Certification Report: 0521a

Certification Report: 0521a

BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008

for

STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition

Version 2.0a

from

Giesecke & Devrient GmbH

BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn

Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111

Certification Report V1.0

ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.25

BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008

Security IC with MRTD EAC Application

STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition

Version 2.0a

from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH

PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO

Application", Extended Access Control,

BSI-PP-0026

Functionality: PP conformant

Common Criteria Part 2 extended

Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant

EAL 4 augmented by

ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2,

AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4

Common Criteria

Recognition

Arrangement for components up to

EAL 4

The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC

15408:2005).

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the

German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the

Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Bonn, 18 September 2008

For the Federal Office for Information Security

Bernd Kowalski

Head of Department

L.S.

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn

Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008 Certification Report

Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security

(BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by

BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed

Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

1 Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17

December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008

Contents

A Certification........................................................................................................................7

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7

2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7

2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8

2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8

3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8

4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9

5 Publication......................................................................................................................9

B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11

1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12

2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14

3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................14

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15

5 Architectural Information..............................................................................................15

6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16

7 IT Product Testing........................................................................................................16

7.1 Description of the Test Configuration....................................................................16

7.2 Developer Tests according to ATE_FUN..............................................................16

7.3 Evaluator Tests according to ATE_IND.................................................................17

7.4 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA..........................................................18

7.4.1 Developer Vulnerability Analysis.....................................................................18

7.4.2 Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis......................................................................18

8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................18

9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................19

9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................19

9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................20

10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................20

11 Security Target...........................................................................................................20

12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20

12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................20

12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................21

13 Bibliography................................................................................................................23

C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25

D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008 Certification Report

A Certification

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

BSIG 2

BSI Certification Ordinance 3

BSI Schedule of Costs 4

Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the

Interior)

DIN EN 45011 standard

BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]

Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005) 5

Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3

BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)

Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above

EAL4 (AIS 34)

2 Recognition Agreements

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or

CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

2

3

4

5

Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17

December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security

(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19

May 2006, p. 3730

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008

2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates

The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998.

This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece,

Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United

Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL

1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this agreement.

The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates

An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles based on the CC.

As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,

Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,

India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,

Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of

America. The current list of signatory nations resp. approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org

The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.

This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF),

ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of Security Measures), AVA_VLA.4 (Highly Resistant) and

AVA_MSU.3 (Analysis and Testing for insecure States) that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the EAL4components of these assurance families are relevant.

3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0a has undergone the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0463-2008. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0463-2008 were re-used.

The evaluation of the product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0a was conducted by SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 02

September 2008. The SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH is an evaluation facility

(ITSEF)

6

recognised by the certification body of BSI.

6 Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008 Certification Report

For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH

The product was developed by: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH

The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this

Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.

4 Validity of the certification result

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

● all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,

● the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report and in the Security Target.

For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.

The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security

Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular basis.

In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

5 Publication

The product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0a has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de

) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228

9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the

product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet address stated above.

7 Giesecke & Devrient GmbH

Prinzregentenstraße 159

81607 München

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008

B Certification Results

The following results represent a summary of

● the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,

● the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and

● complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

Certification Report

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008

1 Executive Summary

Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] resp. [7] is the

Security IC with a Machine Readable Travel Document, Extended Access Control

Application.

The Security Target is based on the Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine

Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control [9].

The TOE is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents

(MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [10]. It provides the Basic Access Control, the Extended Access Control and authentication mechanisms according to the technical report [11], including the Chip Authentication mechanism described in [9] and the Active Authentication mechanism described in [11]. The TOE will be embedded as an inlay chip module into a passport booklet.

The Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) of the TOE are based entirely on the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance

Level by.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the

Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC part 2 extended.

The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 5.3.

The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE

Security Functions:

TOE Security Function

SF.ACCESS

SF.ADMIN

SF.AUTH

SF.CRYPTO

Addressed issue

Access Control

Before the TSF performs an operation requested by a user, this Security

Function checks if the operation specific requirements on user authorisation and protection of communication data are fulfilled.

Administration of the TOE

The administration of the TOE is managed by this Security Function. The

TOE administration is mainly done in the initialisation and personalisation phase.

Authentication of the authorized TOE user

The authentication of the authorized user is managed by this Security Function.

Cryptographic Support

This Security Function provides the cryptographic support for the other

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008 Certification Report

TOE Security Function

SF.PROTECTION

SF.IC

Addressed issue

Security Functions.

Protection of TSC

This Security Function protects the TSF functionality, TSF data and user data.

After a successfully performed Chip

Authentication no unencrypted data transmission between TOE and the outside of the TOE is allowed.

Security Functions of the IC

This Security Function covers the

Security Functions of the IC

Table 1: TOE Security Functions

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 6.1.

The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'high' (SOF-high) for specific functions as indicated in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 6.1

is confirmed. The rating of the

Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.

The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 3.1.1. Based on these assets the security environment is defined in terms of

Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security

Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 3.2 to chapter 3.4.

This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:

● the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors, the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated

Support Software,

● the associated guidance documentation, the Generic MRTD Application Verifier Tool, Version 2.0 (GMA-Verifier Tool) and

the Reference Initialisation Table for the GMA-Verifier Tool 8 containing the IC

Embedded Software (operating system STARCOS 3.3) and the MRTD application

(dedicated file for the ICAO application in a file system on the chip).

The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification

Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for

Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

8 The GMA-Verifier Tool and the Reference Initialisation Table are part of the TOE but not part of the deliverables. Since the TOE may be initialised with different initialisation tables that have to be compliant to the Reference Initialisation Table without exceeding the CC certificate, the developer has to ensure this compliance by checking the initialisation table with the GMA-Verifier Tool.

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2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 2.0a

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No

1

2

3

4

Type

HW /

SW

Identifier

Chip modules with NXP

P5CD080V0B including

STARCOS 3.3 PE v2.0a

Release Form of Delivery

SW completely contained in ROM and

EEPROM memory, chip mounted into an inlay package (MOB4 module), initialised and tested

- ROM mask of the TOE already Implemented

STARCOS_CPDI0S

CSR33-1AV100

- EEPROM part of the TOE loaded before TOE delivery:

Initialisation Table compliant to STARCOS33PEV20_

Referenz.hex

Possible values:

CPDI0SCSI33-

A-1100V001 to

CPDI0SCSI33-

A-1100V0FF

DOC Administrator Guidance

STARCOS 3.3 Passport

Edition [15]

DOC User guidance STARCOS

3.3 Passport Edition [16]

Version 0.3,

09 May 2008

Version 0.4,

07 May 2008

DOC STARCOS 3.3 Passport

Edition TABLES [17]

(STARCOS33PETABLES)

Version 1

19 August 2008

Document in electronic form (encrypted / signed)

Document in electronic form (encrypted / signed)

Document in electronic form (encrypted / signed)

Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE

The TOE is finalized at the end of phase 2 according to the Protection Profile MRTD EAC

PP [9].

Delivery is performed from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH in Munich to the personalisation facility. Any delivery of the initialised inlays is done via a security transport of the MRTD

Manufacturer (G&D) or a security transport maintained by the Personalization Agent. This delivery process has therefore to be regarded as 'personal pickup'. In addition, the correct inlay modules for the TOE are secured by cryptographic means. Furthermore, the personalizer receives information about the personalisation commands and process requirements. To ensure that the personalizer receives this evaluated version, the procedures to start the personalisation process as described in the administrator manual for personalisation [15] have to be followed.

3 Security Policy

The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD EAC PP [9] by the

Security Objectives and Requirements for the contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of the International

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BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008 Certification Report

Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Basic

Access Control in the Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and

Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE- Environment. The following topics are of relevance:

Personalization of the MRTD’s chip,

Inspection Systems for global interoperability,

PKI for Passive Authentication and

PKI for Inspection Systems.

Details can be found in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 3.2.

5 Architectural Information

The TOE is a composite product. It is composed from an Integrated Circuit (IC), IC

Embedded Software, IC Embedded Software / Part Application Software (containing the

ICAO Application) and the Generic MRTD Application Verifier Tool (GMA-Verifier). While the IC Embedded Software contains the operating system STARCOS 3.3 PE v2.0a and key, the part Application Software contains the ICAO application (also referred as MRTD application). As all these parts of software are running inside the IC, the external interface of the TOE to its environment can be defined as the external interface of this IC, the EAL

5+ certified NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart Card Controller (for details concerning the

CC evaluation of the NXP IC see the evaluation documentation under the Certification ID

BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007).

The GMA-Verifier is not running inside the IC, but on a standard PC. It checks the MRTD application (in form of a hex file) that is designed to be loaded onto the IC whether it contains only allowed modifications in comparison with the reference application hexfile

"STARCOS33PEV20_Referenz.hex".

The following table gives an mapping of the subsystems of the TOE´s Embedded Software and the corresponding TSF which were objects of the evaluation:

Subsystem

Access control

Setup

Commands

Application Data and Basic

Functions

Crypto Functions

Secure Messaging

Enforced TOE Security Function

SF.ACCESS, SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH,

SF.CRYPTO, SF.PROTECTION

SF.ADMIN, SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC.

SF.ACESS, SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH,

SF.CRYPTO, SF.PROTECTION

SF.ACCESS, SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH,

SF.CRYPTO, SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC

SF.ADMIN, SF.AUTH, SF.CRYPTO,

SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC

SF.AUTH, SF.CRYPTO,

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Subsystem

Hardware

Enforced TOE Security Function

SF.PROTECTION

SF.AUTH, SF.PROTECTION, SF.IC

Table 3: Subsystems and corresponding TSF

6 Documentation

The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.

Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.

7 IT Product Testing

7.1 Description of the Test Configuration

The tests were performed with the composite smartcard product STARCOS 3.3 Passport

Edition, Version 2.0a consisting of the NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, operating system STARCOS 3.3 PE v2.0a and a file system (called MRTD application) in the context of the ICAO application

.

7.2 Developer Tests according to ATE_FUN

In the following the developer’s testing effort is summarised:

TOE test configurations

For the description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this report.

Developer’s testing approach

The developer performed functional tests in the Initialisation-, Personalisation- and

Usage phase of the TOE and covered all the TSF and related subfunctions.

Test suites were implemented in accordance with the functional specification of the

TOE in order to verify the TOE’s compliance with its expected behaviour.

The tests were performed on a smartcard emulator and on the test samples with the

MRTD Application.

Amount of developer testing performed

The developer has tested the 6 TSF of the TOE with a total of 1244 test cases. As demonstrated by the documentation of the test coverage the developer has tested the

TOE systematically at the level of TSF functionalities as given in the functional specification. As demonstrated by the documentation of the test depth the developer has tested the TOE systematically at the level of the subsystems as given in the high level design of the TOE.

GMA-Verifier

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For the GMA Verifier, the developer provided a test case set which includes several good case tests and several bad case tests. For the good case tests, only allowed modifications were applied to the test hex file (which represents an MRTD application), while for the bad case tests several unallowed modifications were applied to the test file.

Overall developer testing results

All test of the TSF in the Initialisation-, Personalisation- and Usage phases of the TOE passed all test cases so that all TSF have been successfully tested against the functional specification and the high level design of the TOE.

7.3 Evaluator Tests according to ATE_IND

In the following the evaluator’s independent testing effort is summarised:

TOE test configurations

The tests were performed in the phases Initialisation, Personalisation and Usage. For the description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this report.

Evaluator’s testing approach

The evaluator’s independent tests covered the security functionality of the TOE in the

Initialisation-, Personalisation- and Usage phase.

Subset size chosen

The evaluators have tested all 6 TSF.

TSF subset selection criteria

The evaluators have chosen a subset of developer tests so that all TSF could be covered by at least one test case in order to confirm that the TOE operates as specified. The valid cases as well as invalid cases were considered. For the simulator tests as well as for the

GMA-Verifier tests, all tests were reproduced by the evaluators.

Security functions tested

The evaluators have covered all 6 TSF within the independent testing.

Developer tests performed

The evaluators have selected and tested a sample of 595 test cases from the developer

TSF tests. The evaluator’s sample of developer tests covers all TSF and was performed on a smartcard emulator as well as on the test samples with the MRTD Application.

GMA-Verifier

All developer tests for the GMA-Verifier were reproduced by the evaluators. For the independent tests, two testcases (one good-case test and one bad-case test) were performed by the evaluators. The new functionality of the GMA-Verifier version 2.0 regarding the file EF_CP_ECC_TP2 and the marking of files as deactivated (i.e. these files are not added to the file system during the activation of the file system) has explicitly been addressed by this evaluator test.

Verdict for the activity

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During the evaluator’s TSF subset testing the TOE operated as specified. The evaluators have verified the developer’s test results by executing a sample of tests in the developer’s test documentation.

7.4 Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA

7.4.1 Developer Vulnerability Analysis

In the following the evaluator’s penetration testing effort based on developer vulnerability analysis is summarised:

Testing approach

Examination of developer’s vulnerability analysis in the intended environment of the TOE.

TOE test configurations

For the description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this report.

Security functions penetration tested

The evaluators have covered all the TSF within the penetration testing.

Verdict for the sub-activity

The evaluator has performed penetration testing based on the developer vulnerability analysis. During the evaluator’s penetration testing the TOE operated as specified. The vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended environment for the TOE. The TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential.

7.4.2 Evaluator Vulnerability Analysis

In the following the evaluator’s penetration testing effort based on his independent vulnerability analysis is summarised:

Testing approach

Examination of evaluator’s vulnerability analysis in the intended environment of the TOE.

TOE test configurations

For the description of the test configuration refer to chapter 7.1 of this report.

Security functions penetration tested

The evaluators have covered all the TSF within the penetration testing.

Verdict for the sub-activity

The evaluator has performed penetration testing based on his independent vulnerability analysis. During the evaluator’s penetration testing the TOE operated as specified. The vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended environment for the TOE. The TOE is resistant to attackers with high attack potential.

8 Evaluated Configuration

This certification covers the following configuration of the TOE:

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STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Version 2.0a consisting of

● the NXP Chip P5CD080V0B,

● the embedded software operation system STARCOS 3.3 PE v2.0a,

● a file system (called MRTD application) in the context of the ICAO application,

● the GMA-Verifier Version 2.0 (Build 1.1, 26 June 2008) and

● the Reference Initialisation Table "STARCOS33PEV20_Referenz.hex".

9 Results of the Evaluation

9.1 CC specific results

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the

Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).

As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance components:

All components of the class ASE

All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this report)

The components

ADV_IMP.2 – Implementation of the TSF

ALC_DVS.2 – Sufficiency of security measures

AVA_MSU.3 – Analysis and testing for insecure states

AVA_VLA.4 – Highly resistant augmented for this TOE evaluation.

As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a reevaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0463-2008, re-use of specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on the integration of the additional

Active Authentication mechanism, the upgrade of the Chip Authentication mechanism with a second keypair, the upgrade of the GMA-Verifier with additional features and the integration of the new inlay production site GDSK, Giesecke & Devrient Slovakia.

The evaluation has confirmed:

PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application",

Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0026 [9]

● for the Functionality: PP conformant

Common Criteria Part 2 extended for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant

EAL 4 augmented by

ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and

AVA_VLA.4

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The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: high

SF.ADMIN – Administration of the TOE

SF.AUTH – Authentication of the authorized TOE user

SF.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support

SF.IC - Security Functions of the IC

For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see annex B in part D of this report.

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.

9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment

The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).

This holds for:

SF.ADMIN – Administration of the TOE

SF.AUTH – Authentication of the authorized TOE user

SF.CRYPTO - Cryptographic Support

SF.IC - Security Functions of the IC

10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE

The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.

11 Security Target

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])

12 Definitions

CC

CEM

DES

DOC

EAC

12.1 Acronyms

APDU

Application Protocol Data Unit

BAC

BSI

Basic Access Control

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for

Information Security, Bonn, Germany

Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation

Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation

Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm

Document

Extended Access Control

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EAL

Evaluation Assurance Level

EEPROM

Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory

ES

ETR

IC

ICAO

Embedded Software

Evaluation Technical Report

Integrated Circuit

International Civil Aviation Organisation

IT

ITSEF

LDS

MRTD

PP

RAM

RNG

Information Technology

Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

Logical Data Structure

Machine Readable Travel Document

Protection Profile

Random Access Memory

Random Number Generator

ROM

SF

SFP

SOF

ST

TOE

TSC

TSF

TSF

TSP

Read Only Memory

Security Function

Security Function Policy

Strength of Function

Security Target

Target of Evaluation

TSF Scope of Control

TOE Security Functions

TOE Security Functions

TOE Security Policy

Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES

TSC

TSF Scope of Control

TSF

TOE Security Functions

TSP

TSS

TOE Security Policy

TOE Summary Specification

12.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

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Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.

SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.

SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.

SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.

Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.

TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the

TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.

TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE.

TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.

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13 Bibliography

[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,

August 2005

[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),

Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005

[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)

[4]

Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.

9

[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Website

[6] Security Target STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0a, BSI-DSZ-

CC-0521-2008, Version 0.6, 23 June 2008, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH

(confidential document)

[7] Security Target Lite STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0a, BSI-DSZ-

CC-0521-2008, Version 1.0, 19 August 2008, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (sanitized public document)

[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 1.1, 02 September 2008, STARCOS 3.3

Passport Edition Version 2.0a, SRC Security Research & Consulting GmbH

(confidential document)

[9] Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO

Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0026, Version 1.2, 19 November

2007, BSI

[10] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical

Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision

1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation

Organisation, LDS 1.7, 18 May 2004

9 specifically

• AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including

JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document

AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte

Schaltungen including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document

AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren

• AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.

AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for

EAL5+

AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite) including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies

AIS 36, Version 2, 12 November 2007, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document resp. CC Supporting Document

AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results

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[11] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable

Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version 1.1, Date 01 October

2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation

Organisation

[12] Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI registration ID:

BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs, Hitachi Ltd., Infineon

Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors

[13] Certification Report for NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B,

P5CN080V0B and P5CC080V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software, BSI-

DSZ-CC-410-2007, 05 July 2007, BSI

[14] ETR for composition for NXP P5CD080V0B, BSI-DSZ-CC-0410, T-Systems GEI

GmbH, Version 1.1, 23.04.2008

[15] Administrator Guidance STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Giesecke & Devrient

GmbH, Version 0.3, 09 May 2008

[16] User guidance STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,

Version 0.4, 07 May 2008

[17] STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition TABLES, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Version 1.0,

19 August 2008

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C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part1:

Conformance results (chapter 7.4)

„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).

The conformance result consists of one of the following:

CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.

CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2. plus one of the following:

CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.

CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:

Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to

Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:

PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.“

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CC Part 3:

Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)

“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.

Assurance Class Assurance Family

TOE description (APE_DES)

Security environment (APE_ENV)

Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)

Security objectives (APE_OBJ)

IT security requirements (APE_REQ)

Explicitly stated IT security requirements

(APE_SRE)

Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”

Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)

“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE evaluation.

Assurance Class Assurance Family

TOE description (ASE_DES)

Security environment (ASE_ENV)

ST introduction (ASE_INT)

Class ASE: Security Target evaluation Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)

PP claims (ASE_PPC)

IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)

Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)

TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)

Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”

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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)

“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table

1.

Assurance Class

ACM: Configuration management

ADO: Delivery and operation

ADV: Development

AGD: Guidance documents

Assurance Family

CM automation (ACM_AUT)

CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)

CM scope (ACM_SCP)

Delivery (ADO_DEL)

Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)

Functional specification (ADV_FSP)

High-level design (ADV_HLD)

Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)

TSF internals (ADV_INT)

Low-level design (ADV_LLD)

Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)

Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)

Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)

User guidance (AGD_USR)

Development security (ALC_DVS)

ALC: Life cycle support

ATE: Tests

Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)

Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)

Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)

Coverage (ATE_COV)

Depth (ATE_DPT)

Functional tests (ATE_FUN)

Independent testing (ATE_IND)

Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)

AVA: Vulnerability assessment Misuse (AVA_MSU)

Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)

Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”

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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)

“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)

“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/ or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families

(i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only

EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.

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Assurance

Class

Assurance

Family

Assurance Components by

Evaluation Assurance Level

EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7

1 1 2 2 Configuration management

ACM_AUT

ACM_CAP

ACM_SCP

Delivery and operation

ADO_DEL

ADO_IGS

Development ADV_FSP

ADV_HLD

ADV_IMP

ADV_INT

ADV_LLD

ADV_RCR

ADV_SPM

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

3

1

1

1

1

2

4

2

2

1

2

2

1

1

Guidance documents

AGD_ADM

AGD_USR

Life cycle support

ALC_DVS

ALC_FLR

ALC_LCD

ALC_TAT

Tests ATE_COV

ATE_DPT

ATE_FUN

ATE_IND

1

1

1

Vulnerability assessment

AVA_CCA

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

2

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

1

2

AVA_MSU

AVA_SOF

AVA_VLA

1

1

1

1

1

2

1

2 3

Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”

2

1

1

1

2

2

1

2

2

2

1

1

2

3

1

1

3

3

2

1

4

3

2

5

3

2

1

2

3

2

2

3

4

3

1

1

2

2

3

3

2

2

2

2

3

1

4

5

3

3

1

2

3

3

2

3

3

3

2

3

1

4

1

3

3

3

2

4

5

3

1

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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)

“Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified threats.”

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)

“Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter

11.5)

“Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial re-engineering.”

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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed

(chapter 11.6)

“Objectives

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter

11.7)

“Objectives

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested

(chapter 11.8)

“Objectives

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”

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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested (chapter

11.9)

“Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“

Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)

“Objectives

Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)

"Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”

"Application notes

A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”

“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for

AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”

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D Annexes

List of annexes of this certification report

Annex A: Security Target provided within a separate document.

Annex B: Evaluation results regarding development and production environment 35

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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0521-2008

Evaluation results regarding development and production environment

The IT product STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0a (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed / approved evaluation facility using the

Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the

Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),

Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).

As a result of the TOE certification, dated 18 September 2008, the following results regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria

Security Assurance Requirements

ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.2),

ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and

ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1), are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below: a) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Prinzregentenstrasse 159, 81677 Munich, Germany

(Development Center) b) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Dienstleistungscenter DLC, Prinzregentenstr. 159,

81677 Munich, Germany (Initialisation) c) d)

Smartrac Technology, 142 Moo 1 Hi-Tech industrial Estate, Ban Laean Bang, Pa-In

Phra nakorn Si Ayatthaya, 13160 Thailand (TOE Completion)

Giesecke & Devrient Slovakia (GDSK), s.r.o., Dolné Hony 11, 949 01 Nitra (TOE

Completion)

For development and production sites regarding the NXP chip P5CD080V0B refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0410-2007 [13].

For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance with the Security Target STARCOS 3.3 Passport Edition Version 2.0a, BSI-DSZ-

CC-0521-2008, Version 1.0, 19 August 2008, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH [6] resp. [7]. The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security Objectives and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security Target [6] resp. [7]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.

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