Certification Report: 0436a_pdf

Certification Report: 0436a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0436-2009
for
Microsoft Exchange Server 2007 Enterprise
Edition (English)
Version/Build 08.02.0176.002
from
Microsoft Corporation
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
ZS-01-01-F-326 V4.30
BSI-DSZ-CC-0436-2009
e-mail Server
Microsoft Exchange Server 2007 Enterprise Edition (English)
Version/Build 08.02.0176.002
from
Microsoft Corporation
PP Conformance:
None
Functionality:
product specific Security Target;
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 16 November 2009
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn - Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0436-2009
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Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates..................................................8
2.2 International Recognition of CC - Certificates.........................................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the certification result.....................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................15
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................18
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................18
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE........................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................20
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................23
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................33
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Certification Report
A Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005)5
[1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
●
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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2.1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0436-2009
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC - Certificates
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for certificates based on ITSEC
became initially effective in March 1998.
This agreement on the mutual recognition of IT security certificates was extended in April
1999 to include certificates based on the Common Criteria for the Evaluation Assurance
Levels (EAL 1 – EAL 7). This agreement was signed by the national bodies of Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United
Kingdom. The German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) recognises certificates
issued by the national certification bodies of France and United Kingdom, and from The
Netherlands since January 2009 within the terms of this agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
2.2
International Recognition of CC - Certificates
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Microsoft Exchange Server 2007 Enterprise Edition (English) Version/Build
08.02.0176.002 has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product Microsoft Exchange Server 2007 Enterprise Edition (English)
Version/Build 08.02.0176.002 was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The
evaluation was completed on 01 October 2009. The TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an
evaluation facility (ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: Microsoft Corporation.
The product was developed by: Microsoft Corporation.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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4
Certification Report
Validity of the certification result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels and the confirmed strength of functions, please
refer to the excerpts from the criteria at the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods may evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods can be re-assessed if required
and the sponsor applies for the certified product being monitored within the assurance
continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme. It is recommended to perform a reassessment on a regular basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product Microsoft Exchange Server 2007 Enterprise Edition (English)
Version/Build 08.02.0176.002 has been included in the BSI list of the certified products,
which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further
information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
Microsoft Corporation
One Microsoft Way
Redmond
WA 98052-6399
USA
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B Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0436-2009
Executive Summary
The TOE is the product Microsoft Exchange Server 2007 Enterprise Edition (English)
Version/Build 08.02.0176.002 (hereinafter called “Exchange 2007“). The TOE is a
messaging system, more precisely an e-mail and collaboration server providing secure
access to personal and shared data to a variety of clients using various protocols. Using
Exchange 2007, users throughout an organization can access e-mail, voice mail,
calendars, and contacts from a ariety of devices and from any location.
It is possible to connect to the TOE by using different clients. The different clients are
categorised into the following groups:
●
Generic Client (also known as Internet Client): A client of this type could be any mail
client that uses SMTP to connect to the TOE or a web browser that uses HTTP or Web
Services to connect to the TOE.
●
Outlook client: In contrast to the generic Clients, an Outlook client uses RPC (or RPC
over http) to connect to the TOE.
In addition to the above clients, the TOE allows users to connect using a standard or IP
telephone via Outlook Voice Access. To use standard telephones, a PBX must be
connected to the TOE. A PBX may also forward IP calls.
The Unified Messaging server role in Exchange 2007 lets users access voice mail, e-mail,
fax messages, and calendar information located in their Exchange 2007 mailbox from an
e-mail client such as Microsoft Outlook or Outlook Web Access, from a mobile device that
has Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync enabled.
Furthermore, the SMTP protocol can be used by a SMTP server to connect to the TOE.
The scope of the TOE ends at the interfaces where it provides its services and does not
include any functionality of any client. Therefore all clients that can be used to connect to
the TOE are not addressed during the evaluation.
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is not based on a certified
Protection Profile.
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL4
augmented by ALC_FLR.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 5.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some
of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.]
The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.3.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.SM
Security Management
SF.AC
Access Control
SF.CF
Connection Filtering
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TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
SF.MF
Message filtering
SF.AF
Attachment Filtering
SF.TF
Transport Filtering
SF.I&A
Identification and Authentication
SF.DGR
Distribution Group Restriction
SF.QTA
Mailbox and public folder quota
Table 1: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 6.1.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'medium' (SOF-medium) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6], chapter 5.4 is confirmed.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3.
Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Microsoft Exchange Server 2007 Enterprise Edition (English)
Version/Build 08.02.0176.002
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
1
Base TOE Binaries:
Version/Build
08.02.0176.002
DVD-ROM (boxed,
COTS software)
File name:
E2K7SP2EN64.exe
Download from
website:
https://secure.tuvit.de
SW
Microsoft Exchange Server
2007 Enterprise Edition
(English)
2
SW
TOE update:
Service Pack 2 of Microsoft
Exchange Server 2007
Enterprise Edition (English)
File size: 927.226.128
Bytes
SHA-1 hash value:
B302A90819DE0217545D
63E511591F3A5B3D9F43
3
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DOC
Microsoft Exchange Server Version 1.10
2007 Enterprise Edition
Date: 2009-09-28
Common Criteria Evaluation
– Guidance Addendum [9].
Download from
website:
https://secure.tuvit.de
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0436-2009
No Type
Identifier
Release
Form of Delivery
4
Guidance:
File name: ExchHelp.chm
Microsoft Exchange Server
2007 Help [10]
SHA-1:
89C3A03E89B64E224A0
D26E24B94B77C2E2264
BC
Download from
website:
https://secure.tuvit.de
DOC
File size: 22.662.404
Bytes
August 2009
5
SW
TOE verification tool:
File Checksum Integrity
Verifier (FCIV) utility
File name: windowskb841290-x86-enu.exe
Version 1.4
Download from
website:
https://secure.tuvit.de
File size: 119.600 bytes
SHA-1 hash value:
99fb35d97a5ee0df703f0c
dd02f2d787d6741f65
6
DATA
Checksums to be verified by File name:
FCIV:
checkfiles_ex2k7(sp2).zip
Integrity Check Validation
File size: 109.770 bytes
Data: SHA-1 hash values for
SHA-1 hash value:
Exchange Server 2007
19F62B8B115C0B5D0E3
Enterprise Edition and SP2
B3F1FA3AF0C61A2893D
84
Download from
website:
https://secure.tuvit.de
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
Note that a help file is already delivered on the product-DVD. Nevertheless a newer
version which also covers the issues of SP2 is released on the internet. That help-file [10]
is the main guidance documentation for the purposes of this certification aspect whereas
the addendum [9] extends [10] to CC related issues.
Please note that the DVD contains elements that exceed the TOE and that are not part of
the evaluation. For the evaluated scope please read the Security Target [6] as well as the
Guidance Addendum [9].
To identify the TOE use the Exchange Management Shell and execute the command ‘getExchangeServer | fl‘. Within the field ‘AdminDisplayVersion’ as part of the returned
attributes the TOE will display ‘Version 8.2 (build 176.2)’ which corresponds with build
08.02.0176.002. Within the field ‘Edition’ as part of the returned attributes the TOE will
display the information ‘Enterprise’. The Enterprise Edition marks the TOE.
The Exchange Server package shipped physically is equipped with a label, i.e. the
Certificate of Authenticity (COA) label, particularly including the identifier ‘EXCHANGE
SVR ENT 2007 X64 ENGLISH’ for Exchange Server 2007 Enterprise Edition (English).
This package labelling ensures the TOE identification for consumers at the point of receipt
of the DVD. Additionally, according to the instructions in the Guidance Addendum [9] and
on the web page https://secure.tuvit.de, hash values ensure the integrity of the product
components.
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Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE provides different aspects of security management through
the Exchange Management Shell that is a task-based command line shell which exposes
administration functionality necessary for administering the TOE.
The TOE controls access of users to the types of Exchange Server 2007 data stores which
are mailboxes and public folders. Connection filtering is done by using allow and block lists
which may contain IP addresses, IP address ranges. Message filtering will accept or reject
messages based different rules configurable by the administrator. Attachment filtering
provides the ability to specify that messages which contain a specified attachment or
attachment type will be subject to a predefined action. Transport filtering allows to
configure a set of ordered rules that can be applied to all messages passing through the
Hub Transport server role. Identification and Authentication identifies and authenticates all
users connecting via non-TLS secured Outlook Voice Access. The identity of the user is
represented by the user’s mailbox number or a telephone number that is transmitted from
the PBX to the TOE. Furthermore the TOE supports the restriction of distribution groups by
several security attributes. Another security policy of the TOE is to allow the Exchange
Administrator to set different levels of quotas for size restrictions on a mailbox.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific Security Objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The security objectives
related to the environment of the TOE can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2.
5
Architectural Information
The TOE comprises software installed on Windows servers and its related guidance
documentation. An installation of the TOE can be found in figure 1 of the Security Target
[6] and consists of the following server roles components:
Mailbox Server Role:The Mailbox server role hosts mailbox and public folder databases.
Client Access Server Role: This is the server that hosts the client protocols.
Unified Messaging Server Role: Unified Messaging combines voice messaging, fax,
calendaring and e-mail, which are accessible from a telephone or a computer.
Hub Transport Server Role: This is the mail routing server that routes mail within the
Exchange organization.
Edge Transport Server Role: This is the mail routing server that sits at the perimeter of the
network topology and routes mail into and out of the Exchange organization.
For more information and for a graphical overview of the TOE please read chapter 2.2 of
the Security Target [6].
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
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Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
Developer Tests
Test Configuration
The developer testing was performed on two different configurations. For automated tests
the TOE was configured such that the Edge role was installed on one machine and all
other roles (Unified Messaging, Client Access, Mailbox and Hub Transport) were installed
on another machine. For manual tests the configuration consisted of a network with the
following components (each component is realised on a separate machine): Client Access,
UM & Mailbox, Hub Transport, Firewall, Active Directory, Edge, Test Client, and SIP Client.
All components were connected through hubs.
Test Approach
The developer's tests were conducted to confirm that the TOE meets the security
functional requirements. The tests include both automated tests and manual tests. The
developer's strategy was to test the TOE against the specification of all security enforcing
functions detailed in the developer’s functional specification. The tests cover all security
functions defined in the ST [6].
Test Results
The developer specified, conducted, and documented suitable functional tests for each
security function. The test results obtained for all of the performed tests were as expected.
No errors or other flaws occurred with regard to the security functionality or the
mechanisms defined in the developer’s functional specification. The test results
demonstrate that the behaviour of the security functions is as specified.
All security functions could be tested successfully and the manufacturer provided sufficient
information to describe the realisation of the security functions. The manufacturer was able
to demonstrate that all security functions operate as specified in the developer’s functional
specification.
Independent Evaluator Tests
Test Configuration
The test configuration is similar to the developer’s test configuration and is running on
Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition x64 Edition R2 plus SP 2 (English) with the
patches according to [9], chapter 7.1.
Test Approach
The evaluator aimed to cover all Security Functions which are mentioned in the Security
Target. The evaluator selected test cases addressing the main security features of the
security function. The selected test cases assure that all security functions (as defined in
the ST [6] and described in the developer’s functional specification) are tested regarding
their functional behaviour and all TSP-enforcing subsystems are covered. Additionally the
evaluator conducted independent tests according to each TOE security function as well as
miscellaneous tests, performed manually.
The evaluator's objective regarding these tests was to test the functionality of the TOE as
described in the developer documents and to verify the developer’s test results.
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To verify and reject possible vulnerabilities, the ITSEF also performed a set of penetration
tests based on the developers and the independent vulnerability analysis and containing
proprietary test scripts, different e-mail clients, and third-party penetration testing tools
including a vulnerability scanner to identify possible known vulnerabilities.
Test Results
The independent tests as well as the repeated developer tests confirmed the TOE
functionality as described in the developer documents. Some findings during the testing
lead to minor changes of the test- and guidance documentation and to some clarifications
in the developer’s design documentation upon which the test cases had been created.
Beside this no hints to any errors were given.
Penetration tests have been performed by the evaluation facility with the result that the
TOE is resistant against attacks based upon the level of low attack potential.
According to the intended operational environment, typical attackers possessing basic
attack potential will not be able to exploit the vulnerabilities of the TOE.
8
Evaluated Configuration
Although a help-file (i.e. Guidance) is delivered within the product package DVD,
consumers need to download the evaluated version of the Guidance [10] as well as the
addendum [9]. They need to be downloaded from the secure web-site
https://secure.tuvit.de. Both documents are part of the certified version as they are relevant
for administration and usage of the TOE in the certified version and configuration. The
version of the help-file on the product DVD is out of scope of the certification.
The TOE has to be installed and configured according to the Guidance Addendum [9]
which covers the certified version of the TOE. The certified version includes SP2 of the
product. SP2 is not part of the product package DVD and has to be downloaded from the
secure web-site https://secure.tuvit.de.
The secure product homepage https://secure.tuvit.de gives instructions for the secure
download and verification of all components of the TOE and should be followed. The
Guidance Addendum [9] gives more detailed information about the download of all
components, the verification of the TOE integrity by hash values, the secure installation of
all components, and the certified configuration of the TOE.
Please note that there exists a Standard Version of the product, too. Only the Enterprise
Edition marks the TOE. The Standard Edition is not included in the certificate. Neither is a
32 bit version of the product (which, however, is not contained in the product DVD
anyway.)
The platform for the TOE is Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition x64 Edition R2 plus
SP 2 (English) operating system with patches. The Guidance Addendum [9] chapter 7.1.
gives information about the required patches for the TOE platform.
The platform includes Internet protocol support using the Internet Information Services
(IIS) component in Windows and the Active Directory for directory services.
For administration of the product package, Exchange Server 2007 includes graphical task
pads and wizards. These features simplify navigation and configuration for common tasks.
They are embedded in the Exchange Management Console and do not belong to the TOE.
Therefore the user is advised to use the corresponding cmdlets (A “cmdlet,” pronounced
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"command-let", is the smallest unit of functionality of the Exchange Management Shell) for
administrating purposes (see [9] chapter 5.2.2.).
The features “IMAP4 and POP3 protocols” are included in the Exchange product package
but outside the logical scope of the TOE. Further, the logical scope of the TOE does not
include any functionality of any client. The way external lists for filtering of messages are
compiled and transferred is also out of scope of the evaluation.
Some security functionality of the TOE environment, namely of the operating system, is
used by the TOE which includes aspects of Identification and Authentication, TOE Data
Protection, and TOE Data Management. For details please read the Security Target [6]
which gives information about product features that are excluded from the certification
(chapter 2.3.3) and important functionality of the environment (chapter 2.3.4).
In general, for installation, configuration, and administering the TOE please follow the
Guidance Addendum [9] with its framed important notes.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [7] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4 and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the class ASE
●
All components of the EAL4 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
●
The component ALC_FLR.3 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
None
●
for the Functionality:
product specific Security Target;
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_FLR.3
●
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function: medium
SF.I&A (realised by a probabilistic or permutational mechanism)
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The TOE does not include cryptographic algorithms. Thus, no such mechanisms were part
of the assessment.
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10 Obligations and notes for the usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 2 of this report contain necessary
information about the usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be
considered. Additionally, for secure usage of the TOE the fulfilment of the assumptions
about the environment in the Security Target [6] and the Security Target as a whole has to
be taken into account. Therefore a user/administrator has to follow the guidance in these
documents. Please read also chapter 8 of this report.
The Guidance Addendum Document [9] contains necessary information about the usage
of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be regarded. This mainly (but not entirely)
comprises the following aspects:
●
Assumptions/security objectives of the environment, particularly the requirements for
physical protection of the TOE, protection of the communication channel, secure
installation of the TOE (no untrusted software shall be installed on the machines the
TOE is installed on), secure installation of the platform the TOE is running on and
usage of third party block/allow lists from trustworthy sources only.
●
Instruction how to verify the integrity of the TOE deliverables. The informations are
supplemented by the secure Exchange Server 2007 common criteria web page https://
secure.tuvit.de.
●
Disabling ExOLEDB, CDOEX and WebDAV.
●
Preventing local logon for non-administrators on the TOE systems.
●
Not enabling IMAP4/POP3.
●
Setting the minimum Outlook Voice Access PIN length to 8.
The user of the TOE has to be aware of the existence and purpose of the Guidance
Addendum Document [9]. Therefore, the TOE’s Internet product homepage
(https://secure.tuvit.de) has to provide information about the existence of the document
and describe how to access the document. The reference has to be unambiguous and
permanent.
The TOE itself has to be installed and configured following all instructions given in [9].
The TOE is running on a Windows Server 2003 Enterprise Edition x64 Edition R2 plus SP
2 (English) operating system with all patches as listed in the Guidance Addendum [9]
chapter 7.1.
The developer must publish the secure product homepage
https://secure.tuvit.de
The product homepage must contain all information for a secure download and verification
of the TOE items including SP2, documents, and hash values as specified in this report
and all links to the TOE items as specified in this report, see table 2 in chapter 2.
The links as well as the hash values are required for verification of the components along
with the descriptions for a secure download and the FCIV tool. They have to be present
throughout the validity of this certificate.
11 Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
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12 Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CDOEX
Component Object Model for Exchnge
COA
Certificate of Authenticity
DVD
Digital Versatile Disc
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ExOLEDB
Exchange OLE DB Provider
FCIV
File Checksum Integrity Verifier
HTTP
Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HTTP-DAV Hypertext Transfer Protocol Distributed Authoring and Versioning
IMAP4
Interactive Mail Access Protocol Version 4
IIS
Internet Information Service
IP
Internet Protocol
IT
Information Technology
OLE DB
Object Linking and Embedding, Database
OWA
Outlook Web Access
PBX
Private Branch eXchange
PDA
Personal Digital Assistant
PIN
Personal Identification Number
POP3
Post Office Protocol Version 3
PP
Protection Profile
RPC
Remote Procedure Call
RTM
Release to Manufacturing
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SIP
Session Initiation Protocol
SMTP
Simple Mail Transport Protocol
SOF
Strength of Function
SP
Service Pack
ST
Security Target
TLS
Transport Layer Security
TOE
Target of Evaluation
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TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSFI
TSF Interface
TSP
TOE Security Policy
WebDAV
Web-based Distributed Authoring and Versioning
Certification Report
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
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TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13 Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE.8
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6]
Exchange Server 2007 Common Criteria Evaluation, Security Target, Version 1.38,
Date 2009-09-28
[7]
Microsoft Exchange Server 2007 Enterprise Edition (English) Version/Build
08.02.0176.002, EVALUATION TECHNICAL REPORT, Version 3, Date 2009-10-01,
TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[8]
Configuration list for the TOE: Exchange Server 2007 Common Criteria Evaluation,
Configuration management Exchange Server, Version: 1.05, Date: 2009-09-28;
including all document as referenced in chapter 3.2. (confidential documents)
[9]
Microsoft Exchange Server 2007 Enterprise Edition Common Criteria Evaluation –
Guidance, Addendum, Version 1.10, Date 2009-09-28
[10]
Microsoft Exchange Server 2007 Help, File name ExchHelp.chm, SHA-1 value
89C3A03E89B64E224A0D26E24B94B77C2E2264BC, File size 22.662.404 Bytes,
Date: August 2009
8
specifically
•
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AIS 32, Version 1, 2 July 2001, Übernahme international abgestimmter CC-Interpretationen
ins deutsche Zertifizierungsschema.
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C Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
„The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
–
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
–
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
–
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
–
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
–
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
–
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
–
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation
Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
ADV: Development
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Certification Report
Assurance
Family
Assurance
Components
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Configuration
management
EAL2
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
ACM_AUT
ACM_CAP
1
2
ACM_SCP
Delivery
operation
and ADO_DEL
Development
EAL3
ADO_IGS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADV_FSP
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
1
1
1
ADV_SPM
Guidance
documents
Life
support
AGD_ADM
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_USR
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
ALC_LCD
1
2
2
3
ALC_TAT
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
cycle ALC_DVS
Tests
ALC_FLR
ATE_COV
1
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
Vulnerability
assessment
1
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
1
2
2
3
3
AVA_SOF
1
1
1
1
1
1
AVA_VLA
1
1
2
3
4
4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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D Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
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Security Target provided within a separate document.
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