Certification Report: c0072_erpt
CRP-C0072-01
Certification Report
Buheita Fujiwara, Chairman
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan
Target of Evaluation
Application date/ID
Certification No.
Sponsor
Name of TOE
Version of TOE
PP Conformance
Conformed Claim
Developer
Evaluation Facility
November 14, 2006 (ITC-6116)
C0072
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-II C4300/C3300/C2200
Series Security Kit for Asia Pacific
Controller ROM Ver1.121.7
None
EAL2
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
Japan
Electronics
and
Information
Technology
Industries
Association,
Information Technology Security Center
(JEITA ITSC)
This is to report that the evaluation result for the above TOE is certified as
follows.
December 15, 2006
Haruki Tabuchi, Technical Manager
Information Security Certification Office
IT Security Center
Evaluation Criteria, etc.: This TOE is evaluated in accordance with the following
criteria prescribed in the “IT Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme”.
- Common Criteria for Information-technology Security Evaluation Version 2.3
- Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
Version 2.3
Evaluation Result: Pass
“Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-II C4300/C3300/C2200 Series Security Kit for Asia
Pacific Controller ROM Ver1.121.7” has been evaluated in accordance with the
provision of the “IT Security Certification Procedure” by Information-technology
Promotion Agency, Japan, and has met the specified assurance requirements.
CRP-C0072-01
Notice:
This document is the English translation version of the Certification Report
published by the Certification Body of Japan Information Technology Security
Evaluation and Certification Scheme.
CRP-C0072-01
Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary ............................................................................... 1
1.1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 1
1.2 Evaluated Product ............................................................................ 1
1.2.1 Name of Product ......................................................................... 1
1.2.2 Product Overview ........................................................................ 1
1.2.3 Scope of TOE and Overview of Operation ....................................... 2
1.2.4 TOE Functionality ....................................................................... 3
1.3 Conduct of Evaluation ....................................................................... 4
1.4 Certificate of Evaluation .................................................................... 4
1.5 Overview of Report ............................................................................ 5
1.5.1 PP Conformance .......................................................................... 5
1.5.2 EAL ........................................................................................... 5
1.5.3 SOF ........................................................................................... 5
1.5.4 Security Functions ...................................................................... 5
1.5.5 Threat ........................................................................................ 7
1.5.6 Organisational Security Policy ..................................................... 7
1.5.7 Configuration Requirements ........................................................ 7
1.5.8 Assumptions for Operational Environment .................................... 7
1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product ................................................... 8
2. Conduct and Results of Evaluation by Evaluation Facility......................... 9
2.1 Evaluation Methods .......................................................................... 9
2.2 Overview of Evaluation Conducted ..................................................... 9
2.3 Product Testing ................................................................................ 9
2.3.1 Developer Testing........................................................................ 9
2.3.2 Evaluator Testing ...................................................................... 11
2.4 Evaluation Result ........................................................................... 12
3. Conduct of Certification ....................................................................... 13
4. Conclusion .......................................................................................... 14
4.1 Certification Result ......................................................................... 14
4.2 Recommendations ........................................................................... 14
5. Glossary ............................................................................................. 15
6. Bibliography ....................................................................................... 18
CRP-C0072-01
1. Executive Summary
1.1 Introduction
This Certification Report describes the content of certification result in relation to IT
Security Evaluation of “Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-II C4300/C3300/C2200 Series Security
Kit for Asia Pacific Controller ROM Ver1.121.7” (hereinafter referred to as “the TOE”)
conducted by Japan Electronics and Information Technology Industries Association,
Information Technology Security Center (hereinafter referred to as “Evaluation
Facility”), and it reports to the sponsor, Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
The reader of the Certification Report is advised to read the corresponding ST and
manuals (please refer to “1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product” for further details)
attached to the TOE together with this report. The assumed environment,
corresponding security objectives, security functional and assurance requirements
needed for its implementation and their summary specifications are specifically
described in ST. The operational conditions and functional specifications are also
described in the document attached to the TOE.
Note that the Certification Report presents the certification result based on assurance
requirements conformed to the TOE, and does not certify individual IT product itself.
Note:
In this Certification Report, IT Security Evaluation Criteria and IT
Security Evaluation Method prescribed by IT Security Evaluation and
Certification Scheme are named CC and CEM, respectively.
1.2 Evaluated Product
1.2.1 Name of Product
The target product by this Certificate is as follows:
Name of Product: Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-II C4300/C3300/C2200 Series Security Kit
for Asia Pacific
Version:
Controller ROM Ver1.121.7
Developer:
Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
1.2.2 Product Overview
This product is firmware that is provided as an optional product of ApeosPort-II
C4300 , ApeosPort-II C3300, and ApeosPort-II C2200 (Fuji Xerox s digital
multifunction machines with copy, printer, scanner, and facsimile functions. Hereafter
MFP. )
This product protects document data that is stored on the hard disk drive when MFP
performs processings of copy, print, scan, and facsimile from being illicitly disclosed.
The following are the security functions provided by this product:
- HDD overwriting for residual data
- HDD data encryption
- Key-operator authentication
- Customer-engineer operation restriction
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1.2.3 Scope of TOE and Overview of Operation
MFP consists of three board-units: controller board, control panel, and facsimile card.
TOE is a set of programs that are recorded in the system ROM mounted on the
controller board. TOE’s physical configuration image and functions are shown in
Figure 1-1.
TOE
MFP
Control Panel
Button
Lam p
Touch-panel Display
Controller Board
System ROM
Copy
Control
Function
Scanner
Control
Function
Key-operator
Authentic ation
Function
HDD Data
Encryption
Function
SEEPRO
M
USB
Decomposing
Function
Customerengineer
Operation
Restriction
Function
HDD
Overw riting
Function for
Residual Data
IEEE128
4
Printer Control
Function
IOT
NVRAM
Controlpanel
Control
Function
Ethernet
IIT
CWIS
Facsim ile
Control
Function
Key-operator’s Client
User’s Client
Mail Server
FTP Server
SMB Server
User’s Client
User’s Client
DRAM
Facsim ile
Card
Public Telephone
Line Network
CPU
Hard Disk Drive
Figure 1-1: TOE’s Physical Configuration Image
Usage environment of MFP with TOE security functions and operation overview is
shown below.
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- Printer Driver
- Network Scanner
Utility
- Facsimile Driver
General
User
External
Network
Firewall
ApeosPort/DocuCentre
User’s Client (PC)
- Printer Driver
- Network Scanner
Utility
- Facsimile Driver
General
User
Internal
Network
General
User
TOE
Key Operator
User’s Client (PC)
Web Browser
Key
Operator
Customer
Engineer
Key-operator’s Client
(PC)
Mail Server
- Printer Driver
- Facsimile Driver
FTP Server
SMB Server
Public Telephone
Line Network
User’s Client (PC)
General
User
Figure 1-2: Usage Environment
<Overview of TOE operation related to key operator>
Identification and authentication are performed at the control panel of MFP or the
key-operator ’s client. Key operator makes settings described in Table 1-1 after
being identified and authenticated as key operator.
Table 1-1: Setting Data
Item
number
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Setting data
Setting for HDD overwrite function
Setting for using password
Key-operator ’s password
Setting for customer-engineer operation restriction
function
Access denial due to failure in authentication of
key-operator ’s ID
Setting for HDD data encryption function
Cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard
disk drive
<Overview of TOE operation related to general user>
By operating the control panel of MFP or the user ’s client and performing copy,
print, scan, or facsimile, used document data is stored on the hard disk drive built
into MFP. At this time, security functions automatically operate according to the
setting data in Table 1-1 before general user knows (when the “setting for HDD
overwriting function for residual data” and the “setting for HDD data encryption
function” are enabled, used document data is stored after being encrypted, and
then overwritten and erased at the time of completion of each processing).
1.2.4 TOE Functionality
TOE has the security functions described below:
<HDD overwriting function for residual data>
After the operation of copy, printer, scanner, and facsimile functions, this function
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overwrites and erases used document data stored on the hard disk drive.
<HDD data encryption function>
At the time of the operation of copy, printer, scanner, and facsimile functions, this
function encrypts document data when storing it on the hard disk drive.
<Key-operator authentication function>
This function identifies and authenticates key operator at the control panel or the
key-operator ’s client, and enables only the key operator to make settings on the
TOE security functions described below:
- Setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data
- Setting for using password
- Key-operator ’s password
- Access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator ’s ID
- Setting for HDD data encryption function
- Cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive
<Customer-engineer operation restriction function>
This function enables only the key operator to make the setting for
customer-engineer operation restriction function.
1.3 Conduct of Evaluation
Based on the IT Security Evaluation/Certification Program operated by the
Certification Body, TOE functionality and its assurance requirements are being
evaluated by evaluation facility in accordance with those publicized documents such as
“IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme”[2], “IT Security Certification
Procedure”[3] and “Evaluation Facility Approval Procedure”[4].
Scope of the evaluation is as follow.
- Security design of the TOE shall be adequate;
- Security functions of the TOE shall be satisfied with security functional
requirements described in the security design;
- This TOE shall be developed in accordance with the basic security design;
- Above mentioned three items shall be evaluated in accordance with the CC Part 3
and CEM.
More specific, the evaluation facility examined “Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-II
C4300/C3300/C2200 Series Security Kit for Asia Pacific Security Target V1.01” as the
basis design of security functions for the TOE (hereinafter referred to as “the ST”)[1],
the evaluation deliverables in relation to development of the TOE and the development,
manufacturing and shipping sites of the TOE. The evaluation facility evaluated if the
TOE is satisfied both Annex C of CC Part 1 (either of [5], [8] or [11]) and Functional
Requirements of CC Part 2 (either of [6], [9] or [12]) and also evaluated if the
development, manufacturing and shipping environments for the TOE is also satisfied
with Assurance Requirements of CC Part 3 (either of [7], [10] or [13]) as its rationale.
Such evaluation procedure and its result are presented in “Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-II
C4300/C3300/C2200 Series Security Kit for Asia Pacific Evaluation Technical Report
V1.1” (hereinafter referred to as “the Evaluation Technical Report”) [17]. Further,
evaluation methodology should comply with the CEM (either of [14], [15] or [16]).
1.4 Certification
The Certification Body verifies the Evaluation Technical Report and Observation
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Report prepared by the evaluation facility and evaluation evidence materials, and
confirmed that the TOE evaluation is conducted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Certification review is also prepared for those concerns found in the
certification process. Evaluation is completed with the Evaluation Technical Report
dated December, 2006 submitted by the evaluation facility and those problems pointed
out by the Certification Body are fully resolved and confirmed that the TOE evaluation
is appropriately conducted in accordance with CC and CEM. The Certification Body
prepared this Certification Report based on the Evaluation Technical Report submitted
by the evaluation facility and concluded fully certification activities.
1.5 Overview of Report
1.5.1 PP Conformance
There is no PP to be conformed.
1.5.2 EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level of TOE defined by this ST is EAL2 conformance.
1.5.3 SOF
This ST claims “SOF-basic” as its minimum strength of function.
Attack level of the attackers assumed for this TOE is low level. Therefore, the claim of
“SOF-basic” as the minimum function strength is appropriate.
1.5.4 Security Functions
Security functions of the TOE are as follow.
<HDD overwriting function for residual data (SF.OVERWRITE)>
According to the ”setting for HDD overwriting function for residual data” that is
set by key operator, this function overwrites and erases the used document data on
the hard disk drive using the way described in Table 1-2.
If overwriting of the used document data is not finished such as due to power
shutdown, this function overwrites and erases the data at the next system booting
because a list of the used document data that is to be overwritten and erased is in
the hard disk drive.
Table 1-2: Control of Overwriting
Number of
Data to overwrite with
overwritings
One time
0
Three times First time: random number
Second time: random number
Third time: 0
<HDD data encryption function (SF.ENCRYPTION)>
According the “setting for HDD data encryption function” that is set by key
operator, this function encrypts document data stored on the hard disk drive. At
the time of booting, TOE generates cryptographic key using the “cryptographic
seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive” that is set by key operator.
When storing document data on the hard disk drive, TOE stores the document
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data after performing encryption using the cryptographic key generated at the
time of booting. When reading the stored document data, TOE also performs
decryption using the cryptographic key generated at the time of booting.
Cryptographic key is lost when the power of the mainframe of MFP is shut down.
<Key-operator authentication function (SF.MANAGE)>
This function controls the operation of TOE setting data so that the operation can
be performed by the authenticated key-operator. Before allowing the operation of
TOE setting data, this function identifies and authenticates key operator with
“key-operator s user ID” and “key-operator ’s password” entered at the control
panel or through the Web browser of key-operator ’s client.
While “key-operator ’s password” is being entered at the control panel or through
the Web browser of key-operator ’s client, asterisks (“*”) of the same number as the
characters of the entered password are displayed in the “password” input field of
the control panel or the Web browser of key-operator ’s client.
When the “key-operator ’s user ID” and ”key-operator ’s password” entered at the
control panel or through the Web browser of key-operator ’s client are correct and
the identification/authentication of key operator succeeds, this function allows the
operation of TOE setting data. When either of the “key-operator ’s user ID”
or ”key-operator ’s password” entered at the control panel or through the Web
browser of key-operator ’s client is incorrect and the identification/authentication
of key operator fails, this function displays identification/authentication error.
When authentication fails the same number of times as that set in the “access
denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator ’s ID,” this function denies
authentication. Only the key operator who is authenticated in the above-described
way can set:
- “HDD overwriting function for residual data” to “Not perform,” “Perform (one
time),” or “Perform (three times).”
- “setting for using password” to “Not perform” or “Perform.”
- “HDD data encryption function” to “Not perform” or ”Perform.”
- “key-operator ’s password” to 7 to 12 alphanumeric characters.
- “access denial due to failure in authentication of key-operator ’s ID” to “Not
perform” or ”Perform (1 to 10 times).”
- “cryptographic seed key for data stored on the hard disk drive” to 12
alphanumeric characters.
<Customer-engineer operation restriction function (SF.CEREST)>
This function controls the operation of the TOE setting data for ”setting for
customer-engineer operation restriction function” so that the operation can be
performed by the authenticated key-operator. ”setting for customer-engineer
operation restriction function” can be set to “Not perform” or “Perform”. By setting
to “Perform,” customer engineer can be restricted from referring to / changing
settings on TOE security functions.
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1.5.5 Threat
This TOE assumes such threats presented in Table 1-3 and provides functions for
countermeasure to them.
Table 1-3 Assumed Threats
Identifier
T.RECOVER
<Illicit recovery of
used document data>
T.CONFDATA
<Illicit access to TOE
setting data>
Threat
General user and the person who is not related to
TOE might recover used document data such as by
removing the hard disk drive and connecting it
directly to a tool.
General user and the person who is not related to
TOE might change settings by accessing TOE
setting data from the control panel or
key-operator ’s client. This setting data is allowed
to be accessed only by key operator.
1.5.6 Organisational Security Policy
No organisational security policies to comply with are required of the TOE utilized in
organisations.
1.5.7 Configuration Requirements
This product is offered as an optional product that is installed on Fuji Xerox s digital
multifunction machines, ApeosPort-II C4300 , ApeosPort-II C3300, and ApeosPort-II
C2200.
1.5.8 Assumptions for Operational Environment
Assumptions required in environment using this TOE presents in the Table 1-4.
The effective performance of the TOE security functions are not assured unless these
preconditions are satisfied.
Table 1-4 Assumptions in Use of the TOE
Identifier
A.SECMODE
<Protection mode>
A.ADMIN
<Trust
in
operator>
key
Assumptions
When operating TOE, key operator makes settings
as follows:
Key-operator ’s password: 7 to 12 characters
Setting for customer-engineer operation
restriction function: “Perform”
Setting for using password: “Perform”
Access denial due to failure in authentication
of key-operator ’s ID: “Perform” and five times
Additionally, key-operator ’s password is managed
so that it is prevented from being guessed or
disclosed.
Key operator has knowledge necessary to fulfill
the assigned role and does not conduct improperly
with malicious intention.
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A.NET
<Network connection
condition>
MFP that TOE is installed on is connected to an
internal
network.
This
internal
network
constitutes an environment where interceptions
are not made.
Even when this internal network is connected to
an external network, MFP cannot be accessed
from the external network.
1.5.9 Documents Attached to Product
Documents attached to the TOE are listed below.
-
ApeosPort-II C4300/C3300/C2200 DocuCentre-II C4300/C3300/C2200 User Guide
Edition 1
ApeosPort-II C4300/C3300/C2200 DocuCentre-II C4300/C3300/C2200 Security Kit
Supplementary Guide Edition 0.1
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2. Conduct and Results of Evaluation by Evaluation Facility
2.1 Evaluation Methods
Evaluation was conducted by using the evaluation methods prescribed in CEM in
accordance with the assurance requirements in CC Part 3. Details for evaluation
activities are report in the Evaluation Technical Report. It described the description of
overview of the TOE, and the contents and verdict evaluated by each work unit
prescribed in CEM.
2.2 Overview of Evaluation Conducted
The history of evaluation conducted was present in the Evaluation Technical Report as
follows.
Evaluation has started on November, 2006 and concluded by completion the Evaluation
Technical Report dated December, 2006. The evaluation facility received a full set of
evaluation deliverables necessary for evaluation provided by developer, and examined
the evidences in relation to a series of evaluation conducted. Additionally, the
evaluation facility directly visited the development and manufacturing sites on
November, 2006 and examined procedural status conducted in relation to each work
unit for configuration management and delivery and operation by investigating
records and staff hearing. Further, the evaluation facility executed sampling check of
conducted testing by developer and evaluator testing by using developer testing
environment at developer site on November, 2006.
As for concerns indicated during evaluation process by the Certification Body, the
certification review was sent to the evaluation facility. These were reflected to
evaluation after investigation conducted by the evaluation facility and the developer.
2.3 Product Testing
Overview of developer testing evaluated by evaluator and evaluator testing conducted
by evaluator are as follows.
2.3.1 Developer Testing
1) Developer Test Environment
System configuration for the test that was conducted by developer is shown in
Figure 2-1.
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General
User
- Printer Driver
- Network Scanner
Utility
- Facsimile Driver
External
Network
General
User
General
User
Firewall
ApeosPort/DocuCentre
User’s Client (PC)
- Printer Driver
- Network Scanner
Utility
- Facsimile Driver
User’s Client (PC)
Web Browser
Internal
Network
FTP Server
SMB Server
Customer
Engineer
Public
Telephone Line
Network
Key Operator Key Operator’s Client
(PC)
Mail Server
Key Operator
TOE
Original Converter
User’s Client (PC)
- Printer Driver
- Facsimile Driver
General
User
Debug Serial
IDE Monitor
Test
Conductor B
Test
Conductor C
Figure 2-1 System Configuration of Developer Testing
2) Outlining of Developer Testing
Outlining of the testing performed by the developer is as follow.
a. Test configuration
Test configuration performed by the developer is showed in the Figure 2-1.
Developer testing was performed at the same TOE testing environment with the
TOE configuration identified in ST.
b. Testing Approach
For the testing, following approach was used.
1. Method of directly observing the behavior of security functions from the
external interfaces by stimulating the external interfaces of these functions
by operating MFP and PCs.
2. Method of checking the behavior of the security functions of which behavior
cannot be directly observed from the external interfaces (“HDD overwriting
function for residual data” and “HDD data encryption function”) using the
tools (debug serial and IDE monitor).
Debug serial was connected via the original converter to MFP, and used for
checking the condition of the data in the hard disk drive. IDE monitor was
used for checking the contents of the data communicated between the
controller board and the hard disk drive in MFP by monitoring the
communicated data. By generating pseudo-errors of the hard disk drive by
connecting the trunk cable, which has a switch to turn off the power of the
hard disk drive, to the hard disk drive, the test on the operation errors of the
overwriting and erasing function was conducted.
c. Scope of Testing Performed
Testing is performed 28 items by the developer.
The number of test items for testing each security function was as follows:
HDD overwriting function for residual data: 19 items
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HDD data encryption function: 4 items
Key-operator authentication function: 4 items
Customer-engineer operation restriction function: 1 item
The test covered the behavior of each function, and the overall test volume and
scope were appropriate.
d. Result
The evaluator confirmed consistencies between the expected test results and the
actual test results provided by the developer. The Evaluator confirmed the
developer testing approach performed and legitimacy of items performed, and
confirmed consistencies between the testing approach described in the test plan
and the actual test results.
2.3.2 Evaluator Testing
1) Evaluator Test Environment
Configuration of the system used for evaluator testing is shown in Figure 2-2.
MFP
Control Panel
FAX Card
Controller Board
LAN Port
Straight Cable
Hard Disk
Drive
User’s Client
Unique
Converter
Debug Serial
IDE Monitor
Figure 2-2: System Configuration for Evaluator Testing
2) Outlining of Evaluator Testing
Outlining of testing performed by the evaluator is as follow.
a. Test configuration
Test configuration performed by the evaluator is showed in the Figure 2-2.
Evaluator testing was performed at the same TOE testing environment with the
TOE configuration identified in ST.
b. Testing Approach
Evaluator conducted the test in the same methods as those for developer testing
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based on the judgment that the testing methods implemented by developer are
suitable to verify the expected behavior of security functions.
c. Scope of Testing Performed
Evaluator conducted the 22-item test (3 items created uniquely by evaluator, 14
items conducted by sampling evaluator testing, and 5 items of intrusion test).
The test created uniquely by evaluator was conducted by considering the
accuracy of the developer testing for security functions.
For sampling test, 14 items, which are 50% of the 28 items of the test conducted
by developer, were selected.
For intrusion test, vulnerability analysis was conducted based on the result of
developer vulnerability analysis, and 5-item test was conducted based on this
analysis result.
d. Result
All evaluator testing conducted is completes correctly and could confirm the
behaviour of the TOE. The evaluator also confirmed that all the test results are
consistent with the behaviour.
2.4 Evaluation Result
The evaluator had the conclusion that the TOE satisfies all work units prescribed in
CEM by submitting the Evaluation Technical Report.
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3. Conduct of Certification
The following certification was conducted based on each materials submitted by
evaluation facility during evaluation process.
1. Evidential materials submitted were sampled, its contents were examined, and
related work units shall be evaluated as presented in the Evaluation Technical
Report.
2. Rationale of evaluation verdict by the evaluator presented in the Evaluation
Technical Report shall be adequate.
3. The Evaluator ’s evaluation methodology presented in the Evaluation Technical
Report shall conform to the CEM.
Concerns found in certification process were prepared as certification review, which
were sent to evaluation facility.
The Certification Body confirmed such concerns pointed out in certification review
were solved in the ST and the Evaluation Technical Report.
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4. Conclusion
4.1 Certification Result
The Certification Body verified the Evaluation Technical Report and the related
evaluation evidential materials submitted and confirmed that all evaluator action
elements required in CC Part 3 are conducted appropriately to the TOE. The
Certification Body verified the TOE is satisfied the EAL2 assurance requirements
prescribed in CC Part 3.
4.2 Recommendations
None
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5. Glossary
The abbreviations used in this report are listed below.
CC:
Common Criteria
Evaluation
for
Information
CEM:
Common Methodology
Evaluation
EAL:
Evaluation Assurance Level
PP:
Protection Profile
SOF:
Strength of Function
ST:
Security Target
TOE:
Target of Evaluation
TSF:
TOE Security Functions
IIT:
Image Input Terminal
IOT:
Image Output Terminal
for
Information
Technology
Technology
Security
Security
The glossaries used in this report are listed below.
General User:
One who uses copy and printer functions of MFP.
Key Operator:
One who manages MFP.
Customer
Engineer:
Control Panel:
Fuji Xerox’s engineer who maintains and repairs MFP.
Panel on which the buttons, lamps, and touch panel display
that are necessary for operating MFP are arranged.
User ’s Client:
Client that is used by general user. General user uses printer
functions of MFP by using printer driver that is installed on
the user ’s client.
Key-operator ’s
Client:
Client that is used by key operator. Key operator checks and
rewrites TOE setting data for MFP using the Web browser.
Printer Driver:
Software that converts data on user ’s client to print data
described in page description language (PDL) that can be
interpreted by MFP. Used on user ’s client.
Printer
Function:
Function to decompose and print out print data sent from
user ’s client.
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Storage Print:
Print method in printer function. In this method, bitmap data
created by decomposing print data is once stored on the
internal hard disk drive of MFP, and printed according to the
general-user ’s instruction from the control panel or when the
designated time comes. There are following five methods:
- Security print
- Sample print
- Authentication print
- Time designation print
- Print that uses mailbox
Scanner
Function:
Function to scan an original in IIT and print out from IOT,
according to the general-user ’ s instruction from the control
panel. When multiple copies of the same original are
instructed to be printed, the document data is
- scanned in IIT,
- stored on the internal hard disk drive of MFP,
- read from the internal hard disk drive for the same
number of times as the number of designated copies, and
printed out.
Scanner
Function:
According to the general-user ’s instruction from the control
panel, scans an original in IIT and stores it in an expanded
mailbox created in the internal hard disk drive of MFP. The
stored document data is retrieved by network scanner utility
on user ’s client.
Facsimile
Function:
Sends and receives facsimiles. When sending a facsimile,
document data of an original scanned in IIT is sent to a remote
machine connected to public telephone line network, according
to the general-user ’s instruction from the control panel. When
receiving a facsimile, document data sent via public telephone
line network from a connected remote-machine is received and
printed out from IOT.
Expanded
Mailbox:
Logical box created in the hard disk drive of MFP. The
following can be stored in this box: the document data scanned
by scanner function and the document data for the print that
uses an expanded mailbox.
Document Data: In this ST, “document data” is used as a generic term for the
data including all the image information that pass the inside
of MFP when general user uses copy, printer, scanner, and
facsimile functions of MFP.
The following are included:
- Bitmap data that is printed in IOT when using copy
function.
- Print data sent from user ’s client and bitmap data
created by decomposing the data, when using printer
function.
- Bitmap data that is stored on the internal hard disk
drive when using scanner function.
- Bitmap data that is sent to a connected remote-machine
and bitmap data that is received from a connected
remote-machine and printed in IOT, when using
facsimile function.
16
CRP-C0072-01
Used Document Document data of which use is finished after being stored on
Data:
the internal hard disk drive of MFP.
To Overwrite
and Erase:
To overwrite the data area with the specific data when
document data stored on the hard disk drive is to be deleted.
Cryptographic
Seed Key:
12-digit alphanumeric characters that are entered by user.
Cryptographic key is generated from this key.
Cryptographic
Key:
128-bit data that is automatically generated from
cryptographic seed key. Encryption is performed using this
cryptographic key.
17
CRP-C0072-01
6. Bibliography
[1]
Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-II C4300/C3300/C2200 Series Security Kit for Aisa Pacific
Security Target V1.01 (October 27, 2006) Fuji Xerox Co., Ltd.
[2]
IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan EC-01
[3]
IT Security Certification Procedure, September 2006, Information-technology
Promotion Agency, Japan EC-03
[4]
Evaluation
Facility
Approval
Procedure,
Information-technology Promotion Agency, Japan EC-05
[5]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-001
[6]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional requirements Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-002
[7]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance requirements Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-003
[8]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1:
Introduction and general model Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-001
(Translation Version 1.0 December 2005)
[9]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2:
Security functional requirements Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-002
(Translation Version 1.0 December 2005)
[10]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3:
Security assurance requirements Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-003
(Translation Version 1.0 December 2005)
[11]
ISO/IEC 15408-1:2005 - Information Technology - Security techniques
Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 1: Introduction and general model
-
[12]
ISO/IEC 15408-2:2005 - Information technology - Security techniques
Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 2: Security functional requirements
-
[13]
ISO/IEC 15408-3:2005 - Information technology - Security techniques
Evaluation criteria for IT security - Part 3: Security assurance requirements
-
[14]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation Methodology Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-004
[15]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation:
Evaluation Methodology Version 2.3 August 2005 CCMB-2005-08-004
(Translation Version 1.0 December 2005)
[16]
ISO/IEC 18045:2005 Information technology - Security techniques - Methodology
for IT security evaluation
[17]
Fuji Xerox ApeosPort-II C4300/C3300/C2200 Series Security Kit for Asia Pacific
Evaluation Technical Report V1.1, December 6, 2006, Japan Electronics and
Information Technology Industries Association, Information Technology Security
Center
18
September
September
2006,
2006,
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