User manual | Certification Report: 0281a

Certification Report

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

for

JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with

GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0

from

Gemplus SA

BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn

Phone +49 228 9582-0, Fax +49 228 9582-455, Infoline +49 228 9582-111

BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with

GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0

from

Gemplus SA

Common Criteria Arrangement for components up to EAL4

The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/ approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Part 1

Version 0.6, Part 2 Version 1.0 extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4 and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT

Security Evaluation, Version 2.1 (ISO/IEC 15408:1999) and including final interpretations for compliance with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2.

Evaluation Results:

PP Conformance:

Protection Profile BSI-PP-0005-2002

Protection Profile BSI-PP-0006-2002

Functionality:

PP BSI-PP-0005-2002 and PP BSI-PP-0006-2002 conformant plus product specific extensions

Common Criteria Part 2 extended

Assurance Package: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant

EAL4 augmented by

ADV_IMP.2

(Implementation of the TSF)

AVA_MSU.3

(Vulnerability assessment – Analysis and testing for insecure states)

AVA_VLA.4

(Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant)

This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.

The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.

The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.

Bonn, 22 December 2005

The President of the Federal Office for Information Security

Dr. Helmbrecht L.S.

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn

Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111

The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2)

This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information

Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

Preliminary Remarks

Under the BSIG

Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of issuing certificates for information technology products.

Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.

A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.

The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the

BSI or by BSI itself.

The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed Certification Results.

The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and instructions for the user.

Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of 17 December

1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

Part A: Certification

Part B: Certification Results

Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

A Certification

1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure

The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the following:

• BSIG

• BSI Certification Ordinance

• BSI Schedule of Costs

• Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal

Ministry of the Interior)

• DIN EN 45011 standard

• BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)

• Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.1

• Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM)

• Part 1, Version 0.6

• Part 2, Version 1.0

• BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)

• Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above EAL4 (AIS 34)

The use of Common Criteria Version 2.1, Common Methodology, part 2,

Version 1.0 and final interpretations as part of AIS 32 results in compliance of the certification results with Common Criteria Version 2.2 and Common

Methodology Part 2, Version 2.2 as endorsed by the Common Criteria recognition arrangement committees.

Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of

17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834

Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for

Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,

Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230

Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der

Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,

Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519

Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 22 September 2000 in the Bundesanzeiger p. 19445

A-1

In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.

The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on

ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,

Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).

2.2 CC - Certificates

An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including

EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection

Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The

Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United

States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February

2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,

Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.

This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the

TSF), AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment – Analysis and testing for insecure states) and AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant) that are not mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA.

For mutual recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.

A-2

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification

The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.

The product JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version

1.0 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.

The evaluation of the product JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with

GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0 was conducted by the Evaluation Body for IT-

Security of TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (TÜVIT) which is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)

recognised by BSI.

The sponsor, and vendor and distributor is:

Gemplus SA

Avenue du Pic de Bertagne

Parc d’activités de Gémenos

13420 Gémenos

France

The certification is concluded with

• the comparability check and

• the production of this Certification Report.

This work was completed by the BSI on 22 December 2005.

The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that

• all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the following report, are observed,

• the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following report.

This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.

For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the

Certification Report.

Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

A-3

4 Publication

The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-34.

The product JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version

1.0 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: http:// www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.

Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor

of the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the abovementioned website.

Gemplus SA

Avenue du Pic de Bertagne

Parc d’activités de Gémenos

13420 Gémenos

France

A-4

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

The following results represent a summary of

• the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,

• the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and

• complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.

B-1

Contents of the certification results

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

6 Documentation

9 Results of the Evaluation

10 Comments/Recommendations

11 Annexes

13 Definitions

14 Bibliography

B-2

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

The TOE is part of the product described below.

The product is an Open Platform Smart Card that provides Digital Signature creation services. As shown in Figure 1 (Figure 1 of [6]) the JavaCard Platform

GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0 is composed of:

• the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller) SLE66CX642P/m1485b16 with RSA 2048 V1.30. The IC has been evaluated at EAL5+ level under the certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0315-2005. The TOE Security Target is build using the Security Functionality provided be the IC and the evaluation is build upon the results of the evaluation of the IC.

• specific IC Dedicated Software

• the Embedded Software of the GXP3 Platform

• ROMed application GemSAFE V2 digital signature application

• ROMed applications MPCOS

and GemSafe

(not part of the TOE)

• other ROMed applications (GemID

, VSDC

and Dreifus

) which are deactivated during the Card Initialization phase and therefore cannot be personalized or used afterwards (not part of the TOE)

This certification does not include a confirmation according to the German Law

Governing Framework Conditions for Electronic Signatures and Amending

Other Regulations [30].

MPCOS is a JavaCard Type application that provides Data Storage and e-purse services.

MPCOS application relies on the GXP3 JavaCard platform and uses interoperable interfaces.

GemSafe application is a JavaCard type application that provides also identity, digital signature and data storage services.

GemID is a JavaCard type application that provides identification/authentication services.

VSDC, VISA Smart Debit Credit application, is a JavaCard type application compliant with

VISA specifications and provides EMV payment services.

Dreifus application is a JavaCard type application that provides also Digital Signature services.

B-3

Figure 1: JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0

The TOE is limited to the Digital Signature provided by GemSAFE V2, the

GXP3 services available to install and support GemSAFE V2, and the IC that supports the GXP3 platform. The scope of the TOE is marked by the red dashed line in Figure 1.

GemID, VSDC and Dreifus applications are locked during Card Initialization and cannot be installed or personalized. These applications are out of the scope of the TOE and the TOE environment.

The MPCOS and GemSafe applications are not part of the TOE either. These applications can be installed and personalized using GXP3 platform services.

The platform ensures that these applications do not interfere with the

GemSAFE V2 signature application.

GemSAFE V2 is a Java Card application that provides a Secure Signature

Creation Device (SSCD). The GemSAFE V2 supports

• the generation of SCD/SVD pairs on-board (option b) [12] during the personalization process of the card, or

• the import of the SCD (option a) via a trusted channel [11]

• the generation of electronic signatures.

GemSAFE V2 features the following options:

• Generation of digital signature with PK or SK schemes

GemSAFE V2 is aimed to create legal valid signatures and therefore provides mechanisms to ensure the Secure Signature Creation as:

• authentication of the signatory

• authentication of the administrators

• integrity of access conditions to protected data

B-4

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

• external communication protection against disclosure and corruption (secure messaging)

• access control to commands and data by authorized users

The GXP3 is a Java Open Platform that complies with

• Sun’s Java Card 2.1.1, which consists of the Java Card 2.1.1 Virtual

Machine, Java Card 2.1.1 Runtime Environment and the Java Card 2.1.1

Application Programming Interface

• the GlobalPlatform Card Specification Version 2.0.1 that defines the card management, enhanced by the additional security features described in the

Open Platform 2.0.1 Visa Card Implementation Requirements Configuration

2 -compact with PK

The platform consists of the following components:

• the Operating System that provides the basic card functionalities, including

DES and RSA algorithms, Hash algorithm, true random numbers and the cryptographic library

• the Java Card Runtime Environment, which provides a secure framework for the execution of Java Card programs and data access management

(firewall)

• the Open Platform Card Manager, which provides card and application management functions and security control

The platform is built upon the SLE66CX642P/m1485b16 with RSA 2048 V1.30

IC (evaluated under the certification ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0315-2005) with a 64K

EEPROM size. The EEPROM size can be limited to 36K by software configuration during personalization. The TOE has two configurations. One configuration with a 64K EEPROM and one configuration with 36K EEPROM.

The GXP3 platform will provide the following services:

• Initialization of the GP card Manager and management the GP Card Life

Cycle

• Lock of the LOAD command to avoid loading of other applets in EEPROM in any life cycle state

• Secure installation of the application under Card Manager control

• Secure Messaging services during Applet personalization

• Extradition services to allow several Applet instances to share a dedicated

Security Domain

• Deletion of application instances under Card manager control

• Secure operation of the Applet instances through Java Card/ API

• Card basic security services (as environmental operating conditions check through information provided by the IC, life cycle consistency check, integrity and confidentiality of keys in PIN stored for the applet, random number generation, secure data object handling and backup mechanisms, ROM and

EEPROM integrity check, memory content management and mechanisms to prohibit other applets to interfere with GemSAFE V2 applet)

B-5

The IT product JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2

Version 1.0

was evaluated by the Evaluation Body for IT-Security of TÜV

Informationstechnik GmbH (TÜVIT) which is an evaluation facility (ITSEF)

13 recognised by BSI.

The sponsor, and vendor and distributor is

Gemplus SA

Avenue du Pic de Bertagne

Parc d’activités de Gémenos

13420 Gémenos

France

The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part

3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level

EAL4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4 augmented). The following table shows the augmented assurance components.

Requirement

EAL4

+: ADV_IMP.2

Identifier

TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed

Development – Implementation of the TSF

+: AVA_MSU.3

+: AVA_VLA.4

Vulnerability assessment – Analysis and testing for insecure states

Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant

Table 1: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation

1.2 Functionality

The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security

Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.

The SFRs in the following 2 tables are taken from CC part 2. If an SFR is labeled with (option a) it means that it is taken from the SSCD Type 2 Protection

Profile [11] and (option b) means it is taken from the SSCD Type 3 2 Protection

Profile [12].

Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue

FCS_CKM.1 (option b)

FCS_CKM.4 (option a)

Cryptographic key generation

Cryptographic key destruction

Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility

B-6

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

FDP

FDP_ACC.1 (option a)

SVD Transfer SFP

FDP_ACC.1 (option b)

SVD Transfer SFP

FDP_ACC.1 (option a)

SCD Import SFP

FDP_ACC.1 (option b)

Initialization SFP

FDP_ACC.1

Personalization SFP

FDP_ACC.1

Signature-creation SFP

FDP_ACF.1 (option b)

Initialization SFP

FDP_ACF.1 (option a, b)

SVD Transfer SFP

FDP_ACF.1 (option a)

SCD Import SFP

FDP_ACF.1

Personalization SFP

FDP_ACF.1

Signature-creation SFP

FDP_ETC.1/SVD Transfer

FDP_ITC.1 /SCD (option a)

FDP_ITC.1 /DTBS

FDP_RIP.1

FDP_SDI.2/persistent

Security Functional Requirement

FCS_CKM.4 (option b)

Addressed issue

Cryptographic key destruction

FCS_COP.1/CORRESP Cryptographic operation/Correspondence verification

FCS_COP.1/SIGNING Cryptographic operation /Digital signature verification

User data protection

Subset access control /SVD Transfer SFP

Subset access control/ SVD Transfer SFP

Subset access control/ SCD Import SFP

Subset access control/ Initialization SFP

Subset access control/ Personalization SFP

Subset access control/ Signature-creation

SFP

Security attribute based access control/

Initialization SFP

Security attribute based access control/ SVD

Transfer SFP

Security attribute based access control/ SCD

Import SFP

Security attribute based access control/

Personalization SFP

Security attribute based access control/

Signature-creation SFP

Export of user data without security attributes/SVD Transfer

Import of user data without security attributes/SCD

Import of user data without security attributes/DTBS

Subset residual information protection

Stored data integrity monitoring and

B-7

Security Functional Requirement

FDP_SDI.2/DTBS

FDP_UCT.1/Receiver (option a)

FDP_UIT.1/SVD Transfer

FDP_UIT.1/TOE DTBS

FIA

FIA_AFL.1

FIA_ATD.1

FIA_UAU.1 (option a)

FIA_UAU.1 (option b)

FIA_UID.1 (option a)

FIA_UID.1 (option b)

FMT_MOF.1

FMT_MSA.1(option a)

Administrator

FMT_MSA.1(option b)

Administrator

FMT_MSA.1/Signatory

FMT_MSA.2

FMT_MSA.3 (option a)

FMT_MSA.3 (option b)

FMT_MTD.1

FMT_SMR.1

FPT

FPT_AMT.1

FPT_FLS.1

FPT_PHP.1

FPT_PHP.3

FTP_ITC.1(option a)

SCD Import

FTP_ITC.1(option a)

SVD Transfer

B-8

Addressed issue

action/persistent

Stored data integrity monitoring and action/DTBS

Basic data exchange confidentiality

Data exchange integrity/ SVD Transfer

Data exchange integrity/TOE DTBS

Identification and authentication

Authentication failure handling

User attribute definition

Timing of authentication

Timing of identification

Management of security functions behavior

Management of security attributes/

Administrator (option a)

Management of security attributes/

Administrator (option b)

Management of security attributes/Signatory

Secure security attributes

Static attribute initialization (option a)

Static attribute initialization (option b)

Management of TSF data

Protection of the TOE Security Functions

Abstract machine testing

Failure with preservation of secure state

Passive detection of physical attack

Resistance to physical attack

Inter-TSF trusted channel / SCD Import

(option a)

Inter-TSF trusted channel /SVD Transfer

(option a)

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

Security Functional Requirement

FTP_ITC.1(option b)

SVD Transfer

FTP_ITC.1/DTBS Import

Addressed issue

Inter-TSF trusted channel /SVD Transfer

(option b)

Inter-TSF trusted channel /DTBS Import

Table 2: Digital signature SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2

Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue

FAU_SAA.1

FCS_CKM.1

FCS_CKM.3

FCS_CKM.4

FDP

FDP_ACC.1

FDP_ACF.1

FDP_RIP.1

FDP_SDI.2

FDP_UCT.1

FIA

FIA_AFL.1

FIA_ATD.1

FIA_UAU.1

FIA_UID.1

FMT

FMT_MOF.1

FMT_MSA.1

FMT_MSA.2

FMT_MTD.1

FMT_SMF.1

Potential violation analysis

Cryptographic key generation

Cryptographic key access

Cryptographic key destruction

User data protection

Subset Access control

Security attributes based access control

Subset residual information protection

Stored data integrity monitoring and action

Basic data exchange confidentiality

Identification and Authentication

Authentication failure handling

User attribute definition

Timing of authentication

Timing of identification

Management of security function behavior

Management of security attributes

Secure security attributes

Management of TSF data

Specification of Management Function

B-9

Security Functional Requirement

FPT

FPT_FLS.1

FPT_PHP.1

FPT_PHP.3

FPT_RVM.1

FPT_SEP.1

FPT_TDC.1

Addressed issue

Protection of the TOE Security function

Failure with preservation of secure state

Passive detection of physical attack

Resistance to physical attack

Non bypassability of the TSP

TSF Domain separation

Inter TSF Basic TSF Data consistency

FTP_TRP.1 Trusted Path

Table 3: Platform SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2

The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:

Security Functional Requirement

FPT

Addressed issue

Protection of the TOE Security Functions

Table 4: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended

Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1 and 5.2.

The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the IT-

Environment of the TOE:

Security Functional Requirement Addressed issue

FCS_CKM.1

FCS_CKM.2

FCS_CKM.3

FCS_CKM.4

FDP

FDP_ACC.1

FDP_UCT.1

FDP_UIT.1

FTP_ITC.1

Cryptographic key generation

Cryptographic key distribution

Cryptographic key access

Cryptographic key destruction

User data protection

Subset access control

Basic data exchange confidentiality

Data exchange integrity

Inter-TSF trusted channel

Table 5: SFRs for the IT-Environment

B-10

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.4.

These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security

Functions:

TOE Security Function

Digital Signature TSF

Addressed issue

SF_SIG_INTEGRITY Integrity

SF_SIG_MANAGEMENT Management of operations & access control

Platform TSF

SF_CARD_CRYPTO Card cryptographic algorithm & key management

SF_CARD_INTEGRITY Card objects integrity

SF_CARD_PROTECT Card operation protection

Messaging

Table 6: TOE Security Functions

For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.

There, the hardware TSF are also listed. It is stated that two of the hardware

TSF, SEF2 (Phase management with test mode lock-out) and SEF8 (Memory

Management Unit, MMU) are not used by the embedded software.

1.3 Strength of Function

The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed high (SOF-high) for specific functions as indicated in the Security Target [6, chapter 6.1 and 8.3]. The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this report.

1.4 Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product

The following assets and subjects were defined in the Security Target [6]:

B-11

Digital Signature

assets

D.SCD

D.SVD

D.DTBS

D.VAD

D.RAD

D.SIGN_APPLI

Addressed issue

SCD: private key used to perform an electronic signature operation

(confidentiality of the SCD must be maintained).

SVD: public key linked to the SCD and used to perform an electronic signature verification (integrity of the SVD when it is exported must be maintained).

DTBS and DTBS-representation: set of data or its representation which is intended to be signed (their integrity must be maintained).

VAD: PIN code data entered by the end user to perform a signature operation (confidentiality and authenticity of the VAD as needed by the authentication method employed).

RAD: Reference PIN code authentication reference used to identify and authenticate the End User (Integrity and confidentiality of RAD must be maintained).

Signature-creation function of the SSCD using the SCD: (The quality of the function must be maintained so that it can participate to the legal validity of electronic signatures). be assured).

Table 7: Digital Signature assets

Platform assets Addressed issue

D. CODE

D.GP_KEYS

Executable code ROMed on the platform or patch loaded in

EEPROM, including ROMed applet code.

FAB_KEY loaded by the IC manufacturer to authenticate the Card

Manufacturer during phase 4 and 5 b.

D.GP_ REGISTRY GP registry that contains Card Manager data for Card management operations.

D.ISD_DATA

D.ISD_KEYS

D.SD_DATA

D.SD_KEYS

D.USER_PIN

Issuer Security Domain Data.

Issuer Security Domain Keys: Card Manager keys used during

Applet initialization and card personalization. Includes keys for

Authentication, Encryption and Integrity (MAC).

Application Security Domain Data.

Application Security domain keys, includes Static Keys for secure channel operation (authentication) and keys for cryptographic operations (cipher, MAC) during a session.

Application User Pin.

For the application GemSAFE V2 this data is the D.VAD.

D.JAVA_OBJECT Data Object belonging to an application identified with its SD.

Table 8: Platform assets

B-12

Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

Digital signature

subjects

S.User

S.Admin

S.Signatory

S.OFFCARD

Addressed issue

End user of the TOE which can be identified as S.Admin or

S.Signatory.

User who is in charge to perform the TOE initialization, TOE personalization or other TOE administrative functions.

User who holds the TOE and uses it on his own behalf or on behalf of the natural or legal person or entity he represents.

Attacker. A human or process acting on his behalf being located outside the TOE. The main goal of the S.OFFCARD attacker is to access Application sensitive information. The attacker has a high level potential attack and knows no secret.

Table 9: Digital signature subjects

Platform subjects Addressed issue

S.Card_Manufacturer Administrator of the TOE, which can be identified as the Card

Manufacturer. This entity is in charge of Platform initialization, installation of the Issuer Security Domain (ISD) and set the platform to OP_READY state.

S.Card_Manager

S. Applet

S.OFFCARD

This entity represent the Open Platform Card Issuer, manages the card content and controls application privileges. This entity will install/delete application instances and manage the card life-cycle.

Any application ROMed on the platform and using platform services.

Table 10: Platform subjects

Threats and Organisational Security Policies (OSPs) which were assumed for the evaluation and averted by the TOE are specified in the Security Target [6]:

Addressed issue

Digital Signature

threats

T.Hack_Phys

T.SCD_Divulg

Physical attacks through the TOE interfaces.

An attacker S.OFFCARD interacts with the TOE interfaces to exploit vulnerabilities to gain fraudulent access to the assets.

Storing, copying, and releasing of signature-creation D.SCD.

An attacker S.OFFCARD can store, copy the SCD D.SCD outside the TOE. An attacker S.OFFCARD can release the SCD D.SCD during generation, storage and use for signature-creation in the

TOE.

B-13

Digital Signature

threats

T.Sig_Forgery

T.Sig_Repud

T.SVD_Forgery

T.DTBS_Forgery

T.SigF_Misuse

Platform threats

T.Plt_Integrity

Addressed issue

An attacker S.OFFCARD derives the SCD D.SCD from public known data, such as SVD corresponding to the SCD or signatures created by means of the SCD or any other data communicated outside the TOE, which is a threat against the secrecy of the SCD.

Forgery of electronic signature D.SIGNATURE.

An attacker S.OFFCARD forges the signed data object maybe together with its electronic signature created by the TOE and the violation of the integrity of the signed data object is not detectable by the signatory or by third parties. The signature generated by the

TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.

Repudiation of signatures D.SIGNATURE.

If an attacker S.OFFCARD can successfully threaten any of the assets, then the non repudiation of the electronic signature is compromised.

The signatory is able to deny having signed data using the SCD in the TOE under his control even if the signature is successfully verified with the SVD contained in his un-revoked certificate.

Forgery of the signature- verification data D.SVD.

An attacker S.OFFCARD forges the SVD D.SVD presented by the

TOE. This result in loss of SVD integrity in the certificate of the signatory.

Forgery of the DTBS-representation D.DTBS.

An attacker S.OFFCARD modifies the DTBS-representation

D.DTBS. sent by the SCA. Thus the DTBS-representation used by the TOE for signing does not match the DTBS the signatory intends to sign.

Misuse of the Signature-Creation function of the TOE

D.SIGN_APPLI .

An attacker S.OFFCARD misuses the signature-creation function of the TOE to create SDO for data the signatory has not decided to sign. The TOE is subject to deliberate attacks by experts possessing a high attack potential with advanced knowledge of security principles and concepts employed by the TOE.

Table 11: Digital Signature threats

Addressed issue

Integrity of Platform Data and code

S.OFFCARD tries to alter Platform stored sensitive data (assets) or code to gain access to unauthorized data or operations.

This threat concerns D.GP_KEYS, D.ISD_KEYS, D.SD_KEYS and D.CODE.

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Platform threats Addressed issue

T.Plt_Confidentiality Confidentiality of Platform Data

S.OFFCARD tries to disclose Platform stored Data to gain access to unauthorized operations.

This threat concerns D.GP_KEYS, D.ISD_KEYS, D.SD_KEYS.

T.Plt_Operate concerns either the installation of an unauthorized applet or an attempt to induce a malfunction in the TOE through the installation process.

This threat concerns applets installation and mainly

D.GP_REGISTRY, D.SD_DATA and D.SD_KEYS. access to platform or applet resources.

This threat deals with D.CODE access.

S.OFFCARD or S.APPLET tries to modify Platform behavior by unauthorized or incorrect use of commands, or by producing malfunction conditions.

This includes bad command, authentication bypass, insecure state by insertion or interruption of session.

This threat concerns all platform assets.

Table 12: Platform threats

Digital Signature

OSPs

Addressed issue

P.Sigy_SSCD

The CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate the qualified certificate for the SVD generated by the SSCD. The qualified certificates contains at least inter alia the name of the signatory and the SVD matching the SCD implemented in the TOE under sole control of the signatory. The CSP ensures that the use of the

TOE is evident with signatures through the certificate or other publicly available information.

The signatory uses a signature-creation system to sign data with qualified electronic signatures.

The DTBS are presented to the signatory by the SCA. The qualified electronic signature is based on a qualified certificate and is created by a SSCD.

TOE as secure signature-creation device.

The TOE stores the SCD used for signature creation under sole control of the signatory. The SCD used for signature generation can practically occur only once.

Table 13: Digital Signature OSPs

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Platform OSPs Addressed issue

P.Plt_Support

P.IC_Support

The platform allows the Digital Signature application to operate in a secure environment.

The platform will support:

- Secure Digital Signature application installation and extradition,

- Secure deletion of Digital Signature instantiation,

- Secure operating environment with detection of environmental trouble shooting,

- Secure execution environment and data sharing.

The Platform shall provide cryptographic services for the applet as

RSA and DES.

This IC is the Infineon SLE66CX642P, used by the platform shall be CC certified at a level comparable to the level of the current

TOE evaluation: EAL4+.

The IC shall support the security of the TOE operating environment and provide protection against

- Physical manipulation of the IC,

- Physical Probing of the IC,

- Malfunction due to environment stress,

- Inherent or forced information leakage,

- Deficiency of Random Numbers.

P.Applet_conformity Other instanciable Applets, ROMed on the Platform but not part of the TOE shall comply with Java Card 2.1.1 and GP 2.0.1.

Appropriate instruction on the install of these applications shall be supplied with the TOE.

Table 14: Platform OSPs

1.5 Special configuration requirements

The TOE is a Secure Signature Creation Device. It is defined uniquely by the name and version number product JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with

GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0. Its implementation representation and its configuration are specified by the Configuration List (Data List [27], Card

Software Configuration Check [28] and Configuration Items History G148 [29]).

The TOE as a Secure Signature Creation Device for key generation and signature creation is built upon the SLE66CX642P/m1485b16 with RSA 2048

V1.30 IC with a 64K EEPROM size. The EEPROM size can be limited to 36K by software configuration during Card Initialization flow, which is part of the installation process. Therefore, the TOE has two platform configurations defined in [6, chapter 2.2.1] and was tested in both configurations:

• GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with 64K EEPROM

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

• GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with 36K EEPROM

The evaluation and subsequent certification are therefore only valid for these configurations of the TOE JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with

GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0.

As outlined in chapter 1 of this report and listed in line 2, table 15 in chapter 2 of this report, there are other applications on the product: MPCOS, GemSafe,

GemID, VSDC and Dreifus. The TOE was tested together with these applications and the evaluation results are restricted to chip cards containing the TOE with those applications.

The TOE supports both the import of the SCD via a trusted channel (SSCD type

2, [11]) and the generation of SCD/SVD pairs on-board (SSCD type 3, [12]).

The TOE is delivered after IC initialisation, at the end of phase 3 of the open platform life cycle, see [6, chapter 2.3]. Phases 4 to 7 are covered by guidance for installation and start-up:

• Phase 4 – IC Packaging

IC Packaging guidance (phase 4) [13, chapter 3.4] including ATR

• Phase 5a – Card initialization

Card manufacturer’s guidance (phase 5) [13, chapter 3.5]

Card Initialization specification [13, chapter 3.5.1]

Card Initialization Specification [17] and Flow Description [17, chapter 4]

Initialization flow description [18, chapter 3]

• Phase 5b – Applet Install

GemSafe V2 installation guidance (phase 5b) [14, chapter 3.3.1]

Installing the GemSafe V2 Applet [15, chapter 4]

• Phase 6 – Applet personalization

GemSafe V2 personalization guidance (phase 6) [14, chapter 3.3.2]

Personalizer guidance (phase 6) [13, chapter 3.6]

Personalizing the GemSafe V2 Applet [15, chapter 5]

Personalization Phase Commands [15, chapter 10]

Personalization Constraints [19]

• Phase 7 – Product end-usage

GemSafe V2 Post-issuance Guidance (phase7) [14, chapter 3.3.3]

Card Issuer and Post-Issuance Guidance (phase 7) [13, chapter 3.7]

Application Phase Commands [15, chapter 11]

Recommendation to end user (phase 7) [13, chapter 4.3] for PIN usage and

Smart Card

The end user receives the TOE in an operational state where installation and generation procedures cannot be reapplied and the only start-up procedures applied by the end user is a change of the signatory PIN before the end user

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can first use the TOE to create signatures [15, chapter 11, PSO-Compute

Digital Signature].

Recommendations and hints for the user are provided in the user guidance [14, chapter 4.3]:

The end user is the card holder to which the card is issued for signature application. The card is issued to the card holder by the Card Issuer during phase 7. From that moment the Smart card is in card holder’s care until the card is permanently disabled or destroyed.

End user Guidance recommendation to the Card Issuer:

• The Card Issuer should provide a user guidance to the card holder. This guidance should contain all appropriate recommendations to the card holder to use and keep his card in a secure way and especially the following information. The card issuer should also require the Signatory to follow the provided guidance.

PIN recommendations to End user (phase7)

• The Personal Identification Number (PIN) is required to identify the user’s identity and to protect the fraudulent usage of a card that would be lost and/or stolen,

• The card holder is the only person to know the PIN value,

• The card holder must keep the PIN value strictly confidential and is responsible for it.

• The PIN value should be is at least 6 digits long. When the signatory changes the PIN, the value should be sufficiently diversified.

Card recommendation to end user (phase 7)

• The card may become out of service for reasons like: Card expired, PIN wrong, presentation surpassed the authorized ratification counter value (3 times), Card is blocked, Card is broken and cannot be read any longer, Card is in Terminated stage after severe security fault detection.

• In such cases, the card should be brought to the Issuer or Issuer representative for a safe recovery or destruction process.

• If the card is stolen or lost, the card holder should declare as soon as possible to the issuer.

Signature usage recommendation to end user (phase 7)

• For a high-security certified signature application (Common Criteria certification) the "Change PIN before first use" option, is mandatory.

• For such a high-security product, the end user must verify that the card received from the card issuer has never been used to generate a signature before.

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

• In order to proceed to this verification, the end user should perform the following steps:

1. Perform a PIN verification using the PIN received by mail from the card issuer.

2. Sign a message. The signing operation fails.

3. Change the PIN as required.

4. Verify the new PIN.

5. Sign a message. The signing operation is successful.

This check if the TOE has not been previously used for signing to be performed by the user is also addressed in the delivery to the TOE final user, the signatory, described in [20, chapter 3.2.5]:

The card issuer delivers the card to the final user protected by an initial PIN.

After receiving the card and the PIN, the user verifies that the card has not been previously used for signing and changes the PIN by applying the procedure suggested in [14, chapter 4.3.3] and [15, chapter 4] following table 18. The usage of the signature application by the signatory is protected by the signatory PIN and the signatory has to keep his PIN value secret as required by end user recommendations concerning the PIN usage in [14, chapter 4.3.1].

Detailed information about specific security characteristics of key, PIN and hash values that are under the control of TSF is provided in the Personalization

Constraints [19].

1.6 Assumptions about the operating environment

The following constraints concerning the operating environment are made in the

Security Target, please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.4:

Digital Signature assumptions

• A.CGA: Trustworthy certification-generation application

The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by an advanced signature of the CSP.

• A.SCA: Trustworthy signature-creation application

The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS-representation of data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE.

• A.SCD_Generate (option a): Trustworthy SCD/SVD generation

If a party other than the signatory generates the SCD/SVD-pair of a signatory, then

(a) this party will use a SSCD for SCD/SVD-generation,

(b) confidentiality of the SCD will be guaranteed until the SCD is under the sole control of the signatory and

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sole control of the signatory.

(d) The generation of the SCD/SVD is invoked by authorized users only.

(e) The SSCD Type 1 ensures the authenticity of the SVD it has created and exported.

Platform assumptions

• A.No_Loading

It is assumed that there is no loading of applets after the TOE delivery at the end of phase 3.

• A.Plt_Process

It is assumed that, after TOE delivery, Security Procedures are used by

Card Manufacturer and Card Issuer (phase 4 to 6) during delivery and storage for protection of the TOE material/information.

It is assumed that security procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations through phase 4 to 6, to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data, to prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorized used.

It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the TOE is used in phases 4, 5 and 6.

1.7 Disclaimers

The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the

Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.

2 Identification of the TOE

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:

JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0.

The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:

No Type Identifier Release Form of Delivery

Modules 1 HW JavaCard Platform consisting of

- Micro Controller

SLE66CX642P/m1485b16 with RSA 2048 V1.30

3.2 Software in ROM and EEPROM

GXP3.2-E64PK-CC

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

No Type Identifier

2 SW - MPCOS version 3.01

- GemSafe version 1.11

- GemID version 1.02

- VSDC /PSE version 2.5

- GS-CIS Dreifus C3 Applet

Version 1.0.0.0

3 SW Digital Signature application

GemSAFE V2

Specification For

GemXpresso Pro R3.2 E64

PK CC

Specification

Initialization flow description for GXP3.2 E64PK CC and

PPP 36K

For GXP3-CC -GemSafe V2

7 DOC Administrator & User

Guidance GXP3-CC, TOE -

GXP3.2- E64PK-CC

GemSAFE V2, Product -

GXP3.2-E64PK-CC

8 DOC Administrator & User

Guidance GemSafe V2, TOE

- GXP3.2- E64PK-CC

GemSAFE V2, Product -

GXP3.2-E64PK-CC

Reference Manual

Release

A13

A24

A03

0.3

Reference Manual

11 DOC MPCOS Applet 2.0 Reference

Manual

1.0

Reference 1.0

Form of Delivery

Software in ROM and EEPROM

Document in paper / electronic form [17]

Document in paper / electronic form [18]

Document in paper / electronic form [19]

Document in paper / electronic form [13]

Document in paper / electronic form [14]

13 DOC GEMSAFE Applet Reference

Manual

14 DOC TDS_TG Technical Design

Specification For T=G protocol

A00

Table 15: Deliverables of the TOE

Document in paper / electronic form [15]

Document in paper / electronic form [16]

Document in paper / electronic form [21]

Document in paper / electronic form [22]

Document in paper / electronic form [23]

Document in paper / electronic form [24]

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The delivery process after phase 4 uses the following mechanisms and procedures to allow detection of masquerading between administrators and the

TOE user:

- Defined delivery flow and Card Initialization process and personalization processes

- Protection of the smart card by card manager keys

- Protection of the smart card’s signature application by a PIN

The TOE is the composition of an IC, IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card

Embedded Software and will intended to be used as a Secure Signature

Creation Device (SSCD) for the generation of signature creation data (SCD) and the creation of qualified electronic signatures.

This certification does not include a confirmation according to the German Law

Governing Framework Conditions for Electronic Signatures and Amending

Other Regulations [30].

The security policy of the platform is to provide card during its life-cycle

• card cryptographic algorithms and keys management

• protection of the digital signature application data against snooping

• checks of the integrity of the cryptographic keys, digital signature persistently stored data and the card life cycle state

• protection of the TSF

• the integrity and the confidentiality of command messages transmission in a secure channel

The security policy of the digital signature application GemSAFE V2 is to provide

• authentication management including authentication operations for secure channel management

• cryptographic operations of the digital signature application, including destruction of previous cryptographic keys

• monitoring of the integrity of user data and integrity of the DTBS, prohibition of the use of altered data and informing S.Signatory about integrity errors

• management of operations and access

• the integrity and confidentiality of user data exchanged

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope

4.1 Usage assumptions

Specific usage assumptions were not addressed by this product evaluation.

4.2 Environmental assumptions

The following assumptions about physical and connectivity aspects defined by the Security Target have to be met (refer to Security Target [6, chapter 3.4]):

• The CGA protects the authenticity of the signatory’s name and the SVD in the qualified certificate by an advanced signature of the CSP (A.CGA).

• The signatory uses only a trustworthy SCA. The SCA generates and sends the DTBS-representation of data the signatory wishes to sign in a form appropriate for signing by the TOE (A.SCA).

• If a party other than the signatory generates the SCD/SVD-pair of a signatory, then

(a) this party will use a SSCD for SCD/SVD-generation,

(b) confidentiality of the SCD will be guaranteed until the SCD is under the sole control of the signatory and

(d) The generation of the SCD/SVD is invoked by authorized users only

(e) The SSCD Type 1 ensures the authenticity of the SVD it has created and exported (A.SCD_Generate).

• It is assumed that there is no loading of applets after the TOE delivery at the end of phase 3 (A.No_Loading).

• It is assumed that, after TOE delivery, Security Procedures are used by

Card Manufacturer and Card Issuer (phase 4 to 6) during delivery and storage for protection of the TOE material/information.

It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the TOE is used in phases 4, 5 and 6. (A.Plt_Process).

Furthermore, the Security Target [6, chapter 3.5.1] defines three Organisational

Security Policies for the Digital Signature Application that state that the CSP uses a trustworthy CGA to generate the qualified certificate for the SVD generated by the SSCD (P.CSP_Qcert), that the signatory uses a signature creation system to sign data with a qualified electronic signature that is based on a qualified certificate and that is created by an SSCD (P.Qsign), and that the

TOE implements the SCD used for signature creation under sole control of the signatory (P.Sigy_SSCD).

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There are also three Organisational Security Policies for the Smart Card

Platform [6, chapter 3.5.2]. They state that the platform allows the Digital

Signature application to operate in a secure environment (P.Plt_Support), that the Smart Card IC used by the platform shall be CC certified at a level comparable to the level of the TOE evaluation (P.IC_Support) and other instanciable Applets, ROMed on the Platform but not part of the TOE shall comply with the used standards and appropriate instruction on the install of these applications shall be supplied with the TOE (P.Applet_conformity).

Please refer to the Security Target [6, chapter 3.5] for more detail.

4.3 Clarification of scope

Additional threats that are not countered by the TOE and its evaluated security functions were not addressed by this product evaluation.

The TOE (JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version

1.0) is a secure signature creation device comprising an integrated circuit (IC) with an operating system (OS) and a signature application. An overview of the architecture is given in chapter 1 of this report (including Figure 1, a top level block diagram of the JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC) and chapter 2 of the Security Target [6], where also a top level block diagram of the GXP3 platform architecture can be found. A top level block diagram of the hardware IC including an overview of subsystems can be found within the TOE description of the Security Target of the chip [9].

6 Documentation

The documentation which is provided by the developer is listed in table 15 of this report and discussed in more detail in chapter 1.5 of this report.

7 IT Product Testing

Tests of the TOE were done (i) with real cards using a card reader and a PC,

(ii) on a ROM monitor for destructive test of the TOE leading to a life cycle state

TERMINATED and (iii) on an emulator where tests required break points and monitoring of memory cells during operation in an emulator test environment.

Developer’s Tests:

For developer tests, the test cases were mapped to Security Functions. All

Security Functions with their security properties and their interfaces were covered. In addition, the test cases were mapped to subsystems of the High-

Level Design and to modules of the Low-Level Design. All subsystems and modules with their security properties and their interfaces were covered. The developer tested each property of the design specification. All command APDU

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

with valid and invalid inputs are tested and all functions are tested with valid and invalid inputs. All test results were documented in log-files. All security functions were tested with overall positive results.

Independent evaluator tests:

The tests of the evaluator were performed by ISO-7816 APDU command sequences using a real card as well as tests on a ROM monitor and with emulators. For sample testing the evaluator has decided to perform as many tests as possible or nearly all of the developer’s functional testing performed.

The evaluator conducted penetration testing on identified potential vulnerabilities. The TOE proved to be resistant against high attack potential.

Side channel attacks on DES and RSA were tested and analysed during the evaluation of the IC SLE66CX642P/m1485b16 with RSA 2048 V1.30 (BSI-DSZ-

CC-0315-2005). The result of these analysis is still valid.

The TOE is delivered after phase 3, i.e. after IC initialisation at the hardware manufacturer. It is defined uniquely by the name and version number JavaCard

Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0.

The TOE has two configurations of the platform specified in the ST [6, chapter

2.2.1]:

• TOE configuration GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with 64K EEPROM (ATR historical byte T8 = 04 in [17, chapter 2], [18, chapter 3.5.1]),

• TOE configuration GXP3.2-E64PK-CC (PPP36K) with 36K EEPROM

(limited to 36K by software configuration during personalization by ATR historical byte T8 = 03 in [17, chapter 2], [18, chapter 3.5.1]).

The evaluation results are restricted to chip cards containing the TOE with applications that have been inspected during the evaluation process and that are listed in chapter 1 of this report and in line 2, table 15 in chapter 2 of this report.

The TOE supports both the import of the SCD via a trusted channel (SSCD type

2, [11]) and the generation of SCD/SVD pairs on-board (SSCD type 3, [12]).

9 Results of the Evaluation

The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.

The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in coordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]).

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For smart card specific methodology the scheme interpretations AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36 (see [4]) were used. For specific methodology on random number generator evaluation the scheme interpretations AIS 20 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used.

The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of the TOE.

The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL4 augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are summarised in the following table.

Assurance classes and components

Security Target evaluation CC Class ASE

Verdict

PASS

IT security requirements

Explicitly stated IT security requirements

TOE summary specification

Configuration management

Partial CM automation

Generation support and acceptance procedures

Development tools CM coverage

Delivery and operation

Detection of modification

Development

Semiformal functional specification

Semiformal high-level design

Implementation of the TSF

Descriptive low-level design

ASE_REQ.1 PASS

ASE_SRE.1 PASS

ASE_TSS.1 PASS

CC Class ACM PASS

ACM_AUT.1 PASS

ACM_CAP.4 PASS

ACM_SCP.2 PASS

CC Class ADO

ADO_DEL.2

ADO_IGS.1

PASS

CC Class ADV

ADV_FSP.2

ADV_HLD.2

ADV_IMP.2

ADV_LLD.1

PASS

Formal TOE security policy model

Guidance documents

Life cycle support

ADV_SPM.1 PASS

CC Class AGD PASS

AGD_ADM.1 PASS

AGD_USR.1 PASS

CC Class ALC PASS

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

Assurance classes and components

Sufficiency of security measures

Standardised life-cycle model

Analysis of coverage

Testing: low-level design

Functional testing

Independent testing – sample

ALC_DVS.1

ALC_LCD.1

ALC_TAT.1

Verdict

PASS

ATE_COV.2

ATE_DPT.1

ATE_FUN.1

ATE_IND.2

PASS

Analysis and testing for insecure states

Strength of TOE security function evaluation

AVA_MSU.3 PASS

AVA_SOF.1 PASS

AVA_VLA.4 PASS

Table 16: Verdicts for the assurance components

The evaluation has shown that:

• the TOE is conform to the PPs BSI-PP-0005-2002T [11] and

BSI-PP-0006-2002T [12],

• Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common

Criteria Part 2 extended,

• the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4 augmented by

ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF),

AVA_MSU.3 (Vulnerability assessment – Analysis and testing for insecure states) and

AVA_VLA.4 (Vulnerability assessment – Highly resistant).

• the following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:

SF_SIG_AUTHENTICATION and SF_CARD_AUTHENTICATION were evaluated to fulfil the minimum strength level SOF-high defined in [6].

The random number generator part of SF_CARD_CRYPTO was evaluated to fulfil [4, AIS 20] class K3 requirements with strength HIGH.

Therefore the scheme interpretations AIS 20, AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see [4]) were used. The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4,

Para. 3, Clause 2).

The underlying hardware had been successfully assessed by the Evaluation

Body for IT-Security of TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (TÜViT).

The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the JavaCard Platform

GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0 as outlined in chapter 2 and chapter 8 of this report and is produced and initialised in an environment that

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was subject to an audit in the cause of the evaluation. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product, provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.

10 Comments/Recommendations

The operational documentation (refer to chapter 6 of this report) contains necessary information about the secure usage of the TOE. Additionally, for secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance in these documents.

11 Annexes

None.

For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the target of evaluation

(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the complete security target [6] used for the evaluation performed.

13 Definitions

13.1 Acronyms

AIS

Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme

APDU

BSI

Application Protocol Data Unit, interface standard for smart cards, see ISO/IEC 7816 part 3

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal

Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany

CEM

CGA

CSP

DPA

Certification Authority (part of a CSP)

Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation

Certification Generation Application

Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation

Certification Service Provider

Differential Power Analysis, an attack, which may compromise cryptographic keys by analysing the power consumption of the smart card chip

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DRNG

DTBS

Dedicated File, directory on a smart card file system according to

ISO/IEC 7816

Deterministic Random Number Generator (a term used and introduced in AIS 20)

Data To Be Signed

MMU

OSP

PIN

PROM

PUK

RAD

RNG

RSA

SCA

SCD

EEPROM

Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory;

EEPROM is a special type of PROM that can be erased by exposing it to an electrical charge

ETR

Evaluation Technical Report

FSP

HLD

Functional Specification

High-Level Design

Integrated Circuit

Master File, top level directory (root) on a smart card file system according to ISO/IEC 7816

Memory Management Unit

Operating System

Organisational Security Policy

Personal Computer

Personal Identification Number

Programmable Read-Only Memory, a memory chip on which data can be written only once

Personal Unblock Key

Registration Authority (part of a CSP)

Reference Authentication Data

Random Number Generator

Asymmetric crypto algorithm by R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, L.

Adleman

Signature Creation Application

Signature Creation Data

SFP

SFR

Security Function Policy

Security Functional Requirement

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SOF

SSCD

Strength of Function

Secure Signature Creation Device

SVAD

SVD

TOE

TRNG

TSC

TSF

TSFI

TSP

VAD

Signatory’s Verification Authentication Data

Signature Verification Data

Software

Target of Evaluation

True Random Number Generator (a term used and introduced in

AIS31)

TSF Scope of Control

TOE Security Functions

TOE Security Functions Interface

TOE Security Policy

Verification Authentication Data

13.2 Glossary

Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC

Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.

Dreifus - is a JavaCard type application on the JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-

E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0 that provides Digital Signature services.

Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the

CC.

Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on well-established mathematical concepts.

GemID - a JavaCard type application on the JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-

E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0 that provides identification/authentication services.

GemSafe - is a JavaCard type application on the JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-

E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0 that provides identity, digital signature and data storage services.

Informal - Expressed in natural language.

MPCOS - JavaCard Type application on the JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-

E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0 that provides Data Storage and epurse services. MPCOS application relies on the GXP3 JavaCard platform and uses interoperable interfaces.

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which subjects perform operations.

Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.

Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.

Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.

Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.

SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.

SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.

SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.

Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.

TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the

TSP.

TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and distributed within a TOE.

TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a

TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.

VSDC (VISA Smart Debit Credit application) - a JavaCard type application on the JavaCard Platform GXP3.2-E64PK-CC with GemSAFE V2 Version 1.0 compliant with VISA specifications and provides EMV payment services.

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14 Bibliography

[1] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,

Version 2.1, August 1999

[2] Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation

(CEM), Part 1, Version 0.6; Part 2: Evaluation Methodology, Version 1.0,

August 1999

[3] BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)

[4] Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS), e.g.

AIS 20: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number generators AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December

1999

AIS 25 for: CC-Supporting Document: The application of CC to

Integrated Circuits, Version 2, July 2002

AIS 26 for: CC-Supporting Document: Application of Attack Potential to

Smartcards, Version 2, August 2002

AIS 31: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number generators, Version 1, 25 September 2001

AIS 32: Use of the international approved CC Final Interpretations into the German Certification Scheme, Version 1, 2 July 2001

AIS 34: Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+,

Version 1.00, 1 June 2004

AIS 35 for: CC-Supporting Document: ST-lite, Version 1.1, July 2002

AIS 36 for: CC-Supporting Documents: ETR-lite for Composition, Version

1.1, July 2002

[5] German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list published also on the BSI Web-site

[6] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0281, Version 0.93, 03.11.2005, ASE -

Security Target, TOE - GXP3.2-E64PK-CC GemSafe V2, Product -

GXP3.2-E64PK-CC, SSCD Type 2 (option a) and SSCD Type 3 (option b), Gemplus (confidential document)

[7] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0281, Version 1.0, 14.11.2005, ASE -

Security Target, TOE - GXP3.2-E64PK-CC GemSafe V2, Product -

GXP3.2-E64PK-CC, SSCD Type 2 (option a) and SSCD Type 3 (option b), Gemplus (sanitized public document)

[8] Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, Document ID:

20642118_TÜViT_24.2, 10.11.2005, Evaluation Technical Report (ETR)

(confidential document)

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

[9] Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0315, Version 1.2, 20.04.2004, Security

Target for SLE66CX642P/m1485b16 (Drs) with RSA2048 V1.30, Infineon

Technologies AG,

[10] Certificate for the Infineon Smart Card IC (Security Controller)

SLE66CX642P/m1485b16 with RSA 2048 V1.30 and specific IC

Dedicated Software from Infineon Technologies AG; Deutsches IT-

Sicherheitszertifikat, BSI-DSZ-CC-0315-2005, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, 12.08.2005

[11] Protection Profile - Secure Signature-Creation Device (SSCD-PP) Type

2, Version 1.04, EAL 4+, BSI-PP-0005-2002T, 03.04.2002

[12] Protection Profile - Secure Signature Creation Device (SSCD-PP) Type

3, Version 1.05, EAL 4+, BSI-PP-0006-2002T, 03.04.2002

[13] Administrator & User Guidance GXP3-CC, TOE - GXP3.2-E64PK-CC

GemSAFE V2, Product - GXP3.2-E64PK-CC, Version 0.3, 09.08.2005,

Gemplus (confidential document)

[14] Administrator & User Guidance GemSafe V2, TOE - GXP3.2-E64PK-CC

GemSAFE V2, Product - GXP3.2-E64PK-CC, Version 0.3, 06.09.2005

Gemplus (confidential document)

[15] GemSafe V2 Applet Reference Manual, Version 5, 30.09.2005, Gemplus

[16] GemXpresso Pro R3.x Reference Manual, Version 3, 08.07.2005,

Gemplus

[17] Card Initialization Specification For GemXpresso Pro R3.2 E64 PK CC,

Version A13, 20.09.2005, Gemplus (confidential document)

GXP3.2-E64PK-CC and PPP 36K, Version A24, 15.09.2004, Gemplus

(confidential document)

[19] Personalization Constraints For GXP3-CC GemSafe V2, Version A03,

20.09.2005, Gemplus (confidential document)

[20] Delivery & Operation, TOE - GXP3.2- E64PK-CC GemSAFE V2, Product

- GXP3.2-E64PK-CC, Version 0.5, 20.09.2005, Gemplus (confidential document)

[21] MPCOS Applet 2.0 Reference Manual, Version 1.0, 11.10.2002,

Gemplus

[22] GemID Reference Manual, Version 1.0, 11.10.2002, Gemplus

[23] GEMSAFE Applet Reference Manual, Version 3, 22.06.2004, Gemplus

[24] Technical Design Specification For T=G protocol, Version A00,

30.08.2005, Gemplus (confidential document)

Product - GXP3.2-E64PK-CC, Version 0.3, 27.09.2005, Gemplus

(confidential document)

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[26] Master CMP For GemXpresso Pro R3 CC, Version A08, 25.01.2005,

Gemplus (confidential document

[27] Data List (DAL01A10190G), Version A02, 30.09.2004, Gemplus

(confidential document)

[28] Card Software Configuration Check for GXP3-CC, Version A07, 2.05.05,

Gemplus (confidential document)

(CI_History_G148_G146_for_TUVIT.xls), 02.08.2005, Gemplus

(confidential document)

[30] German Law Governing Framework Conditions for Electronic Signatures and Amending Other Regulations: Gesetz über Rahmenbedingungen für elektronische Signaturen (Signaturgesetz - SigG), 16. Mai 2001 (BGBl. I

S. 876), zuletzt geändert durch Art. 1 des Ersten Gesetzes zur Änderung des Signaturgesetzes (1. SigÄndG) vom 04. Januar 2005 (BGBl. I S. 2))

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

C Excerpts from the Criteria

CC Part 1:

Caveats on evaluation results (chapter 5.4) / Final Interpretation 008

The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with respect to Part 2 (functional requirements), Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL,

Protection Profile).

The conformance result consists of one of the following:

Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 2 conformant if the functional requirements are based only upon functional components in Part 2

Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 2 extended if the functional requirements include functional components not in Part 2 plus one of the following:

Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is Part 3 conformant if the assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in Part 3

Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is Part 3 extended if the assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in Part 3.

Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:

Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements

(functions or assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements

(functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.

Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:

PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the conformance result.

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CC Part 3:

Assurance categorisation (chapter 2.5)

"The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table 2.1."

Assurance Class Assurance Family Abbreviated Name

Class ACM: Configuration management

CM automation ACM_AUT

ACM_CAP

ACM_SCP

Delivery ADO_DEL Class ADO: Delivery and operation

Installation, generation and start-up

Class ADV: Development Functional specification

ADO_IGS

ADV_FSP

ADV_HLD

Class AGD: Guidance documents

Security policy modeling

Administrator guidance

Class ALC: Life cycle support Development security

ADV_INT

ADV_LLD

ADV_SPM

AGD_ADM

Class ATE: Tests

Life cycle definition

Tools and techniques

Coverage

Depth

Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment

Covert channel analysis

Misuse

Strength of TOE security functions

AGD_USR

ALC_DVS

ALC_FLR

ALC_LCD

ALC_TAT

ATE_COV

ATE_DPT

ATE_FUN

ATE_IND

AVA_CCA

AVA_MSU

AVA_SOF

AVA_VLA

Table 17: Assurance family breakdown and map

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 6)

"The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.

It is important to note that not all families and components from Part 3 are included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and

STs for which they provide utility."

Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 6.1)

Table 6.1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.

Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.

As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.

They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families

(i.e. adding new requirements).

These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described in chapter 2 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component are addressed.

While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation“ allows the addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an

EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component“ is not recognised by the CC as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly stated assurance requirements.

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Assurance Class Assurance

Family

Assurance Components by

Evaluation Assurance Level

EAL1 EAL2 EAL3 EAL4 EAL5 EAL6 EAL7

Configuration management

ACM_AUT 1 1 2 2

ACM_CAP

ACM_SCP

Delivery and operation

ADO_DEL 1 1 2 2 2 3

ADO_IGS 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

ADV_HLD 1 2 2 3 4 5

ADV_IMP

ADV_INT

ADV_LLD

ADV_RCR

ADV_SPM

Guidance documents

AGD_USR

Life cycle support

ALC_DVS 1 1 1 2 2

ALC_FLR

ALC_LCD

ALC_TAT

Tests ATE_COV 1 2 2 2 3 3

ATE_DPT

ATE_FUN 1 1 1 1 2 2

ATE_IND 1 2 2 2 2 2 3

Vulnerability AVA_CCA 1 2 2 assessment

AVA_MSU

AVA_SOF 1 1 1 1 1 1

AVA_VLA 1 1 2 3 4 4

Table 18: Evaluation assurance level summary

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 6.2.1)

"Objectives

EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.

EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.

An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified threats.“

Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 6.2.2)

"Objectives

EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.

EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.“

Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked

(chapter 6.2.3)

"Objectives

EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound development practices.

EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial reengineering.“

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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and

reviewed (chapter 6.2.4)

"Objectives

EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.

EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional securityspecific engineering costs.“

Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested

(chapter 6.2.5)

"Objectives

EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a

TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of specialised techniques, will not be large.

EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.“

Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and

tested (chapter 6.2.6)

"Objectives

EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant risks.

EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.“

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Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0281-2005

Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested

(chapter 6.2.7)

"Objectives

EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“

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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 14.3)

AVA_SOF Strength of TOE security functions

"Objectives

Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.“

Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 14.4)

AVA_VLA

Vulnerability analysis

"Objectives

Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.

Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.“

"Application notes

A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.“

"Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the

TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3) or high (for AVA_VLA.4) attack potential.“

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