Security Target: ST

Security Target: ST
ePass ICAO essential
ST lite – EAC RSA
FQR No: 110 7563
FQR Issue: 1
ePass ICAO essential - ST lite - EAC RSA
Legal Notice
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Specifications and information are subject to change without notice.
The products described in this document are subject to continuous development and improvement.
All trademarks and service marks referred to herein, whether registered or not in specific countries, are the properties
of their respective owners.
** Printed versions of this document are uncontrolled **
T. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 00 I F. +33 (0)1 78 01 70 20 I Oberthur Technologies - 420, rue d’Estienne d’Orves 92700
Colombes
France
I
[email protected]
S.A. AU CAPITAL de 22 310 409,20€ - RCS NANTERRE 340 709 534
ePass ICAO essential - ST lite - EAC RSA
Document Management
A. Identification
Business Unit - Department
Document type:
ID R&D
FQR
Document Title:
ePass ICAO essential - ST lite - EAC RSA
FQR No:
110 7563
FQR Issue:
1
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Table of contents
LIST OF FIGURES
7
LIST OF TABLES 8
1
2
3
4
SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
9
1.1
Purpose ................................................................................................................ 9
1.2
Product description ............................................................................................... 9
1.3
Objective of the Security Target ............................................................................. 9
1.4
Security Target Identification ............................................................................... 10
1.5
TOE Technical Identification ................................................................................ 11
1.6
IC Identification ................................................................................................... 11
1.7
Reference documents .......................................................................................... 11
TOE OVERVIEW
14
2.1
Product overview ................................................................................................ 14
2.2
TOE overview ...................................................................................................... 14
2.3
TOE Usages ......................................................................................................... 14
2.4
TOE Definition ..................................................................................................... 16
2.5
TOE Guidance...................................................................................................... 16
2.6
TOE identification................................................................................................ 17
TOE ARCHITECTURE
18
3.1
Integrated Circuit – Infineon SLE 77...................................................................... 18
3.2
Low layer ............................................................................................................ 20
3.3
Tools modules ..................................................................................................... 20
3.4
Applicative modules ............................................................................................ 21
3.5
Operating System ................................................................................................ 21
3.6
Application layer ................................................................................................. 22
TOE LIFE CYCLE
23
4.1
Life cycle overview .............................................................................................. 23
4.2
Phase 1 “Development” ...................................................................................... 25
4.3
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”..................................................................................... 25
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5
6
4.4
Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document” ................................................ 26
4.5
Phase 4 “Operational Use” .................................................................................. 26
CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
27
5.1
Common Criteria conformance ............................................................................ 27
5.2
5.2.1
Protection Profile conformance ........................................................................... 27
Protection Profile claims .......................................................................................... 27
SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
29
6.1
Subjects .............................................................................................................. 29
Additional Subjects ............................................................................................................... 31
7
6.2
Assets ................................................................................................................. 31
6.3
Threats ............................................................................................................... 32
6.4
Organisational Security Policies ........................................................................... 35
6.5
Assumptions ....................................................................................................... 37
SECURITY OBJECTIVES
39
7.1
Security Objectives for the TOE ............................................................................ 39
7.2
Security objectives for the Operational Environment............................................ 41
Issuing State or Organization ......................................................................................................... 41
Receiving State or Organization .................................................................................................... 43
8
EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS
45
8.1
8.1.1
Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage..................................................... 45
Extended components FAU_SAS.1........................................................................... 45
8.2
8.2.1
Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers ................................ 45
Extended component FCS_RND.1 ............................................................................ 45
Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity................................................ 45
Extended component FIA_API.1 ........................................................................................... 45
8.3
8.3.1
8.3.2
8.4
8.4.1
9
Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability ........................... 46
Extended component FMT_LIM.1............................................................................ 46
Extended component FMT_LIM.2............................................................................ 46
Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation ......................................................... 46
Extended component FPT_EMS.1 ............................................................................ 46
SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
9.1
47
Convention ......................................................................................................... 47
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9.2
Security Functional Requirements issued from the PP EAC ................................... 49
FIA Identification and Authentication ........................................................................................... 51
10
11
TOE SUMMARY SPECIFFICATION
61
10.1
TOE summary specification .................................................................................. 61
10.2
Links between SFRs and TSF................................................................................. 64
RATIONALES
APPENDIX A:
68
GLOSSARY
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List of Figures
Figure 1 - TOE architecture
Figure 2: ePass ICAO Essential life cycle
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List of tables
Table 1 - General Identification
Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification
Table 3 - Chip Identification
Table 4: TOE Guidance reference
Table 5 - Supported Cryptography
Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle
Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps
Table 8 - Conformance Rationale
Table 9 - User Data
Table 10 - TSF Data
Table 11: PP EAC SFRs versus ST SFRs details
Table 12 - Links between SFR and TSF
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1 SECURITY TARGET INTRODUCTION
1.1
Purpose
The objective of this document is to present the Security Target Lite of the ePass ICAO essential
product configuration EAC RSA on SLE77.
1.2
Product description
This product is designed to host configurable applications that can satisfy the following use case:
Machine Readable Travel Document.
This present Security Target considers EAC PP [R10].
This product involves the following cryptographic features:
- RSA 1024 to 2048 bits (256 bits steps)
- 3DES (2keys)
- SHA 1, SHA 224, 256
- RNG
- Secure messaging DES
- GP Secure messaging during personalization (SCP02)
The following interfaces are supported:
-
Contactless
-
Contact
A personalization application is embedded, supporting ISO 7816-4 and proprietary commands.
1.3
Objective of the Security Target
This security target describes the security needs for ePass ICAO essential configuration EAC RSA
product. The configuration is conforming to PP BAC and adds requirements for Active Authentication
and for Prepersonalization and personalization.
This Security Target aims to satisfy the requirements of Common Criteria level EAL4 augmented
ALC_DVS.2 in defining the security enforcing functions of the Target Of Evaluation and describing the
environment in which it operates.
The objectives of this Security Target are:
To describe the Target of Evaluation (TOE), its life cycle and to position it in the smart card
life cycle.
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To describe the security environment of the TOE including the assets to be protected and the
threats to be countered by the TOE and by the operational environment during the platform
active phases.
To describe the security objectives of the TOE and its supporting environment in terms of
integrity and confidentiality of sensitive information. It includes protection of the TOE (and
its documentation) during the product active phases.
To specify the security requirements which include the TOE functional requirements, the TOE
assurance requirements and the security requirements for the environment.
To describe the summary of the TOE specification including a description of the security
functions and assurance measures that meet the TOE security requirements.
To present evidence that this ST is a complete and cohesive set of requirements that the TOE
provides on an effective set of IT security countermeasures within the security environment,
and that the TOE summary specification addresses the requirements.
1.4
Security Target Identification
Title:
Ariane - ST - EAC RSA
Editor:
Oberthur Technologies
CC version:
3.1 revision 4
EAL4 augmented with:
EAL:
AVA_VAN.5 and ALC_DVS.2
PP(s):
E- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended
Access control – BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009
ST Reference
FQR: 110 7404 Issue 1
ITSEF:
UL
Certification Body:
CESG
Evaluation scheme:
UK
Table 1 - General Identification
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1.5
TOE Technical Identification
Product name:
ePass ICAO essential Config BAC + EAC RSA on SLE77
Commercial name for
On Infineon
SLE77CLFX2400P
ePass ICAO essential EAC RSA on SLE77
& SLE77CLFX2407P:
Table 2 - TOE Technical Identification
1.6
IC Identification
IC Reference:
Infineon chips
IC EAL
EAL5+, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5
Communication
protocol:
Contact, Contactless and Dual
Memory:
Flash
Chip
Manufacturer:
Infineon
IC PP
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP0035-2007
IC certificate
BSI-DSZ-CC-0917-2014
IC maintenance
BSI-DSZ-CC-0917-2014-MA-01
IC ST lite
Security Target Lite of M7794 A12 and G12, Version 2.3, 2013-11-27, Infineon
Technologies AG.
Table 3 - Chip Identification
1.7
Reference documents
MRTD specifications
[R1]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R2]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable
Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R3]
ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 – Machine Readable Offical
Travel Documents, Specifications for electronically enabled offical travel documents with
biometric identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008
[R4]
Development of a logical data structure – LDS for optional capacity expansion
technologies Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a
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Logical Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –
1.7, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[R5]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine readable travel documents – Extended
Access control (EAC) – TR03110 – v2.10 part 1
[R6]
Annex to Section III Security Standards for Machine Readable Travel Documents Excerpts
from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
Oberthur Technologies Specification
[R7]
FQR 110 7226 Ed 1 - ePass ICAO essential - Perso Guide, Oberthur Technologies
Protection Profiles
[R8]
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile v 1.0 - BSI-PP-0035 15/06/2007
[R9]
Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Basic Access control – BSIPP-0055 v1.10 25th march 2009
[R10]
E- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control
– BSI-PP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009
[R11]
E-passport: adaptation and interpretation
SGDN/DCSSI/SDR, ref. 10.0.1, February 2007
[R12]
Embedded Software for Smart Security Devices, Basic and Extended Configurations,
ANSSi-CC-PP-2009/02, 1/12/2009
of
e-passport
Protection
Profiles,
Chips References
[R13]
BSI-DSZ-CC-0917 Certification report – SLE77CLFX2400P and SLE77CLFX2407P
[R14]
Maintenance report BSI-DSZ-CC-0917 MA01 – SLE77CLFX2400P and SLE77CLFX2407P
Standards
[R15]
ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 – Organization, security and commands for interchange
[R16]
Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO/IEC 15946.TR-ECC, BSI
2006
[R17]
ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002
[R18]
ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002
[R19]
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic
techniques based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
[R20]
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2002 - Information technology - Security techniques - Digital signature
schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Mechanisms using a hash-function
[R21]
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4 Revised November 1, 1993
[R22]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 Secure Hash Standard (+
Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute
of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
[R23]
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1998: Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 9 septembre 1998
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[R24]
Jakob Jonsson and Burt Kaliski. Public-key cryptography standards (PKCS) #1: RSA
cryptography specifications version 2.1. RFC 3447, 2003
[R25]
RSA Laboratories. PKCS#1 v2.1: RSA cryptography standard. RSA Laboratories Technical
Note, 2002
[R26]
ANSI X9.31 - Digital Signatures Using Reversible Public Key Cryptography for the
Financial Services Industry (rDSA), 1998.
[R27]
FIPS 46-3 Data Encryption Standard (DES)
[R28]
ISO/IEC 9797-1:1999 "Codes d'authentification de message (MAC) Partie 1: Mécanismes
utilisant un cryptogramme bloc"
[R29]
NIST SP 800-90 – Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic
Random Bit Generators (Revised)
[R30]
FIPS 197 – Advance Encryption Standard (AES)
[R31]
ISO/IEC 11770-2. Information Technology – Security techniques – Key management –
part 2: Mechanisms using symmetric techniques, 1996
Misc
[R32]
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS31: Funktionalitätsklassen
und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren, Version 1,
25.09.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
[R33]
NOTE-10 - Interpretation with e-passport PP_courtesy translation-draft v0.1
[R34]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 1 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 – version 2.10 March 2012
[R35]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 2 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-2 – version 2.10 March 2012
[R36]
Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents part 3 –
Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 – version 2.10 March 2012
CC
[R37]
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction and
general model, CCMB-2012-09-001, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September 2012
[R38]
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 2: Security
Functional Components, CCMB-2012-09-002, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September
2012
[R39]
Common Criteria for Information Technology security Evaluation Part 3: Security
Assurance Components, CCMB-2012-09-003, version 3.1 Revision 4 Final, September
2012
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2 TOE OVERVIEW
2.1
Product overview
The product EPass ICAO essential on SLE77 is multi-applicative native software, embeddable in
contact and/or contact-less smart card integrated circuits of different form factors. The product can
be configured to serve different use cases, during the Prepersonalization/personalization phases of
the product. For more information on the product, please refer to complete ST.
The product supports the storage and retrieval of structured information compliant to the Logical
Data Structure as specified in [R2].
This product is embedded on an IC. The IC functionalities are described §1.6.
2.2
TOE overview
The TOE described in this security target is the BAC with EAC RSA configuration of the product.
The BAC TOE is instantiated during the product prepersonalization, using the Application Creation
Engine that creates the MF / DF required for the BAC configuration.
The TOE life cycle is described in § 4 TOE life cycle.
2.3
TOE Usages
State or organisation issues MRTDs to be used by the holder to prove his/her identity and claiming
associated rights. For instance, it can be used to check identity at customs in an MRTD configuration,
verifying authenticity of electronic visa stored on the card and correspondence with the holder.
In order to pass successfully the control, the holder presents its personal MRTD to the inspection
system to first prove his/her identity. The inspection system is under control of an authorised agent
and can be either a desktop device such as those present in airports or a portable device to be used
on the field.
The MRTD in context of this security target contains:
Visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder printed in the booklet or
any other form factor.
A separate data summary for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine
Readable Zone,
And data elements stored on the TOE’s chip for contact and contact-less machine reading.
The authentication of the holder is based on:
The possession of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given
on the biographical data page.
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When holder has been authenticated the issuing State or Organization can perform extra
authentications in order to gain rights required to grant access to some sensitive information such as
“visa information”…
The issuing State or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTDs. The
receiving State trusts a genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
The MRTD can be viewed as the combination:
A physical MRTD in form of paper or plastic with an embedded chip and possibly an antenna.
It presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD
holder.
The biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book or any other form
factor.
The printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) or keydoc area that identifies the
device.
The printed portrait.
A logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure as
specified by ICAO on the integrated circuit. It presents contact or contact-less readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder.
The digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data or keydoc data, DG1).
The digitized portraits.
The other data according to LDS (up to DG24).
The Document security object.
The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the physical device and the MRTD’s
chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational security measures
(e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures). These security measures include the binding
of the MRTD’s chip to the physical support.
The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the MRTD’s
chip.
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2.4
TOE Definition
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents
(MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Basic
Access Control according to ICAO Doc 9303 and Extended Access Control according to TR 03110.
The physical scope of the TOE is:
Circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC)
IC Dedicated Software
IC Embedded Software (operating system)
MRTD application
Associated guidance documentation
2.5
TOE Guidance
The table below identifies the guidance for the personalization of the TOE (the guidance is identical
for both TOEs).
Guidance
document
for [R7] FQR 110 7226 - ePass ICAO essential - Perso Guide, Oberthur
Prepersonalization
Technologies
and Personalization
[R1] Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for
Machine Readable Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access,
Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004, published by authority of the
secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[R2] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 1 –
Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006, International Civil
Aviation Organization
Guidance
[R3] ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel Documents, part 3 –
documents
for Machine Readable Offical Travel Documents, Specifications for
Operational Phase
electronically enabled offical travel documents with biometric
identification capabilities (including supplement), ICAO doc 93003, 2008
[R34] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents part 1 – Technical Guideline TR-03110-1 – version 2.10 March
2012
[R36] Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents part 3 – Technical Guideline TR-03110-3 – version 2.10 March
2012
Table 4: TOE Guidance reference
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2.6
TOE identification
The means to identify the TOE is presented in the chapter 3 of guidance for personalization [R7].
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3 TOE ARCHITECTURE
The TOE is an IC with software, composed of various modules and composed of the following
components:
The EPass ICAO essential configuration BAC + EAC RSA on SLE77 architecture can be viewed as
shown in the following picture:
Application
layer
MRTD BAC + EAC RSA application
Personalization application
Operating System
Applicative modules
Tools modules
Platform
layer
Low layer
Infineon SLE77CLFX2400P / SLE77CLFX2407P
Figure 1 - TOE architecture
3.1
Integrated Circuit – Infineon SLE 77
The TOE is embedded on Infineon chips, as presented in Table 3 - Chip Identification.
The IC part of the TOE comprises the following:
Core System:
CPU
Memory Encryption/Decryption Unit (MED)
Memory Management Unit (MMU)
Memories:
Read-Only Memory (ROM)
Random Access Memory (RAM)
SOLID FLASH™ NVM
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Peripherals:
True Random Number Generator (TRNG)
Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG)
Watchdog and timers
Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART)
Checksum module (CRC)
Radio Frequency Interface (RFI)
Control:
Dynamic Power Management
Internal Clock Oscillator (ICO)
Interrupt and Peripheral Event Channel Controller (ITP and PEC)
Interface Management Module (IMM)
User mode Security Life Control (UmSLC)
Voltage regulator
Coprocessors:
Crypto2304T for asymmetric algorithms like RSA and EC
Symmetric Crypto Coprocessor for AES and 3DES Standard
Security Peripherals:
Filters
Sensors
Buses:
Memory Bus
Peripheral Bus
And associated Firware and Sofware, it comprises:
RMS and SAM routines for Solid Flash NVM programming; security functions test, random number
online testing. STS consisting of test and initialization routines. All stored in the ROM part.
The Flash Loader that allows the loading of TOE software.
And cryptographic libraries.
IC is part of the TOE and also part of the TSF. More information on the chips is given in the related
Security Target.
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3.2
Low layer
The native low layer of Oberthur Technologies provides an efficient and easy way to access chip
features from the applications. It is based on services organized according to a multi-layer design
which allows applications to use a high level interface completely independent of the chip.
The main features of the OS are the following:
Management Memories and secure data processing,
Transaction management,
APDU protocol management,
Low level T=0 ; T=1 and T=CL management (type A and type B),
Error processing.
A dedicated cryptographic library has been developed and designed by Oberthur Technologies to
provide the highest security level and best tuned performances. It provides the following algorithms:
Cryptographic Feature
Embedded
SHA1, SHA-224, SHA-256
RSA from 1024, to 2048 bits (by steps of 256 bits)
- verification (for EAC)
- key agreement DH (for session keys)
3DES with 112 bits key size
Random Generator compliant AIS31
Table 5 - Supported Cryptography
More information is available in complete ST.
Low layer is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
3.3
Tools modules
The tools modules provide ePAss ICAO essential product:
- File system compliant with ISO/IEC 7816-4 and ISO/IEC 7816-9. It is also compliant with ICAO
recommendations[R1].
- ISO Secure Messaging as specified in [R15] and as described in annex E of [R36].
- Asymmetric Keys Management as storage, signature, verification, DH and generation.
- Symmetric Key management
- Access Control for ‘Change MSK’ and ‘PUT KEY’ APDU
- Authentication and secure messaging to be used during Prepersonalization and
Personalization phases, based on Global Platform standard
More information is available in complete ST.
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Tools modules are part of the TOE and are also part of the TSF.
3.4
Applicative modules
The applicative modules provide ePass ICAO essential product:
- Chip Authentication used to authenticate the card to the terminal. This authentication
service is made available to the MRTD application.
- Terminal Authentication used to authenticate the terminal to the card. This authentication
service is made available to the MRTD application.
- Access Conditions Engine that checks the AC rules attached to an object (file, key, data
object) with a current context (CHA, Role ID…).
More information is available in complete ST.
Those applicative modules are part of the TOE and are also part of the TSF.
Another applicative module is the Digital Blurred Image (DBI) module. It allows the blurring of a JPG
or JPEG2000 file stored in a transparent file. This feature is the implementation of patents owned by
Oberthur Technologies. More information is available in complete ST.
This module is part of the TOE and outside the scope of this present certification.
3.5
Operating System
The operating system manages the TOE in pre-personalization and personalization phases in order to
configure the TOE in the expected way. It implements and control access to Key management (MSK)
or File management including data reading and writing. It can be addressed in clear mode for secure
environment or non-sensitive commands or using SCP02.
The operating system also manages protocols available during Use phase such as Basic Access
Control or Active Authentication. The protocol for Basic Access Control is specified by ICAO [R2].
Basic Access Control checks that the terminal has physical access to the MRTD’s data page. This is
enforced by requiring the terminal to derive an authentication key from the optically read MRZ of the
MRTD. The protocol for Basic Access Control is based on ISO/IEC 11770-2 [R31] key establishment
mechanism 6. This protocol is also used to generate session keys that are used to protect the
confidentiality (and integrity) of the transmitted data.
The inspection system:
- Reads the printed data in the MRZ (for MRTD),
- Authenticates itself as inspection system by means of keys derived from MRZ data.
After successful 3DES based authentication, the TOE provides read access to data requiring BAC
rights by means of a private communication (secure messaging) with the inspection system.
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More information is available in complete ST.
The Operating System is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
3.6
Application layer
Two kinds of applications are available on the top of the product: MRTD EAC RSA and resident
application used for Personalization.
More information is available in complete ST.
This layer is part of the TOE and is also part of the TSF.
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4 TOE LIFE CYCLE
4.1
Life cycle overview
The TOE life-cycle is described in terms of four life-cycle phases. (With respect to the [R8], the TOE
life-cycle is additionally subdivided into 7 steps). The table below presents the TOE role:
Roles
Subject
IC developer
Infineon
IC
manufacturer
Infineon
Embedded
software
developer
Oberthur Technologies
Module
Manufacturer
Oberthur Technologies or Infineon
Prepersonalizer
Oberthur Technologies or another agent: Agent in charge of the
Prepersonalization
This additional subject is a refinement of the role Manufacturer as described in
[R9]. It is the agent in charge of the Prepersonalization of the TOE.
It corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer as described in [R9]
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize
the MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing
the identity of the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the
biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical
and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national
interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the DSO.
Personalization
Agent
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
Table 6 - Roles identification on the life cycle
The table below presents the subjects following TOE life cycle steps in accordance with the standard
smart card life cycle [R8], the TOE delivery point and the coverage:
Steps
Step 1
Phase
Development
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Oberthur Technologies
Covered by
ALC R&D sites
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(Phase1)
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Development
(Phase1)
Manufacturing
(Phase2)
Manufacturing
(Phase2)
Infineon
IC certification
Infineon (code loading in flash Memory)
IC certification
Oberthur Technologies Manufacturer
ALC sites
(Code loading in flash Memory)
TOE delivery point
Step 5
Step 6
Step 7
Manufacturing
(Phase2)
Personalization (p
Operational Use
Prepersonalization or Other agent
AGD_OPE & AGD_PRE
Oberthur Technologies Personalization or
AGD_OPE & AGD_PRE
Other agent
End user
AGD_OPE & AGD_PRE
Table 7 - Subjects identification following life cycle steps
The figure below summarizes the different phases of the development of any configuration of the
ePass ICAO Essential family.
Figure 2: ePass ICAO Essential life cycle
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4.2
Phase 1 “Development”
(Step1) The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
(Step2) The TOE developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the
guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC
Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
The Oberthur Technologies Code with associated documentation is ready to be loaded in the flash
memory.
4.3
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
(Step 3) The Oberthur Technologies code is loaded in the flash memory, this operation can be done
in the step 3 and in the step 4:
At Infineon site; the code is then securely delivered to the IC manufacturer. The Infineon site
is covered by an audit, step 3.
Or at Oberthur Technologies manufacturing Site. The code is then securely transferred to
audited Oberthur Technologies factories, step 4.
(Step) When the code is loaded by Infineon in the Step 3, the TOE integrated circuit is produced
containing the travel document’s chip Dedicated Software in the flash memories. The manufacturer
writes the IC Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as travel document material during
the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to the Manufacturer.
The manufacturer adds initialization data and keys. The product is self protected, security functions
are active. The product can be sent:
to Oberthur Technologies or
directly to Oberthur Technologies Customers.
(Step4) Oberthur Technologies load the Code and data on the flash memories. The IC contains the
MRTD code and data with the required protection. The product can be sent to Oberthur
Technologies customers (another agent).
TOE delivery point
(Step5) The Manufacturer (i) adds the IC Embedded Software or part of it, (ii) creates the eMRTD
application, and (iii) equips travel document’s chips with pre-personalization Data.
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The pre-personalised travel document together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
Manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The Manufacturer also provides the relevant parts of the
guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
4.4
Phase 3 “Personalization of the travel document”
(Step6) The personalization of the travel document includes
the survey of the travel document holder’s biographical data,
the enrolment of the travel document holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized
portraits),
the personalization of the visual readable data onto the physical part of the travel document,
the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical travel document and
configuration of the TSF if necessary.
The step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the
creation of
(i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1),
(ii) the digitized portrait (EF.DG2),
and (iii) the Document security objects. The signing of the Document security object by the
Document signer finalizes the personalization of the genuine travel document for the travel
document holder. The personalised travel document (together with appropriate guidance for
TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the travel document holder for operational use.
4.5
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
(Step7) The TOE is used as a travel document's chip by the traveler and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the issuing
State or Organisation and can be used according to the security policy of the issuing State but they
can never be modified.
Note that the personalization process and its environment may depend on specific security needs of
an issuing State or Organisation. All production, generation and installation procedures after TOE
delivery up to the “Operational Use” (phase 4) have to be considered in the product evaluation
process under AGD assurance class. Therefore, the Security Target outlines the split up of
P.Manufact, P.Personalization and the related security objectives into aspects relevant before vs.
after TOE delivery. Some production steps, e.g. Step 4 in Phase 2 may also take place in the Phase 3.
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5 CONFORMANCE CLAIMS
5.1
Common Criteria conformance
This Security Target (ST) claims conformance to the Common Criteria version 3.1 revision 4 [R37],
[R38] and [R39].
The conformance to the CC is claimed as follows:
CC
Conformance rationale
Part 1
Strict conformance
Conformance to the extended1 part:
- FAU_SAS.1 “Audit Storage”
- FCS_RND.1 “Quality metric for random numbers”
- FMT_LIM.1 “Limited capabilities”
- FMT_LIM.2 “Limited availability”
- FPT_EMS.1 “TOE Emanation”
- FIA_API.1 “Authentication Proof of Identity”
Strict conformance to Part 3.
The product claims conformance to EAL 4, augmented with:
- ALC_DVS.2 “Sufficiency of security measures”
- AVA_VAN.5 “Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis”
Part 2
Part 3
Table 8 - Conformance Rationale
Remark:
For interoperability reasons it is assumed the receiving state cares for sufficient measures against
eavesdropping within the operating environment of the inspection systems. Otherwise the TOE may
protect the confidentiality of some less sensitive assets (e.g. the personal data of the TOE holder
which are also printed on the physical TOE) for some specific attacks only against enhanced basic
attack potential (AVA_VAN.3).
FPT_EMSEC.1 from the Protection Profile has been renamed to FPT_EMS.1, in order to keep the SFR
formatting.
5.2
Protection Profile conformance
5.2.1 Protection Profile claims
The Security Target claims strict conformance to the following PPs written in CC3.1 revision 2:
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[R10] E- Machine readable travel documents with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access control – BSIPP-0056 v1.10 25th march 2009.
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6 SECURITY PROBLEM DEFINITION
6.1
Subjects
Before
phase 2
SFR
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
PP EAC subjects
Manufacturer
Personalization Agent
x
x
x
Terminal
x
x
x
Inspection System
x
MRTD Holder
Traveler
Attacker
x
x
x
x
x
x
Additional subjects
x
IC Developer
Software Developer
Prepersonalizer (refinement of
Manufacturer. It corresponds to the MRTD
manufacturer)
x
x
Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the TOE
during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC Manufacturer
and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer.
Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organization to personalize the MRTD for the
holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity the holder for the
biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the
portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) (iii) writing these data on the
physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national
interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (iv) signing the Document Security Object defined
in [R2].
Application Note:
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Personalization Agent is referred as the Personalizer in the Security Target.
Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing State
or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the
MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates
the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of the CVCA are
distributed in the form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving State with respect to the
protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection Systems.
The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for the
sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations in the form of
the Document Verifier Certificates.
Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless interface.
Inspection System (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an MRTD
presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD holder.
The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with the
MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism and (iii) gets
the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic Access Control by optical reading the
MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this information. The General Inspection System
(GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additionally the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the
Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through
the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The
security attributes of the EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalized the MRTD.
Traveler
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD holder.
Attacker
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A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e.
without knowing or optically reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the logical
MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
Application Note
An impostor is attacking the inspection system as TOE IT environment independent on using a
genuine, counterfeit or forged MRTD. Therefore the impostor may use results of successful attacks
against the TOE but the attack itself is not relevant for the TOE.
Additional Subjects
IC Developer
Developer of the IC.
TOE Developer
Developer of part of the TOE source code.
Prepersonalizer
Agent in charge of the Prepersonalization. This agent corresponds to the MRTD manufacturer as
described in [R9].
6.2
Assets
Logical MRTD data
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Application note:
Due to interoperability reasons the ‘ICAO Doc 9303’ requires that Basic Inspection Systems must
have access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16. Note the BAC mechanisms may not resist
attacks with high attack potential.
“”The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security needs)
and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [R2]. These data are user data of the
TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1 to EF.DG13
and EF.DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication Public Key (CAPK)
in EF.DG 14 is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD is used by the
inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.””
User Data
Description
CPLC Data
Data uniquely identifying the chip. They are considered as user
data as they enable to track the holder
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User Data
Description
Personal Data of the MRTD
holder (EF.DGx, except EF.DG15)
Contains identification data of the holder
Document Security Object (SOD)
in EF.SOD
Contain a corticated ensuring the integrity of the file stored
within the MRTD and their authenticity. It ensures the data are
issued by a genuine country
Common data in EF.COM
Declare the data the travel document contains. This data is
optional and may be absent in the TOE
Table 9 - User Data
TSF Data
Description
TOE_ID
Prepersonalizer reference
authentication data
Personalization Agent reference
authentication Data
Data enabling to identify the TOE
Private key enabling to authenticate the Prepersonalizer
Private key enabling to authenticate the Personalization Agent
Basic Access Control (BAC) Key
Master keys used to established a trusted channel between the
Basic Inspection Terminal and the travel document
Chip Authentication Private key
(CAK)
Private key used by the Chip to perform a Chip Authentication
Session keys for the secure
channel
Session keys used to protect the communication in
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity
Life Cycle State
Life Cycle state of the TOE
Public Key CVCA
Trust point of the travel document stored in persistent memory
CVCA Certificate
All the data related to the CVCA key (expiration date, name,…)
stored in persistent memory
Current date
Current date of the travel document
Table 10 - TSF Data
Authenticity of the MRTD's chip
The authenticity of the MRTD's chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the MRTD
holder is used by the traveler to prove his possession of a genuine MRTD.
6.3 Threats
This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with its
IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational environment
and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
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Application note: The threats T.Chip_ID and T.Skimming (cf [R27]) are averted by the mechanisms
described in the BAC PP which cannot withstand an attack with high attack potential thus these are
not addressed here. T.Chip_ID addresses the threat of tracing the movement of the MRTD by
identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening to communications through the
contactless communication interface. T.Skimming addresses the threat of imitating the inspection
system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE.
Both attacks are conducted by an attacker who cannot read the MRZ or who does not know the
physical MRTD in advance.
Next threats presented are all related to and issued from PP EAC.
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Adverse action: An attacker tries to gain the sensitive biometric reference data through the
communication interface of the MRTD's chip. The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the
threat T.Skimming (cf. [R10]) in respect of the attack path (communication interface) and the
motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD's chip) but differs from those in the asset under the
attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the
opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods.
Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data are stored only on the MRTD's chip as private
sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and the portrait are visually readable on the physical
MRTD as well.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, knowing the Document Basic Access Keys, being in
possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: confidentiality of sensitive logical MRTD (i.e. biometric reference) data
T.Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to deceive on an inspection system by means of the
changed MRTD holder’s identity or biometric reference data. This threat comprises several attack
scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the biographical data on the biographical data
page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the
traveler. The attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual
inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face
recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric
authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of
different logical MRTDs to create a new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker writes the digitized portrait
and optional biometric reference finger data read from the logical MRTD of a traveler into another
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MRTD’s chip leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The
attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD to another contactless chip.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate
MRTDs.
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data.
T.Counterfeit
Adverse action: An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or
reproduction of a genuine MRTD's chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the
authenticity of the MRTD's chip used for authentication of a traveler by possession of a MRTD. The
attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a genuine
MRTD's chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD's chip.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of one or more legitimate MRTDs
Asset: authenticity of logical MRTD data
T.Abuse-Func
Adverse action: An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in the phase
"Operational Use" in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate
or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in the
operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Information_Leakage
Adverse action: An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal
operation or caused by the attacker. Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power
consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements.
This leakage may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to
measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the
contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even
for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples
are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g.
Differential Fault Analysis).
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality of logical MRTD and TSF data.
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T.Phys-Tamper
Adverse action: An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose
TSF Data or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may
physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s
chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or
(iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User Data
(e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication key of
the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by modification
of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering
requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC
failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that, the hardware security
mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of software design
including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a pre-requisite. The modification may
result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or
temporary.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.Malfunction
Adverse action: An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or
functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions,
exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function. To
exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
Threat agent: having enhanced basic attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD.
Asset: confidentiality and authenticity of logical MRTD and TSF data, correctness of TSF.
T.TOE_Identification_Forgery
Adverse action: An attacker tries to perturbate the TOE identification.
Threat agent: having high attack potential, being in possession of a legitimate MRTD
Asset: TOE_ID
6.4
Organisational Security Policies
P.BAC-PP
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The issuing States or Organizations ensures that successfully authenticated Basic Inspection Systems
have read access to logical MRTD data DG1, DG2, DG5 to DG16 the "ICAO Doc 9303" [R2] as well as
to the data groups Common and Security Data. The MRTD is successfully evaluated and certified in
accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with
"ICAO Application", Basic Access Control" [R9] in order to ensure the confidentiality of standard user
data and preventing the traceability of the MRTD data.
Application note: The organizational security policy P.Personal_Data drawn from the ‘ICAO Doc
9303’ [R2] is addressed by the [R9] (cf. P.BAC-PP). The confidentiality of the personal data other than
EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 is ensured by the BAC mechanism. Note the BAC mechanisms may not resist
attacks with high attack potential (cf. [R9]). The TOE shall protect the sensitive biometric reference
data in EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 against attacks with high attack potential. Due to the different resistance
the protection of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 on one side and the other EF.SOD, EF.COM, EF.DG1, EF.DG2
and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 are addressed separated protection profiles, which is assumed to result in
technically separated evaluations (at least for classes ASE and VAN) and certificates.
P.Sensitive_Data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive private
personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used only by
inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is presented to the
inspection system (Extended Inspection Systems). The issuing State or Organization authorizes the
Document Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within
the limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate. The MRTD's chip shall protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the sensitive private personal data even during transmission to the
Extended Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
P.Manufact
The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization Agent
Key.
P.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD
with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed by an
agent authorized by the issuing State or Organization only.
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6.5 Assumptions
The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used or is
intended to be used.
A.MRTD_Manufact
It is assumed that appropriate functionality testing of the MRTD is used. It is assumed that security
procedures are used during all manufacturing and test operations to maintain confidentiality and
integrity of the MRTD and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any possible copy,
modification, retention, theft or unauthorized use).
A.MRTD_Delivery
Procedures shall guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and conformance to
its objectives:
- Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in
the delivery process and storage.
- Procedures shall ensure that people dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the
required skill.
A.Pers_Agent
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD
holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication v1 Public Key (EF.DG14) if
stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the
MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization
Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by
symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
A.Insp_Sys
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
MRTD presented by the traveler and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveler as MRTD
holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country Signing CA
Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization, and (ii)
implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control. The Basic Inspection System reads the
logical MRTD under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical
MRTD.
The General Inspection System in addition to the Basic Inspection System implements the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD's
chip during inspection and establishes secure messaging with keys established by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection
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System (i) supports the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric
reference data.
A.Signature_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing State
or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which securely generates, stores and uses the
Country Signing CA Key pair. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and is
recommended to distribute the Country Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States
maintaining its integrity. The Document Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands
over the Document Signer Public Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer
Private Key secret and (iv) uses securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document
Security Objects of the MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document
Signer Public Keys that are distributed to the receiving States and Organizations.
A.Auth_PKI
The issuing and receiving States or Organizations establish a public key infrastructure for card
verifiable certificates of the Extended Access Control. The Country Verifying Certification Authorities,
the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key pairs and
certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country Verifying
Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organizations are signing the certificates of the
Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the Extended Inspection
Systems of the receiving States or Organizations. The issuing States or Organizations distribute the
public keys of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their MRTD's chip.
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7 SECURITY OBJECTIVES
7.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified threats
to be countered by the TOE and organizational security policies to be met by the TOE.
OT.AC_Pers
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security object
according to LDS [R2] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization Agents only. The
logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written only during and cannot be
changed after its personalization. The Document security object can be updated by authorized
Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG 3 to EF.DG16 are added.
OT.Data_Int
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD's chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication data.
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized Extended Inspection Systems. The authorization
of the inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful
authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document Verifier
Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the issuing State
or Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their
transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive biometric
reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Identification
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification and Pre-Personalization Data in its nonvolatile
memory. The IC Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
"Manufacturing" and Phase 3 "Personalization of the MRTD". The storage of the Pre- Personalization
data includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s). The storage of the Prepersonalization data
includes writing of the Personalization Agent Key(s).
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
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The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication v1 as defined in [R34]. The authenticity proof provided by the MRTD’s chip shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
After delivery of the TOE to the MRTD Holder, the TOE must prevent the abuse of test and support
functions that may be maliciously used to:
- (i) Disclose critical User Data
- (ii) Manipulate critical User Data of the IC Embedded Software
- (iii) Manipulate Soft-coded IC Embedded Software
- (iv) Bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test Features
provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or processed
in the MRTD's chip:
- By measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock,
or I/O lines and
- By forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
- By a physical manipulation of the TOE.
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF Data,
and the MRTD's chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with enhancedbasic attack potential by means of
- Measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
- Measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between
charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
- Manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
- Controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
- reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
OT.Prot_Malfunction
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the normal
operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested. This is to
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prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp. electromagnetic)
fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
7.2 Security objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.MRTD_Manufact
Appropriate functionality testing of the TOE shall be used in step 4 to 6.
During all manufacturing and test operations, security procedures shall be used through phases 4, 5
and 6 to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and its manufacturing and test data.
OE.MRTD_ Delivery
Procedures shall ensure protection of TOE material/information under delivery including the
following objectives:
- Non-disclosure of any security relevant information
- Identification of the element under delivery
- Meet confidentiality rules (confidentiality level, transmittal form, reception
acknowledgment)
- Physical protection to prevent external damage
- Secure storage and handling procedures (including rejected TOE"s)
- Traceability of TOE during delivery including the following parameters:
o Origin and shipment details
o Reception, reception acknowledgement
o Location material/information.
Procedures shall ensure that corrective actions are taken in case of improper operation in the
delivery process (including if applicable any non-conformance to the confidentiality convention) and
highlight all non-conformance to this process.
Procedures shall ensure that people (shipping department, carrier, and reception department)
dealing with the procedure for delivery have got the required skill, training and knowledge to meet
the procedure requirements and be able to act fully in accordance with the above expectations.
OE.Personalization
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of the
issuing State or Organization:
- (i) Establish the correct identity of the holder and create biographical data for the MRTD
- (ii) Enroll the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded
finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s)
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-
(iii) Personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical
security measures to protect the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
The issuing State or Organization must:
- (i) Generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA Key Pair
- (ii) Ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document Signer
Certificates in a secure operational environment
- (iii) Distribute the Certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and
Organizations maintaining its authenticity and integrity.
The issuing State or Organization must:
- (i) Generate a cryptographic secure Document Signer Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the
Document Signer Private Keys
- (ii) Sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment
only
- (iii) Distribute the Certificate of the Document Signer Public Key to receiving States and
Organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates all data in the
data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [R2].
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to:
- (i) Generate the MRTD's Chip Authentication Key Pair
- (ii) Sign and store the Chip Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key
data in EF.DG14
- (iii) Support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity
of the MRTD's chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public
Key by means of the Document Security Object.
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order to
limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD's holders to authorized receiving
States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing State or
Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized Document
Verifier only.
OE.BAC-PP
It has to be ensured by the issuing State or Organization, that the TOE is additionally successfully
evaluated and certified in accordance with the "Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine
Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application", Basic Access Control" [R9]. This is necessary to
cover the BAC mechanism ensuring the confidentiality of standard user data and preventing the
traceability of the MRTD data. Note that due to the differences within the assumed attack potential
the addressed evaluation and certification is a technically separated process.
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Receiving State or Organization
The receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
OE.Exam_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization must examine the MRTD presented by
the traveler to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability:
- (i) Includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each
issuing State or Organization
- (ii) Implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [R2]
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
The border control officer of the receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveler as
MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of Document
Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are used. The
receiving States and Organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document
Signer Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organization ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent
eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully
established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Application note:
The figure 2.1 in [R10] supposes that the GIS and the EIS follow the order (i) running the Basic Access
Control Protocol, (ii) reading and verifying only those parts of the logical MRTD that are necessary to
know for the Chip Authentication Mechanism (i.e. Document Security Object and Chip
Authentication Public Key), (iii) running the Chip Authentication Protocol, and (iv) reading and
verifying the less-sensitive data of the logical MRTD after Chip Authentication. The supposed
sequence has the advantage that the less-sensitive data are protected by secure messaging with
cryptographic keys based on the Chip Authentication Protocol which quality is under control of the
TOE. The inspection system will prevent additionally eavesdropping to their communication with the
TOE before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
Note that reading the less sensitive data directly after Basic Access Control Mechanism is allowed
and is not assumed as threat in this ST. However, the TOE ensures that reading of sensitive data is
possible after successful Chip Authentication and Terminal Authentication Protocol only.
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OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorizes Extended Inspection Systems
by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference data of the
logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the MRTD's chip for
access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal Authentication Key and its
Inspection System Certificate.
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8 EXTENDED REQUIREMENTS
8.1 Extended family FAU_SAS - Audit data storage
8.1.1 Extended components FAU_SAS.1
Description: see [R9].
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1 The TSF shall provide [assignment: authorized users] with the capability to store
[assignment: list of audit information] in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: see [R9]
8.2 Extended family FCS_RND - Generation of random numbers
8.2.1 Extended component FCS_RND.1
Description: see [R9]
FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet
[assignment: a defined quality metric].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [R9]
Extended family FIA_API – Authentication proof of identity
Extended component FIA_API.1
Description: see [R10]
FIA_API.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FIA_API.1.1 The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to prove the identity of
the [assignment: authorized user or role].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [R10]
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8.3 Extended family FMT_LIM - Limited capabilities and availability
8.3.1 Extended component FMT_LIM.1
Description: See [R9]
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.2)
Rationale: See [R9]
8.3.2 Extended component FMT_LIM.2
Description: See [R9]
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced [assignment:
Limited capability and availability policy].
Dependencies: (FMT_LIM.1)
Rationale: See [R9]
8.4 Extended family FPT_EMS - TOE Emanation
8.4.1 Extended component FPT_EMS.1
Description: See [R9]
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment:
specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of
types of user data].
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following
interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
Dependencies: No dependencies.
Rationale: See [R9]
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9 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
9.1
Convention
The following table ’PP SFRs versus ST SFRs’ expresses the links between SFRs form PP EAC and SFRs
used in the ST (and in the specifications of the TOE). It allows ease evaluation of the ST and ease
comparison with the PP EAC.
The first column presents the sfrs with PP extension and the others columns present the same SFRs
with extra extensions.
This table presents also the “use” phase of each SFR.
For example, FAU_SAS.1 listed in the column 1 is from the PP EAC. The SFR is specified in this ST as
FAU_SAS.1.1/MP and is implemented only in phases 2 and 3, not in phase 4 (MP means in steps
Prepersonalization and personalization).
For SFR in Column generic, it means that this sfr is used in all phases (2, 3 and 4) as for example
FCS_RND.1.
CA: Chip authentication, TA: Terminal Authentication and EAC: means that the sfr is not specified to
TA neither to CA.
These details are useful for the read of functional specification as the TOE FSP uses detailed
extension. For coherency with the PP EAC, the present ST for rationales uses the first columns.
SFR family
Generic
Phases 2,3 & 4
Phases 2 & 3
Phase 4
SFR from PP EAC
FAU_SAS.1
FAU_SAS.1.1/MP
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_D
ES
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.4.1
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_
3DES
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_RSA
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1/SYM
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_
3DES
FCS_COP.1/MAC
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SFR family
Generic
Phases 2,3 & 4
Phases 2 & 3
Phase 4
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_
3DES
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_
RSA
FCS_RND.1
FCS_RND.1.1
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1.1/CA
FIA_UID.1.2/CA
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1.1/CA
FIA_UAU.1.2/CA
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_3DES
FIA_UAU.4.1/TA
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES
FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC
FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_3DES
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_3DES
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA
FIA_API.1
FIA_API.1.1/CA
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1.1/EAC
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1.1/EAC
FDP_ACF.1.2/EAC
FDP_ACF.1.3/EAC
FDP_ACF.1.4/EAC
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UCT.1.1/CA
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_UIT.1.1/CA
FDP_UIT.1.2/CA
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1.1/MP
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1.1/MP
FMT_SMR.1.2/MP
FMT_SMR.1.1/TA
FMT_SMR.1.2/TA
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.1.1
FMT_LIM.1.1/EAC
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2.1
FMT_LIM.2.1/EAC
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_DIS
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SFR family
Generic
Phases 2,3 & 4
Phases 2 & 3
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
Phase 4
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_INI
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_UP
D
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_DA
TE
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_WR
ITE
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_DATE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_RE
AD
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.3
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_RE
AD
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_REA
D
FMT_MTD.3.1/EAC
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_EMS.1.1
FPT_EMS.1.2
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_FLS.1.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST.1.1
FPT_TST.1.2
FPT_TST.1.3
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_EMS.1.1/MP
FPT_EMS.1.2/MP
FPT_EMS.1.1/CA
FPT_EMS.1.2/CA
FPT_TST.1.1/CA
FPT_TST.1.2/CA
FPT_TST.1.3/CA
FPT_TST.1.1/TA
FPT_TST.1.2/TA
FPT_TST.1.3/TA
Table 11: PP EAC SFRs versus ST SFRs details
9.2 Security Functional Requirements issued from the PP EAC
FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
FAU_SAS.1.1/MP The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the IC
Identification Data in the audit records.
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FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_3DES The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm DH compliant to PKCS#3 and specified
cryptographic key sizes 112bits that meet the following: [R34][R21], Annex A.1.
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_CKM.4.1 The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic
key destruction method zeroisation that meets the following: none.
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform cf below in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
cf below and cryptographic key sizes cf below that meet the following:
Iteration
Operation
Algo
Key Length
(bits)
Standard
Hashing
Hashing
SHA-1
SHA-1, SHA224, SHA-256
None
None
FIPS 140-2
FIPS 140-2
Encryption and
decryption
TDES CBC
mode
112
TR-03110 [R34]
Authentication
SM MAC
TDERS Retail
MAC
112
TR-03110 [R34]
Digital Signature
verification
RSA coupled
with SHA
From 1024 up
to 2048 (by
TR-03110 [R34]
step of 256
bits)
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_RSA
FCS_COP.1/SYM
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA
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FCS_RND.1 Quality metric for random numbers
FCS_RND.1.1 The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that meet (1) the
requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.976 bits in each byte, following AIS 31 [R32].
FIA Identification and Authentication
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
FIA_UID.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow
1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by the TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.1.1/CA The TSF shall allow
1. To establish the communication channel
2. To read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by the TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
3. To identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
4. To carry out the Chip Authentication Protocol
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2/CA The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any
other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
FIA_UAU.4 Single-use authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.4.1/TA The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol
FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
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1. Authentication Mechanisms based on Triple-DES
FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES The TSF shall provide
1. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
1. After run of the Chip Authentication Protocol the TOE accepts only received commands
with correct message authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with key
agreed with the terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC The TSF shall provide
1. Terminal Authentication Protocol in use phase only
2. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the Terminal Authentication
Protocol only if the terminal uses the public key presented during the Chip Authentication
Protocol and the secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_3DES The TSF shall provide
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
(GP in Perso Phase)
to support user authentication.
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_3DES The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent by the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Key.
FIA_UAU.6 Re-authenticating
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each command sent to
the TOE after successful run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent by
the GIS.
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FIA_API.1/CA Authentication Proof of Identity
FIA_API.1.1/CA The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication protocol according to [R34] to prove the
identity of the TOE.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FDP_ACC.1.1 /EAC The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining write, read
and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, and EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACF.1.1/EAC The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent
b. Extended Inspection System
c. Terminal
2. Objects:
a. Data EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
b. Data EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
c. Data in EF.COM
d. Data in EF.SOD
3. Security attributes
a. Authentication status of terminals
b. Terminal Authorization
FDP_ACF.1.2/EAC The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among
controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. The successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write and to read the
data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
2. The successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG3
(Fingerprint) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to
read the data in EF.DG3 of the logical MRTD
3. The successfully authentication Extended Inspection System with the Read access to DG4
(Iris) granted by the relative certificate holder authorization encoding is allowed to read
the data in EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
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FDP_ACF.1.3/EAC The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: none.
FDP_ACF.1.4/EAC The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following
additional rules:
1. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3
2. A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4
3. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG3
4. A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read data in the EF.DG4
5. Any terminal is not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD
6. Any terminal not being successfully authenticated as Extended Inspection System is not
allowed to read any of the EF.DG3 to EF.DG4 of the logical MRTD
FDP_UCT.1 Basic data exchange confidentiality
FDP_UCT.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit and receive user data in a
manner protected from unauthorized disclosure after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1 Data exchange integrity
FDP_UIT.1.1/CA The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to transmit and receive user data in a
manner protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors after Chip
Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2/CA The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether modification,
deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after Chip Authentication.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
FMT_SMF.1.1/MP The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions:
1. Initialization
2. Pre-personalization
3. Personalization
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FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMR.1.1/MP The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Manufacturer
2. Personalization Agent
FMT_SMR.1.2/MP The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Application Note: Here the role “Manufacturer” matches the “Prepersonalizer”, i.e. the “MRTD
manufacturer”.
FMT_SMR.1.1/TA The TSF shall maintain the roles
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority
2. Document Verifier
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System
4. Foreign Extended Inspection System
FMT_SMR.1.2/TA The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.1.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed and
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks
FMT_LIM.1.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that in
conjunction with "Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:
Sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed
FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
FMT_LIM.2.1 The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:
1. User Data to be manipulated
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2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. Software to be reconstructed and
4. Substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered which may
enable other attacks
FMT_LIM.2.1/EAC The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that in
conjunction with "Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)" the following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow:
Sensitive User Data (EF.DG3 and EF.DG4) to be disclosed.
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_ENA The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Prepersonalization Data to the Prepersonalizer.
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_DIS The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the
Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the See below to See below:
TSF Data
Authorized Identified roles
MSK
Personalization Agent keys
None
None
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_INI The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the:
1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
3. Initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_UPD The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the:
1. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key
2. Initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate
to the Country Verifying Certification Authority
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_DATE The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current date to:
1. Country Verifying Certification Authority
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2. Document Verifier
3. Domestic Extended Inspection System
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the See below to See
below:
TSF Data
Authorized Identified roles
Document Basic Access Keys
Personalization Agent
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK The TSF shall restrict the ability to create and load the Chip Authentication
Private Key to respectively the Manufacturer Agent and the Personalization Agent.
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_Key_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document Basic Access
Keys to none.
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_Key_READ The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the CAK to none.
FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
FMT_MTD.3.1/EAC [Editorially Refined] The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the
certificate chain are accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access
Control.
Refinement:
The Certificate chain is valid if and only if:
1- The digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct with the
public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of the Inspection System
Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE
2- The digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct with the
public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority and the expiration date
of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE
3- The digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority can be
verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying Certification Authority known to the
TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not
before the Current Date of the TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a valid certificate
chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the Extended Inspection System.
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The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of a valid
certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful authenticated Extended
Inspection System.
FPT_EMS.1 TOE Emanation
FPT_EMS.1.1 The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command execution
in excess of non useful information enabling access to EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG6
to EF.DG16.
FPT_EMS.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart card
circuit contacts to gain access to EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG6 to EF.DG16.
FPT_EMS.1.1/MP The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to Personalization Agent Keys and
MSK and CAK.
FPT_EMS.1.2/MP The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart card
circuit contacts to gain access to Prepersonalizer Key, Personalization Agent Keys and MSK.
FPT_EMS.1.1/CA The TOE shall not emit power variations, timing variations during command
execution in excess of non useful information enabling access to Chip Authentication: Session Keys,
Private Key (CAK)
FPT_EMS.1.2/CA The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface smart card
circuit contacts to gain access to Chip Authentication: Session Keys, Private Key (CAK).
FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur:
1. Exposure to out-of-range operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could occur
2. Failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
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FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF, at
the conditions:
- At reset
- Before any cryptographic operation
- When accessing a DG or any EF
- Prior to any use of TSF data
- Before execution of any command
FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
data.
FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of TSF
executable code.
FPT_TST.1.1/CA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
- When performing the Chip Authentication
FPT_TST.1.2/CA The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/CA The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF executable code.
FPT_TST.1.1/TA The TSF shall run a suite of self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the
TSF, at the conditions:
- When using the CVCA Root key
- When verifying a certificate with an extracted public key µ
- When performing a Terminal Authentication
FPT_TST.1.2/TA The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF data.
FPT_TST.1.3/TA The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of
TSF executable code.
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FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the TSF by
responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.
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10 TOE SUMMARY SPECIFFICATION
10.1
TOE summary specification
Access Control in reading
This function controls access to read functions and enforces the security policy for data retrieval.
Prior to any data retrieval, it authenticates the actor trying to access the data, and checks that the
access conditions are fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
It ensures that at any time, the following keys are never readable:
- BAC keys
- Chip Authentication keys,
- Personalization Agent keys
- MSK
- CVCA certificate
It controls access to the CPLC data as well:
- It ensures the CPLC data can be read during the personalization phase.
- It ensures it cannot be readable in free mode at the end of the personalization step.
Regarding the file structure:
In the operational use:
- The terminal can read user data (except DG3 & DG4), EF.SOD, EF.CVCA, EF.COM only
after BAC authentication and through a valid secure channel.
- When the EAC was successfully performed, the terminal can only read the DG3 & DG4
provided the access rights are sufficient and through a valid secure channel.
In the personalization phase
- The Personalization Agent can read all the data stored in the TOE after it is authenticated
by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
- The TOE is uniquely identified by a random number, generated at each reset. This unique
identifier is called (PUPI).
It ensures as well that no other part of the flash Memory can be accessed at anytime.
Access Control in writing
This function controls access to write functions and enforces the security policy for data writing.
Prior to any data update, it authenticates the actor, and checks that the access conditions are
fulfilled as well as the life cycle state.
This security functionality ensures the application locks can only be written in Prepersonalization and
personalization phases.
It ensures as well the writable part of CPLC data cannot be written anymore once the TOE is
personalized.
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Regarding the file structure
In the operational use:
It is not possible to create any files (system or data files). Furthermore, it is not possible to
update any system files. However:
- The application data is still accessed internally by the application for its own needs
- The root CVCA key files and temporary key files are updated internally by the application
according to the authentication mechanism described in [R16].
In the Prepersonalization and personalization phase:
- The Personalization Agent can create and write through a valid secure channel all the
data files it needs after it is authenticated by the TOE (using its authentication keys).
EAC mechanism
This security functionality ensures the EAC is correctly performed.
In particular:
- It handles the certificate verification.
- The management of access rights to DG3 & DG4.
- The management of the current date (updates and control towards the expiration date of
the incoming certificate).
- The signature verification (in the certificate or in the challenge/response mechanism)
It can only be performed once the TOE is personalized with the chip authentication keys & Root CVCA
key(s) loaded by the Personalization Agent during the Prepersonalization and personalization phase.
Furthermore, this security functionality ensures that the authentication is performed as described in
the PP [R10].
The TOE also implements countermeasures to protect the TOE; it takes more and more time for the
TOE to reply to subsequent wrong GIS authentication attempts.
Personalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Personalization Agent, demands
an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric
Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES algorithm. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging
described in the TSF Secure Messaging.
Physical protection
This security functionality protects the TOE against physical attacks.
Prepersonalization
This security functionality ensures the TOE, when delivered to the Prepersonalization Agent,
demands an authentication prior to any data exchange. This authentication is based on a symmetric
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Authentication mechanism based on a Triple DES algorithm. This function is in charge of preinitializing the product. This TSF can use a Secure Messaging described in the TSF Secure Messaging.
Safe state management
This security functionalities ensures that the TOE gets back to a secure state when
- an integrity error is detected by F.SELFTESTS
- a tearing occurs (during a copy of data in the memory)
This security functionality ensures that such a case occurs, the TOE is either switched in the state "kill
card" or becomes mute.
Secure Messaging
This security functionality ensures the confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of the channel the
TOE and the IFD are using to communicate.
After a successful BAC authentication and successful Chip Authentication, a secure channel is
established based on Triple DES algorithm.
This security functionality ensures:
- No commands were inserted, modified nor deleted within the data flow
- The data exchanged remain confidential
- The issuer of the incoming commands and the destinatory of the outgoing data is the one
that was authenticated (through BAC or EAC)
If an error occurs in the secure messaging layer, the session keys are destroyed.
This TSF also provides a GP Secure Messaging (SCP02) for the Prepersonalization or Personalization.
Self tests
The TOE performs self tests to verify the integrity on the TSF data and TSF Code:
- At reset
- Before any cryptographic operation
- When accessing a DG or any EF
- Prior to any use of TSF data
- Before execution of any command
- When performing the Chip Authentication
- When using the CVCA Root key
- When verifying a certificate with an extracted public key
When performing a Terminal Authentication
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10.2
Links between SFRs and TSF
This table explicits where PP EAC requirements are implemented.
SFR family
Generic
Phases 2 & 3
Phases 2,3 & 4
Phase 4
Implemented in SF
SFR from PP EAC
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1
FCS_CKM.4
Prepersonalization
FAU_SAS.1.1/MP
FCS_CKM.1.1/CA_DH_SM_DES
Secure Messaging
EAC mechanism
Personnalisation
FCS_CKM.4.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SHA_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SHA_RSA
FCS_COP.1/SYM
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_SYM_SM_3DES
FCS_COP.1/MAC
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_RND.1
Secure Messaging
Prepersonalization
Personnalisation
EAC mechanism
Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1.1/CA_MAC_SM_3DES
Prepersonalization
EAC mechanism
Secure Messaging
FCS_COP.1.1/TA_SIG_VER_RSA
Secure Messaging
EAC mechanism
Prepersonalization
EAC mechanism
Personalization
Secure Messaging
Self tests
FCS_RND.1.1
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SFR family
Generic
Phases 2 & 3
Phases 2,3 & 4
Phase 4
Implemented in SF
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UID.1.1/CA
FIA_UID.1.2/CA
Prepersonalization
Access Control in reading
EAC mechanism
Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1.1/CA
FIA_UAU.1.2/CA
Access Control in reading
EAC mechanism
Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.4.1/TA
Access Control in reading
EAC mechanism
Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.5.1/CA_3DES
FIA_UAU.5.2/CA_3DES
FIA_UAU.5.1/EAC
FIA_UAU.5.2/EAC
FIA_UAU.5.1/MP_3DES
FIA_UAU.5.2/MP_3DES
Access Control in reading
EAC mechanism
Secure Messaging
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UAU.6.1/CA
Access Control in reading
EAC mechanism
Secure Messaging
FIA_API.1
FIA_API.1.1/CA
EAC mechanism
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACC.1.1/EAC
Access Control in reading
Access Control in writing
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_ACF.1.1/EAC
FDP_ACF.1.2/EAC
FDP_ACF.1.3/EAC
FDP_ACF.1.4/EAC
Access Control in reading
EAC mechanism
FDP_UCT.1
FDP_UCT.1.1/CA
Access Control in reading
EAC mechanism
FDP_UIT.1
FDP_UIT.1.1/CA
FDP_UIT.1.2/CA
Access Control in reading
EAC mechanism
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.4.1/MP_3DES
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SFR family
Generic
Phases 2 & 3
Phases 2,3 & 4
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMF.1.1/MP
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1.1/MP
FMT_SMR.1.2/MP
Phase 4
Implemented in SF
Prepersonalization
Personalization
Access Control in writing
Safe state management
FMT_SMR.1.1/TA
FMT_SMR.1.2/TA
Safe state management
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.1.1
FMT_LIM.1.1/EAC
Safe state management
Physical protection
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_LIM.2.1
FMT_LIM.2.1/EAC
Safe state management
Physical protection
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UP
D
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_DA
TE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRI
TE
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_REA
D
FMT_MTD.1.1/MP_KEY_RE
AD
FMT_MTD.3
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_EMS.1.1
FPT_EMS.1.2
FPT_EMS.1.1/MP
FPT_EMS.1.2/MP
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Access Control in writing
Personalization
Access Control in reading
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_INI
Access Control in writing
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_UPD
Access Control in writing
EAC mechanism
FMT_MTD.1.1/TA_CVCA_DATE
Access Control in writing
EAC mechanism
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_WRITE
Access Control in writing
FMT_MTD.1.1/CAPK
Access Control in writing
FMT_MTD.1.1/BAC_KEY_READ
FMT_MTD.1.1/CA_KEY_READ
Access Control in reading
FMT_MTD.3.1/EAC
Access Control in reading
EAC mechanism
FPT_EMS.1.1/CA
FPT_EMS.1.2/CA
Prepersonalization
EAC mechanism
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SFR family
FPT_FLS.1
Generic
Phases 2 & 3
Phases 2,3 & 4
Phase 4
Safe state management
FPT_FLS.1.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_TST.1.1
FPT_TST.1.2
FPT_TST.1.3
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_PHP.3
Implemented in SF
FPT_TST.1.1/CA
FPT_TST.1.2/CA
FPT_TST.1.3/CA
FPT_TST.1.1/TA
FPT_TST.1.2/TA
FPT_TST.1.3/TA
Self tests
Physical protection
Table 12 - Links between SFR and TSF
Application NOTE: the ADV_FSP and ATE documents explicit more precisely how to get the links between SFR and Oberthur Technologies specifications.
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11 RATIONALES
The rationales are available in the complete ST.
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Appendix A: Glossary
Acronym
AA
BAC
CC
CPLC
DF
DFA
DG
EAL
EF
EFID
DES
DH
I/0
IC
ICAO
ICC
IFD
LDS
MF
MRTD
MRZ
MSK
OCR
OS
PKI
PP
SFI
SHA
SOD
TOE
TSF
Definition
Active Authentication
Basic Access Control
Common Criteria Version 3.1 revision 4
Card personalization life cycle
Dedicated File
Differential Fault Analysis
Data Group
Evaluation Assurance Level
Elementary File
File Identifier
Digital encryption standard
Diffie Hellmann
Input/Output
Integrated Circuit
International Civil Aviation organization
Integrated Circuit Card
Interface device
Logical Data structure
Master File
Machine readable Travel Document
Machine readable Zone
Manufacturer Secret Key
Optical Character Recognition
Operating System
Public Key Infrastructure
Protection Profile
Short File identifier
Secure hashing Algorithm
Security object Data
Target of Evaluation
TOE Security fonction
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