Security Target: 0384b

Security Target: 0384b
Security Target lite Machine Readable Travel Document
with ICAO Application and Basic Access Control
MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO / P5CD072V0Q
MaskTech GmbH
Document number: BSI-DSZ-CC-0384, ST-lite, Version 1.0
Created by: Matthias Brüstle
Date: 2006-10-27
Signature:
Released by Management
Date:
Signature:
Change history
Version Date
1.0
2006-10-27
Reason
First Version of ST-liste based on ST
Remarks
Table of Content
1Introduction..........................................................................................................6
1.1ST identification..................................................................................................6
1.2ST Overview.......................................................................................................6
1.3CC Conformance................................................................................................6
2TOE Description...................................................................................................7
2.1System Type.......................................................................................................7
2.1.1Machine Readable Travel Documents................................................7
2.1.2Use of TOE........................................................................................10
2.2Limits of the TOE..............................................................................................10
2.2.1Architecture........................................................................................11
3Security Environment........................................................................................11
3.1Introduction.......................................................................................................11
3.2Assumptions.....................................................................................................13
3.3Threats..............................................................................................................13
3.4Organisational Security Policies.......................................................................15
4Security Objectives...........................................................................................16
4.1Security Objectives for the TOE.......................................................................16
4.2Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment. . .18
4.3Security Objectives for the Operational Environment......................................19
5Security Requirements.....................................................................................20
5.1Security Functional Requirements for the TOE...............................................20
5.1.1Class FAU Security Audit..................................................................20
5.1.2Class Cryptographic Support (FCS).................................................20
5.1.1.1Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1).......................21
5.1.1.2Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)...............22
5.1.2Class FIA Identification and Authentication.......................................23
5.1.3Class FDP User Data Protection.......................................................26
5.1.3.1Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)..........................26
5.1.3.2Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1) 26
5.1.3.3Inter-TSF-Transfer........................................................28
5.1.4Class FMT Security Management.....................................................29
5.1.5Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions...............................32
5.2Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE...............................................34
5.3Security Requirements for the IT environment................................................34
5.3.1Passive Authentication......................................................................35
5.3.2Basic Inspection Systems.................................................................35
5.3.3Personalization Terminals.................................................................39
6TOE Summary Specification............................................................................39
6.1TOE Security Functions....................................................................................39
6.1.1TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC)....................................40
6.1.1.1F.RNG – Random Number Generator.........................40
6.1.1.2F.HW_DES – Triple-DES Co-processor.......................40
6.1.1.3F.OPC – Control of Operating Conditions....................41
6.1.1.4F.PHY – Protection against Physical Manipulation......42
6.1.1.5F.LOG – Logical Protection..........................................42
6.1.1.6F.COMP – Protection of Mode Control........................42
6.1.2TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES).................44
6.1.2.1F.Access_Control.........................................................44
6.1.2.2F.Deactivate_Non_TSF................................................44
6.1.2.3F.Identification_Authentication.....................................44
6.1.2.4F.Initialization_Prepersonalization................................45
6.1.2.5F.Personalization..........................................................45
6.1.2.6F.Retry_Counter...........................................................45
6.1.2.7F.Secure_Messaging....................................................45
6.1.2.8F.Verification.................................................................45
6.2Assurance Measures........................................................................................45
7PP Claims...........................................................................................................46
7.1PP Reference...................................................................................................46
7.2PP Refinements................................................................................................47
7.3PP Additions......................................................................................................47
8Rationale.............................................................................................................47
8.1Security Objectives Rationale..........................................................................47
8.2Security Requirements Rationale.....................................................................49
8.2.1Security Functional Requirements Rationale....................................49
8.2.2TOE Summary Specification Rationale.............................................54
8.2.3Strength of Function Level Rationale................................................58
9Glossary and Acronyms...................................................................................58
10Literature..........................................................................................................63
ST-lite — Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application (MRTD-ST)
1
Introduction
1.1
ST identification
Title:
Security Target lite — Machine Readable Travel Document with
ICAO Application and Basic Access Control (MRTD-ST)
Version:
1.0, 2006-10-27
Editors:
Matthias Brüstle, MaskTech GmbH
Compliant to:
Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine Readable Travel
Document with ''ICAO Application'', Basic Access Control, version
1.0, BSI-PP-0017
CC Version:
2.3
Assurance Level: The assurance level for this ST is EAL4 augmented.
General Status: Submitted for evaluation
Hardware:
Philips P5CD072V0Q
TOE version:
MTCOS Pro 2.0 ICAO
Keywords:
ICAO, machine readable travel document
1.2
ST Overview
1
The aim of this document is to describe the Security Target for the Machine Readable
Travel Document (MRTD) chip with the ICAO Application and Basic Access Control on
the MaskTech MTCOS Standard operating system.
2
The Security Target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless
chip based on the requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods Basic Access Control
in the Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.
3
MTCOS Standard is a fully interoperable multi-application smart card operating system
compliant to ISO/IEC 7816. It provides secret key cryptography and supports also other
applications like e-purses, health insurance cards and access control.
4
The operating system software is implemented on the Philips P5CD072V0Q secure
dual-interface controller, which is certified according to CC EAL5 augmented. This
means, that the TOE consists of software and hardware.
5
The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL4 augmented.
6
The minimum strength level (SOF) for the TOE security functions is high.
1.3
7
CC Conformance
This security target claims conformance to
-
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1:
Introduction and general model, August 2005, version 2.3, CCMB-2005-08-001
-
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
function requirements, August 2005, version 2.3, CCMB-2005-08-002
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-
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance requirements, August 2005, version 2.3, CCMB-2005-08-001
as follows
2
-
Part 2 extended,
-
Part 3 conformant,
-
Package conformant to EAL4 augmented with ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2.
TOE Description
2.1
System Type
2.1.1
Machine Readable Travel Documents
8
(This description is taken from the corresponding Protection Profile [16] and should be
used as a general introduction to MRTDs.)
9
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine
readable travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data
Structure (LDS) [6] and providing the Basic Access Control according to the ICAO
document [7].
10 The TOE comprises of
- the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the
contactless interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors,
- the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC
Dedicated Support Software,
- the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
- the MRTD application and
- the associated guidance documentation.
TOE usage and security features for operational use
11 State or organisation issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel. The
traveller presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The
MRTD in context of this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical
data and portrait of the holder, (ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and
machine reading using OCR methods in the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data
elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS for contactless machine reading. The
authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession of a valid MRTD
personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical data
page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State
or Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving
State trust a genuine MRTD of a issuing State or Organization.
12 For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
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(a)
the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It
presents visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the
MRTD holder
(1)
the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport
book,
(2)
the printed data in the Machine-Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3)
the printed portrait.
(b)
the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical
Data Structure [6] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It
presents over the logical interface of APDUs contactless readable data
including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1)
the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, DG1),
(2)
the digitized portraits (DG2),
(3)
the optional biometric reference data of finger(s) (DG3) or iris image(s)
(DG4) or both
(4)
the other data according to LDS (DG5 to DG16) and
(5)
the Document security object.
13 The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain
the authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and its data. The MRTD as the passport book
and the MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
14 The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on
paper, security printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and
organisational security measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures)
[8]. These security measures include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport
book.
15 The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created
by the document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security
features of the MRTD’s chip.
16 The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the
optional advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active
Authentication of the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption
of additional biometrics as optional security measure in the ICAO Technical report [7].
The Passive Authentication Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed
completely and independently on the TOE by the TOE environment.
17 This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by writeonly-once access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic
Access Control Mechanism. This security target does not address the Active
Authentication and the Extended Access Control as optional security mechanisms.
18 The Basic Access Control is a security feature which shall be mandatory supported by
the TOE but may be disabled by the Issuing State or Organization. The inspection
system (i) reads the printed data in the MRZ, (ii) authenticates themselves as inspection
system by means of keys derived from MRZ data. After successful authentication of the
inspection system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means
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of private communication (secure messaging) with this inspection system [7], Annex E,
and [6].
TOE life cycle
19 The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases similar to the PP.
The phase 2 is split into multiple steps.
Phase 1 “Development”
20 The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the
IC Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE
components.
21 The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and
the guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and
develops the IC Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the
guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
22 The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the
Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is securely
delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile
programmable memories, the MRTD application and the guidance documentation is
securely delivered to the MRTD manufacturer.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
23 In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip
Dedicated Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the nonvolatile non-programmable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC
Identification Data onto the chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC
manufacturing and the delivery process to the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely
delivered from the IC manufacture to the MRTD manufacturer.
24 The MRTD manufacturer (i) adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the nonvolatile programmable memories (for instance EEPROM) if necessary, (ii) creates the
MRTD application, and (iii) equips MRTD’s chip with Pre-personalization Data and (iv)
packs the IC with hardware for the contactless interface in the passport book.
25 The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the
MRTD manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also
provides the relevant parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
26 For easier handling this phase is split into:
a) IC manufacturing: Manufacturing of the chip incl. Identification Data by the IC
manufacturer.
b) Initialization: The MRTD manufacturer configures the TOE like in a software
installation procedure.
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c) Pre-personalization: The MRTD manufacturer prepares the TOE for the
personalization, e.g. creation of data files.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
27 The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder
biographical data, (ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e.
the digitized portraits and the optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the
visual readable data onto the physical MRTD, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and
TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) the writing the TSF Data into the logical MRTD
and configuration of the TSF if necessary. The step (iv) is performed by the
Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation of (i) the digital MRZ
data (DG1), (ii) the digitised portrait (DG2), and (iii) the Document security object.
28 The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [7] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD
(together with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the
MRTD holder for operational use.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
29 The term “Operational Use” is not used here and afterwards in the sense of the
Common Criteria, but just to describe that here the MRTD is really used by the enduser.
30 The TOE is used as MRTD’s chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the
“Operational Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of
the Issuing State or Organization and used according to the security policy of the
Issuing State but they can never be modified.
2.1.2
Use of TOE
31 The TOE is implemented as a smart card IC, which supports the communication via a
contactless interface according to ISO/IEC 14443. It is based on ISO/IEC 7816
commands and is intended to be used inside a MRTD as storage of the digital data and
supports Basic Access Control.
32 Because of the support of ISO/IEC 7816 the TOE can be also used as multi-application
smart card with applications of health care, e-purse or loyalty.
2.2
2.2.1
Limits of the TOE
Architecture
33 The TOE is an RFID device according to ICAO technical reports [6] and [7] supporting
Basic Access Control. It is implemented as an embedded software on a smart card chip,
in this case the CC EAL 5+ certified Philips P5CD072V0Q. The TOE is the MTCOS
Standard smart card operating system stored in the ROM of the IC, the file system
including application data, any configurable and non-volatile parameters and perhaps
parts of the operating system stored in EEPROM and the IC itself.
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34 The TOE provides following services for MRTDs:
1. Storage of the MRTD data, e.g. data groups and signature.
2. Organization of the data in a file system as dedicated and elementary files.
3. Mutual Authenticate and secure messaging as specified in TrPKI [7] for Basic
Access Control.
4. Contactless communication according to ISO/IEC 14443.
5. Protection of data against modification.
6. Protection of the privacy of the passport holder with functions like random UID and
Basic Access Control.
35 The TOE life cycle is as defined in the preceding subsection with the addition, that the
operating system distinguishes in phase 2 between initialization mode and operational
mode. In initialization mode the operating system can be configured with secure
messaging protected commands. In this phase also the file system is created. The prepersonalization is done in phase 2 after switching the OS to operational mode. The
operating system is in the operational mode until end of life.
3
3.1
Security Environment
Introduction
Assets
36 The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
37 Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the data groups DG1 to DG16 and the Document
security object according to LDS [6]. These data are user data of the TOE. The data
groups DG1 to DG14 and DG 16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Active
Authentication Public Key Info in DG 15 is used by the inspection system for Active
Authentication of the chip. The Document security object is used by the inspection
system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
38 An additional asset is the following more general one.
39 Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization
for the MRTD’s holder is used by the traveller to authenticate himself as possessing a
genuine MRTD.
Subjects
40 This security target considers the following subjects:
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41 Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default
user of the TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish
between the users IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role
Manufacturer.
42 MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalised
the MRTD.
43 Traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the
MRTD holder.
44 Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on the behalf of the issuing State or Organisation to personalize the
MRTD for the holder by some or all of the following activities (i) establishing the identity
the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data
of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris
image(s) (iii) writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as
defined for global, international and national interoperability and (iv) signing the
Document Security Object defined in [6].
45 Inspection system
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the
traveller as MRTD holder. The Primary Inspection System (PIS) (i) contains a terminal
for the contactless communication with the MRTD’s chip and (ii) does not implement the
terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism. The Primary Inspection System
can read the logical MRTD only if the Basic Access Control is disabled. The Basic
Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless communication with
the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access Control
Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic
Access Control by optical reading the printed data in the MRZ or other parts of the
passport book providing this information. The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in
addition to the Basic Inspection System (i) implements the Active Authentication
Mechanism, (ii) supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism and (iii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization to
read the optional biometric reference data.
46 Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
47 Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement the MRTD’s chip remotely
(i.e. without knowing or reading the printed MRZ data), (ii) to read or to manipulate the
logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
3.2
Assumptions
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48 The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will
be used or is intended to be used.
49 A.Pers_Agent
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect
to the MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Active
Authentication Public Key Info (DG15) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the
Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if stored on the MRTD’s chip). The
Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The Personalization Agent
bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to the TOE by
symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
50 A.Insp_Sys
Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii)
verifying the traveller as MRTD holder. The Primary Inspection System for global
interoperability contains the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer
Public Key of each issuing State or Organization [7]. The Primary Inspection System
performs the Passive Authentication to verify the logical MRTD if the logical MRTD is
not protected by Basic Access Control. The Basic Inspection System in addition to the
Primary Inspection System implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control
and reads the logical MRTD being under Basic access Control.
3.3
Threats
51 This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in
collaboration with its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use
in the operational environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
52 The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified
below.
53 T.Chip_ID
Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the
MRTD’s chip by establishing or listening a communication through the contactless
communication interface. The attacker can not read and does not know in advance the
MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page.
54 T.Skimming Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
the contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker can not read and
does not know in advance the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page.
55 T.Eavesdropping Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system
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An attacker is listening to the communication between the MRTD’s chip and an
inspection system to gain the logical MRTD or parts of it. The inspection system uses
the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page but the attacker does not know this data
in advance.
Note in case of T.Skimming the attacker is establishing a communication with the
MRTD’s chip not knowing the MRZ data printed on the MRTD data page and without a
help of the inspection system which knows these data. In case of T.Eavesdropping the
attacker uses the communication of the inspection system.
56 T.Forgery
Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it
including its security related data in order to impose on an inspection system by means
of the changed MRTD holders identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may
alter the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the
printed MRZ and in the digital MRZ to claim an other identity of the traveller. The
attacker may alter the printed portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual
inspection of the inspection officer and the automated biometric authentication
mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter the biometric reference data to
defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the inspection system. The
attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTD’s to create a new forged
MRTD, e.g. the attacker write the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference
data of finger read from the logical MRTD of a traveller into an other MTRD’s chip
leaving their digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The
attacker may also copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD in an other contactless
chip.
57 The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.
58 T.Abuse-Func
Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational
phase in order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass,
deactivate or change) security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to
manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the
personalization in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
59 T.Information_Leakage
Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in
order to disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the
normal operation or caused by the attacker.
60 Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics, clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage
may be interpreted as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to
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measurement of operating parameters, which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface (emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to
the chip still available even for a contactless chip) and can then be related to the specific
operation being performed. Examples are the Differential Electromagnetic Analysis
(DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Moreover the attacker may try
actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g. Differential Fault Analysis).
61 T.Phys-Tamper
Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose
TSF Data, or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An
attacker may physically modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features
or functions of the MRTD’s chip, (ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software, (iii) to modify User Data or (iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the discloser or manipulation of
TOE User Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF
Data (e.g. authentication key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the
TOE to following attack methods by modification of security features (e.g. to enable
information leakage through power analysis). Physical tampering requires direct
interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used. Before that hardware
security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified. Determination of
software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a prerequisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function.
Changes of circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
62 T.MalfunctionMalfunction due to Environmental Stress
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded
Software by applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security
features or functions of the TOE or (ii) circumvent or deactivate or modify security
functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating
conditions, exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misuse of
administration function. To exploit this an attacker needs information about the
functional operation.
3.4
Organisational Security Policies
63 The TOE shall comply to the following organisation security policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its
operations (see CC part 1, sec. 3.2).
64 P.Manufact
Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the security of
the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2
Manufacturing. The Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the
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IC uniquely. The MRTD Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which
contains at least the Personalization Agent Key.
65 P.Personalization Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data,
the printed portrait and the digitised portrait, the biometric reference data and other
data of the logical MRTD with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the
MRTD for the holder is performed by authorized agents of the issuing State or
Organization only.
66 P.Personal_Data
Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the
MRTD’s chip (DG1), the printed portrait and the digitised portrait (DG2), the biometric
reference data of finger(s) (DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (DG4)
and data according to LDS (DG5 to DG14, DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are
personal data of the MRTD holder. These data groups are intended to be used only
with agreement of the MRTD holder by inspection systems to which the MRTD is
presented. The MRTD’s chip shall provide the possibility for the Basic Access Control
to allow read access to these data only for terminals successfully authenticated based
on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Keys as defined in [7]. The issuing State
or Organization decides (i) to enable the Basic Access Control for the protection of the
MRTD holder personal data or (ii) to disable the Basic Access Control to allow Primary
Inspection Systems of the receiving States and all other terminals to read the logical
MRTD.
4
Security Objectives
67 This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for
the TOE environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated
into security objectives for the development and production environment and security
objectives for the operational environment.
4.1
Security Objectives for the TOE
68 This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of
identified threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be
met by the TOE.
69 OT.AC_Pers Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16, the Document
security object according to LDS [6] and the TSF data can be written by authorized
Personalization Agents. The logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16 and the TSF
data can be written only once and can not be changed after personalization. The
Document security object can be updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data
in the data groups DG 3 to DG16 are added. Only the Personalization Agent shall be
allowed to enable or to disable the TSF Basic Access Control.
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70 OT.Data_Int Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip
against physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. If the TOE is configured for the
use with Basic Inspection Terminals only the TOE must ensure that the inspection
system is able to detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD data.
71 OT.Data_Conf
Confidentiality of personal data
If the TOE is configured for the use with Basic Inspection Systems the TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16 by granting
read access to terminals successfully authenticated by (i) as Personalization Agent or
as (ii) Basic Inspection System. The Basic Inspection System shall authenticate
themselves by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the
Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical
MRTD data during their transmission to the Basic Inspection System.
If the TOE is configured for the use with Primary Inspection Systems no protection in
confidentiality of the logical MRTD is required.
72 OT.Identification
Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification Data in its non-volatile memory.
The IC Identification Data must provide an unique identification of the IC during Phase
2 “Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. If the TOE is configured
for use with Basic Inspection Terminals only in Phase 4 “Operational Use” the TOE
shall identify themselves only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or
Personalization Agent.
73 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE
Delivery can be abused in order (i) to disclose critical User Data, (ii) to manipulate
critical User Data of the Smartcard Embedded Software, (iii) to manipulate Soft-coded
Smartcard Embedded Software or (iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security
features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the
Test Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified
here.
74 The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s
chip independent on the TOE environment.
75 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored
and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip
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-
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines and
-
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
-
by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
76 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the
TSF Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against
attacks with high attack potential by means of
-
measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips
surface except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage
and current) or
-
measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction
between charges (using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure
analysis)
-
manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
-
controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
with a prior
-
reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
77 OT.Prot_Malfunction Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation
outside the normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not
been proven or tested. This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may
include external energy (esp. electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock
frequency, or temperature.
4.2
Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment
78 OD.Assurance
Assurance
Manufacturing Environment
Security
Measures
in
Development
and
The developer and manufacturer ensure that the TOE is designed and fabricated so
that it requires a combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be
able to derive detailed design information or other information which could be used to
compromise security through attack. This includes the use of the Initialization Data for
unique identification of the TOE and the pre-personalization of the TOE including the
writing of the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s). The developer provides
necessary evaluation evidence that the TOE fulfils its security objectives and is
resistant against obvious penetration attacks with low attack potential and against
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direct attacks with high attack potential against security function that uses probabilistic
or permutational mechanisms.
79 OD.Material Control over MRTD Material
The IC Manufacturer, the MRTD Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent must
control all materials, equipment and information to produce, to initialise, to prepersonalize genuine MRTD materials and to personalize authentic MRTD in order to
prevent counterfeit of MRTD using MRTD materials.
4.3
Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
80 The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the
TOE environment.
81 OE.Personalization Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting
on the behalf of the issuing State or Organisation (i) establish the correct identity of the
holder and create biographic data for the MRTD, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data
of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded
iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the MRTD for the holder together with the defined
physical and logical security measures (including the digital signature in the Document
Security Object). The Personalization Agents enable or disable the Basic Access
Control function of the TOE according to the decision of the issuing State or
Organization. If the Basic Access Control function is enabled the Personalization
Agents generate the Document Basic Access Keys and store them in the MRTD’s chip.
82 OE.Pass_Auth_SignAuthentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The Issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country
Signing Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing Private Key and sign
Document Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute
the Certificate of the Country Signing Public Key to receiving States and organizations
maintaining its authenticity and integrity. The Issuing State or organization must (i)
generate a cryptographic secure Document Signing Key Pair and ensure the secrecy
of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii) sign Document Security Objects of genuine
MRTD in a secure operational environment only and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the
Document Signing Public Key to receiving States and organizations. The digital
signature in the Document Security Object include all data in the data groups DG1 to
DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [6].
Receiving State or organization
83 The Receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of
the TOE environment.
84 OE.Exam_MRTD
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The inspection system of the Receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by
the traveller to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to
detect any manipulation of the physical MRTD.
85 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the Receiving State uses the inspection system to verify
the traveller as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified
the signature of Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the
logical MRTD before they are used. The receiving States and organizations must
manage the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signing Public Key
maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection systems.
86 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD Protection of data of the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State ensures the confidentiality and integrity of
the data read from the logical MRTD. The receiving State examining the logical MRTD
being under Basic Access Control will use inspection systems which implement the
terminal part of the Basic Access Control and use the secure messaging with fresh
generated keys for the protection of the transmitted data (i.e. Basic Inspection
Systems). The receiving State examining the logical MRTD with Primary Inspection
Systems will prevent eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and
inspection system.
MRTD Holder
87 OE.Secure_Handling Secure handling of the MRTD by MRTD holder
The holder of a MRTD configured for use with Primary Inspection Systems (i.e. MTRD
with disabled Basic Access Control) will prevent unauthorized communication of the
MRTD’s chip with terminals through the contactless interface.
5
Security Requirements
All SFRs contained in the PP are included in this ST. Refinements of the PP SFRs are
marked by double underlining.
5.1
Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
88 This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section
following the main security functionality.
5.1.1
Class FAU Security Audit
89 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
90 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to
store the IC Identification Data in the audit records.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.2
Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
91 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic key generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by
the TOE.
92 FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document
Basic Access Keys by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
BAC_MRTD
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic
Access Key Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key
sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [7], Annex E.
Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
93 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
94 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion
of key value that meets the following: FIPS PUB 140-2 [11].
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.1.1 Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
95 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the TOE.
96 FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by
MRTD
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_MRTD
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes
none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
97 FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple
DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
TDES_MRTD
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [12] and [7]; Annex E.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
98 FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC_MRTD
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm Retail MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES,
Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2).
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
5.1.1.2 Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
99 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
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100 FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1/
MRTD
101 Dependencies:
5.1.2
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers
that meet the requirement to provide an entropy of at least 7.95 bit
in each byte.
No dependencies.
Class FIA Identification and Authentication
Name
SFR for the TOE
SFR for the
TOE
environment
(terminal)
FIA_UAU.4/BAC_T,
FIA_UAU.6/T
Basic Access FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
Control
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
Authentication
Mechanism
Symmetric
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
FIA_API.1/PT
Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization Agents
Table 1: Overview on authentication SFR
Algorithms and key sizes
according to [7], Annex E,
and [17]
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys,
Retail-MAC, 112 bit keys
Triple-DES with 112 bit
keys
102 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
103 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UID.1.1
The TSF shall allow
(1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the ATS in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
(3) to read the ATS if the TOE is configured for use with Basic
Inspection Systems only in Phase 4 “Operational Use”,
(4) to read the logical MRTD if the TOE is configured for use
with Primary Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational
Use”
FIA_UID.1.2
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on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
identified.
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of
that user.
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Dependencies: No dependencies.
104 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
105 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.1.1
The TSF shall allow
(1) to read the Initialization Data in Phase 2 “Manufacturing”,
(2) to read the ATS in Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”,
(3) to read the ATS if the TOE is configured for use with Basic
Inspection Systems only in Phase 4 “Operational Use”,
(4) to read the logical MRTD if the TOE is configured for use with
Primary Inspection System in Phase 4 “Operational Use”
FIA_UAU.1.2
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is
authenticated.
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated
before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
106 The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
107 FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication
authentication of the Terminal by the TOE
mechanisms
-
Single-use
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
108 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
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109 FIA_UAU.5 Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.5.1
The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
2. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
FIA_UAU.5.2
to support user authentication.
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according
to the following rules:
1. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as
Personalization Agent by one of the following mechanisms
(a) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
the Personalization Agent Keys,
(b) the Symmetric Authentication
Personalization Agent Key
Mechanism
with
the
2. the TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic
Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access
Keys .
Dependencies: No dependencies.
110 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
111 FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions each
command sent to TOE after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.1.3
Class FDP User Data Protection
5.1.3.1 Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)
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112 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The instantiations of FDP_ACC.1 are caused by the
TSF management according to FMT_MOF.1.
113 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Primary Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
PRIM
The TSF shall enforce the Primary Access Control SFP on
terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data
groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
114 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control – Basic Access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACC.1.1/
BASIC
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP on
terminals gaining write, read and modification access to data
groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
5.1.3.2 Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)
115 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control
(FDP_ACF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The instantiations of
FDP_ACC.1 address different SFP.
116 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control – Primary Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1/
PRIM
The TSF shall enforce the Primary Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Terminals,
2. Objects: data in the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD,
3. security attributes
a. configuration of the TOE according to FMT_MOF.1
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FDP_ACF.1.2/
PRIM
b. authentication status of terminals.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: in the TOE configuration for use with Primary Inspection
Systems
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is
allowed to write the data of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of
the logical MRTD,
FDP_ACF.1.3/
PRIM
FDP_ACF.1.4/
PRIM
2. the Terminals are allowed to read the data of the groups DG1
to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the rule: the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the
data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
117 FDP_ACF.1/Basic Security attribute based access control – Basic Access Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1/
BASIC
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to objects
based on the following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Terminal,
2. Objects: data in the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD
3. Security attributes
a. configuration of the TOE according to FMT_MOF.1
FDP_ACF.1.2/
BASIC
b. authentication status of terminals.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an
operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is
allowed: in the TOE configuration for use with Basic Inspection
Systems only
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is
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allowed to write and to read the data of the data groups DG1
to DG16 of the logical MRTD,
FDP_ACF.1.3/
BASIC
FDP_ACF.1.4/
BASIC
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is
allowed to read data of the groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD.
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects
based on the following additional rules: none.
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based
on the rule: the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the
data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
5.1.3.3 Inter-TSF-Transfer
118 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
119 FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive objects in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure.
Dependencies: FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
120 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
121 FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/
MRTD
FDP_UIT.1.2/
MRTD
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The TSF shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to be able to
transmit and receive user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred.
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Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
5.1.4
Class FMT Security Management
122 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of functions in TSF (FMT_MOF.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
123 FMT_MOF.1 Management of functions in TSF
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MOF.1.1
The TSF shall restrict the ability to enable and disable the functions
TSF Basic Access Control to Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
124 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions
(FMT_SMF.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
125 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
a) Initialization,
b) Personalization
c) Configuration.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
126 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
127 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1
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The TSF shall maintain the roles
1.
Manufacturer,
2.
Personalization Agent,
3.
Primary Inspection System,
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FMT_SMR.1.2
4.
Basic Inspection System.
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
128 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
129 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so
that in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
130 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
131 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to: No other components.
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FMT_LIM.2.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so
that in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1. User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2. TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3. software to be reconstructed and
4. substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks.
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
132 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management
functions and different TSF data.
133 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and
Pre-personalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
134 FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to
the Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
135 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_WRITE
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The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic
Access Keys to the Personalization Agent.
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Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
136 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
KEY_READ
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the Document Basic
Access Keys and Personalization Agent Keys to none.
Dependencies: FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
5.1.5
Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
137 The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and
TSF Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent
leakage. With respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination
with the security functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to
physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the other. The SFR “Non-bypassability of the TSP
(FPT_RVM.1)” and “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” together with “Limited
capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to
physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” prevent bypassing, deactivation and manipulation of the
security features or misuse of TOE functions.
138 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset information flow control (FDP_IFC.1)” as
specified below:
FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit information about IC power consumption
and command execution time in excess of non-useful information
enabling access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and
none.
FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure any unauthorized users are unable to use the
following interface smart card circuit contacts to gain access to
Personalization Agent Authentication Key and none.
Dependencies: No other components.
139 The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced
illicit information leakage including physical manipulation.
140 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state
(FPT_FLS.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
141 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
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Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
(1) exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction
could occur,
(2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
Dependencies: ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
142 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
143 FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_TST.1.1
FPT_TST.1.2
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [selection: during initial
start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of
the authorised user, at the conditions ][assignment: conditions
under which self test should occur] to demonstrate the correct
operation of the TSF.
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of TSF data.
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to
verify the integrity of stored TSF executable code.
Dependencies: FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing.
144 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
145 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_PHP.3.1
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
146 The following security functional requirements protect the TSF against bypassing. and
support the separation of TOE parts.
147 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
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148 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RVM.1.1
The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked
and succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to
proceed.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
149 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
150 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_SEP.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that
protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2
The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of
subjects in the TSC.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
5.2
Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
151 The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are
those taken from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)
and augmented by taking the following components:
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2.
152 The minimum strength of function is SOF-high.
153 This security target does not contain any security functional requirement for which an
explicit stated strength of function claim is required.
5.3
Security Requirements for the IT environment
154 This section describes the security functional requirements for the IT environment using
the CC part 2 components.
155 Due to CCIMB Final Interpretation #58 these components are editorial changed to
express the security requirements for the components in the IT environment where the
original components are directed for TOE security functions. The editorial changes are
indicated in bold.
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5.3.1
Passive Authentication
156 The ICAO, the Issuing States or Organizations and the Receiving States or Organization
run a public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication. This public key
infrastructure distributes and protects the Country Signing CA Keys and the Document
Signing Keys to support the signing of the User Data (DG1 to DG16) by means of the
Document Security Object. The Technical Report [7] describes the requirements to the
public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication.
157 The Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement
“Basic data authentication (FDP_DAU.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
158 FDP_DAU.1/DS Basic data authentication – Passive Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_DAU.1.1/
DS
FDP_DAU.1.2/
DS
The Document Signer shall provide a capability to generate
evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of logical
the MRTD (DG1 to DG16) and the Document Security Object.
The Document Signer shall provide Inspection Systems of
Receiving States or Organization with the ability to verify evidence
of the validity of the indicated information.
Dependencies: No dependencies
5.3.2
Basic Inspection Systems
159 This section describes common security functional requirements to the Basic Inspection
Systems and the Personalization Agent if it uses the Basic Access Control Mechanism
with the Personalization Agent Authentication Keys. Both are called “Basic Terminals”
(BT) in this section.
160 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
161 FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document
Basic Access Keys by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
BAC_BT
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The Basic Terminal shall generate cryptographic keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm and
specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following:
[7], Annex E.
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Dependencies: [FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
162 FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction - BT
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/BT The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion
of key value that meets the following: FIPS PUB 140-2 [11].
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
163 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different
cryptographic algorithms to be implemented by the Basic Terminal.
164 FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by the Basic
Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform hashing in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithms SHA-1 and cryptographic key
sizes none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2.
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
165 FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure Messaging Encryption /
Decryption by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
ENC_BT
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The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging –
encryption and decryption in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode and
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: FIPS 463, ISO 11568-2, ISO 9797-1 (padding mode 2).
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Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
166 FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure messaging Message
Authentication Code by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC_BT
The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm Retail-MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: FIPS 46-3, ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3,
block cipher DES, zero IV 8 bytes, padding mode 2).
Dependencies: [FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
167 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
168 FCS_RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_RND.1.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall provide a mechanism to generate
random numbers that meets the requirement to provide an
entropy of at least 7.95 bit in each byte.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
169 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication
mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
170 FIA_UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms – Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall prevent reuse of authentication data
related to Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
171 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Re-authentication (FIA_UAU.6)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
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172 FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall re-authenticate the user under the
conditions each command sent to TOE after successful
authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
173 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
174 FDP_UCT.1/BT Basic data exchange confidentiality - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/BT The Basic Terminal shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP to
be able to transmit and receive objects in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure.
Dependencies: FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
175 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
176 FDP_UIT.1/BT Data exchange integrity - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/BT
FDP_UIT.1.2/BT
The Basic Terminal shall enforce the Basic Access Control SFP
to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner protected
from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors.
The Basic Terminal shall be able to determine on receipt of user
data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has
occurred.
Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
5.3.3
Personalization Terminals
177 The TOE supports different authentication and access control mechanisms which may
be used for the Personalization Agent depending on the personalization scheme of the
Issuing State or Organization:
(1) The Basic Access Control Mechanism which may be used by the Personalization
Agent with a Personalization Agent Secret Key Pair. The Basic Access Control
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Mechanism establishes strong cryptographic keys for the secure messaging to
ensure the confidentiality by Triple-DES and integrity by Retail-MAC of the
transmitted data. This approach may be used in a personalization environment
where the communication between the MRTD’s chip and the personalization
terminal may be listen or manipulated.
(2) In a centralized personalization scheme the major issue is high productivity of
personalization in a high secure environment. In this case the personalization
agent may wish to reduce the protocol to symmetric authentication of the terminal
without secure messaging. Therefore the TOE and the Personalization Terminal
support a simple protocol as requested by the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
178 The Personalization Terminal shall meet the requirement “Authentication Prove of
Identity (FIA_API)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
179 FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity - Personalization Terminal
Authentication with Symmetric Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/
SYM_PT
The Personalization Terminal shall provide a Authentication
Mechanism based on Triple-DES to prove the identity of the
Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
6
TOE Summary Specification
180 This chapter describes the TOE Security Functions and the Assurance Measures
covering the requirements of the previous chapter.
6.1
TOE Security Functions
181 This chapter gives the overview description of the different TOE Security Functions
composing the TSF.
182 In the following table all TOE Security Functions with a SOF claim are listed. The
assessment of cryptographic algorithms is not part of this CC evaluation.
TOE Security Function
SOF claim
Description
F.RNG
high
Random numbers can be analyzed with
probabilistic methods.
F.HW_DES
high
The quality can be analyzed with probabilistic
methods on side-channels.
F.Identifcation_Authentication
high
The mechanism for identification/authentication
of the roles is probabilistic.
F.Secure_Messaging
high
The mechanism for identification/authentication
and confidentiality of communication is
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TOE Security Function
SOF claim
Description
probabilistic.
183
6.1.1
TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC)
184 Some SFs have additional information appended.
6.1.1.1 F.RNG – Random Number Generator
185 The random number generator continuously produces random numbers with a length of
one byte. The TOE implements the F.RNG by means of a physical hardware random
number generator working stable within the limits guaranteed by F.OPC (operational
conditions).
186 The TSF provides a hardware test functionality that can be used by the Smartcard
Embedded Software to detect faults in the hardware implementing the random number
generator.
187 According to AIS31 the random number generator claims the fulfilment of the
requirements of functionality class P2. This means that the random number generator is
suitable for generation of signature key pairs, generation of session keys for symmetric
encryption mechanisms, random padding bits, zero-knowledge proofs and generation of
seeds for DRNGs.
188 Addition:
189 These random numbers are used in:
●
the anticollision phase of the chip in phase 4 to create communication
identification data and
●
the creation of a session key and authentication nonces.
6.1.1.2 F.HW_DES – Triple-DES Co-processor
190 The TOE provides the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) according to the Data
Encryption Standard (DES). F.HW_DES is a modular basic cryptographic function which
provides the TDEA algorithm as defined by FIPS PUB 46 by means of a hardware coprocessor and supports (a) the 3-key Triple-DEA algorithm according to keying option 1
and (b) the 2-key Triple DEA algorithm according to keying option 2 in FIPS PUB 46-3
[12]. The two/three 56 bit keys (112/168 bit) for the 2-key/3-key Triple DES algorithm
shall be provided by the Smartcard Embedded Software. For encryption the Smartcard
Embedded Software provides 8 bytes of the plain text and F.HW_DES calculates 8
bytes cipher text. The calculation output is read by the Smartcard Embedded Software.
For decryption the Smartcard Embedded Software also provides 8 bytes of cipher text
and F.HW_DES calculates 8 bytes plain text. The calculation output is read by the
Smartcard Embedded Software.
191 Addition:
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192 This SF is used in all cases where DES/3DES is used.
6.1.1.3 F.OPC – Control of Operating Conditions
193 The function F.OPC ensures the correct operation of the TOE (functions offered by the
micro- controller including the standard CPU as well as the Triple-DES co-processor,
AES co-processor, the arithmetic co-processor, the memories, registers, I/O interfaces
and the other system peripherals) during the execution of the IC Dedicated Support
Software and Smartcard Embedded Software. This includes all specific security features
of the TOE which are able to provide an active response.
194 The TOE ensures its correct operation and prevents any malfunction using the following
sub- functions: filtering of power supply and clock input as well as monitoring of power
supply, the frequency of the clock and the temperature of the chip by means of sensors.
There are multiple sensors for the different ISO 7816 supply voltage classes and the
contact-less operation mode. Light sensors are distributed over the chip surface and
used to detect light attacks. The thresholds allowed for these parameters are defined
within the range where the TOE ensures its correct operation. Additionally to the light
sensors the EEPROM provides two functions to detect light attacks. The Smartcard
Embedded Software can select one function and also disable both functions of the
EEPROM detection function.
195 Specific functional units of the TOE are equipped with special circuitry to detect a
number of single fault injection attacks: The Program Counter, the stack pointer, the
logic that implements the PSWH register, the DES co-processor and the FameXE coprocessor.
196 If one of the monitored parameters is out of the specified range, either (i) a reset is
forced and the actual running program is aborted or (ii) an exception is raised which
interrupts the program flow and allows a reaction of the Smartcard Embedded Software.
A reset is forced by the sensors for voltage, frequency, temperature and light. An
exception is forced by the EEPROM light detector and the single fault injection detection
circuitry. If the TOE is reset all components of the TOE are initialised with their reset
values. In addition the TOE provides a reset cause indicator to the Smartcard
Embedded Software. In the case an exception is raised an indicator for the reason of
the exception is provided.
197 Before TOE delivery the Test Mode is disabled. In all other modes except the Test Mode
the TOE enables the sensors automatically when operated. Furthermore the TOE
prevents that the Smartcard Embedded Software disables the sensors. The assignment
which sensor raises an exception or forces a reset is hard-wired and cannot be changed
by software.
198 In addition, the TOE controls the specified range of the stack pointer. The stack pointer
and the control logic is implemented threefold for the User Mode, System Mode and
Super System Mode (comprising Boot Mode, Test Mode and Mifare Mode). In case the
specified limits are reached an exception is generated.
199 Beside the sensors the security function comprises an additional sensor to check the
high voltage for the write process to the EEPROM during every write sequence. The
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result of this sensor must be read from a Special Function Register and does not force
an automatic event (e.g. exception).
6.1.1.4 F.PHY – Protection against Physical Manipulation
200 The function F.PHY protects the TOE against manipulation of (i) the hardware, (ii) the IC
Dedicated Software in the ROM, (iii) the Smartcard Embedded Software in the ROM
and the EEPROM, (iv) the application data in the EEPROM and RAM including the
configuration data in the security row. It also protects User Data or TSF data against
disclosure by physical probing when stored or while being processed by the TOE.
201 The protection of the TOE comprises different features within the design and
construction which make reverse-engineering and tamper attacks more difficult. These
features comprise dedicated shielding techniques for different components and specific
encryption features for the memory blocks. The security function F.PHY supports the
efficiency of other security functions.
202 F.PHY also supports the integrity of the EEPROM and the ROM. The EEPROM is able
to correct a 1-bit error within each byte. The ROM provides a parity check. The
EEPROM corrects errors automatically without user interaction, a ROM parity error
forces a reset.
6.1.1.5 F.LOG – Logical Protection
203 The function F.LOG implements measures to limit or eliminate the information that might
be contained in the shape and amplitude of signals or in the time between events found
by measuring such signals. This comprises the power consumption and signals on the
other pads that are not intended by the terminal or the Smartcard Embedded Software.
Thereby this security function prevents the disclosure of User Data or TSF data stored
and/or processed in the smartcard IC through the measurement of the power
consumption and subsequent complex signal processing. The protection of the TOE
comprises different features within the design that support the other security functions.
204 The Triple-DES co-processor includes special features to prevent SPA/DPA analysis of
shape and amplitude of the power consumption and ensures that the calculation time is
independent from any key and plain/cipher text.
205 Specific features as described for the function F.PHY (e.g. the encryption features) and
for the function F.OPC (e.g. the filter feature) support the logical protection.
6.1.1.6 F.COMP – Protection of Mode Control
206 The function F.COMP provides a control of the CPU mode for (i) Boot Mode, (ii) Test
Mode and (iii) Mifare Mode. This includes the protection of electronic fuses stored in a
protected memory area, the so-called "Security Row", and the possibility to store
initialisation or pre- personalisation data in the so-called "FabKey Area".
207 The control of the CPU mode according to Boot Mode, Test Mode and Mifare Mode
prevents the abuse of test functions after TOE delivery. Additionally it also ensures that
features used at boot time to configure the TOE can not be abused. The initial but not
user visible CPU mode is the Boot Mode. Hardware circuitry determines whether the
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Test Mode is available or not. If it is available, the TOE starts the IC Dedicated Test
Software in the Test Mode. Otherwise, the TOE switches to the System Mode the initial
user visible CPU mode and starts execution of the Smartcard Embedded Software.
208 The protection of electronic fuses ensures the secure storage of configuration- and
calibration data stored in the Test Mode. F.COMP protects CPU mode changes
regarding Boot Mode, Test Mode and Mifare Mode in the following way: Switches from
Boot Mode to Test Mode or Mifare Mode are allowed, switches from these two modes
back to Boot Mode are prevented. The switch to the Test Mode is prevented after TOE
delivery, therefore it is permanently disabled. F.COMP also ensures that the Boot Mode
is only active during the boot phase of the TOE after every reset and cannot be invoked
afterwards. Therefore, once the TOE has left the test phase and every time the TOE has
started up, the Mifare Mode is the only CPU mode available when the PSWH.SSM bit is
set. All three CPU modes Boot Mode, Test Mode and Mifare Mode are meant with
"Super System Mode" and F.COMP controls which mode is used if the PSWH.SSM bit
indicates the Super System Mode.
209 The TSF controls access to the Security Row, within the EEPROM memory, accessible
at reserved addresses within the memory map. The available EEPROM memory space
for the Smartcard Embedded Software is reduced by this area. F.COMP provides three
memory areas within the security row that can be used by the Smartcard Embedded
Software:
●
the User Read Only Area
●
the User Write Protected Area and
●
the User Write Once Area.
210 The User Read Only Area contains 32 bytes that are read-only for the Smartcard
Embedded Software. The User Write Protected area contains 16 bytes that can be
write-protected by the Smartcard Embedded Software on demand. The User Write Once
Area contains 32 bytes in which each bit independently can be once set to `1' not reset
to `0'.
211 F.COMP also provides the FabKey Area in which initialisation or identification data can
be stored. The FabKey area does not belong to the Security Row and is not protected
by hardware mechanisms.
212 For all areas the initial values are set during chip testing and pre-personalisation. They
depend on the choice of the Smartcard Embedded Software developer and are included
in the Order Entry Form. The User Write Protected Area and the User Write Once Area
are designed to store the identification of a (fully personalised) smartcard or a sequence
of events over the life cycle that can be coded by an increasing number of bits set to
"one" or protecting bytes, respectively.
213 F.COMP limits the capabilities of the test functions and provides test personnel during
phase 2 with the capability to store the identification and/or pre-personalisation data
and/or supplements of the Smartcard Embedded Software in the EEPROM. The security
function F.COMP maintains the security domain for its own execution that protects it
from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects both in the Test Mode and in the
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other modes. It also enforces the separation between the security domains of subjects
regarding the IC Dedicated Software and the Smartcard Embedded Software.
214 Addition:
215 This SF is used to store the chip identification data in the User Read Only Area.
6.1.2
TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES)
6.1.2.1 F.Access_Control
216 This TSF regulates all access by external entities to operations of the TOE which are
only executed after this TSF allowed access. This function consists of following
elements:
1. Access to objects is controlled based on subjects, objects and attributes.
2. No access control policy allows reading of any key.
3. Access Control in phase 2b - initialization - enforces initialization policy:
Configuration and initialization of the TOE only by the manufacturer or on behalve
of him. (See F.Initialization_Prepersonalization.)
4. Access Control in phase 2c – pre-personalization – enforces pre-personalization
policy: Creation of the ICAO file structure, configuring of access control policy,
doing key management and reading of initialization data only by the prepersonalization agent. (See F.Initialization_Prepersonalization.)
5. Access Control in phase 3 – personalization – enforces personalization policy:
Writing of user data, doing key management, e.g. BAC key, and reading of
initialization data only by the personalization agent. (See F.Personalization.)
6. Access Control in phase 4 – operation – enforces operational use policy: Read
only. Depending on configuration made in phase 2 enforcement of PIS or BIS
policy.
6.1.2.2 F.Deactivate_Non_TSF
217 This security function limits the available commands in the different life cycles.
6.1.2.3 F.Identification_Authentication
218 This function provides identification/authentication of user roles:
•
Pre-personalization agent
•
Personalization agent
•
BIS
219 Each of these roles is identified/authenticated with at least one specific key.
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220 It uses for this the Basic Access Control [18] authentication method which has following
properties:
1. Requires a challenge fetched directly before this function from the TOE.
2. The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC.
3. The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC.
4. The cryptographic method for key derivation is SHA-1. The SHA-1 algorithm is
compliant to FIPS 180-2. [13]
221 Keys in transient memory are overwritten after usage.
222 On error (wrong MAC, wrong challenge) the user role is not identified/authenticated.
223 On success the generated session key is stored for F.Secure_Messaging.
6.1.2.4 F.Initialization_Prepersonalization
224 This function is performed by the pre-personalization agent in phases 2b (initialization)
and 2c (pre-personalization).
6.1.2.5 F.Personalization
225 This function is performed by the personalization agent in phase 3.
226 The agent does for this function following steps:
•
Formatting of all data to be stored on the TOE according to ICAO requirements which
are outside the scope of the TOE. The data to be formated includes the index file
EF.COM, the data groups – e.g. DG1 with the MRZ – and the passive authentication
data with a signature over all data.
•
If BIS policy: Deriving of the Basic Access Control key from the Machine Readable
Zone data as specified in TrPKI [18] and writing it to the TOE.
•
Writing of all the required data to the appropriate files as specified in TrLDS [17].
•
Changing the TOE into the end-usage mode for phase 4.
227 Operations on the TOE are regulated according to F.Access_Control.
6.1.2.6 F.Retry_Counter
228 The retry counter (RTC) reacts to failed authentication procedures whereby it limits the
number of consecutively failed authentication procedures to a specified maximum.
When this limit is reached the respective key is blocked against further usage.
229 Reasons for authentication failures are e.g.:
•
Wrong MAC
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•
Wrong challenge
230 All administrative keys used in phases 2c and 3 use this SF to limit the consecutively
failed authentication procedures to three.
231 The MRZ derived key used for BIS policy must not be protected with this SF as this
could introduce practical problems, i.e. accidently blocked and hence unusable
passports.
6.1.2.7 F.Secure_Messaging
232 This security function implements a secure communication channel with following
parameters:
1. The Secure Messaging is as specified in Basic Access Control.
2. In phases 3 – 4 a session key is used.
3. The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC.
4. The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC.
5. In a Secure Messaging protected command it must be the method for
confidentiality and the method for authenticity present.
6. The initialization vector is changed after each command according to [7].
7. Any non Secure Messaging protected command overwrites the session key and
requires new authentication via F.Identification_Authentication.
8. Overwrites keys in transient memory after usage.
6.1.2.8 F.Verification
233 This function ensures correct operation.
6.2
Assurance Measures
234 The assurance measures fulfilling the requirements of EAL4 augmented with
ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2 are:
Assurance Measure
Description
ACM_AUT.1
Partial CM automation
ACM_CAP.4
Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_SCP.2
Problem tracking CM coverage
ADO_DEL.2
Detection of modification
ADO_IGS.1
Installation, generation and startup
ADV_FSP.2
Fully defined external interfaces
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Assurance Measure
Description
ADV_HLD.2
Security enforcing high-level design
ADV_LLD.1
Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2
Descriptive low-level design
ADV_RCR.1
Informal correspondence demonstration
ADV_SPM.1
Informal TOE security policy model
AGD_ADM.1
Administrator guidance
AGD_USR.1
User guidance
ALC_DVS.2
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1
Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1
Well-defined development tools
ATE_COV.2
Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1
Testing: high-level design
ATE_FUN.1
Functional testing
ATE_IND.2
Independent testing – sample
AVA_MSU.2
Validation of analysis
AVA_SOF.1
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis
7
7.1
PP Claims
PP Reference
235 The conformance of this ST to the Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine
Readable Travel Document with ''ICAO Application'', Basic Access Control, version 1.0,
BSI-PP-0017 is claimed.
7.2
PP Refinements
236 None.
7.3
PP Additions
237 None.
8
8.1
Rationale
Security Objectives Rationale
238 The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage.
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OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Malfuntion
OD.Assurance
OD.Material
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Secure_Handling
ST-lite — Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application (MRTD-ST)
T.Chip-ID
T.Skimming
T.Eavesdropping
T.Forgery
T.Abuse-Func
T.Information_Leakage
T.Phys-tamper
T.Malfunction
P.Manufact
P.Personalization
P.Personal_Data
A.Pers_Agent
A.Insp_Sys
x
x
x
x
x
x
x x
x
x x x
x
x
x
x
x x
x
x
x
x x
x
x
x
Table 1: Security Objective Rationale
239 The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires the quality and
integrity of the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2
Manufacturing including unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data
and the writing of the Pre-personalization Data. The security objective for the TOE
environment OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment” address these obligations of the IC Manufacturer and
MRTD Manufacturer.
240 The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or
Organization only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the
Personalization Agent as described in the security objective for the TOE environment
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for
the user data and TSF data as described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”. Note, the manufacturer equips the TOE
with the Personalization Agent Authentication key(s) according to OD.Assurance
“Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environment”. The
security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of TSF data and the management
of TSF (enabling and disabling of the TSF Basic Access Control) to the Personalization
Agent.
241 The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires the TOE (i) to
support the protection of the confidentiality of the logical MRTD by means of the Basic
Access Control and (ii) enforce the access control for reading as decided by the issuing
State or Organization. This policy is implemented by the security objectives OT.Data_Int
“Integrity of personal data“ which describes the unconditional protection of the integrity
of the stored data and the configurable integrity protection during the transmission. The
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security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” describes the
protection of the confidentiality as configured by the Personalization Agent acting in
charge of the issuing State or Organization.
242 The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD
movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless
communication interface. In case of TOE configuration for use with Basic Inspection
Terminals only this threat is countered as described by the security objective
OT.Identification by Basic Access Control. If the TOE is configured for use with Primary
Inspection Systems this threat shall be adverted by the TOE environment as described
by OE.Secure_Handling.
243 The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” and
T.Eavesdropping “Eavesdropping to the communication between TOE and inspection
system” address the reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface or
listening the communication between the MRTD’s chip and a terminal. In case of TOE
configuration for use with Basic Inspection Terminals only this threat is countered by the
security objective OT.Data_Conf through Basic Access Control. If the TOE is configured
for use with Primary Inspection Systems the threat T.Skimming shall be adverted by the
TOE environment according to OE.Secure_Handling “Secure handling of the MRTD by
MRTD holder” and the threat T.Eavesdropping shall be adverted by
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD”.
244 The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent
alteration of the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective
OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to
limit the write access for the logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf.
OE.Personalization). The TOE will protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD
according the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” and
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”. The examination of the
presented MRTD passport book according to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the
MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book does not contain an additional
contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical MRTD. The TOE
environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital signature
which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
245 The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks using the MRTD’s
chip as production material for the MRTD and misuse of the functions for personalization
in the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder to disclose or to manipulate the
logical MRTD. The protection of the TOE against this threat is addressed by the directly
related security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func. The security objective for the TOE
environment OD.Material “Control over MRTD Material” ensures the control of the
MRTD material. The security objectives for the TOE environment OD.Assurance
“Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environment” and
OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” ensure that the TOE security
functions for the initialization and the personalization are disabled and the security
functions for the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder are enabled according
to the intended use of the TOE.
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246 The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,
T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to
Environmental Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct
attack with high attack potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats are
addressed by the directly related security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection
against Information Leakage”, OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions”.
247 The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of
logical MRTD” including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the
storage of the MRTD holder personal data and the enabling of security features of the
TOE according to the decision of the Issuing State or Organization concerning the Basic
Access Control.
248 The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for
the TOE environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”. If
the Issuing State of Organization decides to protect confidentiality of the logical MRTD
than the security objectives for the TOE environment OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
“Protection of data of the logical MRTD” will require the Basic Inspection System to
implement the Basic Access Control and to protect the logical MRTD data during the
transmission and the internal handling. If the Issuing State of Organization decides to
configure the TOE for use with Primary Inspection Systems than no protection of the
logical MRTD data is required by the inspection system.
8.2
8.2.1
Security Requirements Rationale
Security Functional Requirements Rationale
249 The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
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FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
FCS_RND.1/MRTD
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FDP_ACC.1/PRIM
FDP_ACF.1/PRIM
FDP_ACC.1/BASIC
FDP_ACF.1/BASIC
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_RVM.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_SEP.1
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Malfunction
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Identification
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Data_Int
OT.AC_Pers
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x
(x)
(x)
x
x
x
(x)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
(x)
x
(x)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Table 2: Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
250 The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD” addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD and the
management of the TSF for Basic Access Control. The write access to the logical MRTD
data are defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1/PRIM, FDP_ACC.1/BASIC, FDP_ACF.1/PRIM
and FDP_ACF.1/BASIC in the same way: only the successfully authenticated
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Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups DG1 to DG16 of the
logical MRTD only once.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF
according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_UAU.5/MRTD. In case the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism was used the SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD describes the
re-authentication and FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD the protection of the
transmitted data by means of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic
functions
according
to
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD,
FCS_CKM.4,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD,
FCS_RND.1/MRTD
(for
key
generation),
and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent) and the SFR
FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including Personalization) because
the Personalization Agent handles the configuration of the TSF Basic Access Control
according to the SFR FMT_MOF.1 and the Document Basic Access Keys according to
the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data if Basic Access
Control is enabled. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the
secret key of the Personalization Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR
FPT_EMSEC.1, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_PHP.3 the confidentially of these keys.
251 The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to
protect the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical
manipulation and unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is
defined by the SFR FDP_ACC.1/PRIM, FDP_ACC.1/BASIC, FDP_ACF.1/PRIM and
FDP_ACF.1/BASIC in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write
the data of the groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and
terminals are not allowed to modify any of the data groups DG1 to DG16 of the logical
MRTD (cf. FDP_ACF.1.4). The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions
(including Personalization).
If the TOE is configured for the use with Basic Inspection Terminals only by means of
FMT_MOF.1 the security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires
the TOE to ensure that the inspection system is able to detect any modification of the
transmitted logical MRTD data. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization
Agent shall be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD, FDP_UCT.1
and FDP_UIT.1 requires the protection of the transmitted data by means of secure
messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRD, FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for key
generation), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the
ENC_MAC_Mode. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the Personalization
Agent to establish the Document Basic Access Keys.
252 The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the TOE
to ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data groups DG1 to DG16 if the TOE is
configured for the use with Basic Inspection Systems by means of FMT_MOF.1. The
SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification respective
authentication which do not violate OT.Data_Conf. The read access to the logical MRTD
data is defined by the FDP_ACC.1/BASIC and FDP_ACF.1.2/BASIC: only the
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successful authenticated Personalization Agent and the successful authenticated Basic
Inspection System are allowed to read the data of the logical MRTD. The SFR
FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic Inspection
System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys).
The SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the
authentication of the user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD enforces the TOE to accept the
authentication attempt as Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access Keys. Moreover,
the SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD requests secure messaging after successful authentication
of the terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism which includes the
protection of the transmitted data in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic
functions according to FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (cf.
the SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD). (for key generation), and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode.
The SFR FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD, FCS_CKM.4, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD and
FCS_RND.1/MRTD establish the key management for the secure messaging keys.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
requires the Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism or secure messaging. If the TOE is configured for the use with Primary
Inspection Systems, no protection in confidentiality of the logical MRTD is needed to
ensure.
253 The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE”
addresses the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip
in its non-volatile memory. This will be ensure by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
Furthermore, if the TOE is configured for use with Basic Inspection Terminals the TOE
shall identify themselves only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in
Phase 4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the
Manufacturer to write Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if
their use in the phase 4 “Operational Use” violates the security objective
OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not allow reading of any data
uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication of the Basic
Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication
attempt.
254 The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality”
is ensured by (i) the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test
functionality of the TOE or other which may not be used after TOE Delivery, (ii) the SFR
FPT_RVM.1 which prevents by monitoring the bypass and deactivation of security
features or functions of the TOE, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1 which prevents change or
explore security features or functions of the TOE by means of separation the other TOE
functions.
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255 The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”
requires the TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the
MRTD’s chip against disclosure
-
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time
between events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power
consumption, clock, or I/O lines, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
-
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1
and FPT_TST.1, and/or
-
by a physical manipulation of the TOE, which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
256 The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering”
is covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
257 The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is
covered by (i) the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstare the correct
operation and tests of authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code,
(ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which requires a secure state in case of detected failure or
operating conditions possibly causing a malfunction, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1
limiting the effects of malfunctions due to TSF domain separation.
258 The following table provides an overview how security functional requirements for the IT
environment cover security objectives for the TOE environment. The protection profile
describes only those SFR of the IT environment directly related to the SFR for the TOE.
It does not state any SFR for the IT environment supporting the security objectives
OD.Assurance and OD.Material. The OE.Exam_MRTD uses only security function of the
IT environment, i.e. the passive authentication. The security objective
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD is directed to Basic Inspection Systems only which cooperate
with the TOE in protection of the logical MRTD.
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OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
x
x
x
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Personalization
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
(x)
OE.Exam_MRTD
Document Signer
FDP_DAU.1/DS
Terminal
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT
FCS_CKM.4/BT
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT
FCS_RND.1/BT
FIA_UAU.4/BT
FIA_UAU.6/BT
FDP_UCT.1/BT
FDP_UIT.1/BT
Personalization Agent
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT
OD.Material
OD.Assurance
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x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
(x)
Table 3: Coverage of Security Objectives for the IT environment by SFR
259 The security objective OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”
requires the inspection system to verify the passport, the security objective
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature” requires the issuer
to provide Passive Authentication infrastructure and the security objective
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication” requires the inspection
system to verify the digital signature and data. The document signer provides the
security function Passive Authentication according to FDP_DAU.1/DS to support the
inspection system to verify the logical MRTD.
260 The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD“
address the protection of the logical MRTD during the transmission and internal
handling. The SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT and FIA_UAU.6/BT address the terminal part of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and FDP_UCT.1/BT and FDP_UIT.1/BT
the secure messaging established by this mechanism. The SFR FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT, FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT, FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT and FCS_RND.1/BT
are necessary to implement this mechanism. The BIS shall destroy the Document
Access Control Key and the secure messaging key after inspection of the MRTD
because they are not needed any more (FCS_CKM.4/BT).
261 The OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the personalization
terminal to authenticate themselves to the MRTD’s chip to get the write authorization.
This implies to implement the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism (SFRs
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_BT, FCS_CKM.4/BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT, FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT,
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT, FCS_RND.1/BT, FIA_UAU.4/BT, FIA_UAU.6/BT, FDP_UCT.1/BT,
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FDP_UIT.1/BT) with the Personalization Agent Authentication Keys or support the
symmetric authentication protocol according to the SFR FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
262 For dependency rationale (SFR/SAR) see PP 7.2.2.
8.2.2
TOE Summary Specification Rationale
FAU_SAS.1
x
FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD
x
FCS_CKM.4
x
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD
x
x
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
x
x
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
x
x
FCS_RND.1/MRTD
x
FIA_UID.1
x
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
x
x
x
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
x
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
x
FDP_ACC.1/PRIM
x
FDP_ACF.1/PRIM
x
FDP_ACC.1/BASIC
x
FDP_ACF.1/BASIC
x
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD
x
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD
x
FMT_MOF.1
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
x
FMT_LIM.2
x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
x
x
x
x
x
x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE
x
x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
x
x
x
x
x
FPT_TST.1
x
FPT_PHP.3
x
x
FPT_RVM.1
FPT_SEP.1
x
x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
FPT_FLS.1
x
x
FMT_LIM.1
FPT_EMSEC.1
F.Verification
F.Secure_Messaging
F.Retry_Counter
F.Personalization
F.Initialization_Prepersonalization
F.Identification_Authentication
F.Deactivate_Non_TSF
F.Access_Control
F.COMP
F.LOG
F.PHY
F.OPC
F.HW_DES
F.RNG
263 This shows the coverage of the SFRs by TSFs.
x
x
x
Table 4: Coverage of SFRs for the TOE by TSFs.
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264 The SFR FAU_SAS.1 requires the storage of the chip identification data which is
addressed in the addition to F.COMP.
265 The SFR FCS_CKM.1/BAC_MRTD requires the generation of the document Basic
Access Control key which is done by the personalization agent in F.Personalization (“If
BIS policy: Deriving of the Basic Access Control key ...”).
266 The SFR FCS_CKM.4 requires the destroying of cryptographic keys. This is done in
F.Identification_Authentication (“Keys in transient memory are overwritten after
usage.”) and F.Secure_Messaging (“Overwrites keys in transient memory after usage”).
267 The SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD requires the SHA-1 algorithm which is provided by
F.Identification_Authentication (Item 4).
268 The SFR FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD requires Triple-DES in CBC mode for data
confidentiality. F.Secure_Messaging (Item 3) uses Triple-DES/CBC as specified in the
Basic Access Control specification. [7] Triple-DES is used from F.HW_DES (See
addition there).
269 The SFR FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD requires Triple-DES in retail-MAC mode for data
authenticity. F.Secure_Messaging (Item 4) uses Triple-DES/retail-MAC as specified in
the Basic Access Control specification. [7] DES and Triple-DES are used from
F.HW_DES (See addition there).
270 The SFR FCS_RND.1/MRTD requires the generation of random numbers which is
provided by F.RNG. F.RNG produces cryptographically strong random numbers which
are used at the appropriate places as written in the addition there.
271 The SFR FIA_UID.1 requires timing of identification. It is handled by F.Access_Control
which enforces identification of a role before access is granted (“...only executed after
this TSF allowed access.”). Also all policies there besides PIS in phase 4 prevent
reading sensitive or user dependent data without user identification.
272 The SFR FIA_UAU.1 requires timing of authentication. It is handled by
F.Access_Control which enforces authentication of a role before access is granted
(“...only executed after this TSF allowed access.”). Also all policies there besides PIS in
phase 4 prevent reading sensitive or user dependent data without user authentication.
273 The SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD requires the prevention of authentication data reuse. This
is fulfilled by using random data from F.RNG (“... used in ... the creation of a session key
and authentication nonces.”) and by using changing initialization vectors in
F.Secure_Messaging (Item 6) as specified in the Basic Access Control specification. [7]
274 The SFR FIA_UAU.5 requires Basic Access Control authentication mechanism and
authentication
mechanism
using
Triple-DES.
This
is
provided
by
F.Identification_Authentication (“It uses for this the Basic Access Control
authentication method...” and items 2 and 3) as specified in the Basic Access Control
specification. [7] The SFR FIA_UAU.5 also requires the role to be identified with role
specific keys. This is done in F.Identification_Authentication (“Each of these roles it
identified/authenticated with at least one specific key.”).
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275 The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD requires re-authentication of each command. This is
ensured by the enforced method for authenticity in F.Secure_Messaging (Item 5).
276 The SFR FDP_ACC.1/PRIM requires the enforcement of the PIS access control policy
which is done by F.Access_Control (Item 6: “Access Control in phase 4 ... enforcement
of PIS ...”).
277 The SFR FDP_ACF.1/PRIM requires the enforcement of accesses to objects based on
subjects, objects and attributes, which is enforced by F.Access_Control (Item 1). The
SFR FDP_ACF.1/PRIM also requires the enforcement of the rules of the PIS access
control pilicy which are there formulated in detail. This is enforced by F.Access_Control
(Item 6: “Access Control in phase 4 ... enforcement of PIS ...”).
278 The SFR FDP_ACC.1/BASIC requires the enforcement of the BIS access control policy
which is done by F.Access_Control (Item 6: “Access Control in phase 4 ... enforcement
of BIS ...”).
279 The SFR FDP_ACF.1/BASIC requires the enforcement of accesses to objects based on
subjects, objects and attributes, which is enforced by F.Access_Control (Item 1). The
SFR FDP_ACF.1/BASIC also requires the enforcement of the rules of the BIS access
control pilicy which are there formulated in detail. This is enforced by F.Access_Control
(Item 6: “Access Control in phase 4 ... enforcement of BIS ...”).
280 The SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD requires a TSF for confidentiality in communication
provided by the encrypted communication channel in F.Secure_Messaging. It does this
by enforcing to use a cryptographic method for confidentiality when used. (Item 5)
281 The SFR FDP_UIT.1/MRTD requires a TSF for protecting communication against
modification provided by the protected communication channel in F.Secure_Messaging.
It does this by using unique initialization vectors (Item 6) and the cryptographic method
for authenticity (Item 4). The send sequence counter makes each command unique
while the authenticity method makes it possible to detect any of the listed modifications.
282 The SFR FMT_MOF.1 requires the restriction of the selection of Basic Access Control to
the personalization agent in F.Personalization. In fact the choice is already made in
F.Initialization_Prepersonalization. Later - esp. in phase 4 - this can't be changed
anymore. Hence the purpose of the SFR is satisfied.
283 The SFR FMT_SMF.1 requires management functions to be present which are provided
by F.Initialization_Prepersonalization and F.Personalization.
284 The SFR FMT_SMR.1 requires the maintenance of user roles. These are managed by
F.Identification_Authentication. The first list gives the user roles 1, 2 and 4 listed in
FMT_SMR.1. The role 3 is implicit as it requires no identification/authentication.
285 The SFR FMT_LIM.1 requires limited capabilities of test functions, which is provided by
F.Deactivate_Non_TSF. Also the test functions of the hardware part are disabled when
the embedded software is running. (F.COMP: paragraph “The control of the boot mode
...”)
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286 The SFR FMT_LIM.2 requires limited availability of test functions, which is provided by
F.Deactivate_Non_TSF. Also the testfunctions of the hardware part are disabled when
the embedded software is running. (F.COMP: paragraph “The control of the boot mode
...”)
287 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA requires writing of initialization data and prepersonalization data to the manufacturer. Writing of pre-personalization and installation
data only by the manufacturer is enforced by F.Access_Control, which limits these
operations to phase 2b and 2c (“Access Control in phase 2b/2c ... ”). Independent of
F.Access_Control writing of the initialization data is only possible in phase 2a because
F.COMP (See addition) stores this data in the User Read Only Area which can't be
changed afterwards.
288 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires only the personalization agent to be able to
disable reading of the initialization data. This is provided by F.Deactivate_Non_TSF and
F.Personalization.
289 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the personalization agent to be able to
write the Document Basic Access Control keys. This is provided by F.Access_Control
(“Access Control in phase 3 ... doing key management, e.g. BAC key ...”) allowing the
personalization agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
290 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires the Document Basic Access Control keys to
never be readable. This is enforced by F.Access_Control, which does not allow reading
of any key to any role (Item 2).
291 The SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 requires limiting of emanations. This is provided by F.HW_DES
(special DES protection) and F.LOG (general protection) by the hardware. Additional
F.Retry_Counter limits the number of possible tries to use management keys which
reduces the availability of analyzable data.
292 The SFR FPT_FLS.1 requires failure detection and preservation of a secure state.
F.OPC is directly designed for this SFR. It audits continually and reacts to environmental
and other problems by bringing it into a secure state.
293 The SFR FPT_TST.1 requires testing which is provided by F.Verification. F.PHY tests
all EEPROM and ROM content for integrity (“... able to correct a 1-bit error within each
byte.” / “... parity check.”).
294 The SFR FPT_PHP.3 requires resistance to physical attacks. This is provided by F.PHY
which is provided by the hardware to resist attacks. (“The function F.PHY protects the
TOE against manipulation ...” / “... construction which make reverse-engineering and
tamper attacks more difficult.”)
295 The SFR FPT_RVM.1 requires enforcement functions to succeed. This is provided by
F.Access_Control which enforces first the TSP and then allows execution of the
protected functions only on success. (“... which only are only executed after this TSF
allowd access.”)
296 The SFR FPT_SEP.1 requires separation of TSF and Non-TSF data. This is done by
disabling Non-TSF functions with F.Deactivate_Non_TSF. Also F.COMP does protect
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the embedded software against test functions of the hardware (“... control of the CPU
mode ...”).
297 The summary specification rationale obviously shows that the set of IT security functions
work together to form a mutually supportive and internally consistent whole satisfying
the TOE security functional requirements.
8.2.3
Strength of Function Level Rationale
Due to the requirements of the PP the level for the strength of the TOE´s security functional
requirements is claimed as SOF-high. The TOE is considered as a product with critical
security mechanisms which only have to be defeated by attackers possessing a high level of
expertise, opportunity and resources, and whereby successful attack is judged beyond
normal practicability.
9
Glossary and Acronyms
Term
Active
Authentication
Audit records
Authenticity
Basic
Control
Access
Basic Inspection
System (BIS)
Biographical data
(biodata).
biometric
reference data
Counterfeit
Definition
Security mechanism defined in [7] option by which means the MTRD’s
chip proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and
authenticity of the MTRD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a
known State of organization.
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTD’s chip to store
the Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip
were created by the issuing State or Organization
Security mechanism defined in [7] by which means the MTRD’s chip
proves and the inspection system protect their communication by
means of secure messaging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
An inspection system which implements the terminal’s part of the Basic
Access Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the
MRTD’s chip using the Document Basic Access Keys drawn form
printed MRZ data for reading the logical MRTD.
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as
text in the visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data
page of a passport book or on a travel card or visa. [8]
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
MRTD’s chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference
data.
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document
made by whatever means. [8]
Self-signed certificate of the Country Signing CA Public Key (KPuCSCA)
issued by CSCA stored in the inspection system.
Country Signing
CA
Certificate
(CCSCA)
Document Basic Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with
Access Keys
encryption (key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data
transmitted between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [7]. It
is drawn from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an
entity able to read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document
A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document
Security
Object Signer (DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is
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Term
Definition
stored in the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer
Certificate (CDS). [7]
Eavesdropper
A threat agent with moderate attack potential reading the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to
gain the data on the MRTD’s chip.
Enrolment
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the
subsequent preparation and storage of biometric reference templates
representing that person's identity. [9]
Extended Access Security mechanism identified in [7] by which means the MTRD’s chip
Control
(i) verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to
read the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to
the optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the
confidentiality and integrity of the optional biometric reference data
during their transmission to the inspection system by secure
messaging. The Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism
to authenticate themselves with Personalization Agent Authentication
Private Key and to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and
TSF data.
Extended
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition
Inspection System to Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or
(EIS)
Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Forgery
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g.
changes to the biographical data or the portrait. [8]
Global
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in
Interoperability
different States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data
received from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in
inspection operations in their respective States. Global interoperability
is a major objective of the standardized specifications for placement of
both eye-readable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [9]
IC Dedicated
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
Support Software functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used
Software
to test the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
Impostor
A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false
name and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical
appearance to represent himself or herself as another person for the
purpose of using that person’s document. [8]
Improperly
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
documented
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
person
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d)
no travel document or visa, if required. [9]
Initialisation Data Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the nonvolatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2).
These data are for instance used for traceability and for IC
identification as MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection
The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveller
(SOD)
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Term
Inspection system
(IS)
Integrated
(IC)
Integrity
circuit
Issuing
Organization
Issuing State
Logical
Data
Structure (LDS)
Logical MRTD
Logical
document
travel
Machine readable
travel document
(MRTD)
Machine readable
visa (MRV):
Machine readable
zone (MRZ)
Machine-verifiable
biometrics feature
MRTD application
2007-02-13
Definition
(the MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [9]
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving
State (i) examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying
its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or
memory functions. The MRTD’s chip is a integrated circuit.
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip
have not been altered from that created by the issuing State or
Organization
Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the
United Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [6]
The Country issuing the MRTD. [6]
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional
capacity expansion technology [6]. The capacity expansion technology
used is the MRTD’s chip.
Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [6] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit.
It presents contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
personal data of the MRTD holder
(1) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, DG1),
(2) the digitized portraits (DG2),
(3) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (DG3) or iris image(s)
(DG4) or both and
(4) the other data according to LDS (DG5 to DG16).
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAO in the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by
the holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document
of identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data
and a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use,
reflecting essential data elements capable of being machine read. [6]
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter
collectively referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications
contained herein, formulated to improve facilitation and enhance
security for the visa holder. Contains mandatory visual (eye readable)
data and a separate mandatory data summary capable of being
machine read. The MRV is normally a label which is attached to a visa
page in a passport. [6]
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data
Page or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing
mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods.
[6]
A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a
form that can be read and verified by machine. [8]
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system
on the IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
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Term
Definition
the file structure implementing the LDS [6],
the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data
itself (i.e. content of DG1 to DG14 and DG 16) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but
except the authentication data itself.
MRTD
Basic Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between
Access Control
the inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information
as key seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip
according to LDS.
MRTD holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or
Organization personalized the MRTD.
MRTD’s Chip
A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAOT, [10], p. 14.
MRTD’s
chip Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the
Embedded
IC Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in
Software
Phase 1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE
life-cycle.
Optional biometric Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the
reference data
MRTD’s chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (DG3) or (ii) encoded iris
image(s) (DG4) or (iii) both. Note that the European commission
decided to use only finger print and not to use iris images as optional
biometric reference data.
Passive
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object
authentication
and (ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the
hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
Personalization
The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are
applied to the document. [8]
Personalization
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organisation to
Agent
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity the
holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric
reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the encoded finger
image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) writing these data on
the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
Personalization
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the
Agent
Personalization Agent.
Authentication
Information
Personalization
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to
Agent
prove their identity and get access to the logical MRTD according to
Authentication
the SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT FIA_UAU.6/BT and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT and
Key
(ii) by the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a terminal
as Personalization Agent according to the SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
Prepersonalizatio A part of the manufacturer role acting on the behalf of the issuing State
n Agent
or organisation to configure the TOE before phase 3.
Physical
travel Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure
document
printing to present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
-
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Term
Definition
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
PreAny data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by
personalization
the MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized
Data
MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle phases
2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Active Authentication Key
Pair and the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized MRTD’s chip equipped with an unique identifier and an unique
MRTD’s chip
asymmetric Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Primary
A inspection system that contains a terminal for the contactless
Inspection System communication with the MRTD’s chip and does not implement the
(PIS)
terminals part of the Basic Access Control Mechanism.
Receiving State
The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [6]
reference data
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
secondary image A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the
document by whatever means. [8]
secure messaging Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
in encrypted mode according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
Skimming
Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of
it via the contactless communication channel of the TOE without
knowledge of the printed MRZ data.
travel document
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or
organization, which may be used by the rightful holder for international
travel. [9]
traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the
identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE, that might affect the operation of the
TOE (CC part 1 [1]).
unpersonalized
MRTD material prepared to produce an personalized MRTD containing
MRTD
an initialised and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
User data
Data created by and for the user, that does not affect the operation of
the TSF (CC part 1 [1]).
Verification
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the
biometric reference template of a single enrolee whose identity is being
claimed, to determine whether it matches the enrolee’s template. [9]
verification data
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their
identity to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data
match the reference data known for the claimed identity.
Acronyms
Acronym
SFR
TOE
SAR
TSF
CC
2007-02-13
Term
Security functional requirement
Target of Evaluation
Security assurance requirements
TOE security functions
Common Criteria
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ST-lite — Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application (MRTD-ST)
Acronym
OSP
PIS
BIS
PT
Term
Organisational security policy
Primary Inspection System
Basic Inspection System
Personalization Terminal
10 Literature
Common Criteria
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction
and general model; Version 2.3, August 2005
[2]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
functional requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
assurance requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005
[4]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation CEM-99/045
Part 2: Evaluation methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[5]
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema, AIS32: Übernahme
international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema,
Version 1, 02.07.2001, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
ICAO
[6]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical
Data Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –1.7,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization, LDS 1.7, 2004-05-18
[7]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable
Travel Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01,
2004, published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation
Organization
[8]
ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS, Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable
Passports, Fifth Edition – 2003
[9]
BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
TECHNICAL REPORT Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable
Biometric Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine
Readable Travel Documents, Version 1.9, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 19 May 2003
[10]
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL) DIVISION,
twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
2007-02-13
MaskTech GmbH
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ST-lite — Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application (MRTD-ST)
Cryptography
[11]
FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION FIPS PUB
140-2, SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULES, Issued
2001 May 25, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards
and Technology
[12]
FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION FIPS PUB
46-3, DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[13]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH
STANDARD (+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
Protection Profiles
[14]
PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001;
registered and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
under the reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
[15]
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Version 1.00, March 8th, 2002
[16]
Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel Document with ''ICAO Application'',
Basic Access Control, Version 1.0, BSI-PP-0017, 2005-08-18
Sonstige
[17]
Technical Report Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Version 0.8 (final), BSI
[18]
ISO/IEC 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4:
Organization, security and commands for interchange, FDIS 2004
[19]
ISO/IEC 14443-3:2001, Identification cards – Contactless integrated circuit(s) cards –
Proximity cards, Part 3: Initialization and anticollision, 2001
2007-02-13
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