Certification Report: 20080514_0467a

Certification Report: 20080514_0467a
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
for
STARCOS 3.01 PE
Version 1.2
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
Security IC with MRTD BAC Application
STARCOS 3.01 PE
Version 1.2
from
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control,
BSI-PP-0017-2005
Functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2
Common Criteria
Arrangement
for components
up to EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved
evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by
advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and smart card specific guidance for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 31 January 2008
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
This page is intentionally left blank.
IV
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
Certification Report
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
•
BSIG 2
•
BSI Certification Ordinance 3
•
BSI Schedule of Costs 4
•
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
•
DIN EN 45011 standard
•
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
•
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC
15408:2005) 5
•
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
•
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
•
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
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Certification Report
2.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 03 March 1998.
This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition
of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC
for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). The German Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates issued by the national
certification bodies of France and the United Kingdom within the terms of this
Agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised
under the terms of this agreement.
2.2
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 has been signed in May 2000 (CC-MRA). It includes also the recognition
of Protection Profiles based on the CC.
As of February 2007 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies
of: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory
nations resp. approved certification schemes can be seen on the web site:
http:\\www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates that
this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the
TSF) and ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product STARCOS 3.01 PE, Version 1.2 has undergone the certification
procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007.
Specific results from the evaluation process based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007
were re-used.
The evaluation of the product STARCOS 3.01 PE, Version 1.2 was conducted
by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH . The evaluation was completed on
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
Certification Report
24 January 2008. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF) 6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Giesecke &
Devrient GmbH.
The product was developed by: Giesecke & Devrient GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of
this Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
•
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
•
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the
Security Target at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over
time, the resistance of the certified version of the product against new attack
methods can be re-assessed if required and the sponsor applies for the certified
product being monitored within the assurance continuity program of the BSI
Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a
regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be
extended to the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for
assurance continuity (i.e. re-certification or maintenance) of the modified
product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation
does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-14 and D1 to D-4.
The product STARCOS 3.01 PE, Version 1.2 has been included in the BSI list
of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http://
www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49
228 9582-111.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7
of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form
at the internet address stated above.
7
A-4
Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
Prinzregentenstr. 159
81607 München
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
B
Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
•
the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
•
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
•
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
Contents of the certification results
1
Executive Summary
3
2
Identification of the TOE
5
3
Security Policy
6
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
6
5
Architectural Information
6
6
Documentation
7
7
IT Product Testing
7
8
Evaluated Configuration
8
9
Results of the Evaluation
8
9.1 CC specific results
8
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment
9
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
9
11 Security Target
10
12 Definitions
10
12.1
Acronyms
10
12.2
Glossary
11
13 Bibliography
B-2
12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
1
Certification Report
Executive Summary
Target of Evaluation (TOE) and subject of the Security Target (ST) [6] is the
Security IC with a Machine Readable Travel Document, Basic Access Control
Application STARCOS 3.01 PE Version 1.2.
The Security Target is based on the Common Criteria Protection Profile
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Basic Access
Control [9].
The certification of Starcos 3.01 PE Version 1.2 is a re-certification based on
BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007 (Starcos 3.01 PE V1.1) with some changes at the level
of life cycle.
The TOE is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel
documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure
(LDS) [10] and providing the Basic Access Control according to ICAO document
[11]. It will be embedded as an inlay chip module into a passport booklet.
The security assurance requirements of the TOE are based entirely on the
assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or
[1], part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the
Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented
by ADV_IMP.2 and
ALC_DVS.2.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are
outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 5.1. They are selected from
Common Criteria Part 2 and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is
CC part 2 extended.
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of
the TOE are outlined in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 5.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following
TOE Security Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.ACCESS
Access Control
Before the TSF performs an operation
requested by a user, this Security
function checks if the operation specific
requirements on user authorisation and
protection of communication data are
fulfilled.
SF.ADMIN
Administration of the TOE
The administration of the TOE is
managed by this Security Function. The
TOE administration is mainly done in the
B-3
Certification Report
TOE Security Function
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
Addressed issue
initialisation and personalisation phase.
SF.AUTH
Authentication of the authorized TOE
user
The authentication of the Signatory is
managed by this Security Function. This
Security function is only active during the
usage phase.
SF.CRYPTO
Cryptographic Support
This Security Function provides the
cryptographic support for the other
Security Functions.
SF.PROTECTION
Protection of TSC
This Security Function protects the TSF
functionality, TSF data and user data. If
BAC is enabled, no unencrypted data
transmission between TOE and the
outside of the TOE is allowed.
SF.IC
Security Functions of the IC
This Security Function covers the
Security Functions of the IC
Table 1: TOE Security Funktions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s strength of functions ‘high (SOF-high ) for specific functions
as indicated in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 6.1 is confirmed. The
rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable
for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For
details see chapter 9 of this report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6]
resp. [7], chapter 3.1.1 . Based on these assets the security environment is
defined in terms of assumptions, threats and policies. This is outlined in the
Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 3.2.
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
•
the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for
the contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors,
•
the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software,
•
the IC Embedded Software (operating system STARCOS),
•
the MRTD application (dedicated file for the ICAO application in a file system
on the chip) and
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
•
Certification Report
the associated guidance documentation.
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
STARCOS 3.01 PE, Version 1.2
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
Identifier
Release
1
Chip modules with Philips
P5CT072V0N including
STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.2
- ROM mask of the TOE
already Implemented:
"P5CT072EV4/T0N49360”
(MOB4).
CPAZ0SCSR30- SW completely contained in
01Au_V200
ROM and EEPROM memory,
dated 08.06.2004 chip mounted into an inlay
package initialised and tested
- EEPROM part of the TOE
loaded before TOE delivery:
Initialisation Table ID: 02 41
01 00 EA 64 C5 24 96 43
2C 7D
CPAZ0SCSR301
-01Cu_V100
dated 14.12.2006
HW /
SW
Form of Delivery
2
DOC
Administrator Guidance
STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.2
[14]
Version 2.3,
27. June 2007
Document in electronic form
(encrypted / signed)
3
DOC
User guidance STARCOS
3.01 PE V1.2 [15]
Version 1.2,
27. June 2007
Document in electronic form
(encrypted / signed)
4
DOC
Correspondence between
initialisation table and
Common Criteria
Certification [16]
Version 1.6,
27. June 2007
Document in electronic form
(encrypted / signed)
5
DOC
Installation, generation and
start up STARCOS 3.01 PE
V1.2[17]
Version 1.2,
Document in electronic form
07. January 2008 (encrypted / signed)
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The TOE is finished after initialisation, testing the OS and creation of the
dedicated file system with security attributes and ready made for the import of
LDS. This corresponds to the end of life cycle phase 2 of the Protection Profile
MRTD BAC PP [9]. A more detailed description of the production processes in
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
Phases 5 and 6 of PP0002 resp. Phase 2 and 3 of the MRTD BAC PP is given
in the Administrator Guidance document [14].
Delivery is performed from Giesecke & Devrient GmbH in Munich to the
personalisation facility. Any delivery of the initialised inlays is done via a security
transport of the MRTD Manufacturer (G&D) or a security transport maintained
by the Personalization Agent. This delivery process has therefore to be
regarded as 'personal pickup'. In addition, the correct inlay modules for the TOE
are secured by cryptographic means. Furthermore, the personalizer receives
information about the personalisation commands and process requirements. To
ensure that the personalizer receives this evaluated version, the procedures to
start the personalisation process as described in the administrator manual for
personalisation [14] have to be followed.
3
Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is defined according to the MRTD BAC PP [9] by
the security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and
recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). It
addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control in the
Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of threats
and organisational security policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These
aspects lead to specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOEEnvironment. The following topics are of relevance:
-
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip and
-
Inspection Systems for global interoperability.
Details can be found in the Security Target [6] resp. [7], chapter 3.2.
5
Architectural Information
The TOE consists of hardware and embedded software which can be separated
into the following subsystems: Access Control, Setup, Commands, Application
Data and Basic Functions, Crypto Functions, Secure Messaging, Hardware.
At the subsystem ‘Setup’ the startup of the TOE is initiated. This subsystem
calls ‘Access control’ for the initialisation of security states. Then ‘Setup’ gives
the control to ‘Commands’ which receives command messages via the
corresponding interfaces of ‘Hardware’, calls ‘Access control’ for verification of
access conditions, calls ‘Secure Messaging’ for verification and unwrapping of
the incoming message if BAC is required, performs the command execution,
calls ‘Secure Messaging’ for wrapping of the outgoing message, calls
‘Hardware’ for transmitting the outgoing message and then starts this process
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Certification Report
again. ‘Crypto functions’ and ‘Application Data and basic functions’ are general
support subsystems which are called for cryptographic support or access to
application data, respectively.
The TSF of the software uses the hardware via evaluated hardware interfaces.
External interface of the composite TOE used in the MRTD application is a
specific set of commands operating on a defined file-system of the application.
This interface is available to the inspection system via the contactless chip
interface.
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the
product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information
for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in
chapter 10 of this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
Developer tests, independent evaluator tests and penetration tests were
performed using MRTD chips STARCOS 3.01 PE, Version 1.2 on NXP (Philips)
P5CT072V0N composed of the hardware chip, its dedicated software, the
operating system and a file-system for the ICAO application. Both the Passive
Authentication and BAC (Basic Access Control) configurations were tested. The
Tests have been conducted via the contactless interface. The composite
smartcard TOE was tested by using specific tools.
All TSF and related sub-functions and subsystems are tested in order to assure
complete coverage of all SFR. The Test suites were implemented in
accordance with functional specification and high level design in order to verify
the TOE’s compliance with its expected behaviour. All test cases in each test
suite were run successfully on this TOE version. The developer performed
functional tests with a TOE in the personalization phase and in the operational
phase. The test coverage analysis and the test depth analysis gave evidence
that the TOE was systematically tested at the level of the functional
specification and at subsystem level.
The tests were performed using a smart card simulator and real chips with the
TOE software and the ICAO file-system.
During independent testing the evaluator has verified the developer’s test by
performing the whole developer’s test campaign covering all security functions.
During the evaluator’s TSF testing the TOE operated as specified.
Independent evaluator tests were performed in various life cycle phases of the
TOE using real chips and an emulator. The tests confirmed the expected
behaviour as specified.
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The evaluators penetration tests confirmed the effectiveness of all security
functions of the TOE. During these tests the different life cycle phases were
considered. The penetration tests were performed based on the developers
vulnerability analysis and based on the independent vulnerability analysis of the
evaluator. Potential vulnerabilities were assessed upon their exploitability by
analysis and tests. Analysis results and test results showed that potential
vulnerabilities are not exploitable in the intended operational environment of the
TOE and that the TOE is resistant against low attack potential AVA_VLA.2 as
specified.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is delivered in form of initialised and tested inlay modules. This
corresponds to the end of life cycle phase 2 of the Protection Profile MRTD
BAC PP [9].
All procedures for personalisation and configuration for the end-user necessary
after delivery are described in the Administrator Guidance document [14].
The TOE only features two fixed configurations which cannot be altered by the
end user. One configuration is Passive Authentication and the other is Basic
Access Control (BAC). The personalizer sets the TOE to one of the above
configurations. Both configurations have the same version number. The TOE
was tested in both configurations. The evaluation and subsequent certification
are only valid for Starcos 3.01 PE Version 1.2.
The certification body shall be advised of any modifications made to this
configuration and of modifications to the initialisation table of the TOE. The
certification body will then check if the certification results are still valid and
initiate further steps concerning a re-evaluation and re-certification, if
necessary.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
For components beyond EAL4 the evaluation methodology applied was defined
in co-ordination with the Certification Body [4] (AIS 34).
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components used up
to EAL 4 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond
EAL 4 and smart card specific guidance.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following
assurance components:
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Certification Report
•
All components of the class ASE
•
All components of the EAL 4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C
of this report)
•
The components
ADV_IMP.2 – Implementation of the TSF
ALC_DVS.2 – Sufficiency of security measures
augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out
as a re-evaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0429-2007, re-use of
specific evaluation tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on
the change at the level of the life cycle of the TOE.
The evaluation has confirmed:
•
for PP Conformance
Machine Readable Travel Document with “ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-00172005 [8]
•
for the functionality:
PP conformant
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
•
for the assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2
The TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function 'high'.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production
environment see annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in
chapter 2 and the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This holds for
•
SF.AUTH
Authentication of the authorized TOE user and
•
SF.CRYPTO
Cryptographic Support.
10
Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information
about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
B-9
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11
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a
sanitised version of the complete security target [6] used for the evaluation
performed. Sanitisation was performed according to the rules as outlined in the
relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4]).
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC
Basic Access Control
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DOC
Document
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ES
Embedded Software
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
ICAO
International Civil Aviation Organisation
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDS
Logical Data Structure
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SOF
Strength of Function
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
Certification Report
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
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SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE., specifically:
B-12
-
AIS 25, Version 3, 6 August 2007 for: CC Supporting Document, The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 2.0, CCDB2006-04-003, April 2006
-
AIS 26, Version 3, 6 August 2007 for: CC Supporting Document, Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 2.3, CCDB2007-04-001, April 2007
-
AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
-
AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
-
AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document,
ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1, July 2002 and CC
Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition: Annex A
Composite smartcard evaluation, Version 1.2 March 2002
BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
-
Certification Report
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation
results
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6]
Securtity Target STARCOS 3.01 PE Version 1.2, BSI-DSZ-CC-04672008, Version 3.8, 09 July 2007, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH
(confidential document)
[7]
Security Target Lite STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.2, BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008,
Version 1.0, 25 January 2008, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH (sanitized
public document)
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 3, 23 January 2008, CC Evaluation
of STARCOS 3.01 PE Version 1.2 , TÜVIT (confidential document)
[9]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Basic Access Control, BSI-PP-0017, Version
1.0, 18 August 2005, BSI
[10]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of
a Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion
Technologies, Revision 1.7, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organisation, LDS 1.7, 18 May 2004
[11]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine
Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version
1.1, Date 01 October 2004, published by authority of the secretary
general, International Civil Aviation Organisation
[12]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSI
registration ID: BSI-PP-0002-2001, developed by Atmel Smart Card ICs,
Hitachi Ltd., Infineon Technologies AG, Philips Semiconductors
[13]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005 for Philips Secure Smart
Card Controller P5CT072V0N including OM9500/1 and OM9501/2,
P5CD072V0N and P5CD036V0N with specific IC Dedicated Software,
07 October 2005, BSI
[14]
Administrator Guidance STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.2, Giesecke & Devrient
GmbH, Version 2.3, 27 June 2007
[15]
User guidance STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.2, Giesecke & Devrient GmbH,
Version 1.2, 27 June 2007
[16]
Correspondence between initialisation table and Common Criteria
Certification, V1.6, 27 June 2007
[17]
Installation, generation and start up STARCOS 3.01 PE V1.2, Version
1.2, 07 January 2008
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Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
–
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in CC
Part 2.
–
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
–
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC
Part 3.
–
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
–
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined
named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements
(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as
part of the conformance result.
–
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a predefined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
–
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of
requirements for one or more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for
inclusion within a PP registry.”
“Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly
stated
(APE_SRE)
IT
security
requirements
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements ”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete,
consistent, technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the
corresponding TOE evaluation.”
“Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation
Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class Assurance
Family
Assurance
Components
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Configuration
management
EAL2
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
ACM_AUT
ACM_CAP
1
2
ACM_SCP
Delivery
operation
and ADO_DEL
Development
EAL3
ADO_IGS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADV_FSP
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
1
1
1
ADV_SPM
Guidance
documents
Life
support
by
AGD_ADM
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_USR
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
ALC_LCD
1
2
2
3
ALC_TAT
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
cycle ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
Tests
ATE_COV
1
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
Vulnerability
assessment
1
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
1
2
2
3
3
AVA_SOF
1
1
1
1
1
1
AVA_VLA
1
1
2
3
4
4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial reengineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional securityspecific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product STARCOS 3.01 PE, Version 1.2 (Target of Evaluation, TOE)
has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility
using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and
smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 31 January 2008, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common
Criteria assurance requirements
•
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4,
ACM_SCP.2),
•
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
•
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
a) Giesecke & Devrient GmbH, Prinzregentenstrasse 159, 81677 Munich,
Germany (Development Center)
b) Giesecke
&
Devrient
GmbH,
Dienstleistungscenter
Prinzregentenstr. 159, 81677 Munich, Germany (Initialisation)
DLC,
c) Smartrac Technology, 142 Moo 1 Hi-Tech industrial Estate, Ban
Laean,Bang, Pa-In Phra nakorn Si Ayatthaya, 13160 Thailand (TOE
Completion)
For development and productions sites regarding the NXP (Philips) chip
P5CT072V0N refer to the certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0312-2005.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in
accordance with the Security Target Securtity Target STARCOS 3.01 PE
Version 1.2, BSI-DSZ-CC-0467-2008, Version 3.8, 09 July 2007, Giesecke &
Devrient GmbH [6] resp. [7]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security
objectives and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as
stated in the Security Target [6] resp. [7]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these
sites.
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D-4
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