Security Target: st_idcard_bac32_v0.15

Security Target: st_idcard_bac32_v0.15
Security Target ID&Trust IDentity-eMRTD BAC
ID&TRUST DOCUMENTS
EMRTD WITH BAC
COMMON CRITERIA
EVALUATION
01. SECURITY TARGET ID&TRUST IDENTITY
CARD 3.2/BAC
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Revision history
Version
Date
Information
v.0.1.
05.06.2013.
First Draft
v.0.2.
24.06.2013.
Corrections
v.0.3.
02.09.2013.
First Evaluation version
v.0.4.
25.09.2013.
Composite TOE considerations
v.0.5.
14.10.2013.
The ETR fc indicated changes
v.0.6.
18.03.2014.
Corrections
v.0.7.
21.03.2014.
Further corrections
v.0.8.
25.03.2014
Corrections of formal and conceptual differences
v.0.9.
26.03.2014.
Correcting table headings
v.0.10.
31.03.2014.
OR changes
v.0.11.
13.08.2015
Huntrust->ID&Trust, Certifier review
v.0.12.
06.01.2016.
IDentity Applet 3.1 -> 3.2
v.0.13.
09.02.2016.
FIA_AFL.1.1/1.2 are updated
v.0.14.
05.03.2016.
Evaluator-induced corrections
v.0.15.
08.03.2016.
Reference corrections
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Table of Contents
1
ST Introduction ................................................................................................................ 5
1.1
ST reference ........................................................................................................... 5
1.2
TOE reference......................................................................................................... 5
1.3
TOE overview.......................................................................................................... 6
1.3.1
1.4
2
4
5
TOE description ...................................................................................................... 8
1.4.1
TOE usage and security features for operational use ....................................... 8
1.4.2
TOE life cycle.................................................................................................. 9
1.4.3
TOE security functions .................................................................................12
1.4.4
Features of the Applet ..................................................................................13
Conformance Claims ..................................................................................................... 18
2.1
CC Conformance Claim .........................................................................................18
2.2
PP Claim ................................................................................................................18
2.3
Package Claim .......................................................................................................18
2.4
Conformance rationale ...........................................................................................19
2.5
Statement of compatibility...................................................................................20
2.5.1
Security Functionalities ................................................................................20
2.5.2
OSPs ..............................................................................................................23
2.5.3
Assumptions .................................................................................................23
2.5.4
Security objectives .......................................................................................23
2.5.5
Security requirements ..................................................................................25
2.5.6
Assurance requirements ..............................................................................29
2.6
3
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware ............................................................. 7
Analysis ................................................................................................................29
Security Problem Definition ........................................................................................... 30
3.1
Introduction ............................................................................................................30
3.2
Assumptions ..........................................................................................................32
3.3
Threats ...................................................................................................................33
3.4
Organizational Security Policies .............................................................................36
Security Objectives ....................................................................................................... 38
4.1
Security Objectives for the TOE .............................................................................38
4.2
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment..............................................40
4.3
Security Objective Rationale ..................................................................................43
Extended Components Definition .................................................................................. 46
5.1
Definition of the Family FAU_SAS ..........................................................................46
5.2
Definition of the Family FCS_RND .........................................................................47
5.3
Definition of the Family FMT_LIM ...........................................................................47
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5.4
6
Security Requirements .................................................................................................. 51
6.1
7
Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC .....................................................................49
Security Functional Requirements for the TOE.......................................................52
6.1.1
Class FAU Security Audit ................................................................................52
6.1.2
Class Cryptographic Support (FCS) ................................................................53
6.1.3
Class FIA Identification and Authentication .....................................................56
6.1.4
Class FDP User Data Protection .....................................................................61
6.1.5
Class FMT Security Management ...................................................................63
6.1.6
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions...............................................67
6.2
Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE ......................................................69
6.3
Security Requirements Rationale ...........................................................................69
6.3.1
Security Functional Requirements Rationale ...................................................69
6.3.2
Dependency Rationale ....................................................................................72
6.3.3
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale ..................................................76
6.3.4
Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency ................77
TOE summary specification .......................................................................................... 78
7.1
TOE Security Functions .........................................................................................78
7.1.1
TSF_AccessControl ........................................................................................78
7.1.2
TSF_Authenticate ...........................................................................................79
7.1.3
TSF_SecureManagement_MRTD ...................................................................81
7.1.4
TSF_CryptoKey_MRTD ..................................................................................81
7.1.5
TSF_AppletParameters_Sign ..........................................................................82
7.1.6
TSF_Platform ..................................................................................................82
7.2
Assurance Measures..............................................................................................83
7.3
Fulfilment of the SFRs ............................................................................................84
7.3.1
7.4
8
Correspondence of SFR and TOE mechanisms ..............................................86
Rationale for PP Claims .........................................................................................86
Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 87
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1 ST Introduction
1
This section provides document management and overview information that are required
a potential user of the TOE to determine, whether the TOE fulfils its requirements.
2
Throughout this document, the term BAC refers to Basic Access Control.
3
The inspection system SHALL use BAC in the session."
1.1 ST reference
4
Title: Security Target ID&Trust IDentity Applet Version 3.2. / BAC
TOE: ID&Trust IDentity Card 3.2: NXP JCOP 2.4.2 R3 Smart Card with ID&Trust IDentity
Applet Suite Version 3.2 / BAC
TOE short name: IDentity v3.2/BAC
Editor(s): Tamás Szabó ID&Trust.
CC Version: 3.1 (Revision 4)
Assurance Level: EAL4 augmented with the following assurance component:
ALC_DVS.2.
Version Number: 0.15.
Date: 08.03.2016.
TOE Documentation:
- IDentity Applet Initialization and configuration Version 3.2.07
- IDentity Applet Administrator’s Guide Version 3.2.18
- IDentity Applet User’s Guide Version 3.2.19
1.2 TOE reference
5 The Security Target refers to the product “ID&Trust IDentity Card 3.2: NXP JCOP 2.4.2
R3 Smart Card with ID&Trust IDentity Applet Suite Version 3.2 / BAC” (TOE) for CC
evaluation.
6 The TOE comprises:
i.
Underlying Platform of the TOE, which is evaluated by Brightsight and certified by
TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. at assurance level EAL5 augmented with
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE_TSS.2 under the certificate number C1337760 [25]
Platform name: J3E120_M65 / J2E120_M65 / J3E082_M65 / J2E082_M65, Secure
Smart Card Controller Revision 3
Short name: JCOP 2.4.2 R3
It consists of:
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a. Smart card platform (SCP), which consists of:
i. Hardware Abstraction Layer with the Crypto Lybrary,
ii. Hardware Platform
b. Embedded software (Java Card Virtual Machine, Runtime Environment,
Java Card API, Card Manager)
c. Native MIFARE application (physically always present but logical
availability depends on configuration)
and
ii.
the Application Part of the TOE:
ID&Trust IDentity Applet Suite Version 3.2 , configured as eMRTD application,
iii.
the associated guidance documentation.
1.3 TOE overview
7
The Security Target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contact
based / contactless smart card of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on
the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control in ‘ICAO Doc
9303’ [6].
8
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the a contactless integrated circuit chip containing
components for a machine readable travel document (MRTD’s chip) programmed
according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic Access Control
according to ICAO Doc 9303’ [6].
9
The Application part of the TOE, the applet functionalities are distributed according to the
following table:
No
Function
Standard
1
European citizen card
CEN/TS 15480-2
2
European card for e-Services and National IAS-ECC 1.0.1 specification
e-ID applications
3
Basic Access Control
ICAO Doc 9303
4
Extended Access Control v1
BSI TR-3110 version 2.10
5
International Driving License
ISO/IEC 18013
6
European Driving License
EC 383/2012
Table 1: Applet functionalities
10
All the functions are supplied by the applet “ID&Trust IDentity Applet Suite Version 3.2”,
the behaviour of the applet changes according to the environmental behaviour. The
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scope of the current ST is only concerned with applet behaviour No 3 .
11
IDentity Card 3.2 can be configured and used for different kind of electronic identity
products based on the extended version of the same standard (BSI TR-03110), so called
EAC2. While EAC2 was not subject of the CC evaluation, the evaluation was made for
the product already having EAC2 support.
Meanwhile, there is a new version of TR-03110 v2.20 where many optional features are
standardized. One of these new features is enabling access control for non-standard
Data Groups within CV Certificates, so called “Authorization Extensions to be used for
local Generic Attributes” (see BSI TR-03110 v2.20 Part 4 sec. 2.2 for the details). This
feature is implemented by the new version of ID&Trust IDentity Card applet accordingly.
The actual implementation of the change happens in the EAC2 branch of the applet
function, so it does not effect the certified functions of the IDentity applet. In order to be
separated from the evaluation version, the IDentity Card 3.1 applet is renamed IDentity
Card 3.2.
12
For the TOE, beside the eMRTD application other applications may be present on the
JCOP 2.4.2 R3. They are not relevant for the current ST and do not infer the Security
Functions of the TOE. The TOE utilises the results of the NXP Secure Smart Card
Controllers P5Cx128V0v/P5Cx145V0v/V0B(s) certified under the German CC Scheme
(BSI-DSZ-CC-0858) and the Crypto Library V2.7/V.2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145
V0v/V0B(s) certified under the German CC Scheme (BSI-DSZ-CC-0750).
13
The intended customer of the product the Card Issuer, who is in charge of the issuance
of the product to the smartcard holders.
14
Application note 1 (of the ST author): Operational mode of the TOE depends on the
decided operation of the Inspection Sytem. Identity Applet can work using BAC or EAC
with PACE authentication also. If the Inspection System knows the EAC with PACE
mode and wants to use it the TOE accepts it and communicates on this way.
Nevertheless, this ST addresses the Basic Access Control only. EAC with PACE is out of
scope of this ST and is described in an another ST.
1.3.1 Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
15
There is no explicit non-TOE hardware, software or firmware required by the TOE to
perform its claimed security features. The TOE is defined to comprise the chip and
the complete operating system and application. Note, the inlay holding the chip as
well as the antenna and the booklet (holding the printed MRZ) are needed to
represent a complete travel document, nevertheless these parts are not inevitable for
the secure operation of the TOE
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1.4 TOE description
The Platform part of the Composit ST can be any of the following products:
16




J3E120_M65
J2E120_M65
J3E082_M65
J2E082_M65
These are all based on:




the P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s) hardware controller.
Crypto library version 2.7/2.9 which is built upon the hardware platform
JCOP 2.4.2 R3 OS which is built upon the hardware platform and the
Crypto Library platform
17
The composite part always means ID&Trust IDentity Applet Suite 3.2.
18
The logical architecture of the TOE:
Application Layer
eID Instance
ID&Trust IDentity
Suite Version 3.2.
JCOP 2.4.2 R3
Embedded software
Java Card
Runtime
Environment
Other
applet
Instances
Applet
Java Card API
Card Manager
Java Card Virtual Machine
Smart Card Platform (SCP)
Hardware Abstraction Layer
Hardware Platform
1.4.1 TOE usage and security features for operational use
19
A State or Organisation issues travel documents to be used by the holder for
international travel. The traveller presents a travel document to the inspection system to
prove his or her identity. The travel document in context of this security target contains (i)
visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data
summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine
readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the travel document’s chip according to
LDS in case of contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based
on (i) the possession of a valid travel document personalised for a holder with the
claimed identity as given on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the
reference data stored in the travel document. The issuing State or Organisation ensures
the authenticity of the data of genuine travel documents. The receiving State trusts a
genuine travel document of an issuing State or Organisation.
20
For this security target the travel document is viewed as unit of
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i.
the physical part of the travel document in form of paper and/or plastic and chip.
It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
travel document holder
a) the biographical data on the biographical data page of the travel document
surface,
b) the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
c) the printed portrait.
the logical travel document as data of the travel document holder stored
according to the Logical Data Structure as defined in [6] as specified by ICAO on
the contact based or contactless integrated circuit. It presents contact based /
contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the travel
document holder
a) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
ii.
21
b) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
c) the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both1
d) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
e) the Document Security Object (SOD).
The issuing State or Organisation implements security features of the travel
document to maintain the authenticity and integrity of the travel document and their
data. The physical part of the travel document and the travel document’s chip are
identified by the Document Number.
The physical part of the travel document is protected by physical security measures
(e.g. watermark, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the travel
document’s chip) and organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials,
personalisation procedures) [6]. These security measures can include the binding of
the travel document’s chip to the travel document.
The logical travel document is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital
signature created by the document signer acting for the issuing State or
Organisation and the security features of the travel document’s chip.
The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the
optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical travel
document, ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [6].
This security target addresses the protection of the logical travel document (i) in
integrity by write-only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in
confidentiality by the Basic Access Control Mechanism. This security target does not
address the Active Authentication and the Extended Access Control as optional
security mechanisms,
The Basic Access Control is a security feature which is mandatory supported by the TOE.
The inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection
system by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the
inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of
private communication (secure messaging) with this inspection system according to [6],
normative appendix 5.
22
23
24
25
26
27
1.4.2 TOE life cycle
1
28
The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases. (With respect to
the [18], the TOE life-cycle the life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps.)
29
Phase 1 “Development”
These additional biometric references are optional, and accessible only during PACE sessions.
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(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated
circuit, the IC Dedicated Software (Cryptolibrary) and the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
30
(Step2) NXP uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the
guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and
develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system). The eMRTD application
and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components are
developed by ID&Trust Ltd.2
31
The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and
the Embedded Software and the eMRTD application in the non-volatile nonprogrammable memories is securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. Part of the IC
Embedded Software is in the non-volatile non-programmable memories, and the
guidance documentation is securely delivered to the travel document manufacturer.
32
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step3) In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the travel
document’s chip Dedicated Software and the parts of the travel document’s chip
Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) and the
eMRTD application. The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the
chip to control the IC as travel document material during the IC manufacturing and
the delivery process to the travel document manufacturer. The IC is securely
delivered from the IC manufacture to the travel document manufacturer.
33
If necessary the IC manufacturer adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the
non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM). The IC manufacturer
in this phase preconfigures the JCOP card and the EEPROM.
34
(Step4 optional) The travel document manufacturer combines the IC with hardware
for the contact based/contactless interface in the travel document.
35
(Step5) The travel document manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or
part of it in the non-volatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM or
FLASH) if necessary (this is the so-called Pre-personalization), (ii) creates the
eMRTD application, and (iii) equips travel document’s chips with preloadedpersonalisation Data.
36
Application note 2 (redefined for the goals of this ST by the ST author,
originally from [22]): Creation of the application implies the Applet ROM-coding
NXP burns the ROM of the integrated circuits putting the IDentity on it. This
procedure is called ROM coding. Once it is done, the card or integrated circuit cannot
be programmed or reprogrammed again The pre-personalised travel document
together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the travel document
manufacturer to the Personalisation Agent. The travel document manufacturer also
provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalisation
2
In the case of the Current Security Target, the Common Criteria Certified JCOP v2.4.2 R3 Platforms
also the IC Embedded Software (Operating System) and the IC Dedicated Softwarec (cryptographic
library) and becasue of ROM coding the eMRTD application, thus the Software Developers are two
separated entities, NXP and ID&Trust, the latter only responsible for the development of the IDentity
Applet. The development of the Platform and the cryptolibrary is at one developer, NXP, the
development of the Applet and related documentation is at an another site in Hungary, by ID&Trust
Ltd. For more information on this, see Statement of Compatibility concerning Composite Security
Target chapter.
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Agent.
The Personalization Agent Authentication Keys are the preinstalled keys for the
Applet, which are preinstalled by the Travel Document Manufacturer, and which are
needed and used in the Personalization process.
37
Phase 3 “Personalisation of the travel document”
(Step6) The personalisation of the travel document includes (i) the survey of the
travel document holder’s biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the travel document
holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the optional biometric
reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical part of
the travel document, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the
logical travel document and (v) configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is
performed by the Personalisation Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation
of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the
Document security object.
38
Application Note 3 (of the ST author): The referred Personalization Agent can be
the card issuer, or a different contributor, depending on the business case, but the
intended customer of the TOE is the Card Issuer, who will participate in the process
before (until) the Operational Phase of the Applet. The Applet Life cycle has the
following phases, which differ from the whole TOE Lifecycle:

IDentity applet
LOADED (Creation phase)

IDentity instance
Personalization Phase
SELECTABLE (Configuration Phase)
CONFIGURED (Initialization Phase)
Operational Phase
PERSONALIZED
LOCKED
BLOCKED
These phases are detailed in the IDentity Applet Administrator’s Guide.[23] These
states and phases are presented here because of informational reasons, to serve
better understanding.
The Phase of Personalization of the TOE Paltform and Application Parts are the
same. At the end of the phase the developer issues the Finish Configuration
command. Part of this command is the verification of the authentic profile.
The Personalization Agent Authentication Keys which are loaded at the end of Phase
2 can be changed during this phase by the Personalization Agent
39
The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [6] finalizes the
personalisation of the genuine travel document for the travel document holder. The
personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if
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necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use. This is
the end of the Personalization phase.
40
Application note 3 (taken from [22]): The Personalization Agent Authentication Keys
which are loaded at the end of Phase 2 can be changed here by the Personalization
Agent. The Personalization has 2 parts accordingly.
41
Application note 4 (taken from [22]): This security target distinguishes between the
Personalization Agent as entity known to the TOE and the Document Signer as entity in
the TOE IT environment signing the Document security object as described in [6]. This
approach allows but does not enforce the separation of these roles. The selection of the
authentication keys should consider the organization, the productivity and the security of
the personalization process. Asymmetric authentication keys provide comfortable
security for distributed personalization but their use may be more time consuming than
authentication using symmetric cryptographic primitives.
The TOE uses symmetric authentication keys for the personalization process.
Authentication using symmetric cryptographic primitives allows fast authentication
protocols appropriate for centralized personalization schemes but relies on stronger
security protection in the personalization environment.
42
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveller and the inspection
systems in the “Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the
security policy of the issuing State or Organization and can be used according to the
security policy of the issuing State but they can never be modified.
43
Application note 5 (taken from [22]): The authorized Personalization Agents might be
allowed to add (not to modify) data in the other data groups of the MRTD application
(e.g. person(s) to notify EF.DG16) in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”. This will imply an
update of the Document Security Object including the re-signing by the Document
Signer.
44
Application note 6 (taken from [22]): The intention of the ST is to consider at least the
phases 1 and parts of phase 2 (i.e. Step1 to Step3) as part of the evaluation and
therefore to define the TOE delivery according to CC after this phase. Since specific
production steps of phase 2 are of minor security relevance (e.g. booklet manufacturing
and antenna integration) these are not part of the CC evaluation under ALC.
Nevertheless the decision about this has to be taken by the certification body resp. the
national body of the issuing State or Organization. In this case the national body of the
issuing State or Organization is responsible for these specific production steps.
45
Note that the personalisation process and its environment may depend on specific
security needs of an issuing State or Organization. All production, generation and
installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to
be considered in the product evaluation process under AGD assurance class. Therefore,
the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact, P.Personalisation and the
related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE delivery.
46
Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3.
1.4.3 TOE security functions
47
The following TOEensured security functions are the most significant for its
operational use:
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48
Only entities (e.g. terminals) possessing authorisation can get access to the user
data stored on the TOE and use security functionality of the travel document under
control of the travel document holder,
49
Verifying authenticity and integrity as well as securing confidentiality of user data in
the communication channel between the TOE and the entity connected,
50
Averting of inconspicuous tracing of the travel document,
51
Self-protection of the TOE security functionality and the data stored inside.
52
These are described below informally, and in detail in section 7.1.
1.4.4 Features of the Applet
53
This section is informational and intended to provide a general detail about the
IDentity applet which is the essential part of this ST. Information in this section does
not extend the TOE description or claims of this ST.
54
IDentity applet may be considered as a highly secure and configurable multiapplication cryptographic smart card framework for PKI and e-ID purposes.
55
IDentity applet complies with the standards referenced in TOE Overview.
56
The API exposed by IDentity allows fast development of cryptographic supported
applications for National ID, ePassport, Enterprise ID, Healthcare, Transportation,
and Payment applications.
57
IDentity is designed for the Java Card family of smart card platforms and specifically
for the NXP JCOP IC which is certified according to the CC EAL 5+ both the
microprocessor and the JCOP OS as well. JCOP 2.4.2 R3 is protected against state
of the art attacks.
58
The OS:





supports ISO 14443-4 Type A, ISO/IEC 7816-4, 8 and 9 standards
supports PC/SC applications
provides fast cryptography
enforces smart memory management
provides strong security and data integrity mechanisms
1.4.4.1 File System
59
The applet file system is based on the following basic file types:



directory files, denoted as Dedicated Files (DF)
application containers, denoted as Application Dedicated Files (ADF)
generic data files, denoted as Elementary Files (EF)
60
A Dedicated File (DF) represents a directory and may include other objects (except
ADFs). A DF contains a set of information dedicated to control the access to this DF
and to its included objects. The supported operations on DFs are: creation, selection
and deletion.
61
An Application Dedicated File (ADF) is a special kind of Dedicated File having an
ISO/IEC 7816-4 Application Identifier (AID) which represents an application and may
include other objects. This ST uses the “smart card application” terminology for ADFs
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and “applet” terminology for Java Card applets. An ADF contains a set of information
dedicated to control the access to this ADF and to its included objects. The supported
operations on ADFs are: creation, selection and deletion.
62
Elementary File (EF) is used for data storage. For this reason EFs are also referred
to as data files. File access is similar to traditional file systems controlled by access
control rules. The IDenity applet supports ISO/IEC 7816-4 transparent EFs only.
Transparent files are seen as a single continuous sequence of data units with
granularity of one byte. The supported data unit size is one byte. Any data can be
accessed by providing an offset and a length. The supported operations on EFs are:
read binary, update binary, file selection and deletion. The card is able to import,
store and export data in the file system.
63
The Master File (MF) is the root of the file system and is always the initial entry point
to the file system. It is implicitly selected after a reset of the card. The MF can be
considered to be a special ADF that contains all the files and security data objects.
1.4.4.2 Data Objects
64
A DataObject (DO) represents a byte string available from everywhere in the
directory architecture. For example, the serial number is retrieved with this method.
1.4.4.3 Security Environments
65
A Security Environment is involved in the card security context setting (clarifying
algorithm or Security Data Object to use) when needed dynamically, or to determine
the access control rules of an object / file.
66
The TOE is resistant to physical tampering on the TSF. The TOE detects physical
tampering of the TSF with sensors for operating voltage, clock frequency,
temperature and electromagnetic radiation. If the TOE detects with the above
mentioned sensors, that it is not supplied within the specified limits, a security reset is
initiated and the TOE is not operable until the supply is back in the specified limits.
The design of the hardware protects it against analyzing and physical tampering.
1.4.4.4 Secure Messaging
67
All commands can be secured.
68
Secure Messaging is managed by the Platform, and can be achieved by two different
ways during Perso phase:

Secure Messaging (GP) - GlobalPlatform Secure Messaging

Secure Messaging (ISO) – ISO Secure Messaging –, established with
standard MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command using the SK.PERS key.
Supports command chaining and extended length APDUs with data length up to 32K
bytes More about the Secure Messaging and the key can be read in the
Administrator’s Guide document [23]. Additionally Secure Messaging can be
achieved by BAC during the Operational phase.
1.4.4.5 Memory Management
69
All internal file system structures are stored in highly reliable non-volatile memory
with guaranteed data integrity. All memory updates are updated using “atomic
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operations”. This provides safe operations even when power is interrupted.
70
Content of deleted files and objects are cleared (wiped) and returned to the “free
memory pool” for reuse.
1.4.4.6 Access Control
71
The TOE provides access control mechanisms that allow the maintenance of
different users (Manufacturer, Personalisation Agent, Terminal, Country Verifying
Certification Authority,Document Verifier, Domestic Extended Inspection System,
Foreign Extended Inspection System).
72
The TOE administers the user roles enabling and restricting capabilities and
accesses. The access control mechanisms allow the execution of certain security
relevant actions (e.g. self-tests) without successful user authentication.
73
Before applet instantiation only the role of the Manufacturer exist, who is responsible
for the pre-personalization. After that, the applet instantiation requires the Card Issuer
or a dedicated Application Provider Role. After the instantiation, during
Personalization, the card is prepared to handle the Personalization Agent and the
Application Profile Provider Roles. After Personalization, when the card usage
started, the applet does not contain predefined roles for the operational phase,
because those are contained by the Application Profile.
More about the Management of roles can be read in the Administrator’s Guide
document.[23]
74
The access control is administered through authentication mechanisms.
75
Proving the identity of the TOE is supported by the following means:
76

Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol

Passive Authentication Mechanism
The TOE prevents reuse of authentication data related to:

Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol
 Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple DES
In these the functions the methods are divided between the Platform and the Applet
as follows.
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism: Applet: symmetric key permission verification,
session counter initialization. Platform: symmetric key cryptography, hashing for
session key computation
77
After completion of the BAC Protocol, the TOE accepts commands with correct
message authentication code only. These commands must be send via secure
messaging using the key previously agreed with the terminal during the last
authentication. More about these functions can be read in section 7.1.
1.4.4.7 Cryptography
78
Counter measures are in operation against state of the art attacks such as SPA/DPA.
79
The TOE supports onboard generation of cryptographic keys based on the DH and
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ECDH compliant as well as generation of RSA and ECDSA key pairs
80
The TOE contains a deterministic random number generator rated K4 (high)
according to AIS20 [24] that provides random numbers used authentication. The
seed for the deterministic random number generator is provided by the P2 (high) true
random number generator of the underlying Platform.
81
The algorithms allowed for the different functions are the following, as is stated in the
Users Guide [23]
82
IAS-ECC algorithms:

PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-1 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital signature)

PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-256 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital
signature)

PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-384 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital
signature)

PKCS#1 v1.5 SHA-512 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital
signature)

ISO/IEC 9796-2 SHA-1 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital
signature)

ISO/IEC 9796-2 SHA-256 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital
signature)

ISO/IEC 9796-2 SHA-384 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital
signature)

ISO/IEC 9796-2 SHA-512 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital
signature)

PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS SHA-1 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital
signature)

PKCS#1 v2.1 PSS SHA-256 (Applet padding)

ECDSA SHA-1 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital signature)

ECDSA SHA-224 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital signature)

ECDSA SHA-256 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital signature)

ECDSA SHA-384 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital signature)

ECDSA SHA-512 (All by the Platform: padding, hashing, digital signature)
1.4.4.8 Signed Parameters
83
During the Applet life cycle phases after LOADED state the applet becomes the
default Application and reaches SELECTABLE state. This is called the Initialization
phase. During this phase the following steps are carryed out:

Applet configuration

File creation (all control parameters)
Object creation (all control parameters and some usage parameters)
84
Certain configuration and control parameters are signed, and this signature is verified
before closing the Initialization phase. Only the unsigned parameters can be changed
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by the Initializer. This way only those Application Profiles can be applied which are
validated by the Developer, and conform to the requirements. The Initialization state
can not be finished by reaching the INITIALIZED state, and the Personalization
phase can not be started without successful signature verification.
The Administrators Guide [23] 5.2.2. contains more about this topic.
1.4.4.9 Write once behaviour
85
The personalization of certain Data Object Usage Parameters is restricted to write
once during the Personalization Phase. This way the value of certain Data Object
Usage Parameters can be enforced by the Application Profile (e.g. ‘Algorithm to
compulsory use’). Note that after personalization – i.e. the applet is in Operational
Phase – write once behaviour is not affective any more.
1.4.4.10 Performance
86
IDentity applet supports T=0 and T=1 protocol in contact mode, with speed of up to
223200 bit/s, and T=CL protocol in contactless mode, with speed up to 848 kbit/s.
1.4.4.11 Secure management of the Applet run
87
The TOE supports the calculation of block check values for data integrity checking.
These block check values are stored with persistently stored assets of the TOE as
well as temporarily stored hash values for data to be signed.
88
The TOE hides information about IC power consumption and command execution
time ensuring that no confidential information can be derived from this information.
1.4.4.12 Platform-ensured security functions
89
The following security function is ensured fully by the Platform:
TSF_Audit, which is about detection sensors of the Platform. More about this can be
read in 7.1. chapter of this ST.
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2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
90




This security target claims conformance to
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision
4, September 2012, [1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2:
Security Functional Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision
4, September 2012, [2]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3:
Security Assurance Requirements; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1,
Revision 4, September 2012, [3]
as follows
91
Part 2 extended, (see Chapter 5 Extended components definition)
Part 3 conformant.
The

Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Evaluation Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4,
September 2012, [4]
has to be taken into account.
2.2 PP Claim
92
This ST claims strict conformance to the following Protection Profile:
Title:
Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application and Basic Access Control (MRTD-PP)
Sponsor:
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
CC Version:
3.1 (Revision 2)
Assurance Level:
The minimum assurance level for this PP is EAL4 augmented.
General Status:
Final
Version Number:
1.10
Registration: BSI-CC-PP-0055
Keywords:
ICAO, machine readable travel document, basic access control
2.3 Package Claim
93
This ST is conforming to assurance package EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2 defined
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Security Target ID&Trust IDentity-eMRTD BAC
in CC part 3 [3].
2.4 Conformance rationale
93
The security target claims strict conformance to one PP. ([22])
94
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is contactless/contact smart card with ePassport
application as programmed according to ICAO Technical Report [6]. The Security
Target refers to the eMRTD compliant configurations of the IDentity applet. The
IDentity applet is a Java Card Application used exclusively on the NXP JCOP
2.4.2. R3 Platform, which is a CC EAL5+ certified product.
So the TOE is consistent with the TOE type in the PP.
95
The security problem definition of this security target is consistent with the
statement of the security problem definition in the PP, as the security target
claims strict conformance to the PP and no other assumptions, threats,
organizational security policies are added.
96
The security objectives of this security target are consistent with the statement
of the security objectives in the PP as the security target claims strict
conformance to the PP. There is no added security objectives.
97
The security requirements of this security target are consistent with the
statement of the security requirements in the PP as the security target claims
strict conformance to the PP. No further security functional requirement is added
in this security target. All assignments and selections of the security functional
requirements are defined in the PP section 6.1 and in this security target section
6.1.
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2.5 Statement of compatibility
2.5.1 Security Functionalities
98
The following table contains the security functionalities of the Platform ST and of this
ST, showing which Functionality correspond to the platform ST and which has no
corresspondence. This statement is compliant to the requirements of [16].
99
A classification of TSFs of the Platform-ST has been made. Each TSF has been
classified as ‘relevant’ or ‘not relevant’ for this ST
Platform Security
Functionality
Corresponding
TOE Security
Functionality
Releva
nt
TSF_AccessControl
X
enforces the access
control
TSF_Audit_MRTD
X
Audit functionality
SF.CryptoKey
TSF_CryptoKey_MRTD
X
Cryptographic key
management
SF.CryptoOperation
TSF_Platform,
TSF_AppletParameters
_Sign
X
Cryptographic
operation
Used by calling
Platform Security
Functionalities
TSF_Authenticate
X
Identification and
authentication
SF_SecureManagement_
MRTD
X
Secure management
of TOE resources
TSF_AccessControl
X
PIN management
SF.AccessControl
SF.Audit
SF.I&A
SF.SecureManagement
SF.PIN
Not
releva
nt
Remarks
Used by calling
Access Control TSF
SF.LoadIntegrity
TSF_Platform,
TSF_AppletParameters
_Sign
SF.Transaction
X
Package integrity
check
X
Transaction
management
SF.Hardware:
TSF_Platform
X
TSF of the underlying
Platform
Used by calling
Platform Security
Functionalities
SF.CryptoLib:
TSF_Platform
X
TSF of the certified
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crypto library
Used by calling
Platform Security
Functionalities
Table 2 Classification of Platform-TSFs
100
All listed TSFs of the Platform-ST are relevant for this ST.
101
Application note 5 (by the ST author) The TSF_Platform Security functionality in
the above list represents functionalities which are not directly used in the IDentity
Applet, they are implicitly invoked by calls to the platform, respectively the JCOP
operating system. These functions are called altogether as TSF_Platform.
2.5.1.1 Threats
102
The following threats of this ST are directly related to JCOP Platform functionality:





103
These threats will be mapped to the following Platform-ST threats:





104
T.Phys-Tamper
T.Malfunction
T.Abuse-Func
T.Information_Leakage
T.Forgery
T.PHYSICAL
T.RND
T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA
T.RESOURCES
The following table shows the mapping of the threats.
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Platform ST
T.PHYSICAL
T.Forgery
T.Information_Leakage
T.Malfunction
T.Phys-Tamper
This ST
X
T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA
X
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA
X
T.RND
X
T.RESOURCES
X
Table 3 Mapping of Threats
105
The T.Phys-Tamper matches to T.PHYSICAL, as physical TOE interfaces like
emanations, probing, environmental stress and tampering are used to exploit
vulnerabilities.
106
The T.Malfunction matches T.RND and T.RESOURCES because these are the
threats which may lead to a malfunction of the hardware or the Embedded Software
by applying environmental stress in order to deactivate or modify security features or
functionality of the TOE hardware or to circumvent, deactivate or modify security
functions of the TOE’s Embedded Software.
107
T.Information_Leakage matches T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA as physical TOE
interfaces like emanations, probing, environmental stress and tampering could be
used to exploit exploit information leaking from the TOE during its usage in order to
disclose confidential User Data or/and TSF-data.
108
T.Forgery matches T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA because if an attacker fraudulently alters
the User Data or/and TSF-data stored on the travel document or/and exchanged
between the TOE and the inspection system then the listed threats of the PlatformST could be relevant.
109
The following threats:











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T.CONFID-JCS-CODE
T.CONFID-JCS-DATA
T.DELETION
T.EXE-CODE.1
T.EXE-CODE.2
T.EXE-CODE-REMOTE
T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE
T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE.LOAD
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA.LOAD
T.INTEG-JCS-CODE
T.INTEG-JCS-DATA
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 T.NATIVE
 T.OBJ-DELETION
 T.SID.1
 T.SID.2
 T.SEC_BOX_ORDER
 T.OS_OPERATET.INSTALL
have no corresponde to the treaths of this ST. They are assessed, and found that
there is also no contradiction related to this ST.
2.5.2 OSPs
110
None of the OSPs of this ST are applicable to the JCOP Platform and therefore not
mappable for the Platform-ST.
111
The OSP-s from the Platform ST OSP.VERIFICATION and OSP.PROCESS-TOE
does not deal with any additional security components.
2.5.3 Assumptions
112
The Assumptions of the Platform ST are categorized according to the [25], as IrPA,
CfPA and SgPA. There is also a comment column with respective remarks.
Assumption
Classification
of
assumptions
Comment
A.APPLET
CfPA
The Java Card specification explicitly "does not include
support for native methods" ([28], §3.3) outside the API.
A.VERIFICATION
CfPA
The first place to fulfil the assumption is connected to the
Life-cycle of the TOE, the Applet is loaded on the ROM by
the manufacturer. There is also
OT.Data_Int,
OT_Data_conf
and OT.Prot_Malfunction to fulfil the
Assumption.
A.USE_DIAG
CfPA
A.Insp_Sys, and the related OE.Exam_MRTD and
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
provide
the
necessary
ensurance.
A.USE_KEYS
CfPA
The Assumption A.BAC-Keys and the related objectives
OE.BAC-Keys covers this assumption.
A.PROCESSSEC-IC
CfPA
The
objectives
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak provide the necessary fulfillment.
and
Table 4 Mapping of assumptions
2.5.4 Security objectives
113
These Platform-ST objectives can be mapped to this STs objectives as shown in the
following table.
Objective from the Platform ST
OT.IDENTIFICATION
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OT.OPERATE
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.CIPHER
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.SCP.IC
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.RND
OT.Prot_Malfunction, OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.KEY-MNGT
OT.Data_Int,
OT_Data_Conf,
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak, OT.Identification
OT.PIN-MNGT
OT.Data_Int,
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT_Data_Conf,
Table 5 Mapping of security objectives for the TOE
114
The following Platform-ST objectives are not relevant for or cannot be mapped to the
TOE of this ST:




















OT.NATIVE
OT.REMOTE
OT.OBJ-DELETION
OT.DELETION
OT.SEC_BOX_FW
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_INTEG
OT.GLOBAL_ARRAYS_CONFID
OT.REALLOCATION
OT.RESOURCES
OT.ALARM
OT.MF_FW
OT.LOAD
OT.SCP.SUPPORT
OT.INSTALL
OT.CARD-MANAGEMENT
OT.SCP-RECOVERY
OT.EXT-MEM
OT.TRANSACTION
OT.SID
OT.FIREWALL
cannot be mapped because these are out of scope.
115
The objectives for the operational environment can be mapped as follows:
Objective from the Platform ST
Objective from this ST
OE.USE_DIAG
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC_Keys
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
,
OE.USE_KEYS
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign
OE.BAC_Keys
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
,
OE.PROCESS_SEC_IC
OE.Personalisation
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OE.APPLET
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD, OT.Data_Int, OT.Prot_AbuseFunc OT.Prot_Malfunction
OE.VERIFICATION
OT.Data_Int, OT_Data_Conf and OT.Prot_Malfunction
Table 6 Mapping of security objectives of the environment
116
There is no conflict between security objectives of this ST and the Platform-ST.
2.5.5 Security requirements
117
The Security Requirements of the Platform ST can be mapped as follows:
Platform SFR
Corresponding
TOE SFR
FDP_ACC.2/FIREWALL
No Correspondence
FDP_ACF.1/FIREWALL
No Correspondence
FDP_IFC.1/JCVM
No Correspondence
FDP_IFF.1/JCVM
No Correspondence
FDP_RIP.1/OBJECTS
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.1/JCRE
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.1/JCVM
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.2/FIREWALL_JCVM
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.3/FIREWALL
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.3/JCVM
No Correspondence
FMT_SMF.1
No Correspondence
FMT_SMR.1
No Correspondence
Remarks
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.2
No Correspondence
FCS_CKM.3
No Correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
The FCS_CKM.1 corresponds to the
FCS_CKM.1 requirement of the Platform
since they contain overlapping
requirements.
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
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No contradiction to this ST
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No contradiction to this ST
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4
The requirements are equivalent
(physically overwriting the keys with
zeros).
FCS_COP.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_COP.1/ENC ,
FCS_COP.1/AUTH,
FCS_COP.1/MAC,
FCS_COP.1 pf the Platform matches the
equivalent SFRs of the Platform.
FDP_RIP.1/ABORT
No Correspondence
FDP_RIP.1/APDU
No Correspondence
FDP_RIP.1/bArray
No Correspondence
FDP_RIP.1/KEYS
No Correspondence
FDP_RIP.1/TRANSIENT
No Correspondence
FDP_ROL.1/FIREWALL
No Correspondence
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
FAU_ARP.1
FPT_PHP.3
FDP_SDI.2
No Correspondence
FPR_UNO.1
No Correspondence
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_TDC.1
No Correspondence
FIA_ATD.1/AID
No Correspondence
FIA_UID.2/AID
No Correspondence
FIA_USB.1/AID
No Correspondence
FMT_MTD.1/JCRE
No Correspondence
MT_MTD.3/JCRE
No Correspondence
FDP_ITC.2/Installer
No Correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
The Security Alarms requirement
FAU_ARP.1 of the Platform corresponds
to the FPT_PHP.3 of this ST about
physical resistance.
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
FPT_FLS.1 matches to the equivalent
SFR of the Platform-ST.
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
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Out of scope (Platform functionality)
FMT_SMR.1/Installer
No Correspondence
FPT_FLS.1/Installer
No Correspondence
FPT_RCV.3/Installer
No Correspondence
FDP_ACC.2/ADEL
No Correspondence
FDP_ACF.1/ADEL
No Correspondence
FDP_RIP.1/ADEL
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.1/ADEL
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.3/ADEL
No Correspondence
FMT_SMF.1/ADEL
No Correspondence
FMT_SMR.1/ADEL
No Correspondence
FPT_FLS.1/ADEL
No Correspondence
FDP_ACC.2/JCRMI
No Correspondence
FDP_ACC.2.2/JCRMI
No Correspondence
FDP_ACF.1/JCRMI
No Correspondence
FDP_RIP.1/ODEL
No Correspondence
FPT_FLS.1/ODEL
No Correspondence
FCO_NRO.2/CM
No Correspondence
FDP_IFC.2/CM
No Correspondence
FDP_IFF.1/CM
No Correspondence
FDP_UIT.1/CM
No Correspondence
FIA_UID.1/CM
No Correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
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Out of scope (Platform functionality)
FMT_MSA.1/CM
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.3/CM
No Correspondence
FMT_SMF.1/CM
No Correspondence
FMT_SMR.1/CM
No Correspondence
FTP_ITC.1/CM
No Correspondence
FDP_ACC.1/EXT_MEM
No Correspondence
FDP_ACF.1/EXT_MEM
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.1/EXT_MEM
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.3/EXT_MEM
No Correspondence
FMT_SMF.1/EXT_MEM
No Correspondence
FPT_FLS.1/SCP
No Correspondence
FRU_FLT.2/SCP
No Correspondence
FPT_PHP.3/SCP
FPT_PHP.3
FDP_ACC.1/SCP
No Correspondence
FDP_ACF.1/SCP
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.3/SCP
No Correspondence
FDP_ACC.1/LifeCycle
No Correspondence
FDP_ACF.1/LifeCycle
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.1/LifeCycle
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.3/LifeCycle
No Correspondence
FIA_AFL.1/PIN
No Correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
The FPT_PHP.3 of this ST matches the
FPT_PHP.3/SCP of the Platform ST.
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
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Out of scope (Platform functionality)
FTP_ITC.1/LifeCycle
No Correspondence
FAU_SAS.1/SCP
FAU_SAS.1
FAU_SAS.1 of this ST matches to the
equivalent SFR of the Platform-ST.
FCS_RNG.1
FCS_RND.1
FCS_RND.1 of the ST matches
FCS_RNG.1 of the Platform-ST when the
hardware random number generator is
used by the TOE.
FCS_RNG.1/RNG2
FCS_RND.1
FCS_RND.1 of the ST matches
FCS_RNG.1/RNG2 of the Platform-ST
when the hardware random number
generator is used by the TOE.
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_EMSEC.1 matches the
FPT_EMSEC.1 of the Platform-ST
FDP_ACC.2/SecureBox
No Correspondence
FDP_ACF.1/SecureBox
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.3/SecureBox
No Correspondence
FMT_MSA.1/SecureBox
No Correspondence
FMT_SMF.1/SecureBox
No Correspondence
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Out of scope (Platform functionality)
No contradiction to this ST
Table 7 Mapping of Security requirements
2.5.6 Assurance requirements
118
This ST requires EAL 4 according to Common Criteria V3.2 R4 augmented by
ALC_DVS.2.
119
The Platform-ST requires EAL 5 according to Common Criteria V3.2 R4 augmented
by: ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and ASE_TSS.2.
120
As EAL 5 covers all assurance requirements of EAL 4 all non augmented parts of
this ST will match to the Platform-ST assurance requirements.
2.6 Analysis
121
Overall there is no conflict between security requirements of this ST and the
Platform-ST.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
Assets
122
The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
123
Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different
security needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [6].
These data are user data of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files
(EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG 16 contain personal
data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (EF.DG 14) is used by
the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the
inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
124
Due to interoperability reasons as the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [6] the TOE described in this
security target specifies only the BAC mechanisms with resistance against
enhanced basic attack potential granting access to






125
Logical MRTD standard User Data (i.e. Personal Data) of the MRTD holder
(EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16),
Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14,
Active Authentication Public Key in EF.DG15,
Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD,
Common data in EF.COM.
The TOE prevents read access to sensitive User Data

Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)3.
126
A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
127
Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or
Organization for the MRTD holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of
a genuine MRTD.
Subjects
128
This security target considers the following subjects:
129
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the
MRTD Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the
default user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not
distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role
3
Cf. [1] for details how to access these User data under EAC protection
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Manufacturer.
130
The Manufacturer of the smart card is the NXP company. The ID&Trust IDentity Applet
is located on the card.
131
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the
MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity
the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference
data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the
encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the
holder as defined for global, international and national interoperability, (iv) writing the
initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined in [6].
132
Currently Application Profile Provider is ID&Trust.
133
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the
contactless interface.
134
Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains
a terminal for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the
terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to
read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or
other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection
System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the
General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii)
is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier of the
receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of
the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
135
Application note 8: This security target does not distinguish between the BIS, GIS and
EIS because the Active Authentication and the Extended Access Control is outside the
scope.
136
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
137
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
138
Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip
remotely (i.e. without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or
to manipulate the logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
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139
Application note 9: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT
environment independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore
the impostor may use results of successful attacks against the TOE but the attack itself
is not relevant for the TOE.
3.2 Assumptions
140
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE
will be used or is intended to be used.
141
A.MRTD_Manufact MRTD manufacturing on steps 4 to 6
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed
that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test
data (to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
142
A.MRTD_Delivery MRTD delivery during steps 4 to 6
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives:
-
143
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery
and storage.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper
operation in the delivery process and storage.
Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery
have got the required skill.
Application note 10 (of the ST Author): The developer shall use the delivery
procedures.
The delivery procedures look like the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The developers build up a new version of the java card application.
They make several backups.
After the new version is widely tested, they send it to the NXP Company.
The NXP Company makes a hash code from the object code.
After the developers accept that the right hash code is sent back, the NXP
Company sends an integrated circuit with the java card application on it. This
procedure is called ROM coding.
6. The developing procedure starts again until the application meets the
requirements.
7. The costumers receive the card and the application included. The card is ready
to use.
144
A.Pers_Agent Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect
to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication
Public Key (EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer
Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs
the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization
Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic
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mechanisms.
145
146
PERSONALIZED life cycle state indicates that the applet is in the Operational Phase
following the corresponding standard and documented behaviour. During this phase
access control for eID functions and data objects are activated and managed according
to the pre-defined security attributes and security environments.
A.Insp_Sys Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveler as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global
interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part
of the Basic Access Control [6]. The Basic Inspection System reads the logical MRTD
under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the
logical MRTD.
147
Application note 11: According to [6] the support of the Passive Authentication
mechanism is mandatory whereas the the Basic Access Control is optional. This ST
does not address Primary Inspection Systems therefore the BAC is mandatory within
this ST.
148
A.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the
issuing State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a
consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [6], the Document Basic Access Control Keys are
derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured
that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision
that the inspection system has to derive Document Access Keys from the printed MRZ
data with enhanced basic attack potential.
149
Application note 12: When assessing the MRZ data resp. the BAC keys entropy
potential dependencies between these data (especially single items of the MRZ) have
to be considered and taken into account. E.g. there might be a direct dependency
between the Document Number when chosen consecutively and the issuing date.
150
The ST contains another Assumptions, not defined in the PP, justified by the fact that
the TOE is divided to two parts. The TOE Part I according to 1.4.1 is developed by NXP
at the NXP sites, which are already certified at the EAL5+ assurance level.
3.3 Threats
151
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in
collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use
in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
152
The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified
below.
153
T.Chip_ID Identification of MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying
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remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the
contactless communication interface.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically
readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: Anonymity of user,
154
T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
Adverse action: An attacker imitates an inspection system trying to establish a
communication to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless
communication channel of the TOE.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically
readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
155
T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
Adverse action: An attacker is listening to an existing communication between the
MRTD’s chip and an inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The
inspection system uses the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker
does not know these data in advance.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, not knowing the optically
readable MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page in advance
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD data
156
T.Forgery Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or
any part of it including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection
system by means of the changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may
alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the
printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveler. The
attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual
inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication
mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to
defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The
attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a new forged
MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference
finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another MRTD’s chip leaving
their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker
may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or
more legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
157
The TOE shall avert the threats as specified below.
158
T.Abuse-Func Abuse of Functionality
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in
the phase “Operational Use” in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate
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(explore, bypass, deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii)
to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of
TSF
159
T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE
during its usage in order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage
may be inherent in the normal operation or caused by the attacker.
Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O
characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This
leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely
related to measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from
measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by
contact to the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to
the specific operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic
Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker
may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault
Analysis).
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data
160
T.Phys-Tamper Physical Tampering
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order
(i) to disclose TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software. An attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify
security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the
MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of
TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF
Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the
TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct
interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC
failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the
hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may
also be a pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security
function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of
TSF
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161
T.Malfunction Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or
modify security features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify
security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This may be achieved e.g.
by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions, exploiting errors
in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To exploit
these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a
legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of
TSF
3.4 Organizational Security Policies
162
The TOE shall comply with the following Organizational Security Policies (OSP) as
security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organization upon its
operations (see CC part 1, sec. 3.2).
163
P.Manufact Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely.
The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least
the Personalization Agent Key.
164
P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data,
the printed portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other
data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the
MRTD for the holder is performed by an agent authorized by the issuing State or
Organization only.
165
During Personalization Phase special built-in security policy – so called Security Policy
(perso) – is applied for all objects created and updated.
Security Policy (perso) is defined as the following:
1. If Protocol configuration byte is ‘00’, Secure Messaging (perso) is not needed.
2. If Protocol configuration byte is other than ‘00’, Secure Messaging (perso) is
needed for commands.
166
P.Personal_Data Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s
chip (EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitized portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s)
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(EF.DG4)4 and data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the
MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to
be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the
MRTD is presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access
Control to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated
based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [6].
167
Application note 13: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn
from the ICAO ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [6]. Note that the Document Basic Access Key is
defined by the TOE environment and loaded to the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
4
Note, that EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 are only readable after successful EAC authentication not
being covered by this security target.
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4 Security Objectives
168
This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives
for the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are
separated into security objectives for the development and production environment and
security objectives for the operational environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
169
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
170
OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the
Document security object according to LDS [6] and the TSF data can be written by
authorized Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be changed after its
personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized
Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
171
Application note 14:The OT.AC_Pers implies that
(1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least
EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
(2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not
written yet, and (ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordingly. The
support for adding data in the “Operational Use” phase is optional.
172
173
OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip
against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure that the
inspection system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD
data.
OT.Data_Conf Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. Read access to EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully
authenticated as Personalization Agent. Read access to EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5
to EF.DG16 is granted to terminals successfully authenticated as Basic Inspection
System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate itself by means of the Basic
Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE
must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to
the Basic Inspection System.
174
Application note 15: The traveler grants the authorization for reading the personal
data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 to the inspection system by
presenting the MRTD.The MRTD’s chip shall provide read access to these data for
terminals successfully authenticated by means of the Basic Access Control based on
knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys.
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The security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to ensure the strength of the
security function Basic Access Control Authentication. The Document Basic Access
Keys are derived from the MRZ data defined by the TOE environment and are loaded
into the TOE by the Personalization Agent. Therefore the sufficient quality of these
keys has to result from the MRZ data’s entropy. Any attack based on decision of the
‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [6] that the inspection system derives Document Basic Access is
ensured by OE.BAC-Keys. Note that the authorization for reading the biometric data in
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is only granted after successful Enhanced Access Control not
covered by this security target. Thus the read access must be prevented even in case
of a successful BAC Authentication.
175
OT.Identification Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in
its non-volatile memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification
of the IC during Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”.
The storage of the Pre- Personalization data includes writing of the Personalization
Agent Key(s). In Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE shall identify itself only to a
successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or Personalization Agent.
176
Application note 16: The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security
features of the TOE to support the life cycle security in the manufacturing and
personalization phases. The IC Identification Data are used for TOE identification in
Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and for traceability and/or to secure shipment of the TOE from
Phase 2 “Manufacturing” into the Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The
OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to be used by the TOE
manufacturing. In the Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE is identified by the Document
Number as part of the printed and digital MRZ. The OT.Identification forbids the output
of any other IC (e.g. integrated circuit card serial number ICCSN) or MRTD identifier
through the contactless interface before successful authentication as Basic Inspection
System or as Personalization Agent.
177
The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s
chip independent of the TOE environment.
178
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test
and support functions that may be maliciously used to (i) disclose critical User Data, (ii)
manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software, (iii) manipulate Soft-coded
ICEmbedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features
or functions of the TOE. Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance,
on the capabilities of the Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software
which are not specified here.
179
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored
and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip



180
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
Application note 17: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent
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complex signal processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced
by an attacker. Details correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given
here.
181
182
183
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data,
the TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection
against attacks with enhanced-basic attack potential by means of
 measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the
chips surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring
voltage and current) or
 measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
 manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
 controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
 reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation
outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not
been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may
include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock
frequency, or temperature.
Application note 18: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct
interaction with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a
manipulation (refer to the objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed
knowledge about the TOE´s internals.
4.2 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
184
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
185
OE.MRTD_Manufact Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used
through phases 4, 5 and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its
manufacturing and test data.
186
OE.MRTD_ Delivery Protection of the MRTD delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery
including the following objectives:







Confidential
non-disclosure of any security relevant information,
identification of the element under delivery,
meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment),
physical protection to prevent external damage,
secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE’s),
traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
origin and shipment details,
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

reception, reception acknowledgement,
location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation
in the delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the
confidentiality convention) and highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, reception
department) dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training
and knowledge to meet the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in
accordance with the above expectations.
187
OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting
on behalf of the issuing State or Organization (i) establish the correct identity of the
holder and create biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enroll the biometric reference
data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the
encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the
defined physical and logical security measures to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of these data.
188
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing CA Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and
sign Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii)
distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and
Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The issuing State or
Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and
ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security
Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute
the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and
Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in
the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [6].
189
OE.BAC-Keys Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys
The Document Basic Access Control Keys being generated and imported by the issuing
State or Organization have to provide sufficient cryptographic strength. As a
consequence of the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ [6] the Document Basic Access Control Keys are
derived from a defined subset of the individual printed MRZ data. It has to be ensured
that these data provide sufficient entropy to withstand any attack based on the decision
that the inspection system has to derive Document Basic Access Keys from the printed
MRZ data with enhanced basic attack potential.
Receiving State or Organization
190
191
192
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of
the TOE environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD
presented by the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security
measures and to detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing Public Key and the
Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii) implements
the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [6].
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the
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traveller as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the
signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical
MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and Organizations must manage the
Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key maintaining their
authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
193
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data from the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality
and integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the
logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which
implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging
with fresh generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection
Systems).
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4.3 Security Objective Rationale
x
T.Eavesdropping
x
T.Forgery
x
x
OE.Prot Logical MRTD
OE.BAC- Keys
OE.Pass Auth Sign
OE.Personalization
OE.MRTD Delivery
OE.MRTD Manufact
OT.Prot Malfunction
x
x
x
x
x
T.Phys-Tamper
x
T.Malfunction
x
P.Manufact
A.MRTD_Delivery
OT.Prot Phys-Tamper
x
T.Information_Leakage
A.MRTD_Manufact
x
x
x
T.Abuse-Func
P.Personal_Data
OE.Passive Auth Verif
T.Skimming
P.Personalization
OT.Prot Inf Leak
x
OE.Exam MRTD
T.Chip-ID
OT.Prot Abuse-Func
OT.Data Int
OT.Data Conf
OT.Identification
The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
OT.AC Pers
194
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
A.Pers_Agent
x
A.Insp_Sys
x
A.BAC-Keys
x
x
Table 8 Security Objective Rationale
195
The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires a unique
identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the Prepersonalization Data as being fulfilled by OT.Identification.
196
The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE
environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the
access control for the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective
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OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note the
manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Key(s) according to
OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”. The security
objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and management of TSF
to the Personalization Agent.
197
198
The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE (i) to
support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the
Basic Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by
the issuing State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security
objectives OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” describing the unconditional
protection of the integrity of the stored data and during transmission. The security
objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” describes the protection
of the confidentiality.
The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the
MRTD movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless
communication interface. This threat is countered as described by the security
objective OT.Identification by Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived
keys as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
199
The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and
T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system” address the reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless
interface or listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal.
This threat is countered by the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of
personal data” through Basic Access Control using sufficiently strong derived keys
as required by the security objective for the environment OE.BAC-Keys.
200
The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security
objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“
requires the TOE to limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy
Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of
the stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of
personal data” and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to
OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that
passport book does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the
complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged
logical MRTD data by means of digital signature which will be created according to
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” and verified by
the inspection system according to OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive
Authentication”.
201
The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the
MRTD’s chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or
to manipulate the logical MRTD. This threat is countered by OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
“Protection against Abuse of Functionality”. Additionally this objective is supported
by the security objective for the TOE environment: OE.Personalization
“Personalization of logical MRTD” ensuring that the TOE security functions for the
initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security functions for the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according to the
intended use of the TOE.
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202
203
The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,
T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to
Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct
attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is
addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection
against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
The assumption A.MRTD_Manufact “MRTD manufacturing on step 4 to 6” is
covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_Manufact
“Protection of the MRTD Manufacturing” that requires to use security procedures
during all manufacturing steps.
204
The assumption A.MRTD_Delivery “MRTD delivery during step 4 to 6” is covered
by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.MRTD_ Delivery “Protection
of the MRTD delivery” that requires to use security procedures during delivery steps
of the MRTD.
205
The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by
the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization
of logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and
the storage of the MRTD holder personal data.
206
The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption
A.Insp_Sys “Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security
objectives for the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD
passport book”. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data from the logical MRTD” will require the
Basic Inspection System to implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the
logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
207
The assumption A.BAC-Keys “Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys”
is directly covered by the security objective for the TOE environment OE.BAC-Keys
“Cryptographic quality of Basic Access Control Keys” ensuring the sufficient key
quality to be provided by the issuing State or Organization.
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5 Extended Components Definition
208
This security target uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of
these components are defined in [16], other components are defined in the relevant
PP0055 [22] protection profile.
5.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
209
To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FAU_SAS) of the Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes
the functional requirements for the storage of audit data. It has a more general
approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not necessarily require the data to be
generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific details of the
content of the audit records.
210
The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behavior
This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data.
Component levelling
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
1
FAU_SAS.1
Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the
capability to store [assignment: list of audit information] in the
audit records.
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5.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
211
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FCS_RND) of the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for random number generation used for
cryptographic purposes. The component FCS_RND is not limited to generation of
cryptographic keys unlike the component FCS_CKM.1.
The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
212
The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behavior
This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers
which are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component leveling:
FCS_RND Generation of random numberts
1
FCS_RND.1
Generation of random numbers requires
that random numbers meet a defined
quality metric.
Management:
FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities
foreseen.
Audit:
FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be
auditable.
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies
FCS_RND.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to
generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
5.3 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
213
The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of
the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because
this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the
technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to
address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the
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capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
214
The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behavior
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of
functions in a combined manner. Note that FDP_ACF restricts the access to
functions whereas the Limited capability of this family requires the functions
themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component leveling:
1
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
2
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its
genuine purpose.
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of
functions (refer to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be
achieved, for instance, by removing or by disabling functions in a
specific phase of the TOE’s lifecycle.
Management:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
215
To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family
(FMT_LIM) of the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family
describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new
functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses
the management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism
used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific
issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the
functions and by limiting their availability.
216
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
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217
218
The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as
follows.
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities
(FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Application note 19: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2
assume that there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited
availability) which together shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy.
This also allows that
(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but
its capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
(ii) the TSF is designed with test and support functionality that is removed from, or
disabled in, the product prior to the Operational Use Phase.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
5.4 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
219
The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of
the TSF) is defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the
TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where
the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE.
Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s electromagnetic radiation, simple
power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This
family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible
emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2
[2].
220
The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Family behavior
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component leveling:
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation
1
FPT_EMSEC.1
TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions
enabling access to TSF data or user data.
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FPT_EMSEC.1.2
Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface
emanation enabling access to TSF data or user data.
Management:
FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
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No other components.
No dependencies.
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess
of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment:
list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user
data].
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use
the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain
access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment:
list of types of user data].
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6 Security Requirements
221
The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements;
refinement, selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph C.4 of Part
1 [1] of the CC. Each of these operations is used in this ST
222
The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further
restricts a requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word
“refinement” in bold text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases
where words from a CC requirement were deleted, a separate attachment indicates
the words that were removed.
223
The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in
stating a requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are
denoted as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a
footnote. Selections to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an
indication that a selection is to be made, [selection:], and are italicized. Selections
filled in by the ST author are denoted as double underlined text and a foot note where
the selection choices from the PP are listed.
224
The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified
parameter, such as the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by
the PP authors are denoted by showing as underlined text and the original text of the
component is given by a footnote. Assignments to be filled in by the ST author
appear in square brackets with an indication that an assignment is to be made
[assignment:], and are italicized. In some cases the assignment made by the PP
authors defines a selection to be performed by the ST author. Thus this text is
underlined and italicized like this. Assignments filled in by the ST author are denoted
as double underlined text.
225
The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying
operations. Iteration is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after
the component identifier.
226
The definition of the subjects “Manufacturer”, “Personalization Agent”, “Basic
Inspection System” and “Terminal” used in the following chapter is given in section
3.1. Note, that all these subjects are acting for homonymous external entities. All
used objects are defined in section 7. The operations “write”, “read”, “modify”, and
“disable read access” are used in accordance with the general linguistic usage. The
operations “transmit”, “receive” and “authenticate” are originally taken from [2].
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227
Definition of security attributes:
security attribute
values
terminal
authentication
none (any Terminal) default role (i.e. without authorisation after
status
meaning
start-up)
Basic Inspection
Terminal is
Inspection
authenticated
as
Basic
System
System after successful Authentication in
accordance with the definition in rule 2 of
FIA_UAU.5.2.
Personalisation
Terminal
is
Personalisation
authenticated
as
Agent
uAgent after successful Authentication in
accordance with the definition in rule 1 of
FIA_UAU.5.2.
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
228
This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into subsection following the main security functionality.
6.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
229
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
230
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
231
5
6
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer5
with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data 6 in the audit records.
Application note 20: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by
the TOE in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD
manufacturer in the Manufacturer role write the Initialization Data and/or Prepersonalization Data as TSF Data of the TOE. The audit records are write-only-once
[assignment: authorised users]
[assignment: list of audit information]
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data of the MRTD’s chip (see FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS).
6.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
232
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated
by the TOE.
233
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic
Access Keys by the TOE
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document
Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm 7 and specified
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit8 that meet the following: [6],
normative appendix 59.
234
Application note 21: The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key
generated and downloaded by the Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control
Authentication Protocol described in [6], normative appendix 5, A5.2, produces
agreed parameters to generate the Triple-DES key and the Retail-MAC message
authentication keys for secure messaging by the algorithm in [6], Normative
appendix A5.1. The algorithm uses the random number RND.ICC generated by TSF
as required by FCS_RND.1.
235
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
236
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4.1
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with
a specified cryptographic key destruction method physically
overwriting the keys with zeros10 that meets the following:
none11.
7
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
9
[assignment: list of standards]
10
[assignment: cryptographic key destruction method]
8
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237
Application note 22: The TOE shall destroy the Triple-DES encryption key and the
Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging.
6.1.2.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
238
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
239
FCS_COP.1/SHA Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA The TSF shall perform hashing12 in accordance with a
specified
cryptographic
algorithm:
SHA-113,14
and
15
cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: FIPS
180-2 or other approved standards 16,17.
240
Application note 23: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the hash function
SHA-1 for the cryptographic primitive of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism (see also FIA_UAU.4) according to [6].
241
FCS_COP.1/ENC Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple
DES
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ ENC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging (BAC) –
encryption and decryption 18 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode19 and
11
[assignment: list of standards]
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
13
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
14
[selection: SHA-1 or other approved algorithms]
15
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
16
[assignment: list of standards]
17
[selection: FIPS 180-2 or other approved standards]
18
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
19
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
12
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cryptographic key sizes 112 bit 20 that meet the following:
FIPS 46-3 [9] and [6]; normative appendix 5, A5.3 21.
242
Application note 24: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic
primitive for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are
agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.
243
FCS_COP.1/AUTH Cryptographic operation – Authentication
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/AUTH
The TSF shall perform symmetric authentication –
encryption and decryption22 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithms Triple-DES23,24 and cryptographic
key sizes
Triple-DES 112bits bits25,26 that meet the
following: : FIPS 46-3 [9.,27,28:
244
Application note 25: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic
primitive for authentication attempt of a terminal as Personalization Agent by means
of the symmetric authentication mechanism (cf. FIA_UAU.4).
245
FCS_COP.1/MAC Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without
attributes, or
security
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/ MAC
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code29 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Retail MAC30 and cryptographic
20
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
[assignment: list of standards]
22
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
23
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
24
[selection: Triple-DES, AES]
25
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
26
[selection: 112, 128, 168, 192, 256]
27
[assignment: list of standards]
28
][selection: FIPS 46-3 [9], FIPS 197 [12]]
29
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
30
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
21
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key sizes 112 bit31 that meet the following: ISO 9797
(MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message
Counter, padding mode 2) 32.
246
Application note 26: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic
primitive for secure messaging with encryption and message authentication code
over the transmitted data. The key is agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism according to the FCS_CKM.1 and FIA_UAU.4.
6.1.2.2 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
247
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
248
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
249
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FCS_RND.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random
numbers that meet K4 (high) according to AIS20 [24]33.
Application note 27: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers
used for the authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4.
6.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
250
Application note 28: The Table 2 provides an overview on the authentication
mechanisms used.
Name
SFR for the TOE
Algorithms and key sizes according to
[6],normative appendix 5, and [20]
Basic Access Control
FIA_UAU.4 and
Authentication
FIA_UAU.6
Triple-DES,
112
bit
keys
(cf.FCS_COP.1/ENC) and Retail-MAC,
112 bit keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/MAC)
Mechanism
Symmetric Authentication
FIA_UAU.4
either Triple-DES with 112 bit keys
Mechanism for
or AES with 128 up to 256 bit keys
Personalization Agents
(cf. FCS_COP.1/AUTH)
251
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
252
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
31
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
[assignment: list of standards]
33
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
32
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Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall allow
1. to read the
“Manufacturing”,
Initialization
2. to read the random
“Personalization of the
Data
in
Phase
2
identifier
in
Phase
3
MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational
Use”34
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
34
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully
identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated
actions on behalf of that user.
253
Application note 29: The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer write the
Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data in the audit records of the IC
during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing”. The audit records can be written only in the
Phase 2 Manufacturing of the TOE. At this time the Manufacturer is the only user
role available for the TOE. The MRTD manufacturer may create the user role
Personalization Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the
MRTD”. The users in role Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of
selecting the authentication key. After personalization in the Phase 3 (i.e. writing the
digital MRZ and the Document Basic Access Keys) the user role Basic Inspection
System is created by writing the Document Basic Access Keys. The Basic
Inspection System is identified as default user after power up or reset of the TOE i.e.
the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to authenticate the user as Basic
Inspection System.
254
Application note 30: In the “Operational Use” phase the MRTD must not allow
anybody to read the ICCSN, the MRTD identifier or any other unique identification
before the user is authenticated as Basic Inspection System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note
that the terminal and the MRTD’s chip use a (randomly chosen) identifier for the
communication channel to allow the terminal to communicate with more then one
RFID. If this identifier is randomly selected it will not violate the OT.Identification. If
this identifier is fixed the ST writer should consider the possibility to misuse this
identifier to perform attacks addressed by T.Chip_ID.
255
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
256
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow
1. to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
2. to read the random identifier in Phase 3 “Personalization of
the MRTD”,
3. to read the random identifier in Phase 4 “Operational Use”35
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully
authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions
on behalf of that user.
257
Application note 31: The Basic Inspection System and the Personalization Agent
authenticate themselves.
258
The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
259
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication
of the Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.4.1
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES.36,37.
260
Application note 32: The authentication mechanisms may use either a challenge
freshly and randomly generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response
generated by a terminal in a successful authentication attempt. However, the
authentication of Personalisation Agent may rely on other mechanisms ensuring
protection against replay attacks, such as the use of an internal counter as a
diversifier.
261
Application note 33: The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device
authentication mechanism defined in [6]. In the first step the terminal authenticates
itself to the MRTD’s chip and the MRTD’s chip authenticates to the terminal in the
second step. In this second step the MRTD’s chip provides the terminal with a
challenge-response-pair which allows a unique identification of the MRTD’s chip with
some probability depending on the entropy of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Therefore the TOE shall stop further communications if the terminal is not
successfully authenticated in the first step of the protocol to fulfill the security
objective OT.Identification and to prevent T.Chip_ID.
262
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms
35
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
37
[selection: Triple-DES, AES or other approved algorithms]
36
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(FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
263
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on TripleDES,38,39 to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity
according to the following rules:
1. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as
Personalization Agent by one of the following mechanism(s):
the Symmetric Authentication
Personalization Agent Key40,
Mechanism
with
the
2. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic
Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access
Keys 41.
264
Application note 34: In case the ‘Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control’ [19]
should also be fulfilled the Personalization Agent should not be authenticated by
using the BAC or the symmetric authentication mechanism as they base on the twokey Triple-DES. The Personalization Agent could be authenticated by using the
symmetric AES-based authentication mechanism or other (e.g. the Terminal
Authentication Protocol using the Personalization Key, cf. [19] FIA_UAU.5.2).
265
Application note 35: The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure
messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the
inspection system. The Personalization Agent may use Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism without secure messaging mechanism as well if the personalization
environment prevents eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
personalization terminal. The Basic Inspection System may use the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
266
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
267
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
38
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
39 [selection: Triple-DES, AES]
40 [selection: the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Keys, the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key, [assignment other]]
41 [assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provideauthentication]
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Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.6.1
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
each command sent to the TOE during a BAC mechanism
based communication after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism42.
268
Application note 36: The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [6] includes
the secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication
of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC
mode each command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the successfully
authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC for further details). The TOE does not
execute any command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the
TOE re-authenticates the user for each received command and accepts only those
commands received from the previously authenticated BAC user.
269
Application note 37: Note that in case the TOE should also fulfill [19] the BAC
communication might be followed by a Chip Authentication mechanism establishing
a new secure messaging that is distinct from the BAC based communication. In this
case the condition in FIA_UAU.6 above should not contradict to the option that
commands are sent to the TOE that are no longer meeting the BAC communication
but are protected by a more secure communication channel established after a more
advanced authentication process.
270
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
271
Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1
FIA_AFL.1.2
272
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable
positive integer within [1-127]43 unsuccessful authentication
attempts occur related to BAC authentication protocol 44.
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication
attempts has been surpassed45, the TSF shall delay each
following authentication attempt until the next successful
authentication.46
Application note 38: Application note 35 of [22]: Applied.
42
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
[selection: [assignment: positive integer number],an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: range of acceptable values]]
44
[assignment: list of authentication events]
45
[assignment: met or surpassed]
46
[assignment: list of actions]
43
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6.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
6.1.4.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
273
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
274
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP47 on
terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data in the
EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD48.
6.1.4.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
275
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
276
FDP_ACF.1 Basic Security attribute based access control – Basic Access
Control
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP49 to
objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes
a. authentication status of terminals50.
47
[assignment: access control SFP]
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the
SFP]
49
[assignment: access control SFP]
50
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFPrelevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
48
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FDP_ACF.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is
allowed to
write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is
allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1,
EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD51.
FDP_ACF.1.3
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none52.
FDP_ACF.1.4
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects
based on the rule:
1. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
2. Any terminal is not allowed to read any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
3. The Basic Inspection System is not allowed to read the data
in EF.DG3 and EF.DG453.
277
Application note 39: The inspection system needs special authentication and
authorization for read access to DG3 and DG4 not defined in this security target (cf.
[19] for details).
6.1.4.3 Inter-TSF-Transfer
278
Application note 40: FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the protection of the User
Data transmitted from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption
and message authentication codes after successful authentication of the terminal.
The authentication mechanisms as part of Basic Access Control Mechanism include
the key agreement for the encryption and the message authentication key to be
used for secure messaging.
279
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
280
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
51
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
52
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
53
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
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Dependencies:
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FDP_UCT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP54 to be
able to transmit and receive55 user data in a manner
protected from unauthorised disclosure.
281
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity (FDP_UIT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
282
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
FDP_UIT.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP56 to be
able to transmit and receive57 user data in a manner
protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay58
errors.
FDP_UIT.1.2
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data,
whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay59 has
occurred.
6.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
283
Application note 41: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic
requirements to the management of the TSF data.
284
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
285
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No Dependencies
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of
performing the following management
54
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
[selection: transmit, receive]
56
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
57
[selection: transmit, receive]
58
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
59
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
55
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functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Pre-personalization,
3. Personalization60.
286
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
287
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to:
No other components
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer,
2. Personalization Agent,
3. Basic Inspection System61
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall be able to associate
users with roles.
288
Application note 42: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the
management of the TSF and TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE
over the life cycle phases.
289
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
290
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
capabilities so that in conjunction with “Limited
availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not
allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to
be gathered which may enable other attacks
60
61
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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291
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
292
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their
availability so that in conjunction with “Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy is
enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not
allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to
be gathered which may enable other attacks.
293
Application note 43: The formulation of “Deploying Test Features…” in
FMT_LIM.2.1 might be a little bit misleading since the addressed features are no
longer available (e.g. by disabling or removing the respective functionality).
Nevertheless the combination of FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 is introduced provide
an optional approach to enforce the same policy.
Note that the term “software” in item 3 of FMT_LIM.1.1 and FMT_LIM.2.1 refers to
both IC Dedicated and IC Embedded Software.
294
Application note 44: The following SFR are iterations of the component
Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to
those identified below.
295
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different
management functions and different TSF data.
296
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data
and Prepersonalization Data
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write 62 the Initialization
Data and Prepersonalization Data 63 to the
Manufacturer64.
62
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
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297
Application note 45: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the
authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric
cryptographic Personalization Agent Key.
298
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for
users to65 the Initialization Data66 to the Personalization
Agent67.
299
Application note 46: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD
Manufacturer are the default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer
during the Phase 2 “Manufacturing” but the TOE is not requested to distinguish
between these users within the role Manufacturer. The TOE may restrict the ability
to write the Initialization Data and the Prepersonalization Data by (i) allowing to write
these data only once and (ii) blocking the role Manufacturer at the end of the Phase
2. The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data which includes but are not
limited to the IC Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The Initialization Data
provides a unique identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the Phase 2
and 3 “personalization” but is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4
“Operational Use”. Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The MRTD
Manufacturer will write the Pre-personalization Data.
300
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write68 the
Document Basic Access Keys69 to the Personalization
Agent70.
301
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
63
[assignment: list of TSF data]
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
65
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
66
[assignment: list of TSF data]
67
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
68
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
69
[assignment: list of TSF data]
70
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
64
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Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1
Specification
management functions
of
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MTD.1.1/KEY_READ
302
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read 71
the Document Basic Access Keys and
Personalization Agent Keys72 to none 73.
Application note 47: The Personalization Agent generates, stores and ensures the
correctness of the Document Basic Access Keys.
6.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
303
The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data
and TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the
inherent leakage. With respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in
combination with the security functional requirements “Failure with preservation of
secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and
“Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFRs “Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to
physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” together with the SAR “Security architecture
description” (ADV_ARC.1) prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the
security features or misuse of TOE functions.
304
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
305
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No Dependencies.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
The TOE shall not emit information about IC Power
consumption and command execution time 74 in excess
of
non-useful information75 enabling access to
Personalization Agent Key(s) 76 and none 77
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users78 are
unable to use the following interface smart card circuit
contacts79 to gain access to Personalization Agent
Key(s)80 and none 81
71
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
[assignment: list of TSF data]
73
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
74
[assignment: types of emissions]
75
[assignment: specified limits]
76
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
77
[assignment: list of types of user data]
78
[assignment: type of users]
79
[assignment: type of connection]
80
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
81
[assignment: list of types of user data]
72
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306
Application note 48: Application note 45 from [22]: Applied.
307
The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced
illicit information leakage including physical manipulation.
308
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
309
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No Dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the
following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions
where therefore a malfunction could occur,
2. failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.182
310
The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
311
FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No Dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up83 to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF84.
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of TSF data85.
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
312
Application note 49: Application note 46 of [22]: Applied.
313
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
314
FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
82
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the
authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]
84
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
85
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF data]
83
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Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_PHP.3.1
The TSF shall resist physical intrusions86 to the IC
Hardware87 by responding automatically such that the
TSP is not violated
315
Application note 50: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to
continuously counter physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature
of these attacks (especially manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks
on all of its elements. Therefore, permanent protection against these attacks is
required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated at any time. Hence, “automatic
response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at any time and
(ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.
316
Application note 51: The SFRs “Non-bypassability of the TSF FPT_RVM.1” and
“TSF domain separation FPT_SEP.1” are no longer part of [2]. These requirements
are now an implicit part of the assurance requirement ADV_ARC.1.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
317
The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment
are those taken from the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4) and augmented by
taking the following component: ALC_DVS.2.
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1/ENC
86
87
OT.Prot Abuse-Func
OT.Prot Malfunction
OT.Prot Inf Leak
OT.Prot PhysTamper
OT.Identification
OT.Data Int
OT.Data Conf
The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements
coverage.
OT.AC Pers
318
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
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FCS_COP.1/AUTH
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_RND.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.6
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UIT.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Table 9: Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
319
The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD. The write
access to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and
FDP_ACF.1 as follows: only the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent
is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Personalization Agent can be
authenticated either by using the BAC mechanism (FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA,
FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as FCS_COP.1/MAC)
with the personalization key or for reasons of interoperability with the [19] by using the
symmetric authentication mechanism (FCS_COP.1/ AUTH).
In case of using the BAC mechanism the SFR FIA_UAU.6 describes the re-authentication
and FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure
messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1,
FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation), and FCS_COP.1/ENC as well as
FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) setting the
Document Basic Access Keys according to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as
authentication reference data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to
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the secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensure together with the SFR
FCS_CKM.4, FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these
keys.
320
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical
MRTD data is defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way:
only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are not allowed
to modify any of the data groups EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf.
FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization
Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization). The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall
be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5 and FIA_UAU.6
using either FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC or FCS_COP.1/AUTH.
The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the
transmitted logical MRTD data by means of the BAC mechanism. The SFR
FIA_UAU.6, FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the transmitted
data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions
according to FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_RND.1 (for key generation),
and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization Agent to establish the
Document Basic Access Keys in a way that they cannot be read by anyone in
accordance to FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ.
321
The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the
TOE to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before
identification respective authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. In case
of failed authentication attempts FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time
prolonging the necessary amount of time for facilitating a brute force attack. The
read access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and
FDP_ACF.1.2: the successful authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to
read the data of the logical MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16). The successful
authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to read the data of the logical
MRTD (EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists
the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection System) and the
SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization
for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4 prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the
authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5 enforces the TOE to accept the
authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic
Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6 requests secure messaging after successful
authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
which includes the protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means
of the cryptographic functions according to FCS_COP.1/ENC and
FCS_COP.1/MAC (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1). (for key generation),
and FCS_COP.1/ENC and FCS_COP.1/ MAC for the ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA and FCS_RND.1 establish the key
management for the secure messaging keys. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of
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the Document Basic Access Keys.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires
the Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism or secure messaging.
322
The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the
TOE” address the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the
MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to
SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, the TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic
Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
allows only the Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization
Data (including the Personalization Agent key). The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their usage in the
phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective OT.Identification. The
SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data uniquely
identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication of the Basic
Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication
attempt (cf. Application note 30). In case of failed authentication attempts
FIA_AFL.1 enforces additional waiting time prolonging the necessary amount of
time for facilitating a brute force attack.
323
The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of
Functionality” is ensured by the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent
misuse of test functionality of the TOE or other features which may not be used
after TOE Delivery.
324
The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”
requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
MRTD’s chip against disclosure
-
-
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the
time between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic
field, power consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_EMSEC.1,
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1, and/or
by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR
FPT_PHP.3.
325
The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
326
The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is
covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the
correct operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data
and TSF code, and (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case
of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction.
6.3.2 Dependency Rationale
327
The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the
basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined functional
requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional
components are analyzed, and non-dissolved dependencies are appropriately
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explained.
328
The Table 10 shows the dependencies between the SFR of the TOE.
SFR
Dependencies
Support of the
Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FCS_CKM.1
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
Fulfilled
FCS_COP.1/ENC
distribution or
and FCS_COP.1/MAC,
by
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction,
FCS_CKM.4
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
FCS_COP.1/SHA
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
justification
satisfied
1
without security attributes,
dependencies,
for
non-
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
destruction
FCS_COP.1/ENC
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[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
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FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
justification 2 for non[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
satisfied
without security attributes,
dependencies
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
justification 2 for nonFCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
satisfied
destruction
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.1,
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
Fulfilled by FCS_CKM.4
destruction
FCS_RND.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication
Fulfilled by FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.4
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.5
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.6
No dependencies
n.a.
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based
access control
Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialization
FDP_UCT.1
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[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1,
justification 3 for nonsatisfied
dependencies
justification 4 for nonsatisfied
dependencies
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
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flow
control or
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control]
FDP_UIT.1
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
justification
satisfied
4
channel, or
dependencies
for
non-
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path],
[FDP_IFC.1
flow
Subset
information
Fulfilled by FDP_ACC.1
control or
FDP_ACC.1
control]
Subset
access
FMT_SMF.1
No dependencies
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_UID.1
identification
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.1
Fulfilled by FMT_LIM.1
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
Timing
n.a.
of
Fulfilled by FIA_UID.1
management functions,
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
management functions,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
management functions,
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Fulfilled by FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled by FMT_SMF.1
management functions,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
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FPT_EMSEC.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FPT_FLS.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FPT_PHP.3
No dependencies
n.a.
FPT_TST.1
No dependencies
n.a.
Table 10 Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE
329
Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE:
No. 1: The hash algorithm required by the SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA does not need
any key material.
Therefore neither a key generation (FCS_CKM.1) nor an import (FDP_ITC.1/2) is
necessary.
No. 2: The SFR FCS_COP.1/AUTH uses the symmetric Personalization Key
permanently
stored
during
the
Pre-Personalization
process
(cf.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA) by the manufacturer. Thus there is neither the necessity to
generate or import a key during the addressed TOE lifecycle by the means of
FCS_CKM.1 or FDP_ITC. Since the key is permanently stored within the TOE there
is no need for FCS_CKM.4, too.
No. 3: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes
which are defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time
of the TOE. No management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and
FMT_MSA.3) is necessary here.
No. 4: The SFR FDP_UCT.1 and FDP_UIT.1 require the use secure messaging
between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to
require this communication channel to be logically distinct from other
communication channels since there is only one channel. Since the TOE does not
provide a direct human interface a trusted path as required by FTP_TRP.1 is not
applicable here.
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
330
The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices
which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and
other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is applicable in those
circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of
independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared
to incur sensitive security specific engineering costs.
331
The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the
security of the MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure
handling of the MRTD’s material.
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332
The component ALC_DVS.2 augmented to EAL4 has no dependencies to other
security requirements
Dependencies ALC_DVS.2: no dependencies.
6.3.4 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
333
The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of
security requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements
(SFRs) and the security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually
supportive and internally consistent whole.
334
The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support
and internal consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale for the security
functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal
consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All
dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and nonsatisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and
internally consistent assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the
sensitive assurance components in section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements
Rationale shows that the assurance requirements are mutually supportive and
internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are satisfied and no
inconsistency appears.
335
Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if
there are functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which
has been shown not to arise in sections 6.3.2 Dependency Rationale and 6.3.3
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in
section 6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale, the chosen assurance
components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the assurance
requirements and security functional requirements support each other and there are
no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
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7 TOE summary specification
336
This chapter gives the overview description of the different TOE Security Functions
composing the TSF. The mapping in-between the TSFs and SFRs can be found in
Table 12.
7.1 TOE Security Functions
7.1.1 TSF_AccessControl
337
The TOE provides access control mechanisms that allow among others the
maintenance of different users.
338
The TOE restricts the ability to write the Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation
Data to the Manufacturer. Manufacturer is the only role with the capability to store
the IC Identification Data in the audit records. Users of role Manufacturer are
assumed default users by the TOE during the Phase 2.
339
Personalisation Agent is the only role with the ability:



340
to disable read access for users to the Initialisation Data.
to write the Document Basic Access Keys.
to write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16
of the logical travel document after successful authentication.
The access control mechanisms ensure that only authenticated Extended Inspection
System with the Read access to


EF.DG3 (Fingerprint) is allowed to read the data in EF.DG3 of the logical
travel document.
EF.DG4 (Iris) is allowed to read the data in EF.DG4 of the logical travel
document.
In order to read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 the TOE uses EAC, which is is not
covered by this Security Target.
341
The access control mechanisms ensure that nobody is allowed to read the
Document Basic Access Keys and the Personalisation Agent Keys.
342
Any terminal is explicitly denied to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the
logical travel document.
343
The access control mechanisms allow the execution of certain security relevant
actions (e.g. self-tests) without successful user authentication.
344
All security attributes under access control are modified in a secure way so that no
unauthorised modifications are possible.
345
The TSF provides functionality for the following SFRs:
FDP_ACC.1: It is a requirement about access control and authentication (for details
see the SFR), the access control is provided by TSF_AccessControl, the
authentication control is provided by TSF_Authenticate.
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FDP_ACF.1: It is a requirement about access control and authentication. The
access control is provided by TSF_AccessControl, the authentication control is
provided by TSF_Authenticate.
FDP_UCT.1: It is a requirement about access control, the access control is provided
by TSF_AccessControl.
FDP_UIT.1: It is a requirement about access control for details see the SFR), the
access control is provided by TSF_AccessControl
FIA_AFL.1: This SFR requires a detection of unsuccessful authentication attempts.
It is realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UAU.1: The requirement is about authentication, and what can be accessed
before and after it. It is realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UAU.4: The requirement is about authentication, and prevention of reuse of
authentication data. It is realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UAU.5: The requirement is about multiple authentication mechanisms. It is
realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UAU.6: The requirement is about authentication, and what can be accessed
before and after it. It is realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UAU.6: The requirement is about re-authentication. It is realized by
TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UID.1: The requirement is about identification, and what can be accessed
before and after it. It is realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ: This requirement is about restriction of the ability to read
out certain passwords and keys. It is realized by TSF.AccessControl.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE: This requirement is about restriction of the ability to to
write the Document Basic Access Keys to the Personalisation Agent. It is realized by
TSF.AccessControl, the authentication control is provided by TSF.Authenticate.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA: This requirement is about restriction of the ability to write the
Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data to the Manufacturer. It is realized by
TSF.AccessControl, the authentication control is provided by TSF.Authenticate. The
control before the operational phase is provided by TSF_Platform.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS: This requirement is about restriction of the ability to read out
the Initialisation Data to the Personalization Agent. It is realized by
TSF.AccessControl, the authentication control is provided by TSF.Authenticate. The
control before the operational phase is provided by TSF_Platform.
FMT_SMR.1: Requires the maintenance of security roles, this is realized by
TSF.AccessControl, the authentication control is provided by TSF.Authenticate.
7.1.2 TSF_Authenticate
346
After activation or reset of the TOE no user is authenticated.
347
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of a user require the user’s prior successful
identification and authentication.
348
The TOE contains a deterministic random number generator rated K4 (high)
according to AIS20 [20] that provides random numbers used authentication. The
seed for the deterministic random number generator is provided by the P2 (high)
true random number generator of the underlying Platform.
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349
Proving the identity of the TOE is supported by the following means:


350
The TOE prevents reuse of authentication data related to:


351
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
Passive Authentication Mechanism
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
Personalisation Agent authenticates himself to the TOE by use of the
Personalisation Agent Keys with the following cryptographic mechanisms:

Symmetric Authentication Mechanism
352
After completion of the BAC Protocol, the TOE accepts commands with correct
message authentication code only. These commands must have been sent via
secure messaging using the key previously agreed with the terminal during the last
authentication.
353
The TSF provides functionality for the following SFRs:
FDP_ACC.1: It is a requirement about access control and authentication (for details
see the SFR), the access control is provided by TSF_AccessControl, the
authentication control is provided by TSF_Authenticate.
FDP_ACF.1: It is a requirement about access control and authentication. The
access control is provided by TSF_AccessControl, the authentication control is
provided by TSF_Authenticate.
FIA_AFL.1: This SFR requires a detection of unsuccessful authentication attempts.
It is realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UAU.1: The requirement is about authentication, and what can be accessed
before and after it. It is realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UAU.4: The requirement is about authentication, and prevention of reuse of
authentication data. It is realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UAU.5: The requirement is about multiple authentication mechanisms. It is
realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UAU.5: The requirement is about multiple authentication mechanisms. It is
realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UAU.6: The requirement is about re-authentication. It is realized by
TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FIA_UID.1: The requirement is about identification, and what can be accessed
before and after it. It is realized by TSF_Authenticate and TSF_AccessControl.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA: This requirement is about restriction of the ability to write the
Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data to the Manufacturer. It is realized by
TSF.AccessControl, the authentication control is provided by TSF.Authenticate. The
control before the operational phase is provided by TSF_Platform.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS: This requirement is about restriction of the ability to read out
the Initialisation Data to the Personalization Agent. It is realized by
TSF.AccessControl, the authentication control is provided by TSF.Authenticate. The
control before the operational phase is provided by TSF_Platform.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE: This requirement is about restriction of the ability to to
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write the Document Basic Access Keys to the Personalisation Agent. It is realized by
TSF.AccessControl, the authentication control is provided by TSF.Authenticate.
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE: This requirement is about restriction of the ability to to
write the Document Basic Access Keys to the Personalisation Agent. It is realized by
TSF.AccessControl, the authentication control is provided by TSF.Authenticate.
FMT_SMR.1: Requires the maintenance of security roles, this is realized by
TSF.AccessControl, the authentication control is provided by TSF.Authenticate.
7.1.3 TSF_SecureManagement_MRTD
354
The life cycle of TOE is split up in several phases. Phase 4 – „Operational Use” is
different from all prior phases, when the TOE is still in the secure environment and
Test Features are available. During start-up of the TOE the decision for one of the
various operation modes is taken dependent on phase identifiers. The decision of
accessing a certain mode is defined as phase entry protection. The phases follow
also a defined and protected sequence. The sequence of the phases is protected by
means of authentication.
355
Test features of the TOE are not available for the user in Phase 4. Deploying test
features after TOE delivery does not allow User Data to be manipulated, TSF data to
be disclosed or manipulated, software to be reconstructed and substantial
information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may enable other
attacks.
356
The TSF provides functionality for the following SFRs:
FMT_LIM.1: The requirement is about restricting capabilities after TOE delivery,
which is provided by TSF_SecureManagement_MRTD.
FMT_LIM.2: The requirement is about restricting availibilities after TOE delivery,
which is provided by TSF_SecureManagement_MRTD.
FMT_SMF.1: The requirement is about performable management functions, which is
provided by TSF_Securemanagement_MRTD.
7.1.4 TSF_CryptoKey_MRTD
357
A successfully authenticated Personalisation Agent is allowed to change the
Personalisation Agent Keys.
358
The TOE supports overwriting the cryptographic keys with zero values as follows:


359
the BAC Session Keys after detection of an error in a received command by
verification of the MAC,
any session keys before starting the communication with the terminal in a
new power-on-session.
The TSF provides functionality for the following SFR:
FCS_CKM.1: The SFR requires generation of cryptographic keys. It is realized by
TSF_CryptoKey_MRTD, and because it uses Platform functionalities, TSF_Platform.
FCS_CKM.4: Requires the cryptographic key destruction according to a specified
cryptographic method. This is realized by TSF_CryptoKey_MRTD.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH: Requires a use of cryptographic operation. It is provided by
TSF_CryptoKey_MRTD and TSF_Platform.
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FCS_COP.1/ENC: Requires a use of cryptographic operation. It is provided by
TSF_CryptoKey_MRTD and TSF_Platform.
7.1.5 TSF_AppletParameters_Sign
360
During the Applet life cycle phases after LOADED state the applet becomes the
default Application and reaches SELECTABLE state. This is called the Initialization
phase. During this phase the following steps are carryed out:
-
Applet configuration
File creation (all control parameters)
Object creation (all control parameters and some usage parameters)
361
Certain configuration and control parameters are signed, and this signature is
verified before closing the Initialization phase. Only the unsigned parameters can be
changed by the Initializer. This way only those Application Profiles can be applied
which are validated by the Developer, and conform to the requirements. The
Initialization state can not be finished by reaching the INITIALIZED state, and the
Personalization phase can not be started without successful signature verification.
362
These signatures can be verified during the whole Applet life-cycle, thus the nonauthorized changed become detectable by applying this SF.
363
The TSF provides functionality for the following SFRs:
FPT_FLS.1: The requirement requires the preservation of a secure state when
detecting failures. This is provided by TSF_AppletParameters_Sign and
TSF_Platform.
FPT_TST.1: Requires self-test and capability to verify integrity of TSF and TSF data.
This is provided by TSF_AppletParameters_Sign and TSF_Platform.
7.1.6 TSF_Platform
364
There are security functionalities based on the security functionalities of the certified
cryptographic library and the certified IC Platform. This TSF covers those
functionalities.
365
The TOE detects physical tampering of the TSF with sensors for operating voltage,
clock frequency, temperature and electromagnetic radiation.
366
The TOE is resistant to physical tampering on the TSF. This is managed by the
Platform. If the TOE detects with the above mentioned sensors, that it is not
supplied within the specified limits, a security reset is initiated and the TOE is not
operable until the supply is back in the specified limits. The design of the hardware
protects it against analyzing and physical tampering.
367
The TOE demonstrates the correct operation of the TSF by among others verifying
the integrity of the TSF and TSF data and verifying the absence of fault injections. In
the case of inconsistencies in the calculation of the signature and fault injections
during the operation of the TSF the TOE preserves a secure state. Both the Applet
and the Platform manage this.
368
The TOE supports the calculation of block check values for data integrity checking.
These block check values are stored with persistently stored assets of the TOE as
well as temporarily stored hash values for data to be signed. Both CRC and HASH
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function are calculated by the Platform
369
The TOE hides information about IC power consumption and command execution
time ensuring that no confidential information can be derived from this information.
370
The TSF provides functionality for the following SFRs:
FAU_SAS.1: The SFR requires audit capabilities, which are provided by
TSF_Platform.
FCS_CKM.1: The SFR requires generation of cryptographic keys. It is realized by
TSF_CryptoKey_MRTD, and because it uses Platform functionalities, TSF_Platform.
FCS_COP.1/ENC: Requires a use of cryptographic operation. It is provided by
TSF_CryptoKey_MRTD and TSF_Platform.
FCS_COP.1/AUTH: Requires use of cryptographic operation. It is provided by
TSF_CryptoKey_MRTD and TSF_Platform.
FCS_COP.1/MAC: Requires use of operation which is provided by TSF_Platform.
FCS_COP.1/SHA: Requires use of operation which is provided by TSF_Platform.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA: This requirement is about restriction of the ability to write the
Initialisation Data and Pre-personalisation Data to the Manufacturer. It is realized by
TSF.AccessControl, the authentication control is provided by TSF.Authenticate. The
control before the operational phase is provided by TSF_Platform.
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS: This requirement is about restriction of the ability to read out
the Initialisation Data to the Personalization Agent. It is realized by
TSF.AccessControl, the authentication control is provided by TSF.Authenticate. The
control before the operational phase is provided by TSF_Platform.
FCS_RND.1: Requires use of operation which is provided by TSF_Platform.
FPT_EMSEC.1: Requires use of operation which is provided by TSF_Platform.
FPT_FLS.1: The requirement requires the preservation of a secure state when
detecting failures. This is provided by TSF_AppletParameters_Sign and
TSF_Platform.
FPT_PHP.3: Requires resistance to physical manipulation and probing to the
Platform. This is realized by the TSF_Platform.
FPT_TST.1: Requires self-test and capability to verify integrity of TSF and TSF data.
This is provided by TSF_AppletParameters_Sign and TSF_Platform.
7.2 Assurance Measures
371
This chapter describes the Assurance Measures fulfilling the requirements listed in
chapter 6.3.
372
The following table lists the Assurance measures and references the corresponding
documents describing the measures.
Assurance measures
Description
AM_ADV
The representing of the TSF is described in the
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documentation for functional specification, in
the documentation for TOE design, in the
security architecture description and in the
documentation for implementation
representation.
AM_AGD
The guidance documentation is described in
the Userguide documentation, the AdminGuide
document and in the InitandConf
documentation.
AM_ALC
The life-cycle support of the TOE during its
development and maintenance is described in
the life-cycle documentation including
configuration management, delivery
procedures, development security as well as
development tools.
AM_ATE
The testing of the TOE is described in the test
documentation.
AM_AVA
The vulnerability assessment for the TOE is
described in the vulnerability analysis
documentation.
Table 11 References of Assurance measures
7.3 Fulfilment of the SFRs
373
The following table shows the mapping of the SFRs to security functions of the TOE.
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FAU_SAS.1
TSF_Platrform
TSF_Appletparameters_sign
TSF_Cryptokey_MRTD
TSF_SecureManagement_MRTD
TSF_Authenticate
TOE SFR / Security Function
TSF_AccessControl
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X
FCS_CKM.1/
X
FCS_CKM.4
X
FCS_COP.1/SHA
X
X
FCS_COP.1/ENC
X
X
FCS_COP.1/AUTH
X
X
FCS_COP.1/MAC
X
FCS_RND.1
X
FIA_AFL.1
X
X
FIA_UID.1
X
X
FIA_UAU.1
X
X
FIA_UAU.4
X
X
FIA_UAU.5
X
X
FIA_UAU.6
X
X
FDP_ACC.1
X
X
FDP_ACF.1
X
X
FDP_UCT.1
X
FDP_UIT.1
X
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_LIM.1
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FMT_LIM.2
X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
X
X
X
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
X
X
X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
X
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
X
X
FPT_EMSEC.1
X
FPT_FLS.1
X
FPT_PHP.3
X
X
FPT_TST.1
X
X
Table 12 Mapping of SFRs to mechanisms of TOE
7.3.1 Correspondence of SFR and TOE mechanisms
374
Each TOE security functional requirement is implemented by at least one TOE
mechanism. In section 7.1 the implementing of the TOE security functional
requirement is described in form of the TOE mechanism.
7.4 Rationale for PP Claims
375
This security target is conformant to the claimed PP [22]. Additionally, the Passive
Authentication Mechanism and the key generation of the Active Authentication keys
on the TOE are included in the TOE.
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[2]
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[3]
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[4]
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[5]
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[6]
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[7]
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[10]
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[11]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2 DIGITAL
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[13]
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[14]
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography
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[15]
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[16]
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[17]
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[18]
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, June 2007; registered
and certified by BSI (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik)
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[19]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
„ICAO Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0056, Version
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[20]
Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable
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[21]
ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part
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[22]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document With
„ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-CC-PP-0055, Version 1.10,
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[23]
ID&Trust IDentity Applet Administrator’s Guide Version 3.2.18
[24]
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NSCIB-CC-13-13-37760-CR NXP J3E145_M64, J3E120_M65, J3E082_M65,
J2E145_M64, J2E120_M65, and J2E082_M65 Secure Smart Card Controller
Revision 3 Certification Report by TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V. , 2013
August 12th.
NXP J3E145_M64, J3E120_M65, J3E082_M65, J2E145_M64, J2E120_M65,
and J2E082_M65 Secure Smart Card Controller Revision 3 Security Target
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Rev. 01.02 — 2nd August 2013 NSCIB-CC-13-37760
[27]
[28]
[29]
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NXP J3E145_M64, J3E120_M65, J3E082_M65, J2E145_M64, J2E120_M65,
and J2E082_M65 Secure Smart Card Controller Revision 3 Security Target
Lite, Rev. 00.02 — 2nd August 2013, NSCIB-CC-13-37760
Technical Guideline TR-03110-2 Advanced Security Mechanisms forMachine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token – Part 2 – Protocols for
electronic IDentification, Authentication and trust Services (eIDAS) Version
2.20 3. February 2015
Technical Guideline TR-03110-4 Advanced Security Mechanisms forMachine
Readable Travel Documents and eIDAS Token – Part 4 – Applications and
Document Profiles Version 2.20 3. February 2015
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