SHA1 and ECDSA with SHA1 required in Javacard specification are included in TSF.
Functions excluded from the TOE
Crypto functions which IC Chip provides are not certified range of IC Chip, are excluded
from the scope of the composite TOE.
Table 2 Functions excluded from the TOE
Division
Crypto
HASH
Details
DES 64bit
RSA 512,640,768,1024,1152 bit
SHA-1
Digital
RSA(ISO9796) 512,640,768,1024,1152 bit
Signature
RSA(PKCS#1) 512,640,768,1024,1152 bit
NON-TSF
Functions below are scope of TOE, but excluded in TSF
Division
Crypto
[VGP]
Details
RSA-CRT, SHA-1 used alone
DES 64bit, RSA 512,640,768,1024,1152 bit
DAP Verification
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*In VGP specification, DAP Verifcation uses RSA-1024
during signature verification operation, But RSA-1024 is not
certification scope, this is non-TSF.
*It is not signature creation but signature verification using
public key, so dap verication doesn’t effect TSF’s secure
operation.
<eID>
•
native public short CipherQuick(byte mode, byte[]
inBuff, short inOffset, short inLength, byte[]
outBuff, short outOffset);
•
native public short SignQuick(byte[] inBuff, short
inOffset, short inLength, byte[] sigBuff, short
sigOffset);
•
native public boolean VerifyQuick(byte[] inBuff,
short inOffset, short inLength, byte[] sigBuff,
short sigOffset, short sigLength);
Native API
•
native public short
unprotectedCAPDUQuick(byte[] ssc, short
sscOffset, short apduLength);
•
native public short protectedRAPDUQuick(byte[]
ssc, short sscOffset, short apduLength, short
sw12)
<Patch Code, Get Patch Code>
For setting I/O protocol, it does not affect the safe
operation TSF because it does not modify the information
related to security functions of IC chip.
Functions that are not available
In Java Card and VGP Spec, Functions below are not supported by TOE.
Division
Details
<API>
[JCAPI]
javacard.biometry
javacard.framework.util.intx
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<Security Constants : javacardx.crypto.Cipher>
ALG_DES_CBC_PKCS5, ALG_DES_ECB_PKCS5,
ALG_RSA_ISO14888, ALG_RSA_PKCS1_OAEP
<Security Constants : javacard.security.MessageDigest >
ALG_MD5, ALG_RIPEMD160
<Security Constants : javacard.security.Signature>
ALG_DES_MAC4_ISO9797_1_M2_ALG3,
ALG_DES_MAC4_PKCS5, ALG_DSA_SHA, ALG_HMAC_MD5,
ALG_HMAC_RIPEMD160, ALG_HMAC_SHA_256,
ALG_HMAC_SHA_384, ALG_HMAC_SHA_512,
ALG_HMAC_SHA1, ALG_RSA_MD5_PKCS1,
ALG_RSA_MD5_PKCS1_PSS, ALG_RSA_MD5_RFC2409,
ALG_RSA_RIPEMD160_ISO9796,
ALG_RSA_RIPEMD160_ISO9796_MR,
ALG_RSA_RIPEMD160_PKCS1,
ALG_RSA_RIPEMD160_PKCS1_PSS,
ALG_RSA_SHA_ISO9796_MR, ALG_RSA_SHA_PKCS1_PSS,
ALG_RSA_SHA_RFC2409
<Security Constants : javacard.security.KeyBuilder>
LENGTH_DSA_1024, LENGTH_DSA_512,
LENGTH_DSA_768, LENGTH_EC_F2M_113,
LENGTH_EC_F2M_163, LENGTH_EC_F2M_193,
LENGTH_HMAC_SHA_1_BLOCK_64,
LENGTH_HMAC_SHA_256_BLOCK_64,
LENGTH_HMAC_SHA_384_BLOCK_128,
LENGTH_HMAC_SHA_512_BLOCK_128
<Security Constants : javacard.security.KeyPair>
ALG_DSA, ALG_EC_F2M, ALG_RSA, ALG_RSA_CRT
[VGP]
Delegated Management
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1.4.3. TOE life cycle
Manual
Platform
Design
Application
Design
Design
IC chip
Design
Manual
Manufacture
IC chip Manufacture
Card Manufacture
issue
Application installation
Basic
Inspectio
n
System
Platform Personalization
Application Personalization
Card usage
usage
Card Termination
Termination
Figure 4 Life Cycle of TOE
The Life Cycle of TOE is consisting of 5 steps, which is design, manufacture, issue, usage
and termination defined in Open Platform smartcard Protect Profile. At each life cycle
various users are involved with different roles. Figure 4 show TOE’s Life Cycle.
Step 1: Design
This step is S/W and IC Chip design step like card operation, interface between
application and OS, application.

IC chip Manufacturer
Normally IC chip Manufacturer has a IC chip developed and designed by itself,
and provides IC chip manual , interface library, manual with platform developer.

Platform Developer
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Develops platform using manual by IC chip manufacturer. And provides manual
for platform interface with application developer.

Application Provider
develops an application that performs a particular function, using manual by
platform developer.
Step 2: Manufacture
It consist of ROM masking with designed platform, IC chip manufacturing, packaging, card
manufacturing using packaged IC chip. In case contactless smartcard it embed antenna to
smartcard and complete it.

IC chip Manufacturer
Platform is masked in ROM and manufacture IC chip , it is packed to module or
COB type for card or chip manufacture.

Card Manufacturer
The Packaged module or COB type is manufactured to a card or a passport type.
in case of contactless smartcard, antenna is embedded on it.
Step 3: Issue
The manufactured card is delivered to issuer, for final usage issuer installs an application
on the card and writes user data, and then delivers it.

Card Issuer
Modifies a manufactured card to the status can be used over specified process,
application is installed to card depending on the purpose of card.

Card Enabler
After getting authority from card issuer, Card Enabler modifies card status to the
status can be used over platform personalization.

Application Loader
After getting authority from card issuer, Card Enabler installs a application
depending on the purpose of card.

Personalization Agent
After getting authority from card issuer, Personalization Agent writes user data in
installed application.
Step 4: Usage
Card Holder, After getting personalized card, uses it correctly depending on the purpose
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of card. In case expanding the function of the smart card, Card Issuer installs additional
application.

Card User.
Card user requests the identification of the card owner.

Card Holder
Attempts to use the card properly.

Card Issuer
During use, If further extension of the functionality of the smart card is necessary,
card issuer organizes the post issuance like application loading, personalization

Terminal
Terminal is an IT system that communicates with the TOE.
Step 5: Termination
Holder, card use is finished, can return the card to the issuer and, the issuer
processes
cards completely useless .

Card Issuer
Card Issuer makes the card completely useless.
1.5. Writing Rules
The notation, formatting and conventions used in this ST are consistent with the Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation (hereafter referred to as “CC”). In
addition to this, additional writing rules are defined and used to prevent any confusion
with operations that are already performed in the Protection Profile conformed to by this
security target.
The Common Criteria allows selection, assignment, refinement, and iteration operations
which can be executed in the Security Functional requirement. Each operation is used in
the ST by the following types.
Iteration
This is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. The result of iteration
operation is represented by iteration number with round bracketed, that is, (Iteration
number).
Assignment
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This is used to assign specific values to unspecified parameters (e.g., password length).
The result of an assignment is represented by square brackets, that is, [Assignment
Value].
Selection
This is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a requirement.
The result of selection operation is represented by underlined italics.
Refinement
This is used that a requirement to be “stricter” than the original by adding detail to a
requirement. It therefore restricts a requirement further. The result of a refinement is
represented by bold text.
2. Security target organization
References provide information on data that this document has referred to for users
interested in this security target wishing to obtain further background or relevant
information above what is specified here. The list of abbreviations is offered for better
understanding of frequently used terms or abbreviations.
Section 1 provides security target references, TOE references, overview, and descriptions
of TOE.
Section 2 provides the conformance claims that declare conformance for Common Criteria,
Protection Profile, and Package and describes rationale of the conformance claims and
methodology for conformance to the Protection Profile.
Section 3 describes the security problems and includes security problems of TOE and its
operational environment in terms of threat, organizational security policy, and assumption.
Section 4 describes TOE security objectives and security objectives for the operational
environment to counter to threats identified in the security problem definition, perform
organizational security policies, and supporting assumptions.
Section 5 defines extended components, explaining components extended in Part 2 or
Part 3 of the Common Criteria.
Section 6 describes the IT security requirements including the security functional and
assurance requirements and rationale of security requirements intended to satisfy security
objectives.
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Section 7 summarizes TOE specification and explains security functionality implemented in
the TOE.
Section 8 compares compatibility between Composite ST and Platform ST.
Section 9 defines the references and abbreviations used in this ST.
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3. Conformance claims
This section provides a description of the Common Criteria, Protection Profile and Package
that conform to Security Target..
3.1. CC Conformance Claim
This ST conforms to the following Common Criteria.
- Common Criteria Identification
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-001
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-002
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012,
CCMB-2012-09-003
- Conformance to Common Criteria
•
Extended to Conformance to Common Criteria for Information Technology
Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1,
Revision 4
•
Conformant to Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 4
3.2. PP Conformance Claim
This ST conforms to the following Protection Profile.
•
Smart Card Open Platform Protection Profile V2.2 [OSCPP]( KECS-PP-0097a2008), June 10, 2010
•
Assuanrace Level: EAL4+ (ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.4)
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The IC chip of TOE is conforming to Protection Profile as follows
•
Protection Profile Identification : Security IC Platform Protection Profile,
Version 1.0, June 2007, BSI-PP-0035

Evaluation Assurance Level : ANSSI-CC-2012/70
•
Assurance Package : CC EAL 4+ (AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2 )
3.2.1. Protection Profile Re-establishment
The following are the items of security target which re-established the protection profile.
Operational Environment

[None]
Security Objective

[None]
Security Functional Requirement

FAU_ARP.1, FAU_SAA.1

FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1

FDP_ACC.2, FDP_ACF.1, FDP_RIP.1

FIA_AFL.1, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.6, FIA_UID.1

FMT_MOF.1, FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_MTD.2, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1

FPT_FLS.1, FPT_RCV.3, FPT_RCV.4, FPT_TST.1
Security objectives for operational environment

FPR_UNO.1
3.2.2. Protection Profile Additions
The items described below are additional to the protection profile for this security target.
Security Environment

[NONE]
Security Objective
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
[NONE]
Security Function Requirement

FCS_CKM.3, FCS_RNG.1

FDP_UCT.1, FDP_UIT.1

FPT_PHP.3
3.3. Package Claim
This Security Target is conforming to assurance package as follows
.

Assurance Package : EAL4+ (ATE_DPT.2, AVA_VAN.4)
Addiontional assuarance packages:

ATE_DPT.2 (Testing: modules)

AVA_VAN.4 (methodical vulnerability analysis)
This Security Target’s IC Chip is conforming to assurance package as follows

Assurance Package : EAL5+ (ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5)
Addiontional assuarance packages:

ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures)

AVA_VAN.5 (methodical vulnerability analysis)
3.4. Rationale of Conformance Claim

The Security Target meet includes all assurance requirements of OSCPP
3.4.1. Rationale of Conformance Claim for Security problem
definition
The following tables show that the security objectives of composite security target is
consistent to [OCSPP]. This security target redefines [A.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE]
Protection Profile
A.TRUSTED_PATH
Security Target
Rationale
A.TRUSTED_PATH
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A.APPLICATION_PROGRAM
A.APPLICATION_PRO
GRAM
Conformance
A.TOE_MANAGEMENT
A.TOE_MANAGEMENT
Conformance
A.TSF_DATA
A.TSF_DATA
Conformance
Refinement
A.UNDERLYING_HARDWAR
E
-
Because composite TOE includes IC Chip, Assume of
IC
chip
is
excluded
and
is
refined
O.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE
T.LOGICAL_ATTCK
T.LOGICAL_ATTCK
Conformance
T.ISSUANCE_MISUSE
T.ISSUANCE_MISUSE
Conformance
T.ILLEGAL_TERMINAL
Conformance
T.ILLEGAL_TERMINAL_USE
_USE
T.ILLEGAL PROGRAM
T.ILLEGAL PROGRAM
Conformance
T.UNINTENTIONAL_FAILUR
T.UNINTENTIONAL_F
Conformance
E
AILURE
T.CONTINUOUS_AUTHENTI
CATION_ATTEMPT
T.INTENTIONAL_TRIGGERI
NG_OF_FAILURES
T.CONTINUOUS_AUT
Conformance
HENTICATION_ATTEM
PT
T.INTENTIONAL_TRIG
Conformance
GERING_OF_FAILURE
S
T.RESIDUAL_INFORMATIO
T.RESIDUAL_INFORM
Conformance
N
ATION
T.INFORMATION_DISCLOS
T.INFORMATION_DIS
URE
CLOSURE
P.Open platform
P.Open platform
Conformance
P.Duty separation
P.Duty separation
Conformance
-
T.SID.1
Addition
-
T.SID.2
-
T.RESOURCES
-
P.Verivication
Conformance
the changes made to [JCSPP] is added
3.4.2. Rationale of Conformance Claim for Security Objective
This Security Target claims for all security objects provided in [OSCPP]
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as
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Protection Profile
Security Target
Rationale
O.DATA_PROTECTION
O.DATA_PROTECTION
Conformance
O.ISSUANCE
O.ISSUANCE_DELETION
Modification
Deletion function is added
O.IDENTIFICATION
O.IDENTIFICATION
Conformance
O.AUTHORIZED_FAILURE_REPAIR
O.AUTHORIZED_FAILURE_REPAIR
Deletion
Duplication with
O.ISSUANCE, O.IDENTIFICATION,
O. AUTHENTICATION
O.AUTHENTICATION
O.AUTHENTICATION
Conformance
O.AUTOMATED_RECOVERY
O.AUTOMATED_RECOVERY
Conformance
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_DEL
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_DEL
Conformance
ETION
ETION
O.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE_H
O.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE_H
ANDLIN
ANDLIN
O.OPEN_PLATFORM
O.OPEN_PLATFORM
Conformance
-
O.HARDWARE
Addition
Conformance
Due to composite TOE, Underlying
hardware in external environment
is
re-established
as
security
objectives
-
O.AUDIT
Addition
Due
to
Deletion
O.Authorized_Failure_Repair , new
security related audit objectives is
added
OE.TRUSTED_COMMUNICATION
OE.TRUSTED_COMMUNICATION
Conformance
OE.TSF_DATA
OE.TSF_DATA
Conformance
OE.TRAINING
OE.TRAINING
Conformance
OE.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE
-
Deletion
Due to composite TOE, Underlying
hardware in external environment
is
re-established
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as
security
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objectives
OE.APPLICATION_PROGRAM
OE.APPLICATION_PROGRAM
3.4.3. Rationale
of Conformance
Funcational Requirement
Conformance
Claim
for
This Security Target claims for all security objects provided in [OSCPP]
Protection Profile
Security Target
Rationale
FAU_ARP.1
FAU_ARP.1
Assignment
FAU_SAA.1
FAU_SAA.1
Assignment
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1
Assignment
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
Assignment
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1
Assignment
FDP_ACC.2
FDP_ACC.2
Assignment
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
Assignment
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_RIP.1
Assignment and Selection
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_AFL.1
Assignment and Selection
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_ATD.1
Conformance
FIA_SOS.1
FIA_SOS.1
Assignment
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1
Assignment
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.4
Assignment
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UAU.6
Assignment
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1
Assignment
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_MOF.1
Assignment
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.1
Assignment and Selection
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.3
Assignment and Selection
FMT_MTD.1
FMT_MTD.1
Assignment and Selection
FMT_MTD.2
FMT_MTD.2
Assignment
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1
Assignment
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1
Refinement
FPR_UNO.1
FPR_UNO.1
Assignment
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Security
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FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1
Assignment
FPT_RCV.3
FPT_RCV.3
Assignment
FPT_RCV.4
FPT_RCV.4
Assignment
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST.1
Assignment and Selection
Added Security Functional Requirements
Security Functional Requirement
Rationale
FCS_CKM.2
Definition of cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.3
Definition of cryptographic key Access
FCS_RNG.1
Due
to
composite
TOE,
Definition
of
SFR
used
by
used
by
O.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE
FDP_UCT.1
Definition of data exchange
FDP_UIT.1
The Verification SFR for data exchange integrity is added
FDP_SDI.2
Verification for saved data integrity and actions for protection
FPT_PHP.3
Due
to
composite
TOE,
Definition
of
SFR
O.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE
FIA_USB.1
Definition of User-subject binding
In SFR of IT environment, as ECC algorithms for application is proveded by IC chip and
crypto library of TOE’s IT environment, which is added to SFR
3.4.4. Rationale for Conformance of Assurance Requirements
This security target confroms to all assurance requirements of EAL4+ (ATE_DPT.2,
AVA_VAN.4) assurance level required by [OCSPP], and there are no additional defined
assurance requirements.
Table 3 Rationale of Conformance Claim for Assurance Requirements
Protection Profile
Security Target
Rationale
ASE_INT.1
ASE_INT.1
Acceptance
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_CCL.1
Acceptance
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_SPD.1
Acceptance
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ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_OBJ.2
Acceptance
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1
Acceptance
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_REQ.2
Acceptance
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1
Acceptance
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_ARC.1
Acceptance
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_FSP.4
Acceptance
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_IMP.1
Acceptance
ADV_TDS.3
ADV_TDS.3
Acceptance
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_OPE.1
Acceptance
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1
Acceptance
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMC.4
Acceptance
ALC_CMS.4
ALC_CMS.4
Acceptance
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DEL.1
Acceptance
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_DVS.1
Acceptance
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_LCD.1
Acceptance
ALC_TAT.1
ALC_TAT.1
Acceptance
ATE_COV.2
ATE_COV.2
Acceptance
ATE_DPT.2
ATE_DPT.2
Acceptance
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1
Acceptance
ATE_IND.2
ATE_IND.2
Acceptance
AVA_VAN.4
AVA_VAN.4
Acceptance
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4. Security Problem Definition
Security Problem Definition defines threats, organizational policy and assumptions that
intended to be processed by TOE and TOE environment.
Smart card, without the physical access control devices, are used freely under the
control of the respective owners and physical security threats as well as a threat via
logical interfaces, are exposed to malicious environment .
TOE is a Java Card platform that is run on the IC chip to manage information and
resources.
In this ST, main assets is the data that is managed by the card.
There are TSF data and user data.
The document to be produced on the production of the TOE is an additional asset to
be protected. Because it affects the integrity and confidentiality of the TOE.
User Data

Application(AS.Applet)
the application includes executing code associated with the applications running in
the execution environment (Runtime Environment), the library, the amount of
memory Quota available in the applet. It is information that is not exposed and can
not access from outside

Application Data( AS.Applet_Data )
It is all the data that you are managing for the application to provide services specific
to the user. It is the information that can be exposed based on the user's privileges in
the application.
It is Application data that must ensure confidentiality and integrity, cryptographic key
owned by applet, user pin.
TSF DATA

Embedded Software ( AS.Embedded Software )
It is the Openplatform smartcard platforms’ code and library loaded on the TOE and
shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure.
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
Embedded Software Data( AS.Embedded Software_Data)
It is the data like instance, frame stack, program counter, object class, assigned
length, when operation of java Card VM. shall be protected from unauthorized
disclosure and modification.

Global Platform Registry( AS.GP_Registry )
It is the data for the management of TOE itself and the loaded applet. It includes the
applet identifier, administration, lifecycle status, card life cycle. It can be exposed in
accordance with rights.

Global PIN ( AS.Global_PIN )
This is Global PIN and can be sharable by all applets on the card.
Global Pin includes PIN number, Retry Count, try-limt. It shall be protected from
unauthorized disclosure and modification from external.

Issuer Key( AS.Issuer_Key )
This is TOE system key, that is, the cryptographic key used when generating secure
channel. It can be input from the outside, but isn’t accessible by.

Secure Channel Session Key( AS.SCS_Key )
It is the symmetric key when establishing a secure channel and is used for the
exchange of secure messages between the terminal and the card. It is not accessible
from the outside.

Cryptographic Data( AS.Cryptographic_Data )
It is the encryption-related data of all types produced in the password calculation. It
includes seed, hash function data, result of the cryptographic operation.
It is not
accessible from the outside.

AS.API_DATA
Private data of the API, like the contents of its private fields.
To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.

AS.SEC_DATA
The runtime security data of the Java Card RE, like, for instance, the AIDs used to
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identify the installed applets, the currently selected applet, the current context of
execution and the owner of each object.
To be protected from unauthorized disclosure and modification.
4.1. Threats
The threat agent is user and external IT entity that attempts illegal access to assets
protected by the TOE using physical or logical methods outside the TOE and harm using
abnormal method. The threat agent to the TOE requires the middle level of expertise,
resources and motivation.
T.LOGICAL_ATTACK
The threat agent may change or disclose the user data or the TSF data by exploiting
logical interface
Application Notes:
The logical interface is the data exchange interface between the TOE and the Smart Card
terminal. It mainly implies the instructions and the responses between the Smart Card and
terminal. For the instruction and the response syntaxes, there are the international
standards, the local standards, the company standards and the independent standards.
The attacker may attack by exploiting syntaxes that exploit logical interface or
interpretational difference, or by exploiting instructions for specific use.
Directly threatened user data(s): AS.Applet_Data, AS.Applet
Changeable/exposable asset(s): AS.GP_Registry, AS.API_DATA,AS.SEC_DATAi
Changeable asset(s): AS.Issuer_Key
T.ISSUANCE_MISUSE
The threat agents may exploit the TOE in the process issuing the Smart Card that includes
the TOE.
Application Notes:
Directly threatened asset(s): AS.SEC_DATA
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T.ILLEGAL_TERMINAL_USE
The threat agent may change and disclose the user data or the TSF data by using
unauthorized the Smart Card terminal.
Application Notes:
Directly threatened user data(s): AS.Applet_Data,
Changeable/exposable TSF asset(s): AS.GP_Registry
Changeable asset(s): AS.Issuer_Key
T.ILLEGAL PROGRAM
The threat agent may change and disclose the user data or the TSF data by illegally
installing the application program that includes malicious code in the TOE.
Application Notes:
Applet can bypass the TOE security functions by performing piecemeal method,
unauthorized method, native methods. And It may perform a remote method that is not
authenticated by the card.
Directly threatened user data(s): AS.Applet_Data,
Changeable/exposable TSF asset(s): AS.GP_Registry
Changeable asset(s): AS.Issuer_Key
T.UNINTENTIONAL_FAILURE
The threat agent may exploit disclosure of and damage to the user data and the TSF data
caused by suspension of the power supply during the card use or incomplete ending of
the TSF service due to impact, etc.
Application Notes:
Directly threatened user data(s): AS.Applet_Data,
Changeable/exposable TSF asset(s): AS.GP_Registry
Changeable asset(s): AS.Issuer_Key
T.CONTINUOUS_AUTHENTICATION_ATTEMPT
Threat agent can obtain the rights by the subsequent attempts to access the TOE.
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The threat agent may access the TOE by continuously attempting authorization.
Application Notes:
Changeable/exposable user data(s): AS.Applet_Data, AS.Applet
Changeable/exposable TOE data(s): AS.SCS_Key
T.INTENTIONAL_TRIGGERING_OF_FAILURES
The threat agent may change and disclose the user data or the TSF data by incompletely
ending the TSF service with attack using physical stress to the Smart Card.
Application Notes:
Changeable/exposable user data(s): AS.Applet_data
Changeable/exposable TSF data(s): AS.GP_Registry, AS.Cryptographic_Data
T.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION
In case the TOE reuses resources, the threat agent may illegally access information as
information of the object is not properly removed.
Application Notes:
Changeable/exposable
user
data(s):
AS.SEC_DATA
,
AS.Embedded_Software,
AS.Applet_Data
T.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE
The threat agent may exploit the information disclosed from the TOE during normal use of
the TOE.
Application Notes:
Information disclosed during normal use of the TOE refers to the electrical signals, such as
the electrical power, the voltage and the current, etc. emitted from the IC circuit of the
Smart Card. This threat implies the attack by the attacker to obtain cryptographic key or
important the TSF data by analyzing electrical signals generated from the Smart Card with
analysis devices. Types of this attack include the electric power analysis attack, the
electric power difference analysis attack and the timing attack, etc.
T.SID.1
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An applet impersonates another application in order to gain illegal access to some
resources of the card or with respect to the end user or the terminal
Application Notes:
Directly threatened asset(s): AS.SEC_DATA,AS.Global_PIN, AS.Applet_Data
T.SID.2
The attacker modifies the TOE's attribution of a privileged role (e.g. default applet and
currently selected applet), which allows illegal impersonation of this role.
Application Notes:
Directly threatened asset(s): AS.GP_Registry , AS.SEC_DATA
T.RESOURCE
An attacker prevents correct operation of the Java Card System through consumption of
some resources of the card: RAM or NVRAM.
Application Notes:
Directly threatened asset(s): AS.Embedded Software, AS.Applet_Data, AS.Embedded
Software_Data
4.2. Organizational Security Policies
Organizational security policies described this section must be observed in the TOE
following this Security Target.
P. Open platform
The TOE must be developed as an open platform which can load and use multiple
applications in an interoperable manner.
P. Duty separation
Role must be assigned to the responsible personnel of each step from manufacturing to
using the smartcard and the TOE must be created and managed according to each role in
a secure manner.
P.VERIFICATION
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This policy shall ensure the consistency between the export files used in the verification
and those used for installing the verified file.
4.3. Assumptions
Following conditions are assumed to exist in the TOE security environment that conforms
to this Protection Profile
A.TRUSTED_PATH
There shall be a secure channel between the TOE and the IFD.
A.APPLICATION_PROGRAM
If the application program is installed adequately, it shall not contain malicious code.
Application Notes:
When loading, installing, executing the application program in the TOE, the approved
procedures must be Followed.
A.TOE_MANAGEMENT
In the steps from manufacturing to using the TOE, there are roles of manufacturers,
issuers and holders and training to each role shall be conducted in accordance with
defined provisions. And the TOE is handled in a secure manner when repaired or replaced
due to breakdown of the TOE or the smartcard.
Application Notes:
Confidentiality and integrity of the TOE shall be maintained in the entire process from
manufacturing to delivery, and providing security-related processes.
A.TSF_DATA
TSF data that are exposed to be processed in the course of TOE operation are managed
securely.
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5. Security Objectives
This Security target defines security objectives by categorizing them into the TOE security
purpose and security purpose for the environment. The TOE security objective is directly
handled by the TOE. Security objective for the environment is handled in relation to the IT
fields or by the technical/process-related means.
5.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
The followings are security objectives directly handling by the TOE:
O.DATA_PROTECTION
The TOE must protect the TSF data stored in TOE against unauthorized disclosure,
modification and deletion.
Application Notes :
TOE has to be able to clearly identify the assets and user
to be connected with the asset
that allows each user to access a logical interface,
TOE must provide a way to securely encrypt your sensitive data, such as the API TOE,
which must comply with each of the standard algorithm
TOE must provide a secure management method of generation / distribution / access /
destruction of encryption key.
The need to provide confidentiality and integrity,
such as PIN and PIN value attempts,
conditions with regard to the PIN.
The TOE must provide a series of methods to support the Atomic transaction.
The TOE need to provide the separation function and controlled share between JCRE
context and package or between packages, and other applet.
O.ISSUANCE_DELETION
The TOE shall ensure that both applet and package installation/deletion perform as
expected and, guarantee that the integrity of the data sent to the issuing process is not
impaired.
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O.IDENTIFICATION
The TOE must clarify users capable of the using logical interface and the assets to be
used according to the role.
Application Notes :
The TOE must be able to clearly identity user and asset so that each user is connected to
the asset that can be accessed with the logical interface.
O.AUTHENTICATION
User must complete authentication process when attempting to access the TOE user data
and the TSF data.
O.AUTOMATED_RECOVERY
The TOE must be recovered to secure state when failure in the TSF occurs. Also, the TOE,
by detecting failure in the TSF, must recommence the TSF service under the state prior to
failure.
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMATION_DELETION
The TOE must ensure that the user data or the TSF data are not remaining when ending
operation domain used by the TSF.
O.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE_HANDLIN
The TOE must implement countermeasures to prevent misuse of the information
disclosed during normal use of the TOE
Application Notes :
In normal operation the password function provided by the TOE state, a countermeasure
must be implemented from exposure through a sub-channel or a perturbation attack of
critical information. The TOE activates the countermeasures provided by the IC chip.
O.OPEN_PLATFORM
The TOE must support open platform to which a variety of the application programs can
be loaded.
O.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE
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The underlying hardware of the TOE, in order to support the security features of the TOE,
need to provide a cryptographic operation and countermeasures to various physical
attacks.
O.AUDIT
If it detects a potential security breaches, TOE will have to provide feedback and
corresponding action.
O.RESOURCE
The TOE shall control the availability of resources for the applications
5.2. Security objectives for the operational environment
The followings are security objectives directly handling by the TOE:
OE.TRUSTED_COMMUNICATION
The trusted path must be provided between the TOE and the Smart Card terminal as the
communication target of the TOE.
OE.TSF_DATA
The TSF data exported to the outside of the TOE, therefore handled in the course of the
TOE operation must be securely managed.
OE.TRAINING
It must be done the operating education, depending on the role of each administrator of
the process.
OE.APPLICATION_PROGRAM
The legitimately installed the application program must not contain malicious code.
OE.VERIFICATION
All the byte codes shall be verified at least once, before the loading, before the installation
or before the execution, depending on the card capabilities, in order to ensure that each
bytecode is valid at execution time.
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Application Notes :
All the byte codes shall be verified CAP file grammar rules, constraints, at least once,
before the loading and installation,
In organizations that are operational TOE, it must be ensured that for the applet to be
installed to maintain separation attributes of the platform, it is in compliance with all
recommendations of the Application Development Guide "
5.3. Security Objectives Rationale
theoretical rationale of security objectives proves that the specified security objectives are
adequate, sufficient to deal with security problems, and not excessive but essential.
The theoretical rationale of security objectives demonstrates the followings:
Each assumption, threat or organizational security policy is handled by at least one
security objective.
Each security objective handles at least one assumption, threat or organizational
security policy.
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Table 4 Relation between security objectives and the security problem definition
TOE security objectives
Security objectives
Security objectives for
the operational
T.ISSUANCE_MISUS
AL_USE
T.ILLEGAL
x
x
x
PROGRAM
OE.VERIFICATION
OE.APPLICATION_PRO
GRAM
OE.TSF_DATA
OE.TRUSTED_COMMU
NICATION
OE.TRAINING
O.RESOURCE
x
O.AUDIT
x
O.UNDERLYING_HARD
WARE
x
O.OPEN_PLATFORM
x
O.INFORMATION_DISC
LOSURE_HANDLIN
x
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMA
TION_DELETION
x
x
x
E
T.ILLEGAL_TERMIN
x
O.RESIDUAL_INFORMA
TION_DELETION
security
O.AUTHENTICATION
x
of
O.IDENTIFICATION
T.LOGICAL_ATTCK
Definition
O.ISSUANCE_DELETIO
N
environment
O.DATA_PROTECTION
environment
T.UNINTENTIONAL_
x
x
FAILURE
x
x
T.CONTINUOUS_AU
THENTICATION_AT
x
TEMPT
T.INTENTIONAL_TR
IGGERING_OF_FAIL
x
x
URES
T.RESIDUAL_INFOR
x
MATION
T.INFORMATION_DI
X
x
SCLOSURE
T.SID.1
x
x
T.SID.2
x
x
T.RESOURCE
x
P.Open platform
x
x
P.Duty separation
x
P.VERIFICATION
x
x
x
x
A.TRUSTED_PATH
A.APPLICATION_PR
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x
x
x
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OGRAM
A.TOE_MANAGEME
N
x
A.TSF_DATA
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x
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6. Extended Components Definition
This chapter identifies the extended security requirement of this Security Target and
provides the explanation about them.
This Security Target defines FCS_RNG that is claimed in the Security Target of the IC Chip.
FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are
intended to be used for cryptographic purpose.
Component levelling:
FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a
defined quality metric.
Management : FCS_RNG.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit : FCS_RNG.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic,
hybrid] random number generator that implements: [assignment: list of security
capabilities].
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined
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quality metric].
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7. Security Requirements
Security requirements specify function and warranty requirements that are accepted by
this security target and should be met on the TOE.
This security target defines all the subjects, objects, operations, security attributes and
external entities used in security requirements as follows:
a) Subjects, objects and related security attributes and operations
표 5 Subject and Object, related security attribute, operation definition
Subject
Subject (user)
Object
Object
(user)
security
(information)
(information)
attribute
Operation
security
attribute
S.ISD
-
O.ISD
S.APPLET
O.APPLET
S.RE
O.GLOBAL_PIN
-
-All Operation
-
Modification,
O.ISSUER_KEY
O.JAVA_OBJECT
O.REMOTE_OBJECT
Administrator,
User
TSF data
Holder
identifier,
deletion
authentication
-Specification
data, role
limits
-Verification
of
of
integrity
security
attribute
-
-
-Modification,
deletion
-Specification
of
initial
to
values
replace defaults
b) External entities
- Smartcard Terminal
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- Smartcard IC Chip
7.1. Security Functional requirements
Security functional requirements defined in this security target are expressed by selecting
relevant security functional components from Part 2 of the Common Criteria to meet the
security objectives identified in the previous section. Below tables summarizes security
functional components used in this security target.
표 6 Security functional requirements
Security Functional
Security Functional Component
Class
Security Audit
Cryptographic Support
User Data Protection
Identification
Authentication
and
FAU_ARP.1
Security alarms
FAU_SAA.1
Potential violation analysis
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.3
Cryptographic key access
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation
FCS_RNG.1
Random number generation
FDP_ACC.2
Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1
Security attribute based access control
FDP_RIP.1
Subset residual information protection
FDP_UCT.1
Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1
Data exchange integrity
FIA_AFL.1
Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1
User attribute definition
FIA_SOS.1
Verification of secrets
FIA_UAU.1
Authentication
FIA_UAU.4
Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.6
Re-authenticating
FIA_UID.1
Identification
FIA_USB.1
User-subject binding
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FMT_MOF.1
Management of security functions behavior
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1
Management of TSF Data
FMT_MTD.2
Management of limits on tsf data
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
Privacy
FPR_UNO.1
Unobservability
Protection of the TSF
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
FPT_RCV.3
Automated recovery without undue loss
FPT_RCV.4
Function recovery
FPT_TST.1
TSF testing
FTP_ITC.1
Inter-TSF trusted channel
Security Management
Inter-TSF trusted channel
7.1.1. Security Audit
FAU_ARP.1 Security alarms
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [one of the below list of actions] upon detection of a
potential security violation.
Lists of actions
 blocks the action that produce the security violation and throws an exception
 terminates the card session
FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
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FAU_SAA.1.1 The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited
events and based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the
SFRs.
FAU_SAA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events.
a) Accumulation or combination of the following known [security violation events]
representing potential security violations
Security violation events

Integrity corruption of authentication data

Unavailability of resources

Failure of EEPROM programming

Violation of the access policy for java object

Violation of the access policy for remote object

Array overflow

card tearing

transaction error

Failure of TRNG test
b) [none]
7.1.2. Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [cryptographic key generation algorithm] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [list of
standards].
Algorithm
key sizes
standards
E.4.1 DES Session Keys(for C-MAC, encryption, data
128
[GPCS]
bits
encryption)
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A.4.3 Elliptic Curve Key Pair Generation
192/224/256 bits
ANSI X9.62-2005
Application note :
External entity is able to exploit the crypto-related information (current, voltage, and
electromagnetic change) from the physical phenomenon that occurs when the TSF to
perform cryptographic operations.
TSF provides the countermeasures like DPA, SPA.
TOE executes symmetric crypto operation, MAC, signature verification using an
authenticated
co-processor on IC Chip or cryptography library mounted on IC Chip.
TOE performs the electronic signature verification according to the ECDSA algorithm and
the encryption key length using a library of the IC chip ECC crypto library.
The evaluation range of the IC chip contains means to countermeasure against DPA, SPA
attack response, and IC Chip can not be observed, such as the cryptographic operation by
the IC Chip, MAC, digital signature verification, digital signature.
Applications installed TOE can be called a command to generate a key based on the
following standards.
Specification
Generation method
Type of cryptographic key generation
[JCAPI]
genKeyPair
ECC cryptographic key
FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key destribution
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key distribution method [cryptographic key distribution method] that meets
the following: [specification].
Specification
Distribution method
Type of cryptographic key distribution
[JCAPI]
setKey
DES,AES,SEED,ARIA Key set
setS, setW
ECPrivateKey, ECPublicKey set
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setExponent, setModulus
RSAPrivateKey, RSAPublicKey set
KeyAgreement
ECDH key distribution
Application note :
ECDH conforms to ANSI X9.63-2001 standard.
FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key accesses
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.3.1 The TSF shall perform [none] in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key access method [cryptographic key access method] that meets the following:
[specification].
Application note :
Specification
Key access method
Type of key access
[JCAPI]
getKey
DES,AES, SEED, ARIA key read
getS
ECPrivateKey read
getW
ECPublicKey read
getExponent
RSAPrivateKey read
getModulus
RSAPrivateKey read
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [physical deletion by overwriting the memory data
with zero value] that meets the following: [none].
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Application note:
Specification
Key destruction method
Type of key destruction
[JCAPI]
clearKey
TDES,AES,SEED,ARIA,RSA, ECC key destruction
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [list of cryptographic operations] in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm [cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes
[cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [list of standards].
standard
TTAS.KO-12.0004
algorithm
SEED
key size
128 bits
ARIA
128/192/256 bits
TDES
ISO/IEC 9797-1]
in ECB/CBC
FIPS PUB 197
AES
128/192 bits
RSA encryption
128/192/256 bits
ISO 9796-2
data
encryption
and
data
encryption
and
data
encryption
and
decryption , mac generation
1408/1984/2048 bits
data
encryption
and
decryption , mac generation
ISO 9796-2
PKCS#1
and
decryption , mac generation
in ECB/CBC
PKCS#1
encryption
decryption , mac generation
in ECB/CBC
FIPS PUB 46-3
data
decryption , mac generation
in ECB/CBC
KSX 1213
cryptography operation
RSA sign
1408/1984/2048 bits
data signature generation and
verification(
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ANSI X9.62-2005
ECDSA
192/224/256 bits
data signature generation and
verification(
NIST FIPS 180-3
SHA
none
Secure hash
224/256/384/5
12
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
Hierarchical to : No other components
Dependencies : No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that implements
total failure test of the random source.
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers together with a post processing
described in TRNG application note and TRNG library that meet the “standard” level of
ANSSI requirements (French metric). In addtition, The TSF shall provide random numbers
that meet AIS 31 version 1 Functional Classes and Evaluation Methodology for Physical
Random Number Generators, 25 September 2001 , Class P2
Application Notes : The SFR provided by IC chip is applied as it is.
7.1.3. User data Protection
FDP_ACC.2 Complete access control
Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] on [list of subject and object]
and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.
access control SFP
subject
object
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Card Manager
S.ISD
O.ISD
S.APPLET
O.APPLET
O.GLOBAL_PIN
O.ISSUER_KEY
Java Object
S.APPLET
O.JAVA_OBJECT
S.RE
Remote Method
S.RE
O.REMOTE_OBJECT
S.APPLET
subject/object
description
Entity that performs the functions of Java card applications that
S.APPLET
are installed on the TOE
Entity to perform the type of application, the function of the
S.ISD
administrator
Principal that provides an environment for the execution of the
S.RE
application
Entity to perform the type of application, the function of the
O.ISD
administrator
O.APPLET
Java card applications that are installed on the TOE
O.GLOBAL_PIN
PIN in the card specific for owner authentication
O.ISSUER_KEY
Secret key for authentication of the issuer
O.JAVA_OBJECT
Java data generated by the application
O.REMOTE_OBJECT
remote accessible object
FDP_ACC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by
the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP .
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
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FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to objects based on the
following: [list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each,
the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes].
Access control SFP
Subject and Object
Security Attribute
Card Manager
S.ISD
Admin_Auth_Status
Card_Life_Cycle_State
S.APPLET
Applet_Life_Cycle_State
Privilege
Java Object
O.GLOBAL_PIN
PIN_State
O.ISSUER_KEY
-
S.APPLET
Context
Quota
S.RE
Currently_Active_Context
O.JAVA_OBJECT
Context
Life_Time
Remote Method
O.REMOTE_OBJECT
Security attributes
Admin_Auth_Status
Context
description
Status that indicates whether or not to keep the administrator
authentication
Card_Life_Cycle_State
Card life cycle status
Applet_Life_Cycle_State
S.APPLET’s life cycle
Privilege
Privileges granted to S.APPLET by administrator
PIN_State
O.GLOBAL_PIN’s status
Security zone O.APPLET, O.JAVA_OBJECT, O.REMOTE_OBJECT
Context
belong
Quota
The amount of memory that can be used by S.APPLET
Currently_Active_Context
Security zones O.APPLET currently active
Life_Time
O.JAVA_OBJECT life state
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:[rules].
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access control SFP
rules
description
Card Manager
CM-1
Loading, installation, removal of O.APPLET are permitted only
S.ISD’s Admin_Auth_Status is valid.
CM-2
.
If Applet_Life_Cycle_State of O.APPLET is valid, the selection of
S.APPLET is permitted to all entities.
CM-3
Changes O.GLOBAL_PIN is acceptable to S.APPLET to own a
consistent privilege and S.ISD ‘s Admin_Auth_Status is valid.
CM-4
If PIN_State is enabled, verification of O.GLOBAL_PIN are
permitted to all entities.
CM-5
Changes O.ISSUER_KEY are authorized only to S.ISD which
Admin_Auth_Status is valid.
CM-6
Change of Card_Life_Cycle_State of O.ISD is acceptable to
S.APPLET to own a consistent privilege or S.ISD which
Admin_Auth_Status is valid.
Java Object
JO-1
Access to O.JAVA_OBJECT, are permitted only in the case of
Context of S.APPLET and O.JAVA_OBJECT is convertible or
identical
Remote Method
RM-1
Remote access to O.REMOTE_OBJECT is permitted only if it is
the same as Currently_Active_Context of S.RE and the Context
of O.REMOTE_OBJECT
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [rules].
SFP
Card Manager
Java Object
rules
description
CM-7
All entities are possible to query card management information of
O.ISD.
JO-3
S.RE is accessible to all O.JAVA_OBJECT which Life_Time is valid.
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [rules].
SFP
rules
description
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CM-8
Card Manager
If Card_Life_Cycle_State of O.ISD is not valid, the operation for
the object of the subject is not allowed
CM-9
Searching of O.GLOBAL_PIN is not permitted in any subject.
CM-10
Searching of O.ISSUER_KEY is not permitted in any subject.
JO-4
S.APPLET does not allow the generation of O.JAVA_OBJECT
exceeding the Quota.
Java Object
JO-5
Access to the disabled O.JAVA_OBJECT is impossible.
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the [list of objects]:
objects
O.ISD
O.APPLET
O.GLOBAL_PIN
O.ISSUER_KEY
O.JAVA_OBJECT
O.REMOTE_OBJECT
Application note :
In addition, the package and the instance of the applet, APDU buffer, bArray object, Key,
encryption buffer, such as Java card trainsient object corresponds.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
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FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to transmit, receive user data
in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
Application note :
The TSF maintains the confidentiality by encrypting the transmitted data
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to transmit, receive
data in a manner protected from
user
modification, deletion, insertion,replay errors
Application note:
By using the MAC key of the session, TSF protects the integrity of the transmitted data.
This provides the method of protection against the insertion,deletion, change of the user
data. It is intended to provide a method that is protected from re-use by using the
SendSequenceCounter.
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies
FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF
for [integrity errors] on all objects, based on the [integrity of sensitive data]:
FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of integrity error, the TSF shall run [the exception
occurrence].
Application note :
At the time of saving, Integrity information of the encryption key, PIN, the package is
stored.
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7.1.4. Identification and Authentication
FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when thresholds unsuccessful authentication attempts
occur related to [authentication events].
authentication events
thresholds
Authentication of Administrator
[1]
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
reached or surpassed, the TSF shall [actions].
authentication events
actions
Authentication of Administrator
Terminate the card session
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to
individual users:
[
a) Identity of user ;
b) Authentication data ;
c) Role ;
]
Application note:
When user is Applet, It must maintain a list of security attributes list such as Package AID,
Applet's version number,Registered applet AID, Applet Selection Status.
FIA_SOS.1 Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_SOS.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets meet [List of
metric].
Secrets information
List of metric
PIN of administrator
At least 1 digit up to 16 digits, number and letter
PIN of user
At least 1 digit up to 127 digits, number and letter
KEY of S.CM on behalf of administrator
112 bit TDES key
FIA_UAU.1 Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [list of TSF mediated actions] on behalf of the user to be
performed before the user is authenticated.
•
Logical communication channel generation with card
•
Request issuer and the card issuer information
•
Select the applications installed on the card
•
The attempt to create a secure channel with card
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user in addition to FIA_UAU.1.1.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UAU.4.1 The TSF shall prevent the reuse of authentication data related to
[authentication mechanism of the security of the channel administrator].
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
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FIA_UAU.6.1 The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions [list of reauthentication is required ].
All commands can be passed to the TOE only through the administrator security
•
channel mechanism

Card session termination

Card reset
FIA_UID.1 Identification
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [list of TSF-mediated actions specified] on behalf of the
user to be performed before the user is identified.

Generation of logical communication channel with card

Request of issuer and card issuing information
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user in addition to FIA_UID.1.1.
FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects
acting on the behalf of that user:[user - security attribute]
User - Security Attribute
Subject - Security Attribute
Issuer
S.APPLET
-
PACKAGE AID
-
Registerd APPLET AID
-
Privilege
Issuer
-
- Context
S.ISD
Card_Life_Cycle_State
- Card_Life_Cycle_State
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FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [rules defined in
FDP_ACF.1(1)]
FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [rules defined in
FMT_MSA.1].
7.1.5. Security Management
FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behavior
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable, enable the behavior of the
functions [Function].
Function
Role
Card lock by Application
S.ISD
Card termination by Application
S.ISD
Global pin initiation by Application
S.ISD
Package Load/Install/Delete
S.ISD
Context Management
S.RE
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [Access control SFP] to restrict the ability to
modify,change,create the security attributes [security attributes] to [Role].
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Access control SFP
Security attributes
Operation
Role
Card Manager
Card_Life_Cycle_State
modify
S.ISD
Privilege
create
S.ISD
PIN_State
change
S.ISD
Java Object
Context
change
S.RE
Remote Methods
Context
change
S.APPLET
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [access control SFP] to provide Attributes default
values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
Access control SFP
Attributes
Card Manager
Restrictive
Java Object
Restrictive
Remote Methos
Restrictive
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [S.ISD, S.RE] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MTD.1 TSF MANAGEMENT of TSF Data
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify
the [TSF data] to [Role].
TSF data
Operation
Role
AS.GP Registry
Modification
S.ISD
AS.Global PIN
Value modification
S.ISD
Resume use
S.ISD
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AS.Issuer Key
Modification
S.ISD
FMT_MTD.2 TSF Management of limits on TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FMT_MTD.1 MANAGEMENT OF TSF Data
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.2.1 The TSF shall restrict the specification of the limits for [TSF data] to [role].
TSF data
role
AS.Global PIN’s Retry Counter
S.ISD
AS.Applet의 Quota
S.ISD
As.Issuer_Key’s number of use
S.ISD
FMT_MTD.2.2 The TSF shall take the [action], if the TSF data are at, or exceed, the
indicated limits:
TSF data
action
AS.Global PIN’s Retry Counter
stop using the Global PIN until issuer’s restarting the Global
PIN service
AS.Applet’s Quota
To stop the generation of Java Object of Applet, and raises an
exception
As.Issuer_Key’s number of use
By generating an error code, additional authentication becomes
impossible.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management
functions: [list of security management functions].

The application of rights management
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
cardholder authentication

Card Life Cycle management

Applet Context management

Key management

PIN management

Signature generation

Object sharing management

Package AID register and applet AID change
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Identification
FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [Role].
Role
Description
S.APPLET:
Application to perform the functions of the card
represents the card user
S.ISD:
Management program that the role of the issuer
represents the card issuer
S.RE
Context Management
Object Sharing Management
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles defined in FMT_SMR.1.1
7.1.6. Privacy
FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPR_UNO.1.1 TSF shall ensure that [external entities] are unable to observe
the operation [
a) ”FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation”
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b) ”FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution”
c) O.ISSUER_KEY
d) O.GLOBAL_PIN
] on [
a)
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic key operation
b)
PIN verification operation]
By [TSF].
Application note :
An external entity may obtain and abuse cryptographic information from physical
phenomena that take place during the cryptographic computation of TOE (e.g. change in
current, voltage and electromagnetism). TSF may provide means to counter attacks like
DPA, SPA.
7.1.7. Protection of the TSF
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur : [
a) Potential security violation events defined in FAU_SAA.
b) Failure of self test defined in FPT_TST.1
c) Condition beyond the normal operating range of the TSF which an IC chip is
detected
d) Load/install/delete failure of package and applet
]
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist [physical manipulation and physical probing] to [TSF] by
re-sponding automatically such as that the SFRs are always enforced.
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Application Notes :
The SFR provided by the IC chip is applied as it is.
FPT_RCV.3 Automated recovery without undue loss
Hierarchical to: FPT_RCV.2 Automated recovery
Dependencies: AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
FPT_RCV.3.1 When automated recovery from [list of failures/services continuities in
FPT_FLS.1] is not possible, the TSF shall enter a maintenance mode where the ability to
return to a secure state is provided.
FPT_RCV.3.2 For [list of failures/services continuities in FPT_FLS.1], the TSF shall ensure
the return of the TOE to a secure state using automated procedures.
FPT_RCV.3.3 The functions provided by the TSF to recover from failure or service
discontinuity shall ensure that the secure initial state is restored without exceeding
[quantification of TSF data or objects during failures event] for loss of TSF data or objects
under the control of the TSF.
FPT_RCV.3.4 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine the objects that were
or were not capable of being recovered.
FPT_RCV.4 Function recovery
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_RCV.4.1 The TSF shall ensure that [list of failures/services continuities in FPT_FLS.1]
have the property that the function either completes successfully, or for the indicated
failure scenarios, recovers to a consistent and secure state.
FPT_TST.1 TSF self test
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
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FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up, at the conditions
[random number generation, crypto operation, administrator authentication, At the user's
request that has been approved] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized issuer with the capability to verify the
integrity of [IC Chip’s value of enabled security function, random number, cryptographic
key and crypto operation’s result value, authentication data, TSF execution code ]
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized issuer with the capability to verify the
integrity of [stored TSF executable code, random number generation function]
7.1.8. Inter-TSF trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT
product that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured
identification of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure
The TSF shall permit [another trusted IT product] to initiate communication via the
trusted channel
FTP_ITC.1.3 The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [new
application package’s load and install to card].
7.2. Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirement level is EAL5 augmented with ATE_DPT.2 and ․
AVA_VAN.4.
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8. TOE Summary
8.1. TOE Security Functions
This section explains TOE security functions (TSF) that meets the security
requirements described in the previous chapter. Each security functions are described
as the name of the function and a simple description. FSP document provides
description in detail
Table 7 TOE Security Function
Security Function
Description
SF_CARD_MANAGEMENT
Card Data Management
SF_AUTHENTICATION
Identity and Authentication
SF_COUNTER_MEASURE
Counter Measure
SF_OBJECT_ACCESS
Access Control for Java Object
SF_RESOURCE_MANAGEMENT
Resource Management
SF_TRANSACTION
Transaction Management
SF_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Crypto Support
8.1.1. SF_CARD_MANAGEMENT
Management functions for the card provides command processing, application/life cycle
management and sub system of card management.
8.1.2. SF_AUTHENTICATION
For authentication and identity, this Security Function provides terminal authentication
which manage security channel for administrator authenctation,message integrity, closing
of secure channel.
For user authentication, Global PIN used in card and Owner PIN using its own function of
the application via the API are provided.
In addition, installation/modification of administrator key and management of session key,
and creation/deletion of key are provided.
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8.1.3. SF_COUNTER_MEASURE
This security function enable H/W protection against various attacks(side attack, error
injection, physical attack.. etc) from the outside and provides counter measure to
maintain stable status when security problem is made from integrity error etc.
8.1.4. SF_RESOURCE_MANAGEMENT
This security function is responsible for resource management and provides deletion
function of remaining information at the time creation or return resource.
8.1.5. SF_OBJECT_ACCESS
This security function controls the application access and the remote access for java
object created by application
8.1.6. SF_TRANSACTION
If abnormal TSF service stops, etc.. the end of power during TOE operation, this
security function detects error at the start of TOE and provides transaction function to
start service at previous status before error status
8.1.7. SF_CRYPTOGRAPHY
This security function provides crypto function like creation/verification of electronic
signature, encryption/decryption, creation hash/random value.
8.2. TSF of IC Chip used in TOE
TOE uses various security functions like table below at using TDES, RSA, ECDSA, and
ECDH from IC chip
Table 8 IC chip security function
Security
Function
Correspon
ding
SFR
Description
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TOE’s Detectors
FPT_FLS.1
Memory Encryption
FDP_IFC.1
TRNG
FCS_RNG.1
Voltage detector, Frequency detector, Active shield
removal detector, Inner insulation removal detector,
Light and laser detector, Temperature detector,
Voltage glitch detector
Memory Encryption when sensitive data into the
memory. Data will be encrypted before stored in
memory so this will enhance the difficultly for an
attacker to get useful information on data bytes
hamming weight.
TRNG is a hardware true random number generator
compliant with AIS31 standard class P2 high.
TDES
FCS_COP.1
RSA
FCS_COP.1
ECDSA
FCS_COP.1
Hardware DES has several security
countermeasures to prevent side channel attacks.
- Secure Key & Data loading
- DPA prevent : random mask
- Variable clock
- RWG automatic enable
- High Order DPA prevent : Virtual DES
The acceleration of modulo exponentiations
required in the RSA encryption/decryption
algorithm.
ECDSA_sign_digest, ECDSA_verify_digest
SHA
FCS_COP.1
SHA224, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512
8.2.1. SFR of IC Chip
described in the following table compatible with the SFR of IC chips used in the TOE
SFR of IC Chip
SFR of Composite
TOE
FAU_SAS.1
[none]
FCS_CKM.1/ECD
SA
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_COP.1/3DES
FCS_COP.1/AES
FCS_COP.1/RSA
FCS_COP.1/ECDS
FCS_COP.1
Compatibility
N/A
Composite TOE provide ECDSA Key
generation using ECC key function
provided by IC Chip
Composite TOE provides TDES, RSA,
AES, ECDSA, SHA function using IC Chip
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A
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1/ECDH
FCS_CKM.2
FCS_RNG.1
FCS_RNG.1
FDP_ACC.1
[none]
Composite TOE provides ECDH
calculation and crypto key distribution
using IC chip
Composite TOE provides True Random
generation using IC chip
N/A
FDP_ACF.1:
[none]
N/A
FPT_ITT.1
FPR_UNO.1
FDP_ITT.1
FPR_UNO.1
FDP_IFC.1
FPR_UNO.1
FMT_LIM.1
[none]
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMF.1
[none]
[none]
[none]
[none]
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3:
FPT_PHP.3:
FRU_FLT.2
[none]
Composite TOE protects the exposure of
inside information using various
functions of IC chip
-memory encryption
-Random wait generator
-Variable Clock 등
Composite TOE treats confidential data
to be managed by embedded S/W
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
Composite TOE maintains stable status
in case of failure
When physical attack is detected ,
Composite TOE generates FIQ or reset
for TSF protection
N/A
8.2.2. Security Objectives of IC Chip
The following table specifies compatibility between the security objectives of
composite TOE and of the Chip
security objectives
of IC chip
security objectives
of composite TOE
Compatibility
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XSMART_ASE
O.Leak-Inherent
O.Phys-Probing
O.INFORMATION_DIS
CLOSURE_HANDLIN
O.UNDERLYING_HAR
DWARE
O.UNDERLYING_HAR
O.Malfunction
DWARE
O.UNDERLYING_HAR
O.Phys-Manipulation
DWARE
O.DATA_PROTECTION
O.INFORMATION_DIS
O.Leak-Forced
CLOSURE_HANDLIN
O.UNDERLYING_HAR
DWARE
O.Leak-Inherent is intended to
protect the leakage of inherent
data in IC,
it is compatible with
O.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE_H
ANDLIN of composite TOE
O.Phys-Probing is intended to
protect the physical attack,
it is compatible with
O.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE of
composite TOE
O.Malfunction provides security
objectives of correct operation of
IC chip,
it is compatible with
O.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE of
composite TOE
O.Phys-Manipulation provides
security objectives which protects
embedded software and user data
from Reverse Engineering., etc.
it is compatible with
O.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE and
O.DATA_PROTECTION of
composite TOE
O.Leak-Forced provides security
objectives which protects data
leakage
at environmental stress of IC Chip
and incorrect operation.
it is compatible with
O.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE_H
ANDLIN and
O.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE of
composite TOE
O.Abuse-Func
[none]
N/A
O.Identification
[none]
N/A
O.RND
O.AUTHENTICATION
O.UNDERLYING_HAR
O.RND provides security objectives
which generate IC Chip Random
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DWARE
O.Add-Functions
O.UNDERLYING_HAR
DWARE
O.Mem-Access
[none]
number.
it is compatible with
O.AUTHENTICATION and
O.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE of
composite TOE
O.Add-Functions provides security
objectives that embedded software
provides security function like
3DES,AES,RSA,ECC using IC Chip
it is compatible with
O.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE of
composite TOE
N/A
8.2.3. Threats of IC Chip
The following table specifies compatibility between the threats of composite TOE and
of the Chip
Threats of
IC Chip
Threats of Composite TOE
T.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE
T.Leak-Inherent
T.INTENTIONAL_TRIGGERING
_OF_FAILURES
T.UNINTENTIONAL_FAILURE
T.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE
T.Phys-Probing
T.INTENTIONAL_TRIGGERING
_OF_FAILURES
T.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE
T.Malfunction
T.INTENTIONAL_TRIGGERING
_OF_FAILURES
T.PhysManipulation
T.Leak-Forced
T.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE
T.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE
T.INTENTIONAL_TRIGGERING
Compatibility
Threat of IC Chip is
compatible with
threat of composite TOE
Threat of IC Chip is
compatible with
threat of composite TOE
Threat of IC Chip is
compatible with
threat of composite TOE
Threat of IC Chip is
compatible with
threat of composite TOE
IC Threat of IC Chip is
compatible with
threat of composite TOE
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XSMART_ASE
_OF_FAILURES
T.UNINTENTIONAL_FAILURE
T.ISSUANCE_MISUSE
T.Abuse-Func
Threat of IC Chip is
compatible with
threat of composite TOE
T.ILLEGAL PROGRAM
T.LOGICAL ATTACK
T.SID.1
T.SID.2
T.RND
T.CONTINUOUS_AUTHENTICA
TION_ATTEMPT
T.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE
Threat of IC Chip is
compatible with
threat of composite TOE
T.INTENTIONAL_TRIGGERING
_OF_FAILURES
T.Mem-Access
[none]
N/A
8.2.4. Organizational Security Policies of the IC chip
The following table specifies compatibility between the Organizational Security
Policies of the IC chip and Security Policies/Threats of composilte TOE
Organizational
Security Policies of
the IC chip
P.Procss-TOE
Security
Policies/Threats
of composilte
TOE
P.ROLE_DIVISION
P.ROLE_DIVISION
P.Add-Functions
T.INFORMATION_D
ISCLOSURE
T.INTENTIONAL_T
Compatibility
P.Process-TOE is security policy that
IC manufacturer protects TOE by
identifying correct TOE.
It is compatible with
P.ROLE_DIVISION of composite TOE
3DES, AES, RSA, ECC,SHA with
embedded software.
Organizational security policy
provides security policy that IC
manufacturer protects TOE by
identifying correct TOE.
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RIGGERING_OF_FA
It
ILURES
P.ROLE_DIVISION,T.INFORMATION
is
not
contradictory
to
_DISCLOSURE,and
T.INTENTIONAL_TRIGGERING_OF_
FAILURE.
8.2.5. Assumptions of IC Chip
The following table specifies compatibility between the Assumptions of the IC chip and
Assumptions/Security Objectives of composilte TOE
Assumptions
of IC Chip
A.Process-SecIC
Assumptions/Secur
ity Objectives of
composilte TOE
A.TOE_MANAGEMEN
O.INFORMATION_DIS
A.Plat-Appl
CLOSURE_HANDLIN
O.UNDERLYING_HAR
DWARE
A.Resp-Appl
A.TSF_DATA
O.DATA_PROTECTION
Compatibility
A.Process-Sec-IC
assumes
that
it
observes security process for confidence
and integrity from TOE manufacture to
user delivery.
It
is
compatible
with
A.TOE_MANAGEMEN of composite TOE
A.Plat-Appl assumes that the requested
contents by manual, certificate report,
IC chip document related platform TOE
should be applied to composite TOE.
These request is mandatory at the time
developing security functions, so it is
compatible
with
O.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE_HANDLI
N and O.UNDERLYING_HARDWARE
A.Resp-Appl
assumes
that
user
data(crypto keys specially) is treated
for the purposes of the application
safely, user data(Issuer Key, PIN., etc)
related security by managed composite
TOE
is
compatible
with
DATA_PROTECTION.
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A.Key-Function
O.INFORMATION_DIS
CLOSURE_HANDLIN
Application to be installed to composite
TOE should manage user data safely, it
is compatible with A.TSF_DATA which
assumes that TSF data transferred out
of TOE is managed safely.
A.Key-Function assumes that it can
protect leakage attack at the time
developing Key-dependent function in
Embedded software,
Composite TOE applied all Counter
Measure using IC chip’s crypto function
against leakage attack.
In addition, software counter measure is
applied to additonal SEED,ARIA crypto
algorithms.
it is compatible with
O.INFORMATION_DISCLOSURE_HANDLI
N
8.2.6. Operational Environment of IC Chip
The following table specifies compatibility between the operational environment of the
IC chip and of composilte TOE
Operational
Environment
of IC Chip
Operational
Environment
of composite TOE
OE.TRUSTED_COMMUN
ICATION
OE.Plat-Appl
OE.APPLICATION_PRO
GRAM
OE.TSF_DATA
OE.TRUSTED_COMMUN
OE.TSF_DATA
OE.TSF_DATA
OE.Process-Sec-IC
OE.APPLICATION_PRO
GRAM
OE.Process-Sec-IC
OE.Plat-Appl comply with IC Chip’s
specification and compatible with
operational
environment
of
composite TOE
OE.Resp-Appl
is
operational
environment that user data is
treated by composite TOE safely, it
is compatible with operational
environment of composite TOE
ICATION
OE.Resp-Appl
Compatibility
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guarantees
XSMART_ASE
integrity during delivery, , it is
compatible
with
operational
environment of composite TOE
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