PP: Machine Readable Travel Document with 'ICAO Application', Extended Access Control, Version 1.1

PP: Machine Readable Travel Document with 'ICAO Application', Extended Access Control, Version 1.1
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
BSI-PP-0026
Approved by the
Federal Ministry of the Interior
Version 1.1, 7th September 2006
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
1
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Version 1.1, 7th September 2006
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
Foreword
This ‘Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application (MRTD-PP),
Extended Access Control’ is issued by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik,
Germany.
The document has been prepared as a Protection Profile (PP) following the rules and formats of
Common Criteria version 2.3 [1], [2], [3].
Correspondence and comments to this Machine Readable Travel Document (MRTD-PP) should be
referred to:
CONTACT ADDRESS
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189
D-53175 Bonn, Germany
Tel
Fax
+49 1888 9582-0 +49 1888 9582-400 Email [email protected]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
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Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
Table of Content 1
PP Introduction
5
1.1
PP reference
5
1.2
PP Overview
5
1.3
Conformance Claim
5
2
TOE Description
6
3
Security Problem Definition
10
3.1
Introduction
10
3.2
Assumptions
12
3.3
Threats
13
3.4
Organisational Security Policies
15
3.5
Security Objectives
16
3.5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
3.5.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment
3.5.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
16
19
20
4
Extended Components Definition
23
4.1
Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
23
4.2
Definition of the Family FCS_RND
23
4.3
Definition of the Family FIA_API
24
4.4
Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
25
4.5
Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
27
5
Security Requirements
29
5.1
Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
31
5.1.1
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4
5.1.5
5.1.6
5.2
Class FAU Security Audit
Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Class FDP User Data Protection
Class FMT Security Management
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
31
31
35
41
44
51
54
5.3
Security Requirements for the IT environment
55
5.3.1
5.3.2
5.3.3
5.3.4
5.3.5
5.3.6
Passive Authentication
Extended Access Control PKI
Basic Terminal
General Inspection System
Extended Inspection System
Personalization Terminals
55
55
56
61
65
66
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6
PP Application Notes
68
7
Rationales
69
7.1
Security Objectives Rationale
69
7.2
Security Requirements Rationale
72
7.2.1
7.2.2
7.2.3
7.2.4
Security Functional Requirements Rationale
Dependency Rationale
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
72
80
87
87
8
Glossary and Acronyms
89
9
Literature
95
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Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
1 PP Introduction
1.1 PP reference
1
Title:
Sponsor:
Editors:
CC Version:
Assurance Level:
General Status:
Version Number:
Registration:
Keywords:
Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application, Extended Access Control (PP-MRTD EAC)
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Wolfgang Killmann, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Solution & Service Center
Testfactory & Security
2.3 The minimum assurance level for this PP is EAL4 augmented. Working draft 1.1 BSI-PP-0026
ICAO, machine readable travel document, extended access control 1.2 PP Overview
2
The protection profile defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of
machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods
Basic Access Control, Extended Access Control and chip authentication similar to the Active
Authentication in the Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.
1.3 Conformance Claim
3
This protection profile claims conformance to
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-001
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-002
• Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-003
as follows
-
Part 2 extended,
-
Part 3 conformant,
-
Package conformant to EAL4 augmented with ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3
and AVA_VLA.4.
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2 TOE Description
TOE definition
4
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable
travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [5]
and providing the Basic Access Control, the Extended Access Control according to the ICAO
document [6] and the chip authentication according to the technical report [25].
5
The TOE comprises of
• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the contactless
interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors,
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software,
• the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
• the MRTD application and
• the associated guidance documentation.
TOE usage and security features for operational use
6
State or organisation issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveller
presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of
this protection profile contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the
holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR
methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip
according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on
(i) the possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given
on the biographical data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD.
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The
receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
7
For this protection profile the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a)
(b)
1
the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1)
the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2)
the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3)
the printed portrait.
the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [5] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents
contactless readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1)
the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2)
the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3)
the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both 1
(4)
the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
These biometric reference data are optional according to [5]. This PP assumes that the issuing State or
Organization uses this option and protects these data by means of extended access control.
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(5)
the Document security object.
8
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the
MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
9
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper,
security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational
security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [7]. These security
measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
10 The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the
MRTD’s chip.
11 The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of
the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as
optional security measure in the ICAO Technical report [6]. The Passive Authentication
Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently of the TOE by
the TOE environment.
12 This protection profile addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write­
only-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic Access
Control Mechanism and the Extended Access Control Mechanism. This protection profile
addresses the Chip Authentication described in [25] as an alternative to the Active Authentication
stated in [6].
13 The Basic Access Control is a security feature that shall be mandatory implemented by the TOE.
The inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection system
by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the inspection
system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of private
communication (secure messaging) with this inspection system [6], Annex E, and [5].
14 The protection profile requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication defined in [25]
instead of the Active Authentication described in [6]. Both protocols provide evidence of the
MRTD’s chip authenticity where the Chip Authentication prevents data traces described in [6],
Annex G, section G.3.3. The Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps: (i) the
inspection system communicates by means of secure messaging established by Basic Access
Control, (ii) the inspection system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the
authenticity of the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object,
(iii) the inspection system generates a ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the inspection system
agree on two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the DiffieHellman Primitive and (v) the inspection system verifies by means of received message
authentication codes whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e.
it could apply the Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication
Public Key for derivation of the session keys). The Chip Authentication requires collaboration of
the TOE and the TOE environment.
15 The protection profile requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined in
[25]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) a Terminal Authentication Protocol to
authenticate the inspection system as entity authorized by the Issuing State or Organization
through the receiving State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive
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biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems. It
requires the Chip Authentication of the MRTD’s chip to the inspection system and uses the secure
messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the
inspection system. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the receiving State by means of
certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System
Certificates.
TOE life cycle
16 The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases.
Phase 1 “Development”
17 The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
18 The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the
guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC
Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
19 The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the
Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is securely
delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable
memories, the MRTD application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the
MRTD manufacturer.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
20 In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip Dedicated
Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile non­
programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the
chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to
the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the MRTD
manufacturer.
21 The MRTD manufacturer (i) adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile
programmable memories (for instance EEPROM) if necessary, (ii) creates the MRTD application,
(iii) equips MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization Data, and (iv) combines the IC with hardware
for the contactless interface in the passport book.
22 The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the MRTD
manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant
parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
23 The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical
data, (ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits
and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the
physical MRTD, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and
(v) the writing of the TSF Data into the logical MRTD and configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the
creation of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitised portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the
Document security object.
24 The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [6] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together
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with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for
operational use.
25 Application note 1: This protection profile distinguishes between the Personalization Agent as
entity known to the TOE and the Document Signer as entity in the TOE IT environment signing
the Document security object as described in [6]. This approach allows but does not enforce the
separation of these roles. The selection of the authentication keys should consider the
organisation, the productivity and the security of the personalization process. Asymmetric
authentication keys provide comfortable security for distributed personalization but their use may
be more time consuming than authentication using symmetric cryptographic primitives.
Authentication using symmetric cryptographic primitives allows fast authentication protocols
appropriate for centralised personalization schemes but relies on stronger security protection in
the personalization environment (cf. section 5.3.6 Personalization Terminals for further details).
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
26 The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational
Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the Issuing State or
Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the Issuing State but they can
never be modified.
27 Application note 2: The authorized Personalization Agents might be allowed to add (not to
modify) data in the other data groups of the MRTD application (e.g. person(s) to notify
EF.DG16) in the Phase 4 “Operational Use”. This will imply an update of the Document Security
Object including the re-signing by the Document Signer.
28 Application note 3: The intention of the PP is to consider at least the phases 1 and 2 as part of
the evaluation and therefore to define the TOE delivery according to CC after phase 2 or later.
The personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of an
issuing state or organisation. The Security Target shall describe the instantiation of the life cycle
defined in this PP relevant for the product evaluation process. It is of importance to define the
point of TOE delivery in the life cycle required for the evaluation according to CC requirements
ADO_DEL. All development and production steps before TOE delivery have to be part of the
evaluation under ACM, ALC and ADO assurance classes as specifically relevant before TOE
delivery. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE delivery up to the
operational use (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation process under ADO and
AGD assurance classes. Therefore, the Security Target has to outline the split up of P.Manufact,
P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs. after TOE
delivery. Note: In many cases security aspects for phase 3 are defined and controlled by the
issuing state or organisation.
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
Assets
29 The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
30 Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security
needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [5]. These data are user data
of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1
to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication
Public Key (EF.DG14) is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The
EF.SOD is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
User Data
Personal Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1,
EF.DG2, EF.DG5 - EF.DG13, EF.DG15, EF.DG16)
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14
Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD
Common data in EF.COM
TSF Data
Personalisation Agent Reference
Authentication Data
Basic Access Control (BAC) Key
Public Key CVCA
CVCA Certificate
Current date
Chip Authentication Private Key
31 A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
32 Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the
MRTD holder is used by the traveller to proof his possession of a genuine MRTD.
Subjects
33 This protection profile considers the following subjects:
34 Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the
TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC
Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
35 Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organisation to personalize the MRTD for the
holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the holder for the
biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e.
the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data
on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national
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interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (v) signing the Document Security Object
defined in [5].
36 Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing
Country or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored
in the MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems
and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of
the CVCA are distributed in form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
37 Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving Country with respect to
the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection
Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems
for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations in
form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
38 Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
39 Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as
MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic
Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this
information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which
implements additional the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System
(EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier
of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the
EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
40 Application note 4: According to [6] the support of (i) the Passive Authentication mechanism is
mandatory, and (ii) the Basic Access Control is optional. In the context of this protection profile
the Primary Inspection System does not implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control.
It is therefore not able to read the logical MRTD because the logical MRTD of the TOE is
protected by Basic Access Control. Therefore this protection profile will not consider the use of
Primary Inspection System by the receiving State or Organization. The TOE of the current
protection profile does not allow the Personalization agent to disable the Basic Access Control for
use with Primary Inspection Systems as described in the BSI-PP-0017 Machine Readable Travel
Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control.
41 MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalised the
MRTD.
42 Traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD
holder.
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43 Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e.
without knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD), (ii) to read or to manipulate the
logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
44 Application note 5: An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment
independent on using a genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use
results of successful attacks against the TOE but his or her attack itself is not relevant for the
TOE.
3.2 Assumptions
45 The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used
or is intended to be used.
46 A.Pers_Agent
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the
MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate
(if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object.
The Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself
to the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
47 A.Insp_Sys
Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller
as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization,
and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [6]. The Basic Inspection
System reads the logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive
Authentication to verify the logical MRTD. The General Inspection System in addition to the
Basic Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General
Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes
secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended
Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal
Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the
Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
48 A.Signature_PKI
PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing
State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which (i) securely generates, stores and
uses the Country Signing CA Key pair, and (ii) manages the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key
Pairs. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and distributes the Country
Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document
Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public
Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses
securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the
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MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys
and distributes them to the receiving States and organizations.
49 A.Auth_PKI
PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for card
verifiable certificates of the extended access control. The Country Verifying Certification
Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key
pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country
Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organisations are signing the
certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of
the Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organisations. The issuing States or
Organizations distributes the public key of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to
their MRTD’s chip.
3.3 Threats
50 This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with
its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
51 The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
52 T.Chip_ID
Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip
by establishing or listening a communication through the contactless communication interface.
The attacker cannot read optically and does not know in advance the physical MRTD.
53 T.Skimming
Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker cannot read and does not know in
advance the physical MRTD.
54 T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Read the sensitive biometric reference data
An attacker with high attack potential knowing the Document Basic Access Keys is trying to gain
the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the MRTD’s chip.
The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threats T.Skimming in respect of the attack
path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD’s chip) but
differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital
MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access
Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data
are stored only on the MRTD’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and
the portrait are visual readable on the physical MRTD as well.
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55 T.Forgery
Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its
security related data in order to impose on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD
holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in
the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveller. The attacker may alter the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and
the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter
the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the
inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a
new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker write the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference
data of finger read from the logical MRTD of a traveller into an other MRTD’s chip leaving their
digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also
copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD in another contactless chip.
56 T.Counterfeit
MRTD’s chip
An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a
genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a
genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine
MRTD’s chip.
57 The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.
58 T.Abuse-Func
Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in
order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change)
security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in
the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
59 T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to
disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation
or caused by the attacker.
60 Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics,
clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted
as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating
parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface
(emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless
chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the
Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
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Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g.
Differential Fault Analysis).
61 T.Phys-Tamper
Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data,
or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically
modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s
chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User
Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User
Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication
key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by
modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis).
Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques
commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used.
Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a
pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of
circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
62 T.Malfunction
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by
applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of
the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration
function. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional
operation.
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
63 The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations (see CC
part 1, sec. 3.2).
64 P.Manufact
Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the security of the
manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The
Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization
Agent Key.
65 P.Personalization
only
Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
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The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitised portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD
with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed
by an agent authorised by the issuing State or Organization only.
66 P.Personal_Data
Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip
(EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitised portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of
finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4) and data according to
LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the
MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD
holder i.e. if the MRTD is presented to an inspection system. Additional to the Basic Access
Control Authentication defined by ICAO in [6] the MRTD’s chip shall protect the confidentiality
and integrity of the personal data during transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip
authentication.
67 Application note 6: The organisational security policy P.Personal_Data is drawn from the ICAO
Technical Report [6]. Note, that the Document Basic Access Key is defined by the TOE
environment and loaded to the TOE by the Personalization Agent.
68 P.Sensitive_Data
Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive
private personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used
only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is
presented to the inspection system. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the Document
Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the
limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate.
3.5 Security Objectives
69 This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security
objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the
operational environment.
3.5.1
Security Objectives for the TOE
70 This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be met by the TOE.
71 OT.AC_Pers
Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [5] and the TSF data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data
may be written only during and cannot be changed after its personalisation. The Document
security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups
EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are added.
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72 Application note 7:The OT.AC_Pers implies that
(1) the data of the LDS groups written during personalization for MRTD holder (at least
EF.DG1 and EF.DG2) can not be changed by write access after personalization,
(2) the Personalization Agents may (i) add (fill) data into the LDS data groups not written yet,
and (ii) update and sign the Document Security Object accordantly.
73 OT.Data_Int
Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical
MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
74 OT.Data_Conf
Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 and the Document Security Object of the logical MRTD by granting read access to
terminals successfully authenticated by as (i) Personalization Agent or (ii) Basic Inspection
System or (iii) Extended Inspection System. The TOE implements the Basic Access Control as
defined by ICAO [6] and enforce Basic Inspection System to authenticate itself by means of the
Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General
Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
75 Application note 8:The traveller grants the authorization for reading the personal data in EF.DG1
to EF.DG16 to the inspection system by presenting the MRTD. The MRTD’s chip shall provide
read access to these data for terminals successfully authenticated by means of the Basic Access
Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys. The security objective
OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to ensure the strength of the security function Basic Access
Control Authentication independent on the quality of the Document Basic Access Keys which is
defined by the TOE environment and loaded into the TOE by the Personalization Agent. Any
attack based on decision of the ICAO Technical Report [6] that the inspection system derives
Document Basic Access Keys from the printed MRZ data does not violate the security objective
OT.Data_Conf. 2
76 OT.Sens_Data_Conf
Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized inspection systems. The authorization of the
inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful
authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document
Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the
issuing State or Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive
biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
77 OT.Identification
Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification Data in its non-volatile memory. The IC
Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
“Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. In Phase 4 “Operational Use”, the
2
Cf. CEM [4], section 8.10.3.4, para. 1625
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TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or
Personalization Agent.
78 Application note 9: The TOE security objective OT.Identification addresses security features of
the TOE to support the life cycle security in the manufacturing and personalization phases. The
IC Identification Data are used for TOE identification in Phase 2 “Manufacturing” and for
traceability and/or to secure shipment of the TOE from Phase 2 “Manufacturing” into the Phase 3
“Personalization of the MRTD”. The OT.Identification addresses security features of the TOE to
be used by the TOE manufacturing environment as described in its security objective
OD.Material. In the Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE is identified by the passport number as
part of the printed and digital MRZ. The OT.Identification forbids the output of any other IC (e.g.
integrated circuit serial number ICCSN) or a MRTD identifier through the contactless interface
before successful authentication as Basic Inspection System or as Personalization Agent.
79 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
Proof of MRTD’S chip authenticity
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication as defined in [25]. The authenticity prove provided by MRTD’s chip shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
80 Application note 10: The OT.Chip_Auth_Proof implies the MRTD’s chip to have (i) a unique
identity as given by the MRTD’s Document number, (ii) a secret to prove its identity by
knowledge i.e. a private authentication key as TSF data. The TOE shall protect this TSF data to
prevent their misuse. The terminal shall have the reference data to verify the authentication
attempt of MRTD’s chip i.e. a certificate for the Chip Authentication Public Key that fit to the
Chip Authentication Private Key of the MRTD’s chip. This certificate is provided by (i) the Chip
Authentication Public Key (EF.DG14) in the LDS [5] and (ii) the hash value of the
Authentication Public Key in the Document Security Object signed by the Document Signer.
81 The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip
independent on the TOE environment.
82 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery can
be abused in order (i) to disclose critical User Data, (ii) to manipulate critical User Data of the
Smartcard Embedded Software, (iii) to manipulate Soft-coded Smartcard Embedded Software or
(iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test
Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
83 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock,
or I/O lines and
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• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
• by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
84 Application note 11: This objective pertains to measurements with subsequent complex signal
processing due to normal operation of the TOE or operations enforced by an attacker. Details
correspond to an analysis of attack scenarios which is not given here.
85 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF
Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with
high attack potential by means of
• measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
• measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges
(using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
• manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
• controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
• reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
86 Application note 12: In order to meet the security objectives OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper the TOE
must be designed and fabricated so that it requires a high combination of complex equipment,
knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive detailed design information or other information
which could be used to compromise security through such a physical attack. This is addressed by
the security objective OD.Assurance.
87 OT.Prot_Malfunction
Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the
normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested.
This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp.
electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
88 Application note 13: A malfunction of the TOE may also be caused using a direct interaction
with elements on the chip surface. This is considered as being a manipulation (refer to the
objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper) provided that detailed knowledge about the TOE´s internals.
3.5.2
Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment
89 OD.Assurance
Assurance
Manufacturing Environment
Security
Measures
in
Development
and
The developer and manufacturer ensure that the TOE is designed and fabricated such that it
requires a combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive
detailed design information or other information which could be used to compromise security
through attack. This includes the use of the Initialization Data for unique identification of the
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TOE and the pre-personalization of the TOE including the writing of the Personalization Agent
Authentication key(s). The developer provides necessary evaluation evidence that the TOE fulfils
its security objectives and is resistant against obvious penetration attacks with high attack
potential.
90 OD.Material
Control over MRTD Material
The IC Manufacturer, the MRTD Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent must control all
materials, equipment and information to produce, initialise, pre-personalize genuine MRTD’s
materials and to personalize authentic MRTDs in order to prevent counterfeit of MRTDs using
MRTD materials.
3.5.3
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
91 The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
92 OE.Personalization
Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of
the issuing State or Organisation (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create
biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e.
the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the
MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect
the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
93 OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The Issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA
Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document
Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the
Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and organizations maintaining its authenticity
and integrity. The Issuing State or organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure
Document Signing Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii)
sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and
(iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signing Public Key to receiving States and
organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data
in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [5].
94 OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
MRTD Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order
to (i) generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip
Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii)
support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by
means of the Document Security Object.
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95 OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order
to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to authorized
receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing
State or Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized
Document Verifier only.
Receiving State or organization
96 The Receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
97 OE.Exam_MRTD
Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the Receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by the traveller
to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i)
includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing
State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [6].
Additionally General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
98 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the Receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveller
as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of
Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are
used. The receiving States and organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and
the Document Signing Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection
systems.
99 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
Protection of data of the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent
eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully
established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
100 Application note 14: The figure 2.1 in [25] supposes that the GIS and the EIS follow the order (i)
running the Basic Access Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of the
logical MRTD after which are necessary to know for the Chip Authentication Mechanism (i.e.
Document Security Object and Chip Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Chip
Authentication protocol, and (iv) reading and verifying the less-sensitive data of the logical
MRTD after Chip Authentication. The supposed sequence has the advantage that the less­
sensitive data are protected by secure messaging with cryptographic keys based on the Chip
Authentication Protocol which quality is under control of the TOE. The inspection system will
prevent additionally eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure
messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol. Note that
reading the less-sensitive data directly after Basic Access Control Mechanism is allowed and is
not assumed as threat in this PP. But the TOE ensures that reading of sensitive data is possible
after successful Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication Protocol only.
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101 OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorize Extended Inspection
Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference
data of the logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the
MRTD’s chip for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal
Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.
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4 Extended Components Definition
102 This protection profile uses components defined as extensions to CC part 2. Some of these
components are defined in [22], other components are defined in this protection profile.
4.1 Definition of the Family FAU_SAS
103 To define the security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FAU_SAS) of the
Class FAU (Security Audit) is defined here. This family describes the functional requirements for
the storage of audit data. It has a more general approach than FAU_GEN, because it does not
necessarily require the data to be generated by the TOE itself and because it does not give specific
details of the content of the audit records.
104 The family “Audit data storage (FAU_SAS)” is specified as follows.
FAU_SAS Audit data storage
Family behaviour This family defines functional requirements for the storage of audit data. Component levelling FAU_SAS Audit data storage
1
FAU_SAS.1
Requires the TOE to provide the possibility to store audit data.
Management:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FAU_SAS.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FAU_SAS.1
Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorised users] with the capability to
store [assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
4.2 Definition of the Family FCS_RND
105 To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FCS_RND) of
the Class FCS (cryptographic support) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for random number generation used for cryptographic purposes. The component
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FCS_RND is not limited to generation of cryptographic keys as the component FCS_CKM.1 is.
The similar component FIA_SOS.2 is intended for non-cryptographic use.
106 The family “Generation of random numbers (FCS_RND)” is specified as follows.
FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
Family behaviour This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers which are intended to be used for cryptographic purposes. Component levelling: FCS_RND Generation of random numbers
1
FCS_RND.1
Generation of random numbers requires that random numbers meet a defined
quality metric.
Management:
FCS_RND.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FCS_RND.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FCS_RND.1
Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
4.3 Definition of the Family FIA_API
107 To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of
the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by
an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity
of an external entity.
108 Application note 15: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users’ identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of the
user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the family FIA_API in the style of
the Common Criteria part 2 (cf. [3], chapter “Explicitly stated IT security requirements
(APE_SRE)”) form a TOE point of view.
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109 FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove their identity and to be verified by an external entity in the TOE IT environment. Component levelling: FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity.
Management:
FIA_API.1
1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in
FMT: Management of authentication information used to prove the claimed
identity.
Audit:
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FIA_API.1
Authentication Proof of Identity
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FIA_API.1.1
The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove
the identity of the [assignment: authorized user or rule].
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
4.4 Definition of the Family FMT_LIM
110 The family FMT_LIM describes the functional requirements for the Test Features of the TOE.
The new functional requirements were defined in the class FMT because this class addresses the
management of functions of the TSF. The examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE
show that no other class is appropriate to address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of
functions by limiting the capabilities of the functions and by limiting their availability.
111 The family “Limited capabilities and availability (FMT_LIM)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements that limit the capabilities and availability of functions in a
combined manner. Note, that FDP_ACF restricts the access to functions whereas the Limited
capability of this family requires the functions themselves to be designed in a specific manner.
Component levelling:
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1
FMT_LIM Limited capabilities and availability
2
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities requires that the TSF is built to provide only the
capabilities (perform action, gather information) necessary for its genuine
purpose.
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability requires that the TSF restrict the use of functions (refer
to Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)). This can be achieved, for instance,
by removing or by disabling functions in a specific phase of the TOE’s life­
cycle.
Management:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FMT_LIM.1, FMT_LIM.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
112 To define the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FMT_LIM) of
the Class FMT (Security Management) is defined here. This family describes the functional
requirements for the Test Features of the TOE. The new functional requirements were defined in
the class FMT because this class addresses the management of functions of the TSF. The
examples of the technical mechanism used in the TOE show that no other class is appropriate to
address the specific issues of preventing the abuse of functions by limiting the capabilities of the
functions and by limiting their availability.
113 The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” is specified as follows.
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following policy
is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies:
F
MT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
114 The TOE Functional Requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” is specified as follows.
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FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following policy
is enforced [assignment: Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies:
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
115 Application note 16: The functional requirements FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 assume that
there are two types of mechanisms (limited capabilities and limited availability) which together
shall provide protection in order to enforce the policy. This also allows that
(i) the TSF is provided without restrictions in the product in its user environment but its
capabilities are so limited that the policy is enforced
or conversely
(ii) the TSF is designed with high functionality but is removed or disabled in the product in its
user environment.
The combination of both requirements shall enforce the policy.
4.5 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC
116 The sensitive family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is
defined here to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall
prevent attacks against the TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external
observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s
electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA),
timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of
intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [2].
117 The family “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)” is specified as follows.
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
FPT_EMSEC TOE emanation
1
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access
to TSF data or user data.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires not emit interface emanation enabling access to
TSF data or user data.
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Management:
FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no management activities foreseen.
Audit:
FPT_EMSEC.1
There are no actions defined to be auditable.
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types
of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the
following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to
[assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of
user data].
Dependencies: No other components.
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5 Security Requirements
118 The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph 2.1.4 of Part 2 of the CC. Each of
these operations is used in this PP.
119 The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement” in bold
text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC requirement
were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.
120 The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as unlined text and the
original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections to be filled in by the ST author
appear in square brackets with an indication that a selection is to be made, [selection:], and are
italicized.
121 The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as
the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors are denoted by
showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote.
Assignments to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that an
assignment is to be made [assignment:], and are italicized.
122 The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration
is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component identifier.
123 The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used:
Name
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Private Key (SKCVCA)
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Public Key (PKCVCA)
Country Verifying
Certification Authority
Certificate (CCVCA)
Document Verifier
Certificate (CDV)
Data
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a
private key (SKCVCA) used for signing the Document Verifier
Certificates.
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority
Public Key (PKCVCA) as part of the TSF data to verify the
Document Verifier Certificates. The PKCVCA has the security
attribute Current Date as the most recent valid effective date of the
Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate or of a
domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be a
self-signed certificate or a link certificate (cf. [25] and Glossary). It
contains (i) the Country Verifying Certification Authority Public
Key (PKCVCA) as authentication reference data, (ii) the coded access
control rights of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii)
the Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as
security attributes.
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i) the Document
Verifier Public Key (PKDV) as authentication reference data (ii)
identification as domestic or foreign Document Verifier, the coded
access control rights of the Document Verifier, the Certificate
Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security
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Name
Inspection System
Certificate (CIS)
Chip Authentication
Public Key Pair
Chip Authentication
Public Key (PKICC)
Chip Authentication
Private Key (SKICC)
Country Signing
Certification Authority
Key Pair
Document Signer Key
Pairs
Document Basic Access
Keys
BAC Session Keys
Chip Session Key
Data
attributes.
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the Document
Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference data the
Inspection System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded access control
rights of the Extended Inspection System, the Certificate Effective
Date and the Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used
for Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH) according to
RFC 2631 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman according to ISO
15946.
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the
EF.DG14 Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s logical
MRTD and used by the inspection system for Chip Authentication
of the MRTD’s chip. It is part of the user data provided by the TOE
for the IT environment.
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE to
authenticate itself as authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of the TSF
data.
Country Signing Certification Authority of the Issuing State or
Organization signs the Document Signer Public Key Certificate
with the Country Signing Certification Authority Private Key and
the signature will be verified by Receiving State or Organization
(e.g. a Basic Inspection System) with the Country Signing
Certification Authority Public Key.
Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization signs the
Document Security Object of the logical MRTD with the
Document Signer Private Key and the signature will be verified by
a Basic Inspection Systems of the Receiving State or organization
with the Document Signer Public Key.
The Document Basic Access Key is created by the Personalization
Agent, loaded to the TOE, and used for mutual authentication and
key agreement for secure messaging between the Basic Inspection
System and the MRTD’s chip.
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed
between the TOE and a BIS in result of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Protocol.
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed
between the TOE and a GIS in result of the Chip Authentication
Protocol.
124 Application note 17: The Country Verifying Certification Authority identifies a Document
Verifier as “domestic” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it belongs to the same country as
the Country Verifying Certification Authority. The Country Verifying Certification Authority
identifies a Document Verifier as “foreign” in the Document Verifier Certificate if it does belong
to the same country as the Country Verifying Certification Authority. From MRTD’s point of
view the domestic Document Verifier belongs to the issuing Country or Organisation.
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5.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
125 This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following
the main security functionality.
5.1.1
Class FAU Security Audit
126 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
127 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
FAU_SAS.1.1
Dependencies:
No other components.
The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer 3 with the capability to store
the IC Identification Data 4 in the audit records.
No dependencies.
128 Application note 18: The Manufacturer role is the default user identity assumed by the TOE in
the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The IC manufacturer and the MRTD manufacturer in the
Manufacturer role write the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data as TSF Data of the
TOE. The audit records are write-only-once data of the MRTD’s chip (see
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS). The security measures in the manufacturing environment assessed under
ADO_IGS and ADO_DEL ensure that the audit records will be used to fulfil the security
objective OD.Assurance.
5.1.2
Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
129 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key
generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
130 FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Key Derivation Function by the
MRTD
Hierarchical to:
FCS_CKM.1.1/ KDF_MRTD
No other components.
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access Key
Derivation Algorithm 5 and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit 6
that meet the following: [6], Annex E 7.
3
[assignment: authorised users]
4
[assignment: list of audit information]
5
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
6
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
7
[assignment: list of standards]
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Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes 131 Application note 19: The TOE is equipped with the Document Basic Access Key generated and
downloaded by the Personalization Agent. The Basic Access Control Authentication Protocol
described in [6], Annex E.2, produces agreed parameters to generate the Triple-DES key and the
Retail-MAC BAC Session Keys for secure messaging by the algorithm in [6], Annex E.1. The
TOE uses this key derivation function to derive other session keys from shared secrets established
by the Chip Authentication Protocol for the secure messaging required by
FCS_COP.1/ENC_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD as well. The TOE may use this key
derivation function for authentication of the Personalization Agent. The algorithm uses the
random number RND.ICC generated by TSF as required by FCS_RND.1/MRTD.
132 FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the
MRTD
Hierarchical to:
FCS_CKM.1.1/ DH_MRTD Dependencies: No other components.
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key
generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [25], Annex A.1 8.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes 133 Application note 20: The TOE generates a shared secret value with the terminal during the
Chip Authentication Protocol, see [25], sec. 3.1 and Annex A.1. This protocol may be based on
the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 (i.e. a modulo arithmetic based
cryptographic algorithm, cf. [21]) or on the ECDH compliant to ISO 15946 (i.e. an elliptic curve
cryptography algorithm) (cf. [25], Annex A.1, [26] and [20] for details). The shared secret value
is used to derive the 112 bit Triple-DES key for encryption and the 112 bit Retail-MAC Chip
Session Keys according to the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm [6], annex
E.1, for the TSF required by FCS_COP.1/ENC_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD.
134 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
135 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to:
FCS_CKM.4.1/ 8
No other components.
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key
[assignment: list of standards]
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MRTD
Dependencies:
destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
136 Application note 21: The TOE shall destroy the BAC Session Keys (i) after detection of an error
in a received command by verification of the MAC, and (ii) after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol. The TOE shall destroy the Chip Session Keys after detection of an error
in a received command by verification of the MAC. The TOE shall clear the memory area of any
session keys before starting the communication with the terminal in a new power-on-session.
5.1.2.1
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
137 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be
implemented by the TOE.
138 FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_MRTD
Dependencies: The TSF shall perform hashing 9 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm] and
cryptographic key sizes none 10 that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 11.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
139 Application note 22: The ST writer shall perform the missing operation for the assignment of the
hash algorithm supported by the TOE. The TOE shall implement the hash function SHA-1 for the
cryptographic primitive to derive the keys for secure messaging from the shared secrets of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (cf. [6], annex E.1). The Chip Authentication
Protocol may use SHA-1 (cf. [25], Annex A.1.1). The TOE may implement additional hash
functions SHA-224, and SHA-256 for the Terminal Authentication Protocol (cf. [25], Annex
A.2.2 for details).
140 FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
9
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
10
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
11
[assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1.1/ TDES_MRTD Dependencies: The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption 12
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in
CBC mode 13 and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit 14 that meet the
following: FIPS 46-3 [13] and [6]; Annex E.3 15.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
141 Application note 23: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for
secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The keys are agreed between the TOE
and the terminal as part of (i) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to
the FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD or (ii) the Chip Authentication Protocol according to the
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD. Note the Triple-DES in CBC mode with zero initial vector include
also the Triple-DES in ECB mode for blocks of 8 byte used to check the authentication attempt of
a terminal as Personalization Agent by means of the symmetric authentication mechanism.
142 FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ MAC_MRTD
Dependencies: The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication
code 16 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC 17 and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit 18 that meet the following:
ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, Sequence Message
Counter, padding mode 2) 19.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
143 Application note 24: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for
secure messaging with encryption and message authentication code over the transmitted data. The
key is agreed between the TSF by the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism as part of
(i) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism according to the
12
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
13
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
14
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
15
[assignment: list of standards]
16
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
17
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
18
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
19
[assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD or (ii) the Chip Authentication Protocol according to the
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD.
144 FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_VER
Dependencies:
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification 20 in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic
algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key
sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
145 Application note 25: The ST writer shall perform the missing operation of the assignments for
the signature algorithms key lengths and standards implemented by the TOE for the Terminal
Authentication Protocol (cf. [25], Annex A.2.1.1 and C.3 for details). The signature verification is
used to verify the card verifiable certificates and the authentication attempt of the terminal
creating a digital signature for the TOE challenge.
5.1.2.2
Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
146 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
147 FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
FCS_RND.1.1/
MRTD
Dependencies:
No other components.
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
No dependencies.
148 Application note 26: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for the
authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4/MRTD.
5.1.3
Class FIA Identification and Authentication
149 Application note 27: The Table 1 provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms used.
20
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
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Name
SFR for the TOE
Symmetric
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization
Agents
FIA_AFL.1,
Basic Access
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
Control
Authentication FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
Mechanism
Chip
FIA_API.1/MRTD,
Authentication FIA_UAU.5/MRTD,
Protocol
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
Terminal
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
Authentication
Protocol
Table 1: Overview on authentication SFR
SFR for the
TOE environment
(terminal)
FIA_API.1/PT
Algorithms and key sizes
according to [6], Annex E,
and [25]
Triple-DES with 112 bit
keys
FIA_UAU.4/BT,
FIA_UAU.6/BT
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys
and
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys
FIA_UAU.4/GIS,
FIA_UAU.5/GIS,
FIA_UAU.6/GIS
FIA_API.1/EIS
DH or ECDH and
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys
RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 or
EC-DSA with SHA
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol include the asymmetric key agreement and the check
whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code with the expected
key for any message received by the terminal.
150 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
151 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UID.1.1 FIA_UID.1.2 The TSF shall allow
(1) to establish the communication channel,
(2) to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS 21
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
152 Application note 28: The MRTD’s chip and the terminal establish the communication channel
through the contactless. The Protocol Type A defines an “Answer to Select” (ATS) and the
protocol Type B is managed through the commands “Answer to Request” and “Answer to
Attrib”. Note that the terminal and the MRTD’s chip use an identifier for the communication
channel to allow the terminal for communication with more then one RFID. If the historical bytes
are used to identify the product as usual for example with hard-mask version and component code
(specific to the manufacturer), in particular context this could lead to an exploitation of the threat
21
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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T.Chip_Id (e.g. in the case a MRTD holder has a chip manufactured by a local manufacturer, he
could be traced in a foreign country where few holders could have the same ATS content).
Therefore the ATS has to be set in such a manner, that it will not lead to a vulnerability by the
means of identifying the chip (e.g. randomly using random number generator as required by
FCS_RND.1).
153 Application note 29: In the “Operation Use” phase the MRTD must not allow anybody to read
the ICCSN or any other unique identification before the user is authenticated as Basic Inspection
System (cf. T.Chip_ID). Note, that the terminal and the MRTD’s chip use an identifier for the
communication channel to allow the terminal for communication with more then one RFID. If
this identifier is randomly selected it will not violate the OT.Identification. If this identifier is
fixed the ST writer should consider the possibility to misuse this identifier to perform attacks
addressed by T.Chip_ID.
154 Application note 30: In the Phase 2 “Manufacturing of the TOE” the Manufacturer is the only
user role known to the TOE which writes the Initialization Data and/or Pre-personalization Data
in the audit records of the IC. The MRTD manufacturer may create the user role Personalization
Agent for transition from Phase 2 to Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. The users in role
Personalization Agent identify themselves by means of selecting the authentication key. After
personalization in the Phase 3 the user role Basic Inspection System is created by writing the
Document Basic Access Keys. The Basic Inspection System is identified as default user after
power up or reset of the TOE i.e. the TOE will use the Document Basic Access Key to
authenticate the user as Basic Inspection System. After successful authentication as Basic
Inspection System the terminal may identify themselves as (i) Extended Inspection System by
selection of the templates for the Terminal Authentication Protocol or (ii) if necessary and
available as Personalization Agent by selection of the Personalization Agent Authentication Key.
155 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
156 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.1.1 FIA_UAU.1.2 The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
3. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key 22
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
22
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
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157 The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
158 FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES 23.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
159 Application note 31: All listed authentication mechanisms uses a challenge of 8 Bytes freshly
and randomly generated by the TOE to prevent reuse of a response generated by a terminal in a
successful authentication attempt: The Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism, the
Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES use
RND.ICC [25].
160 Application note 32: The Basic Access Control Mechanism is a mutual device authentication
mechanism defined in [6]. In the first step the terminal authenticates itself to the MRTD’s chip
and the MRTD’s chip authenticates to the terminal in the second step. In the first step the TOE
sends a randomly chosen challenge which shall contain sufficient entropy to prevent T.Chip_ID.
In the second step the MRTD’s chip provides a challenge-response-pair which allows the terminal
a unique identification of the MRTD’s chip with some probability depending on the entropy of
the Document Basic Access Keys. Therefore the TOE shall stop the communication with the
terminal not successfully authenticated in the first step of the protocol to fulfil the security
objective OT.Identification and to prevent T.Chip_ID.
161 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
162 FIA_UAU.5/MRTD Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.5.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES 24
to support user authentication.
23
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
24
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
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FIA_UAU.5.2/
MRTD
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization
Agent by one of the following mechanisms
(a) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
Personalization Agent Keys,
(b) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization
Agent Key,
(c) the Terminal Authentication Protocol with Personalization
Agent Keys.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection
System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
3. After successful authentication as Basic Inspection System and until
the completion of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE
accepts only received command with correct message authentication
code sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed upon
with the authenticated terminal by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism.
4. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE accepts
only received commands with correct message authentication code
sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the
terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
5. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses secure
messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. 25.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
163 Application note 33: Depending on the authentication methods used the Personalization Agent
holds (i) a pair of a Triple-DES encryption key and a retail-MAC key for the Basic Access
Control Mechanism specified in [6], or (ii) a Triple-DES key for the Symmetric Authentication
Mechanism or (iii) an asymmetric key pair for the Terminal Authentication Protocol (e.g.
provided by the Extended Access Control PKI in a valid card verifiable certificate with
appropriate encoded access rights). The Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure
messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the inspection system.
The Personalization Agent may use Symmetric Authentication Mechanism without secure
messaging mechanism as well if the personalization environment prevents eavesdropping to the
communication between TOE and personalization terminal. The Basic Inspection System shall
use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys
and the secure messaging after the mutual authentication. The General Inspection System shall
use the secure messaging with the keys generated by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
25
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
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164 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
165 FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
1. Each command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and
until the completion of the Chip Authentication Mechanism shall be
verified as being sent by the authenticated BIS.
2. Each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the GIS. 26
Dependencies: No dependencies.
166 Application note 34: The Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Chip Authentication
Protocol specified in [6] include secure messaging for all commands exchanged after successful
authentication of the Inspection System. The TOE checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC
mode each command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated
terminal (see FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for further details). The TOE does not execute any
command with incorrect message authentication code. Therefore the TOE re-authenticates the
user for each received command and accept only those commands received from the initially
authenticated user.
167 Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_AFL.1.1 FIA_AFL.1.2 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: positive integer number],
an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment: range of
acceptable values]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
[assignment: list of authentication events].
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met or surpassed, the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions].
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
168 Application note 35: The ST writer shall perform the open operation in the elements
FIA_AFL.1.1 and FIA_AFL.1.2. These assignments should be assigned to ensure especially the
high strength of authentication function as terminal part of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Protocol or (if necessary) of the Extended Access Control Authentication
Protocol.
The ST writer may consider the following example for such operations and refinement:
FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer within
range of acceptable values 1 to 10 consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related
to BAC authentication protocol.
FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been met or
26
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
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surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an administrator configurable time between the receiving the
terminal challenge eIFD and sending the TSF response eICC during the BAC authentication
attempts.
The terminal challenge eIFD and the TSF response eICC are described in [25], Appendix C. The
refinement by inclusion of the word “consecutive” allows the TSF to return to normal operation
of the BAC authentication protocol (without time out) after successful run of the BAC
authentication protocol. The unsuccessful authentication attempt shall be stored non-volatile in
the TOE thus the “consecutive unsuccessful authentication attempts” are count independent on
power-on sessions but reset to zero after successful authentication only.
169 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
170 FIA_API.1/CAP Authentication Proof of Identity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/CAP The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according to [25] 27
to prove the identity of the TOE 28.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
171 Application note 36: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication
Mechanism specified in [25]. The TOE and the terminal generate a shared secret using the DiffieHellman Protocol (DH or EC-DH) and two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC
mode according to [6], Annex E.1. The terminal verifies by means of secure messaging whether
the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run his protocol properly using its Chip Authentication
Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Key (EF.DG14).
5.1.4
Class FDP User Data Protection
172 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
173 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP 29 on terminals gaining
write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD,
EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD 30.
27
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
28
[assignment: authorized user or rule]
29
[assignment: access control SFP]
30
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
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Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
174 Application note 37: The Basic Access Control SFP addresses the configuration of the TOE for
usage with Basic Inspection Systems only.
175 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
176 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP 31 to objects based on the
following:
1. Subjects:
a.
Personalization Agent,
b.
Basic Inspection System,
c.
Extended Inspection System
d.
Terminal,
2. Objects:
a.
data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b.
data in EF.COM,
c.
data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes:
a.
authentication status of terminals,
b.
Terminal Authorization 32.
31
[assignment: access control SFP]
32
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and. for each, the SFPrelevant security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
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FDP_ACF.1.2 FDP_ACF.1.3 FDP_ACF.1.4
Dependencies: The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to
write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to
read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5
to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is
allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2
and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
4. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is
allowed to read data in the EF.DG3 according to the Terminal
Authorization,
5. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is
allowed to read data in the EF.DG4 according to the Terminal
Authorization 33.
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on
the following sensitive rules: none 34.
1 . The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule: A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read to
read data in the EF.DG3,
2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read to read
data in the EF.DG4,
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read to read data in
the EF.DG3,
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read to read data in
the EF.DG4,
5. the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD 35.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization 177 Application note 38: The TOE verifies the certificate chain established by the Country Verifier
Certification Authority, the Document Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate
(cf. FMT_MTD.3). The Terminal Authorization is the intersection of the Certificate Holder
Authorization in the certificates of the Country Verifier Certification Authority, the Document
Verifier Certificate and the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate chain.
178 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
33
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using
controlled operations on controlled objects]
34
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
35
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
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179 FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/
MRTD
Dependencies: The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP 36 to be able to transmit and
receive 37 objects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure after
Chip Authentication.
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
180 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
181 FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/
MRTD
FDP_UIT.1.2/
MRTD
Dependencies: The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP 38 to be able to transmit and
receive 39 user data in a manner protected from modification, deletion,
insertion and replay 40 errors after Chip Authentication.
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay 41 has occurred after Chip
Authentication.
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
182 Application note 39: FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD require the protection of the
User Data transmitted from the TOE to the terminal by secure messaging with encryption and
message authentication codes after successful Chip Authentication to the General Inspection
System. The authentication mechanism as part of Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Chip
Authentication Protocol establish different key sets to be used for secure messaging (each set of
keys for the encryption and the message authentication key).
5.1.5
Class FMT Security Management
183 Application note 40: The SFR FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 provide basic requirements to the
management of the TSF data.
36
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
37
[selection: transmit, receive]
38
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
39
[selection: transmit, receive]
40
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
41
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
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184 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
185 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Personalization,
3. Configuration 42.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
186 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
187 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1 FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall maintain the roles
1.
Manufacturer,
2.
Personalization Agent,
3.
Country Verifier Certification Authority,
4.
Document Verifier,
5.
Basic Inspection System,
6.
domestic Extended Inspection System
7.
foreign Extended Inspection System 43.
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
188 Application note 41: The SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 address the management of the
TSF and TSF data to prevent misuse of test features of the TOE over the life cycle phases.
189 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
190 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
42
[assignment: list of security management functions to be provided by the TSF]
43
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that
in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the following
policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks 44
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
191 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
192 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: FMT_LIM.2.1 No other components.
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that
in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the following
policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks 45.
Dependencies:
F
MT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
193 Application note 42: The following SFR are iterations of the component Management of TSF
data (FMT_MTD.1). The TSF data include but are not limited to those identified below.
194 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and
different TSF data.
195 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Pre­
personalization Data
44
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
45
[assignment: Limited capability and availability policy]
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write 46 the Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data 47 to the Manufacturer 48.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
196 Application note 43: The pre-personalization Data includes but is not limited to the
authentication reference data for the Personalization Agent which is the symmetric cryptographic
Personalization Agent Authentication Key.
197 FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ INI_DIS Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to 49 the
Initialization Data 50 to the Personalization Agent 51.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
198 Application note 44: According to P.Manufact the IC Manufacturer and the MRTD
Manufacturer are the default users assumed by the TOE in the role Manufacturer during the Phase
2 “Manufacturing” but the TOE is not requested to distinguish between these users within the role
Manufacturer. The TOE may restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and the Pre­
personalization Data by (i) allowing to write these data only once and (ii) blocking the role
Manufacturer at the end of the Phase 2. The IC Manufacturer may write the Initialization Data
which includes but are not limited to the IC Identifier as required by FAU_SAS.1. The
Initialization Data provides an unique identification of the IC which is used to trace the IC in the
Phase 2 and 3 “personalization” but is not needed and may be misused in the Phase 4
“Operational Use”. Therefore the external read access shall be blocked. The MRTD Manufacturer
will write the Pre-personalization Data.
199 FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialisation of CVCA Certificate
and Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
46
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
47
[assignment: list of TSF data]
48
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
49
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
50
[assignment: list of TSF data]
51
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FMT_MTD.1.1/ CVCA_INI Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write 52 the
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date 53
to [assignment: the authorised identified roles].
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
200 Application note 45: The ST writer shall perform the missing operation in the component
FMT_MTD.1.1/INI_CVCA. The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
may be written by the Manufacturer in the production or pre-personalisation phase or by the
Personalization Agent (cf. [25], sec. 2.2.6). The initial Country Verifying Certification Authority
Public Key (and their updates later on) are used to verify the Country Verifying Certification
Authority Link-Certificates. The initial Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate and
the initial Current Date is needed for verification of the certificates and the calculation of the
Terminal Authorization.
201 FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifier Certification
Authority
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ CVCA_UPD
Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to update 54 the
1. Country Verifier Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate 55
to Country Verifier Certification Authority 56.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
202 Application note 46: The Country Verifier Certification Authority updates its asymmetric key
pair and distributes the public key be means of the Country Verifier CA Link-Certificates (cf.
[25], sec. 2.2). The TOE updates its internal trust-point if a valid Country Verifier CA LinkCertificates (cf. FMT_MTD.3) is provided by the terminal (cf. [25], sec. 2.2.3 and 2.2.4).
203 FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
52
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
53
[assignment: list of TSF data]
54
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
55
[assignment: list of TSF data]
56
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FMT_MTD.1.1/ DATE Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify 57 the Current date 58 to
1.
Country Verifier Certification Authority,
2.
Document Verifier,
3.
domestic Extended Inspection System 59.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 204 Application note 47: The authorized roles are identified in identified in their certificate (cf. [25],
sec. 2.2.4 and Table A.5) and authorized by validation of the certificate chain (cf. FMT_MTD.3).
The authorized role of the terminal is part of the Certificate Holder Authorization in the card
verifiable certificate provided by the terminal for the identification and the Terminal
Authentication (cf. to [25], annex A.3.3, for details).
205 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_WRITE Dependencies: The TSF shall restrict the ability to write 60 the Document Basic Access
Keys 61 to the Personalization Agent 62.
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
206 Application note 48: The Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key is the TSF data
for verification of the certificates of the Document Verifier and the Extended Inspection Systems
including the access rights for the Extended Access Control.
207 FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CAPK
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: create, load] 63 the Chip
Authentication Private Key 64 to [assignment: the authorised identified
roles].
57
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] 58
[assignment: list of TSF data] 59
[assignment: the authorised identified roles] 60
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] 61
[assignment: list of TSF data] 62
[assignment: the authorised identified roles] 63
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]] 64
[assignment: list of TSF data] Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
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Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
208 Application note 49: The component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK is refined by (i) selecting other
operations and (ii) defining a selection for the operations “create” and “load” to be performed by
the ST writer. The verb “load” means here that the Chip Authentication Private Key is generated
securely outside the TOE and written into the TOE memory. The verb “create” means here that
the Chip Authentication Private Key is generated by the TOE itself. In the later case the ST writer
shall include an appropriate instantiation of the component FCS_CKM.1 as SFR for this key
generation. The ST writer shall perform the assignment for the authorised identified roles in the
SFR component FMT_MTD.1/CAPK.
209 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/ KEY_READ
Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read 65 the
1. Document Basic Access Keys,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Personalization Agent Keys 66
to none 67.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions FMT_SMR.1 Security roles 210 FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.3.1 Dependencies: The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate chain are
accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the
Access Control.
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
(1) the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of
the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
(2) the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
65
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
66
[assignment: list of TSF data]
67
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before
the Current Date of the TOE,
(3) the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate
of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of
the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a
valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the
Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of
a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful
authenticated Extended Inspection System.
211 Application note 50: The Terminal Authentication is used for Extended Inspection System as
required by FIA_UAU.4 and FIA_UAU.5. The Terminal Authorisation is used as TSF data for
access control required by FDP_ACF.1.
5.1.6
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
212 The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF
Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With
respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security
functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF
testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the
other. The SFR “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” and “TSF domain separation
(FPT_SEP.1)” together with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” prevent bypassing, deactivation
and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
213 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended):
214 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to Personalization Agent
Authentication Key and Chip Authentication Private Key 68 and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
68
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
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FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users 69 are unable to use the following interface
smart card circuit contacts 70 to gain access to Personalization Agent
Authentication Key and Chip Authentication Private Key 71 and
[assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No other components.
215 Application note 51: The ST writer shall perform the operation in FPT_EMSEC.1.1 and
FPT_EMSEC.1.2. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the listed secret data where the attack is
based on external observable physical phenomena of the TOE. Such attacks may be observable at
the interfaces of the TOE or may be originated from internal operation of the TOE or may be
caused by an attacker that varies the physical environment under which the TOE operates. The set
of measurable physical phenomena is influenced by the technology employed to implement the
smart card. The MRTD’s chip has to provide a smart card contactless interface but may have also
(not used by the terminal but maybe by an attacker) sensitive contacts according to ISO/IEC
7816-2 as well. Examples of measurable phenomena include, but are not limited to variations in
the power consumption, the timing of signals and the electromagnetic radiation due to internal
operations or data transmissions.
216 The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit
information leakage including physical manipulation.
217 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
218 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
(1) Exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could
occur,
(2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1 72.
Dependencies: ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
219 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
220 FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
69
[assignment: type of users]
70
[assignment: type of connection]
71
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
72
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
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FPT_TST.1.1
FPT_TST.1.2
FPT_TST.1.3
Dependencies:
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up,
periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised
user, at the conditions ][assignment: conditions under which self test
should occur] to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF.
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing.
221 Application note 52: The ST writer shall perform the operation in FPR_TST.1.1. If the MRTD’s
chip uses state of the art smart card technology it will run the some self tests at the request of the
authorised user and some self tests automatically. E.g. a self test for the verification of the
integrity of stored TSF executable code required by FPT_TST.1.3 may be executed during initial
start-up by the “authorised user” Manufacturer in the Phase 2 “Manufacturing”. Other self tests
may run automatically to detect failure and to preserve of secure state according to FPT_FLS.1 in
the Phase 4 Operational Use, e.g. to check a calculation with a private key by the reverse
calculation with the corresponding public key as countermeasure against Differential Failure
Attacks. The security target writer shall perform the operation claimed by the concrete product
under evaluation.
222 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
223 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: FPT_PHP.3.1 Dependencies:
No other components.
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing 73 to the
TSF 74 by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
No dependencies.
224 Application note 53: The TOE will implement appropriate measures to continuously counter
physical manipulation and physical probing. Due to the nature of these attacks (especially
manipulation) the TOE can by no means detect attacks on all of its elements. Therefore,
permanent protection against these attacks is required ensuring that the TSP could not be violated
at any time. Hence, “automatic response” means here (i) assuming that there might be an attack at
any time and (ii) countermeasures are provided at any time.
225 The following security functional requirements protect the TSF against bypassing and support the
separation of TOE parts.
73
[assignment: physical tampering scenarios]
74
[assignment: list of TSF devices/elements]
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226 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
227 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RVM.1.1 Dependencies:
The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and
succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to proceed.
No dependencies.
228 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
229 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Hierarchical to:
FPT_SEP.1.1
FPT_SEP.1.2
Dependencies:
No other components.
The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that
protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects
in the TSC
No dependencies.
230 Application note 54: The parts of the TOE which support the security functional requirements
“Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” should
be protected from interference of the other security enforcing parts of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
5.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
231 The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those taken
from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)
and augmented by taking the following components:
ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
232 The minimum strength of function is SOF-high.
233 Application note 55: The high minimum strength of function covers but is not limited to the TSF
required by the SFR FIA_UAU.4, FCS_RND.1 and FPT_FLS.1 as far as probabilistic or
permutational mechanisms are involved, e.g. due to challenges generated by the TOE and sent to
the terminal or probabilistic self tests.
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234 This protection profile does not contain any security functional requirement for which an explicit
stated strength of function claim is required.
5.3 Security Requirements for the IT environment
235 This section describes the security functional requirements for the IT environment using the CC
part 2 components.
236 Due to CCIMB Final Interpretation #58 these components are editorial changed to express the
security requirements for the components in the IT environment where the original components
are directed for TOE security functions. The editorial changes are indicated in bold.
5.3.1
Passive Authentication
237 The ICAO, the Issuing States or Organizations and the Receiving States or Organization run a
public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication. This public key infrastructure distributes
and protects the Country Signing CA Keys and the Document Signing Keys to support the
signing of the User Data (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) by means of the Document Security Object. The
Technical Report [6] describes the requirements to the public key infrastructure for the Passive
Authentication.
238 The Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement “Basic data
authentication (FDP_DAU.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
239 FDP_DAU.1/DS Basic data authentication – Passive Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_DAU.1.1/
DS
FDP_DAU.1.2/
DS
The Document Signer shall provide a capability to generate evidence
that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of logical the MRTD
(EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) and the Document Security Object 75.
The Document Signer shall provide Inspection Systems of Receiving
States or Organization 76 with the ability to verify evidence of the validity
of the indicated information.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.3.2
Extended Access Control PKI
240 The CVCA and the DV shall establish a Document Verification PKI by generating asymmetric
key pairs and certificates for the CVCA, DV and IS which may be verified by the TOE. The
following SFR use the term “PKI” as synonym for entities like CVCA, DV and IS which may be
responsible to perform the identified functionality.
75
[assignment: list of objects or information types]
76
[assignment: list of subjects]
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241
FCS_CKM.1/PKI Cryptographic key generation – Document Verification PKI Keys
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKI
Dependencies: T
he PKI shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key
generation algorithm] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [25], Annex A 77.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes 242 FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN Cryptographic operation – Certificate Signing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
The PKI shall perform digital signature creation 78 in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic
algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key
sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
FCS_COP.1.1/ CERT_SIGN Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes 243 Application note 56: The ST writer shall perform the missing operation of the assignments for
the signature algorithms key lengths and standards to be used by CVCA and DV to create
certificates which may be verified by FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER implemented by the TOE for the
Terminal Authentication Protocol (cf. [25], Annex A.2.1.1 and C.3 for details).
5.3.3
Basic Terminal
244 This section describes common security functional requirements to the Basic Inspection Systems
and the Personalization Agent if it uses the Basic Access Control Mechanism with the
Personalization Agent Authentication Keys. Both are called “Basic Terminals” (BT) in this
section.
245 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
77
[assignment: list of standards]
78
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
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246 FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic
Access Keys by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: FCS_CKM.1.1/ KDF_BT Dependencies: No other components.
The Basic Terminal shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic
Access Key Derivation Algorithm 79 and specified cryptographic key
sizes 112 bit 80 that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes 247 Application note 57: The ST writer shall perform the open operation in the element
FCS_CKM.1.1/KDF_BT. The assigned standard shall ensure that the Basic Inspection Terminal
derives the same Document Basic Access Key as loaded by the Personalization Agent into the
TOE and used by the TOE for FIA_UAU.4/BAC_MRTD. The [6], Annex E.1 describes the
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document
Basic Access Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
248 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
249 FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction - BT
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic
key destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes 250 Application note 58: The ST writer shall perform the operation in FCS_CKM.4.1/BT. The basic
terminal shall destroy the Document Basic Access Keys of the MRTD and the Triple-DES
encryption key and the Retail-MAC message authentication keys for secure messaging after
inspection of the MRTD.
79
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
80
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
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251 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic
algorithms to be implemented by the Basic Terminal.
252 FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_BT
Dependencies: The Basic Terminal shall perform hashing 81 in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithms SHA-1 82 and cryptographic key sizes
none 83 that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 84.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
253 Application note 59: This SFR requires the terminal to implement the hash function SHA-1 for
the cryptographic primitive to generate the Document Basic Access Keys according to
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT.
254 FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure Messaging Encryption /
Decryption by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ ENC_BT The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption 85 in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
Triple-DES in CBC mode 86 and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit 87 that
meet the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 11568-2, ISO 9797-1 (padding
mode 2) 88.
81
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
82
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
83
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
84
[assignment: list of standards]
85
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
86
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
87
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
88
[assignment: list of standards]
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Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
255 Application note 60: This SFR requires the Basic Terminal to implement the cryptographic
primitive for secure messaging with encryption of the transmitted data. The key is agreed between
the TOE and the terminal during the execution of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism. The key size of 112 bit is chosen to resist attacks with high attack potential.
256 FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation
Authentication Code by the Basic Terminal
–
Secure
messaging
Message
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC_BT Dependencies: The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code 89 in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm Retail-MAC 90 and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit 91 that
meet the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block
cipher DES, zero IV 8 bytes, padding mode 2) 92.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
257 Application note 61: This SFR requires the terminal to implement the cryptographic primitive
for secure messaging with message authentication code over the transmitted data. The key is
agreed or defined as the key for secure messaging encryption. The key size of 112 bit is chosen to
resist attacks with high attack potential.
258 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
259 FCS_RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: FCS_RND.1.1/BT
No other components.
T
he Basic Terminal shall provide a mechanism to generate random
numbers that meets [assignment: a defined quality metric].
89
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
90
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
91
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
92
[assignment: list of standards]
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Dependencies:
No dependencies.
260 Application note 62: The ST writer shall perform the operation in FCS_RND.1.1/BT. This SFR
requires the terminal to generate random numbers used in the authentication protocols as required
by FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT and FIA_UAU.4 The quality metric shall be chosen to ensure at least
the strength of function Basic Access Control Authentication for the challenges.
261 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
262 FIA_UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms – Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism 93.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
263 Application note 63: The Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism [6] uses a challenge
RND.IFD freshly and randomly generated by the terminal to prevent reuse of a response
generated by a MRTD’s chip and of the session keys from a successful run of authentication
protocol.
264 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Re-authentication (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
265 FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
each command sent to TOE after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism 94.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
266 Application note 64: The Basic Access Control Mechanism specified in [6] includes the secure
messaging for all commands exchanged after successful authentication of the Inspection System.
The terminal checks by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each MRTD’s chip response to a
command based on Retail-MAC whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated MRTD’s
chip. The authentication fails if any response is received with incorrect message authentication
code.
93
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
94
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
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5.3.4
General Inspection System
267 The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additional
the Chip Authentication Mechanism. Therefore it has to fulfil all security requirements of the
Basic Inspection System as described above.
268 The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism during inspection and establishes new secure messaging with keys.
The reference data for the Chip Authentication Mechanism is the Chip Authentication Public Key
read form the logical MRTD data group EF.DG14 and verified by Passive Authentication (cf. to
FDP_DAU.1/DS). Note, that the Chip Authentication Mechanism requires the General Inspection
System to verify at least one message authentication code of a response sent by the MRTD to
check the authenticity of the chip.
269 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
270 FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the GIS
Hierarchical to:
FCS_CKM.1.1/ DH_GIS Dependencies: No other components.
The General Inspection System shall generate cryptographic keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm] and specified
cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet
the following: [25], Annex A.1 95.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes 271 Application note 65: The GIS generates a shared secret value with the terminal during the Chip
Authentication Protocol, see [25], sec. 3.1 and Annex A.1. This protocol may be based on the
Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3 (i.e. a modulo arithmetic based cryptographic
algorithm, cf. [21]) or on the ECDH compliant to ISO 15946 (i.e. an elliptic curve cryptography
algorithm) (cf. [25], Annex A.1, [26] and [20] for details). Even the General Inspection System
shall support only the concrete algorithm implemented in the TOE it is expected that the
General Inspection System will support both of them for interoperability reasons. The shared
secret value is used to derive the 112 bit Triple-DES key for encryption and the 112 bit RetailMAC keys according to the Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm [6], annex E.1,
for the TSF required by FCS_COP.1/ENC_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD.
272 FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by GIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
95
[assignment: list of standards]
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The General Inspection System shall perform hashing 96 in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes none 97 that meet
the following: FIPS 180-2 98.
FCS_COP.1.1/ SHA_GIS Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes 273 Application note 66: The ST writer shall perform the missing operation for the assignment of the
hash algorithm according to the hash function used by the TOE for Chip Authentication and
therefore to be supported by the GIS. The Chip Authentication Protocol may use SHA-1 and
SHA-256 (cf. [25], Annex A.1.3.3).
274 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Single-use authentication
mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
275 FIA_UAU.4/GIS Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the GIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall prevent reuse of authentication data
related to
1.
2.
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
Chip Authentication Protocol 99.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
276 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
277 FIA_UAU.5/GIS Multiple authentication mechanisms – General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.5.1/GIS
The General Inspection System shall provide
1.
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
Chip Authentication 100
2.
to support user authentication.
96
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
97
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
98
[assignment: list of standards]
99
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
100
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
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FIA_UAU.5.2/GIS
The General Inspection System shall authenticate any user’s claimed
identity according to the following rules:
1. The General Inspection System accepts the authentication attempt as
MRTD only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys.
2. After successful authentication as MRTD and until the completion of
the Chip Authentication Mechanism the General Inspection System
accepts only response codes with correct message authentication
code sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the
authenticated MRTD by means of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the General
Inspection System accepts only response codes with correct message
authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key
agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication
Mechanism. 101
Dependencies: No dependencies.
278 Application note 67: Basic Access Control Mechanism includes the secure messaging for all
commands and response codes exchanged after successful mutual authentication between the
inspection system and the MRTD. The inspection system shall use the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys drawn from the second, optical
readable MZR line and the secure messaging after the mutual authentication. The General
Inspection System and the MRTD shall use the secure messaging with the keys generated by the
Chip Authentication Mechanism after the mutual authentication.
279 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
280 FIA_UAU.6/GIS Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the General
Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
101
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
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Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
FIA_UAU.6.1/
GIS The General Inspection System shall re-authenticate the user under the
conditions
1. Each response sent to the General Inspection System after successful
authentication of the MRTD with Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism and until the completion of the Chip Authentication
Mechanism shall have a correct MAC created by means of secure
messaging keys agreed upon by the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
2. Each response sent to the General Inspection System after successful
run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall have a correct MAC
created by means of secure messaging keys generated by Chip
Authentication Protocol. 102
Dependencies: No dependencies.
281 Application note 68: The Basic Access Control Mechanism and the Chip Authentication
Protocol specified in [6] include secure messaging for all commands and responses exchanged
after successful authentication of the inspection system. The General Inspection System checks
by secure messaging in MAC_ENC mode each response based on Retail-MAC whether it was
sent by the successfully authenticated MRTD (see FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for further details).
The General Inspection System does not accept any response with incorrect message
authentication code. Therefore the General Inspection System re-authenticate the user for each
received command and accept only those responses received from the authenticated user.
282 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
283 FDP_UCT.1/GIS Basic data exchange confidentiality - General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall enforce the Access Control SFP 103
to be able to transmit and receive 104 objects in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure after Chip Authentication.
Dependencies: [FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
284 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity
(FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
285 FDP_UIT.1/GIS Data exchange integrity - General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
102
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
103
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
104
[selection: transmit, receive]
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FDP_UIT.1.1/GIS
T
he General Inspection System shall enforce the Basic Access Control
SFP 105 to be able to transmit and receive 106 user data in a manner
protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay 107 errors after
Chip Authentication.
of
FDP_UIT.1.2/GIS The General Inspection System shall be able to determine on receipt
user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay 108 has
occurred after Chip Authentication.
Dependencies: 5.3.5
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
Extended Inspection System
286 The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i)
implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric
reference data.
287 FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by EIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/ SIG_SIGN_EIS Dependencies: The Extended Inspection System shall perform signature creation 109
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment:
cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes 288 Application note 69: The ST writer shall perform the missing operation of the assignments for
the signature algorithms key lengths and standards to be implemented by the Extended Inspection
system for the Terminal Authentication Protocol compliant with the TOE (cf. [25], Annex A.2.1.1
and C.3 for details).
289 FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by EIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
105
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
106
[selection: transmit, receive]
107
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
108
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
109
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
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FCS_COP.1.1/ SHA_EIS Dependencies: The Extended Inspection System shall perform hashing 110 in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic algorithm] and cryptographic key sizes none 111 that
meet the following: FIPS 180-2 112.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes 290 Application note 70: The ST writer shall perform the missing operation for the assignment of the
hash algorithm supported by the TOE. The TOE shall implement the hash function SHA-1 for the
cryptographic primitive to derive the keys for secure messaging from the shared secrets of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (cf. [6], annex E.1). The TOE may implement
additional hash functions SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 for the Terminal
Authentication Protocol (cf. [25], Annex A.2.1.1 and C.3 for details).
291 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
292 FIA_API.1/EIS Authentication Proof of Identity – Extended Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/EIS
The Extended Inspection System shall provide a Terminal Authentication
Protocol according to [25] 113 to prove the identity of the Extended
Inspection system 114.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
293 Application note 71: This SFR requires the Extended Inspection system to implement the
Terminal Authentication Mechanism specified in [25], sec. 3.3. The Extended Inspection system
requests a challenge of 8 Byte from the MRTD and generates a digital signature using RSA or
ECDSA (cf. [25], appendix A.2.1 for details).
5.3.6
Personalization Terminals
294 The TOE supports different authentication and access control mechanisms which may be used for
the Personalization Agent depending on the personalization scheme of the Issuing State or
Organization:
(1) The Basic Access Control Mechanism which may be used by the Personalization Terminal
with a Personalization Agent Secret Key Pair. The Basic Access Control Mechanism
110
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
111
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
112
[assignment: list of standards]
113
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
114
[assignment: authorized user or rule]
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establishes strong cryptographic keys for the secure messaging to ensure the confidentiality
by Triple-DES and integrity by Retail-MAC of the transmitted data. This approach may be
used in a personalization environment where the communication between the MRTD’s
chip and the Personalization Terminal may be listened or manipulated.
(2) The Personalization Terminal may use the Terminal Authentication Protocol like a
Extended Inspection System but using the Personalization Agent Keys to authenticate
themselves to the TOE. This approach may be used in a personalization environment where
(i) the Personalization Agent want to authenticate the MRTD’s chip and (ii) the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the Personalization Terminal may be
listened or manipulated.
(3) In a centralized personalization scheme the major issue is high productivity of
personalization in a high secure environment. In this case the personalization agent may
wish to reduce the protocol to symmetric authentication of the terminal without secure
messaging. Therefore the TOE and the Personalization Terminal support a simple the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key as requested by the
SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
295 The Personalization Terminal shall meet the requirement “Authentication Prove of Identity
(FIA_API)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended) if it uses the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.
296 FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity - Personalization Terminal
Authentication with Symmetric Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/
SYM_PT
The Personalization Terminal shall provide an Authentication
Mechanism based on Triple-DES 115 to prove the identity of the
Personalization Agent 116.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
297 Application note 72: The Symmetric Authentication Mechanism for Personalization Agents is
intended to be used in a high secure personalization environment only. It uses the symmetric
cryptographic Personalization Agent Authentication Secret key of 112 bits to encrypt a challenge
of 8 Bytes with Triple-DES which the terminal receives from the MRTD’s chip e.g. as response
of a GET CHALLENGE. The answer may be sent by means of the EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE command according to ISO 7816-4 [27] command. In this case the
communication may be performed without secure messaging (note, that FIA_UAU.5.2 requires
secure messaging only after run of Basic Access Control Authentication).
115
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
116
[assignment: authorized user or rule]
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6 PP Application Notes
298 There are no sensitive application notes for the protection profile.
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Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
7 Rationales
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale
T.Skimming
x
OE.Ext_Insp_System
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Personalization
OD.Material
OD.Assurance
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
T.Information_Leakage
x
T.Phys-tamper
x
T.Malfunction
x
P.Manufact
P.Sensitive_Data
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
x
x
T.Abuse-Func
P.Personal_Data
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
x
x
T.Counterfeit
P.Personalization
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
x
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
x
x
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
T.Forgery
OT.Identification
T.Chip-ID
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Data_Int
OT.AC_Pers
299 The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
A.Pers_Agent
x
x
A.Insp_Sys
A.Signature_PKI
A.Auth_PKI
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Table 2: Security Objective Rationale
300 The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires the quality and integrity of
the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2 Manufacturing
including unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the
Pre-personalization Data. The security objective for the TOE environment OD.Assurance
“Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environment” address these
obligations of the IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer. OD.Material “Control over
MRTD material” ensures that materials, equipment and tools used to produce genuine and
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authentic MRTDs must be controlled in order to prevent their usage for production of counterfeit
MRTDs.
301 The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as
described in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization
“Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as
described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD”. Note, the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Authentication
key(s) according to OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of
TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
302 The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires that the logical MRTD can
be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder i.e. if the MRTD is presented to an inspection
system. This OSP is covered by security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment
depending on the use of the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging based on
session keys agreed in this protocol. The security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to
implement the Basic Access Control as defined by ICAO [6] and enforce Basic Inspection
System to authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the
Document Basic Access Key. The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of
data of the logical MRTD” requires the inspection system to protect their communication with the
TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication
Protocol. After successful Chip Authentication the security objective OT.Data_Conf
“Confidentiality of personal data” ensures the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during
their transmission to the General Inspection System.
303 The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and the
threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered by the
TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data”
requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference
data) is only granted to authorised inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the
transmission of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorisation bases on
Document Verifier certificates issued by the issuing state or organisation as required by
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorisation for use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The
Document Verifier of the receiving state has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by
creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference
data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems”.
304 The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD
movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication
interface. This threat is countered by security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment
depending on the use of the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging based on
session keys agreed in this protocol. The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE” by limiting the TOE chip identification to the Basic Inspection
System. The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical
MRTD” requires the inspection system to protect to their communication (as Basic Inspection
System) with the TOE before secure messaging based on the Chip Authentication Protocol is
successfully established. After successful Chip Authentication the security objective
OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” ensures the confidentiality of the logical MRTD
data during their transmission to the General Inspection System.
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305 The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” addresses the
reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface outside the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and Inspection System. This threat is countered by the security objective
OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control allowing read
data access only after successful authentication of the Basic Inspection System.
306 The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of
the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit the write access for the
logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will
protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int
“Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to
OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book
does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical
MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital
signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
307 The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorised copy or
reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and
authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authentication”
using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing state or organisation. The Public
Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents
Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”.
According to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” the General
Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip. MRTDs must be controlled in order to prevent their usage for production of
counterfeit MRTDs targeted on by OD.Material.
308 The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing MRTD’s
functionality to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for the TOE OT.Prot_AbuseFunc “Protection against abuse of functionality” ensures that the usage of functions which may
not be used in the operational phase is effectively prevented. Therefore attacks intending to abuse
functionality in order to disclose or manipulate critical (User) Data or to affect the TOE in such a
way that security features or TOE’s functions may be bypassed, deactivated, changed or explored
shall be effectively countered.
309 The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,
T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental
Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack
potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related
security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”,
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction
“Protection against Malfunctions”.
310 The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”
including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder
personal data and the enabling of security features of the TOE according to the decision of the
Issuing State or Organization concerning the Basic Access Control.
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311 The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE
environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” which requires the
inspection system to examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Inspection System to implement
the Basic Access Control, and the General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems
to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the
presented MRTD’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD” requirethe Inspection
System to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
312 The assumption A.Signature_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair
and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures
is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”.
313 The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security objective
for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorisation for use of sensitive biometric
reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometric by issuing
Document Verifier certificates for authorised receiving States or Organisations only. The
Document Verifier of the receiving state is required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorisation of
Extended Inspection Systems” to authorise Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection
System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the
necessary public key infrastructure.
7.2 Security Requirements Rationale
7.2.1
Security Functional Requirements Rationale
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
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OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Identification
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Data_Int
OT.AC_Pers
314 The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_RND.1/MRTD
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_API.1/CAP
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.3
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_RVM.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_SEP.1
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Identification
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Data_Int
OT.AC_Pers
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Version 1.1, 7th September 2006
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x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Table 3: Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
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315 The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”
addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD and the management of the TSF for
Basic Access Control. The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the successfully
authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic Access Keys according
to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data for Basic Access
Control.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according
to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_UAU.5/MRTD. If the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Authentication Key is used the TOE will use the
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging) and
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD (for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Terminal want to
authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip
Authentication) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD,
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the new session
keys after Chip Authentication), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
(for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol) and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD (for the re-authentication). If the
Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF
according to the FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge) and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD (to verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed
according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization
Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 the confidentially of these keys.
316 The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the
integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and
unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to
write the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals
are not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf.
FDP_ACF.1.4). The Personalization Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according
to FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 before accessing these data. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles
and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical
MRTD data after Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization
Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD requires the
integrity protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging
implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD (for the
generation of shared secret), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the
derivation
of
the
new
session
keys),
and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
and
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FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
317 The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the TOE to
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR
FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification respective
authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. The read access to the logical MRTD data is
defined by the FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: only the successful authenticated Personalization
Agent, Basic Inspection Systems 117 and Extended Inspection Systems are allowed to read the data
of the logical MRTD. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and
Basic Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys). The
SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
The SFR FIA_AFL.1 strengthens the authentication function as terminal part of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Protocol or other authentication functions if necessary. The SFR
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of the
user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD enforces the TOE (i) to accept the authentication attempt as
Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
with the Document Basic Access Keys and (ii) to accept chip authentication only after successful
authentication as Basic Inspection System. Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD requests
secure messaging after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
After Chip authentication the TOE and the General Inspection System establish protection of the
communication by secure messaging (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD)
in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key
cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD requires the
Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or secure
messaging.
318 The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference
data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 allowing
the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended
Inspection System being authorised by a validly verifiable certificate according
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD requires the successful Chip Authentication before any authentication
117
Note the General Inspection Systems use the role Basic Inspection System.
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Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
attempt as Extended Inspection System. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD and FDP_UCT.1/MRTD
requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means
of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key
cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and
certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorised identified role as of
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
319 The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” address
the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile
memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
The TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in Phase
4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the
Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their use in the phase 4 “Operational Use”
violates the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not
allow reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication
of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication
attempt (cf. Application note 32).
320 The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” is ensured by
the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1/CAP proving the identity of the TOE.
The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD is performed using a
TOE internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol [25] requires additional TSF
according to FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the
session keys), FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
321 The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is
ensured by (i) the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality
of the TOE or other which may not be used after TOE Delivery, (ii) the SFR FPT_RVM.1 which
prevents by monitoring the bypass and deactivation of security features or functions of the TOE,
and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1 which prevents change or explore security features or functions of
the TOE by means of separation the other TOE functions.
322 The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” requires the
TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip against
disclosure
• by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock,
or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
• by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
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•
by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
323 The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
324 The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by (i)
the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of
authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which
requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a
malfunction, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1 limiting the effects of malfunctions due to TSF domain
separation.
325 The security objectives OD.Assurance and OD.Material for the IT environment will be
supported by non-IT security measures only.
326 The security objective OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data is directed to establish the Document Verifier
PKI and will be supported by non-IT security measures only.
x
OE.Ext_Insp_System
x
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
x
OE.Exam_MRTD
x
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
Document Signer
FDP_DAU.1/DS
Document Verification PKI
FCS_CKM.1/PKI
FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN
Basic Inspection System
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT
FCS_CKM.4/BT
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT
FCS_RND.1/BT
FIA_UAU.4/BT
FIA_UAU.6/BT
General Inspection System
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Personalization
327 The following table provides an overview how security functional requirements for the IT
environment cover security objectives for the TOE environment. The protection profile describes
only those SFR of the IT environment directly related to the SFR for the TOE.
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
page 77 of 96
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS
FIA_UAU.4/GIS
FIA_UAU.5/GIS
FIA_UAU.6/GIS
FDP_UCT.1/GIS
FDP_UIT.1/GIS
x
x
x
x
Extended Inspection System
FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS
FIA_API.1/EIS
x
x
x
Personalization Agent
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
OE.Ext_Insp_System
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Personalization
Version 1.1, 7th September 2006
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Table 4: Coverage of Security Objectives for the IT environment by SFR
328 The OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the Personalization
Terminal to authenticate themselves to the MRTD’s chip to get the write authorization.
If the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent
Authentication Key is used the Personalization Terminal will use the FCS_RND.1/BT (for the
generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT (for the derivation of
the session keys), and FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT and FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT (for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging) to authenticate themselves and to protect the
personalization data during transfer.
If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentication) with the Personalization Agent
Keys the Personalization Terminal will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1/BT (for the
generation
of
the
challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS,
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication),
and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the ENC_MAC_Mode
secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS, FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS and FIA_API.1/EIS (as
part of the Terminal Authentication Protocol).
If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF
according to the SFR FIA_API.1/SYM_PT, FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the
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Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
challenge) and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD (to verify the authentication attempt). Using the keys
derived by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the Personalisation Agent will transfer
MRTD holder’s personalisation data (identity, biographic data, correctly enrolled biometric
reference data) in a confidential and integrity protected manner as required by FDP_UCT.1/GIS
and FDP_UIT.1/GIS.
329 The OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD Signature” is covered by
FDP_DAU.1/DS which requires the Document Signer to provide a capability to generate
evidence for the validity of EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the Document Security Objects and
therefore, to support the inspection system to verify the logical MRTD.
330 The OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key” is covered by FDP_DAU.1/DS which
requires the Document Signer to provide a capability to generate evidence for the validity of chip
authentication public key in DG 14. There is no need for the PP to provide any specific
requirement for the method of generation, distribution and handling of the Chip Authentication
Private Key by the IT environment.
331 The OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data”
addresses the establishment of the Document Verification PKI which include cryptographic key
generation for the Document Verification PKI Keys and the signing of the certificates. The SFR
FCS_CKM.1/PKI and FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN enforce that these cryptographic functions fit
the signature verification function for the certificates and the terminal authentication addressed by
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
332 The OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” requires the Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability to implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [6]
as
required
by
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT,
FCS_CKM.4/BT,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT,
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT, FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT, FCS_RND.1/BT, FIA_UAU.4/BT and
FIA_UAU.6/BT. The verification of the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip by General Inspection
Systems and Extended Inspection Systems (including the functionality of the GIS) is covered by
the FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS, FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS, FIA_UAU.4/GIS, FIA_UAU.5/GIS and
FIA_UAU.6/GIS providing the Chip Authentication Protocol and checking continuously the
messages received from the MRTD’s chip. The authenticity of the Chip Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG14) is ensured by FDP_DAU.1/DS.
333 The OE.Pass_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication” is covered by the SFR
FDP_DAU.1/DS.
334 The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD“
addresses the protection of the logical MRTD during the transmission and internal handling. The
SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT, FIA_UAU.5/GIS and FIA_UAU.6/BT address the terminal part of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and FDP_UCT.1/GIS and FDP_UIT.1/BT the
secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication mechanism. The SFR
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT, FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT, FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT
and FCS_RND.1/BT as well as FCS_CKM.4/BT are necessary to implement this mechanism.
The BIS shall destroy the Document Access Control Key and the secure messaging keys after
inspection of the MRTD according to FCS_CKM.4 because they are not needed any more.
335 .The OE.Ext_Insp_System “Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems” is covered by the
Terminal Authentication Protocol proving the identity of the EIS as required by FIA_API.1/EIS
basing on signature creation as required by FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS and including a hash
calculation according FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS.
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7.2.2
Dependency Rationale
336 The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual
support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All
dependencies between the chosen functional components are analyzed, and non-dissolved
dependencies are appropriately explained.
337 The table 5 shows the dependencies between the SFR and of the SFR to the SAR of the TOE.
SFR
Dependencies
Support of the Dependencies
FAU_SAS.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
justification 1 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
justification 2 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
FCS_CKM.1, justification 1 for
without security attributes,
non-satisfied dependencies
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
justification 3 for non-satisfied
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with dependencies
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
without security attributes,
justification 4 for non-satisfied
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with dependencies
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
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SFR
Dependencies
Support of the Dependencies
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
justification 4 for non-satisfied
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with dependencies
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
justification 5 for non-satisfied
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with dependencies
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_RND.1/MRTD
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UID.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Fulfilled
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication Fulfilled
FIA_API.1/CAP
No dependencies
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based Fulfilled by FDP_ACF.1
access control
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialization
FDP_ACC.1, justification 6 for
non-satisfied dependencies
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted
path], [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_ACC.1 justification 7 for
non-satisfied dependencies
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted
path], [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
FDP_ACC.1, justification 7 for
non-satisfied dependencies
FMT_SMF.1
No dependencies
n.a.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
n.a.
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SFR
Dependencies
Support of the Dependencies
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Fulfilled
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
Fulfilled
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.1
Fulfilled
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled
management functions, FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled
management functions, FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled
management functions, FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled
management functions, FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled
management functions, FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled
management functions, FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled
management functions, FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Fulfilled
management functions, FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
FMT_MTD.3
ADV_SPM.1, FMT_MTD.1
fulfilled
FPT_EMSEC.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FPT_FLS.1
ADV_SPM.1
Fulfilled by EAL4
FPT_PHP.3
No dependencies
n.a.
FPT_RVM.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FPT_SEP.1
No dependencies
n.a.
FPT_TST.1
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine
testing
See justification 8 for non­
satisfied dependencies
Table 5: Dependencies between the SFR for the TOE 338 Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for TOE: Page 82 of 96
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Common Criteria Protection Profile
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Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
No. 1: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD uses only the Document Basic Access Keys or other
shared secrets to generate the secure messaging keys used for FCS_COP.1/TDES and
FCS_COP.1/MAC. The SFR FCS_CKM.4/MRTD destroys these keys automatically. These
simple processes do not need any special security attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 2: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD calculates shared secrets to generate the secure
messaging keys used for FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_COP.1/MAC. The SFR
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD destroys these keys automatically. These simple processes do not need any
special security attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 3: The cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 does not use any cryptographic key. Therefore none
of the listed SFRs are needed to be defined for this specific instantiation of FCS_COP.1.
No. 4: The SFR FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD use the
automatically generated secure messaging keys assigned to the session with the successfully
authenticated BIS only. There is no need for any special security attributes for the secure
messaging keys.
No. 5: The SFR FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER uses the initial public key Country Verifying
Certification Authority and the public keys in certificates provided by the terminals as TSF data
for the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control. Their validity verified
according to FMT_MDT.3 and their security attributes are managed by
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE. There is no
need to import user data or manage their security attributes.
No. 6: The access control TSF according to FDP_ACF.1 uses security attributes which are
defined during the personalization and are fixed over the whole life time of the TOE. No
management of these security attribute (i.e. SFR FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_MSA.2) is necessary
here.
No. 7: The SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD require the use secure messaging
between the MRTD and the BIS. There is no need for sensitive SFR FTP_ITC.1, e.g. to require
this communication channel to be logically distinct from other communication channels it is the
only one.
No. 8: The TOE consists of the software and its underlying hardware on which it is running. Thus
there is no abstract machine to be tested.
339 The following table shows the dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment and of the
SFR to the SAR of the TOE.
SFR
FDP_DAU.1
Dependencies
No dependencies
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Support of the Dependencies
n.a.
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SFR
Dependencies
Support of the Dependencies
FCS_CKM.1/PKI
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
justification 9 for non-satisfied
without security attributes,
dependencies
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_CKM.4/BT
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
FCS_CKM.1, justification 10
without security attributes,
for non-satisfied dependencies
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security
attributes
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
justification 11 for non­
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with satisfied dependencies
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
without security attributes,
justification 12 for non­
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with satisfied dependencies
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.4,
without security attributes,
justification 12 for non­
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with satisfied dependencies
Page 84 of 96
justification 9 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/TDES_BT,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT
justification 10 for non­
satisfied dependencies
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Version 1.1, 7th September 2006
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
SFR
Dependencies
Support of the Dependencies
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_RND.1/BT
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.4/BT
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/BT
No dependencies
n.a.
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution or FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT,
FCS_CKM.4/BT, justification
13 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT,
FCS_CKM.4/BT, justification
13 for non-satisfied
dependencies
FIA_UAU.4/GIS
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.5/GIS
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_UAU.6/GIS
No dependencies
n.a.
FDP_UCT.1/GIS
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted
path], [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
justification 14 for non­
satisfied dependencies
FDP_UIT.1/GIS
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted
path], [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
justification 14 for non­
satisfied dependencies
FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
justification 15 for non­
without security attributes,
satisfied dependencies
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
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SFR
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS
Dependencies
Support of the Dependencies
justification 15 for non­
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes,
satisfied dependencies
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction, FMT_MSA.2 Secure
security attributes
FIA_API.1/EIS
No dependencies
n.a.
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT
No dependencies
n.a.
Table 6: Dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment
340 Justification for non-satisfied dependencies between the SFR for the IT environment.
No. 9: The TOE does not have specific functional security requirements to the IT environment
establishing Document Verification PKI which have to be described by the listed dependency
here.
No. 10: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT derives the Document Basic Access Keys and uses this
key to generate the secure messaging keys used for FCS_COP.1/TDES and FCS_COP.1/MAC.
The SFR FCS_CKM.4/BT destroys these keys. These processes do not need any special security
attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 11: The cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 does not use any cryptographic key. Therefore none
of the listed SFR is needed to be defined for this specific instantiation of FCS_COP.1.
No. 12: The SFR FCS_COP.1/TDES_BT and FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT use the automatically
generated secure messaging keys assigned to the session with the successfully authenticated
MRTD only. There is no need for any special security attributes for the secure messaging keys.
No. 13: The SFR FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS and FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS are used for generation of
secure messaging session keys (cf. FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS, application note 66) by means of the
Chip Authentication Protocol. These session keys are destroyed by the same function as for the
Basic Terminal (cf. FCS_CKM.4/BT). There is no need for import or management of security
attributes of these session keys.
No. 14: The SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD require the use secure messaging
between the MRTD and the GIS as described by the FDP_UCT.1/GIS and FDP_UIT.1/GIS.
There is no need to provide further description of this communication.
No. 15: The SFR FCS_COP.1/SIGN_EIS and FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS are used by the Extended
Inspection System for the proof of identity to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication
Key Pair. The TOE does not have any specific requirements for the method of importing (cf.
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2) or generation (cf. FCS_CKM.1) of the Terminal Authentication Key
Pair, which is completely up to the IT environment.
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7.2.3
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
341 The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not
require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is
applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of
independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur
sensitive security specific engineering costs.
342 The selection of component ADV_IMP.2 provides a higher assurance for the implementation of
the MRTD’s chip especially for the absence of unintended functionality.
343 The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the
MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s
material.
344 The selection of the component AVA_MSU.3 provides a higher assurance of the security of the
MRTD’s usage especially in phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” and Phase 4 “Operational
Use”. It is imperative that misleading, unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent from the
guidance documentation, and that secure procedures for all modes of operation have been
addressed. Insecure states should be easy to detect.
345 The minimal strength of function “high” was selected to ensure resistance against direct attacks
on functions based on probabilistic or permutational mechanisms. The SOF requirement applies
to the identification and authentication functionality within the TOE to fulfil the
OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof. This is consistent with the security objective
OD.Assurance.
346 The selection of the component AVA_VLA.4 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker
possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfil the security
objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof and OD.Assurance.
347
The component ADV_IMP.2 has the following dependencies:
ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
348 The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
349 The component AVA_MSU.3 has the following dependencies:
ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
AGD_USR.1 User guidance
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
350 The component AVA_VLA.4 has the following dependencies:
ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design
ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF
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ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance AGD_USR.1 User guidance All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
-
7.2.4
Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
351 The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the
security assurance requirements (SARs) together form a mutually supportive and internally
consistent whole.
352 The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and internal
consistency demonstrates:
The dependency analysis in section 7.2.2 Dependency Rationale for the security functional
requirements shows that the basis for mutual support and internal consistency between all defined
functional requirements is satisfied. All dependencies between the chosen functional components
are analyzed, and non-satisfied dependencies are appropriately explained.
The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consistent
assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the sensitive assurance components in
section 7.2.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale shows that the assurance requirements
are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all (sensitive) dependencies are satisfied and
no inconsistency appears.
353 Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not to
arise in sections 7.2.2 Dependency Rationale and 7.2.3 Security Assurance Requirements
Rationale. Furthermore, as also discussed in section 7.2.3 Security Assurance Requirements
Rationale, the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the TOE. So the
assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other and there are no
inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
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8 Glossary and Acronyms Term
Definition
Security mechanism defined in [6] option by which means the MRTD’s chip
Active
proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity of the
Authentication
MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known State of
organization.
Optional informative part of the PP containing sensitive supporting
Application note
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction,
evaluation, or use of the TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the
Audit records
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
Authenticity
created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic
Access Security mechanism defined in [6] by which means the MRTD’s chip proves
Control
and the inspection system protects their communication by means of secure
messaging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
Basic Inspection
Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip using
System (BIS)
the Document Basic Access Keys. drawn form printed MRZ data for reading
the logical MRTD.
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as text in the
Biographical data
visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a passport
(biodata).
book or on a travel card or visa. [7]
Biometric reference Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
data
chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest level),
Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification Authority
Certificates (highest level), where the certificate of a lower lever is signed
with the private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate of the
next higher level. The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate is
signed with the private key corresponding to the public key it contains (self­
signed certificate).
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made
Counterfeit
by whatever means. [7]
Country Signing CA Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key
(KPuCSCA) issued by Country Signing Certification Authority stored in the
Certificate (CCSCA)
inspection system.
The country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the
Country Verifying
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It enforces the Privacy policy
Certification
of the issuing Country or Organization in respect to the protection of sensitive
Authority
biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. It is
The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Current date
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the validate card
verifiable certificates.
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
CVCA link
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certificate
Certificate chain
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Term
Document
Access
Derivation
Algorithm
Definition
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new key is
before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old key.
Basic The [6], Annex E.1 describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Key Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access Keys
from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
Document
Access Keys
Basic Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption
(key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted
between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [6]. It is drawn from the
printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity able to read the
printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in the
Object (SOD)
MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS). [6]
Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates and
managing the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the
sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or
Organizations
A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between
Eavesdropper
the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the MRTD’s
chip.
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
Enrolment
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing that
person's identity. [8]
Security mechanism identified in [6] by which means the MRTD’s chip (i)
Extended Access
verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read the
Control
optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the optional
biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality and integrity of
the optional biometric reference data during their transmission to the
inspection system by secure messaging. The Personalization Agent may use
the same mechanism to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent
Authentication Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical
MRTD and TSF data.
Extended Inspection A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip Authentication
Mechanism, (ii) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (iii) is
System
authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier
of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
Extended Inspection A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to
Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or Organization to
System (EIS)
read the optional biometric reference data and supports the terminals part of
the Extended Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the
Forgery
biographical data or the portrait. [7]
General Inspection A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
System
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different
Global
States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received from
Interoperability
Document Verifier
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Term
IC Dedicated
Support Software
IC Dedicated Test
Software
Impostor
Improperly
documented person
Initialisation Data
Inspection
Inspection system
(IS)
Integrated circuit
(IC)
Integrity
Issuing
Organization
Issuing State
Logical Data
Structure (LDS)
Logical MRTD
Logical travel
document
Definition
systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection operations in their
respective States. Global interoperability is a major objective of the
standardized specifications for placement of both eye-readable and machine
readable data in all MRTDs. [8]
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated Software
might be restricted to certain phases.
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test
the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any functionality
thereafter.
A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name
and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to represent
himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using that person’s
document. [7]
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d) no travel
document or visa, if required. [8]
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data are for
instance used for traceability and for IC identification as MRTD’s material (IC
identification data).
The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveller (the
MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [8]
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity
and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory
functions. The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have
not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [5]
The Country issuing the MRTD. [5]
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
expansion technology [5]. The capacity expansion technology used is the
MRTD’s chip.
Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [5]
as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents
contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in
the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
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Term
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Machine readable
visa (MRV):
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
MRTD application
Definition
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of
identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a
separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting essential
data elements capable of being machine read. [5]
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter collectively
referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein,
formulated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa holder.
Contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate mandatory data
summary capable of being machine read. The MRV is normally a label which
is attached to a visa page in a passport. [5]
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page
or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing mandatory and
optional data for machine reading using OCR methods. [5]
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a form that
can be read and verified by machine. [7]
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the
IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS [5],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself
(i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the
inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as key
Control
seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip according to LDS.
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and
MRTD’s Chip
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO,
[9], p. 14.
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC
MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in Phase 1 and
embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE life-cycle.
Optional biometric Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris image(s)
reference data
(EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European commission decided to use
only fingerprint and not to use iris images as optional biometric reference data.
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and
Passive
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the hash values
authentication
contained in the Document Security Object.
The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied
Personalization
MRTD holder
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Term
Personalization
Agent
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
Personalization
Agent
Authentication Key
Physical travel
document
Definition
to the document. [7]
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organisation to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the holder
for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference
data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) or (ii)
the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on the physical and
logical MRTD for the holder.
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization
Agent.
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to prove
their identity and get access to the logical MRTD according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4/BT FIA_UAU.6/BT and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT and (ii) by the
MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal as
Personalization Agent according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to
present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-personalization Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the
MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized MRTD’s
Data
and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases 2 and 3. It
contains (but is not limited to) the Active Authentication Key Pair and the
Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized
MRTD’s chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique asymmetric
Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [5]
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document
Secondary image
by whatever means. [7]
Secure messaging in Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
encrypted mode
Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
Skimming
the contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge of the
printed MRZ data.
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the Inspection
Terminal
System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifier
Authorization
Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current Date.
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organi­
Travel document
zation which may be used by the rightful holder for international travel. [8]
Receiving State
Reference data
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
Term
Traveller
Definition
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the
identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE
(CC part 1 [1]).
Unpersonalized
MRTD
User data
MRTD material prepared to produce a personalized MRTD containing an
initialised and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF
(CC part 1 [1]).
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrolee whose identity is being claimed, to
determine whether it matches the enrolee’s template. [8]
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity
to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match the
reference data known for the claimed identity.
Verification
Verification data
Acronyms
Acronym
Term
BIS
CC
EIS
n.a.
OSP
PT
SAR
SFR
TOE
TSF
Basic Inspection System
Common Criteria
Extended Inspection System
Not applicable
Organisational security policy
Personalization Terminal
Security assurance requirements
Security functional requirement
Target of Evaluation
TOE security functions
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Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Version 1.1, 7th September 2006
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
9 Literature
Common Criteria
[1] [2] [3] [4] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-001
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-002
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-003
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-004
ICAO
[5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data
Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –1.7, published by
authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004­
05-18
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS, Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth
Edition – 2003
BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
TECHNICAL REPORT Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric
Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Version 1.9, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 19 May 2003
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL)
DIVISION, twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version – 0.42 - Draft, August, 2004, Dr.
Kügler, BSI
Cryptography
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
Geeignete Algorithmen zur Erfüllung der Anforderungen nach §17 Abs. 1 bis 3 SigG vom 22.
Mai 2001 in Verbindung mit Anlage 1 Abschnitt I Nr. 2 SigV vom 22. November 2001, Bonn,
10.8.2004 (Zieldatum der Veröffentlichung ist Januar 2005)
ISO/IEC 14888-3: Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signatures with
appendix – Part 3: Certificate-based mechanisms, 1999
FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION FIPS PUB 46­
3, DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH STANDARD
(+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
page 95 of 96
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2 DIGITAL SIGNATURE
STANDARD (DSS) (+ Change Notice), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1999: Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)©,
September 20, 1998
ISO/IEC 9796-2, Information Technology – Security Techniques – Digital Signature Schemes
giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based mechanisms, 2002
ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002.
ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002.
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
Protection Profiles
[22]
[23]
[24]
PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001; registered
and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the
reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Version 1.00, March 8th, 2002
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0017, 18 August 2005
Other
[25]
[26]
[27]
Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents – Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.0, TR-03110, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI),
Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TR-ECC, BSI
2006.
ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4: Organization,
security and commands for interchange, FDIS 2004
Page 96 of 96
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
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