Security Target: XSMART e-Passport V1.3_R3_ASE_LITE(ENG)_v1.0

Security Target: XSMART e-Passport V1.3_R3_ASE_LITE(ENG)_v1.0
XSmart e-Passport V1.3 R3 on
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
Security Target Lite V1.0
Document ID: XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
Copyright ⓒ 2015 – LG CNS Co., Ltd. All rights reserved
XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
[ Modification History ]
Version
1.0
Modified
Modification Detail
Item
-Final Version
Date
2015.11.17
-
Copyright ⓒ 2015 – LG CNS Co., Ltd. All rights reserved
Page 2/146
Approval
Han Kwanghee
XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
[ Table of Contents ]
REFERENCED DOCUMENTS ...................................................................................................................... 8
DEFINITION OF TERMS ............................................................................................................................. 9
1.
2.
3.
4.
SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 18
1.1.
SECURITY TARGET REFERENCE ..................................................................................................... 18
1.2.
TOE REFERENCE ............................................................................................................................ 18
1.3.
TOE OUTLINE ................................................................................................................................ 19
1.4.
TOE DESCRIPTION ........................................................................................................................ 19
1.5.
PREPARATION RULES .................................................................................................................... 40
1.6.
COMPOSITION OF SECURITY TARGET ........................................................................................... 40
CONFORMANCE CLAIM ................................................................................................................... 42
2.1.
COMMON CRITERIA CONFORMANCE CLAIM ................................................................................. 42
2.2.
PROTECTION PROFILE CLAIM ....................................................................................................... 42
2.3.
PACKAGE CLAIM ............................................................................................................................. 43
2.4.
CONFORMANCE RATIONALE .......................................................................................................... 43
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION .............................................................................................. 55
3.1.
THREATS ......................................................................................................................................... 55
3.2.
ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES ....................................................................................... 58
3.3.
ASSUMPTIONS ................................................................................................................................ 60
SECURITY OBJECTIVES ................................................................................................................... 63
4.1.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE TOE .......................................................................................... 63
4.2.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE ENVIRONMENT ......................................................................... 66
4.3.
SECURITY OBJECTIVES RATIONALE .............................................................................................. 68
5.
DEFINITION OF EXTENDED COMPONENT ................................................................................ 77
6.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ........................................................................................................... 79
7.
6.1.
TOE SECURITY FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS................................................................................. 80
6.2.
TOE SECURITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS ............................................................................ 103
6.3.
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS RATIONALE...................................................................................... 122
6.4.
RATIONALE OF MUTUAL SUPPORT AND INTERNAL CONSISTENCY ........................................... 138
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFICATION ................................................................................................ 140
7.1.
TOE SECURITY FUNCTION ........................................................................................................... 140
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XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
9.2.
TSF OF THE IC CHIP USED BY THE TOE ..................................................................................... 142
9.3.
ASSURANCE METHOD................................................................................................................... 145
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[List of Tables]
TABLE 1 REFERENCE OF SECURITY TARGET .......................................................................................................... 18
TABLE 2 REFERENCE OF TOE .............................................................................................................................. 19
TABLE 3 TYPES OF CERTIFICATES ........................................................................................................................ 23
TABLE 4 LIFE CYCLE OF EPASSPORT IC CHIP AND TOE ........................................................................................ 25
TABLE 5 TOE ASSETS ......................................................................................................................................... 32
TABLE 6 LDS CONTENTS WHERE TOE USER DATA IS STORED ............................................................................. 33
TABLE 7 EPASSPORT SECURITY MECHANISMS....................................................................................................... 35
TABLE 8 CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHMS USED BY TOE ......................................................................................... 39
TABLE 9 RELATION OF THREAT BETWEEN THE COMPOSITE-ST AND THE PLATFORM-ST .......................................... 45
TABLE 10 RELATION OF THE SECURITY POLICY OF THE ORGANIZATION BETWEEN THE COMPOSITE-ST AND THE
PLATFORM-ST ............................................................................................................................................ 45
TABLE 11 RELATION OF THE ASSUMPTION BETWEEN THE COMPOSITE-ST AND THE PLATFORM-ST .......................... 46
TABLE 12 TREAT/ORGANIZATION OF THE SECURITY POLICY/ASSUMPTION MAPPING BETWEEN THE COMPOSITE-ST
AND THE PLATFORM-ST .............................................................................................................................. 47
TABLE 13 RELATION OF THE SECURITY OBJECTIVES BETWEEN THE COMPOSITE TOE AND THE PLATFORM TOE ....... 48
TABLE 14 RELATION OF THE SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE RUNNING ENVIRONMENT BETWEEN THE COMPOSITE
TOE AND THE PLATFORM TOE. .................................................................................................................. 49
TABLE 15 MAPPING OF THE SECURITY OBJECTIVES FOR THE RUNNING ENVIRONMENT BETWEEN THE COMPOSITE-ST
AND THE PLATFORM-ST .............................................................................................................................. 50
TABLE 16 RATIONALE FOR RE-ESTABLISHED SECURITY FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS................................................ 51
TABLE 17 ADDED SECURITY FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................................... 52
TABLE 18 THE GUARANTEED REQUIREMENT RELATION BETWEEN THE COMPOSITE TOE AND THE PLATFORM TOE ... 54
TABLE 19 EPASSPORT ACCESS CONTROL POLICIES............................................................................................... 60
TABLE 20 THE MAPPING BETWEEN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES....................................... 69
TABLE 21 DEFINITION OF SUBJECT, OBJECT, RELATED SECURITY ATTRIBUTES AND OPERATION ............................. 79
TABLE 22 TOE SECURITY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................................... 81
TABLE 23 LIST OF KEY ACCESS COMMAND ........................................................................................................... 83
TABLE 24 DIGITAL SIGNATURE RELATED EAC SPECIFICATION ............................................................................... 85
TABLE 25 DIGITAL SIGNATURE RELATED AA SPECIFICATION.................................................................................. 86
TABLE 26 SECURITY PROPERTIES PER SUBJECT.................................................................................................... 88
TABLE 27 SECURITY PROPERTIES PER OBJECT ..................................................................................................... 89
TABLE 28 SECURITY PROPERTIES PER SUBJECT.................................................................................................... 90
TABLE 29 SECURITY PROPERTIES PER OBJECT ..................................................................................................... 91
TABLE 30 ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS .............................................................................................................. 104
TABLE 31 CORRESPONDENCE OF SECURITY OBJECTIVES AND SECURITY FUNCTION REQUIREMENTS..................... 123
TABLE 32 SECURITY FUNCTION COMPONENT DEPENDENCY ................................................................................ 137
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XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
TABLE 33 DEPENDENCY OF ADDED ASSURANCE COMPONENTS............................................................................ 138
TABLE 34 TOE SECURITY FUNCTION.................................................................................................................. 140
TABLE 35 SECURITY FUNCTION OF THE IC CHIP ................................................................................................. 142
TABLE 36 SFR MAP .......................................................................................................................................... 143
TABLE 37 TOE ASSURANCE METHOD ................................................................................................................ 145
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XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
[List of Figures]
FIGURE 1 PHYSICAL COMPOSITION OF EPASSPORT............................................................................................... 21
FIGURE 2 ENTIRE COMPOSITION DIAGRAM OF EPASSPORT SYSTEM ...................................................................... 22
FIGURE 3 TOE SCOPE ........................................................................................................................................ 24
FIGURE 4 TOE OPERATION ENVIRONMENT .......................................................................................................... 26
FIGURE 5 PHYSICAL SCOPE OF TOE .................................................................................................................... 26
FIGURE 6 IC CHIP HARDWARE COMPOSITION DIAGRAM ...................................................................................... 28
FIGURE 7 LOGICAL SCOPE OF TOE ...................................................................................................................... 30
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Referenced Documents
[CC]
Common Criteria for Evaluation of IT Security, Version 3.1r4, CCBM-2012-09-001
[CEM]
Common Criteria Methodology for Evaluation of IT Security, Version 3.1r4, CCBM2012-09-004,
[SCG]
Guide to Preparing Submission Material of SmartCard Evaluation for Developers, Korea
Internet & Security Agency, 2005. 4
[OSCPP]
E-Passport Protection Profile, Version 2.1, National Intelligence Service, 2010. 6
[ICPP]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, BSI-PP-0002, Atmel Smart Card
IC, Hitachi Europe Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, and Philips Semiconductors, July
2001
[MRTDPP]
Machine Readable Travel Document with ,,ICAO Application”, Basic Access Control,
Version 1.0, BSI-PP-0017, BSI, August 2005
[MRTDEPP]
Machine Readable Travel Document with ,,ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control,
Version 1.1, BSI-PP-0026, BSI, September 2006
[ICST]
Security
Target
Lite
of
Samsung
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
16-bit
RISC
Microcontroller for Smart Card with optional Secure RSA and ECC Library including
specific IC Dedicated Software, Version 2.2, 2012. 09. 26
[MRTD]
Machine Readable Travel Document, Part 1 Machine Readable Passport, Volume 2
Specifications for Electronically Enabled Passports with Biometric Identification
Capability, Doc 9303, ICAO, Sixth Edition, 2006
[EAC]
Advanced Security Mechanism for Machine Readable Travel Documents – Extended
Access Control (EAC), Version 1.11, TR-03110, BSI, 2008
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XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
Definition of Terms
Among the terms used in this security target, those that are also used in common criteria
follow the common criteria.
DV : Document Verifier
Certification authority that generates and issues IS certificate.
Personalization Agent
Authority
which
receives
ePassport
identification
information
and
such
from
receipt/issuance authority, generates SOD by electronically signing it, record them on IC
chip of ePassport, then generate TSF data for ePassport, stores them on protected
memory area of IC chip of ePassport, and operates PA-PKI and/or EAC-PKI.
SOD : Document Security Object
Generated digital signature of Personalization agent on the identification/authentication
information of ePassport recorded in the ePassport issuance Phase. Object implemented
as Signed Data Type of "RFC 3369 Cryptographic Message Syntax, 2002.8" and encoded
in DER method.
Executable File
A collection of executable modules stored on EEPROM.
Executable Module
The executable code of a single application program.
Ciphertext Only Attack
An attack attempting deciphering based on the ciphertext collected by threat agents.
Encryption Key
The key used in TDES to encrypt data for data exposure protection.
Passport Digital signature
Unique information signed on ePassport with the digital signature generation key issued
by the issuance authority for issuance and confirmation of recorded items of electronically
processed passport.
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Passport Digital signature System
A system to provide authentication service such as issuance of certificates necessary for
passport digital signature and management of authentication-related records.
Reverse Engineering
Analyzing completed products in detail to understand and reproduce the basic design
concepts and applied technologies.
Certificate
Electronic information signed electronically on digital signature verification key by issuance
authority to confirm and prove that the digital signature generation key uniquely belongs
to the owner.
Applet
Application program executed on the Javacard platform written in Javacard language.
ePassport
A passport containing contactless IC chip with identification and other information of the
passport applicant according to the international standard prescribed by ICAO and ISO.
ePassport User Data
Includes ePassport identification information and ePassport authentication information.
ePassport Identification Information
Includes ePassport application basic information and bio information.
ePassport Applicant Basic Information
Visually distinguishable information and other identification information printed on the
identification information page of ePassport stored on ePassport IC chip in LDS structure.
ePassport Applicant Bio Information (Sensitive Data)
The fingerprint and/or iris information of the ePassport applicant stored on ePassport IC
chip in LDS structure.
ePassport Applied Data
Includes ePassport user data and TSF data.
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ePassport Application Program (MRTD Application)
A program to load on the ePassport IC chip that is programmed according to LDS of
ePassport standard and provides security mechanisms such as BAC and EAC.
ePassport Authentication Information
The information stored on ePassport IC chip in LDS format to support ePassport security
mechanism including SOD for PA, chip authentication public key for EAC, AA chip
authentication public key, etc.
ePassport IC Chip (MRTD Chip)
A contactless IC chip including ePassport application programs and the IC chip operating
system necessary for operating them and supporting communication protocol according to
ISO/IE 14443.
ePassport TSF Data
The information stored on the protected memory area of ePassport IC chip to support
ePassport security mechanism.
KDM : Key Derivation Mechanism
The mechanism to generate encryption key and MAC key from seed value using hash
algorithm.
KDF : Key Derivation Function
A function generating encryption key and MAC key from seed value using hash algorithm.
Inspection
The procedure where the immigration authority inspects the ePassport IC chip presented
by the ePassport carrier and confirms the identity of the ePassport carrier through
verification of ePassport IC chip.
IS : Inspection System
An information system which implements optical MRZ reading capability and security
mechanisms (PA, BAC, EAC, AA, etc.) to support ePassport inspection and consists of the
terminal for RF communication with ePassport IC chip and the system sending commands
to the ePassport IC chip through this terminal and processing the responses.
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AA (Active Authentication)
A security mechanism where ePassport IC chip verifies its authenticity by signing on the
random number transferred from the inspection system and the inspection system verifies
the authenticity of ePassport IC chip by verifying the signature value.
Application Protocol Data Unit (APDU)
A data format for exchanging packaged data between SmartCard and terminal. APDU is
divided into command APDU and response APDU. TPDU of subordinate layer according to
the communication protocol between the card and the terminal exists and APDU is
converted to appropriate TPDU and then transferred.
BAC (Basic Access Control)
A security mechanism which implements the symmetric-key-based entity authentication
protocol for mutual authentication of ePassport IC chip and inspection system and the
symmetric-key-based entity authentication protocol for generating session key needed to
establish a secure messaging between them.
BAC Mutual Authentication
Mutual authentication of ePassport IC chip and inspection system according to ISO 9798-2
symmetric-key-based entity authentication protocol.
BAC Session Keys
BAC session keys and MAC keys generated using key derivation mechanism from the
random value for session key generation shared in the BAC mutual authentication
BAC Secure Messaging (BAC Secure Messaging)
A messaging which encrypts the transfer data with BAC session key, generates message
authentication value with BAC session MAC key before transfer to provide confidentiality
and integrity of transfer data.
BAC Authentication Key (Document Basic Access Keys)
BAC authentication key and MAC key generated by using key derivation mechanism from
MRZ (passport number, passport number check digit, date of birth, date of birth check
digit, expiry date, expiry date check digit) for mutual authentication of ePassport IC chip
and inspection system.
BAC inspection system (BIS : BAC Inspection System)
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An inspection system which implements BAC, PA, and AA security mechanism.
CSCA Certificate
A certificate proving the validity of digital signature verification key against the digital
signature generation key of PA-PKI highest authentication authority by self-signing the
digital signature verification key with the digital signature generation key of the PA-PKI
highest authentication authority.
CVCA Link Certificate
A certificate where the EAC-PKI highest authentication authority generates a new CVCA
certificate before the expiration of CVCA certificate and digitally signs with the digital
signature generation key corresponding to the previous CVCA certificate.
CVCA Certificate
A certificate which includes the value where EAC-PKI highest authentication authority
digitally signs the digital signature verification key with the digital signature generation
key of EAC-PKI highest authentication authority to prove the validity of CVCA link
certificate and DV certificate.
CVM (Cardholder Verification Method)
A SmartCard user authentication method using a password, which is a personal
identification number.
DFA (Differential Fault Analysis)
A method of inferring the encryption key by inducing malfunction through enforced
deformation of voltage or clock in the encryption calculation process.
DPA (Differential Power Analysis)
A method of inferring the encryption key by collecting a large amount of power usage
consumed in the encryption calculation process and performing a statistical analysis.
DS certificate (Document Signer Certificate)
A certificate of Personalization agent signed with the digital signature generation key of
PA-PKI highest authentication authority used by inspection system to verify SOD of PA
security mechanism.
DV certificate
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A certificate including the value of digitally signing digital signature verification key of
inspection system with digital signature generation key of DV to prove the validity of
digital signature verification key of inspection system.
EAC (Extended Access Control)
A security mechanism composed of EAC-CA procedure for chip authentication and EAC-TA
procedure for inspection system authentication where only EAC-supporting inspection
system (EIS) can read the bio information of ePassport applicant to control access to
ePassport applicant bio information stored on ePassport IC chip.
EAC Session Key
EAC session encryption key & MAC key used to establish a secure messaging for transfer
protection of ePassport applicant bio information and generated using KDF with the key
shared with EIS through Ephemeral-Static DH key distribution protocol in the EAC-CA
process as seed value.
EAC Chip Authentication Public Key and EAC Chip Authentication Private key
DH key pair used by the ePassport IC chip to authenticate itself to the EAC-supporting
inspection system in EAC-CA process and recorded in the ePassport IC chip issuance
Phase by the Personalization agent.
EAC inspection system (EIS : EAC Inspection System)
An inspection system which implements BAC, PA and EAC security mechanisms with the
option of AA.
EAC-CA (EAC-Chip Authentication)
A security mechanism which implements Ephemeral-Static DH key distribution protocol
(PKCS#3, ANSI X.42, etc.) so that EAC-supporting inspection system can authenticate
ePassport IC chip through key confirmation for the EACP chip authentication public key
and private key of ePassport IC chip and the temporary public key and private key of EIS.
EAC-TA (EAC-Terminal Authentication)
A security mechanism which implements a digital-signature-based Challenge-Response
authentication protocol where ePassport IC chip authenticates EIS with ePassport IC chip
using IS certificate where ePassport IC chip uses IS certificate to verify the value where
EIS digitally signed the temporary public key with its digital signature generation key in
EAC-CA process.
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EAC-PKI
Highest
Authentication
Authority
(CVCA
:
Country
Verifying
Certification Authority)
Highest authentication authority which generates and issues CVCA certificate, CVCA link
certificate, and DV certificate by securely generating digital signature key in the EAC-PKI
passport digital signature system to support EAC security mechanism.
EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory)
A non-volatile memory device which retains data for a long period of time without power;
a storage area storing major properties to be protected by the operating system and
ePassport application programs such as ePassport user data and portions of TSF data.
EF.COM
Includes LDS version information and tag information for Data Groups.
EF.CVCA
EF-type file specifying the list and reading rights for CVCA digital signature verification key
identification information needed for verification of CVCA certificate validity
EMA (Electromagnetic Analysis)
A method inferring the encryption key collecting and analyzing the electromagnetic wave
leaked from cryptographic calculation process.
Grandmaster Chess Attack
An attack which uses the IC chip that can perform the relay for messaging between
ePassport IC chip and the inspection system to disguise as the ePassport IC chip.
GP Registry
A storage area for information necessary for management of the operating system and
installed application programs.
IC Chip (Integrated Circuit Chip)
An important semi-conductor to process the functions of SmartCard and an processor
including four function units of mask ROM, EEPROM, RAM, and I/O port.
ICAO-PKD
A storage are for DS certificates operated and managed by ICAO which distributes online
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the requested DS certificate of the corresponding country when requested by
domestic/foreign inspection systems.
IS certificate
A certificate used to verify the digital signature value transferred to inspection system by
ePassport IC chip in EAC-TA process where DV digitally signed digital signature
verification key of EIS with digital signature generation key.
LDS (Logical Data Structure)
A logical data structure defined in ePassport specification to store ePassport user data on
ePassport IC chip.
MAC Key (Key for Message Authentic Code)
A key used in symmetric key ciphering algorithm according to ISO 9797 in order to
generate message authentication code to prevent data counterfeiting/falsification.
PA (Passive Authentication)
A security mechanism which proves that the identification information recorded on the
ePassport is not counterfeit or falsified by verifying the has value of the corresponding
ePassport user value according to the reading rights of the ePassport access control policy
where the inspection system with DS certificate verifies the digital signature signed on
SOD.
PA-PKI Highest Authentication Authority (CSCA : Country Signing Certification
Authority)
The highest authentication authority which generates and issues CSCA certificate and DS
certificate by securely generating digital signature key in the PA-PKI passport digital
signature system to support PA security mechanism.
Probing
An attack exploring data by plugging in a probe to the IC chip.
RAM (Random Access Memory)
A volatile memory device that retains recorded information only while power is supplied
and a storage area for storing data temporarily used by the operating system or
application programs.
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ROM (Read-Only Memory)
A type of semiconductor memory device where the contents can be read but not modified.
SCP02 (Secure Channel Protocol 02) mutual authentication
A symmetric-key-based entity authentication protocol defined in GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 Card
Specification.
SCP02 Session Key
A session key generated in the SCP02 mutual authentication process.
SPA (Simple Power Analysis)
A method of inferring encryption key by collecting and analyzing the power consumption
in the cryptographic /< process.
COB(Chip On Board)
As semiconductor fabrication technology, the way a microchip or a die attach directly
to the final circuit board or electrically interconnection
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1. Security Target Introduction
This section provides the information necessary for identifying and controlling security
target and TOE.
1.1. Security Target Reference
Subject
XSmart e-Passport V1.3 R3 on S3CT9KCW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 Security Target V1.0.4
ST Identification
XSMART e-Passport V1.3_R3_ASE_V1.0.4.docx
TOE Version
V1.3 R3
Product Name
XSmart V2.3
Author
LG CNS
Evaluation Criteria
Information Protection System Common Criteria V3.1r4
Evaluation
EAL5+ (ADV_IMP.2)
Assurance Level
Protection Profile
ePassport Protection Profile V2.1
IC Chip
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
Keywords
ePassport, MRTD, ICAO
Table 1 Reference of Security Target
1.2. TOE Reference
TOE
Component
XSmart e-Passport V1.3 R3 on S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
of
TOE
TOE
identification
- XSmart e-Passport V1.3 R3
- User Manual (XSmart e-Passport V1.3_AGD_V1.0.1)
code
-ROM code identification :
XSMART_e-Passport_V1.3_S3CT9KW_03.rom (implemented on S3CT9KW)
XSMART_e-Passport_V1.3_S3CT9KC_03.rom (implemented on S3CT9KC)
XSMART_e-Passport_V1.3_S3CT9K9_03.rom (implemented on S3CT9K9)
-EEPROM code idenfication :
XSMART_e-Passport_V1.3_S3CT9KW_03.eep (implemented on S3CT9KW)
XSMART_e-Passport_V1.3_S3CT9KC_03.eep(implemented on S3CT9KC)
XSMART_e-Passport_V1.3_S3CT9K9_03.eep (implemented on S3CT9K9)
IC Chip
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9
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Reference of IC
ANSSI-CC-2012/70
Chip
Authentication
Table 2 Reference of TOE
1.3. TOE Outline
This document is the security target regarding the XSmart e-Passport V1.3 R3 on
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9(referred to as “XSmart e-Passport V1.3” hereafter),
which is the composite TOE composed of a COS in charge of the chip operating system
and an IC chip as a part of hardware.
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 is a contact/contactless IC chip of Samsung Electronics and
it is certified CC authentication separately from BSI.

The OS is composed of JAVA Layer, GP Layer, Native OS(NOS) Layer. According to
GP spec, GP Layer performs mutual authentication, lifecycle management and so
on. The Java Layer of Non-TSF supports firewall, deletion of redundant infomation,
memory / transaction management according to JavaCard Spec. NOS actualy
performs I/O handling according to ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 14443 and
memory management through the chip interface .

EPassport application is an implementation of [MRTD] standards defined by
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and [EAC] standard of BSI. After
ePassport program is loaded on ROM for the first time, it is active throughout the
processing of installation and issuance.

S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 are the contact/contactless IC chips from Samsung
Electronics Co. that have been certified by the Common Criteria from CEA-LETI.

PP used: Eurosmart Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, June 2007,
BSI-PP-0035

TOE: S3CT9KW/ S3CT9KC/ S3CT9K9 revision 2

Certification Number: ANSSI-CC-2012/70-S02

Assurance Level: CC EAL 5+ (AVA_VAN.5, ALC_DVS.2)

Certified cryptography library: TORNADO 2MX2 Secure RSA/ECC library v2.2
1.4. TOE Description
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XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
XSmart V2.3, ePassport product of LG CNS, is the type of manufactured COB loading TOE
on S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9, Samsung Electronics IC chip.
The type of COB, component of the e-passport booklets, is to be made with the inlay, and
is used after issuing
TOE is composed of the software format of the OS, ePassport application programs and IC
chip as part of H/W.
TOE manages ePassport application data such as ePassport MRZ area information,
ePassport applicant basic information, bio information including ePassport applicant face
and fingerprints, encryption key for authentication and secure communication, etc. and
performs access control to ePassport user data by authenticating Personalization agent
and inspection systems.
The ePassport application programs comprising TOE implement ‘ePassport standard’ and
‘EAC standard’ with Javacard technology. ePassport application program, at the issuance
Phase, uses SCP02 security mechanism of card manager to authenticate the
Personalization agent and grants writing rights for ePassport user data and TSF data, and
at the usage Phase, uses BAC and EAC security mechanism to authenticate inspection
system and grants reading rights for ePassport user data, performing access control. Also,
to allow inspection systems to detect counterfeiting and delicacy of ePassport, AA
functions are provided
OS, the part of TOE, is composed of the native OS and the description of it is defined in
the TOE Outline.
The composition elements of the IC chip TOE is based on includes IC chip hardware,
dedicated IC chip firmware, and cryptographic calculation software library for RSA/ECC
calculation. TOE actives the active shield, temperature sensor, voltage sensor, filter and
such of the IC chip hardware, and provides security measures against physical attacks by
encrypting ROM, RAM, and EEPROM. When generating random numbers, random number
generator (TRNG) is used, and when performing TDES cryptographic calculation, secure
DES module is used to countermeasure attacks such as SPA and DPA. Also, ECC
cryptographic calculation software library is used to perform ECDH encryption key
exchange
and
ECDSA
digital
signature
generation/verification
calculations
and
countermeasure attacks such as SPA and DPA, and RSA cryptographic calculation software
library is used to generate digital signature and countermeasure attacks such as SPA and
DPA.
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1.4.1. TOE Type
ePassport which uses XSmart e-Passport V1.3 is designated as the standard by ICAO
(International Civil Aviation Organization) and ISO (International Standard Organization).
This standard is composed of the physical part dealing with the mechanical recognition
through bare eye and OCR (Optical Character Recognition) for identification information,
picture, passport number, and MRZ(Machine Readable Zone) printed on the passport, and
the logical part dealing with the electronic management of traveler information using
contactless IC chip of ISO 14443 standard.
The physical part of ePassport is composed of the contactless IC chip and antenna for
wireless communication attached to the passport booklet or the cover. The contactless IC
chip used in the ePassport is called ePassport IC chip (MRTD Chip), which contains the IC
chip OS (COS) which supports resource management for hardware elements of IC chip, IT
technology for electronic storage and processing of ePassport identification information,
and information protection technology and ePassport application. The hardware of
ePassport IC chip is generally composed of CPU, auxiliary arithmetic unit, I/O port, RAM,
ROM, EEPROM and such. Figure 1 illustrates the physical composition of ePassport.
Figure 1 Physical Composition of ePassport
The logical part of ePassport includes not only the picture and personal information of the
traveler and MRZ (Machine Readable Zone) information written on the passport, but also
bio information data such as face, fingerprint, and iris for bio-recognition and encryption
key for authentication between the inspection systems and ePassport and for secure
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message communication.
1.4.2. ePassport System
Figure 2 illustrates the entire composition diagram of ePassport system.
Figure 2 Entire Composition Diagram of ePassport System
ePassport applicant requests the issuance of ePassport and receives the ePassport
properly issued according to ePassport issuance policy. ePassport applicant carries the
issued ePassport and when going through domestic/foreign immigration, presents the
ePassport to the immigration officer for inspection. During immigration, according to the
ePassport immigration policy of each country, either the officer verifies the ePassport or
unattended inspection system verifies ePassport.
The registration/issuance agency collects the basic/bio information of the ePassport
applicant and cooperates with the police and such relevant agencies to confirm the
identity and requests the issuance of ePassport with such information.
Personalization agent digitally signs the ePassport user data (ePassport identification
information and authentication information) to generate security object (referred to as
“SOD” hereafter), and records on the ePassport IC chip along with the ePassport
identification information received from the registration/issuance agency. Also, the
ePassport TSF data is recorded onto the protected memory area, and the ePassport IC
chip is embedded to the passport and then the ePassport is produced and issued. The
details of the data recorded on the ePassport is explained in Table 4.
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The
Personalization
agent
generates
the
digital
signature
key
necessary
for
falsification/counterfeiting verification of ePassport user data stored on the ePassport IC
chip, and performs the authentication tasks such as generation/issuance/management of
CSCA certificate and DS certificate according to the authentication task regulations of
passport digital signature system. According to the ePassport issuance policy, if EAC
security mechanism is supported, the digital signature key necessary for verification of
access rights for ePassport applicant bio information, and the authentication tasks such as
generation/issuance/management of CVCA certificate, CVCA link certificate and DV
certificate are performed. Items regarding establishment of passport digital signature and
authentication
tasks
such
as
authentication
server,
key
generation
devices,
physical/procedural security measures and such follow the ePassport issuance policy.
Authentication authority generates the IS certificate using CVCA certificate and DV
certificate and then provides them to the inspection systems.
The types of certificates used in ePassport system is as follows in 오류! 참조 원본을 찾
을 수 없습니다..
Passport
Use
Digital
Signature System,
PA-PKI highest authentication
Verification of ePassport
user data
Certificate Subject
PA-PKI
authority
Certificate
CSCA certificate
falsification/counterfeiting
Personalization agent
DS certificate
Verification of access
EAC-PKI highest authentication
CVCA certificate
authority
CVCA link certificate
Authentication authority
DV certificate
EAC inspection system
IS certificate
rights to ePassport
applicant
bio information
EAC-PKI
Table 3 Types of Certificates
1.4.3. TOE Scope
In this security target, the life cycle of TOE is divided into Phases among the entire life
cycle for ePassport of development, production, issuance, usage and such, and TOE
operation environment and the scope of physical/logical TOE are defined as follows.
In this security target, TOE is described as including the operating system loaded on
ePassport IC chip, the ePassport application, the IC chip hardware which is the
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component of the IC chip, the firmware, RSA/ECC cryptographic calculation library.
Figure 3 illustrates the scope of TOE.
Figure 3 TOE Scope
Application Notes :
SHA-1, a hash function, is provided as software implementation.
1.4.3.1.
Life Cycle and Operation Environment of TOE
TOE Life Cycle
Table 4 shows the IC chip life cycle divided into ePassport IC chip life cycle and TOE life
cycle Phase by Phase, and the delivery process is omitted. From the life cycle of Table 3
Types of Certificates, TOE development process is Phase 1 (development) and 2
(production), and TOE operation environment corresponds to 3 (issuance), 4 (usage), and
5 (termination).
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Phase
ePassport IC Chip Life Cycle
TOE Life Cycle
① IC chip developer designs the IC chip
1
and develops dedicated IC chip S/W
(Devel
② S/W developer uses IC chip and dedicated IC chip
opment
S/W to develop TOE (OS, ePassport application
)
program)
③ IC chip producer performs the ROM
Masking
of
TOE,
chip
identifier
recording, and production of IC chip.
2
④ ePassport producer performs initialization of COS
(Produ
⑤ ePassport producer installs ePassport application
ction)
program to generate user data storage area in
EEPROM according to ePassport LDS standard
⑥ ePassport producer embeds IC chip to the passport
booklet
⑦ Personalization agent records Personalization agent
identification and authentication information on OS
⑧ Personalization agent generates SOD by digitally
3
signing the ePassport identity information
(Issuan
⑨ Personalization agent records the ePassport identity
ce)
information, authentication information (including
SOD) and TSF data onto ePassport application
program
4
⑩ Inspection system communicates with TOE to
(Usage
authenticate ePassport and confirm the identity of
)
the carrier
5
⑪ Personalization
(Termi
agent
changes
the
status
of
ePassport so that it is no longer usable
nation)
Table 4 Life Cycle of ePassport IC Chip and TOE
TOE Operation Environment
Figure 4 TOE Operation Environmentillustrates the TOE operation environment at
ePassport issuance and usage Phase with the major security functions of TOE and the
external entities interacting with TOE (Personalization agent, inspection system).
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Figure 4 TOE Operation Environment
1.4.3.2.
Physical Scope of TOE
Figure 5 illustrates the physical scope of TOE.
Figure 5 Physical Scope of TOE
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The
physical
scope
of
TOE
includes
the
User
Manaul
and
the
IC
chips,
S3CT9CW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9 for ePassport Booklet. Also, IC chips includes the Chip
OS((COS, Chip Operating System) and e-Passport Application Code compliant with ICAO
Doc 9303, EAC v1.11, User Data in EEPROM and TSF Data. The components of IC chips
are SecuCalm CPU, TORN ADO Crypto Co-Processor, I/O, Memory (RAM, ROM, EEPROM)
and various H/W functions.
The COS in physical TOE scope is consist of the NOS part which control IC chip function
directly, the Global Platform (GP) which supports the Open Platform environment and
JavaCard Platform..

NOS(Native OS)
-
Support Implementation of the hardware-dependent part and IC work, H/W
resource management, the realization of algorithms, security function for chip

Global Platform
-
Before ePassport application is enabled, the Global Platform provide INSTALL
command , GET DATA command and SCP02 authentication function according
to 'GP' Spec. After ePassport application is enabled, the Global Platform
provide SCP02 authentication and PUT KEY command for issuance authority
authentication. It is impossible to install and delete applet after ePassport
application is enabled.

Java Platfrom
-
When the TOE receive the power, Initailization function is performed. after
ePassport application is enabled, it is impossible to use any function in Java
Platform.
Biometric data (face, fingerprint) and TSF data (Authenticate key, Seed key for BAC,
private key for CA) of e-Passport are loaded onto EEPROM, but these data is not included
in TOE boundary.
At last, S3CT9CW/3SCT9KC/S3CT9K9 of Samsung Electronics, which is the composition
element of the IC chip, is a product certified with CCRA EAL5+ assurance level, and the
composition elements included in the authentication area are IC chip hardware, firmware
recorded on ROM, and cryptographic calculation software library as shown in the following.
IC Chip Hardware
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
16 bit microprocessor (CPU)

6KB RAM, 2.5KB Crypto RAM, 384KB ROM

EEPROM : 144KB(S3CT9KW), 80KB(S3CT9KC), 40KB(S3CT9K9)

Memory protection unit (MPU), random number generator (RNG), timer (TIM), DES
calculation engine(DES), big number calculation engine (TORNADO 2Mx2)

RF interface, address and data bus (ADBUS)
Software Library for Cryptographic Calculation RSA/ECC Library

RSAECC Library
� ECDSA key generation
� ECDSA sign/verify
� ECDH key sharing
� RSA key generation
� RSA sign/verify
� Hash function( SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512)

Non-Determinant Random Number Generator (TRNG)
Figure 6 IC Chip Hardware Composition Diagramillustrates the composition diagram of IC
chip hardware.
Figure 6 IC Chip Hardware Composition Diagram
The IC chip hardware among the IC chip composition elements provide DES module used
in the symmetric key encryption according to DES and TDES standards, Tornado 2MX2
Crypto module used in the asymmetric key encryption, physical security measures such as
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shield, temperature sensor, voltage sensor, and filter, and non-determinant hardware
random number generator. The firmware provides IC chip hardware management function
such as EEPROM recording and the function for hardware testing, and the cryptographic
calculation
software
library
provides
calculations
such
as
digital
signature
generation/verification for hash value, ECDH key exchange, ECC/RSA key pair generation,
and ECC/RSA public key verification.
The cryptographic algorithms provided by the IC chip composition elements are used in
the following cryptographic calculations.
DES Module

TDES data encryption and decryption calculation

Retail MAC and Full Triple DES MAC generation and verification calculation
TRNG Module

Calculation of big number necessary for the ECC/RSA cryptographic calculation
process
RSA/ECC Cryptographic Library

Key distribution calculation for EAC session key distribution in EAC process

Digital signature verification calculation for certificate verification in EAC process

Hash calculation using SHA algorithm

Digital signature generation calculation using chip authentication private key in AA
process
ECC/RSA Library V2.2
The ECC/RSA library certified with CCRA EAL5+ assurance level is a part of IC chip
composition elements and the IT environment of TOE not included in TOE scope.
ECC Library
The ECC library provides functions such as ECDSA digital signature generation and
verification, ECDH key exchange, ECC key pair generation, and ECC public key verification.
In TOE, however, only the functions of ECDSA digital signature generation and verification
and ECDH key exchange are used. The ECC library includes countermeasures against SPA,
DPA, EMA, DFA and such.
RSA Library
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The RSA library provides functions such as RSA digital signature generation, verification,
and key pair generation. The RSA library also includes countermeasures against SPA, DPA,
EMA, DFA and so on.
Also, this library includes functions of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512.
1.4.3.3.
Logical Scope of TOE
TOE communicates with the inspection system according to the communication protocol
defined in ISO/IEC 14443-4. TOE implements the security mechanism defined in
‘ePassport Standard’ and ‘EAC Standard,’ and provides access control and security
management functions. Also, it provides self-protection functions for TSF such as self-test,
secure state preservation, and separation of area.
Figure 7 shows the logical scope of TOE.
Figure 7 Logical Scope of TOE
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ePassport Application Program (LDS Application)
ePassport application program is an IC chip application program which implements the
function for storing/processing ePassport identity information and the security mechanism
to securely protect it according to the LDS (Logical Data Structure) format defined in
‘ePassport standard’ and ‘EAC standard.’ ePassport application program provides security
management
function
for
ePassport
application
program
to
the
authenticated
Personalization agent through SCP02 security mechanism provided in the card manager,
and permits access to ePassport user data through BAC and EAC secure messaging only
when the access rights were acquired through BAC and EAC secure messaging. Also, AA
security mechanisms are provided as methods to judge counterfeiting of ePassport user
data.
The security management functions of the TOE provides SCP02 mutual authentication and
PUT KEY command for the issuing authority to obtain permission. EPassport application
provides the ability to manage application data and the life-cycle data that is used
internally
Native OS(NOS)
The Native OS provides functions including hardware-dependent implementation, IC chip
start-up, resource management of the hardware, implementation of the algorithm, and
chip secure setting.
Assets
TOE provides information protection functions such as confidentiality, integrity,
authentication, and access control in order to protect the TOE assists of the following
Table 5.
Category
ePassport
Identity
Information
Personal Data of the
ePassport holder
Biometric Data of the
ePassport holder
User
Data
Storage
Description
Data stored in EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5~EF.DG13,
and EF.DG16
Data stored on EF.DG3 and EF.DG4
EF.SOD,
ePassport Authentication Data
Area
EAC
key(EF.DG14),
chip
AA
chip
authentication
public
authentication
public
key(EF.DG15)
List of CVCA digital signature verification key
EF.CVCA
identification
information
authenticate IS in
used
by
TOE
EAC-TA process
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to
EF File
XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
EF.COM
LDS version information, list of used DG tags
Chip private key used by TOE to prove that
EAC chip authentication private key
ePassport IC chip is not counterfeited in the EAC-CA
process
Certificate of highest authentication authority issued
CVCA certificate
by EAC-PKI at the time of ePassport issuance
CVCA digital signature verification
key
certificate renewal after ePassport issuance Phase
Data
Secure
At the time of ePassport issuance, ePassport
ePassport
TSF
Public key of CVCA certificate newly generated by
Memory
issuance date is recorded, but at the ePassport
Current date
usage Phase, it is updated internal by TOE to the
most recent issue date of CVCA link certificate, DV
certificate or IS certificate of issuance country
BAC authentication encryption key,
BAC authentication key
BAC authentication MAC key
BAC session encryption key,
BAC session key
BAC session MAC key
Temporary
Memory
EAC session encryption key,
EAC session key
EAC session MAC key
Issuing-authority-related
Personalization agent Basic data
Personalization
agent
basic
data
identification
such
as
information,
serial number, and issuance date
OS
User
Data
Personalization agent authentication
data
Executable file
Application program
Confidential key for SCP02 mutual authentication
Application program
executable file code loaded on
the OS
OS
Memory
Application program instance installed on the OS
OS management data such as installed application
OS
TSF
Data
GP registry
program ID, application program life cycle state,
and application program rights
OS Life Cycle
SCP02 session key
OS life cycle state value
SCP02 session encryption key and MAC key
Temporary
Memory
Table 5 TOE Assets
LDS where ePassport User Data of TOE is stored defines the file structures of MF, DF, EF,
and Table 6 shows the contents of EF.DG1 ~ EF.DG16 where a portion of TOE user data is
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stored.
category
DG
Contents
LDS Structure
Document type
Issuance State
Name (of Holder)
Document number
Check Digit-Doc Number
Detail(s)
Recorded in
DG1
MRZ
Nationality
date of birth
Check Digit-DOB
Sex
Date of expiry or Valid Until date
Check Digit DOE/VUD
Composite Check Digit
Encoded
DG2
Encoded face
Identification
DG3
Encoded finger(s)
DG4
Encoded Iris(s)
DG5
Displayed Portrait
DG6
-
DG7
Displayed signature
DG8
-
DG9
-
DG10
-
DG11
Additional Personal Detail(s)
DG12
Additional Document Detail(s)
DG13
-
Features
Miscellaneous
DG14
DG15
DG16
EAC chip authentication public
key
AA Digital Signature Verification
Key
Person(s) to Notify
Table 6 LDS Contents where TOE User Data is Stored
Security Mechanism
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TOE provides information protection functions such as confidentiality, integrity, access
control, and authentication for protection of ePassport user data and TSF data such as
ePassport identity information and ePassport authentication information. Such information
protection functions are implemented with SCP02 security mechanism of ‘GP Standard,’
BAC security mechanism of ‘ePassport Standard,’ and EAC security mechanism of ‘EAC
Standard’. Table 7 summarizes ePassport security mechanisms.
ePassport security mechanism
Security
Security
Mechanism
characteristic
ePassport
PA
User Data
Authentication
IT Security characteristic of the
Cryptographic
Cryptography
Key/Certificate
TOE
Type
A function performed by the
inspection
system;
no
cryptographic calculation on
TOE’s part
N/a:
a
function
performed by the
inspection system
Access control for SOD

Read rights: BIS, EIS

Write rights: Personalization
agent
TOE decrypts IS transfer value,
Symmetric Key-Based Entity
BAC mutual
authentication
Authentication Protocol
TDES-CBC
SHA-1
Retail MAC
BAC authentication
key
(Encryption
Key,
MAC key)
performs MAC calculation, and
verifies to confirm if inspection
system has access rights
TOE
encrypts,
calculation,
performs
and
MAC
sends
to
inspection system to verify itself
Symmetric Key-Based Key
BAC
BAC
Key Distribution
Generate BAC session key by
Distribution Protocol
BAC session key
using KDF from the exchanged
TDES-CBC
(Encryption Key,
key-sharing
random
based
TDES-based
SHA-1
MAC key)
Retail MAC
BAC
secure
messaging
key
distribution protocol
Encrypt with BAC session key,
BAC session key
ISO Secure Messaging
on
number
(Encryption Key,
generate MAC and send message
Verify MAC with BAC session key,
MAC key)
decrypt, and receive message
EAC
chip
authentication
EAC
EAC-CA
ECDH Key Distribution
Protocol
public key
EAC
TOE performs Ephemeral-static Dchip
H Key Distribution Protocol
authentication
private key
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EAC
secure
EAC session key
ISO Secure Messaging
messaging
ECDSA-SHA-224
ECDSA-SHA-256
Piracy
CVCA certificate
CVCA link certificate
DV certificate
IS certificate
AA
ePassport
AA
Key,
MAC key)
ECDSA-SHA-1
EAC-TA
(Encryption
Encrypted communication using
RSA-SHA-1
Verification
authentication
public key
AA
authentication
private key
the EAC session key shared in the
EAC-CA process
IS certificate verification using
certificate chain and link certificate
Digital
signature
verification
regarding EIS transfer message
for EIS authentication
TOE generates and sends digital
signature to inspection system to
authenticate itself
TOE performs MAC calculation on
the TOE random number and
Personalization
SCP02
mutual
SCP02
authentication
Secure Channel Protocol 02
Full Triple DES MAC
TDES-CBC
Retail MAC
number
agent
and
MAC
Personalization
authentication
SCP02 session key
random
number and sends TOE random
Personalization
information
agent’s
value
agent
to
to
authenticate itself
TOE performs MAC calculation on
the TOE random number and
Personalization
agent’s
random
number and verifies the MAC
value of the Personalization agent.
SCP02
SCP02 Secure Messaging
secure
TDES-CBC
messaging
Retail MAC
Encrypted communication using
SCP02 session key
SCP02 session key used in SCP02
mutual authentication
Table 7 ePassport Security Mechanisms
Security Function
TOE provides security functions such as identification and authentication, user data
protection, security management, TSF protection, and cryptography support.
Identification and Authentication
TOE provides BAC mutual authentication, EAC-CA, EAC-TA, AA as the methods for
identification and authentication.
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<BAC Mutual Authentication>
The inspection system supporting BAC uses BAC authentication key generated from the
optically read MRZ and TOE either generates BAC authentication key from MRZ
information of DG1 or uses stored BAC authentication key to each encrypt the generated
random number values and exchange. The inspection system supporting BAC and the TOE
perform mutual authentication by confirming the exchanged random number value. If the
BAC mutual authentication fails, the session is terminated.
<EAC-CA>
EAC-CA implements the Ephemeral-static DH key distribution protocol to provide EAC
session key distribution and chip authentication. TOE sends EAC chip authentication public
key so that it can be authenticated by the inspection system, and uses the temporary
public key received from the inspection system to perform key distribution protocol. If the
EAC-CA succeeds, TOE forms EAC secure messaging using EAC session key. Even if EACCA fails, BAC secure messaging is maintained, and the inspection system can confirm that
TOE has been pirated.
<EAC-TA>
EAC-TA
implements
the
digital-signature-based
Challenge-Response
authentication
protocol so that TOE can authenticate the inspection systems supporting EAC. The value
which the inspection system digitally signed on the temporary public key used in EAC-CA
process is verified by TOE with IS certificate to authenticate the inspection system. When
TOE receives CVCA link certificate, DV certificate, and IS certificate from the inspection
system supporting EAC, it uses the CVCA digital signature verification key in protected
memory area to verify CVCA link certificate, and checks the expiry date of CVCA link
certificate and renews the CVCA digital signature verification key and the current date
within TOE when necessary. Once TOE confirms that the certificate is appropriate by
verifying IS certificate, it permits read access by the inspection system to the ePassport
applicant bio information and sends through EAC secure messaging.
<AA>
AA (Active Authentication) implements the digital-signature-based Challenge-Response
authentication protocol so that the inspection system can authenticate TOE. Once TOE
generate the digital signature with AA chip authentication private key in protected
memory area on top of the received value provided by the inspection system, the
inspection system verifies with the EF.DG15 AA chip authentication public key acquired
through BAC secure messaging or EAC secure messaging to authenticate TOE. AA is a
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security mechanism providing a method to verify the authenticity of TOE.
User Data Protection
TOE provides access control and secure messaging for user data protection.
<BAC Secure Messaging >
TOE confirms the reading rights of inspection system for ePassport applicant Basic
Information through BAC mutual authentication, and then generates BAC secure
messaging using the BAC session key shared through BAC key distribution to transfer
ePassport applicant basic information securely. When sending data through this channel,
data is encrypted using TDES encryption algorithm to provide confidentiality and MAC
Verification using Retail MAC algorithm provides integrity.
<EAC Secure Messaging >
TOE generates EAC secure messaging using EAC session key shared through EAC key
distribution of EAC-CA process to perform secure communication with the inspection
system. When sending data through this channel, data is encrypted using TDES
encryption algorithm to provide confidentiality and MAC Verification using Retail MAC
algorithm provides integrity.
<OS Access Control>
TOE provides access control function which permits only the Personalization agent that
acquired management rights by succeeding in SCP02 mutual authentication to have the
application program management function to load/install/delete executable code and
application program to the OS at the ePassport issuance Phase and usage Phase and the
write rights to the basic information of the Personalization agent. Also, the access control
function which prohibits performance of all operations except reading the Personalization
agent basic information at the termination Phase of TOE life cycle is provided.
<ePassport Access Control>
TOE provides access control function which permits only the Personalization agent that
acquired management rights by succeeding in SCP02 mutual authentication to perform
the write functions for ePassport user data and TSF data. Also, access control function
provided for ePassport user data reading rights based on the access rights of inspection
system granted through performance of security mechanisms at the ePassport usage
Phase.
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Security Management
TOE limits the method of managing the security properties of user and user data of the
ePassport application program and OS and the TSF data such as session key,
authentication key and the life cycle of the ePassport application to the authorized
Personalization agent and defines this as the security role.
TSF Protection
TOE provides functions such as reference monitor, domain separation, deletion of residual
information, transaction processing, and self-test for TSF protection.
<Reference Monitor>
TOE guarantees that for all APDU commands which are the external interface of TOE, the
access control will not be bypassed but invoked every time to protect TSF from
interference and invasion by an unauthorized subject.
<Domain Separation>
After LDS application is installed in TOE, The area is separated from other unauthorized
subjects because only ePassport area exists in TOE.
<Deletion of Residual Information >
TOE provides the function to delete residual information when allocating resources to the
object or retrieving resources back from the object so that previous information is not
employed for not only temporarily generated information in the temporary memory area
such as BAC session key, EAC session key, SCP02 session key, and random number, but
also the information generated in the protected memory are such as BAC authentication
key.
<Transaction Processing>
TOE provides transaction function to detect TSF malfunctioning when a power-supply
shut-off or enforced termination of TSF service during operation occurs, and resume TSF
service from the state before the malfunctioning.
<Self-Test and Maintenance Secure State>
TOE performs TSF data change detection and measure functions, and performs self-test to
verify the integrity of stored TSF data and executable code. Also, when a failure from selftest or an abnormal operation status from the IC chip is detected, it maintains secure
state so that malfunctioning of TSF does not occur.
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Cryptography Support
TOE provides hash calculation, and provides random number generation, key exchange
calculation operation mode, encryption/decryption calculation operation mode, and MAC
and digital signature calculation operation mode using the IC chip and cryptographic
calculation library.
TOE guarantees that encryption-related information cannot be found by abusing physical
phenomenon
(current,
voltage,
electromagnetic
change,
etc.)
occurring
during
performance of cryptographic calculation, and provides a method to verify integrity for the
encryption key. The cryptographic algorithms included in TOE are as shown in Table 8.
Classification
Algorithm
Keys
Use
Creation
 BAC session key and EAC-CA session key generation
 SCP02 authentication session key
Distribution
 Generation of shared confidential information in EAC-CA
Termination
 Deletion key value at problem
 confidentiality of SCP02 secure messaging
Encryption/
TDES
Decryption
Retail MAC
 confidentiality of BAC secure messaging
 confidentiality of EAC-CA secure messaging
 SCP02 session key generation
Digital
RSA-SHA-1
Signature
 Digital Signature Generation for AA
ECDSA-SHA-1
ECDSA-SAH-224
 Digital Signature Verification for EAC-TA
ECDSA-SHA-256
Table 8 Cryptographic Algorithms used by TOE
Functions Excluded from TOE
The functions provided in XSmart e-Passport V1.3 but excluded from TOE are function for
integrity and verification of global PIN and PIN of application program, remote method
invocation (RMI).
The function for integrity and verification of global PIN and application program PIN is not
used in the TOE of ePassport and thus excluded from the TOE scope.
The RMI (Remote Method Invocation) function which supports execution of application
programs within TOE from outside of TOE is not used in ePassport application program
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and thus excluded from the TOE scope.
1.5. Preparation Rules
This security target uses English terms to clearly convey several meanings and acronyms.
The used notation, shape, and preparation rules follow the common criteria of information
protection system (referred to as “common criteria” hereafter).
Common criteria allows repetition, allocation, selection, and elaboration that can be
performed in a security function requirement. Each operation is used in this security target.
Repetition
Used when a component is repeated multiple times with various application of an
operation. The result of a repetition operation is denoted with the repetition number in
parentheses, as in (repetition number).
Selection
Used to select one or more selection items provided by the common criteria for
information protection system. The result of selection operation is denoted underlined and
italicized.
Elaboration
Used to limit the requirement further by adding details to the requirement. The result of
an elaboration operation is denoted in bold...
Allocation
Used to allocate a certain value to a non-specified parameter (e.g. password length). The
result of an allocation operation is denoted in brackets, as in [ allocated value ].
1.6. Composition of Security Target
The referenced documents are described for cases where the user needs background or
related information beyond what is mentioned in this security target, and the definition of
terms are provided to aid in understanding of the terms or acronyms used in this security
target.
Section 1 of Security Target Introduction provides TOE outline information necessary for
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identification of security target.
Section 2 of Conformance Claim claims conformance to Common Criteria, Protection
Profile, and Package, and describes the rationale of conformance claims and the method
of conformance by the security target.
Section 3 of Security Problem Definitions describe the security problems of TOE and TOE
operation environment from the perspectives of threats, organizational security policies,
and assumptions.
Section 4 of Security Objectives describe the security objectives for TOE and the operation
environment to countermeasure the threats identified in the security problem definitions,
perform organizational security policies, and support assumptions.
Section 5 of Extended Component Definition identifies the extended security requirement
of this security target and provides due explanation.
Section 6 of Security Requirements describe the function and assurance requirements the
TOE of this security target must satisfy.
Section 7 of TOE Summary Specification describes the TOE security function and
assurance method satisfying TOE security requirements.
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2. Conformance Claim
This section describes the explanation of TOE and the product type, operation
environment, and evaluation scope of TOE.
2.1. Common Criteria Conformance Claim
This Security Target claims conformance to
ㆍCommon Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, part 1:
Introduction and general model, Version 3.1r4, September. 2012, CCMB‐2012‐09‐001
ㆍCommon Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, part 2: Security
functional requirements, Version 3.1r4, September. 2012, CCMB‐2012‐09‐002
ㆍCommon Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, part 3: Security
assurance requirements, Version 3.1r4, September. 2012, CCMB‐2012‐09‐003
as follows
ㆍPart 2 Extension
ㆍPart 3 Conformant
2.2. Protection Profile Claim
2.2.1. Protection Profile Re-establishment
The following are the items of security target which re-established the protection profile.
Security Environment

A.inspection system

T.RESIDUAL_INFO

T.TSF_Data_Modification

P.PERSONALIZATION_AGENT
Security Objective

O.Session Termination

O.Access Control

O.Secure_State

O.Replay_Prevention
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Security Function Requirement

FCS_COP.1(1), FCS_COP.1(2), FCS_COP.1(3), FCS_COP.1(4), FPR_UNO.1.

FCS_CKM.2(1), FCS_CKM.4

FDP_ACC.1(1), FDP_ACF.1(1), FDP_RIP.1, FDP_UIT.1

FIA_AFL.1(1), FIA_UAU.1(1), FIA_UAU.1(2), FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5

FMT_MSA.1, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_MTD.1(1), FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1

FPT_FLS.1, FPT_ITI.1, FPT_TST.1
2.2.2. Protection Profile Additions
The items described below are additional to the protection profile for this security target.
Security Environment

T.Personalization agent authentication reuse

P.IC_Chip

A.Process_Sec_IC

A.Plat_Appl
Security Objective

O.SCP02

O.AA

O.IC_Chip
security function requirement

FCS_CKM.1(2), FCS_CKM.3, FCS_RNG.1

FDP_ACC.1(2), FDP_ACF.1(2), FDP_DAU.1

FIA_AFL.1(2), FIA_UAU.1(3)

FMT_MOF.1(2), FMT_MTD.1(3), FPT_PHP.3
2.3. Package Claim
This Security Target is conforming to assurance package as follows
ㆍAssurance Package : EAL5 augmented with (ADV_IMP.2)
2.4. Conformance Rationale

Compliance protection profile : ePassport Protection Protection Profile V2.1

Compliance type : demonstrable conformance
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2.4.1. Rationale for Conformance of Security Problem Definitions
Re-established
for
this
security
target
of
‘ePassport
Protection
Profile’
are
T.RESIDUAL_INFO among the threats, A.inspection system among the assumptions, and
P.PERSONALIZATION_AGENT, P.EPASSPORT_ACCESS_CONTROL among the organizational
security policies, and it conforms to the all the rest of security environment, and the
additionally defined security environment is the threat of T.Personalization agent
authentication reuse and the security policy of P.IC_Chip of the organization.
Re-established Security Environment

A.inspection system: re-established so that BIS and EIS support AA.

T.RESIDUAL_INFO: the residual information remaining from the process of recording and using
the SCP02 session key on temporary memory is added as a threat and re-established.

P.PERSONALIZATION_AGENT:
re-established
so
that
ePassport
Personalization
agent
establishes the OS access control policy.

P.EPASSPORT_ACCESS_CONTROL: the subjects of BIS and EIS cannot be distinguished at the
identification Phase, and the performance of access control rule is possible with just the rights
attributed to inspection systems, the subject divided into BIS and EIS is unified to inspection
system and re-established.
Added Security Environment
T.Personalization agent authentication reuse: this threat is added where the threat agent reuses
the random number delivered to the Personalization agent by TOE in the Personalization agent
authentication process and attempts bypassing the Personalization agent authentication.
P.IC_Chip : The IC chip, a component of the TOE, provides the functions to protect the TOE from
the IC chip cryptographic calculation and physical attacks.
A.Process_Sec_IC : The process between the delivery of the TOE by the manufacturer and the
delivery to the end-consumer is secure by maintaining confidentiality and integrity of the TOE.
A.Plat_Appl : The Security IC Embedded Software which is loaded onto a low platform of the IC
chip is designed by the authenticated procedure.
The following tables show that the threat, the security policy of the organization and the
assumption defined on the security problem definitions are suggested based on that there
is no contradiction between the composite-ST and the platform-ST.
Separation
PP scope
Threat
Basis
T.Eavesdropping
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T.Fogery_Corruption_Personal_Data
T.BAC_ReplayAttck
T.Damage_to_Biometric_Data
T.EAC_CA_Bypass
T.IS_Certificate_Forgery
T.SessionData_Reuse
T.Skimming
T.Malfunction
T.Leakage_CryptographicKey_Info
T.MRTD_Reproduction
T.Residual_Info
The threat on the SCP02 session key,
which is recorded in the temporary
memory and remained after using it, is
added.
T.TSF_Data_Modification
The threat on the TSF data being
accessed, while recording through the
Inspection System, is added.
T.IC_Chio_Forgery
The treat agent may reuse the random
number, which is sent from the TOE to
Personalization agent, and bypass the
authentication process of Personalization
agent.
Addition
Table 9 Relation of threat between the composite-ST and the platform-ST
Separation
Security policy of Organization
Basis
P.International_Compatibility
P.Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures
P.PKI
P.Range_RF_Comnunication
PP Scope
Addtion
The applied security policy of the
organization based on the PP scope
P.Personalization_Agent
The reestablishment that to make
only the Personalization Agent to
establish the policy of the accessing
the operation system.
P.MRTD_Access_Control
The reestablishment that the main
agent of BIS and EIS cannot be
distinguish during the identification
process and only by the authority
gained from the system, it is
possible to process the access
control rule.
P.Application_Program_Install
The application note is added that
the e-Passport application cannot
be deleted when it is in use.
P.IC_Chip
The IC chip, a component of the
TOE, provides the functions to
protect the TOE from the IC chip
cryptographic
calculation
and
physical attacks.
Table 10 Relation of the security policy of the organization between the composite-ST
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and the platform-ST
Separation
Assumption
Basis
A.Certificate_Verification
PP scope
A.Inspection_System
The applied assumption based on the PP scope.
A.MRZ_Entrophy
A.Process_Sec_IC
The assumption, that the security delivery process
from the IC chip manufacturing to the Personalization
agent and the integrity of TOE should be guaranteed,
is added.
A.Plat_Appl
The assumption, that the Security IC Embedded
Software should be designed and loaded by the
authenticated procedure, is added.
A.IC CHIP
As a component of the TOE,
the IC Chip assumption is deleted because
corresponding
security Objective(O.IC chip) and
security policy (P.IC chips)
is added
Addition
Deletion
Table 11 Relation of the assumption between the composite-ST and the platform-ST
The following table shows the security problem mapping between the composite-ST and
the platform-ST aginst the threat, the security policy of the organization and the
assumption defined on the security problem definitions.
Separation
Platform TOE
T.leak-Inherent
Composite TOE
T.Malfunction
Mapping
Mapped
T.Leakage_CryptographicKey_Info
T.Phys-Probing
T.Malfunction
Mapped
T.Leakage_CryptographicKey_Info
T.Malfunction
T.Malfunction
Mapped
T.Phys-Manipulation
T. Malfunction
Mapped
Threat
T. Leakage_CryptographicKey_Info
T.leak-Forecd
T. Malfunction
Mapped
T. Leakage_CryptographicKey_Info
T.Abuse-Func
T. Leakage_CryptographicKey_Info
Mapped
T.RND
T. Malfunction
Mapped
T. Leakage_CryptographicKey_Info
T.Mem_Access
-
-
P.Process-TOE
-
-
P.Add-Functions
T.Forgery_Corruption_Personal_Data
Security Policy
of Organization
T.Damage_to_Biometric_Data
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Mapped
XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
T.Skimming
T.MRTD_Reproduction
T.Leakage_CryptographicKey_Info
T.Malfunction
P.MRTD_Access_Control
P.IC_Chip
A.Process-Sec-IC
A.Process-Sec-IC
Mapped
T.Leakage_CryptographicKey_Info
Assumption
A.Plat-Appl
A.Plat-Appl
Mapped
A.Resp-Appl
O.Secure_State
Mapped
A.Key-Function
O.Deleting_Residual_Info
Mapped
Table 12 Treat/Organization of
the Security policy/Assumption mapping between the
composite-ST and the platform-ST
2.4.2. Rationale for Conformance of Security Objectives
This security target re-established O.Session Termination, O.Access Control
among the security objectives of ‘ePassport Protection Profile,’ conforms to all the other
security objectives, and additionally defined security objectives are O.AA, O.SCP02 and
O.IC_Chip.
Re-established Security Objective

O.Session Termination: the failure of SCP02 mutual authentication for Personalization agent
authentication is added to session termination situations, and the case of EAC-TA failure which
does not terminate the session is deleted and re-established.

O. Replay_Prevention: Cautions while SCP02 authentication process are added and reestablished.

O.Access Control: re-established for TOE to provide access control for OS.

O.Secure_State: re-established by adding the application notes that the ePassport application
loaded onto the TOE should not be deleted at the issuance and the personalization procedure.
Added Security Objective

O.AA: added as a security objective to provide a method for inspection system to determine
the authenticity of TOE.

O.SCP02: added to support SCP02 security mechanism for Personalization agent authentication.

O.IC_Chip: added to support the IC chip security that protects against the composite nature of
the TOE.
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
OE.Process_Sec_IC: added to support the secure delivery procedure from the manufacturing of
the IC Chip to the end customer and the integrity of the TOE.

OE.Plat_Appl: added to support that the Security IC Embedded Software should be designed
and loaded by the authenticated procedure.

The following tables show that there is no contradiction between the security objective of
the platform-ST and the one of the composite-ST
Separator
Security Objective
Basis
O.Management
O.Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures
O.Session_Management
O.Personalization_Agent_Authentication
O.Certificate_Verification
O.Deleting_Residual_Info
The applied security objective based
on the PP scope
O.Replay_Prevention
O.Access_Control
O.Handling_Info_Leakage
O.BAC
O.EAC
PP scope
O.Session Termination
the
failure
of
SCP02
mutual
authentication for Personalization
agent authentication is added to
session termination situations, and
the case of EAC-TA failure which does
not terminate the session is deleted
and re-established.
O.Access Control
re-established for TOE to provide
access control for OS.
O.Replay_Prevention
Cautions while SCP02 authentication
process are added and re-established.
O.Secure_State
The reestablishment for not to make
the ePassport application to be
deleted while in issuance and
personalization phases by adding the
application notes.
O.SCP02
Added to support the SCP02 security
mechanism
for
the
issuance
authentication.
O.AA
Added to support the way for the
inspection system to distinguish
whether the TOE is reproduced.
O.IC_Chip
Added to support the IC chip
security that protects against the
composite nature of the TOE.
Addition
Table 13 Relation of the security objectives between the composite TOE and the
platform TOE
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Separator
Security Objective
Basis
OE.MPTD_Manufaacturing_Security
OE.Procedures_of_MRTD_Holder_Check
OE.Application_Program_Install
OE.Certificate_Verification
The applied security objective for running
environment based on the PP scope
OE.Personalization_Agent
PP scope
OE.Inspection_System
OE.MRZ_Entropy
OE.PKI
OE.Range_RF_Communication
OE.IC_Chip
The TOE should apply all the running
environmental security objectives and
follows the OE.IC_Chip.
OE.Process_Sec_IC
By applying the security objective that the
security delivery process from the IC chip
manufacturing to the Personalization agent
and
the
integrity
of
TOE,
OE,Process_Sec_IC is added.
OE.Plat_Appl
By applying the security objective that the
Security IC Embedded Software which is
designed and loaded by the authenticated
procedure, OE.Plat_Appl is added.
OE.IC Chip
As a composite of TOE, the OE.IC Chip of
running environment is changed to O.IC
Chip of securtiy objective
Addition
Modification
Table 14 Relation of the security objectives for the running environment between the
composite TOE and the platform TOE.
The following table defines the mapping between the platform-ST and the composite-ST
against the security objectives for the running environment of the TOE security
objectives.
Separator
Platform TOE
O.leak-Inherent
Composite TOE
O.Handling_Info_Leakage
Mapping
Mapped
O.IC_Chip
Security objectives
of the TOE
O.Phys-Probing
O.IC_Chip
Mapped
O.Malfunction
O.Secure_State
Mapped
O.Phys-Manipulation
O.IC_Chip
Mapped
O.leak-Forecd
O.Handling_Info_Leakage
Mapped
O.IC_Chip
O.Secure_State
O.Abuse-Func
-
-
O.Identification
-
-
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O.RND
O.IC_Chip
O.Add-Functions
O.IC칩
Mapped
O.BAC
O.AA
O.Certificate_Verification
O.EAC
O.SCP02
security objectives
for the running
O.Mem_Access
-
-
OE.Process-Sec-IC
OE.Process-Sec-IC
Mapped
OE.Plat-Appl
OE.Plat-Appl
Mapped
environment
Table 15 Mapping of the security objectives for the running environment between the
composite-ST and the platform-ST
2.4.3. Rational for Conformance of Security Function Requirements
This security target conforms to the security function requirement of ‘ePassport Protection
Profile,’ and the operations are completed and re-established according to the preparation
rules allowed in the security function requirement of Table 9, and the security function
Relation of the security policy of the
organization between the composite-ST and the platformSTwere additionally defined.
requirements of Table 10
Re-established Security Function Requirements
Protection Profile
Security Target
Rationale
FCS_CKM.2(1)
FCS_CKM.2(1)
Selected
FCS_CKM.2(2)
FCS_CKM.2(2)
Selected
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
Allocated
FCS_COP.1(1)
FCS_COP.1(1)
Selected
FCS_COP.1(2)
FCS_COP.1(2)
Selected
FCS_COP.1(3)
FCS_COP.1(3)
Allocated, Selected
FCS_COP.1(4)
FCS_COP.1(4)
Allocated, Selected
-
FCS_RNG.1
Allocated, Selected
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1(1)
Allocated
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1(1)
Allocated
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FDP_RIP.1
FDP_RIP.1
Allocated, Selected
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_UIT.1
Selected
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_AFL.1(1)
FIA_UAU.1(1)
FIA_UAU.1(1)
Allocated
FIA_UAU.1(2)
FIA_UAU.1(2)
Allocated
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.4
Allocated
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.5
Allocated
FMT_MSA.1FMT_MSA.1FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.3
Elaboration
FMT_MTD.1(1)
FMT_MTD.1(1)
Allocated
FMT_MTD.1(2)
FMT_MTD.1(2)
Allocated
FMT_MTD.3
FMT_MTD.3
Allocated
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1
Allocated
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1
Allocated
FPR_UNO.1
FPR_UNO.1
Allocated
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1
Allocated
FPT_ITI.1
FPT_ITI.1
Allocated
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST.1
Allocated, Selected
Repeated,
Allocated,
Selected
Table 16 Rationale for Re-established Security Function Requirements
Additional rationale for security function requirement re-established through elaboration is
described.

FDP_ACC.1(1): according to Organizational Security Policies P.EPASSPORT_ACCESS_CONTROL,
subjects of BIS and EIS are combined and elaborated to inspection systems to perform access
control based on the security properties of the subject.

FDP_ACF.1(1): according to Organizational Security Policies P.EPASSPORT_ACCESS_CONTROL,
subjects of BIS and EIS are combined and elaborated to inspection systems to perform access
control based on the security properties of the subject.

FIA_AFL.1(1): elaborate by removing EAC-TA which does not terminate user session.

FMT_MSA.1: elaborate so that the added access control policy of OS access control is enforced

FMT_MSA.3: enforce the added access control policy of OS access control policy, and as the
security properties may not have other initial values due to performing the access control policy
with implementation logic of TOE, elaborate the role of specifying the selective initial values of
security properties as none.
Added Security Function Requirements
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Security
Function
Rationale
Requirements
FCS_CKM.1(2)
Defines security function requirement regarding SCP02 session key generation to
perform SCP02 mutual authentication.
FCS_CKM.3
Defines security function requirement regarding encryption key access performed by
application programs other than ePassport functions.
FCS_COP.1(5)
Defines the security function requirement for the creation of the digital signature
value.
FCS_RNG.1
Defines the SFR to use the function of the platform TOE for creating of the random
value.
FDP_ACC.1(2)
Defines security function requirement for OS access control.
FDP_ACF.1(2):
Defines security function requirement for OS access control rules.
FDP_DAU.1
Defines security function requirement for data authentication to confirm the
authenticity of ePassport.
FIA_AFL.1(2):
Defines security function requirement for Personalization agent authentication failure.
FIA_UAU.1(3):
Defines security function requirement for performing SCP02 mutual authentication to
authenticate Personalization agent.
FMT_MOF.1(2):
Adds security function requirement that only Personalization agent may grant the
function to change the OS life cycle status to application programs.
FMT_MTD.1(3):
Defines
security
function
requirement
for
ePassport
application
Life
Cycle
management of OS
FPT_PHP.3
Defines the SFR to satisfy the O.IC_Chip due to the evaluation of the TOE as
composite.
Table 17 Added Security Function Requirements
2.4.4. Rationale for Conformance of Assurance Requirements
This security target confroms to all assurance requirements of EAL4+ (ADV_IMP.2,
AVA_VAN.4) assurance level required by ‘ePassport Protection Profile,’ and the additionally
defined assurance requirements are of EAL5+, and are as follows.
Added Assurance Requirements

ADV_FSP.5 : Semi-standardized and complete function specification providing additional error
information

ADV_INT.2 : Well-structured inside of TSF

ADV_TDS.4 : Semi-standardized modularization design
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
ALC_CMS.5 : Scope of configuration management of development tools

ALC_TAT.2 : Applied implementation standard

ATE_DPT.3 : Modularization design test
Next, it shows that there is no contradiction between the guaranteed requirement of the
composite TOE and the one the IC chip used as the platform against the security
objectives, the security requirement and the security environment.
The guaranteed requirement of the composite TOE is that among the security requirement
of the IC chip which got the EAL 5+ guaranteed rank is in the range of the security
requirement of the EAL 5+ guaranteed rank. Also, based on the ePassport profile,
ADV_IMP.2, which is at the EAL 5+ guaranteed rank, is chosen to develop the EAL 5+
guaranteed rank.
Guaranteed Class
Composite TOE
Platform TOE
Conformity of the composite TOE
Security objective
ASE_INT.1
ASE_INT.1
accordance
specification
ASE_CCL.1
ASE_CCL.1
Accordance
ASE_SPD.1
ASE_SPD.1
Accordance
ASE_OBJ.2
ASE_OBJ.2
Accordance
ASE_ECD.1
ASE_ECD.1
Accordance
ASE_REQ.2
ASE_REQ.2
Accordance
ASE_TSS.1
ASE_TSS.1
Accordance
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_ARC.1
Accordance
ADV_FSP.5
ADV_FSP.5
Accordance
ADV_IMP.2
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_IMP.2 observance according to
Development
the requirement of PP
Instructions
Supporting
cycle
life
ADV_INT.2
ADV_INT.2
Accordance
ADV_TDS.4
ADV_TDS.4
Accordance
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_OPE.1
Accordance
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1
Accordance
ALC_CMC.4
ALC_CMC.4
Accordance
ALC_CMS.5
ALC_CMS.5
Accordance
ALC_DEL.1
ALC_DEL.1
Accordance
ALC_DVS.1
ALC_DVS.2
Subset observance of the platform
TOE ST
ALC_LCD.1
ALC_LCD.1
accordance
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Test
Evaluation of the
ALC_TAT.2
ALC_TAT.2
accordance
ATE_COV.2
ATE_COV.2
accordance
ATE_DPT.3
ATE_DPT.3
accordance
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1
accordance
ATE_IND.2
ATE_IND.2
accordance
AVA_VAN.4
AVA_VAN.5
Subset observance of the platform
weakness
TOE ST
Table 18 The guaranteed requirement relation between the composite TOE and the
platform TOE
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3. Security Problem Definition
Security Problem Definition defines threats, organizational policy and assumptions that
intended to be processed by TOE and TOE environment.
3.1. Threats
The ePassport is used by possession of individuals without physically controlled devices,
therefore both logical and physical threats is occurred. The threat agent is an external
entity that attempts illegal access to assets protected by the TOE, by using the physical or
logical method outside the TOE.
Therefore, the threat agent to the TOE has the moderate level of expertise, resources and
motivation.
< Threats to the TOE in the Personalization phase>
T.Personalization _Agent_Authentication_Replay
After intercepting the transmitted information from TOE and personalization agent in the
initial process of the personalization agent authentication mechanism, SCP02, the threat
agent may bypass the SCP02 mutual authentication as replaying.
Application Notes: When the TOE uses the same values for the authentication information
and SCP02 session key, they are vulnerable to ciphertext only attack.
T.TSF_DATA_MODIFICATION
When the ePassport personalization agent records the TSF data, the threat agent can
modify the data, and attempt to access in the stored TSF data using outer interfaces
through the inspection system.
< BAC-related Threats in the TOE Use phase>
T.Eavesdropping
In order to find out the personal data of the ePassport holder, the threat agent may
eavesdrop the transmitted data by using the terminal capable of the RF communication.
T.FORGERY_CORRUPTION_ PERSONAL_ DATA
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In order to forge and corrupt the personal data of the ePassport holder stored in the
MRTD chip, the threat agent may attempt access to read the user data by using the
unauthorized Inspection System.
T.BAC_AUTHENTICATION_KEY_DISCLOSE
In order to find out the personal data of the ePassport holder, the threat agent may
obtain the read-rights of the BAC authentication key located inside the TOE and disclose
the related information.
Application Notes: BAC authentication key is generated by the personalization agent in the
ePassport personalization phase or by the TOE in the ePassport using phase after the
ePassport personalization phase.
T.BAC_REPLAYATTACK
The threat agent may bypass the BAC mutual authentication by replay after intercepting
data transmitted by the TOE and the Inspection System in the initial phase of the BAC
mutual authentication.
Application Notes: The TOE delivers the random number of plaintext to Inspection System
according to „get_challenge‟ instruction of the Inspection System in the BAC. Therefore,
the threat agent can bypass the BAC mutual authentication by intercepting the random
number and response value of the Inspection System and re‐transmitting the response
value of the Inspection System to the next session. Also, the threat agent may find the
transmission data as threat agent can generate the BAC session key after obtaining the
BAC authentication key by T.BAC_Authentication_Key_Disclose.
< EAC‐related Threats in the Operational Use phase>
T. DAMAGE_TO_BIOMETRIC_DATA
The threat agent may disclose, forge and corrupt the biometric data of the ePassport
holder by using terminal capable of the unauthorized RF communication, etc.
Application Notes: Only the EIS that succeeded the EAC‐TA can access the read‐rights the
biometric data of the ePassport holder. Therefore, the threat agent may attempt to obtain
the biometric data by using the unauthorized Inspection System and BIS, etc.
T.EAC-CA_BYPASS
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The threat agent may bypass the authentication of the Inspection System so that to go
through EAC-CA by using the threat agent generated EAC chip authentication public key.
T.IS_CERTIFICATE_FORGERY
In order to obtain the access-rights the biometric data of the ePassport holder, the threat
agent may attempt to bypass the EAC-TA by forging the CVCA link certificate, DV
certificate and IS certificate and requesting verification of the certificates to the TOE.
< BAC and EAC‐related Threats in the Operational Use phase>
T.SESSIONDATA_REUSE
In order to find out the transmitted data through the secure messaging, the threat agent
may derive session keys from a number of cryptographic communication texts collected
by using the terminal capable of wide-ranging RF communication.
Application Notes: When the TOE and Inspection System use the BAC authentication key
as the BAC session key, they are vulnerable to ciphertext only attack as the same session
key is used in each BAC session. When the BAC session key is generated with the same
random number used in the BAC mutual authentication, critical information necessary in
deriving the session key may be provided to an attacker as the first random number of
the TOE is transmitted as plaintext. In case the EIS transmits temporary public key in the
EAC‐CA and random number in the EAC‐TA to other sessions in the same way and the
TOE continues to use them, they may be vulnerable to ciphertext only attack.
T.SKIMMING
The threat agent may read information stored in the IC chip by communicating with the
MRTD Chip through the unauthorized RF communication terminal without the ePassport
holder realizing it.
< Threats related to IC Chip Support>
T.MALFUNCTION
In order to bypass security functions or to damage the TSF and TSF data stored in the
TOE, threat agent may occur malfunction of the TOE in the environmental stress outside
the normal operating conditions.
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< Other Threats in the Operational Use phase>
T.LEAKAGE_CRYPTOGRAPHICKEY_INFO
By using electric power and wave analysis devices, the threat agent may obtain key
information used in cryptographic technique applied to the ePassport security mechanism
by analyzing information of electric power and wave emitted in the course of the TOE
operation.
T.EPASSPORT_REPRODUCTION
The threat agent may masquerade as the ePassport holder by reproduction the MRTD
application data stored in the TOE and forgery identity information page of the ePassport.
T.RESIDUAL_INFO
The threat agent may disclose to critical information by using residual information
remaining while the TSF data, such as BAC authentication key, BAC session key, EAC
session key, DV certificate and IS certificate, etc., are recorded and used in temporary
memory.
3.2. Organizational Security Policies
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its operations.
P.INTERNATIONAL_COMPATIBILITY
The Personalization agent shall ensure compatibility between security mechanisms of the
ePassport and security mechanism of the Inspection System for immigration.
Application Notes: The international compatibility shall be ensured according to the ICAO
document and EAC specifications
P.SECURITY_MECHANISM_APPLICATION_PROCEDURES
The TOE shall ensure the order of security mechanism application according to the type of
the Inspection System so that not to violate the ePassport access control policies of the
Personalization agent.
Application Notes: The operation flow of the TOE differs according to the type of security
mechanisms supported by the Inspection System. The basic operation flow depends on
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2.1.1 Standard ePassport Inspection Procedure and 2.1.2 Advanced ePassport Procedure
of the EAC specifications.
P.APPLICATION_PROGRAM_INSTALL
The Personalization agent shall approve application program installing after checking that
application programs loaded in the MRTD chip does not affect the secure TOE.
Application notes: The application program installing can only be done by organizations
holding the same authority as the Personalization agent. Also, ePassport application
program installed in the IC chips cannot be deleted in the utilized procedure.
P.PERSONALIZATION_AGENT
The personalization agent shall issue the ePassport in the secure manner so that to
confirm that the issuing subject has not been changed and shall deliver the TOE to the
Operational Use phase after verifying that the data inside MRTD chip are operating
normally after issuing. The Personalization agent shall deactivate the writing function
before the TOE delivery to the Operational Use phase. Also, the personalization agent
should establish the access control policy about the operation system management.
Application Notes: SCP02 security mechanism of ‘GP standard’ as the security mechanism
is used for the personalization agent authentication
P.EPASSPORT_ACCESS_CONTROL
The Personalization agent and TOE shall build the ePassport access control policies in
order to protect the MRTD application data. Also, the TOE shall regulate the roles of user.
Application Notes: The TOE shall build access control policies as of the following according
to the ICAO document and EAC specifications.
Objects
List of
Personal data
of the ePassport
holder
Biometric data
of the ePassport
holder
ReadRight
WriteRight
ReadRight
WriteRight
ReadRight
WriteRight
ReadRight
WriteRight
ReadRight
WriteRight
BAC
Authorization
Allow
Deny
Deny
Deny
Allow
Deny
Allow
Deny
Allow
Deny
BAC
Authorization
Allow
Deny
Deny
Deny
Allow
Deny
Allow
Deny
Allow
Deny
EAC
Authorization
Allow
Deny
Allow
Deny
Allow
Deny
Allow
Deny
Allow
Deny
Objects
List of Subjects
BIS
Subjec
ts
EIS
Security
Attribute
Security
Attribute
ePassport
authentication data
EF.CVCA
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EF.COM
XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
Personalization Personalization
Agent
Allow
Authorization
Allow
Allow
Allow
Allow
Allow
Allow
Allow
Allow
Allow
Table 19 ePassport Access Control Policies
P. PKI
The Issuing State of the ePassport shall execute certification practice to securely generate
· manage a digital signature key and to generate · issue · operate · destroy certificates
according to the CPS by implementing the PA-PKI and EAC-PKI according to the ePassport
PKI System.
Also, The Issuing State of the ePassport shall update certificates according to the policies
to manage valid date of certificates, therefore securely deliver them to the Verifying State
and Inspection System. When the EAC-TA provides the TOE with CVCA link certificate, DV
certificate and IS certificate after the Inspection System obtaining information from
EF.CVCA stored in the TOE, the TOE shall internally update certificates by verifying validity
of the certificates.
P.RANGE_RF_COMMUNICATION
The RF communication distance between the MRTD chip and Inspection System shall be
less than 5cm and the RF messaging shall not be established if the page of the ePassport
attached with IC chip is not opened.
P.IC_Chip
The IC chip, a component of the TOE, provides the random number generation and
cryptographic operation to support security functions of the TOE. It also detects the TOE’s
malfunction outside the normal operating conditions and provides functions of the physical
protection to protect the TOE from physical attacks using the probing and reverse
engineering analysis.
Application Notes :
To ensure the secure TOE environment, the IC chip shall be a certified product,
S3CT9KW/S3CT9KC/S3CT9K9,
of
CCRA
EAL4+(SOF-high)
or
higher
level.
The
cryptographic operation supported by the IC chip may be provided in the co-processor of
the IC chip or cryptographic libraries loaded in the IC chip.
3.3. Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will
be used or is intended to be used in order to limit the scope of security consideration.
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A.Certificate_Verification
The Inspection System, such as the BIS and the EIS, verifies the SOD after verifying
validity of the certificate chain for the PA (CSCA certificate → DS certificate) in order to
verify for forgery and corruption of the ePassport identity data recorded in the TOE. For
this, the DS certificate and CRL shall be verified periodically.
The EIS shall securely hold the digital signature generation key that corresponds to the IS
certificate and shall provide the TOE with the CVCA link certificate, the DV certificate and
the IS certificate in the EAC-TA.
Application Notes: The Inspection System should connect to ICAO-PKD periodically, and
download CSCA certificates to verify the certificate for PA of the inspection system.
A.Inspection_System
The Inspection System shall implement security mechanisms of the PA, the BAC and the
EAC according to the ICAO document and EAC specifications on the basis of the verifying
policy of the ePassport for the ePassport holder.
Also, after session ends, the BIS and the EIS shall securely destroy all information used in
communication and the TOE, such as the BAC session key, the EAC session key and
session information, etc.
Application Notes: The TOE denies the request to access EF.SOD by the Inspection
System that failed the BAC mutual authentication.
As the BIS supports the BAC and PA security mechanisms, it obtains the read‐rights for
the personal and authentication data of the ePassport holder if the BAC mutual
authentication using the BAC authentication key succeeds. Then, by establishing the BAC
secure messaging with the BAC session key, it ensures the confidentiality and integrity of
all transmitted data. The BIS verifies the SOD by executing the PA after the BAC. Then, by
calculating and comparing a hash value for the personal and authentication data of the
ePassport holder, it verifies the forgery and corruption for the personal and authentication
data of the ePassport holder. As the EIS supports the BAC, EAC and PA security
mechanisms, it obtains the read‐rights for the personal, authentication and biometric data
of the ePassport holder. The EIS, when the BAC mutual authentication and secure
messaging succeed, executes the EAC‐CA by using the EAC chip authentication public key
read in the BAC to verify the genuine TOE. Then, it executes the PA in order to verify the
EAC chip authentication public key. When the EAC‐CA is succeeded, the BAC secure
messaging is ended and the EAC secure messaging with the EAC session key is started,
and the EAC‐TA that the TOE authenticates inspection system.
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The Inspection System is executed. When the EAC‐TA is succeeded, the EIS obtains the
read‐rights for the biometric data of the ePassport holder. Therefore, the EIS is provided
the biometric data of the ePassport holder from the TOE. BIS or EIS could implement AA
security mechanism additionally, verify the digital signature provided by TOE using the AA
digital signature verification key of EF.DG15, and verify the probability of TOE.
A.MRZ Entropy
The BAC authentication key seed takes the MRZ entropy to ensure the secure BAC
authentication key.
Application Notes: In order to resistant to the moderate‐level threat agent, the entropy for
the passport number, date of birth, data of expiry or valid until date and check digit used
as BAC authentication key seed among the MRZ in the current technological level shall be
at least 56bit.
<The Assumption of the IC chip>
The followings are quoted from “3.4 Assumptions” of [ICST].
A.Process-Sec-IC
(
Protection
during
Packaging,
Finishing
and
Personalisation )
It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery of the composite TOE(H/W
and Embedded Software) by the Manufacturer up to delivery to the consumer to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the composite TOE and of its manufacturing and test data
(to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use).
This means that the Phases after composite TOE Delivery are assumed to be protected
appropriately.
A.Plat-Appl ( Usage of Hardware Platform )
The Security IC Embedded Software is designed so that the requirements from the
following documents are met: H/W TOE guidance documents (refer to the Common
Criteria assurance class AGD) such as the hardware data sheet, and the hardware
application notes, and findings of the H/W TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security
IC Embedded Software as documented in the certification report.
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4. Security Objectives
This security target defines security objectives by categorizing them into the TOE and the
environment. The security objectives for the TOE are directly handled by the TOE. The
security objectives for the environment are handled by technical/process-related means
supported from IT environment in order to provide TOE security functionality accurately.
4.1. Security Objectives for the TOE
The followings are security objectives to be directly handled by the TOE.
O. Management
The TOE shall provide the means to manage the MRTD application data in the
Personalization phase to the authorized Personalization agent.
Application Notes: In the Personalization phase, the Personalization agent shall deactivate
the writing function after recording the MRTD application data.
O. Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures
The TOE shall ensure instruction flow according to ePassport inspection procedures of the
EAC specifications.
Application Notes : The TOE shall ensure that the application order of PA, BAC and EAC
security mechanisms conforms to 2.1.1 Standard ePassport Inspection Procedure and
2.1.2 Advanced ePassport Procedure of the EAC specifications and shall not allow requests
from the Inspection System that do not correspond to the security mechanism application
order.
O. Session_Termination
The TOE shall terminate the session in case of failure of the BAC mutual authentication,
failure of the EAC-TA or detecting modification in the transmitted TSF data.
O. Secure_Messaging
The TOE shall ensure confidentiality and integrity to protect the transmitted user and TSF
data.
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O. Certificate_Verification
The TOE shall automatically update the certificate and current date by checking valid date
on the basis of the CVCA link certificate provided by the Inspection System.
O. Secure_State
The TOE shall preserve secure state from attempt of modification of TSF and data at startup.
Application Notes: The ePassport application program should not be deleted in the
personalization and operational use phase
O. Deleting_Residua_Info
When allocating resources, the TOE shall provide means to ensure that previous securityrelated information (Ex.: BAC session key, EAC session key, etc.) is not included.
O. Replay_Prevention
The TOE shall ensure generation and use of different random number per session for the
secure cryptographic-related information used in security mechanisms.
Application Notes: The TOE shall generate the transmitted data to the Inspection System
in the BAC mutual authentication and EAC-TA to be different per session and shall not use
the BAC authentication key as the BAC session key. Also, the TOE shall not provide critical
information necessary in deriving session key by generate the BAC session key with the
same random number used in the BAC mutual authentication.
O. Access_Control
The TOE shall provide the access control function so that access to the MRTD application
data is allowed only to external entities granted with access-rights according to the
ePassport access control policies of the Personalization agent.
Application Notes: Only the authorized Personalization agent in the Personalization phase
can record the MRTD application data or TSF data and access control policies for the readrights according to the type of the Inspection System shall be built in the Operational Use
phase. Also, the access control policy is established about operation system user data
including
execute
file,
application
program
and
fundamental
information
personalization agent or authority in the personalization or operational use phase.
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for
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O.Handling_Info_Leakage
The TOE shall implement countermeasures to prevent exploiting of leakage information
during cryptographic operation for the TSF.
O.BAC
The TOE executes the BAC mutual authentication of the Inspection System with the TOE
by implementing the BAC security mechanism in order to allow the read-rights for the
personal data of the ePassport holder only to the authorized Inspection System. Also, the
TOE generates the BAC session key to be used for the BAC secure messaging.
O.EAC
The TOE authenticates the Inspection System by implementing the EAC security
mechanism (EAC-CA and EAC-TA) in order to allow the read-rights for the biometric data
of the ePassport holder only to the authorized Inspection System. Also, the TOE generates
the EAC session key to be used for the EAC secure messaging.
O.SCP02
TOE implements the security mechanism SCP02 to provide means managing ePassport
application data by only the authorized personalization agent, and performs SCP02 mutual
authentication between TOE and inspection system.
O.AA
TOE implements AA security mechanism to recognize the illegal reproduction of TOE by
the inspection system.
O.IC_Chip
The IC chip, the component of the TOE, provides the random number generation and
cryptographic operation to support security functions of the TOE. It also detects the TOE’s
malfunction outside the normal operating conditions and provides functions of the physical
protection to protect the TOE from physical attacks using the probing and reverse
engineering analysis.
Application Notes:
In case performing TDES operation, RSA operation or ECDSA operation, the co-processor
of the IC chip or cryptographic libraries loaded in the IC chip shall implement
countermeasures to prevent exploiting of leakage information
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4.2. Security Objectives for the Environment
The following are security objectives handled by IT fields or nontechnical/procedurerelated means.
OE. ePassport_Manufacturing_Security
Physical security measures(security printing, etc.) for the ePassport shall be prepared to
detect reproduction of the MRTD chip and attack attempt of the Grandmaster chess,
replacement of the portrait and modification of the MRZ data, etc.
OE. Procedures_of_ePassport_holder_Check
The Immigration officer shall prepare for procedures to check identity of the ePassport
holder against the printed identity information page of the ePassport.
OE. Application_Program_Install
The Personalization agent shall approve application program loading after checking that
application programs loaded in the MRTD chip does not affect the secure TOE.
OE. Certificate_Verification
The Inspection System, such as the BIS and the EIS, verifies the SOD after verifying
validity of the certificate chain for the PA (CSCA certificate → DS certificate) in order to
verify for forgery and corruption of the ePassport identity data recorded in the TOE. For
this, the DS certificate and CRL shall be verified periodically. The EIS shall securely hold
the digital signature generation key that corresponds to the IS certificate and shall provide
the TOE with the CVCA link certificate, the DV certificate and the IS certificate in the EACTA.
OE. Personalization_Agent
The personalization agent shall issue the ePassport in the secure manner so that to
confirm that the issuing subject has not been changed and shall deliver the TOE to the
Operational Use phase after verifying the normal operation and compatibility of the
ePassport. The Personalization agent shall deactivate the writing function before the TOE
delivery to the Operational Use phase.
OE. .Inspection_System
The Inspection System shall implement security mechanisms according to the type of the
Inspection System so that not to violate the ePassport access control policies of the
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Personalization agent and to ensure the order of application. Also, the Inspection System
shall securely destroy all information used in communication with the TOE after the
session termination.
OE.MRZ_Entropy
Personalization agent shall ensure the MRZ entropy to ensure the secure BAC
authentication key.
OE.PKI
The Issuing State of the ePassport shall execute certification practice to securely generate
· manage a digital signature key and to generate · issue · operate · destroy certificates
according to the CPS by implementing the PA-PKI and EAC-PKI according to the ePassport
PKI System. Also, The Issuing State of the ePassport shall update certificates according to
the policies to manage valid date of certificates, therefore securely deliver them to the
Verifying State and Inspection System.
OE.Range_RF_Communication
The RF communication distance between the MRTD chip and Inspection System shall be
less than 5cm and the RF messaging shall not be established if the page of the ePassport
attached with the IC chip is not opened.
<The running environment of the IC chip>
The followings are quoted from “4.2 Security Objectives for the Security IC Embedded
software development Environment” of [ICST].
OE.Process-Sec-IC ( Protection during composite product manufacturing )
Security procedures shall be used after composite TOE(H/W and Embedded Software)
Delivery up to delivery to the "consumer" to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the
composilte TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use). This means that Phases after
composilte TOE Delivery up to the end of Phase 6 must be protected appropriately.
OE.Plat-Appl ( Usage of Hardware Platform )
To ensure that the composite TOE(H/W and Embedded Software) is used in a secure
manner the Security IC Embedded Software shall be designed so that the requirements
from the following documents are met: hardware data sheet for the H/W TOE, data sheet
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of the IC Dedicated Software of the H/W TOE , application notes, other guidance
documents, and (iv) findings of the H/W TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security
IC Embedded Software as referenced in the certification report.
4.3. Security Objectives Rationale
Security objectives Rationale demonstrate that the specified security objectives are
appropriate, sufficient to trace security problems and are essential, rather than excessive.
The rationale of security objectives demonstrates the following:

Each assumption, threat or organizational security policy has at least one security
objective tracing to it.

Each security objective traces to at least one assumption, threat or organizational
security policy.
Table 20 shows the mapping between Security Problem Definition and Security
Objectives.
T.Personalization_Agen
t_Authen._Rreplay
T.TSF_DATA_MODIFICA
TION
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
T.
DAMAGE_TO_BIOMETR
IC_DATA
X
T.EAC-CA_BYPASS
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
T.SESSIONDATA_REUSE
X
T.SKIMMING
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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X
OE.Plat-appl
OE.Process-Sec-IC
OE.Range_RF_Comm.
OE.PKI
X
T.BAC_REPLAYATTACK
T.IS_CERTIFICATE_FOR
GERY
OE.MRZ_Entropy
X
X
T.FORGERY_CORRUPTI
ON_ PERSONAL_ DATA
T.BAC_AUTHENTICATIO
N_KEY_DISCLOSE
OE.Inspection_system
OE.Personalization_Age.
OE.ePassport_Manufactu
ring_Security
OE.Procedures_ePasspor
t_holder_check
OE.Application_Program
_Install
OE.Certificate_Verifi.
O.SCP02
O.IC_Chip
O.EAC
O.BAC
O.Handling_Info_Leakag
e
O.AA
O.Access_Control
Security Objective for environment
X
T.Eavesdropping
T.MALFUNCTION
O.Replay_Prevention
O.Deleting_Residu_Info
O.Secure_State
O.Certificate_Verfifi.
O.Secure_Messaging
Security
Environment
TOE Security Objective
O.Management
O.Security_Mechanism_A
pplication_Procedure
O.Session_Termination
Security
Objectives
XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
T.LEAKAGE_CRYPTOGR
APHICKEY_INFO
X
T.EPASSPORT_REPROD
UCTION
X
X
T.RESIDUAL_INFO
X
X
X
X
X
P.INTERNATIONAL_CO
MPATIBILITY
X
P.SECURITY_MECHANIS
M_APPLICATION_PROC
EDURES
X
X
P.APPLICATION_PROGR
AM_INSTALL
X
X
P.PERSONALIZATION_A
GENT
X
X
P.EPASSPORT_ACCESS_
CONTROL
X
X
P.PKI
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P.Range_RF_Comm.
X
P.IC_Chip
X
A.Certificate_Vefification
X
X
X
A.Inspection_System
X
X
A.MRZ_Entropy
X
X
A.Process-Sec-IC
X
A.Plat-Appl
Table 20 The mapping between Security Environment and Security Objectives
4.3.1. Security Objective Rationale for the TOE
O. Management
This security objective ensures that the TOE provides the means to write user data in EF
domain and the means to write TSF data in secure memory only to the authorized
Personalization agent in the Personalization phase and prevents unauthorized access using
external interface by deactivating the MRTD application data writing function of the
Personalization agent in the Operational Use phase. Therefore, this security objective is
required
to
counter
the
threats
of
T.TSF_Data_Modification
and
T.BAC_Authentication_Key_Disclose and to enforce the organizational security policies of
P.ePassport_Access_Control and P.Personalization_Agent. Also, this security objective
provides the Personalization agent with the means to record CVCA certificate in secure
memory in the Personalization phase, therefore is required to counter the threat of
T.IS_Certificate_Forgery.
O. Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures
This security objective is required to enforce the organizational security policies of
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P.Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures since the TOE ensures that the application
order of the PA, BAC and EAC security mechanisms according to 2.1.1 Standard ePassport
Inspection Procedure and 2.1.2 Advanced ePassport Procedure of the EAC specifications
and by not allowing requests from the Inspection System that do not correspond to the
security mechanism application order. Also, this security objective is required to counter
the threat of T.EAC-CA Bypass by eliminating the cases of demonstrating the genuine TOE
to the unauthorized Inspection System as it ensures the application order of security
mechanisms so that to enable the EAC-CA execution by only the Inspection System with
access-rights for the EAC chip authentication public key through the BAC execution.
O. Session_Termination.
This security objective ensures that the TOE prevents continuous authentication attempts
of authentication in order for access to forge and corrupt the personal or biometric data of
the ePassport holder and terminates session in case modification for the transmitted TSF
data is detected. Therefore, this security objective is required to counter the threats of
T.Forgery_Corruption_Personal
Data,
T.Damage_to_Biometric_Data,
T.BAC_Authentication_Key_Disclose and T.TSF_Data_Modification.
O. Secure_Messaging
This security objective ensures that the TOE establishes the BAC or EAC secure messaging
for secure transmission of the personal and biometric data of the ePassport holder to the
Inspection System, and provides the confidentiality and integrity for the transmitted
personal and biometric data of the ePassport holder. Therefore, this security objective is
required to counter the threats of T.Damage_to_Biometric_Data and T.Eavesdropping.
O. Certificate_Verification
This security objective is required to enforce the organizational security policies of P. PKI
as it ensures for the TOE to check the valid date on the basis of the CVCA link certificate
provided by the Inspection System, therefore to automatically update the certificate and
the current date. This security objective is required to counter the threats of
T.Damage_to_Biometric_Data and T.IS_Certificate_Forgery by determining the status of
forgery as the TOE verifies validity of the CVCA link certificate, DV certificate and IS
certificate in the EAC-TA.
O. Secure_State
This security objective is required to counter the threat of T.Malfunction as the TOE
detects modification of the TSF and data through self-testing, and protects the TOE itself
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by preserving a secure state so that malfunction of TSF do not occur. Also, this security
objective should not delete the application program, and operate Organizational Security
Policies P.APPLICATION_PROGRAM_INSTALL.
O. Deleting_Residua_Info
This security objective is required to counter the threat of T.Residual_Info by deleting all
of the previous security-related information (BAC session key and EAC session key, etc.)
so that it is not included when the TOE allocates or deallocates memory resources,
therefore ensuring that information is not available. This security objective is required to
counter the threat of T.BAC_Authentication_Key_Disclose by providing the means to
ensure that residual information remaining in temporary memory is not available.
O. Replay_Prevention
This security objective is required to counter the threat of T.BAC_ReplayAttack by ensuring
that the TOE generates different values per session that are transmitted to the Inspection
System in the BAC mutual authentication. Also, this security objective is required to
counter the threat of T.SessionData_Reuse by ensuring that different random numbers are
generated and used per each session of security mechanism because the TOE ensures
that the BAC authentication key is not used as the BAC session key in the BAC mutual
authentication and the BAC session key is not generated with the same random number
used in the BAC mutual authentication and checks the status of replay of random number
transmitted by the EIS in the EAC.
O. Access_Control
This
security
objective
is
required
to
counter
the
threats
of
T.
Forgery_Corruption_Personal Data, T.Damage_to_Biometric_Data and T.Skimming and
enforce
the
organizational
security
policies
of
P.ePassport_Access_Control
by
implementing the rules of allowing or denying of Inspection System to read user data in
accordance with the ePassport access control policies by the Personalization agent. Also,
this security objective shall implement access control function according to application
management authority, access authority for fundamental information and authorized
information of personalization agent and perform Organizational Security Policies
P.PERSONALIZATION_AGENT.
O.Handling_Info_Leakage
This
security
objective
is
required
to
counter
the
threat
of
T.Leakage_CryptographicKey_Info as the TOE provides the means to prevent analyzing
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the leakage information (electric power and wave, etc.) during cryptographic operation,
and obtaining of key information.
O.AA
This security objective is mapping Threats T.EPASSPORT_REPRODUCTION because TOE
shall implement AA security mechanism that the inspection system is utilizing for
recognizing the illegal reproduction of TOE.
O.BAC
This security objective is required to enforce the organizational security policies of
P.ePassport_Access_Control as the TOE implements the BAC security mechanism to
control access to the personal data of the ePassport holder, therefore gives the read-rights
for the personal data of the ePassport holder only to the authorized Inspection System of
which the BAC mutual authentication is successfully completed. This security objective is
required to counter the threats of T. Forgery_Corruption_Personal Data and T.Skimming as
the TOE allows the read-rights for the personal data of the ePassport holder only to the
authorized Inspection System by generating the BAC session key during the BAC mutual
authentication and denies access by the Inspection System that does not have the readrights.
O.EAC
This security objective is required to enforce the organizational security policies of
P.ePassport_Access_Control as the TOE implements the EAC-CA and EAC-TA to control
access to the biometric data of the ePassport holder, therefore gives the read-rights for
the biometric data of the ePassport holder only to the authorized Inspection System of
which the EAC-TA is successfully completed. This security objective is required to counter
the threats of T.Damage_to_Biometric_Data and T.Skimming as the TOE allows the readrights for the biometric data of the ePassport holder only to the authorized Inspection
System through the EAC-TA by generating the EAC session key during the EAC-CA and
denies access by the Inspection System that does not have the read-rights. Also, it is
mapping Threats T.EPASSPORT_REPRODUCTION because of providing means to recognize
the illegal reproduction of TOE through EAC_CA.
O.IC_Chip
This security objective is required to support the assumption of A.IC_Chip as it uses
EAL4+(SOF-high) IC chip as a TOE component that generates random number and
provides cryptographic op-eration in order to support security functions of the TOE and
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provides the malfunction detection and physical protection, etc. Therefore, it is required to
counter OSP P.IC_Chip.
Also, this security objective is required to counter the threat of T.Malfunction as the IC
chip detects malfunction outside the normal operating conditions, and this security
objective is required to counter the threat of T.Leakage_CryptographicKey_Info as it uses
EAL5+ IC Chip that is assured.
O.SCP02
This
security
objective
shall
perform
Organizational
Security
Policies
P.EPASSPORT_ACCESS_CONTROL, P.PERSONALIZATION_AGENT as TOE shall authorize
ePassport personalization agent, implement SCP02 mutual authentication for personalizing
securely, and provide management means about ePassport applicant information and TSF
data to only personalization agent succeeding SCP02 mutual authentication.
4.3.2. Security Objective Rationale for Operating Environment
OE. ePassport_Manufacturing_Security
This security objective for environment is required to counter the threat of
T.ePassport_Reproduction by ensuring that Physical security measures(security printing,
etc.) for the ePassport are prepared to detect reproduction of the MRTD chip and attack
attempt of the Grandmaster chess, replacement of the portrait and modification of the
MRZ data, etc.
OE. Procedures_of_ePassport_Holder_Check
This security objective for environment is required to counter the threats of
T.ePassport_Reproduction, T.BAC_Authentication_Key_Disclose and T.EAC-CA_Bypass by
implementing procedural security measures in immigration process, such as procedures to
check the printed identify information page of the ePassport and to determine the forgery
status of the ePassport book, etc.
OE. Application_Program_Install
This security objective for environment is required to enforce the organizational security
policies of P.Application_Program_Install by ensuring that only the application programs
are loaded to the MRTD chip in a secure manner by the Personalization agent.
OE. Certificate_Verification
This security objective for environment verifies the SOD after verifying regularly the DS
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certificate and CRL in order for the Inspection System, such as the BIS and EIS, to verify
for forgery and corruption of the ePassport identity data recorded in the TOE. Also, this
security objective for environment ensures for the EIS to securely maintains digital
signature generation key that corresponds to the IS certificate and to provide the TOE
with the CVCA link certificate, DV certificate and IS certificate in the EAC-TA. Therefore,
this security objective for environment is required to counter the threats of
T.Damage_to_Biometric_Data, T. EAC-CA Bypass and T.IS_Certificate_Forgery and support
the assumption of A.Certificate_Verification.
OE. Personalization_Agent
This security objective for environment is required to enforce the organizational security
policies of P.International_Compatibility and P.Personalization_Agent by ensuring that the
TOE is delivered to the Operational Use phase after securely issuing the ePassport so that
the Personalization agent can check that the issuing subject has not been changed,
verifying normal operation and compatibility of the ePassport in the Personalization phase
and deactivating writing function. This security objective for environment also is required
to enforce the organizational security policies of P.ePassport_Access_Control as it defines
the role of the Personalization agent. Also, this security objective for environment is
required
to
support
the
assumption
of
A.Certificate_Verification
because
the
Personalization agent makes certificates necessary in the PA and EAC support available to
the Inspection System. This security objective for environment is required to counter the
threat of T.TSF_Data_Modification because the Personalization agent deactivates writing
function in the Operational Use phase, therefore disables the writing function for
modification of the TSF data.
Application Notes :
Basically, the TOE supports the BAC mechanism and it supports also the AA or the EAC
mechanism as optional. This option can be decided according to the personalization policy
of the Personalization agent and it is set by the install option of the TOE.
OE. Inspection_System
This security objective for environment is required to support the assumption of
A.Inspection
System
and
enforce
the
organizational
security
policies
of
P.Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures and P.ePassport_Access_Control as the
Inspection System implements and ensures application order of security mechanisms in
accordance with the type of the Inspection System so that not to violate the ePassport
access control policies of the Personalization agent and by ensuring that information used
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in communication with the TOE is securely destroyed after session termination.
This security objective for environment is required to counter the threat of
T.Eavesdropping as the confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data are ensured by
establishing the BAC secure messaging after generating the BAC session key through the
BAC key distribution when the Inspection System communicates with the TOE.
This security objective for environment is required to counter the threats of T.
Forgery_Corruption_Personal Data, T.Damage_to_Biometric_Data, T.Skimming and T.EACCA_Bypass as the Inspection System supports the BAC mutual authentication, EAC and PA.
This security objective for environment is required to counter the threat of
T.SessionData_Reuse as the Inspection System generate different temporary public key
per session to be transmitted to the TOE in the EAC-CA.
OE. MRZ_Entropy
This security objective for environment is required to support the assumption of
A.MRZ_Entropy by providing MRZ entropy necessary for the Personalization agent to
ensure the secure BAC authentication key.
OE.PKI
This security objective for environment is required to enforce the organizational security
policies of P. PKI and supports the assumption of A.Certificate_Verification by
implementing and operating the ePassport PKI System that executes certification practice
according to CPS, such as to generate digital signature key and to generate· issue·
distribute of certificates necessary in supporting PA and EAC security mechanisms. Also,
this security objective for environment is required to counter the threat of
T.Damage_to_Biometric_Data
by
generating,
issuing
and
distributing
certificates
necessary in the EAC through implementation of the EAC-PKI.
OE. Range_RF_Communication
This security objective for environment is required to counter the threat of T.Skimming
and enforce the organizational security policies of P.Range_RF_Communication by
ensuring that RF communication distance between the MRTD chip and the Inspection
System is less than 5cm and that RF messaging is not established if the page of the
ePassport attached with the IC chip is not opened.
<The rationale of the security objective against the environment of the IC
chip>
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OE.Process-Sec-IC (Protection during composite product manufacturing)
This security objective for environment is required to counter the assumption of
A.Process-Sec-IC by requiring Composite Product Manufacturer to apply security
procedure to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE through delivery to the end
customer.
OE.Plat-Appl (Usage of Hardware Platform)
This security objective for environment supports the assumption of A.Plat-Appl and A.KeyFunction by requiring Embedded S/W developer to implement while satisfying TOE
guidance documents and findings of IC chip evaluation report.
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5. Definition of Extended Component
This chapter identifies the extended security requirement of this Security Target and
provides the explanation about them.
The component belongs to the cryptographic calculation providing the function to
generate the random number so it is included in the FCS class. There was no family
supporting the function to generate the random number so it is included in the FCS class.
It supports only the function to generate the random number therefore only one
component is required to be exist.
This Security Target defines FCS_RNG that is claimed in the Security Target of the IC Chip.
FCS_RNG Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are
intended to be used for cryptographic purpose.
Component levelling:
FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a
defined quality metric.
Management : FCS_RNG.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit : FCS_RNG.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic,
hybrid] random number generator that implements: [assignment: list of security
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capabilities].
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined
quality metric].
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6. Security Requirements
Security requirements specify security functional and assurance requirements that must
be satisfied by the TOE that claims this Security Target.
In this Protection Profile, the external entities specified in security requirements include
Personalization agent, BIS and EIS.
This Security Target defines all subjects, objects, operation, security attributes employed
in security requirements as Table 21. Also, it defines SSC (Send Sequence Counter) with
session security attributes related to establishing secure messaging.
Table 21 Definition of Subject, Object, related Security Attributes and Operation
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6.1. TOE Security Function Requirements
The security requirement of this Security Target consists of the components from Part 2 of
the common criteria. The following Table 22 shows the security requirement using in this
Security Target in order to satisfy TOE security objective identified in the previous chapter.
Security Functional
Security Functional Components
Class
FCS_CKM.1(1)
Cryptographic key generation (Key Derivation Mechanism)
FCS_CKM.1(2)
Cryptographic key generation (Generation of SCP02
Session Key)
FCS_CKM.2(1)
Cryptographic key distribution (KDF Seed Distribution for
BAC session key generation)
Cryptographic
Support
(FCS)
User Data Protection
(FDP)
identification and
Authentication
(FIA)
Security Management
(FMT)
FCS_CKM.3
Cryptographic key access
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1(1)
Cryptographic operation (Symmetric Key Cryptographic
Operation)
FCS_COP.1(2)
Cryptographic operation (MAC)
FCS_COP.1(3)
Cryptographic operation (Hash Function)
FCS_COP.1(4)
Cryptographic operation (Digital Signature Verification for
Certificates Verifica-tion)
FCS_COP.1(5)
Cryptographic operation (Digital Signature Generation for
AA)
FCS_RNG.1
Random Number Generation
FDP_ACC.1(1)
Subset access control (ePassport access control)
FDP_ACC.1(2)
Subset access control (operation system access control)
FDP_ACF.1(1)
Security attribute based access control (ePassport access
control)
FDP_ACF.1(2)
Security attribute based access control (OS access
control)
FDP_DAU.1
Basic data authentication
FDP_RIP.1
Subset residual information protection
FDP_UCT.1
Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UIT.1
Data exchange integrity
FIA_AFL.1(1)
Authentication failure handling (user session termination)
FIA_AFL.1(2)
Authentication failure handling (retry prohibited)
FIA_UAU.1(1)
Timing of authentication (BAC mutual authentication)
FIA_UAU.1(2)
Timing of authentication (EAC-TA)
FIA_UAU.1(3)
Timing of authentication (SCP02 mutual authentication)
FIA_UAU.4
Single-use authentication mechanism
FIA_UAU.5
Multiple authentication mechanism
FIA_UID.1
Timing of identification
FMT_MOF.1(1)
Management of security functions behavior (ePassport
writing)
FMT_MOF.1(2)
Management of security functions behavior (OS life cycle
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change)
FMT_MSA.1
Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3
Static attribute initialization
FMT_MTD.1(1)
Management
information)
FMT_MTD.1(2)
Management of TSF data (SCC initialization)
FMT_MTD.1(3)
Management of TSF data (OS management)
FMT_MTD.3
Secure TSF data
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FPR_UNO.1
Unobservability
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
Protection of the TSF
FPT_ITI.1
Inter-TSF detection of modification
(FPT)
FPT_PHP.3
Resistance to physical attack
FPT_TST.1
TSF TESTING
Privacy (FPR)
of
TSF
data
(certificate
verification
Table 22 TOE Security Functional Requirements
6.1.1. Cryptographic Support
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (Key Derivation Mechanism)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate encryption keys and MAC keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [ Appendix 5.1 Key Derivation
Mechanism ] and specified cryptographic key sizes [ 112bit ] that meet the following:
[ the ICAO document ].
Application Notes: The TOE generates the BAC authentication key, BAC session key and
EAC session key by using key derivation mechanism. BAC authentication key is generated
and provided by the Personalization agent, or in the case the Personalization agent does
not provide it, it is generated directly by TOE and recorded on the protected memory area
of TOE.
FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
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FCS_CKM.1.1 The TSF shall generate the encryption key of the specified encryption key
length of [ 112 bit ] with the specified encryption key generation algorithm [ Appendix
E.4.1 DES Session Keys, Part 3 : Block ciphers ] compliant with the following standard of
[ ISO/IEC 18033-3].
FCS_CKM.2(1) Cryptographic key distribution (KDF Seed Distribution for BAC
session key generation)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute KDF Seed for the BAC session key generation
in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution[ KeyEstablishmentMechanism
6] that meets the [ ISO/IEC 11770-2 ].
FCS_CKM.2(2) Cryptographic Key Distribution(KDF Seed Distribution for EAC
Session Key Generation)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation(Key Derivation Mechanism)]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
FCS_CKM.2.1 The TSF shall distribute KDF Seed for the EAC session key generation
in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellmankey-agreement protocol ] that meets the [ ISO/IEC 15946-3].
Application Notes:
To create the session key for EAC-CA, the TOE use ECC cryptographic library and supports
key length at ECC 224 and 256 bits.
FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Input of user data without security properties, or
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FDP_ITC.2 Input of user data with security properties, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.3.1 The TSF shall perform [encryption key storage/inspection] using the
specified cryptographic key access method of [access using memory address] compliant
with the following [‘no standard’].
Caution when Applying:
The application programs loaded on TOE may call the command to access the key
according to the standards below.
Standard List
Encryption
Key
Encryption Key Access Type
Access Method
GPCS
PUT Key command
VGP
STORE
Encryption key storage
DATA
command
LDS
No command
Encryption key inspection
Table 23 List of Key access command
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies to: No other components.
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy the cryptographic key and MAC key according to
the specified encryption key destruction method [‘deleting memory data physically by
overwriting’] compliant with the following [ ‘no standard’ ].
FCS_COP.1(1)
Cryptographic
operation
(Symmetric
Key
Cryptographic
Operation)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies : [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
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FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ message encryption, decryption operation ] in
accordance with [TDES] and cryptographic key sizes, [112 bits], that meet the [ISO/IEC
18033-3].
Application Notes :
The TOE uses the TDES cryptographic algorithm for the confidentiality protection of the
transmitted data of the BAC or EAC secure messaging, for the BAC mutual authentication
and for the BAC key distribution. The cryptographic algorithm operation mode when it is in
use is the CBC mode which is defined in ISO/IEC 10116 with the IV value equals to 0.
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (MAC)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies : [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ MAC operation ] in accordance with [Retail MAC]
and cryptographic key sizes, [122 bits], that meet the [ISO/IEC 9797-1].
Application Notes :
The TOE uses the Retail MAC algorithm for the integrity protection of the trans-mitted
data of the BAC or EAC secure messaging and for the BAC mutual authentication. The
Retail MAC uses the MAC algorithm 3, the block cipher DES, the sequence message
counter and the pad-ding mode 2 defined in ISO/IEC 9797-1.
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (Hash Function)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies : [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ Hash operation ] in accordance with [SHA-1, [SHA224, SHA-256] ] and cryptographic key sizes [ None ] that meet the [ISO/IEC 10118-3 ].
Application Notes :
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In the key derivation mechanism of the ICAO document, the SHA-1 implemented in the
COS is used as a hash function in order to generate the session key used in the BAC or
EAC secure messaging. The TOE used the SHA-224 and SHA-256 from the library
provided by the IC chip and the SHA-1 from the software loaded onto it.
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (Digital Signature Verification for
Certificates Verification)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies : [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ digital signature verification ] in accordance with
[ ECDSA-SHA-224, ECDSA-SHA-256, [ECDSA-SHA-1]] and cryptographic key sizes [ 224
bits, 256 bits, 320 bits ] that meet the [ISO/IEC 15946-2].
Application Notes :
In Appendix A.3 Terminal Authentication of the EAC specifications, the digital signature
algorithm, hash algorithm and digital signature key sizes are defined as of the following.
Digital Signature
Algorithm
ECDSA
Hash Algorithm
Digital Signature Key Length
SHA-1, SHA-224 / SHA-256
224, 256
Table 24 Digital signature related EAC specification
The added digital signature key sizes provided by the TOE in addition to table 24 are
as follows:
Digital Signature
Algorithm
ECDSA
Hash Algorithm
SHA-1, SHA-224 / SHA-256
Digital Signature Key Length
320
FCS_COP.1(5) Cryptographic operation (Digital Signature Generation)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies : [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
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FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [ digital signature generation ] in accordance with
[ RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5-SHA-1] and cryptographic key sizes [ 2048 bits ] that meet the
[ PKCS#1 ].
Application Notes :
The TOE creates the digital signature value by using the RSA library provided by the IC
chip.
Digital Signature
Algorithm
Hash Algorithm
Digital Signature Key Length
SHA-1
2048
RSA
Table 25 Digital signature related AA specification
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
Hierarchical to : No other components
Dependencies : No dependencies
FCS_RNG.1.1 The TSF shall provide a physical random number generator that
implements :[total failure test of the random source].
FCS_RNG.1.2 The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [AIS 31 version 1
Functional Classes and Evaluation Methodology for Physical Random Number Generators,
25 September 2001 , Class P2]
Application Notes : The SFR provided by IC chip is applied as it is.
6.1.2. User Data Protection
FDP_ACC.1(1) Subset access control (ePassport access control)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [ ePassport access control policy ] on [
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a) Subjects
(1) Personalization agent
(2) BIS
(3) EIS
(4) [ None ]
b) Objects
(1) Personal data of the ePassport holder
: EF.DG1, EF.DG2, EF.DG5~EF.DG13, EF.DG16
(2) Biometric data of the ePassport holder
: EF.DG3, EF.DG4
(3) ePassport authentication data
: EF.DG14, EF.DG15, EF.SOD
(4) EF.CVCA
(5) EF.COM
(6) [ None ]
c) Operations
(1) Read
(2) Write
(3) [ None ]
].
FDP_ACC.1(2) Subset access control (OS access control)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 The TSF shall enforce [ OS access control policy ] on [
a) Subject
(1) Personalization agent
b) Object
(1) Executable File
(2) Application program
(3) Personalization agent basic information
(4) Personalization agent authentication information
c) Operation
(1) Load
(2) Install
(3) Delete
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(4) Read
(5) Write
(6) Change
(7) Select
].
Caution when Applying:
Personalization agent authentication information refers to the Personalization agent
authentication key used in the SCP02 mutual authentication and SCP02 session key
generation, and includes 3 DES keys of 112-bit used for cryptographic calculation SCP02
session key, MAC SCP02 session key, and generation of SCP02 session key for
cryptographic calculation regarding confidential information.
When the ePassport application is enabled, the personalization agent cannot perform the
operation such as loading, installation, deletion and modification to the executable file and
the application.
FDP_ACF.1(1) Security attribute based access control(ePassport access control)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [ ePassport access control policy ] to objects
based on the following: [Table 26, Table 27, [None] ].
Subject
Security Properties
BIS
BAC rights
EIS
BAC rights, EAC rights
Personalization
Agent
Personalization agent issuance rights
Table 26 Security Properties per Subject
Security Properties
Object
ePassport applicant basic information
Operation Security
Access Rights Security Properties of
Properties of Object
Object
Read rights
BAC rights, EAC rights
Write rights
Personalization
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agent
issuance
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rights
Read rights
ePassport applicant bio information
Write rights
Read rights
ePassport authentication information
Write rights
Read rights
EF.CVCA
Write rights
Read rights
EF.COM
Write rights
EAC rights
Personalization
agent
issuance
rights
BAC rights, EAC rights
Personalization
agent
issuance
rights
BAC rights, EAC rights
Personalization
agent
issuance
rights
BAC rights, EAC rights
Personalization
agent
issuance
rights
Table 27 Security Properties per Object
Application Notes :
The BAC authorization is the right given to the user identified with the Inspection System
that supports the MRTD application by FIA_UID.1 when the BAC mutual authentication
succeeds.
The EAC authorization is the right given when the Inspection System with the BAC
authorization succeeds in the EAC‐CA and the EAC‐TA and the read‐rights of the biometric
data is included in all of CVCA certificate, DV certificate and IS certificate held by that
Inspection System. Even when the EAC‐CA and the EAC‐TA succeed, the Inspection
System has only the BAC authorization if the certificates do not include the read‐rights.
The issuance rights of Personalization agent is acquired when the use of ePassport
application program is requested at the ePassport issuance Phase according to FIA_UID.1,
and the user recognized as the Personalization agent has succeeded in the Personalization
agent authentication.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [
a) Execution of the operation is allowed only when security attributes of subjects are
included in security attributes of the object’s access‐rights and operations
corresponds to security attributes of the object’s operation.
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b) [ None ]
]
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [None].
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules.
a) Explicitly deny access of subjects to objects if instructions order of the inspection
system is not correct in order to ensure the application order of security
mechanisms according to 2.1 Inspection Procedures of the EAC specifications
b) Explicitly deny read of subjects to biometric data if there is no the read‐rights of
biometric data in IS certificate of the EIS that has the EAC authorization
c) Explicitly deny access(read, write, etc.) of the unauthorized Inspection System to
all objects
d) [None]
FDP_ACF.1(2) Security attribute based access control (OS access control)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [ OS access control policy ] to objects based on
[ the following Table 28 and Table 29 ].
Subject
Personalization agent
Security Properties
Usage rights, management rights
Table 28 Security Properties per Subject
Security Properties
Object
Operation Security
Properties
Executable File
Application Program
Access Rights Security Properties
Loading rights
Management rights
Deletion rights
Management rights
Loading rights
Management rights
Deletion rights
Management rights
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Selection rights
Usage rights
Personalization
Reading rights
Usage rights, management rights
agent Basic
Selection rights
Management rights
Information
Change rights
Management rights
Personalization
Selection rights
Management rights
Change rights
Management rights
agent
Authentication
Information
Table 29 Security Properties per Object
Caution when Applying:
Usage rights are acquired by the user recognized as the Personalization agent when the
use of card manager is requested at the ePassport issuance Phase and usage Phase
according to FIA_UID.1.
Management
rights are acquired when the Personalization agent succeeds in
Personalization agent authentication.
FDP_ACF.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following in order to determine whether to allow
the operation between a controlled subject and a controlled object: [
a) The mapped operation is permitted only if the security properties of the subject
are included in the access rights security properties of the object, and the
operation matches the operation security properties of the object.
]
FDP_ACF.1.3 The TSF shall specifically permit the access of the subject to the object
based on the following additional rules: [ none ]
FDP_ACF.1.4 The TSF shall specifically deny the access of the subject to the object based
on the following rules. [
a) At the termination Phase, all operations except read operation for Personalization
agent basic information are denied.
b) The deletion operation for ePassport application programs is denied.
c) The selection operation for an application program not installed is denied.
d) [Additional application installation will be rejected.]
]
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FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_DAU.1.1 The TSF shall provide the ability to generate the evidence to be used for
guaranteeing the validity of [ ePassport user data ].
FDP_DAU.1.2 The TSF shall provide an [ inspection system ] with the ability to verify the
evidence regarding the validity of designated information.
Application Notes:
In order to guarantee the validity of ePassport user data, when AA request is received
from inspection system (BIS or EIS), TOE generates digital signature from the random
number value received in the AA request process with the AA chip authentication private
key stored on the protected memory area which is provided to the inspection system.
Inspection system verifies the digital signature with AA chip authentication public key
acquired from EF.DG15 to verify the authenticity of TOE. Also, in the case of EAC-CA
request from EIS, ECDH calculation is performed using the temporary public key
generated using EAC-CA chip authentication public key information of EF.DG14 and the
EAC-CA chip authentication private key stored on the protected memory of TOE, thus EIS
verifies the authenticity of TOE depending on the success of EAC-CA.
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is
made unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the following objects: [
a) BAC session key
b) EAC session key
c) BAC authentication key
d) [ SCP02 session key, random number value ]
].
Application Notes: After a session termination, the TSF shall not remain the BAC session
key, the EAC session key and random numbers, etc. in temporary memory. The BAC
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session key, the EAC session key and the BAC authentication key, etc. can be ensured
unavailable by destroying them with the method defined in FCS_CKM.4.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [ ePassport access control policy ] to transmit,
receive object in a manner protected from unauthorized disclosure.
Application Notes: When the Inspection System successfully completes the BAC mutual
authentication, the TSF protects from disclosure by using the BAC session encryption key.
When the EAC‐CA is successfully executed, data transmitted thereafter are protected from
disclosure by using the EAC session encryption key.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
The TSF shall enforce the [ ePassport access control policy ] to transmit, receive user data
in a manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion, and reuse.
FDP_UIT.1.2 The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion, and reuse has occurred.
Application Notes : The TSF protects integrity of the transmitted data by using the MAC
key for BAC session or EAC session. This provides the method of protection against
modification, deletion and insertion of user data. Also, a method to protect from reuse
using SSC is provided.
6.1.3. Identification and Authentication
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FIA_AFL.1(1) Authentication failure handling (user session temination)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when the number of failed attempts related to [
a) BAC mutual authentication
b) EAC-TA
c) [ SCP02 mutual authentication ]
] reaches 1.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met, the TSF shall [ user session termination ].
FIA_AFL.1(2) Authentication failure handling (Retry Prohibited)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of identification
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when the number of failed attempts related to [ EACTA ] reaches [1] .
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met the TSF
shall [ prohibit retry of EAC-TA].
Application Notes:
When EAC-TA fails, the mechanism, to reject the additional EAC-TA by changing the life
cycle of the application, is provided.
FIA_UAU.1(1) Timing of authentication(BAC Mutual Authentication)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [
a) indication that support the BAC mechanism
b) [ None ]
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
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FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall authenticate the user successfully before allowing any other
actions mediated by TSF on behalf of the user except the action specified in FIA_UAU.1.1.
FIA_UAU.1(2) Timing of authentication(EAC-TA)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1(1) Timing of authentication(BAC mutual authentication)
FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow [
a) to perform the EAC‐CA
b) to read user data except the biometric data of the ePassport holder
c) [ AA Performance ]
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF‐mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1(3) Timing of authentication (SCP02 mutual authentication)
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1 The TSF shall allow [ reading Personalization agent basic information ] which
will be performed on behalf of the user before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall authenticate the user successfully before allowing any other
actions mediated by TSF on behalf of the user except the action specified in FIA_UAU.1.1.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to [
a) BAC mutual authentication
b) EAC-TA
c) [ SCP02 mutual authentication]
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].
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide [
a) BAC mutual authentication
b) EAC-TA
c) [ SCP02 mutual authentication ]
] to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2 The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the [
a) The BIS or EIS shall succeed the BAC mutual authentication in order to have the
BAC authorization.
b) The EIS, in order to have the EAC authorization, shall succeed the BAC mutual
authentication, EAC‐CA and EAC‐TA and include the read‐rights of biometric data
in all of the CVCA certificate, DV certificate and IS certificate. For this, the TSF
shall provide the EAC‐CA.
c) [ For Personalization agent to have issuance rights or management rights, it must
succeed in SCP02 mutual authentication. ]
].
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1 The TSF shall allow [
a) to establish the messaging based on ISO/IEC 14443‐4
] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing
any other TSF‐mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Application Notes:
TOE recognizes the external entity requesting the use of ePassport application programs
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at the ePassport issuance Phase as the Personalization agent, and as the inspection
system if at the ePassport usage Phase.
6.1.4. Security Management
FMT_MOF.1(1) Management of security functions behavior (ePassport write)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable the functions [ writing function ]
to [ Personalization agent in the Personalization phase].
Application Notes : The Personalization agent delivers the ePassport to the Operational
Use phase by deactivating writing function after recording the MRTD application data in
the Personalization phase.
FMT_MOF.1(2) Management of security functions behavior (OS security
function)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable the functions [the following
security functions] to stop, resume, load, delete and change.
Security Function
Role
stop application programs
Personalization agent
Installation of application programs
Personalization agent
Change of issuing agent keys
Personalization agent
Change Lifecycle of application programs
Personalization agent
Application Notes:
This determines whether to grant the application programs installed by the Personalization
agent the rights to change OS life cycle. The application program may change the OS life
cycle to the states of CARD_INITIALIZED and TERMINATED only.
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FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [ ePassport access control policy, OS access
control policy ] to restrict the ability to [ initialization ] the security attributes [ security
attributes of subjects defined in FDP_ACF.1(1) and FDP_ACF.1(2)] to [ TSF].
Application Notes : As an action to be taken if the TSF detects modification of the
transmitted TSF data in FPT_ITI.1, the TSF shall reset security attributes of subjects
defined in FDP_ACF.1(1) and FDP_ACF.1(2).
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [ ePassport access control policy, OS access
control policy ] to provide restrictive default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow the [ None ] to specify alternative initial values to
override the default values when an object or information is created.
Application Notes:
The operation security properties and access rights security properties of objects of
ePassport access control policy and OS access control policy are determined according to
Table 26 Security Properties per Subjectof FDP_ACF.1(1) and Table 27 Security Properties
per Object오류! 참조 원본을 찾을 수 없습니다.of FDP_ACF.1(2) by the implemented
logic of TOE at the development Phase and the change of default value is not allowed.
FMT_MTD.1(1) Management of TSF data (Certificate Verification Info.)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [ write in secure memory ] the [
a) EAC chip authentication private key
b) initial current date
c) initial CVCA certificate
d) initial CVCA digital signature verification key
e) [ AA chip authentication private key ]
] to [ Personalization agent in the Personalization phase ].
FMT_MTD.1(2) Management of TSF data (SSC Initialization
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the [ SSC(Send Sequence
Counter) ] to [ TSF ].
Application Notes : The TSF shall initialize SSC as „0‟ in order to terminate the BAC
secure messaging before establishing the EAC secure messaging after generating the EAC
session key.
FMT_MTD.1(3) ) Management of TSF data (OS Management)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the [ ePassport application life
cycle ] to [ Personalization agent].
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for TSF data.
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Application Notes : The TSF shall use only secure value safe as random numbers so that
to respond to moderate attack potential. The TSF shall preserve secure values by verifying
valid data of the CVCA link certificate, DV certificate and IS certificate provided by the EIS
when executing the EAC‐TA and internally updating the CVCA certificate, CVCA digital
signature verification key, current date and EF.CVCA if necessary.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security management functions: [
a) Function to write user data and TSF data in the Personalization phase
b) Function to verify and update the CVCA certificate, CVCA digital signature
verification key and current data in the Operational Use phase
c) [
A. Function to load, install, and delete executable files and application programs
at the issuance Phase and usage Phase of ePassport
B. Function
to
write/change
Personalization
agent
basic
information,
Personalization agent authentication information, and GP registry at the
issuance Phase and usage Phase of ePassport
C. Granting application programs the rights to change the OS life cycle at the
issuance Phase and usage Phase of ePassport
D. Function to inquire about Chip Serial Number of ePassport
]
]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [
a) Personalization agent
b) [ None ]
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].
FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Notes : The Personalization agent is defined as the role to execute a) and c)
security management function of FMT_SMF.1. The TSF executes security management
functions to FMT_MTD.1(2) and b) of FMT_SMF.1. However, the TSF is not defined as the
role since it is not a user.
6.1.5. Privacy
FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPR_UNO.1.1 The [ TSF ] shall ensure that [ external entity ] are unable to observe the
operation [
a) FCS_COP.1(1) Cryptographic operation (Symmetric Key Cryptographic Operation)
b) FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (MAC)
c) FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (Digital Signature Verification for
Certificates Verification)
d) [FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic key generation(SCP02 session key),FCS_COP.1(5)
Cryptographic operation (Digital Signature Generation)]
] on [
a) BAC authentication key
b) BAC session key
c) EAC session key
d) EAC chip authentication private key
e) [ SCP02 session key ]
]
Application Notes :
The external entity may find out and exploit the cryptography‐related data from physical
phenomena(change of current, voltage and electromagnetic, etc.) occurred when the TSF
performs cryptographic operations. The TSF provides the means to counter attacks, such
as DPA and SPA, etc.
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6.1.6. TSF Protection
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [
a) Failure detected in self‐testing by FPT_TST.1
b) Conditions outside the normal operating of the TSF detected by the IC chip
c) [ State with power supply shut off during TSF operation ]
]
FPT_ITI.1 Inter-TSF detection of modification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FPT_ITI.1.1 The TSF shall provide the capability to detect modification of all TSF data
during transmission between the TSF and a remote trusted IT product within the following
metric: [ strength of Retail MAC ].
FPT_ITI.1.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to verify the integrity of all TSF data
transmitted between the TSF and a remote trusted IT product and perform [
a) Termination of the BAC secure messaging or EAC secure messaging
b) Deletion of BAC session key or EAC session key
c) Management action specified in FMT_MSA.1
d) Termination of Personalization agent messaging
e) [ Deletion of Personalization agent session key ]
] if modifications are detected.
Application Notes : The Strength of Retail MAC is equivalent to the secure Retail MAC.
Also, Personalization agent messaging uses SCP02 secure messaging, which detects
change through Retail MAC.
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist [physical manipulation and physical probing] to [TSF] by
responding automatically such as that the SFRs are always enforced.
Application Notes :
The SFR provided by the IC chip is applied as it is.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: No dependencies
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self-tests during initial start‐up to demonstrate
the correct operation of TSF.
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the
integrity of [TSF Execution Code].
6.2. TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The security assurance requirements for this Security Target consist of the following
components from Part 3 of the CC, summarized in the following [Table 30 Assurance
Requirements] and evaluation assurance level is EAL5+(ADV_IMP.2).
In this Security Target, the assurance components are augmented follows:

ADV_IMP.2 Complete mapping of the implementation representation of the TSF
Assurance Class
Component
Security Target
ASE_INT.1
Security Target Introduction
ASE_CCL.1
Conformance Claims
ASE_SPD.1
Definition of Security Problems
ASE_OBJ.2
Security Objective
ASE_ECD.1
Extended Component Definitions
ASE_REQ.2
Derived Security Requirements
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Development
ASE_TSS.1
TOE Summary Specification
ADV_ARC.1
Security Structure Specification
ADV_FSP.5
Semi-Standardized
and
Complete
Function
Specification
Providing Additional Error Information
Manual
Life Cycle Support
Test
Vulnerability Test
ADV_IMP.2
Complete mapping of the implementation representation of TSF
ADV_INT.2
Well-structured inside of TSF
ADV_TDS.4
Semi-standardized modularization design
AGD_OPE.1
User operation manual
AGD_PRE.1
Preparation procedure
ALC_CMC.4
Production support, reception procedure, and automation
ALC_CMS.5
Scope of configuration management of development tools
ALC_DEL.1
Distribution procedure
ALC_DVS.1
Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1
Life cycle model defined by developer
ALC_TAT.2
Applied implementation standard
ATE_COV.2
Analysis of test range
ATE_DPT.3
Modularization design test
ATE_FUN.1
Function test
ATE_IND.2
Independent test: specimen test
AVA_VAN.4
Systematic vulnerability analysis
Table 30 Assurance Requirements
6.2.1. Security Target
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements :
ASE_INT.1.1D The developer shall provide an ST introduction.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_INT.1.1C The ST introduction shall contain an ST reference, a TOE reference, a TOE
overview and a TOE description.
ASE_INT.1.2C The ST reference shall uniquely identify the ST.
ASE_INT.1.3C The TOE reference shall identify the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.4C The TOE overview shall summarize the usage and major security features of
the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.5C The TOE overview shall identify the TOE type.
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ASE_INT.1.6C The TOE overview shall identify any non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
required by the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.7C The TOE description shall describe the physical scope of the TOE.
ASE_INT.1.8C The TOE description shall describe the logical scope of the TOE.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_INT.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_INT.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE reference, the TOE overview, and
the TOE description are consistent with each other.
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance Claim
Dependencies:
ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
Developer action elements :
ASE_CCL.1.1D The developer shall provide a conformance claim.
ASE_CCL.1.2D The developer shall provide a conformance claim rationale.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1C The conformance claim shall contain a CC conformance claim that
identifies the version of the CC to which the ST and the TOE claim
conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.2C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 2 as either CC Part 2 conformant or CC Part 2 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.3C The CC conformance claim shall describe the conformance of the ST to CC
Part 3 as either CC Part 3 conformant or CC Part 3 extended.
ASE_CCL.1.4C The CC conformance claim shall be consistent with the extended
components definition.
ASE_CCL.1.5C The conformance claim shall identify all PPs and security requirement
packages to which the ST claims conformance.
ASE_CCL.1.6C The conformance claim shall describe any conformance of the ST to a
package as either package-conformant or package-augmented.
ASE_CCL.1.7C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the TOE type is
consistent with the TOE type in the PPs for which conformance is being
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claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.8C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
the security problem definition is consistent with the statement of the
security problem definition in the PPs for which conformance is being
claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.9C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security objectives is consistent with the statement of security objectives
in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
ASE_CCL.1.10C The conformance claim rationale shall demonstrate that the statement of
security requirements is consistent with the statement of security
requirements in the PPs for which conformance is being claimed.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_CCL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ASE_SPD.1.1D The developer shall provide a security problem definition.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_SPD.1.1C The security problem definition shall describe the threats.
ASE_SPD.1.2C All threats shall be described in terms of a threat agent, an asset, and an
adverse action.
ASE_SPD.1.3C The security problem definition shall describe the OSPs.
ASE_SPD.1.4C The security problem definition shall describe the assumptions about the
operational environment of the TOE.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_SPD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
Dependencies:
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
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Developer action elements:
ASE_OBJ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security objectives.
ASE_OBJ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security objectives rationale.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_OBJ.2.1C The statement of security objectives shall describe the security objectives
for the TOE and the security objectives for the operational environment.
ASE_OBJ.2.2C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
TOE back to threats countered by that security objective and OSPs
enforced by that security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.3C The security objectives rationale shall trace each security objective for the
operational environment back to threats countered by that security
objective, OSPs enforced by that security objective, and assumptions
upheld by that security objective.
ASE_OBJ.2.4C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives counter all threats.
ASE_OBJ.2.5C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives enforce all OSPs.
ASE_OBJ.2.6C The security objectives rationale shall demonstrate that the security
objectives for the operational environment uphold all assumptions.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_OBJ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2D The developer shall provide an extended components definition.
Content and presentation elements:
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ASE_ECD.1.1C The statement of security requirements shall identify all extended security
requirements.
ASE_ECD.1.2C The extended components definition shall define an extended component
for each extended security requirement.
ASE_ECD.1.3C The extended components definition shall describe how each extended
component is related to the existing CC components, families, and classes.
ASE_ECD.1.4C The extended components definition shall use the existing CC components,
families, classes, and methodology as a model for presentation.
ASE_ECD.1.5C The extended components shall consist of measurable and objective
elements such that conformance or nonconformance to these elements
can be demonstrated.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_ECD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_ECD.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that no extended component can be clearly
expressed using existing components.
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
Dependencies: ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
Developer action elements:
ASE_REQ.2.1D The developer shall provide a statement of security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.2D The developer shall provide a security requirements rationale.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_REQ.2.1C The statement of security requirements shall describe the SFRs and the
SARs.
ASE_REQ.2.2C All subjects, objects, operations, security attributes, external entities and
other terms that are used in the SFRs and the SARs shall be defined.
ASE_REQ.2.3C The statement of security requirements shall identify all operations on the
security requirements.
ASE_REQ.2.4C All operations shall be performed correctly.
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ASE_REQ.2.5C Each dependency of the security requirements shall either be satisfied, or
the security requirements rationale shall justify the dependency not being
satisfied.
ASE_REQ.2.6C The security requirements rationale shall trace each SFR back to the
security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.7C The security requirements rationale shall demonstrate that the SFRs meet
all security objectives for the TOE.
ASE_REQ.2.8C The security requirements rationale shall explain why the SARs were
chosen.
ASE_REQ.2.9C The statement of security requirements shall be internally consistent.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_REQ.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
Dependencies: ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1D The developer shall provide a TOE summary specification.
Content and presentation elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1C The TOE summary specification shall describe how the TOE meets each
SFR.
Evaluator action elements:
ASE_TSS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ASE_TSS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the TOE summary specification is
consistent with the TOE overview and the TOE description.
6.2.2.
Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
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Developer action elements:
ADV_ARC.1.1D The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security
features of the TSF cannot be bypassed.
ADV_ARC.1.2D The developer shall design and implement the TSF so that it is able to
protect itself from tampering by untrusted active entities.
ADV_ARC.1.3D The developer shall provide a security architecture description of the TSF.
Content and presentation elements:
ADV_ARC.1.1C The security architecture description shall be at a level of detail
commensurate with the description of the SFR-enforcing abstractions
described in the TOE design document.
ADV_ARC.1.2C The security architecture description shall describe the security domains
maintained by the TSF consistently with the SFRs.
ADV_ARC.1.3C The security architecture description shall describe how the TSF
initialization process is secure.
ADV_ARC.1.4C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
protects itself from tampering.
ADV_ARC.1.5C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF
prevents bypass of the SFR-enforcing functionality.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_ARC.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_FSP.5 Semi-standardized and complete function specification providing
additional error information
Dependencies:
ADV_TDS.1 Basic Design
ADV_IMP.1 Expression of Implementation regarding TSF
Developer action elements:
ADV_FSP.5.1D The developer must provide function specification.
ADV_FSP.5.2D The developer must provide traceability from function specification to SFR.
Content and presentation elements:
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ADV_FSP.5.1C Function specification must express TSF completely.
ADV_FSP.5.2C Function specification must describe TSFI in a semi-standardized
method.
ADV_FSP.5.3C Function specification must describe the objective and usage method for all
TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.4C Function specification must identify and describe all parameters related to
each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.5C Function specification must describe all actions related to each TSFI.
ADV_FSP.5.6C Function specification must describe all direct error messages occurring as
a result of each TSFI call.
ADV_FSP.5.7C Function specification must describe all error messages occurring
from causes other than TSFI calls.
ADV_FSP.5.8C Traceability must provide the rationale for each error message
whose function specification is included in TSF implementation
but occurring from causes other than TSFI call.
ADV_FSP.5.9C Traceability must prove that SFR is traced to TSFI in function specification.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_FSP.5.1E The evaluator must confirm that provided information satisfies all evidence
requirements.
ADV_FSP.5.2E The evaluator must determine if the function specification substantializes
SFR precisely and completely.
ADV_IMP.2 Complete mapping of the implementation representation of the
TSF
Dependencies: ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
Developer action elements:
ADV_IMP.2.1D The developer shall make available the implementation representation for
the entire TSF.
ADV_IMP.2.2D The developer shall provide a mapping between the TOE design description
and the entire implementation representation.
Content and presentation elements:
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ADV_IMP.2.1C The implementation representation shall define the TSF to a level of detail
such that the TSF can be generated without further design decisions.
ADV_IMP.2.2C The implementation representation shall be in the form used by the
development personnel.
ADV_IMP.2.3C The mapping between the TOE design description and the entire
implementation representation shall demonstrate their correspondence.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_IMP.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ADV_INT.2 Well-Structured Inside of TSF
Dependencies:
ADV_IMP.1 Expression of Implementation regarding TSF
ADV_TDS.3 Basic Modularization Design
ALC_TAT.1 Well-Defined Development Tool
Developer action elements:
ADV_INT.2.1D The developer must design and implement so that the entire TSF is wellstructured inside.
ADV_INT.2.2D The developer must provide explanation and justification for the inside of
TSF.
Content and presentation elements:
ADV_INT.2.1C Justification must describe the characteristics used to judge the meaning of
“well-structured.”
ADV_INT.2.2C The explanation of inside the TSF shall prove that the entire TSF is wellstructured.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_INT.2.1E The evaluator must confirm that the provided information satisfies all
evidence requirements.
ADV_INT.2.2E The evaluator must perform internal analysis regarding TSF.
ADV_TDS.4 Basic modular design
Dependencies:
ADV_FSP.5 Semi-standardized and complete function specification providing
additional error information
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Developer action elements:
ADV_TDS.4.1D The developer shall provide the design of the TOE.
ADV_TDS.4.2D
The developer shall provide a mapping from the TSFI of the functional specification to the
lowest level of decomposition available in the TOE design.
Content and presentation elements:
ADV_TDS.4.1C The design shall describe the structure of the TOE in terms of subsystems.
ADV_TDS.4.2C The design must designate each module as SFR-Execution, SFRSupport or SFR-No_interference and describe TSF from the
perspectives of modules.
ADV_TDS.4.3C The design shall identify all subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.4C The design must provide semi-standardized explanation on each
subsystem
of
TSF
and,
when
necessary,
must
support
non-
standardized explanation text.
ADV_TDS.4.5C The design shall provide a description of the interactions among all
subsystems of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.6C The design shall provide a mapping from the subsystems of the TSF to the
modules of the TSF.
ADV_TDS.4.7C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing module in terms of its
purpose and relationship with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.8C The design shall describe each SFR-enforcing module in terms of its SFRrelated interfaces, return values from those interfaces, interaction with
other modules and called SFR-related interfaces to other SFR-enforcing
modules.
ADV_TDS.4.9C The design shall describe each SFR-supporting or SFR-non-interfering
module in terms of its purpose and interaction with other modules.
ADV_TDS.4.10C The mapping shall demonstrate that all TSFIs trace to the behavior
described in the TOE design that they invoke it.
Evaluator action elements:
ADV_TDS.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence
ADV_TDS.4.2E The evaluator shall determine that the design is an accurate and complete
instantiation of all security functional requirements.
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6.2.3. Guidance Documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Dependencies:
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
Developer action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1D The developer shall provide operational user guidance.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the useraccessible functions and privileges that should be controlled in a secure
processing environment, including appropriate warnings.
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to
use the available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
AGD_OPE.1.3C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, the
available functions and interfaces, in particular all security parameters
under the control of the user, indicating secure values as appropriate.
AGD_OPE.1.4C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, clearly present
each type of security-relevant event relative to the user-accessible
functions that need to be performed, including changing the security
characteristics of entities under the control of the TSF.
AGD_OPE.1.5C The operational user guidance shall identify all possible modes of
operation of the TOE (including operation following failure or operational
error), their consequences and implications for maintaining secure
operation.
AGD_OPE.1.6C The operational user guidance shall, for each user role, describe the
security measures to be followed in order to fulfill the security objectives
for the operational environment as described in the ST.
AGD_OPE.1.7C The operational user guidance shall be clear and reasonable.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_OPE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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Developer action elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1D The developer shall provide the TOE including its preparative procedures.
Content and presentation elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for
secure acceptance of the delivered TOE in accordance with the
developer's delivery procedures.
AGD_PRE.1.2C The preparative procedures shall describe all the steps necessary for
secure installation of the TOE and for the secure preparation of the
operational environment in accordance with the security objectives for the
operational environment as described in the ST.
Evaluator action elements:
AGD_PRE.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AGD_PRE.1.2E The evaluator shall apply the preparative procedures to confirm that the
TOE can be prepared securely for operation.
6.2.4. Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and automation
Dependencies: ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model Objectives
Developer action elements:
ALC_CMC.4.1D The developer shall provide the TOE and a reference for the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.2D The developer shall provide the CM documentation.
ALC_CMC.4.3D The developer shall use a CM system.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMC.4.1C The TOE shall be labeled with its unique reference.
ALC_CMC.4.2C The CM documentation shall describe the method used to uniquely identify
the configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.3C The CM system shall uniquely identify all configuration items.
ALC_CMC.4.4C The CM system shall provide automated measures such that only
authorized changes are made to the configuration items.
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ALC_CMC.4.5C The CM system shall support the production of the TOE by automated
means.
ALC_CMC.4.6C The CM documentation shall include a CM plan.
ALC_CMC.4.7C The CM plan shall describe how the CM system is used for the
development of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.8C The CM plan shall describe the procedures used to accept modified or
newly created configuration items as part of the TOE.
ALC_CMC.4.9C The evidence shall demonstrate that all configuration items are being
maintained under the CM system.
ALC_CMC.4.10C The evidence shall demonstrate that the CM system is being operated in
accordance with the CM plan.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMC.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ALC_CMS.5.1D
The developer shall provide a configuration list for the TOE.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_CMS.5.1C The configuration list shall include the following: the TOE itself; the
evaluation evidence required by the SARs; the parts that comprise the
TOE; the implementation representation; and security flaw reports and
resolution status.
ALC_CMS.5.2C The configuration list shall uniquely identify the configuration items.
ALC_CMS.5.3C For each TSF relevant configuration item, the configuration list shall
indicate the developer of the item.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_CMS.5.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
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ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ALC_DEL.1.1D The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the
TOE or parts of it to the consumer.
ALC_DEL.1.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_DEL.1.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are
necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to
the consumer.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_DEL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Developer action elements:
ALC_DVS.1.1D The
developer
shall
produce
and
provide
development
security
documentation.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_DVS.1.1C The development security documentation shall describe all the physical,
procedural, personnel, and other security measures that are necessary to
protect the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE design and
implementation in its development environment.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_DVS.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_DVS.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the security measures are being applied.
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
Dependencies: No dependencies.
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Developer action elements:
ALC_LCD.1.1D The developer shall establish a life-cycle model to be used in the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2D The developer shall provide life-cycle definition documentation.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_LCD.1.1C The life-cycle definition documentation shall describe the model used to
develop and maintain the TOE.
ALC_LCD.1.2C The life-cycle model shall provide for the necessary control over the
development and maintenance of the TOE.
Evaluator action elements:
ALC_LCD.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_TAT.2 Applied Implementation Standard
Dependencies:
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
Developer action elements:
ALC_TAT.2.1D The
developer
shall
provide
the documentation
identifying
each
development tool being used for the TOE.
ALC_TAT.2.2D The developer shall document and provide the selected implementationdependent options of each development tool.
ALC_TAT.2.3D The developer must describe the implementation standard
he/she is applying.
Content and presentation elements:
ALC_TAT.2.1C
Each development tool used for implementation shall be well-defined.
ALC_TAT.2.2C
The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all statements as well as all conventions and directives
used in the implementation.
ALC_TAT.2.3C
The documentation of each development tool shall unambiguously define
the meaning of all implementation-dependent options.
Evaluator action elements:
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ALC_TAT.2.1E
The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ALC_TAT.2.2E
The evaluator must confirm that the implementation standard is
applied.
6.2.5. Testing
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
Dependencies: ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Developer action elements:
ATE_COV.2.1D The developer shall provide an analysis of the test coverage.
Content and presentation elements:
ATE_COV.2.1C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSFIs in the
functional specification.
ATE_COV.2.2C The analysis of the test coverage shall demonstrate that all TSFIs in the
functional specification have been tested.
Evaluator action elements:
ATE_COV.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_DPT.3 Modularization Design Test
Dependencies:
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_TDS.4 Semi-standardized modular design
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Developer action elements:
ATE_DPT.3.1D
The developer shall provide the analysis of the depth of testing.
Content and presentation elements:
ATE_DPT.3.1C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate the correspondence
between the tests in the test documentation and the TSF subsystems and
SFR-enforcing modules in the TOE design.
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ATE_DPT.3.2C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that all TSF
subsystems in the TOE design have been tested.
ATE_DPT.3.3C The analysis of the depth of testing shall demonstrate that the SFRenforcing modules in the TOE design have been tested.
Evaluator action elements:
ATE_DPT.3.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Dependencies:
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
Developer action elements:
ATE_FUN.1.1D The developer shall test the TSF and document the results.
ATE_FUN.1.2D The developer shall provide test documentation.
Content and presentation elements:
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results
and actual test results.
ATE_FUN.1.2C The test plans shall identify the tests to be performed and describe the
scenarios for performing each test. These scenarios shall include any
ordering dependencies on the results of other tests.
ATE_FUN.1.3C The expected test results shall show the anticipated outputs from a
successful execution of the tests.
ATE_FUN.1.4C The actual test results shall be consistent with the expected test results.
Evaluator action elements:
ATE_FUN.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing - sample
Dependencies:
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
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ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
Developer action elements:
ATE_IND.2.1D
The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
ATE_IND.2.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
ATE_IND.2.2C The developer shall provide an equivalent set of resources to those that
were used in the developer's functional testing of the TSF.
Evaluator action elements:
ATE_IND.2.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
ATE_IND.2.2E The evaluator shall execute a sample of tests in the test documentation to
verify the developer test results.
ATE_IND.2.3E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF
operates as specified.
6.2.6. Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
Dependencies:
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2 Complete functional specification
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
Developer action elements:
AVA_VAN.4.1D The developer shall provide the TOE for testing.
Content and presentation elements:
AVA_VAN.4.1C The TOE shall be suitable for testing.
Evaluator action elements:
AVA_VAN.4.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
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requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.4.2E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all
requirements for content and presentation of evidence.
AVA_VAN.4.3E The evaluator shall perform a search of public domain sources to identify
potential vulnerabilities in the TOE.
AVA_VAN.4.4E The evaluator shall conduct penetration testing based on the identified
potential vulnerabilities to determine that the TOE is resistant to attacks
performed by an attacker possessing Moderate attack potential.
6.3. Security Requirements Rationale
The rationale for security requirements demonstrates that the described IT security
requirements are suitable to satisfy security objectives and, as a result, appropriate to
address security problems.
6.3.1. TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale
The rationale of TOE security functional requirements demonstrates the followings :
 Each TOE security objective has at least one TOE security function requirement
tracing to it.
 Each TOE security functional requirement traces back to at least one TOE security
objectives.
X
X
FCS_CKM.1(2)
X
FCS_CKM.2(1)
X
FCS_CKM.2(2)
FCS_CKM.3
FCS_COP.1(2)
FCS_COP.1(5)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FCS_COP.1(3)
FCS_COP.1(4)
X
X
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1(1)
O.SCP02
X
O.IC칩
O.EAC
FCS_CKM.1(1)
O.BAC
O.AA
O.
Handling_Info_Leakage
O. Access_Control
O. Replay_Prevention
O. Deleting_Residua_Info
O. Secure_State
O. Certificate_Verification
O. Secure_Messaging
O.Session_Termination
O.Management
Security Functional
Requirements
O.
Security_Mechanism_Appl
ication_Procedures
Security Object of TOE
Security Objects
X
X
FCS_RNG.1
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X
X
X
X
FDP_ACC.1(1)
FDP_ACC.1(2)
X
X
FDP_ACF.1(1)
FDP_ACF.1(2)
X
X
X
FDP_DAU.1
X
FDP_RIP.1
X
X
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1
X
X
FIA_AFL.1(1)
FIA_AFL.1(2)
FIA_UAU.1(1)
X
FIA_UAU.1(2)
FIA_UAU.1(3)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FMT_MOF.1(2)
X
X
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MTD.1(1)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FMT_MSA.1
X
X
FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1(1)
X
X
X
FIA_UAU.5
X
X
X
X
X
X
FIA_UAU.4
X
X
FMT_MTD.1(2)
X
FMT_MTD.1(3)
X
X
X
FMT_MTD.3
X
X
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
X
X
X
FPR_UNO.1
X
X
FPT_FLS.1
X
FPT_ITI.1
X
X
FPT_PHP.3
X
FPT_TST.1
Table 31 presents the mapping between the security objectives and the security functional
requirements.
X
X
FCS_CKM.1(2)
X
FCS_CKM.2(1)
X
X
FCS_CKM.2(2)
FCS_CKM.3
X
X
X
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1(1)
O.SCP02
X
O.IC칩
O.EAC
O.AA
O.
Handling_Info_Leakage
O.BAC
FCS_CKM.1(1)
O. Access_Control
O. Replay_Prevention
O. Deleting_Residua_Info
O. Secure_State
O. Certificate_Verification
O. Secure_Messaging
O.Session_Termination
O.Management
Security Functional
Requirements
O.
Security_Mechanism_Appl
ication_Procedures
Security Object of TOE
Security Objects
X
X
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X
XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
X
FCS_COP.1(2)
X
X
FCS_COP.1(3)
X
FCS_COP.1(4)
X
X
X
FCS_COP.1(5)
FCS_RNG.1
X
X
X
X
FDP_ACC.1(1)
FDP_ACC.1(2)
FDP_ACF.1(1)
FDP_ACF.1(2)
X
X
X
X
X
FDP_DAU.1
X
FDP_RIP.1
X
X
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1
X
X
FIA_AFL.1(1)
FIA_AFL.1(2)
FIA_UAU.1(1)
X
FIA_UAU.1(2)
FIA_UAU.1(3)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FMT_MOF.1(2)
X
X
X
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MTD.1(1)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FMT_MTD.3
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
X
X
X
X
X
FPR_UNO.1
X
X
X
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_TST.1
X
X
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_ITI.1
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
FMT_MTD.1(2)
FMT_MTD.1(3)
X
X
X
FMT_MSA.1
X
X
FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1(1)
X
X
X
X
FIA_UAU.5
X
X
X
X
X
FIA_UAU.4
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 31 Correspondence of Security Objectives and Security Function Requirements
FCS_CKM.1(1) Cryptographic key generation (Key Derivation Mechanism)
This component requires to generate the 112 bit BAC authentication key, BAC and EAC
session keys according to the cryptographic key generation algorithm specified in the
ICAO document. Through this, the BAC authentication key is generated for use in the BAC
mutual authentication and BAC/EAC session key is generated for use in the BAC/EAC
secure messaging. Therefore, this component satisfies the security objectives of O.BAC
and O.EAC.
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FCS_CKM.1(2) Cryptographic Key Generation (SCP02 session key)
This component demands generation of SCP02 session key of 112 bit.’ Through this, the
SCP02 session key to be used in SCP02 mutual authentication and SCP02 secure
messaging is generated. Therefore, this component satisfies security objective O.SCP02.
FCS_CKM.2(1) Cryptographic key distribution (KDF Seed Distribution for BAC
session key generation)
This component defines the method to distribute seed of key derivation mechanism
necessary in generating the BAC session key to the Inspection System (ISO/IEC 11770‐2
Key Establishment Mechanism 6). The distribution method defined in this component
satisfies the security objective of O.Replay_Prevention as it uses random numbers and
O.BAC as it enables to generate the BAC session key of FCS_CKM.1(1) by generating KDF
seed.
FCS_CKM.2(2) Cryptographic key distribution (KDF Seed Distribution for EAC
Session Key Generation)
This component defines the method(Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellmankey-agreement protocol)
to distribute seed of key derivation mechanism necessary in generating the EAC-CA
session key to the Inspection System. The distribution method defined in this component
satisfies the security objective of O.EAC as it generates KDF seed by using the public key
from the Inspection System and the private key stored while the ePassport personalization
phase.
FCS_CKM.3 Cryptographic key access
This component provides the key access method according to ‘GP Standard’ and it
satisfies security objective O.Secure Messaging.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
This component defines the method of securely destroying the key generated by key
derivation mechanism of FCS_CKM.1(1) and SCP02 session key generation of
FCS_CKM.1(2). This component suggests the method of destroying the key generated by
TSF and remaining in temporary memory area by filling with ‘0,’ thus satisfying the
security objective O.Deletion of Residual Information.
FCS_COP.1(1)
Cryptographic
operation
(Symmetric
Key
Cryptographic
Operation)
This component defines the TDES cryptographic calculation which is used to protect from
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the leakage of the ePassport User Data when it is used to be authenticated by the
Inspection System supporting the BAC or transferred. The cryptographic calculation
defined in this component encrypts the ePassport User Data transferred between the TOE
and the Inspection System so it guarantees the secrecy and satisfies the security objective
of O.Secure_Messaging. The cryptographic calculation defined in this component is
required for the BAC mutual authentication so it satisfies the security objective, O.BAC.
This component satisfies the O.IC_Chip by using the TDES cryptographic function of the
IC chip.
FCS_COP.1(2) Cryptographic operation (MAC)
This component defines the Retail MAC for the authentication of the Inspection System
supporting the BAC or for the detecting the change of the transmitting ePassport User
Data. The MAC calculation defined in this component guarantees the integrity and satisfies
the security objective, O.Secure_Messaging, by detecting the change of the ePassport
User Data transmitted between the TOE and the Inspection System. The MAC calculation
defined in this component is required for the BAC mutual authentication so it satisfies the
security objective, O.BAC. This component satisfies the O.IC_Chip by using the TDES
cryptographic function of the IC chip.
Also the reason a symmetric key encryption operations is performed during SCP02 mutual
authentication, which satisfy the O.SCP02
FCS_COP.1(3) Cryptographic operation (Hash Function)
This component defines the hash function, SHA-1, required for the KDF implementation
according to GCS_CKM.1. The hash function defined in this component satisfies the
security objectives, O.BAC and O.EAC, by making the KDF to create the BAC session key
and the EAC session key. This component satisfies the O.IC_Chip by using the SHA
function.
FCS_COP.1(4) Cryptographic operation (Digital Signature Verification for
Certificates Verification)
This component defines the method of the digital signature authentication required for the
EAC-TA procedure. The method of the digital signature authentication defined in this
component satisfies the O.Certificate_Verification by authenticating the CVCS link, DV, IS
certifications which is provided by the Inspection System to the TOE. Also it satisfies the
security objective, O.EAC, by providing the method of the digital signature authentication,
EAC-TA while accessing to the biometric data of the ePassport applicant, the access
authority is checked. This component satisfies the O.IC_Chip by using the ECC library of
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the IC chip.
FCS_COP.1(5) Cryptographic operation (Digital Signature Generation)
This component defines the way of creating the digital signature value required for the AA
procedure. The way of creating the digital signature value in this component satisfies the
O.AA by providing the function to verify the illegal copy of the ePassport by checking the
digital signature value, which is created by the TOE, by the Inspection System.
FCS_RNG.1 Random number generation
This component satisfies the O.IC_Chip by generating the random number using the
TRGN of the IC chip.
FDP_ACC.1(1) Subset access control (ePassport access control)
This component defines list of subjects, objects and operations in order to decide a scope
of control for the ePassport access control policies. The ePassport access control policies
defined in this component satisfies the security objective of O.Access_Control as it defines
the Personalization agent, BIS and EIS as subjects, the personal data and biometric data
of the ePassport holder and ePassport authentication data, etc. as objects and their
relationship as operations.
FDP_ACC.1(2) Subset access control (OS Access Control)
This component defines the list of subjects, objects, and operations in order to determine
the control scope of OS access control policy. The OS access control policy defined in this
component defines the Personalization agent as the subject, executable file, application
programs, Personalization agent basic information, Personalization agent authentication
information as objects, and their relationship as operations, thus satisfying security
objective O.Access Control.
FDP_ACF.1(1) Security attribute based access control (ePassport access
control)
In order to enforce the ePassport access control policies, this component defines security
attributes of subjects and objects defined in FDP_ACC.1(1) and specifies the ePassport
access control rules. Security attributes and the ePassport access control rules defined in
this component satisfy the security objectives of O.Management and O.Access_Control as
only the authorized Personalization agent with the Personalization agent issuing
authorization can perform management functions. Also, this component satisfies the
security objectives of O.BAC, O.EAC and O.Access_Control because the read‐rights for the
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personal data of the ePassport holder and ePassport authentication data, etc. is allowed
only to the subjects holding the BAC authorization and the read‐rights for the biometric
data of the ePassport holder is allowed only to the subjects holding the EAC authorization.
The explicitly deny rules of FDP_ACF.1.4 defined in this component satisfy the security
objective of O.Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures because the application order
of security mechanisms is ensured as access by the Inspection System is denied when the
order of transmitted instructions specified in 2.1 Inspection Procedures of the EAC
specifications is violated.
FDP_ACF.1(2) Security attribute based access control (OS Access Control)
This component defines the security properties of subjects and objects defined in
FDP_ACC.1(2) and specifies OS access control rules in order to perform OS access control
policy. The security properties and OS access control rules defined in this component
grants management rights to the Personalization agent so that only authorized
Personalization agent may perform OS management functions, thus satisfying security
objectives O.Management and O.Access Control. Also, it provides OS management
method only to the subject with Personalization agent management rights, thus satisfying
security objective O.SCP02.
FDP_DAU.1 Basic Data Authentication
This component, in order to verify the validity of ePassport user data, uses the AA chip
authentication private key stored on protected memory to generate digital signature when
requested by the inspection system and provides it to the inspection system, and the
inspection system verifies the digital signature with AA chip authentication public key
acquired in EF.DG15 to confirm if the AA chip authentication private key of protected
memory and the AA chip authentication public key of EF.DG15 are a valid key pair so that
whether EF file has been modified or not can be checked, thus satisfying security
objective O.AA. Also, this component performs ECDH calculation using the temporary
public key generated by EIS with EAC chip authentication public key information of
EF.DG14 and the EAC chip authentication private key stored on the protected memory of
TOE. Depending on the success of EAC-CA, and depending on whether the EAC chip
authentication private key of protected memory and EAC chip authentication public key of
EF.DG14 are a valid key pair or not, the modification of EF can be confirmed, thus
satisfying security objective O.EAC.
FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection
This component ensures that previous information is not included when the TSF allocates
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or deallocates memory resources for the SCP02 session key, BAC authentication key, BAC
session key, EAC session key and random numbers. This component satisfies the security
objective of O.Deleting_Residua_Info as it ensures that previous information of the SCP02
session key, BAC authentication key, BAC session key and EAC session key is not available
when destroying these keys according to the method of destruction defined in FCS_CKM.4.
Also, this component satisfies the security objective of O.Replay_Prevention by ensuring
that previous information of random numbers used for the SCP02 mutual authentication,
BAC mutual authentication, TAC‐TA and generation of session key is not available.
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
This component defines the method to protect from disclosure when transmitting objects,
such as the personal data and the biometric data of the ePassport holder within the scope
of the ePassport access control policies. This component establishes the BAC or EAC
secure messaging by performing cryptographic operations for the personal data of the
ePassport holder, etc. transmitted between the TOE and the Inspection System with the
BAC session encryption key, or the biometric data of the ePassport holder, etc. transmitted
between the TOE and the Inspection System with the EAC session encryption key.
Therefore, this component satisfies the security objective of O.Secure_Messaging as the
confidentiality of user data is ensured. This component satisfies the security objective of
O.Replay_Prevention by ensuring that the BAC session encryption key is not used the
same as the BAC authentication key when establishing the BAC secure messaging.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
This component defines the method to protect from modification, deletion, insertion,
replay when transmitting objects, such as the personal data and the biometric data of the
ePassport holder within the scope of the ePassport access control policies. This
component establishes the BAC or EAC secure messaging by performing cryptographic
operations for the personal data of the ePassport holder, etc. transmitted between the
TOE and the Inspection System with the BAC session MAC key, or the biometric data of
the ePassport holder, etc. transmitted between the TOE and the Inspection System with
the EAC session MAC key. Therefore, this component satisfies the security objective of
O.Secure_Messaging as the integrity of user data is ensured. This component satisfies the
security objective of O.Replay_Prevention by ensuring that the BAC session MAC key is not
used the same as the BAC authentication key when establishing the BAC secure
messaging.
FIA_AFL.1(1) Authentication failure handling (User Session Termination)
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This component detects if the number of authentication attempts for SCP02 mutual
authentication and BAC mutual authentication is greater than 1, and requires termination
of user session. This component satisfies the security objective of O.Session_Termination
as the session is terminated if the authentication attempt failure number of the SCP02
mutual authentication and BAC mutual authentication is surpassed. Also, this component
satisfies the security objective of O.Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures by
disabling the unauthorized external entity to move on to the next phase of inspection
procedures by terminating session if the BAC mutual authentication fails. In addition, this
component satisfies the security objectives of O.BAC, O.EAC and O.Access_Control
because access to user data is denied by terminating session as the SCP02 mutual
authentication or BAC mutual authentication failure is considered that there is no the
access‐rights for user data.
FIA_AFL.1(2) Authentication failure handling (Retry Prohibition)
This component detects if the number of authentication attempts for EAC-TA is greater
than 1, and requires prohibiting retry of EAC-TA in the same user session. This component
regards the failure in EAC-TA as having no access rights to ePassport applicant bio
information and thus denies access to ePassport applicant bio information, thus satisfying
security objectives of O.Security Mechanism Application Procedure, O.EAC, and O.Access
Control.
FIA_UAU.1(1) Timing of authentication (BAC Mutual authentication)
This component defines the functions the user to be performed before the BAC mutual
authentication and executes the BAC mutual authentication for user.
In this component, the BAC mutual authentication is executed in order to enable the
Inspection System identified in FIA_UID.1 to execute the indication function to support
the BAC mechanism and to read the personal data of the ePassport holder. This
component satisfies the security objectives of O.Session Termination, O.BAC and
O.Access_Control as it enables detection by FIA_AFL.1(1) ,if the authentication fails and
allows the read‐rights for the personal data of the ePassport holder if the authentication
succeeds.
FIA_UAU.1(2) Timing of authentication (EAC-TA)
This component defines the functions the user to be performed before the EAC‐TA and
executes the EAC‐TA for user.
In this component, only the Inspection System of which the BAC mutual authentication
succeeded in FIA_UAU.1(1) can execute EAC‐CA and reading of user data(exception of the
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biometric data of the ePassport holder). To read the biometric data of the ePassport holder,
the EAC‐TA shall be executed. This component satisfies the security objectives of
O.Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures,
O.Session_Termination,
O.EAC
and
O.Access_Control as it enables detection by FIA_AFL.1(1) ,if authentication fails and
allows the read‐rights for the biometric data of the ePassport holder if authentication
succeeds.
FIA_UAU.1(3) Timing of authentication (SCP02 mutual authentication)
This component defines the functions the user can perform before SCP02 mutual
authentication and performs SCP02 mutual authentication on the user. This component
performs SCP02 mutual authentication before the Personalization agent identified in
FIA_UID.1 uses management function on ePassport applicant identification information
and TSF data. If the authentication fails, detection by FIA_AFL.1(2) is allowed, and if the
authentication succeeds, the management functions on ePassport applicant basic
information and TSF data are allowed, thus satisfying security objectives of O.Session
Termination, O.SCP02, O.Access Control.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
This component requires that authentication‐related information sent by the TSF to the
Inspection System in the SCP02 mutual authentication, BAC mutual authentication and the
EAC‐TA,
is
not
replay.
This
component
satisfies
the
security
objectives
of
O.Replay_Prevention, O.BAC, O.EAC and O.SCO02 as the TSF executes the SCP02 mutual
authentication, BAC mutual authentication and EAC‐TA by generating different random
numbers used in the SCP02 mutual authentication, BAC mutual authentication and EAC‐TA
per session and transmitting them to the Inspection System.
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
This component defines various authentication mechanisms and defines the rules for
applying authentication mechanisms according to the type of user data the inspection
system wishes to access. For this component, the Personalization agent is given the
issuing rights/management rights if it succeeds in SCP02 mutual authentication according
to the rules for authentication mechanism application, and the inspection system is given
the BAC rights if it succeeds in BAC mutual authentication, and succeeding in EAC-CA,
EAC-TA and certificate verification after BAC mutual authentication, it acquires EAC rights,
thus satisfying security objectives of
O.Security Mechanism Application Procedure,
O.Access Control, O.BAC, O.EAC, and O.SCP02.
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FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
This component requires to establish the messaging based on contactless IC card
transmission protocol (ISO/ IEC 14443‐4) as the functions the user to be performed
before the identification and to identify the user. This component satisfies the security
objectives of O.BAC, O.EAC and O.SCP02 as the external entity is identified with the
Inspection System, if an external entity to establish the messaging request to use the
MRTD application.
FMT_MOF.1(1) Management of security functions behavior (ePassport Writing)
This component defines that the ability to disable writing function is given only to the
Personalization agent in the Personalization phase. This component satisfies the security
objectives of O.Management and O.Access_Control by deactivating the writing function of
the Personalization agent in the Personalization phase so that the TOE in the Operational
Use phase cannot record any data.
FMT_MOF.1(2) Management of security functions behavior (OS Life Cycle
Change)
This component defines that the application program gives the ability to determine the
action regarding the change of OS life cycle only to Personalization agent. This component
allows the application program to determine whether the change of OS life cycle state
when the Personalization agent installs the application program, thus satisfying security
objective of O.Management.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
This component requires to restrict the ability of initializing user security attributes only to
the TSF as an action to be taken if the TSF detects modification of the transmitted TSF
data in FPT_ITI.1. This component satisfies the security objectives of O.Secure_Messaging
and O.Access_Control as the integrity is ensured and access to the MRTD application data
is blocked by resetting the previously given security attributes of the Personalization agent
or the Inspection System as an action to be taken if the TSF detects modification of the
transmitted TSF data.
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute Initialization
This component requires that when generating objects, the security properties have a
limited value as the default value, and that specifying initial values are denied. In this
component, in order to perform ePassport access control policy and OS access control
policy, the security properties for ePassport user data and OS user data is specified by
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TOE implementation logic and does not allow specifying initial values, thus satisfying
security objectives of O.Management, O.Access Control.
FMT_MTD.1(1) Management of TSF data (Certificate Verification Info.)
This component restricts that only the Personalization agent in the Personalization phase
writes certificate verification information necessary for the EAC‐TA in secure memory. This
component satisfies the security objectives of O.Management and O.Access_Control by
enabling only the authorized Personalization agent to have the ability to write TSF data,
such as the EAC chip authentication private key, current data, CVCA certificate and CVCA
digital signature verification key, etc., in secure memory in the Personalization phase
FMT_MTD.1(2) Management of TSF data (SSC Initialization)
This component requires to terminate BAC secure messaging before the EAC secure
messaging
is
established.
This
component
satisfies
the
security
objective
of
O.Security_Mechanism_Application_Procedures by initializing SSC (send sequence counter)
to „0‟ in order to terminate the BAC secure messaging after generating the EAC session
key and newly establishing the EAC secure messaging.
FMT_MTD.1(3) ) Management of TSF data (OS Management)
This component controls that only the Personalization agent successful with SCP02
authentication may change the ePassport application life cycle. This component limits the
rights for the ePassport application life cycle change to Personalization agent, thus
satisfying the security objective of O.Management
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF Data
This component requires to allow only secure values as the TSF data in order to ensure
the secure random numbers and to ensure that valid date of certificates used in EAC‐TA
has not expired. This component satisfies the security objective of O.Replay_Prevention
because only the secure random numbers are used in order to prevent a replay attack
when the TSF generates session key. Also, the TSF compares the CVCA link certificate
provided by the Inspection System with the CVCA certificate stored in the TOE in order for
verification of the IS certificate used in the EAC‐TA. If the CVCA certificate update is
necessary, the TSF internally updates the CVCA certificate, CVCA digital signature
verification key, current dates and EF.CVCA, therefore maintains the TSF data as secure
values. This component satisfies the security objectives of O.Certificate_Verification and
O.EAC because the EAC‐TA can be successfully executed by verifying the DV certificate
and IS certificate with the secure CVCA certificate.
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FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
This component provides the means to manage the MRTD application data in the
Personalization phase. This component satisfies the security objective of O.Management
as it defines the writing function of user data and TSF data in the Personalization phase.
Also, this component satisfies the security objective of O.Certificate_Verification as it
provides the function for the TSF to update the CVCA certificate, the CVCA digital
signature verification key and current dates, etc. by itself in the Operational Use phase.
Also, this component provides application program management function, Personalization
agent basic information, Personalization agent authentication information, functions for
writing/changing and granting OS life cycle change rights to application program as
methods to manage OS application data, thus satisfying security objective O.Management.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
This component defines the role of the Personalization agent to manage the MRTD
application data. This component satisfies the security objective of O.Management as it
defines the role of the Personalization agent that executes the writing function of user
data and TSF data in the Personalization phase.
FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability
This component guarantees that the external entity cannot observe the information
related with the cryptographic such as the BAC authentication key, the BAC session key,
the EAC session key and the private key for the EAC chip authentication when the TSF
processes
the
cryptographic
calculation.
This
component
satisfies
the
O.Handling_Info_Leakage by guaranteeing that the external entity cannot find out and
exploit the cryptography-related data from physical phenomena(change of current,
voltage and electromagnetic, etc.) occurred when the TSF performs cryptographic
operations such as the TDES, the MAC and the digital signature authentication. This
component satisfies the O.IC_Chip by using the functions such as the TDES and the ECC.
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
This component requires that when malfunctioning such as failure detected in self-test
and abnormal operation status detected by IC chip, a secure state is maintained. This
component stops the operation of TOE when it detects change in integrity of TSF data or
executable code in the self-test of FPT_TST.1 or the IC chip detects and notifies of
abnormal operation status so as to prevent TSF malfunction, and in the case power supply
is shut off during TSF operation, the operations stopped by power supply shut-off are
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restored to the state before the operation began to maintain secure state when the TOE
reoperates, thus satisfying the security objective of O.Secure State.
FPT_ITI.1 Inter-TSF detection of modification
This component requires to detect modification in the transmitted TSF data and defines an
action to be taken if modifications are detected.
This
component
satisfies
the
security
objectives
of
O.Secure_Messaging
and
O.Session_Termination by detecting modification of the transmitted TSF data in the
Operational Use phases and by performing an action to be taken, such as terminating the
related messagings, deleting the related session key and management actions specified in
FMT_MSA.1, etc., if modifications are detected
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
This component is required to resist physical manipulation and physical probing against
TSF automatically. This component satisfies the O.IC_Chip by providing the detection of
the abnormal action and the physical protection.
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
This component requires self‐testing to detect loss of the TSF and the TSF data by various
failure (unexpected failure mode, lack of the IC chip design and intentionally damage to
the TSF, etc.).
For this component, self-tests are performed on TSF when initiating TOE to prove precise
operative of O.Secure State. Also, the integrity of TSF and TSF data stored on TOE is
verified to detect their loss and detecting the loss, thus satisfying security objective of
O.Secure State.
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6.3.2. Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
The EAL(Evaluation Assurance Level) of this Security Target was selected as EAL5+
(ADV_IMP.2) by considering the value of assets protected by the TOE and level of threats,
etc.
EAL5 allows the developer to acquire the maximum assurance from security engineering
based on strict commercial development methodology, which refers to applying an eased
version of expert security engineering techniques. Such TOE must be designed and
developed with the intention of achieving EAL5 assurance. The additional cost from strict
development is not very great. EAL5 demands high-level of security with independent
assurance from the development planned by the developer or the user, and is applicable
to a case which requires using a strict development methodology without the burden of
inappropriate cost due to expert security engineering techniques.
Security Target partially selected assurance components that are higher than EAL4. The
rationale of the augmented with assurance components are as follows.
ADV_IMP.2 Complete mapping of the implementation representation of the
TSF
The TOE is an operating system and application program operated in the MRTD chip.
Therefore, it largely depends on the IC chip in terms of cryptographic operation function
and physical security. To ensure the secure MRTD chip, the reliability and secure operation
of not only the TOE, but also the IC chip must be verified.
After ePassport is issued with IC chip inside, it is difficult to make a correction even if a
fault occurs, and accordingly the attacker may abuse this. Therefore, ADV_IMP.2 was
added to implement TSF precisely and analyze the expression of the entire
implementation for existence of faulty code.
6.3.3. Rationale of Dependency
6.3.3.1.
Dependency of TOE Security Functional Requirements
Table 32 shows dependency of TOE functional components.
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Numb
Security Function
Dependency
er
Component
1
FCS_CKM.1(1)
2
FCS_CKM.1(2)
3
FCS_CKM.2(1)
4
FCS_CKM.2(2)
5
FCS_CKM.3
6
FCS_CKM.4
7
FCS_COP.1(1)
8
FCS_COP.1(2)
9
FCS_COP.1(3)
10
FCS_COP.1(4)
11
FCS_COP.1(5)
12
FCS_RNG.1
13
FDP_ACC.1(1)
FDP_ACF.1
14
FDP_ACC.1(2)
FDP_ACF.1
15
FDP_ACF.1(1)
16
FDP_ACF.1(2)
17
FDP_DAU.1
–
18
FDP_RIP.1
–
19
FDP_UCT.1
20
FDP_UIT.1
21
FIA_AFL.1(1)
FIA_UAU.1
22
FIA_AFL.1(2)
FIA_UAU.1
23
FIA_UAU.1(1)
FIA_UID.1
[FCS_CKM.2 OR FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
[FCS_CKM.2 OR FCS_COP.1]
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 OR FDP_ITC.2 OR FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 OR FDP_ITC.2 OR FCS_CKM.1]
Reference
3,4
6
7
6
1
6
1
[FDP_ITC.1 OR FDP_ITC.2 OR FCS_CKM.1]
6
1
FCS_CKM.4
6
[FDP_ITC.1 OR FDP_ITC.2 OR FCS_CKM.1]
1
1
6
1
6
1
6
1
6
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 OR FDP_ITC.2 OR FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 OR FDP_ITC.2 OR FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 OR FDP_ITC.2 OR FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 OR FDP_ITC.2 OR FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 OR FDP_ITC.2 OR FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
-
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.3
[FTP_ICT.1 OR FTP_TRP.1]
[FDP_ACC.1 OR FDP_IFC.1]
[FDP_ACC.1 OR FDP_IFC.1]
[FTP_ITC.1 OR FTP_TRP.1]
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1
6
15
16
13
32
14
32
–
–
N/A (NO.1)
13
13
N/A (NO.1)
23,24,25
24
28
XSMART_ASE_LITE_ENG
Numb
Security Function
Dependency
er
Component
24
FIA_UAU.1(2)
FIA_UAU.1(1)
25
FIA_UAU.1(3)
FIA_UID.1
26
FIA_UAU.4
–
27
FIA_UAU.5
–
28
FIA_UID.1
–
29
FMT_MOF.1(1)
30
FMT_MOF.1(2)
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
[FDP_ACC.1 OR FDP_ICF.1]
31
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1
Reference
23(NO.2)
28
–
–
–
37
38
37
38
13, 14
37
38
31
38
37
38
37
38
37
38
33
32
FMT_MSA.3
33
FMT_MTD.1(1)
34
FMT_MTD.1(2)
35
FMT_MTD.1(3)
36
FMT_MTD.3
FMT_MTD.1
37
FMT_SMF.1
–
–
38
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_UID.1
28
39
FPR_UNO.1
–
–
40
FPT_FLS.1
-
-
41
FPT_ITI.1
42
FPT_PHP.3
–
–
43
FPT_TST.1
-
-
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
Table 32 Security Function Component Dependency
NO.1
FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 have dependency with FTP_ITC.1 or FTP_TRP.1, but the
dependency in this PP is not included. FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require secure
messaging between the Inspection System and the TOE. Since the secure messaging
between Inspection System and TOE is the unique channel, it is not necessary to be
logically separated from other communicational channels. Therefore, in this Security
Target, requirements of FTP_ITC.1 are not defined.
NO.2
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FIA_UAU.1(2) shall have dependency with FIA_UID.1, but the dependency changed to
FIA_UAU.1(1) by refinement operation. Since the EAC‐TA is executed after the BAC
mutual authentication, FIA_UAU.1(2) depends on FIA_UAU.1(1) and FIA_UAU.1(1)
depends on FIA_UID.1. Therefore, indirectly, the dependency is satisfied.
6.3.3.2.
Dependency of TOE Security Assurance Requirements
The dependency of EAL5 provided in Common Criteria is already satisfied. Therefore, the
rationale for this is omitted. The dependency of the augmented security assurance
requirements is as shown in [Table 33 Dependency of Added Assurance Components]
ADV_IMP.2 shall have dependency with ALC_CMC.5 but, ADV_IMP.2 is augmented to
enable analysis on the entire implementation representation in order to check if the TSF is
accurately implemented and defect code does not exist. And ADV_IMP.2 is not augmented
in Security Target because CM at ALC_CMC.5 level which provides automated measure to
identify if the changes in configuration items affect other configuration items is
determined to be not necessarily required.
Number
1
Assurance Component
ADV_IMP.2
Dependency
Reference Number
ADV_TDS.3
EAL4
ALC_TAT.1
EAL4
ALC_CMC.5
N/A
Table 33 Dependency of Added Assurance Components
6.4. Rationale of Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
This rationale demonstrates that the TOE security requirements have a mutually
supportive and internally consistency.
In „6.3.3.1 Dependency of TOE security functional requirements‟ and „6.3.3.2
Dependency of TOE security assurance requirements‟, the dependency is analyzed as a
supportive relationship among security requirements of which it is necessary to depend on
other security requirements in order to achieve a security objective because a security
requirement is insufficient. In case the dependency was not satisfied, additional rationale
is provided. Also, security functional requirements, although there is no dependency
among security functional requirements, are mutually supportive and internally
consistency in relation to the TSF operations as of the following.
In the Personalization phase, the Personalization agent records the MRTD application data
(FMT_MTD.1(1), FMT_MSA.3) and deactivates writing function so that the TOE is not
modified by external entities when delivering the TOE to the Operational Use
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phase(FMT_MOF.1(1), FMT_SMF.1). The role of the Personalization agent as such is
defined as the security role (FMT_SMR.1) and is controlled by the ePassport access
control policies (FDP_ACC.1(1), FDP_ACF.1(1)). Therefore, these security requirements are
mutually supportive and internally consisten.
The TSF, after identifying the Inspection System (FIA_UID.1), executes the BAC mutual
authentication
(FIA_UAU.1(1)),
the
EAC‐TA
(FIA_UAU.1(2))
and
SCP02
mutual
authentication(FIA_UAU.1(3)) according to authentication mechanism application rules
(FIA_UAU.5). If the Personalization agent or inspection system fails SCP02 mutual
authentication or BAC mutual authentication, the session is closed (FIA_AFL.1(1)), and if
the inspection system fails EAC-TA, retry of EAC-TA in the same user session is prohibited
(FIA_AFL.1(2)). The random numbers must be used so that to prevent reuse of
authentication‐related data used in authentication (FIA_UAU.4). In order to ensure the
secure random numbers used and the secure certificates used in the EAC‐TA, the
certificates must be verified and updated (FMT_MTD.3). Therefore, these security
requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent.
The TSF must initialize SSC to 0 (FMT_MTD.1(2)) in order to indicate the channel
termination when terminating the secure messaging (FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1)
established in order to protect the transmitted user data. Therefore, these security
requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent.
After cryptographic calculation, the TSF shall destroy the cryptography-related data
generated in the temporary memory area to prevent reuse (FCS_CKM.4, FDP_RIP.1).
Therefore, these security requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent.
In case the modification of the transmitted TSF data is detected, the TSF must terminate
the session (FPT_ITI.1) and reset the access‐rights of the Inspection System
(FMT_MSA.1). Therefore, these security requirements are mutually supportive and
internally consistent.
The TSF must execute self‐testing(FPT_TST.1) under the conditions decided by the ST
author. In case the failure is detected, the TOE must preserve a secure state(FPT_FLS.1).
Therefore, these security requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent.
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7. TOE Summary Specification
7.1. TOE security function
This clause explains TOE security function (TSF) satisfying the security requirements
described in the last section. Each security function is described with its name and a
simple explanation. Detailed information is given in the function specification document.
Security Function
Explanation
SF_CARD_MANAGEMENT
Management of card data
SF_AUTHENTICATION
Identification and authentication
SF_COUNTER_MEASURE
Security measures
SF_RESOURCE_MANAGEMENT
Resource management
SF_CRYPTOGRAPHY
Support Cryptography
SF_PERSO_CONTROL
Support ePassport issuance
SF_BASIC_ACCESS_CONTROL
Support Basic Access Control
SF_EXTENDED_ACCESS_CONTROL
Support Extended Access Control
SF_ACTIVE_AUTHENTICATION
Support Active Authentication
SF_IC
Security Function supported by IC chip
Table 34 TOE security function
7.1.1. SF_CARD_MANAGEMENT
8.
This is the card management function which includes the functions such as command
processing, application program identification/management, life cycle management,
and internal structure management of card management service.
9.
This security function is not applicable after the installation of the ePassport
application.
9.1.1. SF_AUTHENTICATION
This function manages the security channel for administrator authentication and provides
functions such as maintaining message integrity/confidentiality and terminating security
channel, and for user authentication, also provides the function of Global PIN commonly
used in the card and Owner PIN independently used by the application programs through
API.
9.1.2. SF_COUNTER_MEASURE
This provides security measures when security violation occurs, and also provides
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defensive measures against security attacks.
9.1.3. SF_RESOURCE_MANAGEMENT
This is responsible for resource management and provides the removal function for
residual information when allocating/returning.
9.1.4. SF_OBJECT_ACCESS
This controls the access and remote access of application programs to Java objects
generated by application programs.
9.1.5. SF_CRYPTOGRAPHY
This security function provides cryptographic functions such as generation/verification of
digital signature, encryption/decryption, hash value generation, and random number
generation.
9.1.6. SF_PERSO_CONTROL
This security function allows only successfully authenticated Personalization agent to write
ePassport user data & TSF data through secure messaging.
9.1.7. SF_BASIC_ACCESS_CONTROL
This security function allows only successfully authenticated inspection system through
BAC mutual authentication to read ePassport user data excluding ePassport applicant bio
information through BAC-secure messaging which guarantees confidentiality and integrity.
9.1.8. SF_EXTENDED_ACCESS_CONTROL
This security function allows only the inspection system which succeeded EAC-TA on EACsecure messaging through ECA-CA to read the ePassport user data through EAC-secure
messaging which guarantees confidentiality and integrity.
9.1.9. SF_ACTIVE_AUTHENTICATION
This security function implements AA security mechanism which allows the inspection
system to judge the illegal piracy state of TOE.
This security function can be selectively used according to the issuance policy of the
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Personalization agent.
9.1.10. SF_IC
This security function uses the functions provided by the IC chip.
9.2. TSF of the IC chip used by the TOE
When the TOE performs TDES, RSA, ECDSA and ECDH in the IC chip, various security
functions described below is used.
Security
Function
Mapped
SFR
Description
TOE’s Detectors
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
Memory Encryption
FDP_IFC.1
TRNG
FCS_RNG.1
TDES
FCS_COP.1
RSA
FCS_COP.1
ECDSA
FCS_COP.1
Voltage detector, Frequency detector, Active shield
removal detector, Inner insulation removal detector,
Light and laser detector, Temperature detector,
Voltage glitch detector
Memory Encryption when sensitive data into the
memory. data will be encrypted before stored in
memory so this will enhance the difficultly for an
attacker to get useful information on data bytes
hamming weight.
TRNG is a hardware true random number generator
compliant with AIS31 standard class P2 high.
Hardware DES has several security
countermeasures to prevent side channel attacks.
- Secure Key & Data loading
- DPA prevent : random mask
- Variable clock
- RWG automatic enable
- High Order DPA prevent : Virtual DES
The acceleration of modulo exponentiations
required in the RSA encryption/decryption
algorithm.
ECDSA_sigh_digest, ECDSA_verify_digest
ECDH
FCS_COP.1
ECDH_generate
SHA
FCS_COP.1
SHA224, SHA256
Table 35 Security function of the IC chip
The relation between the SFR provided by the TOE and the SFR provided by the IC chip is
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described as below.
SFR of the IC Chip
SFR of the TOE
Description
FRU_FLT.2
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1
Provides the mechanism to protect from the
abnormal physical attack.
FMT_LIM.1
[none]
FMT_LIM.2
[none]
FAU_SAS.1
[none]
FPT_PHP.3
FDP_PHP.3
FDP_ITT.1
FPR_UNO.1
FDP_IFC.1
FPR_UNO.1
FPT_ITT.1
FPR_UNO.1
FCS_RNG.1
FCS_RNG.1
FCS_COP.1/3DES
FCS_COP.1(1)
FCS_COP.1/AES
[none]
FCS_COP.1/RSA
FCS_COP.1(5)
FCS_COP.1/ECDSA
FCS_COP.1(4)
FCS_COP.1/ECDH
FCS_CKM.2(2)
FDP_ACC.1
[none]
FDP_ACF.1
[none]
FMT_MSA.1
[none]
FMT_MSA.3
[none]
FMT_SMF.1
[none]
FCS_CKM.1(ECDSA)
[none]
FCS_CKM.1(RSA)
[none]
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1(3)
Resistance against the physical attack.
Memory data is encrypted to be stored
Random number generation
Symmetric Key Cryptographic Operation
Digital signature generation
Digital signature verification for the
certification verification
Distribution of the KDF Seed value for
creation of the EAC session key
Hash calculation
Table 36 SFR Map
9.2.1. TOE’s Detectors
The Toe turns its state to the Mute when the following abnormal actions are detected.
List of Detectors :




Abnormal frequency Detector
Abnormal voltage Detector
Abnormal temperature Detector
Light Detector
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


Inner insulation removal Detector
Active shield removal Detector
Glitch Detector
9.2.2. Memory Encryption
The TOE performs the memory encryption and decryption against all data stored in the
ROM, the RAM and the EEPROM by using this function. In the case of the ROM and the
RAM, automatically enabled by the IC chip but in the case of the EEPROM, the TOE
enables it for the enhancement of the security against the attack of TSF Data.
9.2.3. TRNG
The TRNG is the method for the identification and the authentication and it is provided for
the SCP02 mutual authentication, the BAC mutual authentication, the EAC-CA, the EAC-TA
and the AA.
9.2.4. TDES
The TDES is used for the SCP02 mutual authentication, the BAC mutual authentication
and the secure channel for the creation of the session key.
9.2.5. RSA
The RSA is the cryptographic algorithm for the AA(Active Authentication) and the
verification of the signature value.
9.2.6. ECDSA
The ECDSA is the cryptographic algorithm for the verification of a signature value for the
DV(Document Verifier) / IS(Inspection System) of the EAC security mechanism.
9.2.7. ECDH
The ECDH is the security mechanism, in which the ECC encryption algorithm is used, to be
used at the creation of the session key. By changing the BAC Key which is used with the
encrypted communication, it increases the level of the security of the communication.
9.2.8. SHA
The SHA is the hash algorithm for the creation of the encrypted message and it is used at
the creation of the session key, at the verification of the ECDSA signature value and at the
creation of the AA signature value.
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9.3. Assurance Method
This clause defines the assurance method required by TOE assurance requirements
according to EAL5+. Added assurance requirement is ADV_IMP.2
Assurance
Assurance Method (Document ID)
Requirements
ASE_INT.1
XSmart e-Passport Security Target
ASE_CCL.1
XSmart e-Passport Security Target
ASE_SPD.1
XSmart e-Passport Security Target
ASE_OBJ.2
XSmart e-Passport Security Target
ASE_ECD.1
XSmart e-Passport Security Target
ASE_REQ.2
XSmart e-Passport Security Target
ASE_TSS.1
XSmart e-Passport Security Target
ADV_ARC.1
XSmart e-Passport Structure Analysis Document
ADV_FSP.5
XSmart e-Passport Function Specification
ADV_INT.2
XSmart e-Passport Interface Specification
ADV_IMP.2
XSmart e-Passport Implementation Verification Document
ADV_TDS.4
XSmart e-Passport Design Document
AGD_OPE.1
XSmart e-Passport Manual
AGD_PRE.1
XSmart e-Passport Manual
ALC_CMC.4
XSmart e-Passport Configuration Management Document
ALC_CMS.5
XSmart e-Passport Configuration Management Document
ALC_DEL.1
XSmart e-Passport Distribution Guide
ALC_DVS.1
XSmart e-Passport Life Cycle Support Document
ALC_LCD.1
XSmart e-Passport Life Cycle Support Document
ALC_TAT.2
XSmart e-Passport Life Cycle Support Document
ATE_COV.2
XSmart e-Passport Test Analysis Document
ATE_DPT.3
XSmart e-Passport Test Analysis Document
ATE_FUN.1
XSmart e-Passport Test Document
ATE_IND.2
-
AVA_VAN.4
-
Table 37 TOE Assurance Method
Copyright ⓒ 2015 – LG CNS Co., Ltd. All rights reserved
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