Certification Report: 0913a_pdf

Certification Report: 0913a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
for
cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 – Java Card applet
configuration providing Machine Readable Travel
Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended
Access Control with PACE
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
CC-Zert-327 V5.04
BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
Electronic ID documents: IC with Applications
cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”,
Extended Access Control with PACE
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance:
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO
Application" Extended Access Control with PACE,
Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02
Machine Readable Travel Document using Standard
Inspection Procedure with PACE, Version 1.0,
2.11.2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and
AVA_VAN.5
The IT Product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and CC
Supporting Documents as listed in the Certification Report for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1. CC and CEM are also
published as ISO/IEC 15408 and ISO/IEC 18045.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its
evaluated configuration and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification
scheme of the German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions
of the evaluation facility in the evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence
adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT Product by the Federal Office for
Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT Product by the Federal Office for Information
Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is
either expressed or implied.
SOGIS
Recognition Agreement
Common Criteria
Recognition Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
Bonn, 22 December 2014
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber
Head of Division
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn -
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
This page is intentionally left blank.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
Contents
A. Certification........................................................................................................................7
1. Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2. Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
3. Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4. Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5. Publication......................................................................................................................9
B. Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1. Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2. Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3. Security Policy..............................................................................................................17
4. Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17
5. Architectural Information...............................................................................................17
6. Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7. IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................18
8. Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................20
9. Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................21
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11. Security Target............................................................................................................23
12. Definitions...................................................................................................................23
13. Bibliography................................................................................................................26
C. Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................29
CC Part 1:........................................................................................................................29
CC Part 3:........................................................................................................................30
D. Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
A.
Certification
1.
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN ISO/IEC 17065 standard
●
BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification, Procedural
Description (BSI 7138) [3]
●
BSI certification: Requirements regarding the Evaluation Facility (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 5 [1] also published as
ISO/IEC 15408.
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 [2] also published
as ISO/IEC 18045.
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2.
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1.
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and, in addition, at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain SOGIS
Technical Domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL 1 to EAL 4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For
"Smartcards and similar devices" a SOGIS Technical Domain is in place. For "HW Devices
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
with Security Boxes" a SOGIS Technical Domains is in place, too. This Domain is linked to
a conformance claim to one of the related SOGIS Recommended Protection Profiles. In
addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
This certificate is recognized under SOGIS-MRA for all assurance components selected.
2.2.
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
The international arrangement on the mutual recognition of certificates based on the CC
(Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement, CCRA-2014) has been ratified on 08
September 2014. It covers CC certificates based on collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP)
(exact use), certificates based on assurance components up to and including EAL 2 or the
assurance family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR) and certificates for Protection Profiles and
for collaborative Protection Profiles (cPP).
The CCRA-2014 replaces the old CCRA signed in May 2000 (CCRA-2000). Certificates
based on CCRA-2000, issued before 08 September 2014 are still under recognition
according to the rules of CCRA-2000. For on 08 September 2014 ongoing certification
procedures and for Assurance Continuity (maintenance and re-certification) of old
certificates a transition period on the recognition of certificates according to the rules of
CCRA-2000 (i.e. assurance components up to and including EAL 4 or the assurance
family Flaw Remediation (ALC_FLR)) is defined until 08 September 2017.
As of September 2014 the signatories of the new CCRA are government representatives
from the following nations: Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.
The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes can be seen on
the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
As the product certified has been accepted into the certification process before 08
September 2014, this certificate is recognized according to the rules of CCRA-2000, i.e. up
to and including CC part 3 EAL 4 components. The evaluation contained the components
ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually recognised in accordance
with the provisions of the CCRA-2000, for mutual recognition the EAL 4 components of
these assurance families are relevant.
3.
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
Certification Report
The product cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Machine
Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE
has undergone the certification procedure at BSI.
The evaluation of the product cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 – Java Card applet configuration
providing Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access
Control with PACE was conducted by TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH. The evaluation was
completed on 17 December 2014. TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the applicant is: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: cv cryptovision GmbH, Munscheidstr. 14, 45886
Gelsenkirchen.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4.
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, as specified in the following report
and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5.
Publication
The product cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Machine
Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE
has been included in the BSI list of certified products, which is published regularly (see
also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]). Further information can be obtained from
BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the sponsor and the
developer7 of the product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form
at the internet address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
cv cryptovision GmbH
Munscheidstr. 14
45886 Gelsenkirchen
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
B.
Certification Report
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
1.
BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the composite TOE named cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 –
Java Card applet configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application“
Extended
Access
Control
with
PACE,
and
short
named
ePasslet2.1/MRTD-EACv1-SAC.
It
consists
of
an
applet
configuration
ePasslet2.1/MRTD-EACv1-SAC provided by the cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 used for
electronic travel documents providing EAC with PACE, the according guidance document
[10 and 11], the underlying operating system and the hardware platform with the crypto
library.
The
operating
system
NXP
JCOP
2.4.2
R3
(certificate
ID:
NSCIB-CC-13-37760-CR2) is provided in the following variants, that differ in connectivity
(contactless/contact-based communication) and the memory size:
•
J3E120_M65,
•
J3E082_M65,
•
J2E120_M65,
•
J2E082_M65.
The hardware platform consists of the integrated circuit P5Cx145V0v (certificate ID:
BSIDSZ-CC-0858-2013) and the certified Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 (certificate ID:
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014). The IC provides an interface for contact-based
communication and hardware for contactless communication.
The MRTD contains physically visible data including but not limited to personal data of the
holder as, biographical data, the printed data in the MRZ (Machine Readable Zone) and
the printed portrait. Further the MRTD contains digital personal data of the MRTD holder,
i.e. the digital MRZ, the digitized portrait, the biometric reference of fingers or iris images,
the document security object and other data according to the LDS (Logical Data
Structure).
The main security functionalities of the composite TOE are:
•
EAC (Extended Access Control) with PACE functionality,
•
Administrative role authentication for storing manufacturing, pre-personalization and
personalization data,
•
Protection of integrity and confidentiality of internal applet and user data,
•
Secure management and storage of secrets,
•
Secure Messaging and implemented high level cryptographic functionality,
•
Security functionalities provided by the underlying Crypto Library, IC and operating
system,
•
Different authentication mechanism as PACE, Terminal Authentication, symmetric
authentication with AES and chip authentication.
The cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 is a multi-application package for eID documents based on
Java Card. It contains a fixed set of applications as stated in the Security Target [6],
Table 1. These applications are realized by configurations of one or more predefined
applets. While each application has a distinct configuration, different applications might
use the same underlying applet.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
Certification Report
While the whole applet code resides in ROM, the applets providing the different
applications are instantiated into EEPROM. Multiple applications can be present at the
same time by instantiating multiple applets with their distinct configurations with some
restrictions detailed below.
Combinations of certified and non-certified applications are possible. Via configuration the
instantiated applets can be tied to the contactless and / or the contact interface,
respectively. BAC, EACv1, EACv1-SAC require exclusive access to the contactless
interface. Hence, if one of these applications is used (in certified configuration), further
(certified or non-certified) applications have to be bound to the contact interface. The
configuration of the TOE claimed by the Security Target [6] is fixed after personalization.
Only applets of the cv act ePasslet Suite, which is part of the ROM mask, are available for
the initial installation. Post issuance loading of applets is possible, but certain rules have to
be followed as outlined in the user guidance documentation [10] and [11].
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profiles Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended
Access
Control
with
PACE,
Version
1.3.2,
5
December
2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 and Machine Readable Travel Document using
Standard
Inspection
Procedure
with
PACE,
Version
1.0,
2.11.2011,
BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 4
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6], chapter 6. The SFRs are taken from the PPs but complemented by
product specific extensions . They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2 and some of
them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionality:
TOE Security Functionality
Addressed issue
TSF_Access
Access control
TSF_Admin
Administration
TSF_Secret
Secret key management
TSF_Crypto
Cryptographic operations
TSF_ SecureMessaging
Secure Messaging
TSF_Auth
- TSF_Auth_Term
- TSF_Auth_Sym
- TSF_Auth_Chip
- TSF_Auth_PACE
Authentication protocols
- Terminal Authentication
- Symmetric authentication
- Chip Authentication Protocol
- PACE Protocol
TSF_Integrity
Integrity protection
TSF_OS
Javacard OS Security Functionalities
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6], chapter 7.
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The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6], chapter 3 .
Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of Assumptions,
Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security Target [6],
chapter 3.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2.
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing Machine
Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with
PACE
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No Type
Item
Identifier (Name
Description
and
version) Form of Delivery
1
HW/S Hardware-Chip
cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 on JCOP
W
with Applet Suite in 2.4.2 R3 (J3E120_M65,
ROM
J3E082_M65, J2E120_M65,
J2E082_M65) , Mask ID 41h, Mask
Name NX250Ah, Patch ID x1h,
Target ID 01h
This is the integrated circuit (in the
form of modules) with the
embedded operating system and
the cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1,
ready for pre-personalization.
Secure physical
delivery:
Wafer, modules and
packages (dice
including identification
T051A, T051B or
sT051B)
2
DOC
cv act
ePasslet/EAC
PACE Guidance
Manual [10]
cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1, Java
Card applet configuration providing
Machine Readable Travel
Document with “ICAO Application”,
Extended Access Control with
PACE, Guidance Manual v 3.1.7
Secure electronic
delivery
3
DOC
JCOP
Administrator
Manual [11]
JCOP V2.4.2 Revision 3, JCOP
V2.4.2 Revision 3 secure smart
card controller, Administrator
manual, Rev. 0.7, 2014-07-24,
258607, NXP
The Guidance contains necessary
information to pre-personalize the
TOE.
Secure electronic
delivery
14 / 40
BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
No Type
4
Certification Report
Item
KEYS Keys
Identifier (Name
Description
and
version) Form of Delivery
Transport key This key allows to
Secure electronic
access most parts of the EEPROM delivery
(including JCRE configuration area)
to preconfigure the card.
Authentication key This key allows
to verify authenticity of the IC via
internal JCOP authentication
mechanism.
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The composite TOE consists of the underlying hardware platform, the JCOP operating
system and the ePasslet2.1/MRTD-EACv1-SAC applet. First the generated applet is
delivered from the development to the production site, i.e. applet and guidance
documentation delivery from cv cryptovision (developer) to NXP (manufacturer),
confidentiality and integrity is maintained by separate encrypted mails. There the JCOP
operating system and the applet is integrated into the ordered IC variant by masking
during the chip production by the manufacturer, according to the configuration information
contained in the OEF (Order Entry Form). Afterwards the composite TOE is delivered
(before initialization / pre-personalization). The antenna is not part of the TOE. The
pre-personalizer is responsible for the delivery of the pre-personalized hardware and the
key material to the personalizer.
The delivery process is the same for the composite product as the delivery process is
covered by the certified JCOP composite TOE. The Security Target [18] and the
Administrator Guidance [11] of the JCOP platform outline the delivery procedure. Two
different ways of TOE delivery are described. Either, the customer collects the product at
the NXP site himself, or the product is sent by NXP to the customer. In that case the
product is delivered in parcels sealed with special tapes to detect manipulation of the
tapes. Also, a FAX is enclosed which the customer has to send back for verification of
receiving an undamaged parcel.
The delivery of the documents and keys is performed by the document control office of
NXP BU ID. The documents are delivered as encrypted PDF. The password required to
open the document is delivered using a separate route of transport.
During the delivery of the applet and guidance documentation by cv cryptovision
(developer) to NXP (manufacturer) confidentiality and integrity is maintained by separate
encrypted mails.
In addition to the above mentioned methods of delivery and the according security
mechanism, the correctness of delivery is ensured with a hash over the received
decrypted applet, which is sent back to the developer. The developer then compares the
received hash value with the hash value of the delivered applet. Furthermore samples are
provided by the manufacturer to the developer for functional testing to verify the correct
functionality of the composite TOE.
There are different mechanisms to verify the unique identity of the TOEs components
according to the guidance documentation [10].
After selecting the applet with SELECT APDU, the version of the applet can be verified by
the GET DATA APDU return value ‘iijj’ (Vii.jj=V1.13). The personalization options have to
be read out by the GET DATA command and the parameters PO and OO can be checked
against the expected values defined in the guidance documentation, which exactly
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describes
the
parameterization
of
the
TOE,
to
verify
the
(ePasslet2.1/MRTD-EACv1-SAC configuration of the cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1).
applet
With the IDENTIFY command, which is presented in the following table, it is possible to
verify the identity of the TOE platform according to the JCOP guidance [11] (expected
return values are marked with “ERV”):
The parameters for the IDENTIFY command are as follows:
Code
Value
Parameter setting
CLA
00h
ISO/IEC 7816-4
INS
A4h
SELECT command
P1
04h
Select by name
P2
00h
Select parameter
Lc
09h
Length of data field
Le
00h
Expected length
Table 3: Parameters for the IDENTIFY command
The IDENTIFY command response and expected return values are as follows:
Offset
Size
Name
Base mask value
Comment
0
1
FABKEY ID
04h (Precise Biometrics)
05h (Neurotechnology)
“ERV”
“ERV”
1
1
PATCH ID
x1h
“ERV”
2
1
TARGET ID
01h
“ERV”
3
1
MASK ID
40h (mask64)
41h (mask65)
42h (mask 66)
”ERV”
4
4
CUSTOM MASK
xxxxxxxxh
8
6
MASK NAME
NX250Bh (mask64)
NX250Ah (mask65)
NX250Ch (mask66)
”ERV”
14
1
FUSED STATE
00h not fused
01h fused
“ERV”
15
1
ROM INFO LENGTH
03h
16
3
ROM INFO8
784C6Ch (Precise Biometrics)
D4B949h (Neurotechnology)
”ERV”
”ERV”
19
1
FIPS
01h if FIPS is enabled
00h if FIPS is disabled
“ERV”
Table 4: IDENTIFY command response and expected return values
In case that more than one application has been installed, each applet has to be selected
and identified according to the respective guidance [10], [11].
8
ROM INFO: Checksum over the whole ROM of the chip. The checksum includes the JCOP OS and
also any possibly available applets in a custom ROM mask.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
3.
Certification Report
Security Policy
The Security Policy of the TOE is defined according to the Protection Profiles Machine
Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access Control with PACE,
Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 and Machine
Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE, Version 1.0,
2.11.2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011 [7] by the Security Objectives and Requirements for
the contactless chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the
requirements and recommendations of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO).
The Security Policy addresses the advanced security methods in this Protection Profile
according the the Security Target [6].
4.
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
Organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
•
OE.Auth_Key_Travel_Document Travel document Authentication Key
•
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference
Data
•
OE.Exam_Travel_Document Examination of the travel document passport book
•
OE.Prot_Logical_Travel_Document Protection of data from the logical travel
document
•
OE.Ext_Insp_Systems: Authorization of Extended Inspection Systems
•
OE.Legislative_Compliance: Issuing of the travel document
•
OE.Passive_Auth_Sign: Authentication of travel document by Signature
•
OE.Personalisation: Personalisation of travel document
•
OE.Terminal: Terminal operating
•
OE.Travel_Document_Holder: Travel document holder Obligations
•
OE.Active_Auth_Key_MRTD: Verification of Authenticity of the presented travel
document’s chip
Details can be found in the Security Target [6], chapter 4.2. and in the PPs Machine
Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access Control with PACE,
Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012, BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 and Machine
Readable Travel Document using Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE, Version 1.0,
2.11.2011, BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011 [7], chapter 4.2.
5.
Architectural Information
The TOE is an integrated circuit chip of machine readable travel documents (MRTD chip)
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) and providing the Extended
Access Control with PACE.
The TOE comprises eight subsystems, listed with a short description in the following:
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•
Platform: Represents the parts of the underlying hardware platform of the
composite TOE, which interacts with the application in regards of control, including
the creation and selection of applet instances and the internal life cycle control.
•
Operating System: Represents the operating system of the underlying JCOP
platform of the composite TOE, which is used by the applications to implement the
functionality. It also comprises the underlying cryptographic library.
•
Configuration Manager: Provides services for applet creation and configuration.
This subsystem is called by the platform subsystem each time an application is
instantiated.
•
Event Manager: Handles events from internal subsystems and from the underlying
platform and calls other subsystem interfaces to process these events.
•
Command Processor: Provides the main interface to the platform by passing
through APDU commands from the terminal to the applet. The subsystem decides if
special APDUs have to be handled by the application and ensures their execution
by the responsible applet. It also provides access controlled execution of
commands covering all applet commands.
•
Secure Messaging Manager: Handles the secure channel between the applet and
the terminal in accordance with the specified cryptographic mechanisms and key
sizes. The responsibility for secure messaging includes the verification of MAC,
unwrapping messages and security mechanisms for secure messaging.
•
File System Manager: Provides an interface for file and object access and
management by a representation of the existing elements.
•
State Manager: Handles the internal state of the application and provides update
functionality and access to the current DF, EF, KO, security environment, and the
authentication status of the terminal and the challenges used.
The cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 is a modular multi-application package for eID documents
based on the Java Card standard. It provides the applications as stated in the Security
Target [6], Table 1. These applications are realized by configurations of one or more
predefined applets as described in the Security Target [6].
6.
Documentation
The evaluated documentation [10] and [11] as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the
product to the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure
usage of the TOE in accordance with the Security Target. Further documentation is
provided to an applet developer as outlined in the certification report for JCOP [12].
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7.
IT Product Testing
The developer’s testing effort is summarized as follows:
TOE configurations tested: The tests were performed with the composite smartcard
product ePasslet2.1/MRTDEACv1-SAC on JCOP 2.4.2R3 by NXP, in the variants
J3E120/T0BE5076, J2E082/T0BE401, J3E120/T0BE4046, J2E082/T0BE505.
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Developer’s testing approach: The developer considered the following aspects when
designing his test approach: Tests to cover all actions defined in Functional Specification
(FSP); Good case and bad case tests for each command defined in the Functional
Specification and executable on the TOE; Access Rules test as part of the requirements on
TSF data; Conformance Tests according to BSI TR03105 [22] with commercial test suites;
Tests covering all TSF subsystems in the TOE design.
All test cases in each test scenario were run successfully on this TOE version. The
developers testing results demonstrate that the TOE performs as expected.
The evaluator’s testing effort is summarized as follows:
Independent Testing according to ATE_IND:
The evaluator’s testing effort is described as follows, outlining the testing approach,
configuration, depth and results.
Test Approach and Set-up: The TOE consists of the ePasslet2.1/MRTD-EACv1-SAC
application installed on NXP JCOP V2.4.2 R3. The APDU tests were performed using
standard PCSC readers, a standard PC, test software provided by the developer as well
as evaluator’s test software.
The selected tests cover tests of the TSFI related to: Identification and Authentication
(interfaces of different authentication mechanisms); Protection against interference, logical
tampering and bypass (disturbance of interface execution); Secure Messaging (test of
interface commands using secure messaging); Preparative procedures, performed by the
evaluator according to the guidance [10].
The choice of the subset of interfaces used for testing has been done according to the
following approach: Augmentation of developer testing for interfaces and supplementation
of developer testing strategy for interfaces are both used for setting up test cases.
Besides augmentation and supplementation of developer tests the tests are also selected
by the complexity and the susceptibility to vulnerabilities of interfaces and related
functionality. Since the developer has tested all interfaces and the rigour of developer
testing of the interfaces is sufficient, the evaluator found that all TSFI have been suitably
tested. The APDU interfaces are essential for the TOE and therefore in the focus of
testing. Implicit testing was sufficiently included in developer testing because preparative
steps were performed and described for nearly each test case. The selection process is
based on evaluation experience of the evaluation body. Therefore all TOE security
functionality is included within the subset. All cryptographic functionality is provided by the
platform and was sufficiently tested during platform evaluation. Specific tests were
conducted that were aligned during meetings with the certification body.
Configuration: The TOE was tested in the variants J3E120/T0BE5076, J2E082/T0BE401,
J3E120/T0BE4046, J2E082/T0BE505. The keys and personalization data used in the test
configurations were provided by the developer.
Test Results: The test reports for the APDU tests are automatically generated by the test
tool used. The test logs and the test documentation include details and comments on the
test configuration, on the test equipment used, on the used command structure and the
expected results. The test prerequisites, test steps, and expected results adequately test
the related TSFI, and they are consistent with the descriptions of the TSFI in the functional
specification. The test results have not shown any deviations between the expected test
results and the actual test results.
Penetration Testing according to AVA_VAN:
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The penetration testing was performed at the evaluators test environment with the
evaluators test equipment. The samples were provided by the sponsor and partly
configured by the developer. Additional test samples were configured and parameterized
by the evaluator according to the guidance documentation. All configurations of the TOE
were tested. The overall result is that no deviations were found between the expected
result and the actual result of the tests. Moreover, no attack scenario with the attack
potential of High was actually successful.
Penetration testing approach: Based on the list of potential vulnerabilities applicable to the
TOE in its operational environment the evaluator created attack scenarios for penetration
tests, where vulnerabilities could be exploitable. The evaluator also took the aspects of the
security architecture of the TOE into account. The evaluator performed applet code
analysis on his own during the composite activities, to verify that the developer has
implemented all requirements of the underlying platforms for the composite TOE of the
guidance documentation as well as of the security mechanisms of the applet in general.
Further aspects, e.g. aiming the TSFI, are covered by the evaluator’s independent tests.
The results of the evaluator activities led to confidence in the security of the TOE in a
whole.
TOE test configurations: The tests were performed with the configuration of the TOE as it
is delivered in to the personalization agent and stated in the security target. In those cases
where no penetration tests have been performed, analysis due to non-exploitability of the
related attack scenarios in the TOE’s operational environment also including an attacker
with an High attack potential have been performed. Certain LFI tests results on program
flow of the other evaluations BSI-DSZ-CC-0912-2014 and BSI-DSZ-CC-0914-2014 were
reused as they are also assignable to this TOE since they rely on the same platforms,
code base and countermeasures. Also certain results gained during the evaluation and
testing of BSI-DSZ-CC-0912-2014 on the EAC authentication mechanism were reused
since the TOE is an MRTD with SAC and EAC authentication.
The overall test result is that no deviations were found between the expected and the
actual test results. No attack scenario with the attack potential of High was actually
successful in the TOE’s operational environment as defined in the security target provided
that all measures required by the developer are applied.
8.
Evaluated Configuration
The cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 is a multi-application package for eID documents based on
Java Card. It contains a fixed set of applications as stated in the Security Target [6],
Table 1. These applications are realized by configurations of one or more predefined
applets. While each application has a distinct configuration, different applications might
use the same underlying applet.
While the whole applet code resides in ROM, the applets providing the different
applications are instantiated into EEPROM. Multiple applications can be present at the
same time by instantiating multiple applets with their distinct configurations with some
restrictions detailed below.
Combinations of certified and non-certified applications are possible. Via configuration the
instantiated applets can be tied to the contactless and / or the contact interface,
respectively. BAC, EACv1, EACv1-SAC require exclusive access to the contactless
interface. Hence, if one of these applications is used (in certified configuration), further
(certified or non-certified) applications have to be bound to the contact interface. The
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configuration of the TOE claimed by the Security Target [6] is fixed after personalization.
Only applets of the cv act ePasslet Suite, which is part of the ROM mask, are available for
the initial installation. Post issuance loading of applets is possible, but certain rules have to
be followed as outlined in the user guidance documentation [10], [11].
The TOE operating system platform is provided in certain variants that differ in connectivity
(contactless / contact-based communication) and the memory size: J3E120_M65,
J3E082_M65, J2E120_M65, J2E082_M65 as outlined in the platform certification [12].
Please note that in consistency to the claimed protection profile only the security
mechanism Extended Access Control with PACE is in the focus of this certification.
Other certificates cover:
•
the configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application”, Basic Access Control (BAC), BSI-DSZ-CC-0911-2014
•
the configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control, BSI-DSZ-CC-0912-2014
•
the configuration providing Secure Signature Creation Device with key generation,
BSI-DSZ-CC-0914-2014.
9.
Results of the Evaluation
9.1.
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used (see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS
26, AIS 31, AIS 36):
•
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits,
•
Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards,
•
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number
generators (for JCOP),
•
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for physical random number
generators (for the hardware platform),
•
Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices. According to
this concept the relevant documents ETR for Composition from the platform
evaluations (i.e. on hardware, crypto library and JCOP) have been provided to the
composite evaluator and used for the TOE evaluation.
A document ETR for composite evaluation according to AIS 36 has not been provided in
the course of this certification procedure.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
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•
All components of the EAL 4 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC
(see also part C of this report)
•
The components ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
The evaluation has confirmed:
•
PP Conformance: Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application"
Extended Access Control with PACE, Version 1.3.2, 5 December 2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 and Machine Readable Travel Document using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE, Version 1.0, 2.11.2011,
BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011[7]
•
for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
•
for the Assurance: Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 4 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
The evaluation was performed as a composite evaluation according to AIS 36. Therefore,
the evaluation and certification results of the underlying Java card platform NXP JCOP
2.4.2 R3 (certificate NSCIB-CC-13-37760-CR2 issued by the Netherlands CC Certification
Scheme NSCIB, [12]) including the Hardware platform certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013
issued by BSI [14] and the Crypto Library certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014 issued by
BSI [13] by applying the composite certification approach, too.
9.2.
Results of cryptographic assessment
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
For details of the cryptographic algorithms that are implemented by the TOE to enforce its
security policy please refer to chapter 8 of the Security Target [6]. The table outlines the
Purpose, the Cryptographic Mechanism, the Standard of Implementation, the Key Size in
bits and the Standard of Application. According to the Standard of Application noted, the
algorithms are suitable for the intended usege. The validity period of the algorithms is
mentioned in the german official catalogue [21].
10. Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. Please bear in mind that the TOE
is delivered before pre-personalization and the antenna is not part of the TOE. Also, the
pre-personalization agent has to carefully follow the guidance [10] and all JCOP
documentation that is part of the delivery of the TOE, i.e. [11], [12], [18].
In addition all aspects of Assumptions, Threats and OSPs as outlined in the Security
Target not covered by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of
the TOE.
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The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment of the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptographic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9.2 has
to be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
11.
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [6] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report.
12. Definitions
12.1. Acronyms
AIS
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
ANSI
American National Standards Institute
APDU
Application Protocol Data Unit
BAC
Basic Access Control
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
BU ID
A Business Unit of NXP
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
cPP
Collaborative Protection Profile
DTBS
Data To Be Signed
DTBS/R
DTBS Representation
EAC
Extended Access Control
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ePKI
Electronic PKI
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IC
Integrated Circuit
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
LDS
Logical Data Structure
MRTD
Machine Readable Travel Document
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MRZ
Machine Readable Zone
OCR
Optical Character Recognition
OSP
Organisational Security Policy
PACE
Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
PDF
Portable Document Format
PKCS
Public-key cryptography standards
PKI
Public Key Infrastructure
PP
Protection Profile
RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
SAC
Supplemental access control
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SCD
Signature Creation Data
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SSCD
Secure Signature Creation Device
ST
Security Target
SVD
Signature Verification Data
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TSF
TOE Security Functionality
BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
12.2. Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Collaborative Protection Profile - A Protection Profile collaboratively developed by an
International Technical Community endorsed by the Management Committee.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in CC
part 2 and/or assurance requirements not contained in CC part 3.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on
well-established mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - A passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Package - named set of either security functional or security assurance requirements
Protection Profile - A formal document defined in CC, expressing an implementation
independent set of security requirements for a category of IT Products that meet specific
consumer needs.
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Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - An IT Product and its associated administrator and user guidance
documentation that is the subject of an Evaluation.
TOE Security Functionality - Combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs.
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13. Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 2: Security functional components, Revision 4, September 2012
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 4, September 2012
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 4, September 2012
[3]
BSI certification: Technical information on the IT security certification of products,
protection profiles and sites (BSI 7138) and Requirements regarding the Evaluation
Facility for the Evaluation of Products, Protection Profiles and Sites under the CC
and ITSEC (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE 9.
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014, cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 – Java Card
applet configuration providing Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application”, Extended Access Control with PACE - Security Target Version 1.5, 1
October 2014, cv cryptovision
[7]
Machine Readable Travel Document with "ICAO Application" Extended Access
Control
with
PACE,
Version
1.3.2,
5
December
2012,
BSI-CC-PP-0056-V2-2012-MA-02 and Machine Readable Travel Document using
Standard Inspection Procedure with PACE, Version 1.0, 2.11.2011,
BSI-CC-PP-0068-V2-2011
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report, Version 2, BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014, 27 November
2014, TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH (confidential document)
[9]
Configuration list for the TOE BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014, 13 November 2014, cv
cryptovision (confidential document)
9
specifically
•
AIS 1, Version 13, Durchführung der Ortsbesichtigung in der Entwicklungsumgebung des Herstellers
•
AIS 20, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für deterministische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 26, Version 9, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 3, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für physikalische
Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 7, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL 5+ (CCv2.3 &
CCv3.1) and EAL 6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 36, Version 4, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.9, Reuse of evaluation results
•
AIS 46, Version 2, Informationen zur Evaluierung von kryptographischen Algorithmen und
ergänzende Hinweise für die Evaluierung von Zufallszahlengeneratoren
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[10]
cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1, Java Card applet configuration providing Machine
Readable Travel Document with “ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control with
PACE, Guidance Manual v 3.1.7, 23 October 2014, cv cryptovision
[11]
JCOP V2.4.2 Revision 3, JCOP V2.4.2 Revision 3 secure smart card controller,
Administrator manual, Rev. 0.7, 24 July 2014, 258607, NXP
[12]
Certification Report NXP J3E145_M64, J3E120_M65, J3E082_M65, J2E145_M64,
J2E120_M65, and J2E082_M65 Secure Smart Card Controller Revision 3, version
1, 25 August 2014, TÜV Rheinland Nederland B.V., NSCIB-CC-13-37760-CR2
[13]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-V2-2014 for Crypto Library V2.7/2.9 on
SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145 V0v/ V0B(s) from NXP Semiconductors Germany
GmbH, 16 July 2014
[14]
Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013 for NXP Secure PKI Smart Card
Controllers P5CD128V0v/ V0B(s), P5CC128V0v/V0B(s), P5CD145V0v/ V0B(s),
P5CC145V0v/ V0B(s), P5CN145V0v/V0B(s), each including IC Dedicated Software
from NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH, 12 June 2013, BSI
[15]
ETR for Composite Evaluation NXP J3E145_M64, J3E120_M65, J3E082_M65,
J2E145_M64, J2E120_M65, and J2E082_M65 Secure Smart Card Controller
Revision 3 EAL5+, version 6, 12 August 2014, Brightsight (confidential document)
[16]
ETR for composition Crypto Library V2.7/V2.9 on SmartMX P5Cx128/P5Cx145,
according to AIS36, Brightsight 14-RPT-169, Revision 1.0, 26 June 2014
(confidential document)
[17]
ETR for composition according to AIS36 on P5CD128V0A/B, P5CD128V0B(s),
P5CC128V0A/B,
P5CC128V0B(s),
P5CD145V0A/B,
P5CD145V0B(s),
P5CC145V0A/B, P5CC145V0B(s), P5CN145V0A/B, P5CN145V0B(s), each
including IC Dedicated Software, BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013, Version 1.0, 22 April
2013, T-Systems GEI GmbH (confidential document)
[18]
NXP J3E145_M64, J3E120_M65, J3E082_M65, J2E145_M64, J2E120_M65, and
J2E082_M65 Secure Smart Card Controller Revision 3, Security Target, Rev. 01.05,
2014-08-07, NSCIB-CC-13-37760-CR2, NXP
[19]
International Civil Aviation Organization: ICAO Doc 9303, Machine Reada-ble Travel
Documents, part 1 – Machine Readable Passports, Sixth Edition, 2006.
[20]
Technical Guideline TR-03110:
BSI-TR-03110-1, Version 2.10, 20.03.2012, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 1, BSI, https://www.bsi.bund.de/TR
BSI-TR-03110-2, Version 2.10, 20.03.2012, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 2, BSI, https://www.bsi.bund.de/TR
BSI-TR-03110-3, Version 2.11, 12.07.2013, Advanced Security Mechanisms for
Machine Readable Travel Documents – Part 3, BSI, https://www.bsi.bund.de/TR
[21]
BSI-TR-3116-2, eCard-Projekte der Bundesregierung,
Ausweisdokumente, BSI, https://www.bsi.bund.de/TR
[22]
BSI TR-03105 Conformity Tests for Official Electronic ID Documents, BSI,
https://www.bsi.bund.de/TR
Teil
2,
Hoheitliche
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C.
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part 1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
“The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
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CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
Profile evaluation
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
Target evaluation
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
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Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal
high-level design presentation
AGD:
Guidance documents
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
Assurance Components
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
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component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL 1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL 1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL 1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that
the TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions
through security objectives.
EAL 1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL 1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL 2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL 2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL 2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL 3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL 3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
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EAL 3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL 4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL 4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL 4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL 4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL 5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter
8.7)
“Objectives
EAL 5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL 5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL 5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL 5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL 6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL 6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL 6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL 7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL 7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL 7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
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Assurance
Class
Certification Report
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL 1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL 2
EAL 3
EAL 4
EAL 5
EAL 6
EAL 7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
Documents
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
Support
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
“Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
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D.
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development and production environment
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Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0913-2014
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product cv act ePasslet Suite v2.1 – Java Card applet configuration providing
Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application”, Extended Access Control
with PACE (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation
facility using the Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT
Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 22 December 2014, the following results
regarding the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria
assurance requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.4,
ALC_DEL.1, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.1) are fulfilled for the development and
production sites of the TOE listed below:
a)
Developer, MRTD Manufacturer: cv cryptovision GmbH Munscheidstr. 14,
45886 Gelsenkirchen
b)
For development and production sites regarding the platform please refer to
the certification reports NSCIB-CC-13-37760-CR2 [12], BSI-DSZ-CC-0750V2-2014 [13] and BSI-DSZ-CC-0858-2013 [14]
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6]. The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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