null  null
Certification Report
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
for
Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2)
from
IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)3018 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)3018 9582-5455, Infoline +49 (0)3018 9582-111
Certification Report V1.1
ZS-01-01-F-330 V3.31
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Smartcard with Java Card Platform
Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2)
from
IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH
Common Criteria Arrangement
for components up to EAL4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an accredited and licensed/
approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3
(ISO/IEC 15408:2005) extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL4
and smart card specific guidance for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security
Evaluation, Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
Evaluation Results:
Functionality:
Product specific Security Target
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance Package:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented with
ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the TSF) and
ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures)
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated
configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme
of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation
facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
The notes mentioned on the reverse side are part of this certificate.
Bonn, 31. August 2006
The Vice President of the Federal Office
for Information Security
Hange
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 228 9582-0 - Fax +49 228 9582-5455 - Infoline +49 228 9582-111
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption
and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty
of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG 1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the
task of issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a
distributor, hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product
according to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised
security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the
BSI or by BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This
report contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the
detailed Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security
functionality of the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and
weaknesses) and instructions for the user.
1
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
V
Certification Report
Contents
Part A: Certification
Part B: Certification Results
Part C: Excerpts from the Criteria
Part D: Annexes
VI
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Certification Report
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down
in the following:
•
BSIG 2
•
BSI Certification Ordinance 3
•
BSI Schedule of Costs 4
•
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal
Ministry of the Interior)
•
DIN EN 45011 standard
•
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
•
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), version 2.3 5
•
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), version 2.3
•
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS)
•
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance
components above EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Act setting up the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, BSIG) of
17 December 1990, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2834
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 7 July 1992,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger
dated 19 May 2006, p. 3730
A-1
Certification Report
2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries
a mutual recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are
based on ITSEC or CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Agreement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on
ITSEC became effective on 3 March 1998. This agreement was signed by the
national bodies of Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. This
agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended to
include certificates based on the CC for all evaluation levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7).
2.2
CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC evaluation assurance levels up to and including
EAL 4 was signed in May 2000. It includes also the recognition of Protection
Profiles based on the CC. The arrangement was signed by the national bodies
of Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom and the United
States. Israel joined the arrangement in November 2000, Sweden in February
2002, Austria in November 2002, Hungary and Turkey in September 2003,
Japan in November 2003, the Czech Republic in September 2004, the Republic
of Singapore in March 2005, India in April 2005.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_IMP.2 (Implementation of the
TSF) and ALC_DVS.2 (Sufficiency of security measures) that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
3
Certification Report
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform
procedure, a uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) has undergone the
certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) was
conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit. The
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF) 6 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor is IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH, Schoenaicher
Strasse 220, 71032 Böblingen, the distributor is Philips Semiconductor GmbH,
Stresemannallee 101, 22529 Hamburg.
The certification is concluded with
•
the comparability check and
•
the production of this Certification Report.
This work was completed by the BSI on 31. August 2006.
The confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
•
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in
the following report, are observed,
•
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the
following report.
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product indicated
here. The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification of the modified product, in
accordance with the procedural requirements, and the evaluation does not
reveal any security deficiencies.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of
functions, please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the
Certification Report.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
A-3
Certification Report
4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Publication
The following Certification Results contain pages B-1 to B-26.
The product Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) has been included in the
BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also Internet:
http://www.bsi.bund.de). Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline
+49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the vendor 7 of
the product. The Certification Report can also be downloaded from the abovementioned website.
7
A-4
IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH
Schoenaicher Strasse 220
71032 Böblingen
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
B
Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
•
the security target of the sponsor for the target of evaluation,
•
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
•
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Contents of the certification results
1
Executive Summary
2
Identification of the TOE
14
3
Security Policy
14
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
15
5
Architectural Information
15
6
Documentation
17
7
IT Product Testing
17
8
Evaluated Configuration
18
9
Results of the Evaluation
19
10 Comments/Recommendations
21
11 Annexes
21
12 Security Target
22
13 Definitions
22
14 Bibliography
24
B-2
3
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
1
Certification Report
Executive Summary
The target of evaluation (TOE) is the Java Card Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP
41 v2.2), and consists of:
-
Smart Card Platform SCP (hardware platform and hardware abstraction
layer)
-
Embedded software (Java Card Virtual Machine, Runtime Environment,
Java Card API, Card Manager), and
-
native MIFARE application (physically present, but not within the logical
scope because for this TOE the minor configuration option of the
hardware “MIFARE Emulation = A” is mandatory, i. e. MIFARE interface
disabled.)
The software for the application layer (Java applets) is not part of the TOE.
The physical scope is defined by the hardware platform Philips P5CT072V0P
which is certified under registration number BSI-DSZ-CC-0348-2006 on the
level EAL5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3, and AVA_VLA.4 (see
Hardware Security Target [11] and certification report [10].
The logical scope of the TOE is comprised of
-
different communication protocols: ISO 7816 T=1 direct convention, ISO
7816 T=0 direct convention, ISO 7816 T=1 inverse convention, ISO 7816
T=0 inverse convention, ISO 14443 T=CL (contact-less) 8 .
-
cryptographic algorithms and functionality: 3DES (112 and 168 bit keys)
for en-/decryption (CBC and ECB) and signature (MAC) generation and
verification, RSA (1024 up to 2368 bits keys) for en-/decryption and
signature generation and verification, AES (Advanced Encryption
Standard) with key length of 128, 192, and 256 Bit for en-/decryption
(CBC and ECB), SHA-1 hash algorithm, random number generation
according to class K3 of AIS 20 [4]
-
JavaCard 2.2.1 functionality: Garbage Collection fully implemented with
complete memory reclamation incl. compactification
-
GlobalPlatform 2.1.1 functionality: CVM Management (Global PIN) fully
implemented: all described APDU and API interfaces for this feature are
present, Secure Channel Protocol (SCP01, and SCP02) is supported
-
functionality as defined in the JCSPP [9] minimal configuration (i. e. no
post-issuance installation and deletion of applets, packages and objects,
no RMI, no logical channels, no on-card byte code verification), and
-
card manager functionality for pre-issuance loading and management of
packages and applets.
8
Communication via the USB interface was not part of the evaluation
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Byte code verification and applets are not part of the TOE.
The life-cycle for this Java Card is shown in the following table. It is based on
the general smart card life-cycle defined in the smart card hardware platform
protection profile [12] and has been adapted to Java Card specifics.
Phase
Name
Description
1
Smartcard
The Smartcard Embedded Software Developer is in charge
Embedded Software of smartcard embedded software development including the
Development
development of Java applets and specification of IC prepersonalization requirements, though the actual data for IC
pre-personalization come from phase 6 (or phase 4 or 5).
2
IC Development
The IC Designer designs the IC, develops IC Dedicated
Software, provides information, software or tools to the
Smartcard Embedded Software Developer, and receives the
smartcard embedded software from the developer, through
trusted delivery and verification procedures.
From the IC design, IC Dedicated Software and Smartcard
Embedded Software, the IC Designer constructs the smartcard
IC database, necessary for the IC photomask fabrication.
3
IC
Manufacturing The IC Manufacturer is responsible for producing the IC
and Testing
through three main steps: IC manufacturing, IC testing, and IC
prepersonalization.
The IC Mask Manufacturer generates the masks for the IC
manufacturing based upon an output from the smartcard IC
database.
4
IC Packaging and The IC Packaging Manufacturer is responsible for IC
Testing
packaging and testing.
5
Smartcard Product The Smartcard Product Manufacturer is responsible for
Finishing Process
smartcard product finishing process including applet loading
and testing.
6
Smartcard
Personalization
The Personalizer is responsible for smartcard (including
applet) personalization and final tests. Other smartcard
embedded software may be loaded onto the chip at the
personalization process
7
Smartcard
Endusage
The Smartcard Issuer is responsible for smartcard product
delivery to the smartcard end-user, and the end of life process.
Table 1: TOE life cycle
The evaluation process is limited to phases 1 to 4, while delivery is either at the
end of phase 3 or 4 (see also Hardware Security Target [11]).
The applet development is outside the scope of this evaluation. Applets with
patch code can be loaded in phase 3 only. Normal applet loading is only
possible in phases 5 or 6, i. e. no post-issuance loading of applets.
The IT product Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) was evaluated by TÜV
Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle IT-Sicherheit. The evaluation was
B-4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Certification Report
completed on 11. July 2006. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH, Prüfstelle ITSicherheit is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 9 recognised by BSI.
The sponsor and vendor is IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH, the distributor
is Philips Semiconductor GmbH.
1.1
Assurance package
The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in part 3 of the Common Criteria (see Annex C or [1], part
3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level
EAL 4 + (Evaluation Assurance Level augmented). The following table shows
the augmented assurance components.
Requirement
Identifier
EAL4
TOE evaluation: methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
+: ADV_IMP.2
Development – Implementation of the TSF
+: ALC_DVS.2
Life cycle support – Sufficiency of security measures
Table 2: Assurance components and EAL-augmentation
1.2
Functionality
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) selected in the Security
Target are Common Criteria Part 2 extended as shown in the following tables.
The following SFRs are taken from CC part 2:
Security Functional Requirement
Addressed issue
Firewall Policy
9
FDP
User data protection
FDP_ACC.2/Firewall
Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1/Firewall
Security attribute based access control
FDP_IFC.1/JCVM
Subset Information flow control
FDP_IFF.1/JCVM
Simple security attributes
FDP_RIP.1/Objects
Subset residual information protection
FMT
Security Management
FMT_MSA.1/JCRE
Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.2/JCRE
Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3/Firewall
Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMR.1/JCRE
Security roles
FPT
Protection of the TSF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Security Functional Requirement
Addressed issue
FPT_SEP.1
TSF domain separation
Application programming Interface
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation
FCS_CKM.2
Cryptographic key distribution
FCS_CKM.3
Cryptographic key access
FCS_CKM.4
Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1/Triple DES
Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/AES
Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/RSAChiper
Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/MAC
Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/RSASignatureISO9796
Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/RSASignaturePKCS#1
Cryptographic operation
FCS_COP.1/SHA-1
Cryptographic operation
FDP
User data protection
FDP_RIP.1/APDU
Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1/bArray
Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1/Transient
Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1/Abort
Subset residual information protection
FDP_RIP.1Keys
Subset residual information protection
FDP_ROL.1/Firewall
Basic rollback
Card Security Management
FAU
Security audit
FAU_ARP.1/JCS
Security alarms
FDP
User data protection
FDP_SDI.2
Stored data integrity monitoring and action
FPT
Protection of the TSF
FPT_RVM.1
Non-bypassability of the TSF
FPT_FLS.1/JCS
Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_TST.1
TSF testing
FPR
Privacy
FPR_UNO.1
Unobservability
AID Management
FMT
Security Management
FMT_MTD.1/JCRE
Management of TSF data
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Security Functional Requirement
Addressed issue
FMT_MTD.3
Secure TSF data
FIA
Identification and authentication
FIA_ATD.1/AID
User attribute definition
FIA_UID.2/ATD
User identification before any action
FIA_USB.1
User-subject binding
SCPG Security Functional
Requirements
FPT
Protection of the TSF
FPT_AMT.1/SCP
Abstract machine testing
FPT_FLS.1/SCP
Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_PHP.3/SCP
Resistance to physical attack
FPT_RVM.1/SCP
Non-bypassability of the TSF
FRU
Resource utilization
FRU_FLT.2/SCP
Limited fault tolerance
FPT_SEP.1/SCP
TSF domain separation
CMGRG Security Functional
Requirements
FDP_ACC.1/CMGR
Subset access control
FDP_ACF.1/CMGR
Security attribute based access control
FMT
Security Management
FMT_MSA.1/CMGR
Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.3/CMGR
Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMR.1/CMGR
Security roles
FIA
Identification and authentication
FIA_UID.1/CMGR
Timing of identification
Further Functional Requirements not
contained in [9]
FDP
User data protection
FDP_ETC.1
Export of user data without security
attributes
FDP_ITC.1
Import of user data without security
attributes
FIA
Identification and authentication
FIA_AFL.1/PIN
Authentication failure handling
FIA_AFL.1/CMGR
Authentication failure handling
FIA_UAU.1
Timing of authentication
FIA_UAU.3/CMGR
Unforgeable authentication
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Security Functional Requirement
Addressed issue
FIA_UAU.4/CMGR
Single-use authentication mechanisms
FTP
Trusted path/channels
FTP_ITC.1/CMGR
Inter-TSF trusted channel
FAU
Security audit
FAU_SAA.1
Potential violation analysis
FMT
Security Management
FMT_SMF.1
Specification of Management Functions
Table 3: SFRs for the TOE taken from CC Part 2
The following CC part 2 extended SFRs are defined:
Security Functional Requirement
Addressed issue
FMT
Security Management
FMT_LIM.1
Limited capabilities
FMT_LIM.2
Limited availability
FCS
Cryptographic support
FCS_RND.1
Quality Metric for random numbers
FPT
Protection of the TSF
FPT_EMSEC.1
TOE Emanation
Table 4: SFRs for the TOE, CC part 2 extended
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.1.
The following Security Functional Requirements are defined for the ITEnvironment of the TOE:
Security Functional Requirement
Addressed issue
Byte Code Verification
FDP
User data protection
FDP_IFC.2/BCV
Complete information flow control
FDP_IFF.2/BCV
Hierarchical security attributes
FMT
Security Management
FMT_MSA.1/BCV
Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.2/BCV
Secure security attributes
FMT_MSA.3/BCV
Static attribute initialization
FMT_SMR.1/BCV
Security roles
FRU
Resource utilization
FRU_RSA.1/BCV
Maximum quotas
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Security Functional Requirement
Addressed issue
Trusted Channel
FTP
Trusted path/channels
FTP_ITC.1/ENV
Inter-TSF trusted channel – none
Table 5: SFRs for the IT-Environment
Note: only the titles of the Security Functional Requirements are provided. For
more details and application notes please refer to the ST chapter 5.3.
In addition there is a security requirement defined for the Non-IT Environment,
R.ICManufacturer (IC Design, manufacturing and testing), which is related to
the need for confidentiality and integrity of the Smart Card Native Operating
System manufacturing (see ST chapter 5.4).
These Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the TOE Security
Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.AccessControl
enforces the access control
SF.Audit
Audit functionality
SF.CryptoKey
Cryptographic key management
SF.CryptoOperation
Cryptographic operation
SF.I&A
Identification and authentication
SF.SecureManagement
Secure management of TOE resources
SF.PIN
PIN management
SF.Transaction
Transaction management
SF.Hardware
TSF of the underlying IC
Table 6: TOE security functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.
1.3
Strength of Function
The TOE’s strength of functions is claimed ‘high’ (SOF-high) for specific
functions as indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2).
For details see chapter 9 of this report.
1.4
Summary of threats and Organisational Security Policies
(OSPs) addressed by the evaluated IT product
Assets are divided in primary and secondary assets. As primary assets User
Data and TSF Data are further refined. The TOE objective is to protect the
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
primary assets, during usage phase. In order to protect these primary assets,
information and tools used for the development and manufacturing of the Smart
Card, need to be protected. These information and tools are called secondary
assets.
•
Primary assets: TOE including NOS (Native Operating System ) code,
TSF data, as initialization data, configuration data, cryptographic keys,
random numbers for key generation, and all data used by the TOE to
execute its security functions. This includes also configuration of
hardware specific security features; User Data, as application code
(applets), specific sensitive application values, as well as application
specific PIN and authentication data.
•
Secondary assets: IC development and manufacturing related
information, handled by the IC manufacturer during phase 2 and 3 as IC
specification; IC dedicated software; NOS development related
information handled by NOS developer during phase 1; TOE
documentation exchanged between IC manufacturer and NOS developer
as IC data sheet, IC user guidance, NOS mask related information; TOE
documentation delivered to IC packaging or Smartcard product
manufacturer as initialization data or other sensitive information for usage
phase 4 to 7.
For more details on the definition of assets refer to the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
As subjects active components of the TOE that (essentially) act on behalf of
users are considered. The main subjects of the TOE considered are the
following ones taken from the JCSPP [9]:
•
Packages used on the Java Card platform that act on behalf of the applet
developer. These subjects are involved in the FIREWALL security policy
and they should be understood as instances of the subject S.PACKAGE.
•
The CardManager, can be considered a special instance of S.PACKAGE
which implements the Open Platform specification. This package
provides the functionality of a runtime environment running at the JCRE
‘system’ (privileged) context and for clarity is always represented by the
subject S.PACKAGE(CM).
•
The JCRE, which acts on behalf of the card issuer. This subject is
involved in several of the security policies defined in this document and is
always represented by the subject S.JCRE.
The threats are partly taken from JCSPP [9] and others are specifically defined.
The following threats are not taken from JCSPP:
Threats on TOE environment:
•
B-10
T.DEV_IC on theft, modification, disclosure of information related to IC
development and manufacturing. This includes disclosure/modification of
the NOS code by the IC manufacturer. This threat addresses the
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Certification Report
information handled by the IC manufacturer in the IC development and
manufacturing environment (phases 2 and 3).
•
T.DEV_NOS on theft, modification, or disclosure of NOS related
information during NOS development. This threat addresses the
information handled by the NOS Developer during phase 1.
•
T.DEL_IC_NOS on theft, modification, disclosure of information related to
IC or NOS during delivery between IC manufacturer and NOS Developer.
This threat addresses the delivery process used for information
exchange between the IC manufacturer and the NOS developer.
•
T.DEL on theft, modification, disclosure of information related to TOE
during delivery to IC packaging manufacturer or Smart Card
manufacturer or personalization. This threat addresses the delivery
process used for information transfer to IC packaging, Smart Card
Manufacturer, or Personalizer.
The TOE is intended to protect itself against the following threats in the phases
4 to 7: Manipulation of User Data and of the Smart Card Native Operating
System (while being executed/processed and while being stored in the TOE’s
memories) and Disclosure of User Data and of the Smart Card NOS (while
being processed and while being stored in the TOE’s memories). Therefore, the
following threats are defined as so called software threats:
•
T.ACCESS_DATA on unauthorized access to sensitive information
stored in memories in order to disclose or to corrupt the TOE data (TSF
and user data). This includes any consequences of bad or incorrect user
authentication by the TOE.
•
T.OS_OPERATE on modification of the correct NOS behaviour by
unauthorized use of TOE or use of incorrect or unauthorized instructions
or commands or sequence of commands, in order to obtain an
unauthorized execution of the TOE code.
•
T.OS_DECEIVE on Modification of the expected TOE configuration by
unauthorized loading of code, unauthorized execution of code,
unauthorized modification of code behaviour
The following threats are defined as so called environment threats on the
complete TOE:
•
T.LEAKAGE on exploitation of information which is leaked from the TOE
during usage of the Smart Card in order to disclose the confidential
primary assets.
•
T.FAULT on causing a malfunction of TSF or of the Smart Card
embedded NOS by applying environmental stress in order to (1)
deactivate or modify security features or functions of the TOE or (2)
deactivate or modify security functions of the Smart Card embedded
NOS.
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•
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
The threat T.RND on random numbers is about Deficiency of Random
Numbers
The following threats are taken from JCSPP:
•
T.PHYSICAL on discloses or modification of the design of the TOE, its
sensitive data (TSF and User Data) or application code or disabling of
security features of the TOE.
•
T.CONFID-JCS-CODE on executing an application without authorization
to disclose the Java Card System code.
•
T.CONFID-APPLI-DATA on executing an application
authorization to disclose data belonging to another application.
•
T.CONFID-JCS-DATA on executing an application without authorization
to disclose data belonging to the Java Card System.
•
T.INTEG-APPLI-CODE on executing an application to alter (part of) its
own or another application’s code.
•
T.INTEG-JCS-CODE on executing an application to alter (part of) the
Java Card System code.
•
T.INTEG-APPLI-DATA on executing an application to alter (part of)
another application’s data.
•
T.INTEG-JCS-DATA on executing an application to alter (part of) Java
Card System or API data.
•
T.SID.1 on impersonating another application, or even the JCRE, in order
to gain illegal access to some resources of the card or with respect to the
end user or the terminal.
•
T.SID.2 on modification of the identity of the privileged roles.
•
T.EXE-CODE.1 on unauthorized execution of a method.
•
T.EXE-CODE.2 on unauthorized execution of a method fragment or
arbitrary data.
•
T.NATIVE on trying to execute a native method to bypass some security
function such as the firewall.
•
T.RESOURCES on preventing correct operation of the Java Card
System through consumption of some resources of the card:
without
A policy OSP.IC_ORG is defined on the need for procedures dealing with
physical, personnel, organizational, technical measures for the confidentiality
and integrity, of Smart Card Native Operating System and IC Manufacturer
proprietary information in IC development and manufacturing and procedures to
ensure confidentiality and integrity of information during exchange with the NOS
developer.
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1.5
Certification Report
Special configuration requirements
The evaluation process is limited to phases 1 to 4, while delivery is either in
phase 3 or 4. The administrator guidance includes all information for
prepersonalization including ROM mask configuration via FabKey (phase 3) and
for smart card finishing and personalizing including applet loading (phases 3, 5,
6).
1.6
Assumptions about the operating environment
The assumptions are defined for the different phases of the TOE life cycle:
•
Assumption A.DLV_PROTECT on the TOE delivery process (phases 4 to
7) to guarantee the control of the TOE delivery and storage process and
conformance to its objectives.
•
Assumption A.TEST_OPERATE on phases 4 to 6 for security procedures
to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its
manufacturing and test data and on appropriate functionality testing of
the TOE.
•
Assumption A.USE_DIAG on phase 7 for the usage of secure
communication protocols offered by TOE.
•
Assumption A.USE_KEYS on phase 7 for confidentiality and integrity of
keys.
•
Assumptions used from JCSPP [9] are:
•
A.NATIVE on conformance of native code with the TOE not to violate the
security policies and objectives.
•
A.NO-DELETION related to phase 7 for impossibility of deletion of
installed applets (or packages).
•
A.NO-INSTALL related to phase 7 for impossibility of post-issuance
installation of applets.
•
A.VERIFICATION related to phases 1-6 that all the bytecodes are
verified at least once before the loading.
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 3.3.
1.7
Disclaimers
The Certification Results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the
Certificate and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in
this Certification Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product
by the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation
that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT
product by BSI or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
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2
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2)
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
1
Philips P541G072VOP
(JCOP 41 v2.2)
Chip including ROM mask
and EEPROM patch
Mask ID: 0x24
Sawn Wafer or embedded into
specific module package (see
[11]
HW /
SW
Mask name:
PH522D
Patch ID: 0x04
2
DOC
User Guidance Philips
P541G072V0P (JCOP 41
v2.2) Secure Smart Card
Controller [13],
Version 1.6, 31.
March 2006
Electronic PDF document,
encrypted and signed
3
DOC
Administrator Guidance
Philips P541G072V0P
(JCOP 41 v2.2) Secure
Smart Card Controller [14],
Version 1.5, 06.
June 2006
Electronic PDF document,
encrypted and signed
Table 7: Deliverables of the TOE
The Philips P541G072VOP (JCOP 41 v2.2) includes the hardware chip
P5CT072V0P. It can be identified by the administrator in phases 3-5 by
determination of Device Coding Byte DC2 as outlined in [10]. The value 11 hex
in Device Coding Byte DC2 identifies the chip P5CT072. For that, the
administrator sends either APDU ‘DFB0FFDC04’ (possessing the
ADMIN_ROOTKEY) or encrypted APDU ‘0020000008D2C8FCD61B6C8CF0’
(using Transport Key, related to Fabkey-ID=1B) to the TOE. In both cases he
will receive ‘410711009000’ indicating P5CT072 as HW platform.
In addition the customer can use the so called nameplate (on-chip code on the
surface of the chip) to make sure that the evaluated version of the chip has
been delivered. This on-chip code is printed onto the chip during production.
This code also corresponds to the version of the chip and can therefore be used
to check it. The nameplate for the waferfab in Singapore (SSMC) is T023P
where (i)‘T’ identifies the waferfab, (ii)‘023’ identifies the P5CT072 (and its
possible configurations) and (iii) where ‘P’ identifies the version V0P.
The delivered HW/SW at the end of phase 3 or 4 is protected by applying the
Philips Fabkey-procedure.
3
Security Policy
The TOE is the composition of an IC, IC Dedicated Software and Smart Card
Embedded Software and is intended to be used as a Java Card platform and to
be equipped with Java applets conformant to the Java Card standard.
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Certification Report
The Java Card virtual machine (JCVM) is responsible for ensuring languagelevel security. The basic runtime security feature imposed by the JCRE
enforces isolation of applets using an applet firewall. It prevents objects created
by one applet from being used by another applet without explicit sharing. This
prevents unauthorized access to the fields and methods of class instances, as
well as the length and contents of arrays.
The applet firewall is considered as the most important security feature. It
enables complete isolation between applets or controlled communication
through additional mechanisms that allow them to share objects when needed.
The JCVM should ensure that the only way for applets to access any resources
are either through the JCRE or through the Java Card API (or other vendorspecific APIs).
The Card Manager is responsible for the management of applets in the card. No
post-issuance loading and deletion of applets is allowed for the present TOE.
The platform also provides cryptographic algorithms and functionality for 3DES,
AES, RSA and SHA-1.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
For assumptions see chapter 1.6 above.
The TOE provides a secure operating platform in case the assumptions,
guidance and obligations are fulfilled. The scope of the TOE does not include
any applet and thus it can not implement a specific card issuer or end user
security policy by itself. A card issuer or end user security policy and the
functionality of applets needs to be examined when specific applets are
considered to be loaded onto this platform. Specific APIs were not part of the
TSF (see below).
5
Architectural Information
Security Target [6], chapter 2.1 provides a high level overview about the
architecture of the TOE. This high level concept is implemented by subsystems
of the TOE as summarized in the following:
API Mapping Layer:
•
The API_JavaCard module provides the API interface according to the
Java Card 2.2.1 Application Programming Interface, June 2002. The API
includes runtime, communication and crypto functions. This module
implements the functionality using the Java System Layer APIs or directly
maps the methods to the native System Layer.
•
The API_GP module provides the API interface according to the Global
Platform Card Specification, Version 2.1.1, March 2003. The API
includes card management and security functions. This module
implements the functionality using the Java System Layer APIs or directly
maps the methods to the native System Layer.
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Certification Report
•
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
The API_OP, API_BIO and API_Korean are not within the scope of the
TSF.
Java System Layer:
•
JS_CardManager: The card manager is a special application with system
rights, which is responsible for the administration of the smart card. It
provides services to JavaCard applets over API interfaces and services
to off card entities over APDU interfaces. This includes authentication as
well as loading, installing and deleting of JavaCard packages and
applets.
•
JS_System (Internal System API): The JS_System module provides the
API interface to special internal native functions and various helper
functions required for the implementation of the standard APIs and the
CardManager application. It directly maps to the native S_System
module in the System Layer. Additionally it defines the layout for ROM
and EEPROM regions and a number of constants shared between the
native and the Java layers.
•
JS_JZ System (JZSystem API): It provides the low-level Java API
interface for cryptographic functions. It is used for implementation of the
standard cypto API and the Card Manager implementation. It directly
maps to the native S_Crypto module in the System Layer.
System Layer:
•
S_VM: The S_VM module provides the JavaCard bytecode interpreter as
defined in the JavaCard Virtual Machine specification. This module
implements the interpreter loop and all of the virtual machine's byte code
instructions. It is used by the S_JCRE module to execute JavaCard
applications or system library code.
•
S_JCRE: The S_JCRE module implements the runtime behaviour
required by the JavaCard Runtime Environment specification. This
includes command processing, applet control and memory management.
•
S_System: The S_System module provides the common (i.e., hardwareindependent) glue between high-level Java API and lower-level HAL
implementations. This includes parameter and bounds checks as well as
parameter and return value conversions. Additionally it implements
common utility functions (e.g.array copy) and hardware-independent runtime functionality.
•
S_Crypto: The S_Crypto module provides the common (i.e. hardwareindependent) glue between the JS_JZSystem module and the
HAL_Crypto implementation. This includes parameter and bounds
checks as well as parameters and return values conversions.
Hardware Abstraction Layer:
•
B-16
HAL_Crypto: The HAL_Crypto module provides low-level cryptographic
libraries. The library functions are performed by the micro controller or by
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Certification Report
dedicated crypto hardware like DES, AES or RSA co-processors.
Hardware-specific details are hidden from upper layers.
•
HAL_System: The HAL_System module provides low-level system
runtime libraries. Hardware-specific details are hidden from upper layers.
•
HAL_IO: The HAL_IO module provides low-level communication
libraries. The library functions are performed by the micro controller or by
dedicated communications hardware like serial UART for contact
interface (ISO 7816) or radio transmitters for contactless interface (ISO
14443). Hardware-specific details are hidden from upper layers.
Hardware Layer:
•
This layer implements certain security functionality. This is done by the
certified hardware (part of the TOE). Information about the hardware
platform can be taken from the Hardware Security Target [11] and
certification report [10].
6
Documentation
The following documentation is provided with the product by the developer to
the customer for secure usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security
Target:
•
User Guidance Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) Secure Smart
Card Controller, Version 1.6, 31. March 2006, IBM, [13],
•
Administrator Guidance Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) Secure
Smart Card Controller, Version 1.5, 06. June 2006, IBM, [14].
The Administrator Guidance addresses the prepersonalization including ROM
mask configuration via FabKey (phase 3) and smart card finishing and
personalizing including applet loading (phases 3, 5, 6). The User Guidance
addresses the applet developer (phase 1).
7
IT Product Testing
The TOE has been tested using automated test tools together with automated
comparison of expected and actual test results.
Developer’s testing approach:
The TOE has been tested as a composite product according to Java Card
specifications by the main test suites used during integration, system, function
and performance test: (i) JavaCard - TCK tests, (ii) GlobalPlatform (GP) - Offical
GP test suites and (iii) VISA GlobalPlatform - Test suite. During development
additional UNIT tests have been performed. This has been done with internal
tools, test applet(s) and test script(s) on an emulator and on basis of the source
code.
Therefore the developer’s approach of testing the TOE is that the required
functions and supported options of the card are correctly implemented and work
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
as expected. The developer also employs code reviews as an alternate testing
approach for testing of internal mechanisms or implementation of external
requirements.
The developer has tested the TOE systematically at the level of TSF
functionality according to FSP and of the HLD subsystems. The developer’s
testing results demonstrate that the TSF performs as specified.
Independent Evaluator Testing according to ATE_IND:
The TOE under test was the composite smartcard TOE as defined in table 7.
Two physical configurations were used for testing: (i) contactless only chip
(embedded in card body) and (ii) chip with contact and contactless interface
available (as SO28 chip). Since the tests of the developer are of the kind of
exhaustive specification testing, the testing approach of the evaluator has been
to rerun specific test suites of the TOE.
The evaluator has performed additional tests on top of and different from the
developer’s testing for all security functions using both physical configurations.
The independent testing was performed using an equivalent set of test tools.
During the evaluator’s independent testing the TOE operated as specified.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VLA
The penetration testing approach was based on developer’s vulnerability
analysis and based on the independent vulnerability assessment of the
evaluator. The evaluators approach was to systematically search for potential
vulnerabilities and for known attacks in public domain sources and the use of
actual information from an international working group (ISCI). Analysis why
vulnerabilities are unexploitable in the intended environment of the TOE were
performed assuming low attack potential. To support and to verify the analysis
specific penetration attacks were performed in the course of this evaluation.
During the evaluator’s penetration testing the TOE operated as specified. All
potential vulnerabilities are not exploitable with a low attack potential in the
intended environment for the TOE. Therefore it is concluded that the TOE is
resistant to attackers with low attack potential as claimed in the Security Target.
8
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE was evaluated in the configuration as outlined in table 7 and with the
native MIFARE application physically present, but not within the logical scope
because for this TOE the minor configuration option of the hardware “MIFARE
Emulation = A” is mandatory, i. e. MIFARE interface disabled. The evaluated
Philips P541G072VOP (JCOP 41 v2.2) includes the hardware chip
P5CT072V0P as certified under the registration number BSI-DSZ-CC-03482006.
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9
Certification Report
Results of the Evaluation
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), [8] was provided by the ITSEF
according to the Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of
the Scheme [3] and all interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as
relevant for the TOE.
The evaluation methodology CEM [2] was used for those components identical
with EAL4. For components beyond EAL4 the methodology was defined in coordination with the Certification Body [4, AIS 34]). For smart card IC specific
methodology the CC supporting documents
(i)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii)
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(iii)
ETR-lite – for Composition and
ETR-lite – for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation:
Recommended best practice
(see [4, AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36]) were used and the scheme interpretation
[4, AIS 20] (Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic
random number generators) was used. The evaluation was performed as a
composite evaluation process based on the concepts defined ([4, AIS 36]).
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the
course of the evaluation of the TOE.
The verdicts for the CC, Part 3 assurance components (according to EAL 4
augmented and the class ASE for the Security Target evaluation) are
summarised in the following table.
Assurance classes and components
Security Target evaluation
Verdict
CC Class ASE
PASS
TOE description
ASE_DES.1
PASS
Security environment
ASE_ENV.1
PASS
ST introduction
ASE_INT.1
PASS
Security objectives
ASE_OBJ.1
PASS
PP claims
ASE_PPC.1
IT security requirements
ASE_REQ.1
PASS
PASS
Explicitly stated IT security requirements
ASE_SRE.1
PASS
TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.1
PASS
Configuration management
CC Class ACM
PASS
Partial CM automation
ACM_AUT.1
PASS
Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_CAP.4
PASS
Development tools CM coverage
ACM_SCP.2
PASS
Delivery and operation
CC Class ADO
PASS
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Assurance classes and components
Verdict
Detection of modification
ADO_DEL.2
PASS
Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
ADO_IGS.1
PASS
Development
CC Class ADV
PASS
Semiformal functional specification
ADV_FSP.2
PASS
Semiformal high-level design
ADV_HLD.2
PASS
Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2
PASS
Descriptive low-level design
ADV_LLD.1
PASS
Semiformal correspondence demonstration
ADV_RCR.1
PASS
Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_SPM.1
PASS
Guidance documents
CC Class AGD
PASS
Administrator guidance
AGD_ADM.1
PASS
User guidance
AGD_USR.1
PASS
Life cycle support
CC Class ALC
PASS
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_DVS.2
PASS
Standardised life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.1
PASS
Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.1
PASS
Tests
CC Class ATE
PASS
Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.2
PASS
Testing: low-level design
ATE_DPT.1
PASS
Functional testing
ATE_FUN.1
PASS
Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.2
PASS
Vulnerability assessment
CC Class AVA
PASS
Validation of analysis
AVA_MSU.2
PASS
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_SOF.1
PASS
Independent vulnerability analysis
AVA_VLA.2
PASS
Table 8: Verdicts for the assurance components
The evaluation has shown that:
•
Security Functional Requirements specified for the TOE are Common
Criteria Part 2 extended
•
the assurance of the TOE is Common Criteria Part 3 conformant, EAL4
augmented by ADV_IMP.2 and ALC_DVS.2.
B-20
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
•
Certification Report
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function
SOF high: SF.AccessControl (aspect 1 10 ), SF.CryptoOperation (aspects 7,
8), SF.I&A (aspects 1, 2), SF.SecureManagement (aspect 6), SF.PIN
(aspects 1,2,3) and SF.Hardware as outlined in the hardware certification
report [10]. The random number generator (SF.CryptoOperation aspect 7)
was evaluated to fulfil [4, AIS 20] class K3 requirements with strength high.
The rating of the strength of functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms
suitable for encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause
2). This holds for SF.CryptoKey (aspect 11 1, 2, 3) and SF.CryptoOperation
(aspects 1 to 6) and for other usage of encryption and decryption within the
TOE.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the Java Card Platform
Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) as outlined in chapter 2 and chapter 8 of
this report and produced in an evaluated site.
Regarding the development and production environment the sites listed in the
hardware certification report [10] apply for the TOE. For TOE software
development the IBM sites in Boeblingen and Zurich 12 were part of the
evaluation process. Sites for the life cycle phases 5 (Smartcard Product
Finishing Process) and 6 (Smartcard Personalization) were not part of the
evaluation process.
The underlying hardware had been successfully evaluated by T-Systems GEI
GmbH, Prüfstelle für IT-Sicherheit, an evaluation facility (ITSEF) recognised by
BSI and, is certified under the ID BSI-DSZ-CC-0348-2006 (see [10]).
The validity can be extended to new versions and releases of the product,
provided the sponsor applies for re-certification or assurance continuity of the
modified product, in accordance with the procedural requirements, and the
evaluation of the modified product does not reveal any security deficiencies.
10
Comments/Recommendations
The operational documents [13] and [14] contain necessary information about
the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered.
10
The aspects are those functionalities numbered within the description of the security
function in the Security Target chapter 6.1.x
11
The aspects are those functionalities numbered within the description of the security
function in the Security Target chapter 6.1.x
12
IBM Deutschland Entwicklung GmbH, Schoenaicher Str. 220, D-71032 Boeblingen
IBM Research GmbH, Zurich Research Laboratory, Säumerstrasse 4 / Postfach CH-8803
Rüschlikon, Switzerland
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11
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Annexes
None.
12
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the security target [7] of the target of evaluation
(TOE) is provided within a separate document. It is a sanitized version of the
complete security target [6] used for the evaluation performed.
13
Definitions
13.1 Acronyms
AID
Application identifier, an ISO-7816 data format used for unique
identification of Java Card applications
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit, an ISO 7816-4 defined
communication format between the card and the off-card
applications.
applet
The name is given to a Java Card technology-based user
application
BCV
Byte Code Verifier (here off-card verifier)
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal
Office for Information Security, Bonn, Germany
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CM
Card Manger
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable ROM
ES
Embedded Software
HAL
Hardware Abstraction Layer
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
JCRE
Java Card Runtime Environment
JCVM
Java Card Virtual Machine
NOS
Native Operating System
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
ROM
Read Only Memory
RTE
Runtime Environment
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
SCP
Smart Card Platform
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SOF
Strength of Function
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
VM
Virtual Machine
Certification Report
13.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC
Part 3 to an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not
contained in part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the
CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics
based on well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and
upon which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for
enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used
as the basis for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined
semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing
the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security
behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows
that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or
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intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack
potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that
the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or
organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack
potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated
administrator and user guidance documentation that is the subject of an
evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and
firmware of the TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the
TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed,
protected and distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a
TOE and are subject to the rules of the TSP.
14
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation,
Version 2.3, August 2005
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
(CEM), Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for
the TOE, specifically
B-24
-
AIS 20: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for
deterministic random number generators AIS 20, Version 1, 2
December 1999
-
AIS 25, Version 2, 29 July 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits, Version 1.2, July
2002
-
AIS 26, Version 2, 6 August 2002 for: CC Supporting Document, Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards, Version 1.1, July
2002
-
AIS 32, Version 1, 02 July 2001, Übernahme international
abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
-
AIS 34, Version 1.00, 1 June 2004, Evaluation Methodology for
CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
-
Certification Report
AIS 36, Version 1, 29 July 2002 for:
CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for Composition, Version 1.1,
July 2002 and CC Supporting Document, ETR-lite for
Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation, Version
1.2 March 2002
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically
updated list published also on the BSI Web-site
[6]
Security Target Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41, v2.2) Secure Smart
Card Controller, Version 2.2, 25. March 2006, IBM Deutschland
Entwicklung GmbH (confidential document)
[7]
Security Target lite Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41, v2.2) Secure Smart
Card Controller, Version 1.0, 21. August 2006, IBM Deutschland
Entwicklung GmbH (sanitized public document)
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report (ETR), Version 3, 10. July 2006, CC
Evaluation of Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) (confidential
document)
[9]
Java Card System – Minimal Configuration Protection Profile (registered
at DCSSI under registration number PP/0303) as part of Java Card
System Protection Profile Collection, Version: 1.0b, August 2003
[10]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0348-2006 for Philips Secure Smart
Card Controller P5CT072V0P, P5CC072V0P, P5CD072V0P and
P5CD036V0P each with specific IC Dedicated Software from Philips
Semiconductors GmbH Business Line Identification, Version 1.0, 28.
March 2006, BSI
[11]
Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-CC-0348 Evaluation of the Philips
P5CT072V0P, P5CC072V0P, P5CD072V0P and P5CD036V0P Secure
Smart Card Controller, Version 1.2, 17. January 2006 Philips
Semiconductors GmbH Business Line Identification
[12]
Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
registered at the German Certification Body under number BSI-PP-00022001
[13]
User Guidance Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) Secure Smart
Card Controller, Version 1.6, 31. March 2006, IBM
[14]
Administrator Guidance Philips P541G072V0P (JCOP 41 v2.2) Secure
Smart Card Controller, Version 1.5, 06. June 2006, IBM
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements
that is met by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result
is presented with respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3
(assurance requirements) and, if applicable, to a pre-defined set of
requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
a)
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the
functional requirements are based only upon functional components in
CC Part 2.
b)
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the
functional requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
a)
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the
assurance requirements are based only upon assurance components in
CC Part 3.
b)
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the
assurance requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part
3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect
to sets of defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
a)
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a predefined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) include all components in the
packages listed as part of the conformance result.
b)
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a predefined named functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the
requirements (functions or assurance) are a proper superset of all
components in the packages listed as part of the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect
to Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
a)
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of
the conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are
shown in Table 1.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation
Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
ADV: Development
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that
balances the level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of
acquiring that degree of assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate
concepts of assurance in a TOE at the end of the evaluation, and of
maintenance of that assurance during the operational use of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are
included in the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful
and desirable assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and
components will be considered for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and
STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a
hierarchically ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families.
Each number in the resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component
where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation
assurance levels are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance.
They are hierarchically ordered inasmuch as each EAL represents more
assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in assurance from EAL to EAL is
accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher assurance component
from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope, and/or depth)
and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance families
(i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as
described in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no
more than one component of each assurance family and all assurance
dependencies of every component are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other
combinations of assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the
addition of assurance components (from assurance families not already
included in the EAL) or the substitution of assurance components (with another
hierarchically higher assurance component in the same assurance family) to an
EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only EALs may be
augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance component”
is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with it
the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of
the added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended
with explicitly stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0294-2006
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Configuration
management
EAL2
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
ACM_AUT
ACM_CAP
1
2
ACM_SCP
Delivery and
operation
Development
EAL3
ADO_DEL
ADO_IGS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADV_FSP
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
1
1
1
ADV_SPM
Guidance
documents
Life cycle
support
AGD_ADM
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_USR
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
ALC_LCD
1
2
2
3
ALC_TAT
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
Tests
ATE_COV
1
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
Vulnerability
assessment
1
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
1
2
2
3
3
AVA_SOF
1
1
1
1
1
1
AVA_VLA
1
1
2
3
4
4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but
the threats to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where
independent assurance is required to support the contention that due care has
been exercised with respect to the protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer,
including independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the
guidance documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could
be successfully conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE,
and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a
manner consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection
against identified threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of
design information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the
part of the developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such
it should not require a substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a low to moderate level of independently assured security in the
absence of ready availability of the complete development record. Such a
situation may arise when securing legacy systems, or where access to the
developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from
positive security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of
existing sound development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate level of independently assured security, and require a thorough
investigation of the TOE and its development without substantial reengineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and
reviewed (chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though
rigorous, do not require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other
resources. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be economically
feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a moderate to high level of independently assured security in
conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur additional securityspecific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security
engineering based upon rigorous commercial development practices supported
by moderate application of specialist security engineering techniques. Such a
TOE will probably be designed and developed with the intent of achieving EAL5
assurance. It is likely that the additional costs attributable to the EAL5
requirements, relative to rigorous development without the application of
specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users
require a high level of independently assured security in a planned development
and require a rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable
costs attributable to specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and
tested (chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security
engineering techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to
produce a premium TOE for protecting high value assets against significant
risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for
application in high risk situations where the value of the protected assets
justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in
extremely high risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies
the higher costs. Practical application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with
tightly focused security functionality that is amenable to extensive formal
analysis.“
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Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted,
it may still be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept
of its underlying security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their
security behaviour can be made using the results of a quantitative or statistical
analysis of the security behaviour of these mechanisms and the effort required
to overcome them. The qualification is made in the form of a strength of TOE
security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of
the TOE or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to
violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover
flaws that will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the
ability to interfere with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised
capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the
presence of security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of
all the TOE deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance
level. The developer is required to document the disposition of identified
vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to make use of that information if it is found
useful as a support for the evaluator's independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by
the developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the
TOE is resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a
low (for AVA_VLA.2 Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for
AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant)
attack potential.”
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