COMMON CRITERIA SECURITY TARGET LITE Machine Readable Travel Document – Extended

COMMON CRITERIA SECURITY TARGET LITE  Machine Readable Travel Document – Extended
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COMMON CRITERIA SECURITY
TARGET LITE
Machine Readable Travel Document – Extended
Access Control – CC IDeal Pass
Reference : SSE-0000078622-01
Date : 2010-03-24
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................... 5 1.1 SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCE ........................................................................5 1.2 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE TARGET OF EVALUATION (TOE) ......................................5 1.3 2 4 TOE type.......................................................................................................................5 1.2.2 Usage and major security features of the TOE ............................................................6 TOE DESCRIPTION..................................................................................................................7 1.3.1 TOE Boundary ..............................................................................................................7 1.3.2 TOE architecture...........................................................................................................7 1.3.3 TOE life cycle................................................................................................................8 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS................................................................................... 11 2.1 CONFORMANCE WITH THE COMMON CRITERIA..............................................................11 2.2 CONFORMANCE WITH AN ASSURANCE PACKAGE..........................................................11 2.3 CONFORMANCE WITH A PROTECTION PROFILE .............................................................11 2.4 3 1.2.1 2.3.1 Protection Profile reference ........................................................................................11 2.3.2 Protection Profile Refinements ...................................................................................11 2.3.3 Protection Profile Additions.........................................................................................11 2.3.4 Application notes ........................................................................................................12 2.3.5 Protection Profile Claims rationale .............................................................................12 CONFORMANCE WITH THE CC SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS ..........................................13 2.4.1 Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards.............................................................13 2.4.2 Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices ...........................13 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION .................................................................... 14 3.1 ASSETS...................................................................................................................................14 3.2 SUBJECTS ..............................................................................................................................15 3.3 THREATS ................................................................................................................................16 3.3.1 Attacker.......................................................................................................................16 3.3.2 Attack potential ...........................................................................................................16 3.3.3 Threats not included ...................................................................................................17 3.3.4 Threats relative to the TOE in operation.....................................................................17 3.4 ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES (OSP).................................................................19 3.5 ASSUMPTIONS ......................................................................................................................20 3.5.1 Assumptions for the manufacturing and personalization environment.......................20 3.5.2 Assumptions for the operational environment ............................................................21 SECURITY OBJECTIVES .................................................................................... 23 Page 2/83
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5 6 4.1 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE..............................................................................23 4.2 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT25 4.3 SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ...............................26 4.4 RATIONALE ............................................................................................................................29 9 4.4.2 Coverage of threats in the operational environment ..................................................30 4.4.3 Coverage of organisational security policies ..............................................................32 4.4.4 Coverage of assumptions ...........................................................................................33 5.1 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS ..............................................................................35 5.2 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND..............................................................................36 5.3 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API .................................................................................36 5.4 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM ...............................................................................37 5.5 DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMSEC .........................................................................39 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................... 41 6.1 INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................................41 6.2 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS................................................................43 6.2.1 Class FAU Security Audit ...........................................................................................43 6.2.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) ...........................................................................43 6.2.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication ................................................................47 6.2.4 Class FDP User Data Protection ................................................................................52 6.2.5 Class FMT Security Management ..............................................................................56 6.2.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions.........................................................63 SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE ...............................................66 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION....................................................................... 67 7.1 8 Coverage matrix .........................................................................................................29 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION........................................................... 35 6.3 7 4.4.1 SECURITY FUNCTIONS DESCRIPTION...............................................................................67 7.1.1 Chip security functions................................................................................................67 7.1.2 Low level security functions ........................................................................................68 7.1.3 Operating system security functions...........................................................................69 7.1.4 Application manager security functions ......................................................................69 7.1.5 Application security functions .....................................................................................70 DEFINITIONS, GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS................................................... 71 8.1 ACRONYMS............................................................................................................................71 8.2 CONVENTIONS USED ...........................................................................................................72 8.3 DEFINITIONS ..........................................................................................................................72 REFERENCE AND APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS ............................................... 81 Page 3/83
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9.1 REFERENCE DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................................81 9.2 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS ..................................................................................................82 List of tables
Table 1: Security problem definition / Security objectives....................................................................................... 30 Table 2: Overview of the keys and certificates ......................................................................................................... 42 Table 3: Cryptographic key generation methods ............................................................................................................ 44 Table 4: Cryptographic signature verification methods.................................................................................................. 46 Table 5: Overview on authentication SFR ................................................................................................................. 48 List of figures
Figure 1: Architecture of the CC IDeal Pass...................................................................................................................... 8 Figure 2 : TOE life cycle.................................................................................................................................................... 9 Page 4/83
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1
SECURITY TARGET AND TOE REFERENCE
ST reference :
Title : MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENT – EXTENDED ACCESS
CONTROL – CC IDEAL PASS
Version : 1
Security target identifier : SSE-0000078622
TOE reference :
Chip identifier : SB23YR48 revision B
TOE Identifier IDEAL/ST23YR48/1.5
Administration guidance : 0000074722 - IDeal - AGD - Pre-Personalization Manual
0000074723 - IDeal - AGD - Personalization Manual
User guidance : 0000074862 - IDeal - AGD - ICAO User Manual
CC compliance :
Version : 3.1
Assurance level : EAL5 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
Chip certificate reference : DCSSI-2010/02
Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0056, VERSION 1.10 [R5]
1.2
1.2.1
GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE TARGET OF EVALUATION (TOE)
TOE type
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a chip programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS)
[R9] (i.e. the MRTD’s chip) and providing the advanced security methods Extended Access Control
(EAC), chip authentication as defined in [R10] and/or Active Authentication as defined in the Technical
reports of “ICAO Doc 9303” [R9] in addition to the Basic Access Control1. The MRTD’s chip allows the
authenticity of the travel document and the identity of its holder to be checked during a border control,
with the support of an inspection system.
The MRTD’s chips are intended to be inserted into the cover page of traditional passport booklets.
They can be integrated into modules, inlay or datapage. The final product can be a passport, a plastic
card etc…
The Chip Authentication prevents data traces described in [R9] informative appendix 7, A7.3.3. The
Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps:
1
This BAC feature is not covered by the current ST
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−
the inspection system communicates by means of secure messaging established by Basic Access
Control,
−
the inspection system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the authenticity
of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object,
−
the inspection system generates an ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the inspection system
agree on two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the DiffieHellman Primitive and
−
the inspection system verifies by means of received message authentication codes whether the
MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e. the TOE proves to be in possession
of the Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key used
for derivation of the session keys).
The Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and the TOE environment.
1.2.2
Usage and major security features of the TOE
The MRTD’s chip enables:
−
protection of integrity of the holder’s stored data: issuing state or organization, travel document
number, expiration date, holder’s name, nationality, birth date, sex, holder’s face portrait, other
optional data, additional biometric data and several other pieces of data for managing the security
of the document,
−
authentication between the travel document holder and the inspection system prior to any border
control by the Basic Access Control mechanism2,
−
protection of integrity and confidentiality of data read by secure messaging,
−
authentication of the genuine chip by the Active Authentication mechanism (optional),
−
strong authentication of the chip and the inspection system prior to any biometric data retrieval by
the Extended Access Control mechanism.
In addition to the protection provided by the chip, the logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and
integrity by a digital signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or
Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s chip.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organizational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures)[R9]. These security measures include the
binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
The details of these features are specified in [R9] and [R10].
2
This BAC feature is not covered by the current ST but will be evaluated in another ST, see §3.3.3.
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1.3
TOE DESCRIPTION
1.3.1
TOE Boundary
The Target Of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [R9] and
providing Basic Access Control and Extended Access Control according to the ICAO Doc 9303 [R9]
and BSI TR-03110 [R10], respectively. The TOE may also provide Active Authentication according to
[R9].
The TOE boundary encompasses:
−
The ICAO application
−
The Operating System
−
The ST embedded crypto library : NesLib V3.0
−
The ST chip
The TOE does not allow any additional applets loading during its operational use.
1.3.2
TOE architecture
The TOE is embedding two applications:
−
AIP Application, compliant with [R21], which performs the pre-personalization and the
personalization operations of the CC IDeal Pass. This application is not accessible once in
Operational Use phase.
−
The ICAO/EAC application, which is compliant with [R9]. The ICAO application may be
instantiated several times.
The TOE does not allow any additional applets loading during its operational use.
The architecture of the CC IDeal Pass is given in Figure 1.
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AIP Data
ICAO Data
AIP Instance
ICAO instance
AIP application
ICAO application
Application manager
Operating System
HAL
Deactivated in user phase
Figure 1: Architecture of the CC IDeal Pass
1.3.3
TOE life cycle
The product’s life cycle is organised as follows:
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Phase 1
Development
Step 1
Embedded software
development
IC design and dedicated
software development
Step 2
Integration
Photomask fabrication
Step 3
Personalization
Manufacturing
Phase 2
TOE considered
under construction
for the evaluation,
covered by
assurance class
ALC
IC manufacturing, test and
possible pre-personalization
Step 4
IC packaging and initialization
Step 5
IC pre-personalization:
Create application/
Create LDS File System
Phase 3
Step 6
Personalization
TOE considered as
operational for the
evaluation, covered
by assurance class
AGD
Phase 4
Usage
Usage
Step 7
End of life
Legend
Trusted delivery and
verification procedures
Delivery supposed to
be done within
secure environment
Figure 2 : TOE life cycle
This figure represents two views of the life-cycle:
1. an “end-user” view made of 4 phases, focusing on the main logical phases as defined in a
protection profile like [R6]:
a. Development phase: IC design, and embedded software development;
b. Manufacturing phase: from IC manufacturing to booklet manufacturing, including patch
loading, application creation and pre-personalization (loading the authentication key for
the personalization agent);
c.
Personalization phase: loading of all data related to the MRTD holder;
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d. Operational use phase: MRTD used by the traveler at the border control. The user data
can be read according to the security policy of the issuing State or Organization and can
be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they can never be
modified.
2. a business view made of 7 steps, focusing more on the different trades and actors involved in
smartcard business, and commonly used in protection profile related to smartcard such as
[R7]. For example, the company in charge of IC manufacturing may be different from the one
in charge of IC packaging, as well as from the one in charge of packaging, initialisation, prepersonalization, not considering all other actors involved in this phase: antenna supplier,
booklet supplier. The definition of the content of each step and the associated supply chain
vary from one provider to another and the picture is just indicative.
Referring to the life-cycle, the evaluated product is the product that comes out of the IC
manufacturing, test and possible pre-personalization operations (step 3).
At this step, the product is already self-protected before delivery to step 4 and all steps after.
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2 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
2.1
CONFORMANCE WITH THE COMMON CRITERIA
This Security Target claims conformance to:
Part 1 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 1, dated September 2006 (see [R1])
−
Part 2 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 2, dated September 2007 (see [R2]),
−
Part 3 of the Common Criteria, Version 3.1, Release 2, dated September 2007 (see [R3]),
as follows
−
Part 2 extended,
−
Part 3 conformant.
2.2
CONFORMANCE WITH AN ASSURANCE PACKAGE
The level of assurance targeted by this Security Target is EAL5, augmented by the following
components defined in CC part 3 [R3]:
2.3
2.3.1
−
ALC_DVS.2,
−
AVA_VAN.5.
CONFORMANCE WITH A PROTECTION PROFILE
Protection Profile reference
This Security Target claims strict conformance to the Protection Profile MRTD EAC [R5].
2.3.2
Protection Profile Refinements
No specific refinement was performed to the Protection Profile MRTD EAC [R5].
2.3.3
Protection Profile Additions
The following asset which is optional the PP MRTD EAC [R5] has been added explicitly:
¾
Active Authentication Private Key
This additional asset is marked in italics in this ST.
The following assumptions have been added to the PP MRTD EAC [R5]:
¾
¾
A_Pers_Agent_Active_Auth
A_Insp_Sys_Active_Auth
These additional assumptions are marked in italics in this ST.
The following objective has been added to the PP MRTD EAC [R5]:
¾
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
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This additional objective is marked in italics in this ST.
The following objectives for the environment have been added to the PP MRTD EAC [R5]:
¾
¾
OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD_Active_Auth
These additional objectives for the environment are marked in italics in this ST.
The following requirements have been added to the PP MRTD EAC [R5]:
¾
¾
¾
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN
FIA_API.1/AAP
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
Additional requirements are marked in italics in this ST.
Assignments of the following requirements have been augmented compared to those of the PP MRTD
EAC [R5]:
¾
¾
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FPT_EMSEC.1
Augmentations are marked in italics inside the SFRs.
2.3.4
Application notes
Application notes from the PP MRTD EAC [R5] have been copied in this ST when relevant.
Moreover, application notes dedicated to the TOE described in this ST have been stated in addition to
the application notes of the PP MRTD EAC [R5]. Those additional application notes should be marked
in italics.
2.3.5
Protection Profile Claims rationale
The differences between this Security Target security objectives and requirements and those of PP
MRTD EAC [R5], to which conformance is claimed, have been identified and justified in chapter 4 and
in 6. They have been recalled in the previous section.
The TOE type defined in this security target is exactly the same than the one defined in the PP MRTD
EAC [R5]: an IC with embedded software, and the MRTD application conformant to ICAO [R9] and
EAC [R10].
In the following, the statements of the security problem definition, the security objectives, and the
security requirements are consistent with those of the PP MRTD EAC [R5].
The security problem definition presented in chapter 3 clearly shows the additions to the security
problem statement of the PP MRTD EAC [R5].
The security objectives rationale presented in chapter 4.4 clearly identifies modifications and additions
made to the rationale presented in the PP MRTD EAC [R5].
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All PP requirements have been shown to be satisfied in the extended set of requirements whose
completeness, consistency and soundness has been argued in the rationale sections of the present
document.
2.4
CONFORMANCE WITH THE CC SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
This security target address a smartcard TOE and therefore, the associated evaluation shall be
performed in compliance with all CC mandatory supporting documents related to smartcard
evaluations:
2.4.1
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards
This document [R11] shall be used instead of the CEM [R4] when calculating the attack potential of the
successful attack performed during AVA_VAN analysis. This document impacts only the vulnerability
analysis performed by the ITSEF, and is not detailed here.
2.4.2
Composite product evaluation for Smartcards and similar devices
This document [R12] shall be used in addition to the CC part 3 [R3] and to the CEM [R4]. This
document specifies the additional information to be provided by a developer, and the additional checks
to be performed by the ITSEF when performing a “composite evaluation”. This is the case for the
current TOE as the underlying IC SB23YR48 revision B is already evaluated and certified under the
reference: 2010/02. Therefore, the following additional assurance requirements apply for this TOE:
−
ASE_COMP.1 for the security target ;
−
ALC_COMP.1 for the life cycle support ;
−
ADV_COMP.1 for the development activity ;
−
ATE_COMP.1 for the tests activity ;
−
AVA_COMP.1 for the vulnerability assessment.
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3 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1
ASSETS
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the following User Data on the MRTD’s chip. The codes
of the assets are the one used in the document [R9] part 1, volume 2, section III:
−
EF.DG1: document data (type, issuing state or organization, document number, date of expiry)
and holder’s biographical data (name, nationality, date of birth, sex),
−
Sensitivity: integrity,
−
EF.DG2: Sensitive biometric reference data – face,
−
Sensitivity: integrity,
−
EF.DG3 : Sensitive biometric reference data - Fingerprints,
−
Sensitivity: confidentiality, integrity,
−
EF.DG4: Sensitive biometric reference data – Iris,
−
Sensitivity: confidentiality, integrity,
−
EF.DG5: Displayed Portrait,
−
Sensitivity: integrity,
−
EF.DG6 to EF.DG16: optional fields and additional holder and document data (among which
Active the Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15 and the Chip Authentication Public Key in
EF.DG14),
−
Sensitivity: integrity.
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the following security data embedded on the MRTD’s
chip. The codes of the assets are the one used in the document [R9] part 1, volume 2, section III and
[R10] appendix A.3.2.4
−
EF.COM: Common Data Elements, containing the version information and tag list,
−
Sensitivity: integrity,
−
EF.SOD: Document Security Object, containing data integrity and authenticity information,
−
Sensitivity: integrity,
A sensitive asset is the following more general one:
−
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip: The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the
issuing State or Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession
of a genuine MRTD. This means that all assets used for that purpose (active authentication private
key KPrAA, chip authentication private key SKPICC…) have to be protected in terms of confidentiality
and integrity.
Due to interoperability reasons the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [R9] requires that Basic Inspection Systems must
have access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 and files EF.COM, EF.SOD. Therefore,
considering the intrinsic resistance of BAC mechanism, these data shall be protected at a high level
(AVA_VAN.5) in terms of integrity only.
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3.2
SUBJECTS
The following individuals and IT systems have access to the TOE:
Manufacturer
“Manufacturer” is the generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit as well as for
the MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of
the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing (step 3 to step 5). In this Security Target, the TOE does not
distinguish between the users “IC Manufacturer” and the “MRTD Manufacturer” using this role
Manufacturer.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the
holder by:
−
establishing the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD,
−
enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s),
−
writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global,
international and national interoperability,
−
writing the initial TSF data and
−
signing the Document Security Object defined in [R9].
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing Country
or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD.
The CVCA represents the country-specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are
distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving Country with respect to the
protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems.
The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive
data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations in the form of the
Document Verifier Certificates.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through its interface.
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State:
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−
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity,
−
verifying the traveler as the MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System (BIS):
−
contains a terminal for the communication with the MRTD’s chip,
−
implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism,
−
gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optically
reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information.
The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements in addition the
Chip Authentication Mechanism.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System:
−
implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol,
−
is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving
State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the EIS are defined
by the Inspection System Certificates.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
3.3
THREATS
3.3.1
Attacker
Threats may occur as a result of a threat agent trying:
−
to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization,
−
to read sensitive biometric reference data (i.e. EF.DG3, EF.DG4),
−
to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application note 1: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment
independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results
of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
3.3.2
Attack potential
Individuals performing attacks have a high attack potential. They correspond to malicious persons
possessing the skills of an expert.
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3.3.3
Threats not included
An attacker trying to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e. without
knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD) is not considered by this Security Target since this
can only be averted by the BAC mechanism using the “weak” Document Basic Access Keys. These
threats are covered by [R6] through the threats T.CHIP_ID and T.Skimming. The same hold for the
confidentiality of the user data EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 and of the security data EF.SOD
and EF.COM.
3.3.4
Threats relative to the TOE in operation
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Read the sensitive biometric reference data
An attacker with high attack potential knowing the Document Basic Access Keys is trying to gain the
sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the MRTD’s chip.
The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threat T.Skimming (cf. [R6]) in respect of the attack
path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD’s chip) but differs
from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized
portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the
possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the
MRTD’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually
readable on the physical MRTD as well.
T.Forgery
Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its security
related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD holder’s
identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the
digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the
digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric
authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to
defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may
combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes
the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference data of finger read from the logical MRTD of a
traveler into an other MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the
holder this MRTD. The attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another chip.
T.Counterfeit
MRTD’s chip
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An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine
MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of the MRTD’s
chip used for authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine
MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD’s chip.
The TOE shall also avert the threats as specified below:
T.Abuse-Func
Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in “TOE operational Use” phase in
order
−
to manipulate User Data,
−
to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or
−
to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
T.Information_Leakage
Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to disclose
confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by
the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock
frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted as a covert
channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating parameters which may
be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements
(by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific
operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the
Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information
leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
T.Phys-Tamper
Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order
−
to disclose TSF Data, or
−
to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to
−
modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip,
−
modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software,
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−
modify User Data or,
−
to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data
(e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of the
MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification of
security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering
requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure
analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security
mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design
including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or
temporary.
T.Malfunction
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by applying
environmental stress in order to
−
deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or
−
circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions,
exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit
these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
3.4
ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES (OSP)
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security rules,
procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations.
P.BAC-PP
Fulfilment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile
The issuing States or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection Systems
have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [R9] as well as
to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is successfully evaluated and certified in
accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [R6] in order to ensure the confidentiality of standard user
data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data.
Application note 2: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the ‘ICAO Doc
9303’ [R9] is addressed by the [R6] (cf. P.BAC-PP). The confidentiality of the personal data other than
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms may not resist
attacks with high attack potential (cf. [R6]). The TOE shall protect the sensitive biometric reference data
in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 against attacks with high attack potential. Due to the different resistance the
protection of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 on one side and the other EF.SOD, EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and
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EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 are addressed separated security target, which is assumed to result in technically
separated evaluations (at least for classes ASE and VAN) and certificates.
P.Sensitive_Data
Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private
personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by
inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the
inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the
Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the
limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRTD’s chip shall protect the confidentiality
and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the Extended Inspection
System after Chip authentication.
P.Manufact
Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent
Key.
P.Personalization
Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD with
respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent
authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
3.5
ASSUMPTIONS
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
3.5.1
Assumptions for the manufacturing and personalization environment
A.MRTD_Manufact
MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security
procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and
integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to its
objectives:
−
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
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−
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process and storage.
−
Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required
skill.
A.Pers_Agent
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of
−
the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder,
−
the Document Basic Access Keys,
−
the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and
−
the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip).
The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the
Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic
mechanisms.
A_Pers_Agent_Active_Auth
Authentication
Personalization
of
the
MRTD’s
chip
including
Active
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of the Active Authentication Public Key (EF.DG15)
if stored on the MRTD’s chip. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent
Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
3.5.2
Assumptions for the operational environment
A.Insp_Sys
Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State
−
Examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and
−
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability
−
includes the Country Signing CA Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing
State or Organization, and
−
implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R9].
The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the
Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD. The General Inspection System in addition to the
Basic Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection
System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes secure
messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection
System in addition to the General Inspection System
−
supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and
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−
is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving
State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
A_Insp_Sys_Active_Auth
Active Authentication
Inspection Systems for global interoperability supporting
The Extended Inspection System in addition may also support the terminal part of the Active
Authentication Protocol.
A.Signature_PKI
PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State or
Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the Country
Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is recommended to
distributes the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity.
The Document Signer
−
generates the Document Signer Key Pair,
−
hands over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification,
−
keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and
−
uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the
MRTDs.
The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys that are
distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
A.Auth_PKI
PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities,
the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and certificates
for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities
of the issuing States or Organizations are signing the certificates of the Document Verifier and the
Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving
States or Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations distribute the public keys of their Country
Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD’s chip.
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4 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security objectives for
the development and production environment and security objectives for the operational environment.
4.1
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats
to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers
Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security
object according to LDS [R9] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents
only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and
cannot be changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by
authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
Application note 3: The OT.AC_Pers implies that
−
the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least EF.DG1 and
EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
−
the Personalization Agents may :
• add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet, and
• update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly.
The support for adding data in the “Operational Use” phase is optional.
OT.Data_Int
Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended inspection systems. The authorization of
the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful
authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier
Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their
transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference
data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Identification
Identification and Authentication of the TOE
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The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its non-volatile
memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
“Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The storage of the Pre-Personalization
data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s).
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication as defined in [R10]. The authenticity proof provided by MRTD’s chip shall be protected
against attacks with high attack potential.
Application note 4: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the MRTD’s chip to have
−
a unique identity as given by the MRTD’s Document number,
−
a secret to prove its identity by knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data.
The TOE shall protect this TSF data to prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data
to verify the authentication attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Public
Key that matches the Chip Authentication Private Key of the MRTD’s chip. This certificate is provided
by
−
the Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS [R9] and
−
the hash value of the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Document Security Object signed by
the Document Signer.
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity by Active Authentication
The TOE may support the Extended Inspection System to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Active
Authentication as defined in [R9].
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip independent
of the TOE environment.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support
functions that may be maliciously used to
−
disclose critical User Data,
−
manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software,
−
manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software or
−
bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features
provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
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OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed
in the MRTD’s chip
−
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between events
found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines
and
−
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
−
by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note 5: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal
processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details
correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data,
and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with high attack
potential by means of
−
measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface except
on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
−
measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges
(using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
−
manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
−
controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
−
reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to
prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields,
voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
Application note 6: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction with
elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the objective
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE’s internals.
4.2
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION ENVIRONMENT
OE.MRTD_Manufact
Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
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Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5
and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the following
objectives:
−
non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
−
identification of the element under delivery,
−
meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception acknowledgment),
−
physical protection to prevent external damage,
−
secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
−
traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
•
origin and shipment details,
•
reception, reception acknowledgement,
•
location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the delivery
process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and highlight all
non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception department) dealing with
the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet the procedure
requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
4.3
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Personalization
Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the
issuing State or Organization
−
establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD,
−
enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and
−
personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security
measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
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OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must
−
generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair,
−
ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer Certificates
in a secure operational environment, and
−
distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and
Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity.
The issuing State or Organization must
−
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the
Document Signer Private Keys,
−
sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and
−
distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and Organizations.
The digital signature in the Document Security Object EF.SOD relates to all data in the data in EF.DG1
to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [R9].
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
MRTD Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to
−
generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair,
−
sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in
EF.DG14 and
−
support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by
means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to
limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to authorized receiving States
or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or Organization
generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document Verifier only.
OE.BAC_PP
Fulfillment of the Basic Access Control Protection Profile
It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally successfully
evaluated and certified in accordance with the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable
Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control’ [R6]. This is necessary to cover the
BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the traceability of the
MRTD data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack potential the addressed
evaluation and certification is a technically separated process.
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Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD
Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by
the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability
−
includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing
State or Organization, and
−
implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R9].
Additionally General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD
MRTD Active Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization may establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to :
−
generate the MRTD’s Active Authentication Key Pair,
−
sign and store the Active Authentication Public Key in the Active Authentication Public Key data in
EF.DG15 and
support inspection systems of receiving States or Organizations to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s
chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Active Authentication Public Key by means of he
Document Security Object.OE.Exam_MRTD_Active_Auth
Examination of the MRTD
passport book using Active Authentication
During examination of the MRTD presented by the traveler, the Extended Inspection Systems may
perform the Active Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as
MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document
Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The
receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing CA Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
Protection of data from the logical MRTD
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The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and integrity of
the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol.
Application note 7: The figure 2.1 in [R10] supposes that the GIS and the EIS follow the order
−
running the Basic Access Control Protocol,
−
reading and verifying only those parts of the logical MRTD that are necessary to know for the Chip
Authentication Mechanism (i.e. Document Security Object and Chip Authentication Public Key),
−
running the Chip Authentication Protocol, and
−
reading and verifying the less-sensitive data of the logical MRTD after Chip Authentication.
The supposed sequence has the advantage that the less-sensitive data are protected by secure
messaging with cryptographic keys based on the Chip Authentication Protocol which quality is under
control of the TOE. The inspection system will prevent additionally eavesdropping to their
communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol. Note that reading the less-sensitive data directly after Basic Access Control
Mechanism is allowed and is not assumed as threat in this PP. But the TOE ensures that reading of
sensitive data is possible after successful Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication Protocol
only.
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems
by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the
logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip for
access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its
Inspection System Certificate.
4.4
4.4.1
RATIONALE
Coverage matrix
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage:
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T.Read_Sensitive_Data
T.Forgery
T.Counterfeit
T.Abuse-Func
T.Information_Leakage
T.Phys-tamper
T.Malfunction
P.BAC-PP
P.Sensitive_Data
P.Manufact
P.Personalization
X
X
X X
X
X
X
X X
OE.Ext_Insp_System
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Exam_MRTD_Active_Auth
OE.BAC-PP
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Personalization
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
OE.MRTD_Manufact
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Active_Auth_Proof
OT.Identification
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Data_Int
OT.AC_Pers
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X
X
X X
X X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
A.MRTD_Manufact
A.MRTD_Delivery
A.Pers_Agent
A.Pers_Agent_Active_Au
th
A.Insp_Sys
A.Insp_Sys_Active_Auth
A.Signature_PKI
A.Auth_PKI
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 1: Security problem definition / Security objectives
4.4.2
Coverage of threats in the operational environment
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and the threat
T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered by the TOEobjective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data” requiring that
read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference data) is only granted
to authorized inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the transmission of these data ensures
the data’s confidentiality. The authorization bases on Document Verifier certificates issued by the
issuing State or Organization as required by OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of
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sensitive biometric reference data”. The Document Verifier of the receiving State has to authorize
Extended Inspection Systems by creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the
sensitive biometric reference data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended
Inspection Systems”.
T.Forgery
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of the
complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for
Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the
trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the
stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the presented
MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall
ensure that passport book does not contain a sensitive chip which may present the complete
unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means
of digital signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
“Verification by Passive Authentication”.
T.Counterfeit
The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorized copy or reproduction of
the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and authenticity proof required
by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authentication” using a authentication key pair to be
generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Chip Authentication Key has to be written
into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents Security Objects as demanded by
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”. According to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the
MRTD passport book” the General Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol
to verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip.
This threat is also thwarted by chip identification and authenticity proof required by
OT.Active_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authentication by Active Authentication” using a
authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing State or Organization. The Public Active
Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG15 and signed by means of Documents Security
Objects as demanded by OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Active Authentication Key”. According
to OE.Exam_MRTD_Active_Auth “Examination of the MRTD passport book using Active
Authentication”, the Extended Inspection system may perform the Active Authentication Protocol to
verify the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip.
T.Abuse-Func
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing MRTD’s functionality
to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for the TOE OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection
against abuse of functionality” ensures that the usage of functions which may not be used in the
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“operational Use” phase is effectively prevented. Therefore attacks intending to abuse functionality in
order to disclose or manipulate critical (User) Data or to affect the TOE in such a way that security
features or TOE’s functions may be bypassed, deactivated, changed or explored shall be effectively
countered.
T.Information_Leakage, T.Phys-Tamper, T.Malfunction
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”, T.Phys-Tamper
“Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental Stress” are typical for
integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack potential. The protection of the
TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
“Protection against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
4.4.3
Coverage of organisational security policies
P.BAC-PP
The OSP P.BAC-PP is directly addressed by the OE.BAC-PP.
P.Sensitive_Data
See “T.Read_Sensitive_Data”.
P.Manufact
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique identification of the IC by
means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Prepersonalization Data as being fulfilled by
OT.Identification.
P.Personalization
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization only”
addresses the:
−
the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as described in the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and
−
the access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”.
Note the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s) according
to OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers
limits the management of TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
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4.4.4
Coverage of assumptions
A.MRTD_Manufact
The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact “Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that
requires to use security procedures during all manufacturing steps.
A.MRTD_ Delivery
The assumption A.MRTD_ Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection of the MRTD delivery” that requires
to use security procedures during delivery steps of the MRTD.
A.Pers_Agent
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” including the
enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
A.Pers_Agent_Active_Auth
The assumption A.Pers_Agent_Active_Auth “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip including Active
Authentication” is covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization
“Personalization of logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the
storage of the MRTD holder personal data and the enabling of security features of the TOE according
to the decision of the issuing State or Organization concerning the Basic Access Control.
A.Insp_Sys
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys “Inspection
Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” which requires the inspection system to
examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control,
and the General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems to implement and to perform
the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip. The security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data from the logical
MRTD” require the Inspection System to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the
internal handling.
A.Insp_Sys_Active_Auth
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys_Active_Auth
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability supporting Active Authentication” is covered by the
security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD_Active_Auth “Examination of the
MRTD passport book using Active Authentication” which requires the Extended Inspection Systems to
implement and to perform the Active Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented
MRTD’s chip.
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A.Signature_PKI
The assumption A.Signature_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature”
covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair and the Document Signer Key
Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD
“Examination of the MRTD passport book”.
A.Auth_PKI
The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security objective for the
TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for use of sensitive biometric reference
data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometrics by issuing Document Verifier
certificates for authorized receiving States or Organizations only. The Document Verifier of the
receiving State is required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems”
to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection System Certificates. Therefore, the
receiving issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure.
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5 EXTENDED COMPONENTS DEFINITION
This security target uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these components
are defined in [R7], other components are defined in protection profile MRTD EAC [R5].
5.1
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FAU_SAS
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the Class
FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the storage
of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require
the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the content
of the audit records.
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
1
FAU_SAS.1
Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
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5.2
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FCS_RND
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE an additional family (FCS_RND) of the
Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements
for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not
limited to generation of cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1. The similar component
FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to
be use for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
1
FCS_RND.1
Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined quality
metric.
Management:
FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
5.3
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FIA_API
To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of the Class
FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements
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for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by an external entity where the
other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity of an external entity.
Application note 8: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication verification of
users’ identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of the user to prove their
identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the style of the Common Criteria part 2
(cf. [3], chapter “Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)”) from a TOE point of view.
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by an
external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling
FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management:
FIA_API.1
1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed identity.
Audit:
FIA_API.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
5.4
FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity.
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_API.1.1
The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the
identity of the [assignment: authorized user or role].
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FMT_LIM
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the management
of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other
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class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the
capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a combined
manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the component Limited
Capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling
1
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
2
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the capabilities
(perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer to Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance, by removing or by
disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life-cycle.
Management:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of the Class
FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for the
Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because
this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical
mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of
preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their
availability.
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities.
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Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed and implemented in a manner that limits its capabilities
so that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability.
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits its availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Application note 9: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that there are
two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together shall provide
protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that
−
the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its capabilities
are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
−
the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or disabled in, the
product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
5.5
DEFINITION OF THE FAMILY FPT_EMSEC
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirement of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent
attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable
physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic
radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This
family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not
directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [R2].
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation
Family behaviour
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This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation
FPT_EMSEC.1
1
TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation enabling access to TSF
data or user data.
Management:
FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1
TOE emanation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment:
specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types
of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
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6 IT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
6.1
INTRODUCTION
This section identifies the security functional requirements for the TOE.
Some refinement/selection/assignment operations in the SFRs are determined in the PP MRTD EAC
[R5], some are let with unspecified values. Assignments made by the PP MRTD EAC [R5] authors are
marked as bold text, while assignments made by the ST author are marked as bold text and in italics.
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration is
denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component identifier.
The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used:
Name
Data
Country Verifying
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a private
Certification Authority Private key (SKCVCA) used for signing the Document Verifier Certificates.
Key (SKCVCA)
Country Verifying
Certification Authority Public
Key (PKCVCA)
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public
Key (PKCVCA) as part of the TSF data to verify the Document Verifier
Certificates. The PKCVCA has the security attribute Current Date as the
most recent valid effective date of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority Certificate or of a domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Certificate (CCVCA)
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be a selfsigned certificate or a link certificate (cf. [R10] and Glossary). It
contains (i) the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
(PKCVCA) as authentication reference data, (ii) the coded access
control rights of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii) the
Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as
security attributes.
Document Verifier Certificate The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country
(CDV)
Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i) the Document Verifier
Public Key (PKDV) as authentication reference data (ii) identification as
domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the coded access control rights
of the Document Verifier, the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Inspection System Certificate The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the Document
(CIS)
Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference data the Inspection
System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded access control rights of the
Extended Inspection System, the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Chip Authentication Public
Key Pair
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used for
Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to RFC 2631
or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO 15946.
Chip Authentication Public
Key (PKICC)
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the EF.DG14
Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical MRTD and used
by the inspection system for Chip Authentication of the MRTD’s chip.
It is part of the user data provided by the TOE for the IT environment.
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Name
Data
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE to
authenticate itself as authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF data.
The Active Authentication Key Pair (KPrAA, KPuAA) is used for Active
Authentication Protocol: RSA according to ISO9796-2 Digital
Signature scheme 1
Active Authentication Public The Active Authentication Public Key (KPuAA) is stored in the
EF.DG15 Active Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical MRTD
Key
and used by the inspection system for Active Authentication of the
MRTD’s chip. It is part of the user data provided by the TOE for the IT
environment.
Active Authentication Private The Active Authentication Private Key (KPrAA) is used by the TOE to
authenticate itself as authentic MRTD’s chip using the Active
Key
Authentication protocol. It is part of the TSF data.
Chip Authentication Private
Key (SKICC)
Active Authentication Key
Pair
Country Signing Certification
Authority Key Pair
Country Signing Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organization signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate with
the Country Signing Certification Authority Private Key
and the
signature will be verified by receiving State or Organization (e.g. a
Basic Inspection System) with the Country Signing Certification
Authority Public Key.
Document Signer Key Pairs
Document Signer of the issuing State or Organization signs the
Document Security Object of the logical MRTD with the Document
Signer Private Key and the signature will be verified by a Basic
Inspection Systems of the receiving State or Organization with the
Document Signer Public Key.
Document
Keys
Basic
Access The Document Basic Access Key is created by the Personalization
Agent, loaded to the TOE, and used for mutual authentication and key
agreement for secure messaging between the Basic Inspection
System and the MRTD’s chip.
BAC Session Keys
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed
between the TOE and a BIS in result of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Protocol.
Chip Session Key
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed
between the TOE and a GIS in result of the Chip Authentication
Protocol.
Table 2: Overview of the keys and certificates
Application note 10: The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as
“domestic” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs to the same State as the Country Verifying
Certification Authority. The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document Verifier as
“foreign” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it does not belong to the same State as the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. From MRTD’s point of view the domestic Document Verifier belongs to
the issuing State or Organization.
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6.2
TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
6.2.1
Class FAU Security Audit
The TOE shall meet the requirement « Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1) » as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide [assignment : authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment : list of audit information] in the audit records.
Assignment
Authorized users : the Manufacturer
List of Audit Information : the IC Identification Data
Application note 11: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in the
Phase 2 Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in the Manufacturer role
write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF Data of the TOE. The audit records
are write-only-once data of the MRTD’s chip (see FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
6.2.2
Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
6.2.2.1
CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY MANAGEMENT (FCS_CKM)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key generation
algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
FCS_CKM.1/DH
Cryptographic key generation – Key Derivation Function by the MRTD
FCS_CKM.1.1 / DH
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment : cryptographic key
generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment :
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following : [assignment : list of
standards].
Assignment
Cryptographic key generation algorithm : See Table 3.
Cryptographic key sizes : See Table 3.
List of standards : [R10], Annex A.1
Cryptographic key generation algorithm
Cryptographic key size
Standard
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Diffie-Hellman Protocol (PKCS#3)
1024, 1536 and 2048 bits
[R10], Annex A.1 and [R13]
ECDH (ISO 15946)
192, 224 and 256 bits
[R10], Annex A.1 and [R14]
Table 3: Cryptographic key generation methods
Application note 12:
The TOE generates a shared secret value with the terminal during the Chip
Authentication Protocol, see [R10], sec. 3.1 and Annex A.1. This protocol is based on the DiffieHellman Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 (i.e. a modulo arithmetic based cryptographic algorithm, cf.
[R13]) or on the ECDH compliant to ISO 15946 (i.e. an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm) (cf.[R10],
Annex A.1, [R15] and [R14] for details). The shared secret value is used to derive the 112 bit TripleDES key for encryption and the 112 bit Retail-MAC Chip Session Keys according to the Document
Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm [R9] normative appendix 5, A5.1, for the TSF required by
FCS_COP.1/SYM and FCS_COP.1/MAC.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction – MRTD
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment : cryptographic key
destruction method] that meets the following : [assignment : list of
standards].
Assignment
Cryptographic key destruction method : Overwriting of data
List of standards : none
Application note 13: The TOE shall destroy the Chip Session Keys after detection of an error in a
received command by verification of the MAC. The TOE shall clear the memory area of any session
keys before starting the communication with the terminal in a new power-on-session.
6.2.2.2
CRYPTOGRAPHIC OPERATION (FCS_COP)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be
implemented by the TOE.
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1 / SHA
The TSF shall perform [assignment : list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment :
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment :
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cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following : [assignment : list of
standards].
Assignment
List of cryptographic operations : hashing
Cryptographic algorithm : SHA-1, SHA224, SHA-256
Cryptographic key sizes : none
List of standards : FIPS 180-2
Application note 14:
The Chip Authentication Protocol use SHA-1 hash mechanism (cf. [R10],
normative appendix 5, A5.1 and Annex A.2.2 for details). The TOE implements additional hash
functions SHA-224 and SHA-256 for the Terminal Authentication Protocol (cf. [R10], Annex A.2.2 for
details).
FCS_COP.1/SYM Cryptographic operation – Symetric Encryption / Decryption
FCS_COP.1.1 / SYM
The TSF shall perform [assignment : list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment :
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment :
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following : [assignment : list of
standards].
Assignment
List of cryptographic operations : secure messaging – encryption and
decryption
Cryptographic algorithm : Triple-DES in CBC mode
Cryptographic key sizes : 112 bits
List of standards : FIPS 46-3 [R16] and [R10]
Application note 15:
This SFR requires the TOE to implement the secure messaging with
encryption for the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of
the Chip Authentication Protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/DH. Furthermore the SFR is used for
authentication attempts of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric
authentication mechanism.
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation –MAC
FCS_COP.1.1 / MAC
The TSF shall perform [assignment : list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment :
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment :
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following : [assignment : list of
standards].
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Assignment
List
of
cryptographic
operations :
secure
messaging
–
message
authentication code
Cryptographic algorithm : Retail MAC
Cryptographic key sizes : 112 bits
List of standards : [R10]
Application note 16: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for secure
messaging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is
agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism as part of the Chip
Authentication Protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/DH.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
FCS_COP.1.1 /
SIG_VER
The TSF shall perform [assignment : list of cryptographic operations] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment :
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment :
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following : [assignment : list of
standards].
Assignment
List of cryptographic operations : digital signature verification
Cryptographic algorithm : See Table 4
Cryptographic key sizes : See Table 4
List of standards : See Table 4
Cryptographic algorithm
Cryptographic key size
Standard
RSA
1024, 1536, 2048, 3072 and
4096 bits
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5
ECDSA
192, 224, 256, 384 and 521
bits
ISO15946 ECDSA
Table 4: Cryptographic signature verification methods
Application note 17: The signature verification is used to verify the card verifiable certificates and the
authentication attempt of the terminal creating a digital signature for the TOE challenge.
FCS_COP.1/SIG_GEN
Cryptographic operation – Signature generation by MRTD
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FCS_COP.1.1 /
The TSF shall perform [assignment : list of cryptographic operations] in
SIG_GEN
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment :
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment :
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following : [assignment : list of
standards].
Assignment
List of cryptographic operations : digital signature generation
Cryptographic algorithm : RSA
Cryptographic key sizes : 1024, 1536, 2048 and 3072 bits
List of standards : ISO9796-2 Digital Signature scheme 1
Application note 18: The signature generation is used during the Active Authentication Protocol.
6.2.2.3
RANDOM NUMBER GENERATION (FCS_RND)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1
The TSF shall a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
Assignment
A defined quality metric: AIS31 Class P2 quality metric
Application note 19: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the
authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4.
6.2.3
Class FIA Identification and Authentication
The following table provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used:
Name
Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization Agents
Chip Authentication Protocol
Active Authentication
Protocol
Terminal Authentication
Protocol
SFR for the TOE
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
FIA_API.1/CAP,
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_API.1/CAP
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
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Table 5: Overview on authentication SFR
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol as defined in this Security target3 includes:
−
the BAC authentication protocol as defined in ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [R9] in order to gain access to the
Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
−
the asymmetric key agreement to establish symmetric secure messaging keys between the TOE
and the terminal based on the Chip Authentication Public Key and the Terminal Public Key used
later in the Terminal Authentication Protocol,
−
the check whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code with the
expected key for any message received by the terminal.
The BAC mechanism does not provide a security function on its own. The Chip Authentication Protocol
may be used independent of the Terminal Authentication Protocol. But if the Terminal Authentication
Protocol is used the terminal shall use the same public key as presented during the Chip Authentication
Protocol.
6.2.3.1
USER IDENTIFICATION (FIA_UID)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall allow [assignment : list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf
of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
Assignment
List of TSF-mediated actions:
(1) to establish the communication channel,
(2) to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
(3) to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
FIA_UID.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application note 20: In the Phase 2 “Manufacturing of the TOE” the Manufacturer is the only user role
known to the TOE which writes the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data in the audit
records of the IC. The MRTD manufacturer may create the user role Personalization Agent for
transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The users in role Personalization
Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the authentication key. After personalization in the
Phase 3 the Document Basic Access Keys, the Chip authentication data and Terminal Authentication
3
The BAC Authentication Protocol is included here as part of the Chip Authentication Protocol because it is a necessary
condition to read the EF.DG14.
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Reference Data are written into the TOE. The Basic Inspection System (cf. [R6]) is identified as default
user after power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to run
the BAC Authentication Protocol, to gain access to the Chip Authentication Reference Data and to run
the Chip Authentication Protocol (i.e. the BAC mechanism is not seen as an independent mechanism in
this PP, it is a mandatory part within the chip authentication protocol, and thus noted here for reasons
of completeness). After successful authentication of the chip the terminal may identify itself as
6.2.3.2
−
Extended Inspection System by selection of the templates for the Terminal Authentication Protocol
or
−
if necessary and available by symmetric authentication as Personalization Agent (using the
Personalization Agent Authentication Key).
USER AUTHENTICATION (FIA_UAU)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.1
Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow [assignment : list of TSF-mediated actions] on behalf
of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
Assignment
List of TSF-mediated actions:
(1) to established the communication channel,
(2) to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
(3) to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key,
(4) to carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.4
Single-use authentication mechanism – Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the TOE
FIA_UAU.4.1
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [assignment :
identified authentication mechanism(s)].
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Assignment
Identified authentication mechanism(s):
(1) Terminal Authentication Protocol,
(2) Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
Application note 21: The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge freshly and randomly
generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a successful
authentication attempt.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.5.1
Multiple authentication mechanisms
The TSF shall provide [assignment : list of multiple authentication
mechanisms] to support user authentication.
Assignment
List of multiple authentication mechanisms:
(1) Terminal Authentication Protocol,
(2) Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
(3) Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
[assignment : rules describing how
mechanisms provide authentication].
Assignment
the
multiple
authentication
Rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide
authentication:
(1) The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization
Agent by the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with
Personalization Agent Key during personalization phase of the
product's life cycle (phase 3),
(2) After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts
only received commands with correct message authentication
code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with
the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism,
(3) The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses the
public key presented during the Chip Authentication Protocol
and the secure messaging established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
Application note 22: Depending on the authentication methods used the Personalization Agent holds
a key for the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism.
The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure messaging for all commands exchanged
after successful authentication of the inspection system. The Personalization Agent may use
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Symmetric Authentication Mechanism without secure messaging mechanism as well if the
personalization environment prevents eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
personalization terminal.
The authentication of the personalization agent is only possible during phase 3 of the life-cycle, using
symetric authentication mechanism.
This can be considered as a refinement of the SFR FIA_UAU.5 of the PP.
However, this refinement is more restrictive than the PP, increase the level off security and therefore,
do not impact the conformity to the PP.
The Basic Inspection System shall use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the
Document Basic Access Keys and the secure messaging after the mutual authentication. The General
Inspection System shall use the secure messaging with the keys generated by the Chip Authentication
Mechanism.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UAU.6.1
Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions [assignment :
list of conditions under which re-authentication is required].
Assignment
List of conditions under which re-authentication is required:
(1) Each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the
GIS.
Application note 23: The Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Chip Authentication Protocol
specified in [R9] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication
of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each command
based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see
FCS_COP.1/MAC for further details). The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect message
authentication code. Therefore the TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and
accept only those commands received from the previously authenticated user.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
FIA_API.1/CAP
Authentication Proof of Identity - MRTD
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FIA_API.1.1 / CAP
The TSF shall provide a [assignment : authentication mechanism] to
prove the identity of the [assignment : authorized user or rule].
Assignment
Authentication mechanism: Chip Authentication Protocol according to
[R10]
Authorized user or rule : TOE
Application note 24: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication Mechanism
specified in [R10]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared secret using the Diffie-Hellman
Protocol (DH or EC-DH) and two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to
[R9], normative appendix 5, A5.1. The terminal verifies by means of secure messaging whether the
MRTD’s chip was able or not to run his protocol properly using its Chip Authentication Private Key
corresponding to the Chip Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
FIA_API.1/AAP
Authentication Proof of Identity – MRTD using Active Authentication
FIA_API.1.1 / AAP
The TSF shall provide a [assignment : authentication mechanism] to
prove the identity of the [assignment : authorized user or rule].
Assignment
Authentication mechanism: Active Authentication Protocol according to
[R9]
Authorized user or rule : TOE
Application note 25: The TOE may implement the Active Authentication Mechanism specified in [5].
The terminal randomly generates a challenge, then the MRTD chip digitally signs this challenge using
RSA and finally the terminal verifies that the returned signature is correct.
6.2.4
Class FDP User Data Protection
6.2.4.1
ACCESS CONTROL POLICY (FDP_ACC)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1.1
Subset access control
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment : access control SFP] on
[assignment: list of subjects, objects and operations among subjects
and objects covered by the SFP].
Assignment
Access control SFP : Access Control SFP
List of subject, objects and operations among subjects and objects covered
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by the SFP : terminals gaining write, read and modification access to
data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
6.2.4.2
ACCESS CONTROL FUNCTIONS (FDP_ACF)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1.1
Security attribute based access control
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment : access control SFP] to objects
based on the following : [assignment : list of subjects and objects
controlled under the indicated SFP, and, for each, the SFP-relevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security
attributes].
Assignment
Access control SFP : Access Control SFP
List of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and, for
each, the SFP-relevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant
security attributes:
(1) Subjects :
a) Personalization Agent,
b) Extended Inspection System
c) Terminal,
(2) Objects :
d) data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the
logical MRTD,
e) data EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD,
f) Data in EF.COM,
g) Data in EF.SOD.
Security attributes :
h) Authentication status of terminals,
i) Terminal authorization.
FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment : rules
governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects
using controlled operations on controlled objects].
Assignment
Rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled
objects using controlled operations on controlled objects :
(1) the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed
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to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
(2) the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System
with the Read access to DG 3 (Fingerprint) granted by the
relative certificate holder authorization is allowed to read the
data in EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD,
(3) the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System
with the Read access to DG 4 (Iris) granted by the relative
certificate holder authorization is allowed to read the data in
EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following sensitive rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes,
that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].
Assignment
Rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of
subjects to objects : none
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the rule:
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny
access of subjects to objects].
Assignment
Rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to
objects :
(1) A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in
the EF.DG3,
(2) A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in
the EF.DG4,
(3) A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG3,
(4) A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the
EF.DG4,
(5) Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
(6) Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended
Inspection System is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG3 to
EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD.
Application note 26: The relative certificate holder authorization encoded in the CVCA of the
inspection system is defined in [R10], Annex A.5.1, table A.8. The TOE verifies the certificate chain
established by the Country Verifying Certification Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the
Inspection System Certificate (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The Terminal Authorization is the intersection of the
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Certificate Holder Authorization in the certificates of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, the
Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain.
Application note 27: Note the BAC mechanism controls the read access of the EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. According to P.BAC-PP this security
features of the MRTD are not subject of this Security Target.
6.2.4.3
INTER-TSF USER DATA CONFIDENTIALITY TRANSFER PROTECTION (FDP_UCT)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UCT.1
Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
FDP_UCT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment : access control SFP(s) and/or
information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection : transmit,
receive] user data in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure after
Chip Authentication.
Assignment
Access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s): Access
Control SFP
Selection
6.2.4.4
Transmit and receive
INTER-TSF USER DATA INTEGRITY TRANSFER PROTECTION (FDP_UIT)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FDP_UIT.1
Basic data exchange integrity - MRTD
FDP_UIT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the [assignment : access control SFP(s) and/or
information flow control SFP(s)] to be able to [selection : transmit,
receive] user data in a manner protected from [selection : modification,
deletion, insertion, replay] errors after Chip Authentication.
Assignment
Access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s): Access
Control SFP
Selection
transmit and receive
modification, deletion, insertion and replay
FDP_UIT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
[selection : modification, deletion, insertion, replay] has occurred after
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Chip Authentication.
Selection
modification, deletion, insertion and replay
Refinement: Note that the Access Control SFP (cf. FDP_ACF.1.2) allows the Extended Inspection
System (as of [R9] and [R6]) to access the data EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD. Nevertheless there is explicitly no rule for preventing access to these
data. More over their data integrity (cf. FDP_UIT.1) and confidentiality (cf. FDP_UCT.1) is ensured by
the BAC mechanism being addressed and covered by [R6]. The fact that the BAC mechanism is not
part of the Security Target in hand is addressed by the refinement “after Chip Authentication”.
Application note 28: FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the protection of the User Data transmitted
from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and message authentication codes
after successful Chip Authentication to the General Inspection System. The authentication mechanism
as part of Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Chip Authentication Protocol establish different key
sets to be used for secure messaging (each set of keys for the encryption and the message
authentication key).
6.2.5
Class FMT Security Management
Application note 29: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the
management of the TSF data.
6.2.5.1
SPECIFICATION OF MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS (FMT_SMF)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1.1
Specification of Management Functions
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management
functions [assignment : list of security management functions to be
provided by the TSF].
Assignment
List of security management functions to be provided by the TSF :
(1) Initialization,
(2) Personalization,
(3) Configuration.
Application note 30: The configuration capabilities of the TOE are available during the prepersonalization (initialization) and personalization phases.
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6.2.5.2
SECURITY MANAGEMENT ROLES (FMT_SMR)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment : the authorized identified
roles].
Assignment
The authorized identified roles:
(1) Manufacturer,
(2) Personalization Agent,
(3) Country Verifying Certification Authority,
(4) Document Verifier,
(5) Domestic Extended Inspection System,
(6) Foreign Extended Inspection System.
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application note 31: Note that the MRTD also maintains the role Basic Inspection System due to a
direct consequence of P.BAC-PP resp. OE.BAC-PP. Nevertheless this role is not explicitly listed in
FMT_SMR.1.1, above since the TSF cannot maintain the role with respect to the assumed high attack
potential due to the known weaknesses of the Document Basic Access Keys.
6.2.5.3
LIMITED CAPABILITIES AND AVAILABILITY (FMT_LIM)
Application note 32: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the TSF and
TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle phases.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is
enforced: [assignment : Limited capability and availability policy].
Assignment
Limited capability and availability policy :
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Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:
(1) User Data to be manipulated,
(2) sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
(3) TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
(4) software to be reconstructed and
(5) substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capability (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced: [assignment : Limited capability and availability policy].
Assignment
Limited capability and availability policy :
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
(1) User Data to be manipulated,
(2) sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed,
(3) TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
(4) software to be reconstructed and
(5) substantial information about construction of TSF to be
gathered which may enable other attacks.
Application note 33: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features …” in FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little
bit misleading since the addressed features are no longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing the
respective functionality). Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced
provide an optional approach to enforce the same policy.
Note that the term “software” in item 4 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to both IC Dedicated
and IC Embedded Software.
6.2.5.4
MANAGEMENT OF TSF DATA (FMT_MTD)
Application note 34: The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF data
(FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.
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The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and different TSF
data.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
Pre-personalization data
Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Selection
Assignment : write
Assignment
List of TSF data : Initialization Data and Pre-Personalization Data
The authorized identified roles : the Manufacturer
Application note 35: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the authentication
reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic Personalization
Agent Authentication Key.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization data
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Selection
Assignment : disable read access for users to
Assignment
List of TSF data : Initialization Data
The authorized identified roles : the Personalization Agent
Application note 36: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD Manufacturer are
the default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing” but
the TOE is not requested to distinguish between these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE
may restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Pre-personalization Data by
−
allowing to write these data only once and
−
blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2.
The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data which includes but are not limited to the IC
Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The Initialization Data provides a unique identification of the IC
which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2 and 3 “personalization” but is not needed and may be
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misused in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”. Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The
MRTD Manufacturer will write the Pre-personalization Data.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
Current Date
Management of TSF data – Initialization of CVCA Certificate and
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
CVCA_INI
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Selection
Assignment : write
Assignment
List of TSF data :
(1) initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
(2) initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
(3) initial Current Date.
The authorized identified roles : Personalization Agent
Application note 37: The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key may be written by
the Manufacturer in the production or prepersonalization phase or by the Personalization Agent (cf.
[R10], sec. 2.2.6). The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Keys (and their updates
later on) are used to verify the Country Verifying Certification Authority Link-Certificates. The initial
Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate and the initial Current Date is needed for verification
of the certificates and the calculation of the Terminal Authorization.
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
Authority
Management of TSF data – Country Verifying Certification
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
CVCA_UPD
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Selection
Assignment : update
Assignment
List of TSF data :
(1) Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
(2) Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate,
The authorized identified roles : Country Verifying Certification Authority
Application note 38: The Country Verifier Certification Authority updates its asymmetric key pair and
distributes the public key be means of the Country Verifier CA Link-Certificates (cf. [R10], sec. 2.2). The
TOE updates its internal trust-point if a valid Country Verifier CA Link-Certificates (cf. FMT_MTD.3) is
provided by the terminal (cf. [R10], sec. 2.2.3 and 2.2.4).
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FMT_MTD.1/DATE
Management of TSF data – Current date
FMT_MTD.1.1 / DATE
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Selection
Modify
Assignment
List of TSF data : Current date
The authorized identified roles :
(1) Country Verifying Certification Authority,
(2) Document Verifier,
(3) Domestic Extended Inspection System.
Application note 39: The authorized roles are identified in their certificate (cf. [R10], sec. 2.2.4 and
Table A.5) and authorized by validation of the certificate chain (cf. FMT_MTD.3). The authorized role of
the terminal is part of the Certificate Holder Authorization in the card verifiable certificate provided by
the terminal for the identification and the Terminal Authentication (cf. to [R10], annex A.3.3, for details).
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
Management of TSF data – Key Write
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
KEY_WRITE
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Selection
Assignment : write
Assignment
List of TSF data : Document Basic Access Keys
The authorized identified roles : the Personalization Agent
Application note 40: The Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key is the TSF data for
verification of the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Extended Inspection Systems including
the access rights for the Extended Access Control.
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1.1 / CAPK
Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations: [selection: create,
load]]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized
identified roles].
Selection
Assignment : load
Assignment
List of TSF data : Chip authentication Private Key
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The authorized identified roles : Personalization Agent
Application note 41: The component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is refined by
−
selecting the “load” operation.
The verb “load” means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key is generated securely outside the
TOE and written into the TOE memory.
FMT_MTD.1/AAPK
FMT_MTD.1.1 / CAPK
Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations: [selection: create,
load]]] the [assignment: list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized
identified roles].
Selection
Assignment : load
Assignment
List of TSF data : Active authentication Private Key
The authorized identified roles : Personalization Agent
Application note 42: The component FMT_MTD.1/AAPK is refined by defining a selection between
“create” and “load” for the assignment “other operations”. “Load” means here that the Active
Authentication Private Key is generated securely outside the TOE and written into the TOE memory.
“Create” means here that the Active Authentication Private Key is generated by the TOE itself.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
Management of TSF data – Key Read
FMT_MTD.1.1 /
KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: change_default, query,
modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] the [assignment:
list of TSF data] to [assignment: the authorized identified roles].
Selection
Assignment : read
Assignment
List of TSF data :
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Document Basic Access Keys,
Chip Authentication Private Key,
Personalization Agent Keys,
Active Authentication Private Key
The authorized identified roles : none
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Secure TSF data (FMT_MTD.3)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
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FMT_MTD.3
Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certification chain are
accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the
Access Control.
Refinement
Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if:
(1) the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be
verified as correct with the public key of the Document Verifier
Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System
Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
(2) the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be
verified as correct with the public key in the Certificate of the
Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date
of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current
Date of the TOE,
(3) the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority can be verified as correct with the public
key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to
the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country
Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date
of the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System
Certificate in a valid certificate chain is a secure value for the
authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in
the certificates of a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal
Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended Inspection
System.
Application note 43: The Terminal Authentication is used for Extended Inspection System as required
by FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Terminal Authorization is used as TSF data for access control
required by FDP_ACF.1.
6.2.6
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF Data. The
security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With respect to the
forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security functional requirements
“Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one
hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFRs “Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)”
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together with the SAR “Security architecture description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation
and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
6.2.6.1
TOE EMANATION (FPT_EMSEC)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
TOE Emanation
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of
types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Assignment
Types of emissions : side channel
Specified limits : limits of the state of the art
List of types of TSF data : Personalization Agent Authentication Keys
and Chip Authentication Private Key and Active Authentication Private
Key
List of types of user data : none
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: types of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: types of connection] to gain access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of
user data].
Assignment
Types of users : any users
Types of connection : smart card circuit contacts
List of types of TSF data : Personalization Agent Authentication Keys
and Chip Authentication Private Key and Active Authentication Private
Key
List of types of user data : none
Application note 44: The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is
based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at the
interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the TOE or may be caused by an
attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set of measurable
physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the smart card. The
MRTD’s chip may provide a smart card contactless interface but may have also (not used by the
terminal but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contacts according to ISO/IEC 7816-2 as well. Examples
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of measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to variations in the power consumption, the
timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to internal operations or data transmissions.
6.2.6.2
FAIL SECURE (FPT_FLS)
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit information
leakage including physical manipulation.
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur : [assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF].
Assignment
List of types of failures in the TSF :
(1) Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore
a malfunction could occur,
(2) Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1
6.2.6.3
TSF PHYSICAL PROTECTION (FPT_PHP)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1
The TSF shall resist [assignment: physical tampering scenarios] to the
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements] by responding automatically
such that the SFRs are always enforced.
Assignment
Physical tampering scenarios : physical manipulation and physical
probing
List of TSF devices/elements : TSF
Application note 45: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter physical
manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially manipulation) the
TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against
these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic
response” means here
−
assuming that there might be an attack at any time and
−
countermeasures are provided at any time.
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6.2.6.4
TSF SELF TEST (FPT_TST)
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria
Part 2).
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST.1.1
TSF testing
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection : during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized
user, at the conditions [assignment : conditions under which self test
should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
Selection
During initial start-up
FPT_TST.2.1
The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.3.1
The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Application note 46: the FPT_TST.1 requirement describes requirement for the Personalization and
Operational Use phases. Self-tests during the Manufacturing phase are described in the chip security
target and have been evaluated during the chip evaluation.
6.3
SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TOE
The TOE shall be evaluated according to Evaluation Assurance Level 5 (EAL5)
And augmented by the following components:
−
ALC_DVS.2,
−
AVA_VAN.5.
Application note 47: The TOE shall protect the assets against high attack potential under the
assumption that the inspection system will prevent eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE
before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol
(OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD). Otherwise the confidentiality of the standard data shall be protected against
attacker with at least Enhanced-Basic attack potential (AVA_VAN.3).
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7 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION
7.1
SECURITY FUNCTIONS DESCRIPTION
7.1.1
Chip security functions
The following functionalities of the product are directly addressed by the chip. The complete list the chip
security functionality can be check in the chip Security Target [R8].
TSF_INTEGRITY
This security functionality is responsible for :
−
correcting single bit fails upon a read operation on each NVM byte,
−
verifying valid CPU usage,
−
checking integrity loss when accessing NVM, ROM or RAM,
−
providing a sign engine to check code and/or data integrity loss,
−
monitoring various manifestations of fault injection attempts,
−
providing a security timeout feature (watchdog timer),
−
providing the embedded software developer with the traceability information of the TOE.
TSF_PHYSICAL_TAMPERING
This security functionality ensures that:
−
The TOE detects clock and voltage supply operating changes by the environment,
−
The TOE detects attempts to violate its physical integrity, and glitch attacks,
−
The TOE is always clocked with shape and timing within specified operating conditions.
TSF_SECURITY_ADMIN
This security functionality ensures the management of the following security violation attempts:
−
Incorrect CPU usage,
−
Integrity loss in NVM, ROM or RAM
−
Code signature alarm,
−
Fault injection attempt,
−
access attempt to unavailable or reserved memory areas,
−
MPU errors,
−
Clock and voltage supply operating changes,
−
TOE physical integrity abuse.
TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY
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This security functionality prevents the disclosure of user data and of TSF data when it is transmitted
between separate parts of the TOE (the different memories, the CPU and other functional units of the
TOE such as a cryptographic co-processor are seen as separated parts of the TOE) :
This functionality provides additional support mechanisms to the SICESW developer contributing to
avoid information leakage.
TSF_SYM_CRYPTO
This security functionality provides DES and TDES data encryption / decryption capability, in order to
compute Message Authentication code (MAC) or the encrypted data.
TSF_ASYM_CRYPTO
This security functionality provides:
−
RSA verification (encryption) with an RSA modulo up to 4096 bits,
−
RSA signature (decryption) using or not using the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT), with an
RSA modulo up to 4096 bits,
−
RSA private and public keys computation with an RSA modulo up to 4096 bits,
−
Prime number generation up to 3200 bits, with Rabin-Miller primality tests.
This functionality implements also the following standard hash function:
−
SHA-1 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 160 bits result,
−
SHA-224 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 224-bit result,
−
SHA-256 hash function chaining blocks of 512 bits to get a 256-bit result.
This security function provides also the following basic functions for Elliptic Curves Cryptography over
prime fields:
−
general point addition,
−
point expansion and compression,
−
public scalar multiplication,
−
private scalar multiplication.
TSF_ALEAS
This security functionality provides a hardware Random Number Generator (RNG) to support security
operations performed by cryptographic applications. The RNG complies with the AIS31 Class P2
quality metric.
7.1.2
Low level security functions
TSF_PHYS
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This security function provides protection mechanism of the TOE towards observation and physical
tampering, such as random delay and desynchronization capability. This security function may call
TSF_UNOBSERVABILITY.
7.1.3
Operating system security functions
TSF_ACCESS
This security function manages the access to objects (files, directories, data and secrets) stored in
E²PROM.
TSF_INIT
This security performs TOE testing and initialization after each reset of the TOE.
TSF_MEMORY
This security function manages E²PROM and RAM erasure.
TSF_OTP
This security function manages the OTP area in E²PROM and in particular the « life cycle parameter »,
enforcing non-reversibility of the life cycle.
TSF_CPLC
This security function manages the CPLC area. The CPLC area contains Manufacturing data, prepersonalization data and Personalization data. The CPLC area is a write-only-once area and write
access is subject to Manufacturer or Personalization Agent authentication. Read access to the CPLC
area is allowed during Personalization phase. During Operational Use phase, the CPLC area read
access is only possible after BAC authentication.
TSF_CHECK
This security function performs data integrity checks.
TSF_TEST
This security function performs self-tests at start-up and monitors code integrity during execution.
TSF_AUDIT
This security function reacts when a fault or an anomaly is detected.
7.1.4
Application manager security functions
TSF_GESTION
This security function manages:
−
Management of the secure state of the TOE.
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7.1.5
−
Application selection.
−
Application separation.
Application security functions
TSF_SECRET
This security function ensures secure management of secret such as cryptographic keys.
TSF_CRYPTO
This security function performs high level cryptographic operations.
TSF_TERM_AUTH
TSF_TERM_AUTH performs the Terminal Authentication to authenticate the terminal.
TSF_TDES_AUTH
TSF_TDES_AUTH performs an authentication mechanism based on TDES.
TSF_CHIP_AUTH
This security function manages the capability of the TOE to authenticate itself to the terminal using the
Chip Authentication Protocol as defined in [R10].
TSF_ACTIVE_AUTH
This security function manages the capability of the TOE to authenticate itself to the terminal using the
Active Authentication Protocol as defined in [R9].
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8 DEFINITIONS, GLOSSARY AND ACRONYMS
8.1
ACRONYMS
BIS
Basic Inspection System
CC
Common Criteria
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EF
Elementary File
EIS
Extended Inspection System
GIS
General Inspection System
IAS
Identité Authentification Signature
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organization
ICCSN
Integrated Circuit Card Serial Number
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
JCRE
Java Card Runtime Environment
JVM
Java Virtual Machine
MF
Master File
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
n.a.
Not applicable
OSP
Organizational security policy
PP
Protection Profile
RAD
Reference Authentication Data
RNG
Random Number Generator
SAR
Security assurance requirements
SDO
Signed Data Object
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security functional requirement
ST
Security Target
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TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
VAD
Verification Authentication Data
VGP
Visa Global Platform
8.2
CONVENTIONS USED
The following list shows the roots used for the various elements.
Root
Elements described by this root
T.
Threats relative to the TOE and the TOE operational environment
OSP.
Organisational security policy
A.
Assumption
OT.
Security objectives for the TOE
OE.
Security objectives for the operational environment
8.3
DEFINITIONS
Active Authentication
Security mechanism defined in [5] option by which means the MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection
system verifies the identity and authenticity of the MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a
known State of Organization.
Application note
Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting information that is considered
relevant or useful for the construction, evaluation, or use of the TOE.
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data.
Authenticity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were created by the issuing
State or Organization.
Basic Access Control (BAC)
Security mechanism defined in [R9]] by which means the MRTD’s chip proves and the inspection
system protects their communication by means of secure messaging with Document Basic Access
Keys (see there).
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Basic Inspection System (BIS)
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and
authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys derived from the
printed MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data (biodata)
The personalized details of the MRTD holder appearing as text in the visual and machine readable
zones on the biographical data page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa. [R9].
Biometric reference data
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait
and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Certificate chain
Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest level), Document Verifier Certificate and
Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificates (highest level), where the certificate of a lower
lever is signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the next higher
level. The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate is signed with the private key
corresponding to the public key it contains (selfsigned certificate).
Chip
An integrated circuit and its embedded software as it come out of the IC manufacturing step.
Counterfeit
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made by whatever means. [R9]
Country Signing CA Certificate (CCSCA)
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing
Certification Authority stored in the inspection system.
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the Document Verifier
Certificates within this PKI. It enforces the Privacy policy of the issuing State or Organization in respect
to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD.
Current date
The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic Inspection System certificates
known to the TOE. It is used the validate card verifiable certificates.
CVCA link Certificate
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Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority signed with the old
public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new
key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm
The [R9], normative appendix 5, A5.1 describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm
on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access Keys from the second line of the printed
MRZ data.
Document Basic Access Keys
Pair of symmetric (two-key) Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption (key KENC) and
message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection
system [R9]. It is drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to
read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security Object (SOD)
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer (DS). Carries the hash values
of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate
(CDS). [R9]
Document Verifier
Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates and managing the authorization of the
Extended Inspection Systems for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing
States or Organizations.
Eavesdropper
A threat agent with Enhanced-Basic attack potential reading the communication between the MRTD’s
chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent preparation and
storage of biometric reference templates representing that person's identity. [R9]
Extended Access Control
Security mechanism identified in [R9] by which means the MRTD’s chip (i) verifies the authentication of
the inspection systems authorized to read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access
to the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of the optional
biometric reference data during their transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging. The
Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalization
Agent Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection System
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A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism, (ii) implements
the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (iii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through
the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Extended Inspection System (EIS)
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to Basic Inspection System
authorized by the issuing State or Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the biographical data or the
portrait. [R9]
General Inspection System
A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
Global Interoperability
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different States throughout the
world to exchange data, to process data received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data
in inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the
standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine readable data in all
MRTDs. [R9]
IC Dedicated Support Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides functions after TOE Delivery.
The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test Software
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test the TOE before TOE
Delivery but which does not provide any functionality thereafter.
Initialisation Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile memory by the Integrated
Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC
identification as MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection
The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveler (the MRTD holder) and verifying its
authenticity. [R9]
Inspection system (IS)
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A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit (IC)
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is
built on an integrated circuit.
Integrity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have not been altered from that
created by the issuing State or Organization.
Issuing Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United Nations Organization,
issuer of the Laissez-passer). [R9]
Issuing State
The Country issuing the MRTD. [R9]
Logical Data Structure (LDS)
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity expansion technology [R9].
The capacity expansion technology used is the MRTD’s chip.
Logical MRTD
Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [R9] as specified by ICAO on
the MRTD’s chip. It presents readable data including (but not limited to)
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
(6) EF.COM and EF.SOD
Logical travel document
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in the integrated circuit
including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
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(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine readable travel document (MRTD)
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the holder for international travel
(e.g. passport, visa, official document of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable)
data and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential data
elements capable of being machine read. [R9]
Machine readable zone (MRZ)
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page or, in the case of the TD1,
the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR
methods. [R9]
MRTD application
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It
includes
−
the file structure implementing the LDS [R9]
−
the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself (i.e. content of EF.DG1 to
EF.DG13 and EF.DG16, EF.COM and EF.SOD) and
−
the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
−
the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the inspection system and the
MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s
chip according to LDS.
MRTD holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip
A chip programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by [R9] and ready for
personalisation.
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software is designed in Step 1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Step 3 of the TOE
life-cycle.
Optional biometric reference data
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Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger
image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European
commission decided to use only fingerprint and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference
data.
Patch
Additional executable code loaded in EEPROM of a chip after IC manufacturing step, in order to fix a
bug or a problem encountered with the embedded software execution. A patch can fix
−
a functional problem, eg. missing arguments in an APDU, bad timing in the protocol
management…
−
a security problem: typically, a patch that corrects a weakness discovered on a security function.
Note that a patch that fixes a functional problem can have an impact on the security of the chip if it
affects the behaviour of a security function.
Passive authentication
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values contained in the
Document Security Object.
Personalization
The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied to the document. This
may also include the optional biometric data collected during the “Enrolment”. [R9]
Personalization Agent
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the
holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the
biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the
encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization Agent Authentication Information
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization Agent.
Personalization Agent Authentication Key
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to prove their identity and get
access to the logical MRTD and (ii) by the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a
terminal as Personalization Agent.
Physical travel document
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to present data including (but
not limited to)
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(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-personalization Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2)
for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle
phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the
Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair
of the chip.
Receiving State
The Country to which the Traveler is applying for entry. [R9]
Reference data
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the verification data provided by an
entity to prove this identity in an authentication attempt.
Secure messaging in encrypted mode
Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code according to ISO/IEC 7816-4.
Skimming
Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless
communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
Security Target (ST)
Reference document for the TOE evaluation: the certificate awarded by the DCSSI will attest
conformity of the product and its documentation with the (functional and assurance) requirements
formulated in the security target.
Target of Evaluation (TOE)
The product to be evaluated and its associated documentation.
Terminal Authorization
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Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the Inspection System Certificate, the
Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the
Current Date.
TOE Security Functionality (TSF)
A set consisting of all hardware, software and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the
correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy (TSP)
Set of rules stipulating how to manage, protect and distribute assets within a TOE.
Travel document
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or Organization which may be used
by the rightful holder for international travel. [R9]
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE (CC part 1 [R1]).
Unpersonalized MRTD
The MRTD that contains the MRTD Chip holding only Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
as delivered to the Personalisation Agent from the Manufacturer.
User data
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF (CC part 1 [R1]).
Verification
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric reference template of a
single enrollee whose identity is being claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrollee’s
template. [R9]
Verification data
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity to the verifier. The verifier
checks whether the verification data match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
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9 REFERENCE AND APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
9.1
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
Designation
Reference
Title
Revision
Date
Common Criteria
[R1]
CCMB-2006-09-001
Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model
Version
3.1,
Revision
1
September
2006
[R2]
CCMB-2007-09-002
Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components
Version
3.1,
Revision
2
September
2007
[R3]
CCMB-2007-09-003
Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Components
Version
3.1,
Revision
2
September
2007
[R4]
CCMB-2007-09-004
Common Methodology for Information
Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology
Version
3.1,
Revision
2
September
2007
Protection Profiles and Security Target
[R5]
BSI-PP-0056
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
“ICAO Application” - Extended Access
Control
Version
1.10
March 2009
[R6]
BSI-PP-0055
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
version
1.10
March 2009
with “ICAO Application", Basic Access
Control
[R7]
BSI-PP-0002-2001
Protection Profile, Security IC Platform
Protection Profile. Certified by BSI
(Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik).
Version
1.0
July 2001
[R8]
SMD_Sx23YRxx_ST_09_002
Sx23YRxxB Security Target - Public
Version
Rev
02.01
February 2010
Sixth
edition
2006
E-passport specifications
[R9]
ICAO Doc 9303
part 1 volume 1, Sixth edition, 2006,
Passports with Machine Readable Data
Stored in Optical Character Recognition
Format;
part 1 volume 2, Sixth edition, 2006,
Specifications for Electronically Enabled
Passports with Biometric Identification
Capability.
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Designation
Reference
Title
Revision
[R10]
TR-03110
Technical Guideline Advanced Security
Mechanisms for Machine Readable
Travel Documents – Extended Access
Control (EAC)
Version
1.11
Date
CC supporting document
9.2
[R11]
CCDB-2008-04-001
Supporting Document - Mandatory
Technical Document - Application of
Attack Potential to Smartcards
V2.5, R1
April 2008
[R12]
CCDB-2007-09-001
Supporting Document - Mandatory
Technical Document - Composite product
evaluation for Smartcards and similar
devices
V1.0, R1
September
2007
APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
Designation
Reference
Title
Revision
Date
Version
1.4
Revised
November 1,
1993
Cryptography
[R13]
PKCS#3
PKCS#3 : Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement
Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical
Note
[R14]
ISO/IEC 15946
ISO/IEC 15946 : Information technology –
Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 3
: Key establishment.
2002
Technical Guideline :Elliptic Curve
Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TRECC, BSI
2006
[R15]
[R16]
FIPS PUB 46-3
Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication FIPS PUB 46-3, Data
Encryption Standards (DES), U.S.
Department Of Commerce / National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
Reaffirmed
1999 October
25
[R17]
ANSI X9.31
American Bankers Association, Digital
Signatures Using Reversible Public Key
Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry (rDSA), ANSI X9.31-1998 Appendix A.2.4
1998
Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH
STANDARD (+ Change Notice to include
SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of
Standards and Technology
2002 August
1
[R18]
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OTHER
[R19]
VISA global platform requirements
configuration 3 – compact
v2.1.1
[R20]
Plate-forme commune pour
l’eAdministration – Spécification technique
Version
1.01
[R21]
EMV CPS
1.0 Final
May 2003
16 June 2003
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