Security Target: c0470_est

Security Target: c0470_est
MP 2554/3054/3554/4054/5054/6054
(Ricoh/Lanier/nashuatec/Rex-Rotary/Gestetner/infotec)
Security Target
Author : RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
Date
: 2015-03-06
Version : 1.00
Portions of MP 2554/3054/3554/4054/5054/6054 (Ricoh/Lanier/nashuatec/
Rex-Rotary/Gestetner/infotec) Security Target are reprinted with written
permission from IEEE, 445 Hoes Lane, Piscataway, New Jersey 08855, from
U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government Protection
Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std 2600.2™-2009),
Copyright © 2010 IEEE. All rights reserved.
This document is a translation of the evaluated and certified security target
written in Japanese.
Copyright (c) 2015 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Page 1 of 93
Revision History
Version
1.00
Date
2015-03-06
Author
RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
Detail
Publication version.
Copyright (c) 2015 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Page 2 of 93
Table of Contents
1
................................................................
................................................................
.....................................................
ST Introduction ................................
................................
................................
..................... 7
1.1
ST Reference ................................................................
................................................................................................
...................................................................................
................................................... 7
1.2
TOE Reference................................................................
................................................................................................
................................................................................
................................................ 7
1.3
TOE Overview ................................................................
................................................................................................
................................................................................
................................................ 8
1.3.1
TOE Type ..................................................................................................................... 8
1.3.2
TOE Usage ................................................................................................................... 8
1.3.3
Major Security Features of TOE .............................................................................. 11
1.4
TOE Description ................................................................
................................................................................................
...........................................................................
........................................... 11
1.4.1
Physical Boundary of TOE........................................................................................ 11
1.4.2
Guidance Documents ................................................................................................ 14
1.4.3
Definition of Users .................................................................................................... 17
1.4.3.1.
Direct User ......................................................................................................... 17
1.4.3.2.
Indirect User....................................................................................................... 18
1.4.4
1.4.4.1.
Basic Functions .................................................................................................. 19
1.4.4.2.
Security Functions ............................................................................................. 22
1.4.5
1.5
3
Protected Assets......................................................................................................... 24
1.4.5.1.
User Data............................................................................................................ 24
1.4.5.2.
TSF Data............................................................................................................. 24
1.4.5.3.
Functions ............................................................................................................ 25
Glossary ................................................................
................................................................................................
........................................................................................
........................................................ 25
1.5.1
2
Logical Boundary of TOE.......................................................................................... 18
Glossary for This ST.................................................................................................. 25
................................................................
................................................................
.............................................
Conformance Claim ................................
................................
................................
............. 29
2.1
CC Conformance Claim ................................................................
................................................................................................
................................................................ 29
2.2
PP Claims ................................................................
................................................................................................
.....................................................................................
..................................................... 29
2.3
Package Claims ................................................................
................................................................................................
............................................................................
............................................ 29
2.4
Conformance Claim Rationale ................................................................
.....................................................................................
..................................................... 30
2.4.1
Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP ................................................................ 30
2.4.2
Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP ......... 30
2.4.3
Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP .......................................... 31
................................................................
..............................................................
Security Problem Definitions ................................
................................
.............................. 34
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4
3.1
Threats ................................................................
................................................................................................
.........................................................................................
......................................................... 34
3.2
Organisational Security Policies ................................................................
..................................................................................
.................................................. 35
3.3
Assumptions ................................................................
................................................................................................
.................................................................................
................................................. 35
................................................................
................................................................
..............................................
Security Objectives ................................
................................
................................
.............. 37
4.1
Security Objectives for TOE ................................................................
.........................................................................................
......................................................... 37
4.2
Security Objectives of Operational Environment ........................................................
........................................................ 38
4.2.1
IT Environment ......................................................................................................... 38
4.2.2
Non-IT Environment ................................................................................................. 39
4.3
5
4.3.1
Correspondence Table of Security Objectives.......................................................... 40
4.3.2
Security Objectives Descriptions.............................................................................. 41
Extended Components Definition ................................................................
.......................................................................................
....................................................... 45
5.1
6
Restricted
Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP) ....................... 45
................................................................
................................................................
........................................
Security Requirements ................................
................................
................................
........ 47
6.1
7
Security Objectives Rationale ................................................................
......................................................................................
...................................................... 40
Security Functional Requirements
Requirements ................................................................
..............................................................................
.............................................. 47
6.1.1
Class FAU: Security audit ........................................................................................ 47
6.1.2
Class FCS: Cryptographic support........................................................................... 51
6.1.3
Class FDP: User data protection .............................................................................. 52
6.1.4
Class FIA: Identification and authentication.......................................................... 56
6.1.5
Class FMT: Security management ........................................................................... 60
6.1.6
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF ............................................................................. 65
6.1.7
Class FTA: TOE access ............................................................................................. 66
6.1.8
Class FTP: Trusted path/channels ........................................................................... 66
6.2
Security Assurance Requirements ................................................................
...............................................................................
............................................... 67
6.3
Security Requirements Rationale ................................................................
................................................................................
................................................ 67
6.3.1
Tracing........................................................................................................................ 68
6.3.2
Justification of Traceability ...................................................................................... 69
6.3.3
Dependency Analysis................................................................................................. 76
6.3.4
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale .......................................................... 77
................................................................
...............................................................
TOE Summary Specification ................................
................................
............................... 79
7.1
Audit Function................................
Function................................................................
................................................................................................
..............................................................................
.............................................. 79
7.2
Identification and Authentication Function ................................................................
................................................................ 81
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7.3
Document Access Control Function................................
Function................................................................
..............................................................................
.............................................. 84
7.4
UseUse-ofof-Feature Restriction Function................................
Function................................................................
............................................................................
............................................ 86
7.5
Network Protection Function ................................................................
.......................................................................................
....................................................... 86
7.6
Residual Data Overwrite Function ................................................................
..............................................................................
.............................................. 87
7.7
Stored Data Protection Function ................................................................
.................................................................................
................................................. 88
7.8
Security Management Function ................................................................
...................................................................................
................................................... 88
7.9
Software Verification Function ................................................................
....................................................................................
.................................................... 93
7.10
Fax Line Separation Function ................................................................
.....................................................................................
..................................................... 93
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List of Figures
Figure 1 : Example of TOE Environment ........................................................................................................ 9
Figure 2 : Hardware Configuration of the TOE ............................................................................................. 12
Figure 3 : Logical Scope of the TOE ............................................................................................................. 19
List of Tables
Table 1: Guidance for English Version-1 ....................................................................................................... 15
Table 2: Guidance for English Version-2 ....................................................................................................... 16
Table 3 : Definition of Users ......................................................................................................................... 17
Table 4 : List of Administrative Roles ........................................................................................................... 17
Table 5 : Definition of User Data .................................................................................................................. 24
Table 6 : Definition of TSF Data ................................................................................................................... 24
Table 7 : Specific Terms Related to This ST ................................................................................................. 25
Table 8 : Rationale for Security Objectives ................................................................................................... 40
Table 9 : List of Auditable Events ................................................................................................................. 48
Table 10 : List of Cryptographic Key Generation ......................................................................................... 51
Table 11 : List of Cryptographic Operation ................................................................................................... 51
Table 12 : List of Subjects, Objects, and Operations among Subjects and Objects (a) ................................. 52
Table 13 : List of Subjects, Objects, and Operations among Subjects and Objects (b) ................................. 52
Table 14 : Subjects, Objects and Security Attributes (a) ............................................................................... 53
Table 15 : Rules to Control Operations on Document Data and User Jobs (a).............................................. 53
Table 16 : Additional Rules to Control Operations on Document Data and User Jobs (a) ............................ 54
Table 17 : Subjects, Objects and Security Attributes (b) ............................................................................... 55
Table 18 : Rule to Control Operations on MFP Applications (b) .................................................................. 55
Table 19 : List of Authentication Events of Basic Authentication ................................................................. 56
Table 20 : List of Actions for Authentication Failure .................................................................................... 56
Table 21 : List of Security Attributes for Each User That Shall Be Maintained ............................................ 57
Table 22 : Rules for Initial Association of Attributes .................................................................................... 59
Table 23 : User Roles for Security Attributes (a)........................................................................................... 60
Table 24 : User Roles for Security Attributes (b) .......................................................................................... 61
Table 25 : Authorised Identified Roles Allowed to Override Default Values ................................................ 62
Table 26 : List of TSF Data ........................................................................................................................... 63
Table 27 : List of Specification of Management Functions ........................................................................... 64
Table 28 : TOE Security Assurance Requirements (EAL2+ALC_FLR.2) .................................................... 67
Table 29 : Relationship between Security Objectives and Functional Requirements .................................... 68
Table 30 : Results of Dependency Analysis of TOE Security Functional Requirements .............................. 76
Table 31 : List of Audit Events ...................................................................................................................... 79
Table 32 : List of Audit Log Items ................................................................................................................ 80
Table 33 : Unlocking Administrators for Each User Role ............................................................................. 83
Table 34 : Stored Documents Access Control Rules for Normal Users ......................................................... 85
Table 35 : Encrypted Communications Provided by the TOE ....................................................................... 87
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Table 36 : List of Cryptographic Operations for Stored Data Protection ...................................................... 88
Table 37 : Management of TSF Data ............................................................................................................. 89
Table 38 : List of Static Initialisation for Security Attributes of Document Access Control SFP ................. 92
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1 ST Introduction
This section describes ST Reference, TOE Reference, TOE Overview and TOE Description.
1.1
ST Reference
The following are the identification information of this ST.
Title
: MP 2554/3054/3554/4054/5054/6054
(Ricoh/Lanier/nashuatec/Rex-Rotary/Gestetner/infotec)
Security Target
1.2
Version
: 1.00
Date
: 2015-03-06
Author
: RICOH COMPANY, LTD.
TOE Reference
The identification information of the TOE is shown below.
TOE Names
: MP 2554/3054/3554/4054/5054/6054
(Ricoh/Lanier/nashuatec/Rex-Rotary/Gestetner/infotec)
Version
: EEA-1.00
TOE Type
: Digital multifunction product (hereafter "MFP")
Target MFPs
: TOE is MFPs to which Auto Document Feeder (ADF) (Auto Reverse Document Feeder),
Auto Document Feeder (ADF) (one-pass duplex scanning ADF), or exposure glass cover is
attached.
MFPs to which Auto Document Feeder (ADF) (Auto Reverse Document Feeder), Auto
Document Feeder (ADF) (one-pass duplex scanning ADF), or exposure glass cover can be
attached.
Ricoh MP 4054SP, Ricoh MP 4054ASP, Ricoh MP 5054SP,
Ricoh MP 5054ASP, Ricoh MP 6054SP,
Lanier MP 4054SP, Lanier MP 5054SP, Lanier MP 6054SP,
nashuatec MP 4054SP, nashuatec MP 4054ASP, nashuatec MP 5054SP,
nashuatec MP 5054ASP, nashuatec MP 6054SP,
Rex-Rotary MP 4054SP, Rex-Rotary MP 4054ASP, Rex-Rotary MP 5054SP,
Rex-Rotary MP 5054ASP, Rex-Rotary MP 6054SP,
Gestetner MP 4054SP, Gestetner MP 4054ASP, Gestetner MP 5054SP,
Gestetner MP 5054ASP, Gestetner MP 6054SP,
infotec MP 4054SP, infotec MP 4054ASP, infotec MP 5054SP,
infotec MP 5054ASP, infotec MP 6054SP
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MFPs to which Auto Document Feeder (ADF) (Auto Reverse Document Feeder) or
exposure glass cover can be attached.
Ricoh MP 2554SP, Ricoh MP 3054SP, Ricoh MP 3554SP,
Lanier MP 2554SP, Lanier MP 3054SP, Lanier MP 3554SP,
nashuatec MP 2554SP, nashuatec MP 3054SP, nashuatec MP 3554SP,
Rex-Rotary MP 2554SP, Rex-Rotary MP 3054SP, Rex-Rotary MP 3554SP,
Gestetner MP 2554SP, Gestetner MP 3054SP, Gestetner MP 3554SP,
infotec MP 2554SP, infotec MP 3054SP, infotec MP 3554SP
All of the above MFPs with "Fax Option Type M12" installed.
If customers want to purchase these products as CC-certified products, it is necessary to ask a sales
representative for the request.
1.3
TOE Overview
This section defines TOE Type, TOE Usage and Major Security Features of TOE.
1.3.1
TOE Type
This TOE is an MFP, which is an IT device that inputs, stores, and outputs documents.
1.3.2
TOE Usage
The operational environment of the TOE is illustrated below and the usage of the TOE is outlined in this
section.
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Figure 1 : Example of TOE Environment
The TOE is used by connecting to the local area network (hereafter "LAN") and telephone lines, as shown in
Figure 1. Users can operate the TOE from the Operation Panel of the TOE or through LAN communications.
Below, explanations are provided for the MFP, which is the TOE itself, and hardware and software other
than the TOE.
MFP
A machinery that is defined as the TOE. The MFP is connected to the office LAN, and users can perform the
following operations from the Operation Panel of the MFP:
-
Various settings for the MFP,
-
Copy, fax, storage, and network transmission of paper documents,
-
Print, fax, network transmission, and deletion of the stored documents.
Also, the TOE receives information via telephone lines and can store it as a document.
LAN
Network used in the TOE environment.
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Client computer
A computer that performs as a client of the TOE if it is connected to the LAN, and users can remotely
operate the MFP from the client computer. The possible remote operations from the client computer are as
follows:
-
Various settings for the MFP using a Web browser installed on the client computer,
-
Operation of stored documents using a Web browser installed on the client computer,
-
Storage and/or printing of documents using the printer driver installed on the client computer,
-
Storage and/or faxing of documents using the fax driver installed on the client computer.
Telephone line
A public line for the TOE to communicate with external faxes.
Firewall
A device to prevent the office environment from network attacks via the Internet.
FTP Server
A server used by the TOE for folder transmission of the stored documents in the TOE to its folders.
SMB Server
A server used by the TOE for folder transmission of the stored documents in the TOE to its folders.
SMTP Server
A server used by the TOE for e-mail transmission.
External Authentication Server
A server that identifies and authenticates the TOE user with Windows authentication (Kerberos
authentication method). This server is only used when External Authentication is applied. The TOE
identifies and authenticates the user by communicating with the external authentication server via LAN.
RC Gate
An IT device used for @Remote. The function of RC Gate for @Remote is to relay communications
between the MFP and maintenance centre. A transfer path to other external interface for input information
from the RC Gate via network interface is not implemented in the TOE. The RC Gate products include
Remote Communication Gate A, Remote Communication Gate Type BM1, and Remote Communication
Gate Type BN1.
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1.3.3
Major Security Features of TOE
The TOE stores documents in it, and sends and receives documents to and from the IT devices connected to
the LAN. To ensure provision of confidentiality and integrity for those documents, the TOE has the
following security features:
-
Audit Function
-
Identification and Authentication Function
-
Document Access Control Function
-
Use-of-Feature Restriction Function
-
Network Protection Function
-
Residual Data Overwrite Function
-
Stored Data Protection Function
-
Security Management Function
-
Software Verification Function
-
Fax Line Separation Function
1.4
TOE Description
This section describes Physical Boundary of TOE, Guidance Documents, Definition of Users, Logical
Boundary of TOE, and Protected Assets.
1.4.1
Physical Boundary of TOE
The physical boundary of the TOE is the MFP, which consists of the following hardware components
(shown in Figure 2): Operation Panel Unit, Engine Unit, Fax Controller Unit, Controller Board, HDD, Ic
Hdd, Network Unit, USB Port, and SD Card Slot.
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Figure 2 : Hardware Configuration of the TOE
Controller Board
The Controller Board is a device that contains Processors, RAM, NVRAM, Ic Key, and FlashROM. The
Controller Board sends and receives information to and from the units and devices that constitute the MFP,
and this information is used to control the MFP. The information to control the MFP is processed by the
MFP Control Software on the Controller Board. The following describes the components of the Controller
Board:
-
Processor
A semiconductor chip that performs basic arithmetic processing for MFP operations.
-
RAM
A volatile memory medium which is used as a working area for image processing such as
compressing/decompressing the image data. It can also be used to temporarily read and write
internal information.
-
NVRAM
A non-volatile memory medium in which TSF data for configuring MFP operations is stored.
-
Ic Key
A security chip that has the functions of random number generation, cryptographic key generation
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and digital signature. It has the memory medium inside, and the signature root key is installed
before the TOE is shipped.
-
FlashROM
A non-volatile memory medium in which the MFP Control Software that constitutes the TOE is
installed.
Operation Panel Unit (hereafter "Operation Panel")
The Operation Panel is a user interface installed on the TOE and consists of the following devices: key
switches, LED indicators, an LCD touch screen, and Operation Control Board. The Operation Control Board
is connected to the key switches, LED indicators, and LCD touch screen. The Operation Panel Control
Software is installed on the Operation Panel Control Board. The Operation Panel Control Software performs
the following:
1.
Transfers operation instructions from the key switches and the LCD touch screen to the
Controller Board.
2.
Controls the LEDs and displays information on the LCD touch screen according to display
instructions from the Controller Board.
Engine Unit
The Engine Unit consists of Scanner Engine that is an input device to read paper documents, Printer Engine
that is an output device to print and eject paper documents, and Engine Control Board. The Engine Control
Software is installed in the Engine Control Board. The Engine Control Software sends status information
about the Scanner Engine and Printer Engine to the Controller Board, and operates the Scanner Engine or
Printer Engine according to instructions from the MFP Control Software.
Fax Controller Unit (FCU)
The Fax Controller Unit is a unit that has a modem function for connection to a telephone line. It also sends
and receives fax data to and from other fax devices using the G3 standard for communication. The Fax
Controller Unit sends and receives control information about the Controller Board and the FCU and fax data.
FCU Control Software is installed on the FCU.
HDD
The HDD is a hard disk drive that is a non-volatile memory medium. It stores documents, login user names
and login passwords of normal users.
Ic Hdd
The Ic Hdd is a board that implements data encryption and decryption functions. It is provided with
functions for HDD encryption realisation.
Network Unit
The Network Unit is an external interface to an Ethernet (100BASE-TX/10BASE-T) LAN.
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USB Port
The USB Port is an external interface to connect a client computer to the TOE for printing directly from the
client computer. During installation, this interface is disabled.
SD Card Slot
There are SD Card Slots for customer engineer and for users.
The SD Card Slot for customer engineer is used when the customer engineer installs the TOE. A cover is
placed on the SD Card Slot during the TOE operation so that an SD Card cannot be inserted into or removed
from the slot.
The SD Card Slot for users is used by users to print documents in the SD Card. The slot is set to disabled at
the installation.
1.4.2
Guidance Documents
The following sets of user guidance documents are available for this TOE: [English version-1] and [English
version-2]. Selection of the guidance document sets depends on the sales area and/or sales company.
Guidance document sets will be supplied with individual TOE component. Details of the document sets are
as follows.
[English version-1]
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Table 1: Guidance for English Version-1
Guidance Documents for Product
TOE
Components
MFP
-
MP 2554/3054/3554/4054/5054/6054 series
Read This First
D202-7007
- Notes for Using This Machine Safely
- Safety Information
D202-7051
A232-8561A
- SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT
- NOTICE TO USERS
- Notes for Users
-
D193-7658
D193-7659
D202-7058A
CE Marking Traceability Information
(For EU Countries Only)
- About This Machine
M109-8615
D202-7471
- Copy/Document Server
- Fax
D202-7472
D202-7473
- Print
D202-7474
- Scan
D202-7475
- Troubleshooting
D202-7476
- Connecting the Machine/System Settings
- Security Guide
D202-7478
- Extended Feature Settings
- PostScript 3
- Appendix
D202-7477
D193-7479
D202-7480
D202-7481
- MP 2554/3054/3554/4054/5054/6054 series
User Guide
D202-7482
- Operating Instructions
Driver Installation Guide
D202-7483
- About Open Source Software License
-
D202-7464
Notes for Administrators: Using This
Machine in a Network Environment
Compliant with IEEE Std 2600.2TM-2009
-
Notes on Security Functions
-
Help
D202-7079
D146-7587
83NHCWENZ1.10 v170
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[English version-2]
Table 2: Guidance for English Version-2
Guidance Documents for Product
TOE
Components
MFP
-
MP 2554/3054/3554/4054/5054/6054 series
Read This First
D202-7009
- Notes for Using This Machine Safely
D202-7150
- SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT
- NOTICE TO USERS
- Notes for Users
D193-7659
D202-7058A
- About This Machine
D202-7471
- Copy/Document Server
- Fax
D193-7658
D202-7472
D202-7473
- Print
D202-7474
- Scan
D202-7475
- Troubleshooting
D202-7476
- Connecting the Machine/System Settings
- Security Guide
D202-7478
- Extended Feature Settings
- PostScript 3
- Appendix
D202-7477
D193-7479
D202-7480
D202-7481
- MP 2554/3054/3554/4054/5054/6054 series
User Guide
D202-7482
- Operating Instructions
Driver Installation Guide
D202-7483
- About Open Source Software License
-
D202-7464
Notes for Administrators: Using This
Machine in a Network Environment
Compliant with IEEE Std 2600.2TM-2009
-
Notes on Security Functions
-
Help
D202-7079
D146-7587
83NHCWENZ1.10 v170
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1.4.3
Definition of Users
This section defines the users related to the TOE. These users include those who routinely use the TOE
(direct users) and those who do not (indirect users). The direct users and indirect users are described as
follows:
1.4.3.1.
Direct User
The "user" referred to in this ST indicates a direct user. This direct user consists of normal users,
administrators, and RC Gate. The following table (Table 3) shows the definitions of these direct users.
Table 3 : Definition of Users
Explanation
Definition of
Users
Normal user
A user who is allowed to use the TOE. A normal user is provided with a login user
name and can use Copy Function, Fax Function, Scanner Function, Printer Function,
and Document Server Function.
Administrator
A user who is allowed to manage the TOE. An administrator performs management
operations, which include issuing login names to normal users.
RC Gate
An IT device connected to networks. RC Gate performs the @Remote Service Function
of the TOE via RC Gate communication interface. Copy Function, Fax Function,
Scanner Function, Printer Function, Document Server Function, and Management
Function cannot be used.
The administrator means the user registered for TOE management. According to its roles, the administrator
can be classified as the supervisor and the MFP administrator. Up to four MFP administrators can be
registered and selectively authorised to perform user management, machine management, network
management, and file management. Therefore, the different roles of the management privilege can be
allocated to multiple MFP administrators individually. The "MFP administrator" in this ST refers to the MFP
administrator who has all management privileges (Table 4).
Table 4 : List of Administrative Roles
Definition of
Administrator
Supervisor
Management Privileges
Explanation
Supervisor
Authorised to modify the login password of the
MFP administrator.
User management privilege
Authorised to manage normal users. This
privilege allows configuration of normal user
settings.
Machine management
privilege
Authorised to specify MFP device behaviour
(network behaviours excluded). This privilege
allows configuration of device settings and
view of the audit log.
MFP administrator
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Definition of
Administrator
1.4.3.2.
Management Privileges
Explanation
Network management
privilege
Authorised to manage networks and configure
LAN settings. This privilege allows
configuration of network settings.
File management privilege
Authorised to manage stored documents. This
privilege allows access management of stored
documents.
Indirect User
Responsible manager of MFP
The responsible manager of MFP is a person who is responsible for selection of the TOE administrators in
the organisation where the TOE is used.
Customer engineer
The customer engineer is a person who belongs to the organisation which maintains TOE operation. The
customer engineer is in charge of installation, setup, and maintenance of the TOE.
1.4.4
Logical Boundary of TOE
The Basic Functions and Security Functions are described as follows:
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Figure 3 : Logical Scope of the TOE
1.4.4.1.
Basic Functions
The overview of the Basic Functions is described as follows:
Copy Function
The Copy Function is to scan paper documents and copy scanned image data from the Operation Panel.
Magnification and other editorial jobs can be applied to the copy image. It can also be stored on the HDD as
a Document Server document.
Printer Function
The Printer Function is to print or store the documents received from the printer driver installed on the client
computer. It also allows users to print and delete the documents stored in the TOE from the Operation Panel
or the client computer.
-
Receiving documents from the printer driver installed on the client computer.
The TOE receives documents from the printer driver installed on the client computer. Printing
methods for documents is selected by users from the printer driver. The printing methods include
direct print, Document Server storage, locked print, stored print, hold print, and sample print.
For direct print, documents received by the TOE will be printed. The documents will not be stored
in the TOE.
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For Document Server storage, the received documents will be stored on the HDD as Document
Server documents.
For locked print, stored print, hold print, and sample print, the received documents will be stored
on the HDD as printer documents. A dedicated password, which is used for locked print, is not
subject to this evaluation.
-
Operating from the Operation Panel
The TOE can print or delete printer documents according to the operations by users from the
Operation Panel.
-
Operating from the client computer
The TOE can print or delete printer documents according to the operations by users from the client
computer.
-
Deleting printer documents by the TOE
The deletion of printer documents by the TOE differs depending on printing methods. If locked
print, hold print, or sample print is specified, the TOE deletes printer documents when printing is
complete. If stored print is specified, the TOE does not delete printer documents even when
printing is complete.
According to the guidance document, users first install the specified printer driver on their own client
computers, and then use this function.
Scanner Function
The Scanner Function is for users to scan paper documents by operating from the Operation Panel. The users
can send and then save those scanned documents to SMB server, FTP server, and the client computer. The
images of the scanned paper documents can be stored in the TOE to be transmitted or deleted afterwards.
Methods to transmit documents include folder transmission, e-mail transmission of attachments, and e-mail
transmission of the URL.
Folder transmission can be applied only to the destination folders in a server that the MFP administrator
pre-registers in the TOE and with which secure communication can be ensured. E-mail transmission of
attachments and e-mail transmission of the URL are possible only with the mail server and e-mail addresses
that the MFP administrator pre-registers in the TOE and with which secure communication can be ensured.
Users, who receive e-mails sent by e-mail transmission of the URL, can download scanner documents to the
client computer.
Fax Function
As for the Fax Function, the fax complying with the G3 standard, which uses a telephone line, is the target of
evaluation. This function consists of Fax Transmission Function and Fax Reception Function.
Fax Transmission Function is to send paper documents or images of electronic documents in the client
computer as documents to external fax devices. Faxes are allowed to be sent only to the telephone numbers
that are pre-registered in the TOE. Documents for fax transmission can be stored in the TOE. This is called
the Fax Data Storage Function, and those documents stored in the TOE are called fax transmission
documents.
Fax transmission documents can be sent by fax, printed, deleted, sent to folders, and sent as attachments by
e-mail, all from the Operation Panel. To send documents from the client computer by fax, the fax driver
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specified in the guidance documents must be installed on the client computer.
A person who sends fax can send the transmission results by e-mail to the e-mail addresses that the MFP
administrator pre-registers in the TOE. This is called the E-mail TX Results Function. The person who sends
the fax can also send fax transmission documents as attachments by e-mail to the e-mail addresses that the
MFP administrator pre-registers in the TOE. The MFP administrator pre-registers the destination servers that
provide secure communication with the TOE for folder transmission. Users select the destination server from
the servers that the MFP administrator pre-registers, and send data to the folder.
Fax Reception Function is to store documents, which are received from external faxes via a telephone line, in
the TOE. The documents stored in the TOE can be printed or deleted from the Operation Panel or the client
computer. The documents stored in the TOE can also be downloaded to the client computer.
Document Server Function
The Document Server Function is to operate documents stored in the TOE by using the Operation Panel and
the client computer.
From the Operation Panel, users can store, print and delete Document Server documents. Also, users can
print and delete fax transmission documents.
From the client computer, users can print and delete Document Server documents, fax, print, download, and
delete fax transmission documents. Also, users can send scanner documents to folders, send them by e-mail
as attachments, download, and delete them.
Management Function
The Management Function is to control the MFP's overall behaviour. The management function can be
operated by using the Operation Panel or the client computer.
Maintenance Function
The Maintenance Function is to perform maintenance service for the MFP if it is malfunctioning. When
analysing causes of the malfunction, a customer engineer operates this function from the Operation Panel.
The customer engineer will implement this function following the procedures that are allowed to customer
engineers only. If the MFP administrator sets the Service Mode Lock Function to "ON", the customer
engineer cannot use this function.
In this ST, the Service Mode Lock Function is set to "ON" for the target of evaluation.
Web Image Monitor Function
The Web Image Monitor Function (hereafter "WIM") is for the TOE user to remotely control the TOE from
the client computer. The Operation Panel screen of the connected MFP can be displayed by the MFP
administrator.
To use this function, the TOE user needs to install the designated Web browser on the client computer
following the guidance documents and connect the client computer to the TOE via the LAN.
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@Remote Service Function
The @Remote Service Function is for the TOE to communicate with RC Gate via networks for @Remote
Service.
In this function, [Proh. Some Services] is selected for @Remote setting information. The scope of evaluation
covers the operation with a restriction of access to the protected assets and software of the TOE.
1.4.4.2.
Security Functions
The Security Functions are described as follows:
Audit Function
The Audit Function is to generate the audit log of TOE use and security-relevant events (hereafter, "audit
events"). Also, this function provides the recorded audit log in a legible fashion for users to audit. This
function can be used only by the MFP administrator to view and delete the recorded audit log. To view and
delete the audit log, WIM will be used.
Identification and Authentication Function
The Identification and Authentication Function is to verify persons before they use the TOE. The persons are
allowed to use the TOE only when confirmed as the authorised user.
Users can use the TOE from the Operation Panel or via the network. By the network, users can use the TOE
from a Web browser, printer/fax driver, and RC Gate.
A person who attempts to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or a Web browser will be required to enter
his or her login user name and login password so that he or she can be verified as a normal user, MFP
administrator, or supervisor.
A person who attempts to use the Printer or Fax Function from the printer or fax driver will be required to
enter his or her login user name and login password received from the printer or fax drivers, so that he or she
can be verified as a normal user.
A person who attempts to use the @Remote Service Function from the RC Gate communication interface
will be verified whether the communication request is sent from RC Gate.
Methods to verify normal users are Basic Authentication and external server authentication. The users will be
verified by the MFP administrator-specified procedure, whereas the MFP administrator and supervisor can
be verified only by the Basic Authentication.
This function includes protection functions for the authentication feedback area, where dummy characters are
displayed if a login password is entered using the Operation Panel. In addition to this and for the Basic
Authentication only, this function can be used to register passwords that fulfil the requirements of the
Minimum Character No. (i.e. minimum password length) and obligatory character types the MFP
administrator specifies, so that the lockout function can be enabled and login password quality can be
protected.
Document Access Control Function
The Document Access Control Function is to authorise the operations for documents and user jobs by the
authorised TOE users who are authenticated by Identification and Authentication Function. It allows user's
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operation on the user documents and user jobs based on the privileges for the user role, or the operation
permissions for each user.
Use-of-Feature Restriction Function
The Use-of-Feature Restriction Function is to authorise the operations of Copy Function, Printer Function,
Scanner Function, Document Server Function and Fax Function by the authorised TOE users who are
authenticated by Identification and Authentication Function. It authorises the use of functions based on the
user role and the operation permissions for each user.
Network Protection Function
The Network Protection Function is to prevent information leakage through wiretapping on the LAN and
detect data tampering. When using WIM from the client computer, the protection function can be enabled by
specifying the URL where encrypted communication is available. If the Printer Function is used, the
protection function can be enabled using the printer driver to specify encrypted communication. If the folder
transmission function of Scanner Function is used, the protection function can be enabled through encrypted
communication. If the e-mail transmission function of Scanner Function is used, the protection function can
be enabled through encrypted communication with communication requirements that are specified for each
e-mail address. If the LAN-Fax Transmission Function of Fax Function is used, the protection function can
be enabled using the fax driver to specify encrypted communication. When communicating with RC Gate,
encrypted communication is used.
Residual Data Overwrite Function
The Residual Data Overwrite Function is to overwrite specific patterns on the HDD and disable the reusing
of the residual data included in deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments on the HDD.
Stored Data Protection Function
The Stored Data Protection Function is to encrypt the data on the HDD and protect the data so that data
leakage can be prevented.
Security Management Function
The Security Management Function is to control operations for TSF data in accordance with user role
privileges or user privileges allocated to normal users, MFP administrator, and supervisor.
Software Verification Function
The Software Verification Function is to verify the integrity of the executable codes of the MFP Control
Software and FCU Control Software, and to ensure that they can be trusted.
Fax Line Separation Function
The Fax Line Separation Function is to restrict input information from the telephone lines so that only fax
data can be received and unauthorised intrusion from the telephone lines (same as the "fax line") can be
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prevented. Also, this function can be used to prohibit transmissions of received faxes so that unauthorised
intrusion from the telephone lines to the LAN can be prevented.
1.4.5
Protected Assets
Assets to be protected by the TOE are user data, TSF data, and functions.
1.4.5.1.
User Data
The user data is classified into two types: document data and function data. Table 5 defines user data
according to these data types.
Table 5 : Definition of User Data
Type
Description
Document data
Digitised documents, deleted documents, temporary documents and their
fragments, which are managed by the TOE.
Function data
Jobs specified by users. In this ST, a "user job" is referred to as a "job".
1.4.5.2.
TSF Data
The TSF data is classified into two types: protected data and confidential data. Table 6 defines TSF data
according to these data types.
Table 6 : Definition of TSF Data
Type
Description
Protected data
This data must be protected from changes by unauthorised persons. No security
threat will occur even this data is exposed to the public. In this ST, "protected
data", listed below, is referred to as "TSF protected data".
Login user name, Number of Attempts before Lockout, settings for Lockout
Release Timer, lockout time, date settings (year/month/day), time settings,
Minimum Character No., Password Complexity Setting, Operation Panel auto
logout time, WIM auto logout time, S/MIME user information, destination folder,
Stored Reception File User, document user list, available function list, user
authentication method, IPsec setting information, @Remote setting information,
and Device Certificate.
Confidential data
This data must be protected from changes by unauthorised persons and reading by
users without viewing permissions. In this ST, "confidential data", listed below, is
referred to as "TSF confidential data".
Login password, audit log, and HDD cryptographic key.
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1.4.5.3.
Functions
The MFP applications (Copy Function, Document Server Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, and
Fax Function) that are for management of the document data of user data are classified as protected assets,
whose use is subject to restrictions.
1.5
Glossary
1.5.1
Glossary for This ST
For clear understanding of this ST, Table 7 provides the definitions of specific terms.
Table 7 : Specific Terms Related to This ST
Terms
Definitions
MFP Control Software
A software component installed in the TOE. This component is stored in
FlashROM.
FCU Control Software
A software component installed in the TOE. This component is stored in the
FCU.
Login user name
An identifier assigned to each normal user, MFP administrator, and supervisor.
The TOE identifies users by this identifier.
Login password
A password associated with each login user name.
Lockout
A type of behaviour to deny login of particular users.
Auto Logout function
A function for automatic user logout if no access is attempted from the
Operation Panel or the client computer before the predetermined time elapses.
Also called Auto Logout.
Operation Panel auto
logout time
Auto logout time for the Operation Panel.
WIM auto logout time
Auto logout time for WIM.
Minimum Character No.
The minimum number of registrable password digits.
Password Complexity
Setting
The minimum combination of the characters and symbols that can be used as
registrable passwords.
There are four types of characters: uppercase and lower case alphabets, digits
and symbols.
There are Level 1 and Level 2 Password Complexity Settings. Level 1 requires a
password to be a combination of two or more types of characters and symbols
specified above. Level 2 requires a password to be a combination of three or
more types of characters and symbols specified above.
Basic Authentication
One of the procedures for identification and authentication of TOE users who
are authorised to use the TOE. The TOE authenticates TOE users by using the
login user names and the login passwords registered on the TOE.
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Terms
Definitions
External Authentication
One of the procedures for identification and authentication of TOE users who
are authorised to use the TOE. The TOE authenticates TOE users by using the
login user names and the login passwords registered on the external
authentication server connected to the MFP via LAN. External Authentication
implemented in the TOE includes Windows Authentication, LDAP
Authentication, and Integration Server Authentication. Windows Authentication
supports NTLM Authentication and Kerberos Authentication. As for this ST, the
term "External Authentication" refers to Windows Authentication using
Kerberos Authentication method.
HDD
An abbreviation of hard disk drive. In this document, unless otherwise specified,
"HDD" indicates the HDD installed on the TOE.
User job
A sequence of operations of each TOE function (Copy Function, Document
Server Function, Scanner Function, Printer Function and Fax Function) from
beginning to end. A user job may be suspended or cancelled by users during
operation. If a user job is cancelled, the job will be terminated.
Documents
General term for paper documents and electronic documents used in the TOE.
Document data
attributes
Attributes of document data, such as +PRT, +SCN, +CPY, +FAXOUT,
+FAXIN, and +DSR.
+PRT
One of the document data attributes. Documents printed from the client
computer, or documents stored in the TOE by locked print, hold print, and
sample print using the client computer.
+SCN
One of the document data attributes. Documents sent to IT devices by e-mail or
sent to folders, or downloaded on the client computer from the MFP. For these
operations the Scanner Function is used.
+CPY
One of the document data attributes. Copies of original documents made by
using Printer Function.
+FAXOUT
One of the document data attributes. Documents sent by fax or to folders by
using Fax Function.
+FAXIN
One of the document data attributes. Documents received from the telephone
line. Documents stored in the TOE after the reception, are also included.
+DSR
One of the document data attributes. Documents saved in the TOE by using
Copy Function, Scanner Function, Document Server Function, and Fax Data
Storage Function. Documents saved in the TOE after being printed with
Document Server printing or stored print from the client computer.
Document user list
One of the security attributes of document data.
A list of the login user names of the normal users whose access to documents is
authorised, and it can be set for each document data. This list does not include
the login user names of MFP administrators whose access to the document data
is possible for administration.
Stored documents
Documents stored in the TOE so that they can be used with Document Server
Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, and Fax Function.
Stored document type
Classification of stored documents according to their purpose of use. This
includes Document Server documents, printer documents, scanner documents,
fax transmission documents, and fax reception documents.
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Terms
Definitions
Document Server
documents
One of the stored document types. Documents stored in the TOE when
Document Server storage is selected as the printing method for Copy Function,
Document Server Function, and Printer Function.
Printer documents
One of the stored document types. Documents stored in the TOE when any one
of locked print, hold printing, and sample print is selected as the printing method
for Printer Function.
Scanner documents
One of the stored document types. Documents stored in the TOE using Scanner
Function.
Fax transmission
documents
One of the stored document types. Documents scanned and stored using Fax
Function, and those stored using the LAN Fax.
Fax reception
documents
One of the stored document types. Documents received by fax and stored. These
documents are externally received and whose "users cannot be identified".
MFP application
A general term for each function the TOE provides: Copy Function, Document
Server Function, Scanner Function, Printer Function, and Fax Function.
Available function list
A list of the functions (Copy Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function,
Document Server Function, and Fax Function) that normal users are authorised
to access. This list is assigned as an attribute of each normal user.
Operation Panel
A panel that consists of a touch screen LCD and key switches. The Operation
Panel is used by users to operate the TOE.
Stored Reception File
User
A list of the normal users who are authorised to read and delete fax reception
documents.
Folder transmission
A function that sends documents from the MFP via networks to a shared folder
in an SMB Server by using SMB protocol or that sends documents to a shared
folder in an FTP Server by using FTP protocol. The following documents can be
delivered to folders: scanned documents using Scanner Function and Fax
Function, and scanned and stored documents using Scanner Function and Fax
Function.
IPsec protects the communication for realising this function.
Destination folder
Destination information for the "folder transmission" function. The destination
folder includes the path information to the destination server, the folder in the
server, and identification and authentication information for user access. The
destination folder is registered and managed by the MFP administrator.
E-mail transmission
A function to send e-mails from the MFP to the client computer via the SMTP
Server.
E-mail transmission of
attachments
A function to send documents scanned by the Scanner Function or fax
transmission documents as e-mail. S/MIME protects the communication for
realising this function.
E-mail transmission of
the URL
A function to send the URL of scanner documents stored in the MFP by e-mail.
S/MIME user
information
Information required for e-mail transmission using S/MIME. Also, this
information consists of e-mail address, user certificate, and encryption setting
(S/MIME setting). Uniquely provided for each e-mail address, the S/MIME user
information is registered and managed by the MFP administrator.
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Terms
Definitions
IPsec setting
information
Information that determines the action of IPsec of the TOE.
LAN Fax
One of Fax Functions. A function that transmits fax data and stores the
documents using the fax driver on client computer. Sometimes referred to as
"PC FAX".
@Remote
General term for remote diagnosis maintenance services for the TOE. Also
called @Remote Service.
@Remote setting
information
Information for the TOE to determine whether the @Remote Service is used
with [Proh. Some Services] selected, or set to [Prohibit].
Maintenance centre
The facility where the centre server of @Remote is located.
Repair Request
Notification
A function for users to request a repair to the maintenance centre via RC Gate
from the TOE.
The TOE displays the Repair Request Notification screen on the Operation Panel
if paper jams frequently occur, or if the door or cover of the TOE is left open for
a certain period of time while jammed paper is not removed.
Exposure glass cover
A cover to hold an original placed on the exposure glass of the scanner device
that reads the original.
Auto Document Feeder
(ADF) (Auto Reverse
Document Feeder)
A device that feeds the originals set on the device one by one to the exposure
glass. When scanning both sides of the original, each side is scanned in turn.
Auto Document Feeder
(ADF) (one-pass duplex
scanning ADF)
A device that feeds the originals set on the device one by one to the exposure
glass. When scanning both sides of the original, both sides are scanned
simultaneously.
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2 Conformance Claim
This section describes Conformance Claim.
2.1
CC Conformance Claim
The CC conformance claim of this ST and TOE is as follows:
-
CC version for which this ST and TOE claim conformance
Part 1:
Introduction and general model September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4 (Japanese translation
ver.1.0) CCMB-2012-09-001
Part 2:
Security functional components September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4 (Japanese translation
ver.1.0) CCMB-2012-09-002
Part 3:
Security assurance components September 2012 Version 3.1 Revision 4 (Japanese translation
ver.1.0) CCMB-2012-09-003
2.2
-
Functional requirements: Part 2 extended
-
Assurance requirements: Part 3 conformance
PP Claims
The PP to which this ST and TOE are demonstrable conformant is:
PP Name/Identification
: U.S. Government Approved Protection Profile - U.S. Government
Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices Version 1.0 (IEEE Std
2600.2™-2009)
Version
: 1.0
Notes: This PP conforms to "IEEE Standard Protection Profile for Hardcopy Devices in IEEE Std
2600-2008, Operational Environment B", published in Common Criteria Portal, and also satisfies "CCEVS
Policy Letter #20".
2.3
Package Claims
The SAR package which this ST and TOE conform to is EAL2+ALC_FLR.2.
The selected SFR Packages from the PP are:
2600.2-PRT conformant
2600.2-SCN conformant
2600.2-CPY conformant
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2600.2-FAX conformant
2600.2-DSR conformant
2600.2-SMI conformant
2.4
Conformance Claim Rationale
2.4.1
Consistency Claim with TOE Type in PP
The targeted product type by the PP is the Hardcopy devices (hereafter, HCDs). The HCDs consist of the
scanner device and print device, and have the interface to connect telephone line. The HCDs combine these
devices and equip one or more functions of Copy Function, Scanner Function, Printer Function or Fax
Function. The Document Server Function is also available when installing the non-volatile memory medium,
such as hard disk drive, as additional equipments.
The MFP is the type of this TOE. The MFP has the devices the HCDs have, and equips the functions that
HCDs equip including the additional equipments. Therefore, this TOE type is consistent with the TOE type
in the PP.
2.4.2
Consistency Claim with Security Problems and Security Objectives in PP
Defining all security problems in the PP, P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION and P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
were augmented to the security problem definitions in chapter 3. Defining all security objectives in the PP,
O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED and O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT were augmented to the security objectives
in chapter 4. Described below are the rationale for these augmented security problems and security objectives
that conform to the PP.
Although the PP is written in English, the security problem definitions in chapter 3 and security objectives in
chapter 4 are translated from English into Japanese. If the literal translation of the PP was thought to be
difficult for readers to understand the PP in Japanese, the translation was made comprehensible. This,
however, does not mean that its description deviates from the requirements of the PP conformance. Also, the
description is neither increased nor decreased.
Augmentation of P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION and O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION and O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED encrypt data on HDD and satisfy both other
organisational security policies in the PP and security objectives of the TOE. Therefore,
P.STORAGE_ENCRYPTION and O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED were augmented but still conform to the PP.
Augmentation of P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT and O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT and O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT refer to security problems and security
objectives respectively, both of which are concerned with communications between the TOE and RC Gate.
These communications are not assumed in the PP, so that they are independent from the PP. Neither
transmission nor reception of the protected assets defined in the PP takes place in the communication
between the TOE and RC Gate. Also, the protected assets are not operated from the RC Gate. For these
reasons, these communications do not affect any security problems and security objectives defined in the PP.
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Therefore, P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT and O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT were augmented, yet still
conform to the PP.
Augmentation of threat scope of T.DOC.DIS and T.DOC.ALT
The definition of a user allowed to view or modify D.DOC is the same in this TOE and the PP. However, the
PP defines the scope in which the leakage and tampering of D.DOC may occur as inside the TOE. While on
the other hand, the TOE defines it as inside the TOE and TOE’s communication path, which means that the
TOE incorporates the PP.
Therefore, T.DOC.DIS and T.DOC.ALT conform to the PP.
Augmentation of threat scope of T.FUNC.ALT
The definition of a user allowed to modify D.FUNC is the same in this TOE and the PP. However, the PP
defines the scope in which the threat of tampering D.FUNC may occur as inside the TOE. While on the other
hand, the TOE defines it as inside the TOE and TOE’s communication path, which means that the TOE
incorporates the PP.
Therefore, T.FUNC.ALT conforms to the PP.
For those points mentioned above, the security problems and security objectives in this ST are consistent
with those in the PP.
2.4.3
Consistency Claim with Security Requirements in PP
The SFRs for this TOE consist of the Common Security Functional Requirements, 2600.2-PRT, 2600.2-SCN,
2600.2-CPY, 2600.2-FAX, 2600.2-DSR, and 2600.2-SMI.
The Common Security Functional Requirements are the indispensable SFR specified by the PP. 2600.2-PRT,
2600.2-SCN, 2600.2-CPY, 2600.2-FAX, 2600.2-DSR, and 2600.2-SMI are selected from the SFR Package
specified by the PP.
2600.2-NVS is not selected because this TOE does not have any non-volatile memory medium that is
detachable.
Although the security requirements of this ST were partly augmented and instantiated over the security
requirements of the PP, they are still consistent with the PP. Described below are the parts augmented and
instantiated with the reasons for their consistency with the PP.
Augmentation of FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FAU_SAR.1, and FAU_SAR.2
FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FAU_SAR.1, and FAU_SAR.2 are augmented according to PP APPLICATION
NOTE7 in order for the TOE to maintain and manage the audit logs.
Augmentation of FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.7, and FIA_SOS.1
For the Basic Authentication function of the TOE, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_UAU.7, and FIA_SOS.1 are augmented
according to PP APPLICATION NOTE38.
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Refinement of FIA_UAU.1(a), FIA_UAU.1(b), FIA_UID.1(a), FIA_UID.1(b), and FIA_SOS.1
For authentication of normal users of this TOE, Basic Authentication conducted by the TOE and
authentication conducted by the external authentication server can be used. According to PP APPLICATION
NOTE37, the authentications of users are assumed to be executed by the TOE or external IT devices. For this
reason, both Basic Authentication and External Authentication comply with the PP. The refinement of
FIA_UAU.1(a), FIA_UAU.1(b), FIA_UID.1(a), FIA_UID.1(b), and FIA_SOS.1 is to identify these
authentication methods; it is not to change the security requirements specified by the PP.
Augmentation and Refinement of FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2
Since the identification and authentication method for RC Gate differs from the identification and
authentication methods for normal users or administrator, FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2 are augmented
according to PP APPLICATION NOTE39 and PP APPLICATION NOTE43, aside from FIA_UAU.1(a),
FIA_UAU.1(b), FIA_UID.1(a) and FIA_UID.1(b).
The refinement of FIA_UAU.2 and FIA_UID.2 is to identify the identification and authentication method for
normal users or administrator and the identification and authentication method for RC Gate; it is not to
change the security requirements specified by the PP.
Ownership of Fax Reception Documents
For the ownership of the fax reception documents, the TOE has the characteristic that the ownership of the
document is assigned to the intended user. This is according to PP APPLICATION NOTE 95.
Augmentation of FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_COP.1
This TOE claims O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED as the security objectives for the data protection applied to
non-volatile memory media that are neither allowed to be attached nor removed by the administrator. To
fulfil this claim, additional changes were augmented to the functional requirements FCS_CKM.1 and
FCS_COP.1 and to the functional requirements interdependent with FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_COP.1; however,
these changes still satisfy the functional requirements demanded in the PP.
Augmentation of information protected by FTP_ITC.1
FTP_ITC.1 was changed in this TOE. This change only augmented communication with RC Gate via LAN
on the information protected by FTP_ITC.1 that the PP requires; it is to restrict the requirements in the PP.
Therefore, this satisfies the functional requirements demanded in the PP.
Augmentation of restricted forwarding of data to external interface (FPT_FDI_EXP)
This TOE, in accordance with the PP, extends the functional requirement Part 2 due to the addition of the
restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP).
Consistency Rationale of FDP_ACF.1(a)
While FDP_ACF.1.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1.2(a) in the PP require the access control SFP to the document data
that is defined for each SFR package in the PP, this ST requires the access control SFP to the document data
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that is defined for each document data attribute, which is the security attribute for objects. This is not a
deviation from the PP but an instantiation of the PP.
Although FDP_ACF.1.3(a) in the PP has no additional rules on access control of document data and user
jobs, this ST allows the MFP administrator to delete document data and user jobs.
The TOE allows the MFP administrator to delete document data and user jobs on behalf of normal users who
are privileged to delete them in case normal users cannot execute such privileges for some reasons. This does
not deviate from the access control SFP defined in the PP.
Although FDP_ACF.1.4(a) in the PP has no additional rules on access control of document data and user
jobs, this ST rejects supervisor and RC Gate to operate document data and user jobs.
Supervisor and RC Gate are not identified in the PP and are the special users for this TOE.
This indicates that the PP does not allow users to operate the TOE, unless they are identified as the users of
document data and user jobs.
Therefore, FDP_ACF.1(a) in this ST satisfies FDP_ACF.1(a) in the PP.
Additional Rules on FDP_ACF.1.3(b)
While FDP_ACF.1.3(b) in the PP allows users with administrator privileges to operate the TOE functions,
this ST allows them to operate Fax Reception Function only, which is part of the TOE functions.
The TOE allows the MFP administrator to delete document data and user jobs (document access control SFP,
FDP_ACC.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1(a)), and as a result, the TSF restrictively allows the MFP administrator to
access the TOE functions. Therefore, the requirements described in FDP_ACF.1.3(b) in the PP are satisfied
at the same time. The fax reception process, which is accessed when receiving from a telephone line, is
regarded as a user with administrator privileges.
Therefore, FDP_ACF.1.3(b) in this ST satisfies FDP_ACF.1.3(b) in the PP.
FTP_ITC.1.3 including D.DOC and D.FUNC
Although the PP does not define threat of leakage and tampering of D.DOC and D.FUNC in the
communication path, FTP_ITC.1.3 in this ST states that D.DOC and D.FUNC communicate via the trusted
channel. This suggests that the TOE protects D.DOC and D.FUNC in wider scope than the PP does.
FTP_ITC.1.3 in this ST satisfies the PP.
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3 Security Problem Definitions
This section describes Threats, Organisational Security Policies and Assumptions.
3.1
Threats
Defined and described below are the assumed threats related to the use and environment of this TOE. The
threats defined in this section are unauthorised persons with knowledge of published information about the
TOE operations and such attackers are capable of Basic attack potential.
T.DOC.DIS
Document disclosure
Documents under the TOE management may be disclosed to persons without a login
user name, or to persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the
document.
T.DOC.ALT
Document alteration
Documents under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login user
name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the
document.
T.FUNC.ALT
User job alteration
User jobs under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a login user
name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the user
job.
T.PROT.ALT
Alteration of TSF protected data
TSF Protected Data under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a
login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission
to the TSF Protected Data.
T.CONF.DIS
Disclosure of TSF confidential data
TSF Confidential Data under the TOE management may be disclosed to persons without
a login user name, or to persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the TSF Confidential Data.
T.CONF.ALT
Alteration of TSF confidential data
TSF Confidential Data under the TOE management may be altered by persons without a
login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission
to the TSF Confidential Data.
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3.2
Organisational Security Policies
The following organisational security policies are taken:
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION
User identification and authentication
Only users with operation permission of the TOE shall be authorised to use the TOE.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION
Software verification
Procedures shall exist to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING
Management of audit log records
The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events. The
audit log shall be protected from unauthorised disclosure or alteration, and shall be
reviewed by authorised persons.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
Management of external interfaces
To prevent unauthorised use of the external interfaces of the TOE, operation of those
interfaces shall be controlled by the TOE and its IT environment.
P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION
Encryption of storage devices
The data stored on the HDD inside the TOE shall be encrypted.
P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
Protection of communication with RC Gate
As for communication with RC Gate, the TOE shall protect the communication data
between itself and RC Gate.
3.3
Assumptions
The assumptions related to this TOE usage environment are identified and described.
A.ACCESS.MANAGED
Access management
According to the guidance document, the TOE is placed in a restricted or monitored
area that provides protection from physical access by unauthorised persons.
A.USER.TRAINING
User training
The responsible manager of MFP trains users according to the guidance document and
users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation and are
competent to follow those policies and procedures.
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A.ADMIN.TRAINING
Administrator training
Administrators are aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation,
are competent to correctly configure and operate the TOE in accordance with the
guidance document following those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRUST
Trusted administrator
The responsible manager of MFP selects administrators who do not use their privileged
access rights for malicious purposes according to the guidance document.
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4 Security Objectives
This section describes Security Objectives for TOE, Security Objectives of Operational Environment and
Security Objectives Rationale.
4.1
Security Objectives for TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE.
O.DOC.NO_DIS
Protection of document disclosure
The TOE shall protect documents from unauthorised disclosure by persons without a
login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission
to the document.
O.DOC.NO_ALT
Protection of document alteration
The TOE shall protect documents from unauthorised alteration by persons without a
login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission
to the document.
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
Protection of user job alteration
The TOE shall protect user jobs from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login
user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the
job.
O.PROT.NO_ALT
Protection of TSF protected data alteration
The TOE shall protect TSF Protected Data from unauthorised alteration by persons
without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the TSF Protected Data.
O.CONF.NO_DIS
Protection of TSF confidential data disclosure
The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorised disclosure by persons
without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the TSF Confidential Data.
O.CONF.NO_ALT
Protection of TSF confidential data alteration
The TOE shall protect TSF Confidential Data from unauthorised alteration by persons
without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access
permission to the TSF Confidential Data.
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O.USER.AUTHORIZED
User identification and authentication
The TOE shall require identification and authentication of users and shall ensure that
users are authorised in accordance with security policies before allowing them to use the
TOE.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
Management of external interfaces by TOE
The TOE shall manage the operation of external interfaces in accordance with the
security policies.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED Software verification
The TOE shall provide procedures to self-verify executable code in the TSF.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
Management of audit log records
The TOE shall create and maintain a log of TOE use and security-relevant events in the
MFP and prevent its unauthorised disclosure or alteration.
O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED Encryption of storage devices
The TOE shall ensure that the data is encrypted first and then stored on the HDD.
O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
Protection of communication with RC Gate
The TOE shall conceal the communication data on the communication path between
itself and RC Gate, and detect any tampering with those communication data.
4.2
Security Objectives of Operational Environment
This section describes the security objectives of the operational environment.
4.2.1
IT Environment
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED
Audit log protection in trusted IT products
If audit logs are exported to a trusted IT product, the responsible manager of MFP shall
ensure that those logs are protected from unauthorised access, deletion and
modifications.
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED
Audit log access control in trusted IT products
If audit logs are exported to a trusted IT product, the responsible manager of MFP shall
ensure that those logs can be accessed in order to detect potential security violations,
and only by authorised persons.
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OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED
Management of external interfaces in IT environment
The IT environment shall take a countermeasure for the prevention of unmanaged
access to TOE external interfaces.
4.2.2
Non-IT Environment
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED Physical management
According to the guidance document, the TOE shall be placed in a secure or monitored
area that provides protection from physical access to the TOE by unauthorised persons.
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
Assignment of user authority
The responsible manager of MFP shall give users the authority to use the TOE in
accordance with the security policies and procedures of their organisation.
OE.USER.TRAINED
User training
The responsible manager of MFP shall train users according to the guidance document
and ensure that users are aware of the security policies and procedures of their
organisation and have the competence to follow those policies and procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED
Administrator training
The responsible manager of MFP shall ensure that administrators are aware of the
security policies and procedures of their organisation; have the training, competence,
and time to follow the guidance document; and correctly configure and operate the TOE
according to those policies and procedures.
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED
Trusted administrator
The responsible manager of MFP shall select administrators who will not use their
privileged access rights for malicious purposes according to the guidance document.
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED
Log audit
The responsible manager of MFP shall ensure that audit logs are reviewed at appropriate
intervals according to the guidance document for detecting security violations or
unusual patterns of activity.
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4.3
Security Objectives Rationale
This section describes the rationale for security objectives. The security objectives are for upholding the
assumptions, countering the threats, and enforcing the organisational security policies that are defined.
4.3.1
Correspondence Table of Security Objectives
Table 8 describes the correspondence between the assumptions, threats and organisational security policies,
and each security objective.
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION
P.AUDIT.LOGGING
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION
X
P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
A.ACCESS.MANAGED
OE.USER.TRAINED
X
OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED
X
OE.ADMIN.TRAINED
X
O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
X
O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED
X
OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED
X
OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED
X
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
X
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
X
X
OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED
T.CONF.ALT
X
X
OE.AUDIT_ACCESS_AUTHORIZED
T.CONF.DIS
X
X
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTCTED
T.PROT.ALT
X
X
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
T.FUNC.ALT
X
OE.USER.AUTHORIZED
T.DOC.ALT
X
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
T.DOC.DIS
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.DOC.NO_DIS
Table 8 : Rationale for Security Objectives
X
X
A.ADMIN.TRAINING
X
A.ADMIN.TRUST
X
A.USER.TRAINING
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4.3.2
Security Objectives Descriptions
The following describes the rationale for each security objective being appropriate to satisfy the threats,
assumptions and organisational security policies.
T.DOC.DIS
T.DOC.DIS is countered by O.DOC.NO_DIS, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.
By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users
who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.DOC.NO_DIS, the TOE protects the documents from
unauthorised disclosure by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but
without an access permission to those documents.
T.DOC.DIS is countered by these objectives.
T.DOC.ALT
T.DOC.ALT is countered by O.DOC.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.
By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users
who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.DOC.NO_ALT, the TOE protects the documents from
unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but
without an access permission to the document.
T.DOC.ALT is countered by these objectives.
T.FUNC.ALT
T.FUNC.ALT is countered by O.FUNC.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.
By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users
who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.FUNC.NO_ALT, the TOE protects the user jobs from
unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but
without an access permission to the user job.
T.FUNC.ALT is countered by these objectives.
T.PROT.ALT
T.PROT.ALT is countered by O.PROT.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.
By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users
who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.PROT.NO_ALT, the TOE protects the TSF protected
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data from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name
but without an access permission to the TSF protected data.
T.PROT.ALT is countered by these objectives.
T.CONF.DIS
T.CONF.DIS is countered by O.CONF.NO_DIS, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.
By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users
who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.CONF.NO_DIS, the TOE protects the TSF confidential
data from unauthorised disclosure by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user
name but without an access permission to the TSF confidential data.
T.CONF.DIS is countered by these objectives.
T.CONF.ALT
T.CONF.ALT is countered by O.CONF.NO_ALT, O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.
By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users
who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE. By O.CONF.NO_ALT, the TOE protects the TSF confidential
data from unauthorised alteration by persons without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name
but without an access permission to the TSF confidential data.
T.CONF.ALT is countered by these objectives.
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION is enforced by O.USER.AUTHORIZED and OE.USER.AUTHORIZED.
By OE.USER.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP gives the authority to use the TOE to users
who follow the security policies and procedures of their organisation. By O.USER.AUTHORIZED, the TOE
requires identification and authentication of users, and users are authorised in accordance with the security
policies before being allowed to use the TOE.
P.USER.AUTHORIZATION is enforced by these objectives.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION is enforced by O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED.
By O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED, the TOE provides measures for self-verifying the executable code of the
TSF.
P.SOFTWARE.VERIFICATION is enforced by this objective.
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P.AUDIT.LOGGING
P.AUDIT.LOGGING is enforced by O.AUDIT.LOGGED, OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED,
OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED and OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED.
By O.AUDIT.LOGGED, the TOE creates and maintains a log of TOE use and security-relevant events in the
MFP and prevents its unauthorised disclosure or alteration.
By OE.AUDIT.REVIEWED, the responsible manager of MFP reviews audit logs at appropriate intervals for
security violations or unusual patterns of activity according to the guidance document.
By OE.AUDIT_STORAGE.PROTECTED, if audit records are exported from the TOE to another trusted IT
product, the responsible manager of MFP protects those records from unauthorised access, deletion and
alteration. By OE.AUDIT_ACCESS.AUTHORIZED, the responsible manager of MFP ensures that those
records can be accessed in order to detect potential security violations, and only by authorised persons.
P.AUDIT.LOGGING is enforced by these objectives.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT is enforced by O.INTERFACE.MANAGED and OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED.
By O.INTERFACE.MANAGED, the TOE manages the operation of the external interfaces in accordance
with the security policies. By OE.INTERFACE.MANAGED, the TOE constructs the IT environment that
prevents unmanaged access to TOE external interfaces.
P.INTERFACE.MANAGEMENT is enforced by these objectives.
P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION
P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION is enforced by O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED.
By O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED, the TOE shall encrypt the data to be written on the HDD, and written on
the HDD shall be those encrypted data.
P.STORAGE.ENCRYPTION is enforced by this objective.
P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is enforced by O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT.
By O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT, the TOE shall conceal the communication data on the communication
path between itself and RC Gate, and detect any tampering with those communication data.
P.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is enforced by this objective.
A.ACCESS.MANAGED
A.ACCESS.MANAGED is upheld by OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED.
By OE.PHYSICAL.MANAGED, the TOE is located in a restricted or monitored environment according to
the guidance documents and is protected from the physical access by the unauthorised persons.
A.ACCESS.MANAGED is upheld by this objective.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING
A.ADMIN.TRAINING is upheld by OE.ADMIN.TRAINED.
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By OE.ADMIN.TRAINED, the responsible manager of MFP ensures that the administrators are aware of the
security policies and procedures of their organisation. For this, the administrators have the training,
competence, and time to follow the guidance documents, and correctly configure and operate the TOE in
accordance with those policies and procedures.
A.ADMIN.TRAINING is upheld by this objective.
A.ADMIN.TRUST
A.ADMIN.TRUST is upheld by OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED.
By OE.ADMIN.TRUSTED, the responsible manager of MFP selects the administrators and they will not
abuse their privileges in accordance with the guidance documents.
A.ADMIN.TRUST is upheld by this objective.
A.USER.TRAINING
A.USER.TRAINING is upheld by OE.USER.TRAINED.
By OE.USER.TRAINED, the responsible manager of MFP instructs the users in accordance with the
guidance documents to make them aware of the security policies and procedures of their organisation, and
the users follow those policies and procedures.
OE.USER.TRAINED is upheld by this objective.
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5 Extended Components Definition
This section describes Extended Components Definition.
5.1
Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces (FPT_FDI_EXP)
Family behaviour
This family defines requirements for the TSF to restrict direct forwarding of information from one external
interface to another external interface.
Many products receive information on specific external interfaces and are intended to transform and process
this information before it is transmitted on another external interface. However, some products may provide
the capability for attackers to misuse external interfaces to violate the security of the TOE or devices that are
connected to the TOE's external interfaces. Therefore, direct forwarding of unprocessed data between
different external interfaces is forbidden unless explicitly allowed by an authorized administrative role. The
family FPT_FDI_EXP has been defined to specify this kind of functionality.
Component levelling:
FPT_FDI_EXP: Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
1
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces provides for the functionality to require
TSF controlled processing of data received over defined external interfaces before these data are sent out on
another external interface. Direct forwarding of data from one external interface to another one requires
explicit allowance by an authorized administrative role.
Management: FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:
a)
Definition of the role(s) that are allowed to perform the management activities
b)
Management of the conditions under which direct forwarding can be allowed by an administrative role
c)
Revocation of such an allowance
Audit:
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
There are no auditable events foreseen.
Rationale:
Quite often, a TOE is supposed to perform specific checks and process data received on one external
interface before such (processed) data are allowed to be transferred to another external interface. Examples
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are firewall systems but also other systems that require a specific work flow for the incoming data before it
can be transferred. Direct forwarding of such data (i.e., without processing the data first) between different
external interfaces is therefore a function that—if allowed at all—can only be allowed by an authorized role.
It has been viewed as useful to have this functionality as a single component that allows specifying the
property to disallow direct forwarding and require that only an authorized role can allow this. Since this is a
function that is quite common for a number of products, it has been viewed as useful to define an extended
component.
The Common Criteria defines attribute-based control of user data flow in its FDP class. However, in this ST,
the authors needed to express the control of both user data and TSF data flow using administrative control
instead of attribute-based control. It is considered inappropriate to use FDP_IFF and FDP_IFC by applying
refinement for this purpose. Therefore, the authors decided to define an extended component to address this
functionality.
This extended component protects both user data and TSF data, and it could therefore be placed in either the
FDP or the FPT class. Since its purpose is to protect the TOE from misuse, the authors believed that it was
most appropriate to place it in the FPT class. It did not fit well in any of the existing families in either class,
and this led the authors to define a new family with just one member.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
No other components
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1
The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: list of
external interfaces] from being forwarded without further processing by the TSF to
[assignment: list of external interfaces].
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6 Security Requirements
This section describes Security Functional Requirements, Security Assurance Requirements and Security
Requirements Rationale.
6.1
Security Functional Requirements
This section describes the TOE security functional requirements for fulfilling the security objectives defined
in section 4.1. The security functional requirements are quoted from the requirement defined in the CC Part2.
The security functional requirements that are not defined in CC Part2 are quoted from the extended security
functional requirements defined in the PP.
The part with assignment and selection defined in the [CC] is identified with [bold face and brackets].
The part with refinement is identified with (refinement:).
6.1.1
Class FAU: Security audit
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
FAU_GEN.1.1
The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:
a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
b) All auditable events for the [selection: not specified] level of audit; and
c) [assignment: auditable events of the TOE shown in Table 9].
FAU_GEN.1.2
The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:
a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome
(success or failure) of the event; and
b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional
components included in the PP/ST, [assignment: types of job for FDP_ACF.1(a), all login
user names that attempted the user identification for FIA_UID.1, communication
direction of communication by WIM, communication IP address of the communication
used for WIM and folder transmission, recipient's e-mail address used for e-mail
transmission of attachments, communication direction of communication with RC Gate,
lockout operation type, Locked out User, and Locked out User who is to be released].
Table 9 shows the action (CC rules) recommended by the CC as auditable for each functional requirement
and the corresponding auditable events of the TOE.
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Table 9 : List of Auditable Events
Functional
Requirements
Actions Which Should Be Auditable
Auditable Events
FDP_ACF.1(a)
a) Minimal: Successful requests to perform
an operation on an object covered by the
SFP.
Original:
b) Basic: All requests to perform an
operation on an object covered by the SFP.
- Start and end operation of printing
document data.
c) Detailed: The specific security attributes
used in making an access check.
- Start and end operation of downloading
document data.
- Start and end operation of creating
document data.
- Start and end operation of faxing
document data.
- Start and end operation of sending
document data as attachments by e-mail.
- Start and end operation of sending
document data to folder.
- Start and end operation of deleting
document data.
Those described above, "creating,
printing, downloading, faxing, sending
attachments by e-mail, sending to folder,
and deleting", are the job types of
additional information that are required
by the PP.
FDP_ACF.1(b)
a) Minimal: Successful requests to perform
an operation on an object covered by the
SFP.
Original: Not recorded.
b) Basic: All requests to perform an
operation on an object covered by the SFP.
c) Detailed: The specific security attributes
used in making an access check.
FIA_AFL.1
a) Minimal: the reaching of the threshold
for the unsuccessful authentication attempts
and the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal)
taken and the subsequent, if appropriate,
restoration to the normal state (e.g.
re-enabling of a terminal).
a) Minimal: Starting and releasing
lockout
FIA_UAU.1(a)
a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the
authentication mechanism;
b) Basic: Success and failure of login
operation
b) Basic: All use of the authentication
mechanism;
c) Detailed: All TSF mediated actions
performed before authentication of the user.
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Functional
Requirements
FIA_UAU.1(b)
Actions Which Should Be Auditable
a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the
authentication mechanism;
Auditable Events
b) Basic: Success and failure of login
operation
b) Basic: All use of the authentication
mechanism;
c) Detailed: All TSF mediated actions
performed before authentication of the user.
FIA_UAU.2
a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the
authentication mechanism;
b) Basic: Success and failure of login
operation
b) Basic: All use of the authentication
mechanism.
FIA_UID.1(a)
a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user
identification mechanism, including the
user identity provided;
b) Basic: All use of the user identification
mechanism, including the user identity
provided.
FIA_UID.1(b)
a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user
identification mechanism, including the
user identity provided;
b) Basic: All use of the user identification
mechanism, including the user identity
provided.
FIA_UID.2
a) Minimal: Unsuccessful use of the user
identification mechanism, including the
user identity provided;
b) Basic: Success and failure of login
operation. Also includes the user
identification that is required by the PP
as the additional information.
b) Basic: Success and failure of login
operation. Also includes the user
identification that is required by the PP
as the additional information.
b) Basic: Success and failure of login
operation
b) Basic: All use of the user identification
mechanism, including the user identity
provided.
FMT_SMF.1
a) Minimal: Use of the management
functions.
a) Minimal: Record of management
items in Table 27.
FMT_SMR.1
a) Minimal: modifications to the group of
users that are part of a role;
No record due to no modification.
b) Detailed: every use of the rights of a role.
FPT_STM.1
FTA_SSL.3
a) Minimal: changes to the time;
b) Detailed: providing a timestamp.
a) Minimal: Settings of
Year-Month-Day and Hour-Minute
a) Minimal: Termination of an interactive
session by the session locking mechanism.
a) Minimal: Termination of session by
auto logout.
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Functional
Requirements
FTP_ITC.1
Actions Which Should Be Auditable
a) Minimal: Failure of the trusted channel
functions.
Auditable Events
a) Minimal: Failure of communication
with trusted channel.
b) Minimal: Identification of the initiator
and target of failed trusted channel
functions.
c) Basic: All attempted uses of the trusted
channel functions.
d) Basic: Identification of the initiator and
target of all trusted channel functions.
FAU_GEN.2 User identity association
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components.
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FAU_GEN.2.1
For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate
each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_STG.1.1
The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.
FAU_STG.1.2
The TSF shall be able to [selection: prevent] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit
records in the audit trail.
FAU_STG.4 Prevention of audit data loss
Hierarchical to:
FAU_STG.3 Action in case of possible audit data loss
Dependencies:
FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4.1
The TSF shall [selection: overwrite the oldest stored audit records] and [assignment: no
other actions to be taken in case of audit storage failure] if the audit trail is full.
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation
FAU_SAR.1.1
The TSF shall provide [assignment: the MFP administrators] with the capability to read
[assignment: all of log items] from the audit records.
FAU_SAR.1.2
The TSF shall provide the audit records in a manner suitable for the user to interpret the
information.
FAU_SAR.2 Restricted audit review
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
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Dependencies:
FAU_SAR.1 Audit review
FAU_SAR.2.1
The TSF shall prohibit all users read access to the audit records, except those users that have
been granted explicit read-access.
6.1.2
Class FCS: Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.1.1
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key
generation algorithm [assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm in Table 10] and
specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes in Table 10] that
meet the following: [assignment: standards in Table 10].
Table 10 : List of Cryptographic Key Generation
Key Type
Standard
Cryptographic Key
Generation Algorithm
Cryptographic
Key Size
HDD cryptographic key
NIST SP 800-90
HMAC_DRBG(SHA-1)
256 bits
FCS_COP.1
Cryptographic operation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1
The TSF shall perform [assignment: cryptographic operations shown in Table 11] in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [assignment: cryptographic algorithm
shown in Table 11] and cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes shown
in Table 11] that meet the following: [assignment: standards shown in Table 11].
Table 11 : List of Cryptographic Operation
Key Type
Standard
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Cryptographic
Key Size
HDD
cryptographic
key
FIPS197
AES
256 bits
Cryptographic Operation
- Encryption when writing the data
on HDD
- Decryption when reading the data
from HDD
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6.1.3
Class FDP: User data protection
FDP_ACC.1(a) Subset access control
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1(a) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: document access control SFP] on [assignment: list
of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects in Table 12].
Table 12 : List of Subjects, Objects, and Operations among Subjects and Objects (a)
Subjects
- Normal user process
- MFP administrator process
- Supervisor process
- RC Gate process
Objects
- Document data
- User jobs
Operations
- Read
- Delete
FDP_ACC.1(b) Subset access control
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1(b) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: TOE function access control SFP] on [assignment:
list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects in Table 13].
Table 13 : List of Subjects, Objects, and Operations among Subjects and Objects (b)
Subjects
- Normal user process
- Supervisor process
- RC Gate process
Object
- MFP application
Operation
- Execute
FDP_ACF.1(a) Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1(a) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: document access control SFP] to objects based on the
following: [assignment: subjects or objects, and their corresponding security attributes
shown in Table 14].
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Table 14 : Subjects, Objects and Security Attributes (a)
Category
Subjects or Objects
Security Attributes
Subject
Normal user process
- Login user name of normal user
- User role
Subject
MFP administrator process
- User role
Subject
Supervisor process
- User role
Subject
RC Gate process
- User role
Object
Document data
- Document data attribute
- Document user list
Object
User job
- Login user name of normal user
FDP_ACF.1.2(a) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment: rules to control operations among
subjects and objects shown in Table 15].
Table 15 : Rules to Control Operations on Document Data and User Jobs (a)
Objects
Document Data
Attributes
Operations
Subjects
Rules to control Operations
Document
data
+PRT
Delete
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process that created the
document data.
Document
data
+PRT
Read
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process that created the
document data.
Document
data
+SCN
Delete
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process that created the
document data.
Document
data
+SCN
Read
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process that created the
document data.
Document
data
+FAXOUT
Delete
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process that created the
document data.
Document
data
+FAXOUT
Read
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process that created the
document data.
Document
data
+FAXIN
Delete
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process with login user
name of normal user registered on
document user list for document data.
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Objects
Document Data
Attributes
Operations
Subjects
Rules to control Operations
Document
data
+FAXIN
Read
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process with login user
name of normal user registered on
document user list for document data.
Document
data
+CPY
Delete
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process that created the
document data.
Document
data
+CPY
Read
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process that created the
document data.
Document
data
+DSR
Delete
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process with login user
name of normal user registered on
document user list for document data.
Document
data
+DSR
Read
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process with login user
name of normal user registered on
document user list for document data.
User jobs
No setting of
document data
attribute
Delete
Normal user
process
Not allowed. However, it is allowed for
normal user process with login user
name of normal user, which is the
security attribute of user jobs.
FDP_ACF.1.3(a) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [assignment: rules to control operations among subjects and objects
shown in Table 16].
Table 16 : Additional Rules to Control Operations on Document Data and User Jobs (a)
Objects
Document Data
Attributes
Operations
Subjects
Rules to control Operations
Document
data
+PRT
Delete
MFP
administrator
process
Allows.
Document
data
+FAXIN
Delete
MFP
administrator
process
Allows.
Document
data
+DSR
Delete
MFP
administrator
process
Allows.
User jobs
No setting of
document data
attribute
Delete
MFP
administrator
process
Allows.
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FDP_ACF.1.4(a) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [assignment: deny the operations on the document data and user jobs in case of
supervisor process or RC Gate process].
FDP_ACF.1(b) Security attribute-based access control
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
No other components.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1(b) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: TOE function access control SFP] to objects based
on the following: [assignment: subjects or objects, and their corresponding security
attributes shown in Table 17].
Table 17 : Subjects, Objects and Security Attributes (b)
Category
Subject
Object
Subjects or Objects
Security Attributes
Normal user process
- Login user name of normal user
- Available function list
- User role
Supervisor process
- User role
RC Gate process
- User role
MFP application
- Function type
FDP_ACF.1.2(b) The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled
subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [assignment: rule to control operations among
objects and subjects shown in Table 18].
Table 18 : Rule to Control Operations on MFP Applications (b)
Object
MFP application
Operation
Execute
Subject
Normal user process
Rule to control Operations
Allows executing MFP application
which MFP administrator allowed in
available function list for normal user
process.
FDP_ACF.1.3(b) The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules: [assignment: rules that the Fax Reception Function operated using
administrator permission is surely permitted].
FDP_ACF.1.4(b) The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional
rules: [assignment: deny an operation on MFP application in case of supervisor process or
RC Gate process].
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FDP_RIP.1
Subset residual information protection
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FDP_RIP.1.1
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable
upon the [selection: deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [assignment:
user documents].
6.1.4
Class FIA: Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1
Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_AFL.1.1
The TSF shall detect when [selection: an administrator configurable positive integer within
[assignment: 1 to 5]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: the
authentication events of Basic Authentication shown in Table 19].
Table 19 : List of Authentication Events of Basic Authentication
Authentication Events
User authentication using the Operation Panel
User authentication using WIM from the client computer
User authentication when printing from the client computer
User authentication when using LAN Fax from client computer
FIA_AFL.1.2
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: met],
the TSF shall [assignment: perform actions shown in Table 20].
Table 20 : List of Actions for Authentication Failure
Actions for Authentication Failure
Unsuccessfully
Authenticated Users
Normal user
The lockout for the normal user is released by the lockout time set by the MFP
administrator, or release operation by the MFP administrator.
Supervisor
The lockout for a supervisor is released by the lockout time set by the MFP
administrator, release operation by the MFP administrator, or elapse of a given
time after the TOE's restart.
MFP administrator
The lockout for the MFP administrator is released by the lockout time set by the
MFP administrator, release operation by a supervisor, or elapse of a given time
after the TOE's restart.
FIA_ATD.1
Hierarchical to:
User attribute definition
No other components.
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Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users:
[assignment: the security attributes listed in Table 21 for each user in Table 21].
Table 21 : List of Security Attributes for Each User That Shall Be Maintained
Users
Normal user
List of Security Attributes
- Login user name of normal user
- User role
- Available function list
Supervisor
- User role
MFP administrator
- Login user name of MFP administrator
- User role
RC Gate
FIA_SOS.1
- User role
Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_SOS.1.1
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets (refinement: secrets used in Basic
Authentication) meet [assignment: the following quality metrics].
(1) Usable character and types:
Upper-case letters: [A-Z] (26 letters)
Lower-case letters: [a-z] (26 letters)
Numbers: [0-9] (ten digits)
Symbols: SP (spaces) ! " # $ % & ' ( ) * + , - . / : ; < = > ? @ [ \ ] ^ _ ` { | } ~ (33 symbols)
(2) Registrable password length:
For normal users:
No fewer than the minimum character number specified by MFP administrator (8-32 characters) and no
more than 128 characters.
For MFP administrators and a supervisor:
No fewer than the minimum character number specified by MFP administrator (8-32 characters) and no
more than 32 characters.
(3) Rule:
Passwords that are composed of a combination of characters based on the password complexity setting
specified by the MFP administrator can be registered. The MFP administrator specifies either Level 1 or
Level 2 for password complexity setting.
FIA_UAU.1(a) Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
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FIA_UAU.1.1(a) The TSF shall allow [assignment: the viewing of the list of user jobs, WIM Help, system
status, counter and information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request
notification] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated (refinement:
authentication with Basic Authentication).
FIA_UAU.1.2(a) The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1(b) Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.1.1(b) The TSF shall allow [assignment: the viewing of the list of user jobs, WIM Help, system
status, counter and information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request
notification] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated (refinement:
authentication of MFP administrator and supervisor with Basic Authentication, and
authentication of normal user with external authentication server).
FIA_UAU.1.2(b) The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.2
User authentication before action
Hierarchical to:
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UAU.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated (refinement: authentication of
a person who intends to use the TOE from RC Gate communication interface) before allowing
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.7
Protected authentication feedback
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.7.1
The TSF shall provide only [assignment: displaying dummy letters as authentication
feedback on the Operation Panel] to the user while the authentication is in progress.
FIA_UID.1(a) Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1(a) The TSF shall allow [assignment: the viewing of the list of user jobs, WIM Help, system
status, counter and information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request
notification] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified (refinement:
identification with Basic Authentication).
FIA_UID.1.2(a) The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
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FIA_UID.1(b) Timing of identification
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1.1(b) The TSF shall allow [assignment: the viewing of the list of user jobs, WIM Help, system
status, counter and information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request
notification] on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified (refinement:
authentication of MFP administrator and supervisor with Basic Authentication, and
identification of normal user with external authentication server).
FIA_UID.1.2(b) The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing other
TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UID.2
User identification before action
Hierarchical to:
FIA_UID.1Timing of identification
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FIA_UID.2.1
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified (refinement: identification of a
person who intends to use the TOE from RC Gate communication interface) before allowing
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_USB.1
User-subject binding
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FIA_USB.1.1
The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf
of that user: [assignment: login user name of normal user, login user name of MFP
administrator, available function list, and user role].
FIA_USB.1.2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes
with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: rules for the initial association of
attributes listed in Table 22].
Table 22 : Rules for Initial Association of Attributes
Users
Normal user
Subjects
Normal user process
User Security Attributes
- Login user name of normal user
- User role
- Available function list
Supervisor
Supervisor process
- User role
MFP administrator
MFP administrator process
- Login user name of MFP administrator
- User role
RC Gate
FIA_USB.1.3
RC Gate process
- User role
The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes
associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [assignment: none].
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6.1.5
Class FMT: Security management
FMT_MSA.1(a)Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Function
FMT_MSA.1.1(a) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: document access control SFP] to restrict the ability to
[selection: query, modify, delete, [assignment: newly create]] the security attributes
[assignment: security attributes in Table 23] to [assignment: the user roles with operation
permission in Table 23].
Table 23 : User Roles for Security Attributes (a)
Security Attributes
Operations
User Roles
with Operation Permission
Query,
modify,
Login user name of normal user
for Basic Authentication
delete,
MFP administrator
newly create
Query
Normal user who owns the applicable
login user name
Query,
Login user name of normal user
for External Authentication
modify,
delete,
MFP administrator
newly create
Login user name of supervisor
Login user name of MFP administrator
Document data attribute
Query,
modify
Supervisor
Newly create
MFP administrator
Query,
modify
MFP administrator who owns the
applicable login user name
Query
Supervisor
No operation permitted
None
No operation permitted
None
Document user list
[when document data attributes are
(+PRT), (+SCN), (+CPY), and
(+FAXOUT)]
Document user list
Query,
[when document data attribute is (+DSR)]
modify
MFP administrator,
applicable normal user who created
the document data
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Security Attributes
Operations
Document user list
Query,
[when document data attribute is
(+FAXIN)]
modify
User Roles
with Operation Permission
MFP administrator
FMT_MSA.1(b)Management of security attributes
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Function
FMT_MSA.1.1(b)The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: TOE function access control SFP] to restrict the
ability to [selection: query, modify, delete, [assignment: newly create]] the security attributes
[assignment: security attributes in Table 24] to [assignment: the user roles with operation
permission in Table 24].
Table 24 : User Roles for Security Attributes (b)
Security Attributes
Operations
User Roles with operation permission
Query,
modify,
Login user name of normal user
for Basic Authentication
delete,
newly create
Query
Login user name of normal user
for External Authentication
MFP administrator
Normal user who owns the applicable
login user name
Query,
modify,
delete,
MFP administrator
newly create
Available function list
Query,
MFP administrator
modify
Query
(however, query operation
is not allowed in case of
External Authentication)
Applicable normal user
Function type
No operation permitted
None
User role
No operation permitted
None
FMT_MSA.3(a)Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
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Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1(a) The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: document access control SFP] to provide [selection:
restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2(a) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: authorised identified roles shown in Table 25] to
specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is
created.
Table 25 : Authorised Identified Roles Allowed to Override Default Values
Objects
Authorised Identified Roles
Security
Attributes
Document data
Document data
attribute
No authorised identified roles
Document data
Document user list
MFP administrator
Document user list
No authorised identified roles
Login user name
of normal user
No authorised identified roles
[when document data
attribute is (+DSR)]
Document data
[when document data
attributes are (+PRT),
(+SCN), (+CPY),
(+FAXIN), and
(+FAXOUT)]
User job
FMT_MSA.3(b)
Static attribute initialisation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_MSA.3.1(b)The TSF shall enforce the [assignment: TOE function access control SFP] to provide
[selection: restrictive] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
FMT_MSA.3.2(b) The TSF shall allow the [assignment: no authorised identified roles] to specify alternative
initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_MTD.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to [selection: query, modify, delete, [assignment: newly
create]] the [assignment: list of TSF data in Table 26] to [assignment: the user roles in
Table 26].
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Table 26 : List of TSF Data
TSF Data
Operations
User Roles
Newly create, modify
MFP administrator
Modify
Normal user who owns the login
password
Modify
Supervisor
Modify
Supervisor
Login password of MFP
administrator
Newly create
MFP administrator
Modify
MFP administrator who owns the
login password
Number of Attempts before
Lockout for Basic
Authentication
Query, modify
MFP administrator
Setting for Lockout Release
Timer for Basic Authentication
Query, modify
MFP administrator
Lockout time for Basic
Authentication
Query, modify
MFP administrator
Date setting (year, month,
day), time setting (hour,
minute)
Query, modify
MFP administrator
Query
Supervisor,
normal user
Minimum character number for
Basic Authentication
Query, modify
MFP administrator
Password complexity setting
for Basic Authentication
Query, modify
MFP administrator
Operation Panel auto logout
time
Query, modify
MFP administrator
WIM auto logout time
Query, modify
MFP administrator
Audit logs
Query, delete
MFP administrator
HDD cryptographic key
Newly create
MFP administrator
Newly create, modify, query,
delete
MFP administrator
Query
Normal user
Login password of normal user
for Basic Authentication
Login password of supervisor
S/MIME user information
(however, operation of query
on user certificate is not
allowed in case of External
Authentication)
Newly create, modify, query,
delete
MFP administrator
Query
Normal user
Stored Reception File User
Query, modify
MFP administrator
User authentication method
Query
MFP administrator
Destination information for
folder transmission
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TSF Data
Operations
User Roles
IPsec setting information
Query, modify
MFP administrator
@Remote setting information
Query, modify
MFP administrator
Device Certificate
Modify
MFP administrator
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [assignment:
management functions shown in Table 27].
Table 27 : List of Specification of Management Functions
Management Functions
New creation, query, modification, and deletion of the login user name of normal user by MFP administrator
when the Basic Authentication is used
Query of own login user name by normal user when the Basic Authentication is used
New creation, query, modification, and deletion of the login user name of normal user by MFP administrator
when External Authentication is used
Query and modification of login user name of supervisor by supervisor
New creation of login user name of MFP administrator by MFP administrator
Query and modification of own login user name by MFP administrator
Query of login user name of MFP administrator by supervisor
New creation and modification of login password of normal user by MFP administrator when the Basic
Authentication is used
Modification of own login password by normal user when the Basic Authentication is used
Modification of login password of supervisor by supervisor
Modification of login password of MFP administrator by supervisor
New creation of login password of MFP administrator by MFP administrator
Modification of own login password by MFP administrator
Query and modification of minimum character number by MFP administrator when the Basic Authentication
is used
Query and modification of Password Complexity by MFP administrator when the Basic Authentication is
used
Query and modification of Operation Panel auto logout time by MFP administrator
Query and modification of WIM auto logout time by MFP administrator
Query and modification of Number of Attempts before Lockout by MFP administrator when the Basic
Authentication is used
Query and modification of Lockout Release Timer Setting by MFP administrator when the Basic
Authentication is used
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Management Functions
Query and modification of lockout time by MFP administrator when the Basic Authentication is used
Query and modification of document user list by MFP administrator
Query and modification of document user list by the normal user who created the document
Query and modification of available function list by MFP administrator
Query of own available function list by normal user when the Basic Authentication is used
Query and modification of default values of the document user list by MFP administrator
Query and modification of date and time by MFP administrator
Query of date and time by supervisor
Query of date and time by normal user
Query and deletion of audit logs by MFP administrator
New creation of HDD encryption key by MFP administrator
New creation, query, modification and deletion of S/MIME user information by MFP administrator
Query of S/MIME user information by normal user
New creation, query, modification and deletion of destination information for folder transmission by MFP
administrator
Query of destination information for folder transmission by normal user
Query and modification of Stored Reception File User by MFP administrator
Query of user authentication method by MFP administrator
Query and modification of IPsec setting information by MFP administrator
Query and modification of @Remote setting information by MFP administrator
Modification of Device Certificate by MFP administrator
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FMT_SMR.1.1
The TSF shall maintain the roles [assignment: normal user, supervisor, MFP administrator,
and RC Gate].
FMT_SMR.1.2
6.1.6
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF
FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_STM.1.1
The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.
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FPT_TST.1
TSF testing
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial start-up] to demonstrate the
correct operation of [selection: [assignment: the MFP Control Software, FCU Control
Software]].
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection:
[assignment: the audit log data file]].
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [selection:
[assignment: the stored TSF executable code]].
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FPT_FDI_EXP.1.1
The TSF shall provide the capability to restrict data received on [assignment: the
Operation Panel, LAN, telephone line] from being forwarded without further processing by
the TSF to [assignment: the LAN and telephone line].
6.1.7
Class FTA: TOE access
FTA_SSL.3
TSF-initiated termination
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FTA_SSL.3.1
The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [assignment: lapse of Operation Panel
auto logout time, lapse of WIM auto logout time, completion of document data reception
from the printer driver, completion of document data reception from the fax driver, and
termination of communication with RC Gate].
6.1.8
Class FTP: Trusted path/channels
FTP_ITC.1
Inter-TSF trusted channel
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FTP_ITC.1.1
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and another trusted IT product
that is logically distinct from other communication channels and provides assured identification
of its end points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
FTP_ITC.1.2
The TSF shall permit [selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product] to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
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Page 67 of 93
FTP_ITC.1.3
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for [assignment: communication
via the LAN of document data, function data, protected data, and confidential data, and
communication with RC Gate via the LAN].
6.2
Security Assurance Requirements
The evaluation assurance level of this TOE is EAL2+ALC_FLR.2. Table 28 lists the assurance components
of the TOE. ALC_FLR.2 was added to the set of components defined in evaluation assurance level 2
(EAL2).
Table 28 : TOE Security Assurance Requirements (EAL2+ALC_FLR.2)
Assurance Classes
Assurance Components
ADV_ARC.1
Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.2
Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_TDS.1
Basic design
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1
Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1
Preparative procedures
ALC:
Life-cycle support
ALC_CMC.2
Use of a CM system
ALC_CMS.2
Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1
Delivery procedures
ALC_FLR.2
Flaw reporting procedures
ASE_CCL.1
Conformance claims
ASE_ECD.1
Extended components definition
ASE_INT.1
ST introduction
ASE_OBJ.2
Security objectives
ASE_REQ.2
Derived security requirements
ASE_SPD.1
Security problem definition
ASE_TSS.1
TOE summary specification
ATE_COV.1
Evidence of coverage
ATE_FUN.1
Functional testing
ATE_IND.2
Independent testing - sample
AVA_VAN.2
Vulnerability analysis
ADV:
Development
ASE:
Security Target evaluation
ATE:
Tests
AVA:
Vulnerability assessment
6.3
Security Requirements Rationale
This section describes the rationale for security requirements.
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Page 68 of 93
If all security functional requirements are satisfied as below, the security objectives defined in "4 Security
Objectives" are fulfilled.
6.3.1
Tracing
Table 29 shows the relationship between the TOE security functional requirements and TOE security
objectives. Table 29 shows that each TOE security functional requirement fulfils at least one TOE security
objective.
FAU_GEN.1
X
FAU_GEN.2
X
FAU_STG.1
X
FAU_STG.4
X
FAU_SAR.1
X
FAU_SAR.2
X
FCS_CKM.1
X
FCS_COP.1
X
FDP_ACC.1(a)
X
X
X
FDP_ACC.1(b)
FDP_ACF.1(a)
X
X
X
FDP_ACF.1(b)
FDP_RIP.1
X
X
X
X
FIA_AFL.1
X
FIA_ATD.1
X
FIA_SOS.1
X
FIA_UAU.1(a)
X
X
FIA_UAU.1(b)
X
X
FIA_UAU.2
X
X
FIA_UAU.7
X
Copyright (c) 2015 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
O.CONF.NO_ALT
O.CONF.NO_DIS
O.PROT.NO_ALT
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
O.DOC.NO_ALT
O.DOC.NO_DIS
Table 29 : Relationship between Security Objectives and Functional Requirements
FIA_USB.1
X
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
FMT_MSA.1(a)
X
X
X
X
FMT_MSA.1(b)
FMT_MSA.3(a)
X
X
X
X
FMT_MSA.3(b)
X
FMT_MTD.1
X
X
X
X
FMT_SMF.1
X
X
X
X
FMT_SMR.1
X
X
X
X
FPT_STM.1
X
FPT_TST.1
X
FTA_SSL.3
FTP_ITC.1
6.3.2
O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
X
O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED
X
O.AUDIT.LOGGED
FIA_UID.2
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED
X
O.CONF.NO_ALT
X
O.CONF.NO_DIS
FIA_UID.1(b)
O.PROT.NO_ALT
X
O.FUNC.NO_ALT
X
O.DOC.NO_ALT
FIA_UID.1(a)
O.DOC.NO_DIS
O.USER.AUTHORIZED
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Justification of Traceability
This section describes below how the TOE security objectives are fulfilled by the TOE security functional
requirements corresponding to the TOE security objectives.
O.DOC.NO_DIS Protection of document disclosure
O.DOC.NO_DIS is the security objective to prevent the documents from unauthorised disclosure by persons
without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the
document. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.
(1) Specify and implement the access control to the document data.
FDP_ACC.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1(a) only allow the following persons to view document data according
to the document data attributes: the normal user who generated the document data or the normal user
Copyright (c) 2015 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
Page 70 of 93
who is registered on the document user list of the document data. The MFP administrator, supervisor
and RC Gate are not allowed to view document data.
(2) Prevent reading the deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments.
Deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments are prevented from being read by
FDP_RIP.1.
(3) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving document data.
The document data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN are protected by FTP_ITC.1.
(4) Management of the security attributes.
FMT_MSA.1(a) specifies the available operations (newly create, query, modify and delete) on the login
user name, and available operations (query and modify) on the document user list, and a specified user
is thus restricted to perform each operation.
FMT_MSA.3(a) surely sets the restrictive value to the security attributes of document data (object)
when document data are generated.
By
satisfying
FDP_ACC.1(a),
FDP_ACF.1(a),
FDP_RIP.1,
FTP_ITC.1,
FMT_MSA.1(a)
and
FMT_MSA.3(a), which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.DOC.NO_DIS
is fulfilled.
O.DOC.NO_ALT Protection of document alteration
O.DOC.NO_ALT is the security objective to prevent the documents from unauthorised alteration by persons
without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the
document. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.
(1) Specify and implement the access control to document data.
FDP_ACC.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1(a) allow the following persons to delete document data (there is no
"editing operation" of document data) according to the document data attributes: the normal user who
generated the document data, the normal user who is registered in the document user list of the
document data, and the MFP administrator. The supervisor and RC Gate are not allowed to delete
document data.
(2) Prevent deleting the deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments.
Deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments are prevented from being used by
FDP_RIP.1.
(3) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving document data.
The document data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN interface are protected by FTP_ITC.1.
(4) Management of the security attributes.
FMT_MSA.1(a) specifies the available operations (newly create, query, modify and delete) on the login
user name, and available operations (query and modify) on the document user list, and a specified user
is thus restricted to perform each operation.
FMT_MSA.3(a) surely sets the restrictive value to the security attributes of document data (object)
when the document data are generated.
By
satisfying
FMT_MSA.3(a),
FDP_ACC.1(a),
which
are
the
FDP_ACF.1(a),
security
FDP_RIP.1,
functional
FTP_ITC.1,
requirements
for
FMT_MSA.1(a)
these
O.DOC.NO_ALT is fulfilled.
Copyright (c) 2015 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
and
countermeasures,
Page 71 of 93
O.FUNC.NO_ALT Protection of user job alteration
O.FUNC.NO_ALT is the security objective to prevent the user jobs from unauthorised alteration by persons
without a login user name, or by persons with a login user name but without an access permission to the user
job. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.
(1) Specify and implement the access control to user jobs.
FDP_ACC.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1(a) allow the MFP administrator to delete user jobs, and the normal
user with the permission to delete the applicable user job. The supervisor and RC Gate are not allowed
to delete user jobs. Deletion is the only modification operation on this TOE's user jobs.
(2) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving user jobs.
The user jobs sent and received by the TOE via the LAN are protected by FTP_ITC.1.
(3) Management of the security attributes.
FMT_MSA.1(a) restricts each available operation (newly create, query, modify and delete) for the login
user name to specified users only.
FMT_MSA.3(a) sets the restrictive value to the security attributes of user jobs (object) when the user
jobs are generated.
By satisfying FDP_ACC.1(a), FDP_ACF.1(a), FTP_ITC.1, FMT_MSA.1(a) and FMT_MSA.3(a), which are
the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.FUNC.NO_ALT is fulfilled.
O.PROT.NO_ALT Protection of TSF protected data alteration
O.PROT.NO_ALT is the security objective to allow only users who can maintain the security to alter the
TSF protected data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following
countermeasures.
(1) Management of the TSF protected data.
By FMT_MTD.1, only the MFP administrator is allowed to manage the minimum character number for
Basic Authentication, password complexity setting for Basic Authentication, Number of Attempts
before Lockout for Basic Authentication, settings for Lockout Release Timer for Basic Authentication,
lockout time for Basic Authentication, date, time, S/MIME user information, destination folder, Stored
Reception File User, IPsec setting information, @Remote setting information, Device Certificate,
Operation Panel auto logout time, WIM auto logout time, and user authentication method.
(2) Specification of the Management Function.
FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.
(3) Specification of the roles.
FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.
(4) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving the TSF protected data.
The TSF protected data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN are protected by FTP_ITC.1.
By satisfying FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 and FTP_ITC.1, which are the security functional
requirements for these countermeasures, O.PROT.NO_ALT is fulfilled.
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O.CONF.NO_DIS Protection of TSF confidential data disclosure
O.CONF.NO_DIS is the security objective to allow only users who can maintain the security to disclose the
TSF confidential data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following
countermeasures.
(1) Management of the TSF confidential data.
FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator and applicable normal user to operate the login password
of normal user. A supervisor is allowed to operate the login password of supervisor. The supervisor and
applicable MFP administrator are allowed to operate the login password of the MFP administrator. The
MFP administrator is only allowed to operate the audit log and HDD cryptographic key.
(2) Specification of the Management Function.
FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.
(3) Specification of the roles.
FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.
(4) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving TSF confidential data.
The TSF confidential data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN are protected by FTP_ITC.1.
By satisfying FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 and FTP_ITC.1, which are the security functional
requirements for these countermeasures, O.CONF.NO_DIS is fulfilled.
O.CONF.NO_ALT Protection of TSF confidential data alteration
O.CONF.NO_ALT is the security objective to allow only users who can maintain the security to alter the
TSF confidential data. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following
countermeasures.
(1) Management of the TSF confidential data.
FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator and applicable normal user to operate the login password
of normal user. A supervisor is allowed to operate the login password of supervisor. The supervisor and
applicable MFP administrator are allowed to operate the login password of the MFP administrator. The
MFP administrator is only allowed to operate the audit log and newly create an HDD cryptographic
key.
(2) Specification of the Management Function.
FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.
(3) Specification of the roles.
FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.
(4) Use trusted channels for sending or receiving TSF confidential data.
The TSF confidential data sent and received by the TOE via the LAN are protected by FTP_ITC.1.
By satisfying FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_SMR.1 and FTP_ITC.1, which are the security functional
requirements for these countermeasures, O.CONF.NO_ALT is fulfilled.
O.USER.AUTHORIZED User identification and authentication
O.USER.AUTHORIZED is the security objective to restrict users in accordance with the security policies so
that only valid users can use the TOE functions. As for normal users, the MFP administrator, and a
supervisor, who all access the TOE from the Operation Panel or from the client PC over a network, the
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Page 73 of 93
security policies of the authentication failure handling and verification of secrets need to be augmented. To
fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.
(1) Identify and authenticate the users prior to the TOE use.
FIA_UID.1(a) and FIA_UAU.1(a) identify and authenticate the persons who attempt to use the TOE
from the Operation Panel or client computer on the network by the Basic Authentication.
FIA_UID.1(b) and FIA_UAU.1(b) identify and authenticate the persons by the Basic Authentication if
the person who attempts to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or client computer on the network is
the MFP administrator or supervisor, and if the person is the normal user, the External Authentication is
used for the identification and authentication.
FIA_UID.2 identifies the person who attempts to use the TOE from the interface for RC Gate
communication, and FIA_UAU.2 authenticates RC Gate.
(2) Allow the successfully identified and authenticated user to use the TOE.
FIA_ATD.1 and FIA_USB.1 manage the access procedures to the protected assets of the users who are
defined in advance, and associate the users who are successfully identified and authenticated with the
access procedures.
FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b) allow the applicable normal user to use the MFP application
according to the operation permission granted to the successfully identified and authenticated normal
user.
(3) Complicate decoding of login password.
FIA_UAU.7 displays dummy letters as authentication feedback on the Operation Panel and prevents the
login password from disclosure.
FIA_SOS.1 accepts only passwords that satisfy the minimum character number and password character
combination specified for the Basic Authentication by the MFP administrator, and makes it difficult to
guess the password. For the External Authentication, this depends on the settings for the External
Authentication.
FIA_AFL.1 does not allow the user who is unsuccessfully authenticated by the Basic Authentication for
certain times to access to the TOE for certain period. For the External Authentication, this depends on
the settings for the External Authentication.
(4) Terminate login automatically.
FTA_SSL.3 automatically logs out of the Operation Panel or the client computer at the state of being
logged in. It also logs out the status of document data reception after the completion of document data
reception from the printer driver or fax driver. The TOE terminates the session with RC Gate after
completing the communication with RC Gate.
(5) Management of the security attributes.
According to FMT_MSA.1(b), the login user name and available function list of normal user are
managed by the MFP administrator, and users are not allowed to operate the function type.
FMT_MSA.3(b) sets the restrictive default value to the function type.
By satisfying FDP_ACC.1(b), FDP_ACF.1(b), FIA_UID.1(a), FIA_UID.1(b), FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.1(a),
FIA_UAU.1(b), FIA_UAU.2, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_USB.1, FIA_UAU.7, FIA_AFL.1, FIA_SOS.1, FTA_SSL.3,
FMT_MSA.1(b) and FMT_MSA.3(b), which are the security functional requirements for these
countermeasures, O.USER.AUTHORIZED is fulfilled.
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The function for 2600.2-SMI (F.SMI), selected SFR Package from the PP, is used in conjunction with the
function whose access control is enforced by FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b). Therefore, the access
control for F.SMI is included with the access control by FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b) and fulfilled.
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED Management of external interfaces by TOE
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is the security objective to ensure that the TOE manages the operation of
external interface according to the security policy. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement
the following countermeasures.
(1) Identify and authenticate the users prior to use the Operation Panel and LAN interface.
FIA_UID.1(a) and FIA_UID.1(b) identify the persons who attempt to use the TOE from the Operation
Panel or client computer on the network, and FIA_UAU.1(a) and FIA_UAU.1(b) authenticate the
identified users.
FIA_UID.2 identifies the persons who attempt to use the TOE from the interface for RC Gate
communication, and FIA_UAU.2 authenticates the persons.
(2) Automatically terminate the connection to the Operation Panel and LAN interface.
FTA_SSL.3 terminates the session after no operation is performed from the Operation Panel or LAN
interface for certain period.
(3) Restricted forwarding of data to external interfaces.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1 prevents the data received from the Operation Panel, LAN interface and telephone
line from being transmitted from the LAN or telephone line without further processing by the TSF.
By satisfying FIA_UID.1(a), FIA_UID.1(b), FIA_UAU.1(a), FIA_UAU.1(b), FIA_UID.2, FIA_UAU.2,
FTA_SSL.3 and FPT_FDI_EXP.1, which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures,
O.INTERFACE.MANAGED is fulfilled.
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED Software verification
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED is the security objective to ensure that the TOE provides procedures to
self-verify executable code in the TSF. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the
following countermeasures.
(1) Self-check
FPT_TST.1 checks if the MFP Control Software and FCU Control Software are verified software at the
start-up.
By satisfying FPT_TST.1, which is the security functional requirement for this countermeasure,
O.SOFTWARE.VERIFIED is fulfilled.
O.AUDIT.LOGGED Management of audit log records
O.AUDIT.LOGGED is the security objective to record the audit log required to detect the security intrusion,
and allow the MFP administrator to view the audit log. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to
implement the following countermeasures.
(1) Record the audit log.
FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2 record the events, which should be auditable, with the identification
information of the occurrence factor.
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(2) Protect the audit log.
FAU_STG.1 protects the audit logs from the alteration, and FAU_STG.4 deletes the audit logs that
have the oldest time stamp, and records the new audit logs if auditable events occur and the audit log
files are full.
(3) Provide Audit Function.
FAU_SAR.1 allows the MFP administrator to read audit logs in a format that can be audited.
FAU_SAR.2 prohibits the persons other than the MFP administrator reading the audit logs.
(4) Reliable occurrence time of the event
FPT_STM.1 provides a trusted time stamp, and a reliable record of the times when events occurred are
recorded in the audit log.
By satisfying FAU_GEN.1, FAU_GEN.2, FAU_STG.1, FAU_STG.4, FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2 and
FPT_STM.1, which are the security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.AUDIT.LOGGED
is fulfilled.
O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED Encryption of storage devices
O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED is the security objective to ensure the data to be written into the HDD is
encrypted. To fulfil this security objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasures.
(1) Generate appropriate cryptographic keys.
FCS_CKM.1 generates the cryptographic key for encryption.
(2) Perform cryptographic operation.
FCS_COP.1 encrypts the data to be stored in the HDD, and decrypts the data to be read from the HDD.
(3) Manage the TSF data.
FMT_MTD.1 allows the MFP administrator to manage the cryptographic keys.
(4) Specification of Management Function.
FMT_SMF.1 performs the required Management Functions for Security Function.
(5) Specification of the roles.
FMT_SMR.1 maintains the users who have the privileges.
By satisfying FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1, FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1, which are the
security functional requirements for these countermeasures, O.STORAGE.ENCRYPTED is fulfilled.
O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT
Protection of communication with RC Gate
O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is the security objective to ensure the communication data between the TOE
and RC Gate are concealed, and any tampering on the communication path is detected. To fulfil this security
objective, it is required to implement the following countermeasure.
(1) Use trusted channel for the communication with RC Gate
FTP_ITC.1 allows the TOE to establish the communication that protects the data from tampering and
disclosure for the communication between the TOE and RC Gate.
By satisfying FTP_ITC.1, which is the security functional requirement for this countermeasure,
O.RCGATE.COMM.PROTECT is fulfilled.
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6.3.3
Dependency Analysis
Table 30 shows the result of dependency analysis in this ST for the TOE security functional requirements.
Table 30 : Results of Dependency Analysis of TOE Security Functional Requirements
TOE Security
Functional
Requirements
Claimed
Dependencies
Dependencies
Satisfied in ST
Dependencies
Not Satisfied in
ST
FAU_GEN.1
FPT_STM.1
FPT_STM.1
None
FAU_GEN.2
FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1
FAU_GEN.1
None
FAU_STG.1
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.1
None
FAU_STG.4
FAU_STG.1
FAU_STG.1
None
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_GEN.1
FAU_GEN.1
None
FAU_SAR.2
FAU_SAR.1
FAU_SAR.1
None
FCS_CKM.1
[FCS_CKM.2 or
FCS_COP.1]
FCS_COP.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FIA_UID.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1
[FDP_ITC.1 or
FDP_ITC.2 or
FCS_CKM.1]
FCS_CKM.4
FDP_ACC.1(a)
FDP_ACF.1(a)
FDP_ACF.1(a)
None
FDP_ACC.1(b)
FDP_ACF.1(b)
FDP_ACF.1(b)
None
FDP_ACF.1(a)
FDP_ACC.1(a)
FDP_ACC.1(a)
None
FMT_MSA.3(a)
FMT_MSA.3(a)
FDP_ACC.1(b)
FDP_ACC.1(b)
FMT_MSA.3(b)
FMT_MSA.3(b)
FDP_RIP.1
None
None
None
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_UAU.1(a)
FIA_UAU.1(a)
None
FIA_ATD.1
None
None
None
FIA_SOS.1
None
None
None
FIA_UAU.1(a)
FIA_UID.1(a)
FIA_UID.1(a)
None
FIA_UAU.1(b)
FIA_UID.1(b)
FIA_UID.1(b)
None
FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.2
None
FIA_UAU.7
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1
None
FIA_UID.1(a)
None
None
None
FIA_UID.1(b)
None
None
None
FIA_UID.2
None
None
None
FDP_ACF.1(b)
None
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TOE Security
Functional
Requirements
Claimed
Dependencies
Dependencies
Satisfied in ST
Dependencies
Not Satisfied in
ST
FIA_USB.1
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_ATD.1
None
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1
None
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1
[FDP_ACC.1(a) or
FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_ACC.1(a)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1(a)
None
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1(b)
[FDP_ACC.1(b)
or FDP_IFC.1]
FDP_ACC.1(b)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
None
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.3(a)
FMT_MSA.1(a)
FMT_MSA.1(a)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1(b)
FMT_MSA.1(b)
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1
None
None
None
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1
None
FPT_STM.1
None
None
None
FPT_TST.1
None
None
None
FTA_SSL.3
None
None
None
FTP_ITC.1
None
None
None
FMT_MSA.3(b)
FMT_MTD.1
None
None
None
The following explains the rationale for acceptability in all cases where a dependency is not satisfied:
Rationale for Removing Dependencies on FCS_CKM.4
Once the MFP administrator generates the cryptographic key that is used for the HDD encryption of this
TOE at the start of TOE operation, the cryptographic key will be continuously used for the HDD and will not
be deleted. Therefore, cryptographic key destruction by the standard method is unnecessary.
6.3.4
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
This TOE is the MFP, which is a commercially available product. The MFP is assumed that it will be used in
a general office and this TOE does not assume the attackers with Enhanced-Basic or higher level of attack
potential.
The evaluation of the TOE design (ADV_TDS.1) is adequate to show the validity of commercially available
products. A high attack potential is required for the attacks that circumvent or tamper with the TSF, which is
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not covered in this evaluation. Dealing with attacks performed by an attacker possessing Basic attack
potential (AVA_VAN.2) is therefore adequate for general needs.
In order to securely operate the TOE continuously, it is important to appropriately remediate the flaw
discovered after the start of the TOE operation according to flow reporting procedure (ALC_FLR.2).
Based on the terms and costs of the evaluation, the evaluation assurance level of EAL2+ALC_FLR.2 is
appropriate for this TOE.
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7 TOE Summary Specification
This section describes the TOE summary specification for each security function. The security functions are
described for each corresponding security functional requirement.
7.1
Audit Function
The Audit Function is to generate the audit log of TOE use and security-relevant events (hereafter, "audit
events"). This function provides the recorded audit log in a legible fashion for users to audit (audit log
review). The recorded audit log can be viewed and deleted only by the MFP administrator.
FAU_GEN.1 and FAU_GEN.2
The TOE records the audit log items, shown in Table 32, on the HDD in the TOE when audit events shown
in Table 31 occur.
Audit log items include basic log items and expanded log items. Basic log items are recorded whenever audit
logs are recorded, and expanded log items are recorded only when audit events occur and the audit log items
shown in Table 32 are recorded.
FPT_STM.1
The date (year/month/day) and time (hour/minute/second) the TOE records for the audit log are derived from
the system clock of the TOE.
FAU_SAR.1, FAU_SAR.2, and FAU_STG.1
The TOE displays the operation menu for audit logs to be read on WIM screen only when it is accessed by
the MFP administrator. The TOE provides the audit logs in a text format when the MFP administrator
instructs the TOE to read the audit logs.
FAU_STG.4
The TOE writes the newest audit log over the oldest audit log when there is insufficient space in the audit log
files to append the newest audit log.
Table 31 : List of Audit Events
Audit Events
Start-up of the Audit Function
Shutdown of the Audit Function
Success and failure of login operations (Login attempts from RC Gate are excluded)
Success and failure of login operations from RC Gate Communication interface
Starting and releasing Lockout
Table 27 Record of Management Function
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Audit Events
Date settings (year/month/day), time settings (hour/minute)
Termination of session by auto logout
Failure of WIM communication
Folder transmission
E-mail transmission of attachments
Printing via networks
LAN Fax via networks
Creating document data (storing)
Reading document data (print, download, fax transmission, e-mail transmission of
attachments, and folder transmission)
Deleting document data
Communication with RC Gate
Table 32 : List of Audit Log Items
Audit Log Items
Setting Values of Audit Log
Items
Audit Events to record
Audit Logs
Basic Log Items
Expanded Log Items
Starting date/time of an
event
Values of the TOE system clock at
an event occurrence
Ending date/time of an
event
Values of the TOE system clock at
an event termination
Event types
Audit event identity
Subject identity
User or TOE identity for an audit
event caused by the user or TOE
Outcome (*1)
Audit event outcome (success or
failure)
Communication directions
Communication directions
(IN/OUT)
- WIM communication
Communicating IP address
- WIM communication
Communicating IP address
- All auditable events shown
in Table 31
- Communication with RC
Gate
- Folder transmission
- Printing via networks
- LAN Fax via networks
- Communication with RC
Gate
Communicating e-mail
address
Communicating e-mail address for
e-mail transmission of attachments
- E-mail transmission of
attachments
Lockout operation type
Information to identify starting
Lockout and releasing Lockout
- Starting and releasing
Lockout
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Audit Log Items
Setting Values of Audit Log
Items
Audit Events to record
Audit Logs
Locked out User
Login user name of a user who is
locked out
- Starting and releasing
Lockout
Locked out User who is to
be released
Login user name of a user who is
released from Lockout
- Starting and releasing
Lockout
(*1): If an audit event is "Failure of WIM communication", the failure will be recorded as a result.
7.2
Identification and Authentication Function
The Identification and Authentication Function is to verify whether persons who intend to use the TOE are
authorised users (MFP administrator, supervisor, normal users, and RC Gate) by referring to the
identification and authentication information obtained from the users, so that only persons who are
confirmed as authorised users are allowed to use the TOE. Verification methods for normal users include
those by Basic Authentication and External Authentication. Either Basic Authentication or External
Authentication will be selected when the TOE is installed.
FIA_UAU.1(a) and FIA_UID.1(a): Application of Basic Authentication
The TOE identifies and authenticates a user by checking the login user name and login password entered by
the user. However, regarding the viewing of user job lists, WIM Help, system status, the counter and
information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request notifications, the TOE identification
and authentication is not required for the use of the TOE.
When a user uses the Operation Panel, or uses WIM from the client computer, the screen for the user to enter
his or her login user name and login password is displayed, and this screen will be displayed until the entry
of the login user name and login password is complete.
When the TOE is used from the printer driver or fax driver, the TOE receives the login user name and login
password entered from each driver by a user.
When the entered login user name is the login user name of a normal user, MFP administrator, or supervisor,
the TOE checks if the entered login password match with the one pre-registered in the TOE.
FIA_UAU.1(b) and FIA_UID.1(b): Application of External Authentication
The TOE identifies and authenticates a user by checking the login user name and login password entered by
the user. However, regarding the viewing of user job lists, WIM Help, system status, the counter and
information of inquiries, execution of fax reception, and repair request notifications, the TOE identification
and authentication is not required for the use of the TOE.
When a user uses the Operation Panel, or uses WIM from the client computer, the screen for a user to enter
his or her login user name and login password is displayed, and this screen will be displayed until the entry
of the login user name and login password is complete.
When the TOE is used from the printer driver or fax driver, the TOE receives the login user name and login
password entered from each driver by a user.
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When the entered login user name is the login user name of MFP administrator or supervisor, the TOE
checks if the entered login password matches with the one pre-registered by the MFP administrator or
supervisor in the TOE.
When the entered login user name is not the login user name of the MFP administrator or supervisor, the
entered login user name and login password are sent to an external authentication server for confirmation.
When the sent login user name and login password are identified and authenticated, the user is allowed to use
the TOE according to the identified user role.
FIA_USB.1, FIA_ATD.1, and FMT_SMR.1
If a user is identified and authenticated as a result of checking FIA_UAU.1(a), FIA_UID.1(a),
FIA_UAU.1(b), and FIA_UID.1(b), the use of the TOE by the user is allowed as the identified user role
(normal user, MFP administrator, or supervisor). The user role assigned to the user at login will be
maintained until the user logs out. If user identification and authentication fails, use of the TOE is denied.
FTA_SSL.3
If a user has been logged on to the TOE from the Operation Panel, a Web browser, printer driver, fax driver,
and RC Gate, the user will be logged out of the TOE when the conditions shown below are met.
In case of the Operation Panel, the user is logged out of the TOE when the time that elapses since his or her
final operation on the Operation Panel reaches Operation Panel auto logout time (10 to 999 seconds).
In case of a Web browser, the user is logged out of the TOE when the time that elapses since his or her final
operation on a Web browser reaches WIM auto logout time (3 to 60 minutes).
In case of printer driver, the user is logged out of the TOE immediately after receiving the print data from the
printer driver.
In case of fax driver, the user is logged out of the TOE immediately after receiving the transmission
information from the fax driver.
In case of RC Gate, the TOE terminates a session with RC Gate immediately after the communication with
RC Gate ends.
FIA_UAU.7
Regarding login passwords entered by a person who intends to use the TOE from the Operation Panel or by a
person who intends to use WIM from the client computer, the TOE does not display the entered login
password but it displays a sequence of dummy characters whose length is the same as that of the entered
password.
FIA_AFL.1
When Basic Authentication is applied, the TOE counts the number of identification and authentication
attempts that consecutively result in failure using the login user name of a normal user, MFP administrator,
or supervisor. When External Authentication is applied, the TOE counts the number of identification and
authentication attempts that consecutively result in failure using the login user name of an MFP administrator
or supervisor. The TOE locks out the login user name if the number of consecutive login failures exceeds the
number of attempts before lockout.
If a user name is locked out, the user with that user name is not allowed to log in unless any of the following
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conditions is fulfilled.
- The lockout time set by the MFP administrator elapses.
- An "unlocking administrator" shown in Table 33 and specified for each user role releases the lockout.
- In case of the MFP administrator and supervisor, sixty seconds elapse since the MFP becomes executable
after its power is turned off and then on.
Table 33 : Unlocking Administrators for Each User Role
User Roles (Locked out Users)
Unlocking Administrators
Normal user
MFP administrator
Supervisor
MFP administrator
MFP administrator
Supervisor
FIA_SOS.1
Login passwords for users can be registered only if these passwords meet the following conditions:
(1) Usable characters and types:
Upper-case letters: [A-Z] (26 letters)
Lower-case letters: [a-z] (26 letters)
Numbers: [0-9] (ten digits)
Symbols: SP (space) ! " # $ % & ' ( ) * + , - . / : ; < = > ? @ [ \ ] ^ _ ` { | } ~ (33 symbols)
(2) Registrable password length:
- For normal users
No less than the minimum character number for password (8-32 characters) specified by the MFP
administrator and no more than 128 characters.
- For MFP administrators and a supervisor
No less than the minimum character number for password (8-32 characters) specified by the MFP
administrator and no more than 32 characters.
(3) Combination of character types:
The number of combined character types specified by the MFP administrators (two types or more, or
three types or more).
FIA_UAU.2, FIA_UID.2, and FIA_USB.1
A certificate is a set of identification and authentication information of RC Gate.
When the TOE receives a certificate from an IT device to access the TOE via RC Gate communication
interface, the TOE checks if the certificate matches another certificate installed in the TOE. Only if the
certificate sent from the IT device matches the one installed in the TOE so that the IT device is identified as
RC Gate, the IT device whose user role is RC Gate is allowed to use the TOE.
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FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The TOE inputs information after the TSF reliably identifies and authenticates the input information from the
Operation Panel or the client computer via LAN interface. Therefore, the input information cannot be
forwarded unless the TSF is not involved in information identification and authentication.
7.3
Document Access Control Function
The Document Access Control Function is to allow authorised TOE users to operate document data and user
jobs in accordance with the provided user role privilege or user privilege.
FDP_ACC.1(a) and FDP_ACF.1(a)
The TOE controls user operations for document data and user jobs in accordance with (1) access control rule
on document data and (2) access control rule on user jobs.
(1) Access control rule on document data
The TOE provides users with the interface for stored documents to be printed, downloaded to the client
computers, sent by fax, sent by e-mail as attachments, sent to folders, and deleted. The interface enables
users to delete all the stored documents.
Users authorised to operate stored documents are MFP administrator and normal users. The supervisor
and RC Gate are not allowed to operate stored documents.
When the MFP administrator or a normal user logs on to the TOE from the Operation Panel or to WIM
from the client computer, the TOE displays a list of the stored documents whose operations are
authorised and the menu for the authorised operations (printing, downloading to the client computers,
sending by fax, sending by e-mail as attachments, sending to folders, deleting, and deleting all files).
When the MFP administrator logs on to the TOE from the Operation Panel or to WIM from the client
computer, the TOE displays a list of all the stored documents and the operation menu for deletion and
deletion of all files. The MFP administrator can select and delete a document from the list of the stored
documents or all documents.
When a normal user logs on to the TOE from the Operation Panel or to WIM from the client computer,
the TOE displays a list of the stored documents that register the login user names of the normal users
who logged in to the document user list, and an operation menu. They will be displayed according to the
rules shown in Table 34. The privileges that allow users to edit the document user list are shown in "7.8
Security Management Function".
Also, the TOE allows only the user job owner to view and delete the document data handled as a user
job while Copy Function, Printer Function, Scanner Function, Fax Function, or Document Server
Function is being used.
While no interface to change job owners is provided, an interface to cancel user jobs is provided. If a
user job is cancelled, any document the cancelled job operates will be deleted.
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Table 34 : Stored Documents Access Control Rules for Normal Users
I/F to be Used
Available Functions
for Users
Types of Stored Documents
displayed in the List
Operations
displayed on the Menu
Operation
Panel
Document Server
Function
Document Server documents
Print
Delete
Operation
Panel
Document Server
Function
Fax transmission documents
Print
Delete
Operation
Panel
Printer Function
Printer documents
Print
Delete
Scanner documents
E-mail transmission of
attachments
Folder transmission
Delete
Operation
Panel
Scanner Function
Operation
Panel
Fax Function
Fax transmission documents
Fax transmission
E-mail transmission of
attachments
Folder transmission
Print
Delete
Operation
Panel
Fax Function
Fax reception documents
Print
Delete
Web browser
Document Server
Function
Document Server documents
Print
Delete
Scanner documents
E-mail transmission of
attachments
Folder transmission
Download
Delete
(E-mail transmission of
attachments and folder
transmission are
authorised for normal
users who are privileged to
use Scanner Function)
Web browser
Document Server
Function
Web browser
Document Server
Function
Fax transmission documents
Web browser
Printer Function
Printer documents
Fax transmission
Download
Print
Delete
(Fax transmission is
authorised for normal
users who are privileged to
use Fax Function)
Print
Delete
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I/F to be Used
Available Functions
for Users
Web browser
Fax Function
Operations
Types of Stored Documents
displayed in the List
Fax reception documents
displayed on the Menu
Print
Download
Delete
(Operations above are
authorised only if normal
users are privileged to use
Document Server
Function)
(2) Access control rule on user jobs
The TOE displays on the Operation Panel a menu to cancel a user job only if the user who logs in from
the Operation Panel is a user job owner or MFP administrator and a cancellation of a user job is
attempted by the owner or MFP administrator. Other users are not allowed to operate user jobs.
When a user job is cancelled, any documents operated by the cancelled job will be deleted.
However, if the document data operated by the cancelled user job is a stored document, the data will not
be deleted and remain stored in the TOE.
7.4
Use-of-Feature Restriction Function
The Use-of-Feature Restriction Function is to authorise TOE users to use Copy Function, Printer Function,
Scanner Function, Document Server Function and Fax Function in accordance with the roles of the identified
and authenticated TOE users and user privileges set for each user.
FDP_ACC.1(b) and FDP_ACF.1(b)
The TOE verifies the role for an authorised TOE user who attempts to start operating Copy Function, Printer
Function, Scanner Function, Document Server Function, and Fax Function.
If the role is that of normal user, the user can operate only functions that are included in the available
function list set for each normal user.
If the role is that of MFP administrator, the user can operate Fax Reception Function that corresponds to
MFP management.
If the role is that of supervisor and RC Gate, using any functions is not allowed.
7.5
Network Protection Function
The Network Protection Function is to provide network monitoring to prevent information leakage when
LAN is used and to detect data tampering.
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FTP_ITC.1
The encrypted communications provided by the TOE differ depending on communicating devices. Table 35
shows the encrypted communications provided by the TOE.
Table 35 : Encrypted Communications Provided by the TOE
Encrypted communications provided by the TOE
Communicating
Devices
Protocols
Cryptographic Algorithms
Client computer
TLS1.0
AES(128bits, 256bits), 3DES(168bits), RC4
External
Kerberos
AES(128bits, 256bits), RC4
RC Gate
SSL3.0, TLS1.0
AES(128bits, 256bits), 3DES(168bits)
FTP server
IPsec
AES(128bits, 192bits, 256bits), 3DES(168bits)
SMB server
IPsec
AES(128bits, 192bits, 256bits), 3DES(168bits)
SMTP server
S/MIME
AES(128bits, 256bits), 3DES(168bits)
authentication server
7.6
Residual Data Overwrite Function
The Residual Data Overwrite Function is to overwrite specific patterns on the HDD and disable the reusing
of the residual data included in the deleted documents, temporary documents and their fragments on the
HDD.
FDP_RIP.1
Methods to delete the HDD area through overwriting include sequential overwriting and batch overwriting.
For sequential overwriting, the TOE constantly monitors the information on a residual data area, and
overwrites the area if any existing residual data is discovered. If the user deletes document data, the TOE
applies the method specified by the MFP administrator and overwrites the area on the HDD where the digital
image data of the document data is stored. Also, when a user job is complete, the TOE applies the method
specified by the MFP administrator and overwrites the area on the HDD where temporary documents that are
created while a user job is executed or the fragments of those temporary documents are stored. Overwriting
methods for sequential overwriting include NSA method, DoD method, and random number method.
For batch overwriting, the TOE collectively overwrites the HDD with the method specified by the MFP
administrator. Overwriting methods for batch overwriting include NSA method, DoD method, random
number method, BSI/VSITR method, and Secure Erase method.
NSA method overwrites twice by random numbers and once by Null(0). The DoD method overwrites once
by a certain value, once by its complement, and further by random numbers to be verified afterwards.
Random number method overwrites for three to nine times by random numbers. The MFP administrator
specifies the number of times to overwrite when the TOE is installed. BSI/VSITR method overwrites
hexadecimally by 00, FF, 00, FF, 00, FF, AA, in that order. Secure Erase method overwrites by secure erase,
which is ATA command.
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Since the Residual Data Overwrite Function is used in combination with Stored Data Protection Function in
this ST, all values that overwrite the HDD by sequential overwriting will be encrypted.
7.7
Stored Data Protection Function
The Stored Data Protection Function is to encrypt the data on the HDD and protect the data so that data
leakage can be prevented.
FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_COP.1
The TOE encrypts data before writing it on the HDD, and decrypts the encrypted data after reading it from
the HDD. This process is applied to all data written on and read from the HDD. Detailed cryptographic
operations are shown in Table 36.
Table 36 : List of Cryptographic Operations for Stored Data Protection
Encryption-triggering
Operations
Cryptographic
Operations
Writing data to HDD
Encrypt
Reading data from HDD
Decrypt
Standard
Cryptographic
Algorithm
Key
Size
FIPS197
AES
256 bits
Following operations by the MFP administrator, the TOE generates a cryptographic key. If a login user is the
MFP administrator, the screen to generate an HDD cryptographic key is provided from the Operation Panel.
If the MFP administrator gives instructions to generate an HDD cryptographic key from the Operation Panel,
the TOE uses a genuine random number generator and generates random numbers that conform to the
standard NIST SP 800-90.
7.8
Security Management Function
The Security Management Function consists of functions to 1) control operations for TSF data, 2) maintain
user roles assigned to normal users, MFP administrator, or supervisor to operate the Security Management
Function, and 3) set appropriate default values to security attributes, all of which accord with user role
privileges or user privileges that are assigned to normal users, MFP administrator, or supervisor.
FMT_MSA.1(a), FMT_MSA.1(b), FMT_MSA.3(a), FMT_MTD.1, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1
The TOE allows operations for TSF data according to the rules described in Table 37.
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Table 37 : Management of TSF Data
TSF Data
Login user names of normal users
when Basic Authentication is
applied
Operation
Interface
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Operations
Users
Newly create,
query,
modify,
delete
MFP administrator
Query
Applicable normal
user
Login user names of normal users
when External Authentication is
applied (*1)
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Newly create,
query,
modify,
delete
MFP administrator
Login user name of supervisor
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Query,
modify
Supervisor
Newly create
MFP administrator
Query,
modify
Applicable MFP
administrator
Query
Supervisor
Login user name of MFP
administrator
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Document data attributes
No operation
interfaces available
No operations
allowed
None
Document user list
Stored document types are
Document Server document,
scanner document, fax transmission
document and printer document
(with stored print)
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Query,
modify
MFP administrator,
applicable normal
user who stored the
document
Document user list
Stored document type is fax
reception document(*2)
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Default values of the document
user list
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Web browser
Query
(Query
operation is
unavailable for
External
Authentication)
Applicable normal
user
Function types
No operation
interfaces available
No operations
allowed
None
User roles
No operation
interfaces available
No operations
allowed
Available function list
None
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TSF Data
Operation
Interface
Login passwords of normal users
when Basic Authentication is
applied
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Login password of supervisor
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Operations
Newly create,
modify
Users
MFP administrator
Modify
Applicable normal
user
Modify
Supervisor
Modify
Supervisor
Login password of MFP
administrator
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Newly create
MFP administrator
Modify
Applicable MFP
administrator
Number of Attempts before
Lockout when Basic Authentication
is applied
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Settings for Lockout Release Timer
when Basic Authentication is
applied
Web browser
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Lockout time for Basic
Authentication
Web browser
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Query
Supervisor,
Date settings (year/month/day)
Operation Panel,
Web browser
normal user
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Time
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Query
Supervisor,
normal user
Minimum character number of
password for Basic Authentication
Operation Panel
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Password complexity setting for
Basic Authentication
Operation Panel
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Operation Panel auto logout time
Operation Panel
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
WIM auto logout time
Web browser
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Audit log
Web browser
Query,
delete
MFP administrator
HDD cryptographic key
Operation Panel
Newly create
MFP administrator
S/MIME user information
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Newly create,
modify,
query,
delete
MFP administrator
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TSF Data
Operation
Interface
Operations
Query,
(Query
operation for a
user certificate
is unavailable
for External
Authentication)
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Destination folder
Users
Normal user
Newly create,
modify,
query,
delete
MFP administrator
Query
Normal user
Stored Reception File User
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
User authentication method
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Query
MFP administrator
IPsec setting information
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
@Remote setting information
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Query,
modify
MFP administrator
Device Certificate
Operation Panel,
Web browser
Modify
MFP administrator
(*1): The login user name of a normal user that is registered on an external authentication server is not
changed even though the MFP administrator newly creates, modifies, and deletes the login user name of the
normal user that is registered on the TOE.
(*2): If the MFP administrator modifies Stored Reception File User, and if the stored document type of the
document user list of document data is fax reception document, the list will be modified to the values of the
Stored Reception File User.
FMT_MSA.3(a) and FMT_MSA.3(b)
The TOE sets default values for objects/subjects according to the rules described in Table 38 when those
objects/subjects are generated.
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Table 38 : List of Static Initialisation for Security Attributes of Document Access Control SFP
Objects
Security attributes
Default values
Document data
Document data attribute
+PRT: Documents printed from the client
computer with direct print, locked print, hold
print, and sample print.
+SCN: Documents sent by e-mail as
attachments or to folders from the MFP.
+CPY: Documents copied using the MFP.
+FAXOUT: Documents sent by fax from the
MFP or client computer.
+FAXIN: Documents received from a
telephone line.
+DSR: Documents stored in the TOE by using
Copy Function, Scanner Function, Document
Server Function and Fax Data Storage
Function. Documents printed using Document
Server printing or stored print from the client
computer.
Document data (stored
document types are
Document Server
document, scanner
document and fax
transmission document)
Document user list
Default values of a document user list assigned
to a normal user who created the document
data.
Document data
(stored document type is
printer document)
Document user list
Login user name of a normal user who stored
the document data.
Document data
(stored document type is
fax reception document)
Document user list
Login user name of a normal user included in
the Stored Reception File User list.
User jobs
Login user name of
normal user
Login user name of a normal user who newly
creates a user job.
Each MFP application
(Copy Function, Printer
Function, Scanner
Function, Document
Server Function and Fax
Function)
Function type
The values specified for each function type is
as follows:
For Copy Function, values to identify Copy
Function.
For Document Server Function, values to
identify Document Server Function.
For Printer Function, values to identify Printer
Function.
For Scanner Function, values to identify
Scanner Function.
For Fax Function, values to identify Fax
Function.
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7.9
Software Verification Function
The Software Verification Function is to verify the integrity of the executable codes of the MFP Control
Software and FCU Control Software, and confirm that these codes can be trusted.
FPT_TST.1
The TOE verifies software at the TOE start-up.
The TOE verifies the integrity of the MFP Control Software by using the hash of the MFP Control Software
and then by checking the certificate. If the hash does not match its original value or the certificate
verification fails, the TOE displays the error message and becomes unavailable. If the hash matches its
original value and the certificate is verified, the TOE becomes available. The TOE also verifies the integrity
of the audit log data files.
The TOE outputs the information used for integrity verification so that the integrity of the FCU Control
Software can be verified. To check the integrity of the FCU Control Software, the information the TOE
outputs will be compared with the information described in the guidance documents, so that the integrity of
the FCU Control Software can be verified.
7.10
Fax Line Separation Function
The Fax Line Separation Function is to receive only faxes as input information from telephone lines so that
unauthorised intrusion from telephone lines can be prevented. This function also can be used to prohibit
transmissions of received faxes so that unauthorised intrusion from telephone lines to the LAN can be
prevented.
FPT_FDI_EXP.1
The TOE receives fax data only as input information from telephone lines. If any communication that does
not comply with the fax protocol is performed, the line is disconnected. Since the TOE is set to prohibit
forwarding of received fax data during installation, received fax data will not be forwarded.
Copyright (c) 2015 RICOH COMPANY, LTD. All rights reserved.
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