Security Target: 0479b

Security Target: 0479b
Security Target lite –
Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control
MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC / P5CD080
MaskTech International
Document number: BSI-DSZ-CC-0479, ST lite, Version 1.0
Created by: Matthias Brüstle
Date: 2008-06-18
Signature:
Released by Management
Date:
Signature:
1
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Change history
Version
Date
Reason
1.0
2008-06-18
First Version of ST lite based on ST
Remarks
page 2 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Table of Content
1ST Introduction.................................................................................................................................. ...5
1.1 ST reference...................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 ST Overview................................................................................................................................. ....5
1.3 Conformance Claim...................................................................................................................... ....5
2TOE Description.............................................................................................................................. .....7
2.1.1 Use of TOE........................................................................................................................ ..........10
2.2 Limits of the TOE................................................................................................................ ...........10
2.2.1 Architecture........................................................................................................... ......................10
3Security Problem Definition................................................................................................ ...............12
3.1 Introduction................................................................................................................ ....................12
3.2 Assumptions........................................................................................................... ........................14
3.3 Threats................................................................................................................................ ............15
3.4 Organisational Security Policies..................................................................................... ................17
3.5 Security Objectives................................................................................................................. ........18
3.5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE.................................................................................... ..............18
3.5.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment...................... ..........20
3.5.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment...................................... ...........................20
4Security Requirements................................................................................................................... .....23
4.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE............................................................ ..................25
4.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit.................................................................................................. ..........25
4.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)................................................................ ............................25
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1).................................................................................. .....26
Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)............................................................................... 27
4.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication............................................................. ...................28
4.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection.............................................................................. ....................32
4.1.5 Class FMT Security Management............................................................................................ ....35
4.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions................................................................... ........40
4.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE....................................................................... ........42
4.3 Security Requirements for the IT environment................................................................... ............42
4.3.1 Passive Authentication......................................................................................................... ........43
4.3.2 Extended Access Control PKI................................................................................................. .....43
4.3.3 Basic Terminal................................................................................................................. ............44
4.3.4 General Inspection System.................................................................................. ........................47
4.3.5 Extended Inspection System........................................................................................... .............50
4.3.6 Personalization Terminals................................................................................................. ...........51
5TOE Summary Specification............................................................................................... ...............52
5.1 TOE Security Functions............................................................................................................... ...52
5.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library......................................... ......52
page 3 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
F.IC_CL: Security Functions of the Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library.....................................52
5.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES) – Operating System....................... ......53
F.Access_Control........................................................................................................... .............53
F.Identification_Authentication................................................................................................. ..53
F.Management............................................................................................................................ .55
F.Crypto.................................................................................................................... ..................56
F.Verification.................................................................................................. ............................56
5.2 Assurance Measures............................................................................................ ...........................56
6PP Claims...................................................................................................................... .....................58
6.1 PP Reference.................................................................................................................................. .58
6.2 PP Refinements............................................................................................................................. ..58
6.3 PP Additions................................................................................................................ ...................58
7Rationale............................................................................................................................................ .59
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale................................................................................................... ......59
7.2 Security Requirements Rationale.............................................................................................. ......62
7.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale.................................................................. .............62
7.2.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale................................................................... ....................69
7.2.3 Rationale for Assurance Measures.................................................................................... ...........74
7.2.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale............................................................................ ....74
7.2.5 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency............................. ...............75
7.2.6 Strength of Function Level Rationale...................................................................... ....................76
8Glossary and Acronyms............................................................................................................. .........77
9Literature............................................................................................................................ ................83
4 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
1 ST Introduction
1.1 ST reference
1
Title:
Version:
Editors:
Compliant to:
CC Version:
Assurance Level:
Hardware:
TOE version:
Keywords:
Security Target lite — Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO
Application, Extended Access Control (ST-MRTD EAC)
1.0, 2008-06-18
Matthias Brüstle
Common Criteria Protection Profile - Machine Readable Travel Document
with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control, version 1.2,
BSI-PP-0026
2.3
The level for this ST is EAL4 augmented.
NXP P5CD080V0B
MTCOS Pro 2.1 EAC
ICAO, machine readable travel document, extended access control
1.2 ST Overview
2
This security target defines the security objectives and requirements for the contactless chip of
machine readable travel documents (MRTD) based on the requirements and recommendations of
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). It addresses the advanced security methods
Basic Access Control, Extended Access Control and chip authentication similar to the Active
Authentication in the Technical reports of the ICAO New Technology Working Group.
3
MTCOS Pro is a fully interoperable multi-application smart card operating system compliant to
ISO/IEC 7816. It provides public and secret key cryptography and supports also other
applications like e-purses, health insurance cards and access control.
4
The operating system software is implemented on the NXP P5CD080V0B (since august 2006:
NXP semiconductors) secure dual-interface controller with the Secured Crypto Library, which is
certified according to CC EAL5 augmented (BSI-DSZ-CC-0417). This means, that the TOE
consists of software and hardware.
5
The assurance level for the TOE is CC EAL4 augmented.
6
The minimum strength level (SOF) for the TOE security functions is high.
1.3 Conformance Claim
7
This security target claims conformance to
•
•
•
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-001
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security
Functional Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-002
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security
Assurance Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-003
page 5 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
as follows
-
Part 2 extended,
-
Part 3 conformant,
-
Package conformant to EAL4 augmented with ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and
AVA_VLA.4.
page 6 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
2 TOE Description
TOE definition
8
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the contactless integrated circuit chip of machine readable
travel documents (MRTD’s chip) programmed according to the Logical Data Structure (LDS) [6]
and providing the Basic Access Control, the Extended Access Control according to the ICAO
document [7] and the chip authentication according to the technical report [26].
9
The TOE comprises of
• the circuitry of the MRTD’s chip (the integrated circuit, IC) with hardware for the contactless
interface, e.g. antennae, capacitors,
• the IC Dedicated Software with the parts IC Dedicated Test Software and IC Dedicated
Support Software,
• the IC Embedded Software (operating system),
•
the MRTD application and
•
the associated guidance documentation.
TOE usage and security features for operational use
10 State or organisation issues MRTD to be used by the holder for international travel. The traveller
presents a MRTD to the inspection system to prove his or her identity. The MRTD in context of
this security target contains (i) visual (eye readable) biographical data and portrait of the holder,
(ii) a separate data summary (MRZ data) for visual and machine reading using OCR methods in
the Machine readable zone (MRZ) and (iii) data elements on the MRTD’s chip according to LDS
for contactless machine reading. The authentication of the traveller is based on (i) the possession
of a valid MRTD personalized for a holder with the claimed identity as given on the biographical
data page and (ii) biometrics using the reference data stored in the MRTD. The issuing State or
Organization ensures the authenticity of the data of genuine MRTD’s. The receiving State trusts a
genuine MRTD of an issuing State or Organization.
11 For this security target the MRTD is viewed as unit of
(a)
(b)
the physical MRTD as travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip. It presents
visual readable data including (but not limited to) personal data of the MRTD holder
(1)
the biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book,
(2)
the printed data in the Machine Readable Zone (MRZ) and
(3)
the printed portrait.
the logical MRTD as data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data
Structure [6] as specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents over
the logical interface of APDUs contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
personal data of the MRTD holder
(1)
the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(2)
the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(3)
the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s) (EF.DG4) or
both
(4)
the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16) and
(5)
the Document security object.
page 7 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
12 The issuing State or Organization implements security features of the MRTD to maintain the
authenticity and integrity of the MRTD and their data. The MRTD as the passport book and the
MRTD’s chip is uniquely identified by the document number.
13 The physical MRTD is protected by physical security measures (e.g. watermark on paper, security
printing), logical (e.g. authentication keys of the MRTD’s chip) and organisational security
measures (e.g. control of materials, personalization procedures) [8]. These security measures
include the binding of the MRTD’s chip to the passport book.
14 The logical MRTD is protected in authenticity and integrity by a digital signature created by the
document signer acting for the issuing State or Organization and the security features of the
MRTD’s chip.
15 The ICAO defines the baseline security methods Passive Authentication and the optional
advanced security methods Basic Access Control to the logical MRTD, Active Authentication of
the MRTD’s chip, Extended Access Control to and the Data Encryption of sensitive biometrics as
optional security measure in the ICAO Technical report [7]. The Passive Authentication
Mechanism and the Data Encryption are performed completely and independently of the TOE by
the TOE environment.
16 This security target addresses the protection of the logical MRTD (i) in integrity by write-onlyonce access control and by physical means, and (ii) in confidentiality by the Basic Access Control
Mechanism and the Extended Access Control Mechanism. This security target addresses the Chip
Authentication described in [26] as an alternative to the Active Authentication stated in [7].
17 The Basic Access Control is a security feature that shall be mandatory implemented by the TOE.
The inspection system (i) reads optically the MRTD, (ii) authenticates itself as inspection system
by means of Document Basic Access Keys. After successful authentication of the inspection
system the MRTD’s chip provides read access to the logical MRTD by means of private
communication (secure messaging) with this inspection system [7], Annex E, and [6].
18 The security target requires the TOE to implement the Chip Authentication defined in [26] instead
of the Active Authentication described in [7]. Both protocols provide evidence of the MRTD’s
chip authenticity where the Chip Authentication prevents data traces described in [7], Annex G,
section G.3.3. The Chip Authentication is provided by the following steps: (i) the inspection
system communicates by means of secure messaging established by Basic Access Control, (ii) the
inspection system reads and verifies by means of the Passive Authentication the authenticity of
the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Public Key using the Document Security Object, (iii) the
inspection system generates a ephemeral key pair, (iv) the TOE and the inspection system agree
on two session keys for secure messaging in ENC_MAC mode according to the Diffie-Hellman
Primitive and (v) the inspection system verifies by means of received message authentication
codes whether the MRTD’s chip was able or not to run this protocol properly (i.e. it could apply
the Chip Authentication Private Key corresponding to the Chip Authentication Public Key for
derivation of the session keys). The Chip Authentication requires collaboration of the TOE and
the TOE environment.
19 The security target requires the TOE to implement the Extended Access Control as defined in
[26]. The Extended Access Control consists of two parts (i) a Terminal Authentication Protocol to
authenticate the inspection system as entity authorized by the Issuing State or Organization
through the receiving State, and (ii) an access control by the TOE to allow reading the sensitive
biometric reference data only to successfully authenticated authorized inspection systems. It
requires the Chip Authentication of the MRTD’s chip to the inspection system and uses the secure
messaging established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism to protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the sensitive biometric reference data during their transmission from the TOE to the
inspection system. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the receiving State by means of
page 8 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
certification the authentication public keys of Document Verifiers who create Inspection System
Certificates.
TOE life cycle
20 The TOE life cycle is described in terms of the four life cycle phases.
Phase 1 “Development”
21 The TOE is developed in phase 1. The IC developer develops the integrated circuit, the IC
Dedicated Software and the guidance documentation associated with these TOE components.
22 The software developer uses the guidance documentation for the integrated circuit and the
guidance documentation for relevant parts of the IC Dedicated Software and develops the IC
Embedded Software (operating system), the MRTD application and the guidance documentation
associated with these TOE components.
23 The manufacturing documentation of the IC including the IC Dedicated Software and the
Embedded Software in the non-volatile non-programmable memories (ROM) is securely
delivered to the IC manufacturer. The IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile programmable
memories, the MRTD application and the guidance documentation is securely delivered to the
MRTD manufacturer.
Phase 2 “Manufacturing”
24 In a first step the TOE integrated circuit is produced containing the MRTD’s chip Dedicated
Software and the parts of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software in the non-volatile nonprogrammable memories (ROM). The IC manufacturer writes the IC Identification Data onto the
chip to control the IC as MRTD material during the IC manufacturing and the delivery process to
the MRTD manufacturer. The IC is securely delivered from the IC manufacture to the MRTD
manufacturer.
25 The MRTD manufacturer (i) adds the parts of the IC Embedded Software in the non-volatile
programmable memories (for instance EEPROM) if necessary, (ii) creates the MRTD application,
(iii) equips MRTD’s chips with pre-personalization Data, and (iv) combines the IC with hardware
for the contactless interface in the passport book.
26 The pre-personalized MRTD together with the IC Identifier is securely delivered from the MRTD
manufacturer to the Personalization Agent. The MRTD manufacturer also provides the relevant
parts of the guidance documentation to the Personalization Agent.
27 For easier handling this phase is split into:
a) IC manufacturing: Manufacturing of the chip incl. Identification Data by the IC
manufacturer.
b) Initialization: The MRTD manufacturer configures the TOE like in a software installation
procedure.
c) Pre-personalization: The MRTD manufacturer prepares the TOE for the personalization,
e.g. creation of data files.
Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”
28 The personalization of the MRTD includes (i) the survey of the MRTD holder’s biographical data,
(ii) the enrolment of the MRTD holder biometric reference data (i.e. the digitized portraits and the
optional biometric reference data), (iii) the printing of the visual readable data onto the physical
MRTD, (iv) the writing of the TOE User Data and TSF Data into the logical MRTD and (v) the
writing of the TSF Data into the logical MRTD and configuration of the TSF if necessary. The
step (iv) is performed by the Personalization Agent and includes but is not limited to the creation
page 9 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
of (i) the digital MRZ data (EF.DG1), (ii) the digitised portrait (EF.DG2), and (iii) the Document
security object.
29 The signing of the Document security object by the Document signer [7] finalizes the
personalization of the genuine MRTD for the MRTD holder. The personalized MRTD (together
with appropriate guidance for TOE use if necessary) is handed over to the MRTD holder for
operational use.
Phase 4 “Operational Use”
30 The TOE is used as MRTD chip by the traveller and the inspection systems in the “Operational
Use” phase. The user data can be read according to the security policy of the Issuing State or
Organization and can be used according to the security policy of the Issuing State but they can
never be modified.
2.1.1 Use of TOE
31 The TOE is implemented as a smart card IC, which supports the communication via a contactless
interface according to ISO/IEC 14443. It is based on ISO/IEC 7816 commands and is intended to
be used inside a MRTD as storage of the digital data and supports Basic Access Control and
Extended Access Control.
32 Because of the support of ISO/IEC 7816 the TOE can be also used as multi-application smart card
with applications of health care, e-purse or loyalty.
2.2 Limits of the TOE
2.2.1 Architecture
33 The TOE is an RFID device according to ICAO technical reports [6] and [7] supporting Basic and
Extended Access Control. It is implemented as an embedded software on a smart card chip, in this
case the CC EAL 5+ certified NXP P5CD080V0B. The TOE is the MTCOS Pro smart card
operating system stored in the ROM of the IC, the file system including application data, any
configurable and non-volatile parameters and perhaps parts of the operating system stored in
EEPROM and the IC itself.
34 The TOE provides following services for MRTDs:
−
Storage of the MRTD data, e.g. data groups and signature.
−
Organization of the data in a file system as dedicated and elementary files.
−
Mutual Authenticate and secure messaging as specified in TrPKI [7] for Basic
Access Control.
−
Extended Access Control (EAC) as specified in TR-03110 [26].
−
Contactless communication according to ISO/IEC 14443.
−
Protection of the privacy of the passport holder with functions like random UID
and Basic Access Control.
page 10 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
35 The TOE life cycle is as defined in the preceding subsection with the addition, that the operating
system distinguishes in phase 2 between initialization mode and operational mode. In
initialization mode the operating system can be configured with secure messaging protected
commands. In this phase also the file system is created. The pre-personalization is done in phase
2 after switching the OS to operational mode. The operating system is in the operational mode
until end of life.
page 11 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Introduction
Assets
36 The assets to be protected by the TOE include the User Data on the MRTD’s chip.
37 Logical MRTD Data
The logical MRTD data consists of the EF.COM, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 (with different security
needs) and the Document Security Object EF.SOD according to LDS [6]. These data are user data
of the TOE. The EF.COM lists the existing elementary files (EF) with the user data. The EF.DG1
to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16 contain personal data of the MRTD holder. The Chip Authentication
Public Key (EF.DG14) is used by the inspection system for the Chip Authentication. The EF.SOD
is used by the inspection system for Passive Authentication of the logical MRTD.
User Data
Personal Data of the MRTD holder (EF.DG1, EF.DG2,
EF.DG5 - EF.DG13, EF.DG15, EF.DG16)
Sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3, EF.DG4)
Chip Authentication Public Key in EF.DG14
Document Security Object (SOD) in EF.SOD
Common data in EF.COM
TSF Data
Personalisation Agent Reference
Authentication Data
Basic Access Control (BAC) Key
Public Key CVCA
CVCA Certificate
Current date
Chip Authentication Private Key
38 A sensitive asset is the following more general one.
39 Authenticity of the MRTD’s chip
The authenticity of the MRTD’s chip personalized by the issuing State or Organization for the
MRTD holder is used by the traveller to proof his possession of a genuine MRTD.
Subjects
40 This security target considers the following subjects:
41 Manufacturer
The generic term for the IC Manufacturer producing the integrated circuit and the MRTD
Manufacturer completing the IC to the MRTD’s chip. The Manufacturer is the default user of the
TOE during the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The TOE does not distinguish between the users IC
Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer using this role Manufacturer. During pre-personalization
the MRTD manufacturer (so-called Pre-Personalization Agent) prepares the TOE for the
personalization, e.g. creation of data files.
42 Personalization Agent
The agent is acting on behalf of the issuing State or Organisation to personalize the MRTD for the
holder by some or all of the following activities: (i) establishing the identity of the holder for the
biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e.
the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s), (iii) writing these data
page 12 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder as defined for global, international and national
interoperability, (iv) writing the initial TSF data and (v) signing the Document Security Object
defined in [6].
43 Country Verifying Certification Authority
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) enforces the privacy policy of the issuing
Country or Organization with respect to the protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored
in the MRTD. The CVCA represents the country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems
and creates the Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. The updates of the public key of
the CVCA are distributed in form of Country Verifying CA Link-Certificates.
44 Document Verifier
The Document Verifier (DV) enforces the privacy policy of the receiving Country with respect to
the protection of sensitive biometric reference data to be handled by the Extended Inspection
Systems. The Document Verifier manages the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems
for the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing States or Organizations in
form of the Document Verifier Certificates.
45 Terminal
A terminal is any technical system communicating with the TOE through the contactless
interface.
46 Inspection system (IS)
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining an
MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as
MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System (BIS) (i) contains a terminal for the contactless
communication with the MRTD’s chip, (ii) implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
Control Mechanism and (iii) gets the authorization to read the logical MRTD under the Basic
Access Control by optical reading the MRTD or other parts of the passport book providing this
information. The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which
implements additional the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended Inspection System
(EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i) implements the Terminal Authentication
Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the Document Verifier
of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data. The security attributes of the
EIS are defined of the Inspection System Certificates.
47 MRTD Holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization personalised the
MRTD.
48 Traveller
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the identity of the MRTD
holder.
49 Attacker
A threat agent trying (i) to identify and to trace the movement of the MRTD’s chip remotely (i.e.
without knowing or optically reading the physical MRTD), (ii) to read or to manipulate the
logical MRTD without authorization, or (iii) to forge a genuine MRTD.
3.2 Assumptions
50 The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used
or is intended to be used.
page 13 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
51 A.Pers_Agent
Personalization of the MRTD’s chip
The Personalization Agent ensures the correctness of (i) the logical MRTD with respect to the
MRTD holder, (ii) the Document Basic Access Keys, (iii) the Chip Authentication Public Key
(EF.DG14) if stored on the MRTD’s chip, and (iv) the Document Signer Public Key Certificate (if
stored on the MRTD’s chip). The Personalization Agent signs the Document Security Object. The
Personalization Agent bears the Personalization Agent Authentication to authenticate himself to
the TOE by symmetric cryptographic mechanisms.
52 A.Insp_Sys
Inspection Systems for global interoperability
The Inspection System is used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i) examining
an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller
as MRTD holder. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i) includes the Country
Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing State or Organization,
and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [7]. The Basic Inspection
System reads the logical MRTD being under Basic Access Control and performs the Passive
Authentication to verify the logical MRTD. The General Inspection System in addition to the
Basic Inspection System implements the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The General
Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip during inspection and establishes
secure messaging with keys established by the Chip Authentication Mechanism. The Extended
Inspection System in addition to the General Inspection System (i) supports the Terminal
Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the
Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric reference data.
53 A.Signature_PKI
PKI for Passive Authentication
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for passive
authentication i.e. digital signature creation and verification for the logical MRTD. The issuing
State or Organization runs a Certification Authority (CA) which (i) securely generates, stores and
uses the Country Signing CA Key pair, and (ii) manages the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key
Pairs. The CA keeps the Country Signing CA Private Key secret and distributes the Country
Signing CA Public Key to ICAO, all receiving States maintaining its integrity. The Document
Signer (i) generates the Document Signer Key Pair, (ii) hands over the Document Signer Public
Key to the CA for certification, (iii) keeps the Document Signer Private Key secret and (iv) uses
securely the Document Signer Private Key for signing the Document Security Objects of the
MRTDs. The CA creates the Document Signer Certificates for the Document Signer Public Keys
and distributes them to the receiving States and organizations.
54 A.Auth_PKI
PKI for Inspection Systems
The issuing and receiving States or Organisations establish a public key infrastructure for card
verifiable certificates of the extended access control. The Country Verifying Certification
Authorities, the Document Verifier and Extended Inspection Systems hold authentication key
pairs and certificates for their public keys encoding the access control rights. The Country
Verifying Certification Authorities of the issuing States or Organisations are signing the
certificates of the Document Verifier and the Document Verifiers are signing the certificates of the
Extended Inspection Systems of the receiving States or Organisations. The issuing States or
Organizations distributes the public key of their Country Verifying Certification Authority to their
MRTD’s chip.
page 14 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
3.3 Threats
55 This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with
its IT environment. These threats result from the TOE method of use in the operational
environment and the assets stored in or protected by the TOE.
56 The TOE in collaboration with its IT environment shall avert the threats as specified below.
57 T.Chip_ID
Identification of MRTD’s chip
An attacker trying to trace the movement of the MRTD by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip
by establishing or listening a communication through the contactless communication interface.
The attacker cannot read optically and does not know in advance the physical MRTD.
58 T.Skimming
Skimming the logical MRTD
An attacker imitates the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via the
contactless communication channel of the TOE. The attacker cannot read and does not know in
advance the physical MRTD.
59 T.Read_Sensitive_Data
Read the sensitive biometric reference data
An attacker with high attack potential knowing the Document Basic Access Keys is trying to gain
the sensitive biometric reference data through the communication interface of the MRTD’s chip.
The attack T.Read_Sensitive_Data is similar to the threats T.Skimming in respect of the attack
path (communication interface) and the motivation (to get data stored on the MRTD’s chip) but
differs from those in the asset under the attack (sensitive biometric reference data vs. digital
MRZ, digitized portrait and other data), the opportunity (i.e. knowing Document Basic Access
Keys) and therefore the possible attack methods. Note, that the sensitive biometric reference data
are stored only on the MRTD’s chip as private sensitive personal data whereas the MRZ data and
the portrait are visual readable on the physical MRTD as well.
60 T.Forgery
Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip
An attacker alters fraudulently the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it including its
security related data in order to impose on an inspection system by means of the changed MRTD
holder’s identity or biometric reference data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of MRTD forgery. The attacker may alter the
biographical data on the biographical data page of the passport book, in the printed MRZ and in
the digital MRZ to claim another identity of the traveller. The attacker may alter the printed
portrait and the digitized portrait to overcome the visual inspection of the inspection officer and
the automated biometric authentication mechanism by face recognition. The attacker may alter
the biometric reference data to defeat automated biometric authentication mechanism of the
inspection system. The attacker may combine data groups of different logical MRTDs to create a
new forged MRTD, e.g. the attacker write the digitized portrait and optional biometric reference
data of finger read from the logical MRTD of a traveller into an other MRTD’s chip leaving their
digital MRZ unchanged to claim the identity of the holder this MRTD. The attacker may also
copy the complete unchanged logical MRTD in another contactless chip.
61 T.Counterfeit
page 15 of 82
MRTD’s chip
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
An attacker with high attack potential produces an unauthorized copy or reproduction of a
genuine MRTD’s chip to be used as part of a counterfeit MRTD. This violates the authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip used for authentication of a traveller by possession of a MRTD.
The attacker may generate a new data set or extract completely or partially the data from a
genuine MRTD’s chip and copy them on another appropriate chip to imitate this genuine MRTD’s
chip.
62 The TOE shall avert the threat as specified below.
63 T.Abuse-Func
Abuse of Functionality
An attacker may use functions of the TOE which shall not be used in TOE operational phase in
order (i) to manipulate User Data, (ii) to manipulate (explore, bypass, deactivate or change)
security features or functions of the TOE or (iii) to disclose or to manipulate TSF Data.
This threat addresses the misuse of the functions for the initialization and the personalization in
the operational state after delivery to MRTD holder.
64 T.Information_Leakage Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip
An attacker may exploit information which is leaked from the TOE during its usage in order to
disclose confidential TSF data. The information leakage may be inherent in the normal operation
or caused by the attacker.
65 Leakage may occur through emanations, variations in power consumption, I/O characteristics,
clock frequency, or by changes in processing time requirements. This leakage may be interpreted
as a covert channel transmission but is more closely related to measurement of operating
parameters which may be derived either from measurements of the contactless interface
(emanation) or direct measurements (by contact to the chip still available even for a contactless
chip) and can then be related to the specific operation being performed. Examples are the
Differential Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) and the Differential Power Analysis (DPA).
Moreover the attacker may try actively to enforce information leakage by fault injection (e.g.
Differential Fault Analysis).
66 T.Phys-Tamper
Physical Tampering
An attacker may perform physical probing of the MRTD’s chip in order (i) to disclose TSF Data,
or (ii) to disclose/reconstruct the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. An attacker may physically
modify the MRTD’s chip in order to (i) modify security features or functions of the MRTD’s chip,
(ii) modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software, (iii) modify User Data or
(iv) to modify TSF data.
The physical tampering may be focused directly on the disclosure or manipulation of TOE User
Data (e.g. the biometric reference data for the inspection system) or TSF Data (e.g. authentication
key of the MRTD’s chip) or indirectly by preparation of the TOE to following attack methods by
modification of security features (e.g. to enable information leakage through power analysis).
Physical tampering requires direct interaction with the MRTD’s chip internals. Techniques
commonly employed in IC failure analysis and IC reverse engineering efforts may be used.
Before that, the hardware security mechanisms and layout characteristics need to be identified.
Determination of software design including treatment of User Data and TSF Data may also be a
pre-requisite. The modification may result in the deactivation of a security function. Changes of
circuitry or data can be permanent or temporary.
67 T.Malfunction
page 16 of 82
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
An attacker may cause a malfunction of TSF or of the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software by
applying environmental stress in order to (i) deactivate or modify security features or functions of
the TOE or (ii) circumvent, deactivate or modify security functions of the MRTD’s chip
Embedded Software.
This may be achieved e.g. by operating the MRTD’s chip outside the normal operating conditions,
exploiting errors in the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software or misusing administration function.
To exploit these vulnerabilities an attacker needs information about the functional operation.
3.4 Organisational Security Policies
68 The TOE shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies (OSP) as security
rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its operations (see CC
part 1, sec. 3.2).
69 P.Manufact
Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip
The IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer ensure the quality and the security of the
manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2 Manufacturing. The
Initialization Data are written by the IC Manufacturer to identify the IC uniquely. The MRTD
Manufacturer writes the Pre-personalization Data which contains at least the Personalization
Agent Key.
70 P.Personalization
only
Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
The issuing State or Organization guarantees the correctness of the biographical data, the printed
portrait and the digitised portrait, the biometric reference data and other data of the logical MRTD
with respect to the MRTD holder. The personalization of the MRTD for the holder is performed
by an agent authorised by the issuing State or Organization only.
71 P.Personal_Data
Personal data protection policy
The biographical data and their summary printed in the MRZ and stored on the MRTD’s chip
(EF.DG1), the printed portrait and the digitised portrait (EF.DG2), the biometric reference data of
finger(s) (EF.DG3), the biometric reference data of iris image(s) (EF.DG4) and data according to
LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG13, EF.DG16) stored on the MRTD’s chip are personal data of the MRTD
holder. These data groups are intended to be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder i.e. if
the MRTD is presented to an inspection system. Additional to the Basic Access Control
Authentication defined by ICAO in [7] the MRTD’s chip shall protect the confidentiality and
integrity of the personal data during transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip
authentication.
72 P.Sensitive_Data
Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data
The biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) and iris image(s) (EF.DG4) are sensitive
private personal data of the MRTD holder. The sensitive biometric reference data can be used
only by inspection systems which are authorized for this access at the time the MRTD is
presented to the inspection system. The issuing State or Organization authorizes the Document
Verifiers of the receiving States to manage the authorization of inspection systems within the
limits defined by the Document Verifier Certificate.
page 17 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
3.5 Security Objectives
73 This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment. The security objectives for the TOE environment are separated into security
objectives for the development and production environment and security objectives for the
operational environment.
3.5.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
74 This section describes the security objectives for the TOE addressing the aspects of identified
threats to be countered by the TOE and organisational security policies to be met by the TOE.
75 OT.AC_Pers
Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD
The TOE must ensure that the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16, the Document security
object according to LDS [6] and the TSF data can be written by authorized Personalization
Agents only. The logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the TSF data may be written
only during and cannot be changed after its personalisation. The Document security object can be
updated by authorized Personalization Agents if data in the data groups EF.DG3 to EF.DG16 are
added.
76 OT.Data_Int
Integrity of personal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against
physical manipulation and unauthorized writing. The TOE must ensure the integrity of the logical
MRTD data during their transmission to the General Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
77 OT.Data_Conf
Confidentiality of personal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the data in EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5 to
EF.DG16 and the Document Security Object of the logical MRTD by granting read access to
terminals successfully authenticated by as (i) Personalization Agent or (ii) Basic Inspection
System or (iii) Extended Inspection System. The TOE implements the Basic Access Control as
defined by ICAO [7] and enforce Basic Inspection System to authenticate itself by means of the
Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document Basic Access Key. The TOE must
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to the General
Inspection System after Chip Authentication.
78 OT.Sens_Data_Conf
Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the sensitive biometric reference data (EF.DG3 and
EF.DG4) by granting read access only to authorized inspection systems. The authorization of the
inspection system is drawn from the Inspection System Certificate used for the successful
authentication and shall be a non-strict subset of the authorization defined in the Document
Verifier Certificate in the certificate chain to the Country Verifier Certification Authority of the
issuing State or Organization. The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data
during their transmission to the Extended Inspection System. The confidentiality of the sensitive
biometric reference data shall be protected against attacks with high attack potential.
79 OT.Identification
Identification and Authentication of the TOE
The TOE must provide means to store IC Identification Data in its non-volatile memory. The IC
Identification Data must provide a unique identification of the IC during Phase 2
page 18 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
“Manufacturing” and Phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD”. In Phase 4 “Operational Use”, the
TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System or
Personalization Agent.
80 OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
Proof of MRTD’S chip authenticity
The TOE must support the General Inspection Systems to verify the identity and authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip as issued by the identified issuing State or Organization by means of the Chip
Authentication as defined in [26]. The authenticity prove provided by MRTD’s chip shall be
protected against attacks with high attack potential.
81 The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the MRTD’s chip
independent on the TOE environment.
82 OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
The TOE must prevent that functions of the TOE which may not be used after TOE Delivery can
be abused in order (i) to disclose critical User Data, (ii) to manipulate critical User Data of the
Smartcard Embedded Software, (iii) to manipulate Soft-coded Smartcard Embedded Software or
(iv) bypass, deactivate, change or explore security features or functions of the TOE.
Details of the relevant attack scenarios depend, for instance, on the capabilities of the Test
Features provided by the IC Dedicated Test Software which are not specified here.
83 OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
Protection against Information Leakage
The TOE must provide protection against disclosure of confidential TSF data stored and/or
processed in the MRTD’s chip
•
•
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock,
or I/O lines and
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE and/or
•
by a physical manipulation of the TOE.
84 OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
Protection against Physical Tampering
The TOE must provide protection of the confidentiality and integrity of the User Data, the TSF
Data, and the MRTD’s chip Embedded Software. This includes protection against attacks with
high attack potential by means of
•
•
measuring through galvanic contacts which is direct physical probing on the chips surface
except on pads being bonded (using standard tools for measuring voltage and current) or
measuring not using galvanic contacts but other types of physical interaction between charges
(using tools used in solid-state physics research and IC failure analysis)
manipulation of the hardware and its security features, as well as
•
controlled manipulation of memory contents (User Data, TSF Data)
•
with a prior
•
reverse-engineering to understand the design and its properties and functions.
page 19 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
85 OT.Prot_Malfunction
Protection against Malfunctions
The TOE must ensure its correct operation. The TOE must prevent its operation outside the
normal operating conditions where reliability and secure operation has not been proven or tested.
This is to prevent errors. The environmental conditions may include external energy (esp.
electromagnetic) fields, voltage (on any contacts), clock frequency, or temperature.
3.5.2 Security Objectives for the Development and Manufacturing Environment
86 OD.Assurance
Assurance
Manufacturing Environment
Security
Measures
in
Development
and
The developer and manufacturer ensure that the TOE is designed and fabricated such that it
requires a combination of complex equipment, knowledge, skill, and time to be able to derive
detailed design information or other information which could be used to compromise security
through attack. This includes the use of the Initialization Data for unique identification of the
TOE and the pre-personalization of the TOE including the writing of the Personalization Agent
Authentication key(s). The developer provides necessary evaluation evidence that the TOE fulfils
its security objectives and is resistant against obvious penetration attacks with high attack
potential.
87 OD.Material
Control over MRTD Material
The IC Manufacturer, the MRTD Manufacturer and the Personalization Agent must control all
materials, equipment and information to produce, initialise, pre-personalize genuine MRTD’s
materials and to personalize authentic MRTDs in order to prevent counterfeit of MRTDs using
MRTD materials.
3.5.3 Security Objectives for the Operational Environment
Issuing State or Organization
88 The Issuing State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
89 OE.Personalization
Personalization of logical MRTD
The issuing State or Organization must ensure that the Personalization Agents acting on behalf of
the issuing State or Organisation (i) establish the correct identity of the holder and create
biographical data for the MRTD, (ii) enrol the biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e.
the portrait, the encoded finger image(s) and/or the encoded iris image(s) and (iii) personalize the
MRTD for the holder together with the defined physical and logical security measures to protect
the confidentiality and integrity of these data.
90 OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
Authentication of logical MRTD by Signature
The Issuing State or Organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure Country Signing CA
Key Pair, (ii) ensure the secrecy of the Country Signing CA Private Key and sign Document
Signer Certificates in a secure operational environment, and (iii) distribute the Certificate of the
Country Signing CA Public Key to receiving States and organizations maintaining its authenticity
and integrity. The Issuing State or organization must (i) generate a cryptographic secure
page 20 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Document Signing Key Pair and ensure the secrecy of the Document Signer Private Keys, (ii)
sign Document Security Objects of genuine MRTD in a secure operational environment only and
(iii) distribute the Certificate of the Document Signing Public Key to receiving States and
organizations. The digital signature in the Document Security Object relates to all data in the data
in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 if stored in the LDS according to [6].
91 OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
MRTD Authentication Key
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order
to (i) generate the MRTD’s Chip Authentication Key Pair, (ii) sign and store the Chip
Authentication Public Key in the Chip Authentication Public Key data in EF.DG14 and (iii)
support inspection systems of receiving States or organizations to verify the authenticity of the
MRTD’s chip used for genuine MRTD by certification of the Chip Authentication Public Key by
means of the Document Security Object.
92 OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data
The issuing State or Organization has to establish the necessary public key infrastructure in order
to limit the access to sensitive biometric reference data of MRTD’s holders to authorized
receiving States or Organizations. The Country Verifying Certification Authority of the issuing
State or Organization generates card verifiable Document Verifier Certificates for the authorized
Document Verifier only.
Receiving State or organization
93 The Receiving State or Organization will implement the following security objectives of the TOE
environment.
94 OE.Exam_MRTD
Examination of the MRTD passport book
The inspection system of the Receiving State must examine the MRTD presented by the traveller
to verify its authenticity by means of the physical security measures and to detect any
manipulation of the physical MRTD. The Basic Inspection System for global interoperability (i)
includes the Country Signing Public Key and the Document Signer Public Key of each issuing
State or Organization, and (ii) implements the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [7].
Additionally General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems perform the Chip
Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the presented MRTD’s chip.
95 OE.Passive_Auth_Verif
Verification by Passive Authentication
The border control officer of the Receiving State uses the inspection system to verify the traveller
as MRTD holder. The inspection systems must have successfully verified the signature of
Document Security Objects and the integrity data elements of the logical MRTD before they are
used. The receiving States and organizations must manage the Country Signing Public Key and
the Document Signing Public Key maintaining their authenticity and availability in all inspection
systems.
96 OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
Protection of data of the logical MRTD
The inspection system of the receiving State or Organisation ensures the confidentiality and
integrity of the data read from the logical MRTD. The inspection system will prevent
page 21 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
eavesdropping to their communication with the TOE before secure messaging is successfully
established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
97 OE.Ext_Insp_Systems
Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems
The Document Verifier of receiving States or Organizations authorize Extended Inspection
Systems by creation of Inspection System Certificates for access to sensitive biometric reference
data of the logical MRTD. The Extended Inspection System authenticates themselves to the
MRTD’s chip for access to the sensitive biometric reference data with its private Terminal
Authentication Key and its Inspection System Certificate.
page 22 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
4 Security Requirements
98 The CC allows several operations to be performed on functional requirements; refinement,
selection, assignment, and iteration are defined in paragraph 2.1.4 of Part 2 of the CC. Each of
these operations is used in this ST.
99 The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and thus further restricts a
requirement. Refinement of security requirements is denoted by the word “refinement” in bold
text and the added/changed words are in bold text. In cases where words from a CC requirement
were deleted, a separate attachment indicates the words that were removed.
100 The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. Selections that have been made by the PP authors are denoted as unlined text and the
original text of the component is given by a footnote. Selections to be filled in by the ST author
are denoted as double-underlined text.
101 The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as
the length of a password. Assignments that have been made by the PP authors are denoted by
showing as underlined text and the original text of the component is given by a footnote.
Assignments to be filled in by the ST author are denoted as double-underlined text.
102 The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration
is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component identifier.
103 The following table provides an overview of the keys and certificates used:
Name
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority Private
Key (SKCVCA)
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority Public
Key (PKCVCA)
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority
Certificate
(CCVCA)
Document Verifier
Certificate (CDV)
page 23 of 82
Data
The Country Verifying Certification Authority (CVCA) holds a
private key (SKCVCA) used for signing the Document
Verifier Certificates.
The TOE stores the Country Verifying Certification Authority
Public Key (PKCVCA) as part of the TSF data to verify the
Document Verifier Certificates. The PKCVCA has the security
attribute Current Date as the most recent valid effective
date of the Country Verifying Certification Authority
Certificate or of a domestic Document Verifier Certificate.
The Country Verifying Certification Authority Certificate may be a
self-signed certificate or a link certificate (cf. [26] and
Glossary). It contains (i) the Country Verifying
Certification Authority Public Key (PKCVCA) as
authentication reference data, (ii) the coded access control
rights of the Country Verifying Certification Authority, (iii)
the Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration
Date as security attributes.
The Document Verifier Certificate CDV is issued by the Country
Verifying Certification Authority. It contains (i) the
Document Verifier Public Key (PKDV) as authentication
reference data (ii) identification as domestic or foreign
Document Verifier, the coded access control rights of the
Document Verifier, the Certificate Effective Date and the
Certificate Expiration Date as security attributes.
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Name
Inspection System
Certificate (CIS)
Chip Authentication
Public Key Pair
Chip Authentication
Public Key
(PKICC)
Chip Authentication
Private Key
(SKICC)
Country Signing
Certification
Authority Key
Pair
Document Signer Key
Pairs
Document Basic Access
Keys
BAC Session Keys
Chip Session Key
Data
The Inspection System Certificate (CIS) is issued by the Document
Verifier. It contains (i) as authentication reference data the
Inspection System Public Key (PKIS), (ii) the coded access
control rights of the Extended Inspection System, the
Certificate Effective Date and the Certificate Expiration
Date as security attributes.
The Chip Authentication Public Key Pair (SKICC, PKICC) are used
for Key Agreement Protocol: Diffie-Hellman (DH)
according to RFC 2631 or Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
according to ISO 15946.
The Chip Authentication Public Key (PKICC) is stored in the
EF.DG14 Chip Authentication Public Key of the TOE’s
logical MRTD and used by the inspection system for Chip
Authentication of the MRTD’s chip. It is part of the user
data provided by the TOE for the IT environment.
The Chip Authentication Private Key (SKICC) is used by the TOE to
authenticate itself as authentic MRTD’s chip. It is part of
the TSF data.
Country Signing Certification Authority of the Issuing State or
Organization signs the Document Signer Public Key
Certificate with the Country Signing Certification
Authority Private Key and the signature will be verified by
Receiving State or Organization (e.g. a Basic Inspection
System) with the Country Signing Certification Authority
Public Key.
Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization signs the
Document Security Object of the logical MRTD with the
Document Signer Private Key and the signature will be
verified by a Basic Inspection Systems of the Receiving
State or organization with the Document Signer Public
Key.
The Document Basic Access Key is created by the Personalization
Agent, loaded to the TOE, and used for mutual
authentication and key agreement for secure messaging
between the Basic Inspection System and the MRTD’s
chip.
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed
between the TOE and a BIS in result of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Protocol.
Secure messaging Triple-DES key and Retail-MAC key agreed
between the TOE and a GIS in result of the Chip
Authentication Protocol.
4.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
104 This section on security functional requirements for the TOE is divided into sub-section following
the main security functionality.
page 24 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
4.1.1 Class FAU Security Audit
105 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Audit storage (FAU_SAS.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2 extended).
106 FAU_SAS.1 Audit storage
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FAU_SAS.1.1
The TSF shall provide the Manufacturer with the capability to store the
IC Identification Data in the audit records.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
4.1.2 Class Cryptographic Support (FCS)
107 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic key
generation algorithms to be implemented and key to be generated by the TOE.
108 FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Key Derivation Function by the
MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
KDF_MRT
D
Dependencies:
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm Document Basic Access
Key Derivation Algorithm and specified cryptographic key sizes
112 bit that meet the following: [7], Annex E.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
109 FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the
MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FCS_CKM.1.1/
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
DH_MRTD
cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDH and specified
cryptographic key sizes 112 bits that meet the following: [26],
Annex A.1.
page 25 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
110 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
111 FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction - MRTD
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/
MRTD
Dependencies:
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion of key
value that meets the following: FIPS PUB 140-2.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP_ITC.2
Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)
112 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic algorithms to be
implemented by the TOE.
113 FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_MRT
D
Dependencies:
The TSF shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256 and
cryptographic key sizes none that meet the following: FIPS
180-2 [15].
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
114 FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Encryption / Decryption Triple DES
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption in
TDES_MR
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Triple-DES
TD
in CBC mode and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the
following: FIPS 46-3 [14] and [7]; Annex E.3.
Dependencies:
page 26 of 82
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
115 FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD Cryptographic operation – Retail MAC
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
The TSF shall perform secure messaging – message authentication code
MAC_MR
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
TD
MAC and cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the
following: ISO 9797 (MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES,
Sequence Message Counter, padding mode 2).
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
116 FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER Cryptographic operation – Signature verification by MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_VER
Dependencies:
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification in accordance with
a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA with SHA-1,
SHA-224 or SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes 224, 256
and 320 bits that meet the following: FIPS 186-2 [16].
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
Random Number Generation (FCS_RND.1)
117 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers (FCS_RND.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
118 FCS_RND.1/MRTD Quality metric for random numbers
Hierarchical to:
FCS_RND.1.1/
MRTD
page 27 of 82
No other components.
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate random numbers that
meet the requirements for SOF high defined in AIS20 [5].
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
4.1.3 Class FIA Identification and Authentication
119 Application note: The following Table provides an overview on the authentication mechanisms
used.
Name
SFR for the TOE
SFR for the
Algorithms and key sizes
TOE
according to [7],
environment
Annex E, and [26]
(terminal)
FIA_API.1/PT
Triple-DES with 112 bit
keys
Symmetric
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
Authentication
Mechanism for
Personalization
Agents
Basic Access
FIA_AFL.1,
FIA_UAU.4/BT,
Triple-DES, 112 bit keys
Control
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.6
and
AuthentiFIA_UAU.6/MRTD
/BT
Retail-MAC, 112
cation
bit keys
Mechanism
Chip
FIA_API.1/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.4/GIS,
ECDH and
AuthentiFIA_UAU.5/MRTD,
FIA_UAU.5
Retail-MAC, 112
cation
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
/GIS,
bit keys
Protocol
FIA_UAU.6
/GIS
Terminal
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
FIA_API.1/EIS
EC-DSA with SHA
Authentication
Protocol
Table 1: Overview on authentication SFR
Note the Chip Authentication Protocol include the asymmetric key agreement and the check
whether the TOE is able to generate the correct message authentication code with the expected
key for any message received by the terminal.
120 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
121 FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
page 28 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UID.1.1
FIA_UID.1.2
The TSF shall allow
(1) to establish the communication channel,
(2) to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF
according to FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that
user.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
122 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
123 FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.1.1
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall allow
1. to establish the communication channel,
2. to read the Initialization Data if it is not disabled by TSF according to
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS,
3. to identify themselves by selection of the authentication key
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
Dependencies: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
124 The TOE shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
125 FIA_UAU.4/MRTD Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/
MRTD
page 29 of 82
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES.
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Dependencies: No dependencies.
126 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
127 FIA_UAU.5/MRTD Multiple authentication mechanisms
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.5.1/
MRTD
FIA_UAU.5.2/
MRTD
The TSF shall provide
1. Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2. Terminal Authentication Protocol,
3. Secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode,
4. Symmetric Authentication Mechanism based on Triple-DES
to support user authentication.
The TSF shall authenticate any user’s claimed identity according to the
following rules:
1. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Personalization Agent
by one of the following mechanisms
(a) the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with
Personalization Agent Keys,
(b) the Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization
Agent Key,
(c) the Terminal Authentication Protocol with Personalization Agent
Keys.
2. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt as Basic Inspection
System only by means of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access
Keys.
3. After successful authentication as Basic Inspection System and until
the completion of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE
accepts only received command with correct message authentication
code sent by means of secure messaging with the key agreed upon
with the authenticated terminal by means of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Mechanism.
4. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the TOE accepts
only received commands with correct message authentication code
sent by means of secure messaging with key agreed with the
terminal by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
5. The TOE accepts the authentication attempt by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol only if the terminal uses
secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication
Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
page 30 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
128 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
129 FIA_UAU.6/MRTD Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the TOE
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/
MRTD
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
1. Each command sent to the TOE after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and
until the completion of the Chip Authentication Mechanism shall be
verified as being sent by the authenticated BIS.
2. Each command sent to the TOE after successful run of the Chip
Authentication Protocol shall be verified as being sent by the GIS.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
130 Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1)
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_AFL.1.1
FIA_AFL.1.2
The TSF shall detect when 1 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur
related to BAC authentication.
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been
met or surpassed, the TSF shall wait for an administrator
configurable time greater ten seconds between the reception of the
authentication command and its processing.
Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication
131 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
132 FIA_API.1/CAP Authentication Proof of Identity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/CAP
The TSF shall provide a Chip Authentication Protocol according to [26] to
prove the identity of the TOE.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.1.4 Class FDP User Data Protection
133 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
134 FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
page 31 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
FDP_ACC.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP on terminals gaining
write, read and modification access to data in the EF.COM,
EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
135 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
136 FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_ACF.1.1
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to objects based on the
following:
1. Subjects:
a. Personalization Agent,
b. Basic Inspection System,
c. Extended Inspection System
d. Terminal,
2. Objects:
a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
b. data in EF.COM,
c. data in EF.SOD,
3. Security attributes:
a. authentication status of terminals,
FDP_ACF.1.2
FDP_ACF.1.3
page 32 of 82
b. Terminal Authorization.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the successfully authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to
write and to read the data of the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
2. the successfully authenticated Basic Inspection System is allowed to
read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2 and EF.DG5
to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
3. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is
allowed to read the data in EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1, EF.DG2
and EF.DG5 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD,
4. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is
allowed to read data in the EF.DG3 according to the Terminal
Authorization,
5. the successfully authenticated Extended Inspection System is
allowed to read data in the EF.DG4 according to the Terminal
Authorization.
The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
FDP_ACF.1.4
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Dependencies:
the following sensitive rules: none.
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on
the rule: A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read to
read data in the EF.DG3,
A terminal authenticated as CVCA is not allowed to read to read data
in the EF.DG4,
A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read to read data in
the EF.DG3,
A terminal authenticated as DV is not allowed to read to read data in
the EF.DG4,
the Terminals are not allowed to modify any of the EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialization
137 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
138 FDP_UCT.1/MRTD Basic data exchange confidentiality - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UCT.1.1/
MRTD
Dependencies:
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and
receive objects in a manner protected from unauthorised disclosure
after Chip Authentication.
FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
139 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality (FDP_UCT.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
140 FDP_UIT.1/MRTD Data exchange integrity - MRTD
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/
MRTD
page 33 of 82
The TSF shall enforce the Access Control SFP to be able to transmit and
receive user data in a manner protected from modification,
deletion, insertion and replay errors after Chip Authentication.
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
FDP_UIT.1.2/
MRTD
Dependencies:
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion and replay has occurred after
Chip Authentication.
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
4.1.5 Class FMT Security Management
141 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
142 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMF.1.1
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following security
management functions:
1. Initialization,
2. Personalization,
3. Configuration.
Dependencies: No Dependencies
143 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
144 FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_SMR.1.1
FMT_SMR.1.2
The TSF shall maintain the roles
1.
Manufacturer,
2.
Personalization Agent,
3.
Country Verifier Certification Authority,
4.
Document Verifier,
5.
Basic Inspection System,
6.
domestic Extended Inspection System
7.
foreign Extended Inspection System.
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
145 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
page 34 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
146 FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_LIM.1.1
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their capabilities so that
in conjunction with “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow,
1.
User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2.
TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3.
software to be reconstructed and
4.
substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks
Dependencies: FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability.
147 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Limited availability (FMT_LIM.2)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
148 FMT_LIM.2 Limited availability
Hierarchical to:
FMT_LIM.2.1
Dependencies:
No other components.
The TSF shall be designed in a manner that limits their availability so that
in conjunction with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)” the
following policy is enforced:
Deploying Test Features after TOE Delivery does not allow
1.
User Data to be disclosed or manipulated,
2.
TSF data to be disclosed or manipulated
3.
software to be reconstructed and
4.
substantial information about construction of TSF to be gathered
which may enable other attacks.
FMT_LIM.1 Limited capabilities.
149 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations address different management functions and
different TSF data.
150 FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA Management of TSF data – Writing of Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_ENA
page 35 of 82
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Initialization Data and Prepersonalization Data to the Manufacturer.
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
151 FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS Management of TSF data – Disabling of Read Access to
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
INI_DIS
Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to disable read access for users to the
Initialization Data to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
152 FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI Management of TSF data – Initialisation of CVCA Certificate
and Current Date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_INI
Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the
1. initial Country Verifying Certification Authority Public Key,
2. initial Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate,
3. initial Current Date
to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
153 FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD Management of TSF data – Country Verifier Certification
Authority
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CVCA_UPD
Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to update the
1. Country Verifier Certification Authority Public Key,
2. Country Verifier Certification Authority Certificate
to Country Verifier Certification Authority.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
154 FMT_MTD.1/DATE Management of TSF data – Current date
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
DATE
page 36 of 82
The TSF shall restrict the ability to modify the Current date to
1.
Country Verifier Certification Authority,
2.
Document Verifier,
3.
domestic Extended Inspection System.
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
155 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE Management of TSF data – Key Write
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
The TSF shall restrict the ability to write the Document Basic Access Keys
KEY_WRITE
to the Personalization Agent.
Dependencies:
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
156 FMT_MTD.1/CAPK Management of TSF data – Chip Authentication Private Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
CAPK
Dependencies:
The TSF shall restrict the ability to load the Chip Authentication Private
Key to the Personalization Agent.
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
157 FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ Management of TSF data – Key Read
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.1.1/
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read the
KEY_READ
1. Document Basic Access Keys,
2. Chip Authentication Private Key,
3. Personalization Agent Keys
to none.
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of management functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
158 FMT_MTD.3 Secure TSF data
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FMT_MTD.3.1
Dependencies:
The TSF shall ensure that only secure values of the certificate chain are
accepted for TSF data of the Terminal Authentication Protocol
and the Access Control.
ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data
Refinement: The certificate chain is valid if and only if
page 37 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
(1) the digital signature of the Inspection System Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key of the Document Verifier Certificate and the expiration date of
the Inspection System Certificate is not before the Current Date of the TOE,
(2) the digital signature of the Document Verifier Certificate can be verified as correct
with the public key in the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority and the expiration date of the Document Verifier Certificate is not before
the Current Date of the TOE,
(3) the digital signature of the Certificate of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority can be verified as correct with the public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority known to the TOE and the expiration date of the Certificate
of the Country Verifying Certification Authority is not before the Current Date of the
TOE.
The Inspection System Public Key contained in the Inspection System Certificate in a
valid certificate chain is a secure value for the authentication reference data of the
Extended Inspection System.
The intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations contained in the certificates of
a valid certificate chain is a secure value for Terminal Authorization of a successful
authenticated Extended Inspection System.
4.1.6 Class FPT Protection of the Security Functions
159 The TOE shall prevent inherent and forced illicit information leakage for User Data and TSF
Data. The security functional requirement FPT_EMSEC.1 addresses the inherent leakage. With
respect to the forced leakage they have to be considered in combination with the security
functional requirements “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” and “TSF
testing (FPT_TST.1)” on the one hand and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” on the
other. The SFR “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” and “TSF domain separation
(FPT_SEP.1)” together with “Limited capabilities (FMT_LIM.1)”, “Limited availability
(FMT_LIM.2)” and “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” prevent bypassing, deactivation
and manipulation of the security features or misuse of TOE functions.
160 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2 extended):
161 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_EMSEC.1.1
FPT_EMSEC.1.2
page 38 of 82
The TOE shall not emit information about IC power consumption and
command execution time in excess of non-useful information
enabling access to Personalization Agent Authentication Key and
Chip Authentication Private Key and Manufacturer Authentication
Keys.
The TSF shall ensure any users are unable to use the following interface
smart card circuit contacts to gain access to Personalization Agent
Authentication Key and Chip Authentication Private Key and
Manufacturer Authentication Keys.
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Dependencies: No other components.
162 The following security functional requirements address the protection against forced illicit
information leakage including physical manipulation.
163 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
164 FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures
occur:
(1) Exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction could
occur,
(2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1.
Dependencies: ADV_SPM.1 Informal TOE security policy model
165 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below (Common
Criteria Part 2).
166 FPT_TST.1 TSF testing
Hierarchical to:
FPT_TST.1.1
FPT_TST.1.2
FPT_TST.1.3
Dependencies:
No other components.
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up and at the
condition “request of random numbers” to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF.
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data.
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of stored TSF executable code.
FPT_AMT.1 Abstract machine testing.
167 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Resistance to physical attack (FPT_PHP.3)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
168 FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to physical attack
Hierarchical to:
FPT_PHP.3.1
Dependencies:
page 39 of 82
No other components.
The TSF shall resist physical manipulation and physical probing to the
TSF by responding automatically such that the TSP is not violated.
No dependencies.
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
169 The following security functional requirements protect the TSF against bypassing and support the
separation of TOE parts.
170 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Non-bypassability of the TSP (FPT_RVM.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
171 FPT_RVM.1 Non-bypassability of the TSP
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FPT_RVM.1.1
Dependencies:
The TSF shall ensure that TSP enforcement functions are invoked and
succeed before each function within the TSC is allowed to
proceed.
No dependencies.
172 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF domain separation (FPT_SEP.1)” as specified below
(Common Criteria Part 2).
173 FPT_SEP.1 TSF domain separation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
FPT_SEP.1.1
The TSF shall maintain a security domain for its own execution that
protects it from interference and tampering by untrusted subjects.
FPT_SEP.1.2
The TSF shall enforce separation between the security domains of subjects
in the TSC
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
4.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
174 The for the evaluation of the TOE and its development and operating environment are those taken
from the
Evaluation Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)
and augmented by taking the following components:
ADV_IMP.2, ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
175 The minimum strength of function is SOF-high.
176 This security target does not contain any security functional requirement for which an explicit
stated strength of function claim is required.
page 40 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
4.3 Security Requirements for the IT environment
177 This section describes the security functional requirements for the IT environment using the CC
part 2 components.
178 Due to CCIMB Final Interpretation #58 these components are editorial changed to express the
security requirements for the components in the IT environment where the original components
are directed for TOE security functions. The editorial changes are indicated in bold.
4.3.1 Passive Authentication
179 The ICAO, the Issuing States or Organizations and the Receiving States or Organization run a
public key infrastructure for the Passive Authentication. This public key infrastructure distributes
and protects the Country Signing CA Keys and the Document Signing Keys to support the
signing of the User Data (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) by means of the Document Security Object. The
Technical Report [7] describes the requirements to the public key infrastructure for the Passive
Authentication.
180 The Document Signer of the Issuing State or Organization shall meet the requirement “Basic data
authentication (FDP_DAU.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
181 FDP_DAU.1/DS Basic data authentication – Passive Authentication
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_DAU.1.1/
DS
FDP_DAU.1.2/
DS
The Document Signer shall provide a capability to generate evidence
that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of logical the
MRTD (EF.DG1 to EF.DG16) and the Document Security
Object.
The Document Signer shall provide Inspection Systems of Receiving
States or Organization with the ability to verify evidence of the
validity of the indicated information.
Dependencies: No dependencies
4.3.2 Extended Access Control PKI
182 The CVCA and the DV shall establish a Document Verification PKI by generating asymmetric
key pairs and certificates for the CVCA, DV and IS which may be verified by the TOE. The
following SFR use the term “PKI” as synonym for entities like CVCA, DV and IS which may be
responsible to perform the identified functionality.
183 FCS_CKM.1/PKI Cryptographic key generation – Document Verification PKI Keys
Hierarchical to:
FCS_CKM.1.1/PKI
page 41 of 82
No other components.
The PKI shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key generation algorithm ECDSA and specified
cryptographic key sizes 224, 256 or 320 bit that meet the
following: [26], Annex A .
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Dependencies:
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
184 FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN Cryptographic operation – Certificate Signing
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
CERT_SIG
N
Dependencies:
The PKI shall perform digital signature creation in accordance with a
specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA and cryptographic
key sizes 224, 256 or 320 bit that meet the following: TR03110 [26].
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
4.3.3 Basic Terminal
185 This section describes common security functional requirements to the Basic Inspection Systems
and the Personalization Agent if it uses the Basic Access Control Mechanism with the
Personalization Agent Authentication Keys. Both are called “Basic Terminals” (BT) in this
section.
186 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation (FCS_CKM.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
187 FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT Cryptographic key generation – Generation of Document Basic
Access Keys by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to:
FCS_CKM.1.1/
KDF_BT
Dependencies:
No other components.
The Basic Terminal shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm
Document Basic Access Key Derivation Algorithm and specified
cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that meet the following: [7].
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
188 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)”
as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
page 42 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
189 FCS_CKM.4/BT Cryptographic key destruction - BT
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_CKM.4.1/BT
Dependencies:
The Basic Terminal shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key destruction method physical deletion by
overwriting the memory data with zeros or random data that meets
the following: FIPS PUB 140-2.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
190 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation (FCS_COP.1)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2). The iterations are caused by different cryptographic
algorithms to be implemented by the Basic Terminal.
191 FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT Cryptographic operation – Hash Function by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_BT
Dependencies:
The Basic Terminal shall perform hashing in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithms SHA-1 and cryptographic key sizes
none that meet the following: FIPS 180-2 [15].
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
192 FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT Cryptographic operation – Secure Messaging Encryption /
Decryption by the Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
ENC_BT
page 43 of 82
The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – encryption and
decryption in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key
sizes 112 bit that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [14], ISO
11568-2, ISO 9797-1 (padding mode 2).
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Dependencies:
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
193 FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT Cryptographic operation
Authentication Code by the Basic Terminal
–
Secure
messaging
Message
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
MAC_BT
Dependencies:
The Basic Terminal shall perform secure messaging – message
authentication code in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm Retail-MAC and cryptographic key
sizes 112 bit that meet the following: FIPS 46-3 [14], ISO 9797
(MAC algorithm 3, block cipher DES, zero IV 8 bytes, padding
mode 2).
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
194 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Quality metric for random numbers
(FCS_RND.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
195 FCS_RND.1/BT Quality metric for random numbers - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to:
FCS_RND.1.1/BT
Dependencies:
No other components.
The Basic Terminal shall provide a mechanism to generate random
numbers that meets the requirements for SOF high defined in
AIS 20 [5].
No dependencies.
196 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirements of “Single-use authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
197 FIA_UAU.4/BT Single-use authentication mechanisms – Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/BT
page 44 of 82
The Basic Terminal shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Dependencies: No dependencies.
198 The Basic Terminal shall meet the requirement “Re-authentication (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2).
199 FIA_UAU.6/BT Re-authentication - Basic Terminal
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/BT
The Basic Terminal shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions
each command sent to TOE after successful authentication of the
terminal with Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.3.4 General Inspection System
200 The General Inspection System (GIS) is a Basic Inspection System which implements additional
the Chip Authentication Mechanism. Therefore it has to fulfil all security requirements of the
Basic Inspection System as described above.
201 The General Inspection System verifies the authenticity of the MRTD’s by the Chip
Authentication Mechanism during inspection and establishes new secure messaging with keys.
The reference data for the Chip Authentication Mechanism is the Chip Authentication Public Key
read form the logical MRTD data group EF.DG14 and verified by Passive Authentication (cf. to
FDP_DAU.1/DS). Note, that the Chip Authentication Mechanism requires the General Inspection
System to verify at least one message authentication code of a response sent by the MRTD to
check the authenticity of the chip.
202 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation
(FCS_CKM.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
203 FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS Cryptographic key generation – Diffie-Hellman Keys by the GIS
Hierarchical to:
FCS_CKM.1.1/
DH_GIS
Dependencies:
No other components.
The General Inspection System shall generate cryptographic keys in
accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation
algorithm ECDH, Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Algorithm and specified cryptographic key sizes 112 bit that
meet the following: [26], Annex A.1 .
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
204 FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by GIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
page 45 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_GIS
Dependencies:
The General Inspection System shall perform hashing in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224 and
SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the
following: FIPS 180-2 [15].
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
205 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Single-use authentication
mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
206 FIA_UAU.4/GIS Single-use authentication mechanisms - Single-use authentication of the
Terminal by the GIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.4.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall prevent reuse of authentication data
related to
1.
2.
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
Chip Authentication Protocol.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
207 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms
(FIA_UAU.5)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
208 FIA_UAU.5/GIS Multiple authentication mechanisms – General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.5.1/GIS
The General Inspection System shall provide
1.
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism,
2.
Chip Authentication
to support user authentication.
page 46 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
FIA_UAU.5.2/GIS
The General Inspection System shall authenticate any user’s claimed
identity according to the following rules:
1. The General Inspection System accepts the authentication attempt as
MRTD only by means of the Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism with the Document Basic Access
Keys.
2. After successful authentication as MRTD and until the completion of
the Chip Authentication Mechanism the General Inspection
System accepts only response codes with correct message
authentication code sent by means of secure messaging with
key agreed with the authenticated MRTD by means of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
3. After run of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the General
Inspection System accepts only response codes with correct
message authentication code sent by means of secure
messaging with key agreed with the terminal by means of
the Chip Authentication Mechanism.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
209 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
210 FIA_UAU.6/GIS Re-authenticating – Re-authenticating of Terminal by the General
Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_UAU.6.1/
GIS
The General Inspection System shall re-authenticate the user under the
conditions
1. Each response sent to the General Inspection System after successful
authentication of the MRTD with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism and until the completion of the
Chip Authentication Mechanism shall have a correct MAC
created by means of secure messaging keys agreed upon by
the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism.
2. Each response sent to the General Inspection System after successful
run of the Chip Authentication Protocol shall have a correct
MAC created by means of secure messaging keys generated
by Chip Authentication Protocol.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
211 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality
(FDP_UCT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
212 FDP_UCT.1/GIS Basic data exchange confidentiality - General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
page 47 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
FDP_UCT.1.1/GIS The General Inspection System shall enforce the Access Control SFP to
be able to transmit and receive objects in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure after Chip Authentication.
Dependencies:
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
213 The General Inspection System shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity
(FDP_UIT.1)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2).
214 FDP_UIT.1/GIS Data exchange integrity - General Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FDP_UIT.1.1/GIS
The General Inspection System shall enforce the Basic Access Control
SFP to be able to transmit and receive user data in a manner
protected from modification, deletion, insertion and replay errors
after Chip Authentication.
The General Inspection System shall be able to determine on receipt of
user data, whether modification, deletion, insertion and replay has
occurred after Chip Authentication.
FDP_UIT.1.2/GIS
Dependencies:
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow
control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
4.3.5 Extended Inspection System
215 The Extended Inspection System (EIS) in addition to the General Inspection System (i)
implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and (ii) is authorized by the issuing State or
Organization through the Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive biometric
reference data.
216 FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS Cryptographic operation – Signature creation by EIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FCS_COP.1.1/
SIG_SIGN_EIS
Dependencies:
The Extended Inspection System shall perform signature creation in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA
and cryptographic key sizes 224, 256 or 320 bit that meet the
following: ISO 15946-2 [20].
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
217 FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS Cryptographic operation – Hash for Key Derivation by EIS
Hierarchical to: No other components.
page 48 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
FCS_COP.1.1/
SHA_EIS
Dependencies:
The Extended Inspection System shall perform hashing in accordance
with a specified cryptographic algorithm SHA-1, SHA-224 and
SHA-256 and cryptographic key sizes none that meet the
following: FIPS 180-2 [15].
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes
218 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended).
219 FIA_API.1/EIS Authentication Proof of Identity – Extended Inspection System
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/EIS
The Extended Inspection System shall provide a Terminal Authentication
Protocol according to [26] to prove the identity of the Extended
Inspection system.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
4.3.6 Personalization Terminals
220 The TOE supports different authentication and access control mechanisms which may be used for
the Personalization Agent depending on the personalization scheme of the Issuing State or
Organization:
(1) The Basic Access Control Mechanism which may be used by the Personalization Terminal
with a Personalization Agent Secret Key Pair. The Basic Access Control Mechanism
establishes strong cryptographic keys for the secure messaging to ensure the confidentiality
by Triple-DES and integrity by Retail-MAC of the transmitted data. This approach may be
used in a personalization environment where the communication between the MRTD’s chip
and the Personalization Terminal may be listened or manipulated.
(2) The Personalization Terminal may use the Terminal Authentication Protocol like a
Extended Inspection System but using the Personalization Agent Keys to authenticate
themselves to the TOE. This approach may be used in a personalization environment where
(i) the Personalization Agent want to authenticate the MRTD’s chip and (ii) the
communication between the MRTD’s chip and the Personalization Terminal may be
listened or manipulated.
(3) In a centralized personalization scheme the major issue is high productivity of
personalization in a high secure environment. In this case the personalization agent may
wish to reduce the protocol to symmetric authentication of the terminal without secure
messaging. Therefore the TOE and the Personalization Terminal support a simple the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key as requested by the
SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT.
page 49 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
221 The Personalization Terminal shall meet the requirement “Authentication Prove of Identity
(FIA_API)” as specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended) if it uses the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key.
222 FIA_API.1/SYM_PT Authentication Proof of Identity - Personalization Terminal
Authentication with Symmetric Key
Hierarchical to: No other components.
FIA_API.1.1/
SYM_PT
The Personalization Terminal shall provide an Authentication
Mechanism based on Triple-DES to prove the identity of the
Personalization Agent.
Dependencies: No dependencies.
page 50 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
5 TOE Summary Specification
223 This chapter describes the TOE Security Functions and the Assurance Measures covering the
requirements of the previous chapter.
5.1 TOE Security Functions
224 This chapter gives the overview description of the different TOE Security Functions composing
the TSF.
225 In the following table all TOE Security Functions with a SOF claim are listed. The assessment of
cryptographic algorithms is not part of this CC evaluation.
TOE Security Function
SOF claim
Description
F.IC_CL
high
The functionality is defined in BSI-DSZ-CC-0417.
F.Identifcation_Authentication
high
The mechanism for identification/authentication of
the roles is probabilistic.
F.Crypto
high
The mechanism for identification/authentication and
confidentiality of communication is
probabilistic.
5.1.1 TOE Security Functions from Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library
F.IC_CL: Security Functions of the Hardware (IC) and Crypto Library
226 This Security Function covers the security functions of the hardware (IC) as well as of the crypto
library and is composed in particular of
●
Generation of random number used in the anticollision phase of the chip in phase 4 to
create communication identification data and the creation of a session key and
authentication nonces; the seed is created by the hardware-realized random number
generator (RNG) and is used by the software-realized RNG
●
Triple-DES co-processor to support DES calculations is used in all cases where DES/3DES
is used
●
internal security measures which clear memory areas used by the Crypto Library after
usage
●
copy memory content in a manner protected against side channel attacks
●
Control of operating conditions
●
Protection against physical manipulations
●
Logical protection includes software countermeasures against side channel attacks
page 51 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
●
Protection of mode control especially used to store the chip identification data in the User
Read Only Area and to separate security domains
●
ECC Signature Generation and Verification
●
ECC Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
227 The supported SHA, AES and RSA algorithms as well as ECC key generation are not used.
5.1.2 TOE Security Functions from Embedded Software (ES) – Operating System
F.Access_Control
228 This TSF regulates all access by external entities to operations of the TOE which are only
executed after this TSF allowed access. This function consists of following elements:
1. Access to objects is controlled based on subjects, objects (any file) and security attributes.
2. No access control policy allows reading of any key.
3. Any access not explicitly allowed is denied.
4. Access Control in phase 2b - initialization - enforces initialization policy: Configuration
and initialization of the TOE only by the manufacturer or on behalf of him. (See
F.Management.)
5. Access Control in phase 2c – pre-personalization – enforces pre-personalization policy:
Creation of the ICAO file structure, configuring of access control policy, doing key
management and reading of initialization data only by the Manufacturer (prepersonalization agent) identified with its authentication key. (See F.Management.)
6. Access Control in phase 3 – personalization – enforces personalization policy: Writing of
user data, keys (BAC, Chip Authentication) and Terminal Authentication data (CVCA data
and current date) and reading of initialization data only by the personalization agent
identified with its authentication key. (See F.Management.)
7. Access Control in phase 4 – operation – enforces operational use policy as described in
TR-03110 [26]: Reading of optional biometrics (EF.DG3, EF.DG4) by authenticated and
authorized EIS; Chip Authentication, Termainal Authentication and reading of other user
data by BIS, GIS and EIS authenticated at least by Secure Messaging with BAC.
F.Identification_Authentication
229 This function provides identification/authentication of the user roles:
●
Manufacturer (Initialization/Pre-personalization Agent)
●
Personalisation Agent
●
Country Verifier Certification Authority
page 52 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
●
Document Viewer
●
Basic Inspection System
●
Extended Inspection System (domestic/foreign)
230 by the methods:
●
●
●
Symmetric BAC authentication method [7] with following properties:
●
The authentication is as specified by ICAO.
●
It uses a challenge from the MRTD.
●
The method can be configured by the administraor to delay the processing of the
authentication command after a failed authentication command of up to over 10
seconds.
●
The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC provided by
F.Crypto.
●
The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC provided by F.Crypto.
●
On error (wrong MAC, wrong challenge) the user role is not identified/authenticated,
●
On success the session keys are created and stored for Secure Messaging.
Secure Messaging with following properties:
●
The Secure Messaging is as specified by ICAO.
●
The cryptographic method for confidentiality is Triple-DES/CBC provided by
F.Crypto.
●
The cryptographic method for authenticity is DES/Retail MAC provided by F.Crypto.
●
In a Secure Messaging protected command the method for confidentiality and the
method for authenticity must be present.
●
The initialization vector is an encrypted send sequence counter (SSC).
●
In phases 3 – 4 a session key is used.
●
On any non correctly with the session keys protected command the session keys are
overwritten according to FIPS 140-2 (or better) and a new BAC authentication is
required.
●
Overwrites keys in transient memory after usage.
Chip Authentication with following properties:
●
According to TR-03110 [26] using ECDH from F.IC_CL.
●
Session keys are created and stored for Secure Messaging replacing existing session
keys.
page 53 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
●
Terminal Authentication with following properties:
●
According to TR-03110 [26] checking certificates with ECDSA from F.IC_CL.
●
It uses a challenge from the MRTD.
●
Usable only in a Secure Messaging session with Chip Authentication key.
●
It distinguishes between the roles:
●
Country Verifier Certification Authority
●
domestic and foreign Document Verifier
●
domestic and foreign Extended Inspection System
●
Update of CVCA certificate is allowed for CVCA.
●
Update of current date is allowed for CVCA, domestic and foreign Document Verifier
and domestic Extended Inspection System.
●
Only with a public key from an IS certificate the challenge-response authentication
itself is performed.
●
The bitwise AND of the Certificate Holder Authorisations of a certificate chain is used
for Terminal Authorization.
●
Verifying validity of certificate chain:
●
Certificates must be in the sequence: known CVCA [> CVCA] > DV > IS
●
Expiration dates must not be before the current date.
F.Management
231 In phase 2b the Manufacturer (Initialisation Agent) performs the initalization.
232 In phase 2c the Manufacturer (Pre-personalization Agent) configures the file layout including
security attributes. The layout done at this step determines that the parameters given in
F.Access_Control for phases 3 and 4 are enforced. The agent can at this step do also key
management and other administrative tasks.
233 In phase 3 the Personalization Agent performs following steps:
●
Formatting of all data to be stored in the TOE according to ICAO requirements which are
outside the scope of the TOE. The data to be formatted includes the index file, data groups,
passive authentication data, BAC key derived from the Machine Readable Zone data, Chip
Authentication private key and Terminal Authentication CVCA public keys and parameters
●
Writing of all the required data to the appropriate files as specified in TrLDS [6].
●
Changing the TOE into the end-usage mode for phase 4 where reading of the initialization
data is prevented.
page 54 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
F.Crypto
234 This function provides a high level interface to:
●
DES (supplied by F.IC_CL):
●
Triple-DES/CBC
●
DES/Retail MAC
235 This function implements the hash algorithms according to FIPS 180-2 [15]:
●
SHA-1
●
SHA-224
●
SHA-256
F.Verification
236 TOE internal functions ensures correct operation.
5.2 Assurance Measures
237 The assurance measures fulfilling the requirements of EAL4 augmented with ADV_IMP.2,
ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 are:
Assurance Measure
Description
ACM_AUT.1
Partial CM automation
ACM_CAP.4
Generation support and acceptance procedures
ACM_SCP.2
Problem tracking CM coverage
ADO_DEL.2
Detection of modification
ADO_IGS.1
Installation, generation and startup
ADV_FSP.2
Fully defined external interfaces
ADV_HLD.2
Security enforcing high-level design
ADV_LLD.1
Implementation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2
Descriptive low-level design
ADV_RCR.1
Informal correspondence demonstration
ADV_SPM.1
Informal TOE security policy model
AGD_ADM.1
Administrator guidance
AGD_USR.1
User guidance
ALC_DVS.2
Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_LCD.1
Developer defined life-cycle model
page 55 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Assurance Measure
Description
ALC_TAT.1
Well-defined development tools
ATE_COV.2
Analysis of coverage
ATE_DPT.1
Testing: high-level design
ATE_FUN.1
Functional testing
ATE_IND.2
Independent testing – sample
AVA_MSU.3
Analysis and testing for insecure states
AVA_SOF.1
Strength of TOE security function evaluation
AVA_VLA.4
Highly resistant
page 56 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
6 PP Claims
6.1 PP Reference
238 The conformance of this ST to the Common Criteria Protection Profile – Machine Readable
Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access Control, version 1.2, BSI-PP-0026
is claimed.
6.2 PP Refinements
239 None.
6.3 PP Additions
240 None.
page 57 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
7 Rationale
7.1 Security Objectives Rationale
OT.AC_Pers
OT.Data_Int
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Identification
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OD.Assurance
OD.Material
OE.Personalization
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Exam_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Ext_Insp_System
241 The following table provides an overview for security objectives coverage. In comparison with
BSI-PP-0026 the table includes the following correction: T.Chip-ID is countered by
OT.Data_Conf, not OT.Sens_Data_Conf.
T.Chip-ID
x
x
x
T.Skimming
x
T.Read_Sensitive_Data
x
x
x
T.Forgery
x x
x
x
x x
T.Counterfeit
x
x
x
x
T.Abuse-Func
x
T.Information_Leakage
x
T.Phys-tamper
x
T.Malfunction
x
P.Manufact
x x
P.Personalization
x
x
x
P.Personal_Data
x x
x
P.Sensitive_Data
x
x
x
A.Pers_Agent
x
A.Insp_Sys
x
x
A.Signature_PKI
x
x
A.Auth_PKI
x
x
Table 2: Security Objective Rationale
242 The OSP P.Manufact “Manufacturing of the MRTD’s chip” requires the quality and integrity of
the manufacturing process and control the MRTD’s material in the Phase 2 Manufacturing
including unique identification of the IC by means of the Initialization Data and the writing of the
Pre-personalization Data. The security objective for the TOE environment OD.Assurance
“Assurance Security Measures in Development and Manufacturing Environment” address these
obligations of the IC Manufacturer and MRTD Manufacturer. OD.Material “Control over MRTD
material” ensures that materials, equipment and tools used to produce genuine and authentic
MRTDs must be controlled in order to prevent their usage for production of counterfeit MRTDs.
243 The OSP P.Personalization “Personalization of the MRTD by issuing State or Organization
only” addresses the (i) the enrolment of the logical MRTD by the Personalization Agent as
described in the security objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization
“Personalization of logical MRTD”, and (ii) the access control for the user data and TSF data as
page 58 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
described by the security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical
MRTD”. Note, the manufacturer equips the TOE with the Personalization Agent Authentication
key(s) according to OD.Assurance “Assurance Security Measures in Development and
Manufacturing Environment”. The security objective OT.AC_Pers limits the management of
TSF data and the management of TSF to the Personalization Agent.
244 The OSP P.Personal_Data “Personal data protection policy” requires that the logical MRTD can
be used only with agreement of the MRTD holder i.e. if the MRTD is presented to an inspection
system. This OSP is covered by security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment
depending on the use of the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging based on
session keys agreed in this protocol. The security objective OT.Data_Conf requires the TOE to
implement the Basic Access Control as defined by ICAO [6] and enforce Basic Inspection System
to authenticate itself by means of the Basic Access Control based on knowledge of the Document
Basic Access Key. The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the
logical MRTD” requires the inspection system to protect their communication with the TOE
before secure messaging is successfully established based on the Chip Authentication Protocol.
After successful Chip Authentication the security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of
personal data” ensures the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data during their transmission to
the General Inspection System.
245 The OSP P.Sensitive_Data “Privacy of sensitive biometric reference data” is fulfilled and the
threat T.Read_Sensitive_Data “Read the sensitive biometric reference data” is countered by the
TOE-objective OT.Sens_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference data”
requiring that read access to EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 (containing the sensitive biometric reference
data) is only granted to authorised inspection systems. Furthermore it is required that the
transmission of these data ensures the data’s confidentiality. The authorisation bases on Document
Verifier certificates issued by the issuing state or organisation as required by
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorisation for use of sensitive biometric reference data”. The
Document Verifier of the receiving state has to authorize Extended Inspection Systems by
creating appropriate Inspection System certificates for access to the sensitive biometric reference
data as demanded by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems”.
246 The threat T.Chip_ID “Identification of MRTD’s chip” addresses the trace of the MRTD
movement by identifying remotely the MRTD’s chip through the contactless communication
interface. This threat is countered by security objectives for the TOE and the TOE environment
depending on the use of the Chip Authentication Protocol and the secure messaging based on
session keys agreed in this protocol. The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and
Authentication of the TOE” by limiting the TOE chip identification to the Basic Inspection
System. The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical
MRTD” requires the inspection system to protect to their communication (as Basic Inspection
System) with the TOE before secure messaging based on the Chip Authentication Protocol is
successfully established. After successful Chip Authentication the security objective
OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” ensures the confidentiality of the logical MRTD
data during their transmission to the General Inspection System.
247 The threat T.Skimming “Skimming digital MRZ data or the digital portrait” addresses the
reading of the logical MRTD trough the contactless interface outside the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and Inspection System. This threat is countered by the security objective
OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” through Basic Access Control allowing read
data access only after successful authentication of the Basic Inspection System.
248 The threat T.Forgery “Forgery of data on MRTD’s chip” addresses the fraudulent alteration of
the complete stored logical MRTD or any part of it. The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access
Control for Personalization of logical MRTD“ requires the TOE to limit the write access for the
logical MRTD to the trustworthy Personalization Agent (cf. OE.Personalization). The TOE will
page 59 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
protect the integrity of the stored logical MRTD according the security objective OT.Data_Int
“Integrity of personal data” and OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical
Tampering”. The examination of the presented MRTD passport book according to
OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” shall ensure that passport book
does not contain a sensitive contactless chip which may present the complete unchanged logical
MRTD. The TOE environment will detect partly forged logical MRTD data by means of digital
signature which will be created according to OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
MRTD by Signature” and verified by the inspection system according to
OE.Passive_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication”.
249 The threat T.Counterfeit “MRTD’s chip” addresses the attack of unauthorised copy or
reproduction of the genuine MRTD chip. This attack is thwarted by chip an identification and
authenticity proof required by OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authentication”
using a authentication key pair to be generated by the issuing state or organisation. The Public
Chip Authentication Key has to be written into EF.DG14 and signed by means of Documents
Security Objects as demanded by OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key”.
According to OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” the General
Inspection system has to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the authenticity of
the MRTD’s chip. MRTDs must be controlled in order to prevent their usage for production of
counterfeit MRTDs targeted on by OD.Material.
250 The threat T.Abuse-Func “Abuse of Functionality” addresses attacks of misusing MRTD’s
functionality to disable or bypass the TSFs. The security objective for the TOE OT.Prot_AbuseFunc “Protection against abuse of functionality” ensures that the usage of functions which may
not be used in the operational phase is effectively prevented. Therefore attacks intending to abuse
functionality in order to disclose or manipulate critical (User) Data or to affect the TOE in such a
way that security features or TOE’s functions may be bypassed, deactivated, changed or explored
shall be effectively countered.
251 The threats T.Information_Leakage “Information Leakage from MRTD’s chip”,
T.Phys-Tamper “Physical Tampering” and T.Malfunction “Malfunction due to Environmental
Stress” are typical for integrated circuits like smart cards under direct attack with high attack
potential. The protection of the TOE against these threats is addressed by the directly related
security objectives OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage”,
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” and OT.Prot_Malfunction
“Protection against Malfunctions”.
252 The assumption A.Pers_Agent “Personalization of the MRTD’s chip” is covered by the security
objective for the TOE environment OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD”
including the enrolment, the protection with digital signature and the storage of the MRTD holder
personal data and the enabling of security features of the TOE according to the decision of the
Issuing State or Organization concerning the Basic Access Control.
253 The examination of the MRTD passport book addressed by the assumption A.Insp_Sys
“Inspection Systems for global interoperability” is covered by the security objectives for the TOE
environment OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” which requires the
inspection system to examine physically the MRTD, the Basic Inspection System to implement
the Basic Access Control, and the General Inspection Systems and Extended Inspection Systems
to implement and to perform the Chip Authentication Protocol to verify the Authenticity of the
presented MRTD’s chip. The security objectives for the TOE environment
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD” requirethe Inspection
System to protect the logical MRTD data during the transmission and the internal handling.
254 The assumption A.Signature_PKI “PKI for Passive Authentication” is directly covered by the
security objective for the TOE environment OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical
page 60 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
MRTD by Signature” covering the necessary procedures for the Country Signing CA Key Pair
and the Document Signer Key Pairs. The implementation of the signature verification procedures
is covered by OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book”.
255 The assumption A.Auth_PKI “PKI for Inspection Systems” is covered by the security objective
for the TOE environment OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorisation for use of sensitive biometric
reference data” requires the CVCA to limit the read access to sensitive biometric by issuing
Document Verifier certificates for authorised receiving States or Organisations only. The
Document Verifier of the receiving state is required by OE.Ext_Insp_Systems “Authorisation of
Extended Inspection Systems” to authorise Extended Inspection Systems by creating Inspection
System Certificates. Therefore, the receiving issuing State or Organisation has to establish the
necessary public key infrastructure.
7.2 Security Requirements Rationale
7.2.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_RND.1/MRTD
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_API.1/CAP
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD
FMT_SMF.1
page 61 of 82
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Identification
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Data_Int
OT.AC_Pers
256 The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage.
x
x
x
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
x
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
x
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD
x
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRIT x
E
x
x
x
x
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
x
x
x
x
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ x
x
FMT_MTD.3
x
FPT_EMSEC.1
FPT_TST.1
FPT_RVM.1
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_PHP.3
FPT_SEP.1
Table 3: Coverage of Security Objective for the TOE by SFR
OT.Prot_Malfuntion
OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper
OT.Prot_Inf_Leak
OT.Prot_Abuse-Func
OT.Chip_Auth_Proof
OT.Identification
OT.Sens_Data_Conf
OT.Data_Conf
OT.Data_Int
OT.AC_Pers
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
257 The security objective OT.AC_Pers “Access Control for Personalization of logical MRTD”
addresses the access control of the writing the logical MRTD and the management of the TSF for
Basic Access Control. The write access to the logical MRTD data are defined by the SFR
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the successfully
authenticated Personalization Agent is allowed to write the data of the groups EF.DG1 to
EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD only once. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including
Personalization Agent) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization). The Personalization Agent handles the Document Basic Access Keys according
to the SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE as authentication reference data for Basic Access
Control.
The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall be performed by TSF according
to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD and FIA_UAU.5/MRTD. If the Basic Access Control Authentication
Mechanism with the Personalization Agent Authentication Key is used the TOE will use the
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the session keys), FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
(for
the
ENC_MAC_Mode
secure
messaging)
and
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD (for the re-authentication). If the Personalization Terminal want to
page 62 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip
Authentication) with the Personalization Agent Keys the TOE will use TSF according to the
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD,
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the new session keys
after Chip Authentication), and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for
the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER (as part of the Terminal
Authentication Protocol) and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD (for the re-authentication). If the
Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the Symmetric
Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF according to
the FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the challenge) and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD (to
verify the authentication attempt). The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after
use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ prevents read access to the secret key of the Personalization
Agent Keys and ensures together with the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 the confidentially of these keys.
258 The security objective OT.Data_Int “Integrity of personal data” requires the TOE to protect the
integrity of the logical MRTD stored on the MRTD’s chip against physical manipulation and
unauthorized writing. The write access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the SFR
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 in the same way: only the Personalization Agent is allowed to write
the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (FDP_ACF.1.2, rule 1) and terminals are
not allowed to modify any of the data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 of the logical MRTD (cf.
FDP_ACF.1.4). The Personalization Agent must identify and authenticate themselves according
to FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 before accessing these data. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles
and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions.
The TOE supports the inspection system detect any modification of the transmitted logical MRTD
data after Chip Authentication. The authentication of the terminal as Personalization Agent shall
be performed by TSF according to SRF FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD requires the integrity
protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means of secure messaging
implemented by the cryptographic functions according to FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD (for the
generation of shared secret), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the
derivation
of
the
new
session
keys),
and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
and
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging. The session keys are
destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use.
The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip
Authentication Key cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
259 The security objective OT.Data_Conf “Confidentiality of personal data” requires the TOE to
ensure the confidentiality of the logical MRTD data in EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. The SFR FIA_UID.1
and FIA_UAU.1 allow only those actions before identification respective authentication which do
not violate OT.Data_Conf. The read access to the logical MRTD data is defined by the
FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1.2: only the successful authenticated Personalization Agent, Basic
Inspection Systems1 and Extended Inspection Systems are allowed to read the data of the logical
MRTD. The SFR FMT_SMR.1 lists the roles (including Personalization Agent and Basic
Inspection System) and the SFR FMT_SMF.1 lists the TSF management functions (including
Personalization for the key management for the Document Basic Access Keys). The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE addresses the key management and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ
prevents reading of the Document Basic Access Keys.
1
Note the General Inspection Systems use the role Basic Inspection System.
page 63 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
The SFR FIA_AFL.1 strengthens the authentication function as terminal part of the Basic Access
Control Authentication Protocol or other authentication functions if necessary. The SFR
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD prevents reuse of authentication data to strengthen the authentication of the
user. The SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD enforces the TOE (i) to accept the authentication attempt as
Basic Inspection System only by means of the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism
with the Document Basic Access Keys and (ii) to accept chip authentication only after successful
authentication as Basic Inspection System. Moreover, the SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD requests
secure messaging after successful authentication of the terminal with Basic Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
After Chip authentication the TOE and the General Inspection System establish protection of the
communication by secure messaging (cf. the SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD and FDP_UIT.1/MRTD)
in ENC_MAC_Mode by means of the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key
cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
Note, neither the security objective OT.Data_Conf nor the SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD requires the
Personalization Agent to use the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism or secure
messaging.
260 The security objective OT.Sense_Data_Conf “Confidentiality of sensitive biometric reference
data” is enforced by the Access Control SFP defined in FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1 allowing
the data of EF.DG3 and EF.DG4 only to be read by successfully authenticated Extended
Inspection System being authorised by a validly verifiable certificate according
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 requires authentication of the inspection systems. The SFR
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD requires the successful Chip Authentication before any authentication
attempt as Extended Inspection System. The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD and FDP_UCT.1/MRTD
requires the confidentiality protection of the transmitted data after chip authentication by means
of secure messaging implemented by the cryptographic functions according to
FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the terminal authentication challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD (for the generation of shared secret), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the new session keys), and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging. The session keys are destroyed according to FCS_CKM.4 after use. The SFR
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires that the Chip Authentication Key
cannot be written unauthorized or read afterwards.
To allow a verification of the certificate chain as in FMT_MTD.3 the CVCA’s public key and
certificate as well as the current date are written or update by authorised identified role as of
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI, FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD and FMT_MTD.1/DATE.
261 The security objective OT.Identification “Identification and Authentication of the TOE” address
the storage of the IC Identification Data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip in its non-volatile
memory. This will be ensured by TSF according to SFR FAU_SAS.1.
The TOE shall identify itself only to a successful authenticated Basic Inspection System in Phase
4 “Operational Use”. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA allows only the Manufacturer to write
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data. The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS allows the
Personalization Agent to disable Initialization Data if their use in the phase 4 “Operational Use”
page 64 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
violates the security objective OT.Identification. The SFR FIA_UID.1 and FIA_UAU.1 do not
allow reading of any data uniquely identifying the MRTD’s chip before successful authentication
of the Basic Inspection Terminal and will stop communication after unsuccessful authentication
attempt.
262 The security objective OT.Chip_Auth_Proof “Proof of MRTD’s chip authenticity” is ensured by
the Chip Authentication Protocol provided by FIA_API.1/CAP proving the identity of the TOE.
The Chip Authentication Protocol defined by FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD is performed using a TOE
internally stored confidential private key as required by FMT_MTD.1/CAPK and
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ. The Chip Authentication Protocol [26] requires additional TSF
according to FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD, FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD (for the derivation of the
session keys), FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging).
263 The security objective OT.Prot_Abuse-Func “Protection against Abuse of Functionality” is
ensured by (i) the SFR FMT_LIM.1 and FMT_LIM.2 which prevent misuse of test functionality
of the TOE or other which may not be used after TOE Delivery, (ii) the SFR FPT_RVM.1 which
prevents by monitoring the bypass and deactivation of security features or functions of the TOE,
and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1 which prevents change or explore security features or functions of
the TOE by means of separation the other TOE functions.
264 The security objective OT.Prot_Inf_Leak “Protection against Information Leakage” requires the
TOE to protect confidential TSF data stored and/or processed in the MRTD’s chip against
disclosure
•
by measurement and analysis of the shape and amplitude of signals or the time between
events found by measuring signals on the electromagnetic field, power consumption, clock,
or I/O lines which is addressed by the SFR FPT_EMSEC.1,
•
by forcing a malfunction of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_FLS.1 and
FPT_TST.1, and/or
•
by a physical manipulation of the TOE which is addressed by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
265 The security objective OT.Prot_Phys-Tamper “Protection against Physical Tampering” is
covered by the SFR FPT_PHP.3.
266 The security objective OT.Prot_Malfunction “Protection against Malfunctions” is covered by (i)
the SFR FPT_TST.1 which requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation and tests of
authorized users to verify the integrity of TSF data and TSF code, (ii) the SFR FPT_FLS.1 which
requires a secure state in case of detected failure or operating conditions possibly causing a
malfunction, and (iii) the SFR FPT_SEP.1 limiting the effects of malfunctions due to TSF domain
separation.
267 The security objectives OD.Assurance and OD.Material for the IT environment will be
supported by non-IT security measures only.
268 The security objective OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data is directed to establish the Document Verifier
PKI and will be supported by non-IT security measures only.
269 The following table provides an overview how security functional requirements for the IT
environment cover security objectives for the TOE environment. The security target describes
only those SFR of the IT environment directly related to the SFR for the TOE.
page 65 of 82
x
OE.Ext_Insp_System
x
OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD
OE.Pass_Auth_Verif
x
OE.Exam_MRTD
x
OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data
OE.Auth_Key_MRTD
Document Signer
FDP_DAU.1/DS
Document Verification PKI
FCS_CKM.1/PKI
FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN
Basic Inspection System
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT
FCS_CKM.4/BT
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT
FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT
FCS_RND.1/BT
FIA_UAU.4/BT
FIA_UAU.6/BT
General Inspection System
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS
FIA_UAU.4/GIS
FIA_UAU.5/GIS
FIA_UAU.6/GIS
FDP_UCT.1/GIS
FDP_UIT.1/GIS
Extended Inspection System
FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS
FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS
FIA_API.1/EIS
Personalization Agent
FIA_API.1/SYM_PT
OE.Pass_Auth_Sign
OE.Personalization
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Table 4: Coverage of Security Objectives for the IT environment by SFR
270 The OE.Personalization “Personalization of logical MRTD” requires the Personalization
Terminal to authenticate themselves to the MRTD’s chip to get the write authorization.
If the Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism with the Personalization Agent
Authentication Key is used the Personalization Terminal will use the FCS_RND.1/BT (for the
page 66 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
generation of the challenge), FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT (for the derivation of
the session keys), and FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT and FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT (for the
ENC_MAC_Mode secure messaging) to authenticate themselves and to protect the
personalization data during transfer.
If the Personalization Terminal want to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the
Terminal Authentication Protocol (after Chip Authentication) with the Personalization Agent
Keys the Personalization Terminal will use TSF according to the FCS_RND.1/BT (for the
generation
of
the
challenge),
FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS,
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS (for the derivation of the new session keys after Chip Authentication), and
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD and FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD (for the ENC_MAC_Mode secure
messaging), FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS, FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS and FIA_API.1/EIS (as part of
the Terminal Authentication Protocol).
If the Personalization Terminal wants to authenticate themselves to the TOE by means of the
Symmetric Authentication Mechanism with Personalization Agent Key the TOE will use TSF
according to the SFR FIA_API.1/SYM_PT, FCS_RND.1/MRTD (for the generation of the
challenge) and FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD (to verify the authentication attempt). Using the keys
derived by means of the Chip Authentication Mechanism the Personalisation Agent will transfer
MRTD holder’s personalisation data (identity, biographic data, correctly enrolled biometric
reference data) in a confidential and integrity protected manner as required by FDP_UCT.1/GIS
and FDP_UIT.1/GIS.
271 The OE.Pass_Auth_Sign “Authentication of logical MRTD Signature” is covered by
FDP_DAU.1/DS which requires the Document Signer to provide a capability to generate
evidence for the validity of EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 and the Document Security Objects and
therefore, to support the inspection system to verify the logical MRTD.
272 The OE.Auth_Key_MRTD “MRTD Authentication Key” is covered by FDP_DAU.1/DS which
requires the Document Signer to provide a capability to generate evidence for the validity of chip
authentication public key in DG 14. There is no need for the ST to provide any specific
requirement for the method of generation, distribution and handling of the Chip Authentication
Private Key by the IT environment.
273 The OE.Authoriz_Sens_Data “Authorization for Use of Sensitive Biometric Reference Data”
addresses the establishment of the Document Verification PKI which include cryptographic key
generation for the Document Verification PKI Keys and the signing of the certificates. The SFR
FCS_CKM.1/PKI and FCS_COP.1/CERT_SIGN enforce that these cryptographic functions fit
the signature verification function for the certificates and the terminal authentication addressed by
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER.
274 The OE.Exam_MRTD “Examination of the MRTD passport book” requires the Basic Inspection
System for global interoperability to implement the terminal part of the Basic Access Control [6]
as
required
by
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT,
FCS_CKM.4/BT,
FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT,
FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT, FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT, FCS_RND.1/BT, FIA_UAU.4/BT and
FIA_UAU.6/BT. The verification of the authenticity of the MRTD’s chip by General Inspection
Systems and Extended Inspection Systems (including the functionality of the GIS) is covered by
the FCS_CKM.1/DH_GIS, FCS_COP.1/SHA_GIS, FIA_UAU.4/GIS, FIA_UAU.5/GIS and
FIA_UAU.6/GIS providing the Chip Authentication Protocol and checking continuously the
messages received from the MRTD’s chip. The authenticity of the Chip Authentication Public
Key (EF.DG14) is ensured by FDP_DAU.1/DS.
275 The OE.Pass_Auth_Verif “Verification by Passive Authentication” is covered by the SFR
FDP_DAU.1/DS.
page 67 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
276 The security objective OE.Prot_Logical_MRTD “Protection of data of the logical MRTD“
addresses the protection of the logical MRTD during the transmission and internal handling. The
SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT, FIA_UAU.5/GIS and FIA_UAU.6/BT address the terminal part of the
Basic Access Control Authentication Mechanism and FDP_UCT.1/GIS and FDP_UIT.1/BT the
secure messaging established by the Chip Authentication mechanism. The SFR
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_BT, FCS_COP.1/SHA_BT, FCS_COP.1/ENC_BT, FCS_COP.1/MAC_BT
and FCS_RND.1/BT as well as FCS_CKM.4/BT are necessary to implement this mechanism.
The BIS shall destroy the Document Access Control Key and the secure messaging keys after
inspection of the MRTD according to FCS_CKM.4 because they are not needed any more.
277 .The OE.Ext_Insp_System “Authorisation of Extended Inspection Systems” is covered by the
Terminal Authentication Protocol proving the identity of the EIS as required by FIA_API.1/EIS
basing on signature creation as required by FCS_COP.1/SIG_SIGN_EIS and including a hash
calculation according FCS_COP.1/SHA_EIS.
278 For dependency rationale (SFR/SAR) see PP 7.2.2 [25].
7.2.2 TOE Summary Specification Rationale
279 This shows the coverage of the SFRs by TSFs.
SFR
FAU_SAS.1
FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD
FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD
FCS_CKM.4/MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD
FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD
FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD
FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER
FCS_RND.1/MRTD
FIA_UID.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD
FIA_UAU.5/MRTD
FIA_UAU.6/MRTD
FIA_AFL.1
FIA_API.1/CAP
FDP_ACC.1
FDP_ACF.1
FDP_UCT.1/MRTD
FDP_UIT.1/MRTD
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_LIM.1
page 68 of 82
TSFs
F.IC_CL
F.Identification_Authentication
F.IC_CL
F.Identification_Authentication
F.Crypto
F.IC_CL, F.Crypto
F.IC_CL, F.Crypto
F.IC_CL
F.IC_CL
F.Access_Control
F.Access_Control
F.Identification_Authentication
F.Access_Control, F.Identification_Authentication
F.Identification_Authentication
F.Identification_Authentication
F.Identification_Authentication
F.Access_Control
F.Access_Control
F.Identification_Authentication
F.Identification_Authentication
F.Managment
F.Identification_Authentication
F.IC_CL
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
SFR
TSFs
FMT_LIM.2
F.IC_CL
FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA
F.IC_CL, F.Access_Control
FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS
F.Access_Control, F.Management
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI
F.Access_Control
FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD F.Identification_Authentication
FMT_MTD.1/DATE
F.Identification_Authentication
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE F.Access_Control
FMT_MTD.1/CAPK
F.Access_Control
FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ F.Access_Control
FMT_MTD.3
F.Identification_Authentication
FPT_EMSEC.1
F.IC_CL
FPT_FLS.1
F.IC_CL
FPT_TST.1
F.IC_CL, F.Verification
FPT_PHP.3
F.IC_CL
FPT_RVM.1
F.Access_Control
FPT_SEP.1
F.IC_CL
Table 5: Coverage of SFRs for the TOE by TSFs.
280 The SFR FAU_SAS.1 requires the storage of the chip identification data which is addressed in
F.IC_CL.
281 The SFR FCS_CKM.1/KDF_MRTD requires the BAC key derivation algorithm, which is
supplied by the BAC authentication mechanism of F.Identification_Authentication.
282 The SFR FCS_CKM.1/DH_MRTD requires the ECDH algorithm. This is provided by the crypto
library function F.IC_CL.
283 The SFR FCS_CKM.4/MRTD requires the destroying of cryptographic keys. This is done in
F.Identification_Authentication (“Overwrites keys in transient memory after usage.”).
284 The SFR FCS_COP.1/SHA_MRTD requires SHA-1, SHA-224 and SHA-256. F.Crypto
provides these hash algorithms.
285 The SFR FCS_COP.1/TDES_MRTD requires Triple-DES in CBC mode and cryptographic key
size 112 bit to perform secure messaging – encryption and decryption. This is provided in
F.IC_CL (Triple-DES Co-processor) and F.Crypto (provides Triple-DES/CBC and DES/Retail
MAC).
286 The SFR FCS_COP.1/MAC_MRTD requires Triple-DES in Retail MAC mode and
cryptographic key size 112 bit to perform secure messaging – message authentication code. This
is provided in F.IC_CL (Triple-DES Co-processor) and F.Crypto (provides Triple-DES/CBC and
DES/Retail MAC).
287 The SFR FCS_COP.1/SIG_VER requires ECDSA and cryptographic key sizes 224, 256 and 320
bits to perform digital signature verification. F.IC_CL provides functions to verify signatures
based on ECC.
page 69 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
288 The SFR FCS_RND.1/MRTD requires the generation of random numbers which is provided by
F.IC_CL. The provided random number generator produces cryptographically strong random
numbers which are used at the appropriate places as written in the addition there.
289 The SFR FIA_UID.1 requires timing of identification. It is handled by F.Access_Control which
enforces identification of a role before access is granted (“...only executed after this TSF allowed
access.”). Also all policies prevent reading sensitive or user dependent data without user
identification.
290 The SFR FIA_UAU.1 requires timing of authentication. It is handled by F.Access_Control
which enforces authentication of a role before access is granted (“...only executed after this TSF
allowed access.”). Also all policies prevent reading sensitive or user dependent data without user
authentication.
291 The SFR FIA_UAU.4/MRTD requires prevention of authentication data reuse. This is in
particular fulfilled by using changing initialisation vectors in secure messaging. Secure
Messaging is provided by F.Identification_Authentication.
292 The SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD requires Basic Access Control authentication mechanism, terminal
authentication protocol, secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode and symmetric authentication
mechanism based on Triple-DES. In addition SFR FIA_UAU.5/MRTD also requires the
authentication
of
any
user's
claimed
identity.
F.Access_Control
and
F.Identification_Authentication fulfil these requirements.
293 The SFR FIA_UAU.6/MRTD requires re-authentication for each command after successful
authentication. This is done by F.Identification_Authentication providing secure messaging.
294 The SFR FIA_AFL.1 requires the detection of an unsuccessful authentication attempt and the
waiting for a specified time between the reception of an authentication command and its
processing. F.Identification_Authentication detects unsuccessful authentication attempts and
can be used “to delay the processing of the authentication command after a failed authentication
command”.
295 The SFR FIA_API.1/CAP requires the proving of the identity of the TOE. The chip
authentication is done by F.Identification_Authentication.
296 The SFR FDP_ACC.1 requires the enforcement of the access control policy on terminals gaining
write,read and modification access to data in the EF.COM, EF.SOD, EF.DG1 to EF.DG16. This is
done by F.Access_Control (based on the objects: “a. data EF.DG1 to EF.DG16 ...”).
297 The SFR FDP_ACF.1 requires the enforcement of the access control policy which is done by
F.Access_Control (“Access to objects is controlled based on subjects, objects (any files) and
security attributes”).
298 The SFR FDP_UCT.1/MRTD requires the transmitting and receiving data protected from
unauthorized disclosure after chip authentication. This is done by using an encrypted
communication channel. This channel is based on secure messaging provided by
F.Identification_Authentication.
299 The SFR FDP_UIT.1/MRTD requires the transmitting and receiving data protected from
modification, deletion, insertion and replay after chip authentication. This is done by using an
protected communication channel. This channel is based on secure messaging provided by
F.Identification_Authentication. A send sequence counter makes each command unique while
the authenticity method makes it possible to detect modifications.
page 70 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
300 The SFR FMT_SMF.1 requires security management functions for initialization, personalization
and configuration. This is done by F.Management: the initialisation agent performs the
initialization in phase 2b, the Manufacturer (pre-personalization agent) configures the file layout
in phase 2c and the personalization agent performs the personalization in phase 3.
301 The SFR FMT_SMR.1 requires the maintenance of roles. The roles are managed by
F.Identification_Authentication.
302 The SFR FMT_LIM.1 requires limited capabilities of test functions which is provided by
F.IC_CL which controls what commands can be executed thereby preventing external usable test
functions to do harm. The IC Dedicated Test Software only is available in the Test Mode.
303 The SFR FMT_LIM.2 requires limited availabilities of test functions which is provided by
F.IC_CL which controls what commands can be executed thereby preventing external usable test
functions to do harm. The IC Dedicated Test Software only is available in the Test Mode.
304 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_ENA requires writing of initialization data and pre-personalization
data to the manufacturer. Writing of pre-personalization and installation data only by the
manufacturer is enforced by F.Access_Control, which limits these operations to phase 2b and 2c.
In addition F.IC_CL stores this data in the User Read Only Area which can't be changed
afterwards.
305 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/INI_DIS requires only the personalization agent to be able to disable
reading of the initialization data. This is provided by F.Management (personalization agent:
“Changing the TOE into the end-usage mode for phase 4 where reading of the initalization data is
prevented.”) and F.Access_Control.
306 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_INI requires only pre- and personalization agent to be able to
write initial Country Verifying Certification Authority public public key, initial Country Verifier
Certification Authority certificate and initial date. This is provided by F.Access_Control.
307 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CVCA_UPD requires only country verifier certification authority to be
able to update Country Verifier Certification Authority public public key and Country Verifier
Certification Authority certificate. This is provided by F.Identification_Authentication
(properties of terminal authentication).
308 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/DATE requires only country verifier certification authority, document
verifier and domestic extended inspection system to be able to modify the current date. This is
provided by F.Identification_Authentication (properties of terminal authentication).
309 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_WRITE requires the personalization agent to be able to write the
Document Basic Access Keys. This is provided by F.Access_Control allowing the
personalization agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
310 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/CAPK requires the personalization agent to be able to load the Chip
Authentication Private Key. This is provided by F.Access_Control allowing the personalization
agent in phase 3 to write all necessary data.
311 The SFR FMT_MTD.1/KEY_READ requires the Document Basic Access Keys, the Chip
Authentication Private Key and the Personalization Agent Keys to never be readable. This is
enforced by F.Access_Control, which does not allow reading of any key to any role.
312 The SFR FMT_MTD.3 requires only secure values of the certificate chain are accepted for data
of the Terminal Authentication Protocol and the Access Control. This is done by
F.Identification_Authentication (Terminal Authentication properties).
page 71 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
313 The SFR FPT_EMSEC.1 requires limiting of emanations. This is provided by F.IC_CL (special
DES protection, general protection and software countermeasures against side channel attacks).
314 The SFR FPT_FLS.1 requires failure detection and preservation of a secure state. The Control of
Operating Conditions of F.IC_CL is directly designed for this SFR. It audits continually and
reacts to environmental and other problems by bringing it into a secure state.
315 The SFR FPT_TST.1 requires testing for (a) correct operation, (b) integrity of data and (c)
integrity of executable code. F.Verification does this testing. F.IC_CL tests all EEPROM and
ROM content for integrity (“... able to correct a 1-bit error within each byte.” / “... parity check.”).
316 The SFR FPT_SEP.1 requires separation of TSF and Non-TSF data. F.IC_CL does protect the
embedded software against test functions of the hardware (“... control of the CPU mode ...”).
317 The SFR FPT_RVM.1 requires enforcement functions to succeed. This is provided by
F.Access_Control which enforces first the TSP and then allows execution of the protected
functions only on success (“... which are only executed after this TSF allowed access.”).
318 The SFR FPT_PHP.3 requires resistance to physical manipulation and probing. This is provided
by F.IC_CL which is provided by the hardware to resist attacks (“The function F.PHY protects
the TOE against manipulation ...” / “... construction which make reverse-engineering and tamper
attacks more difficult.”).
7.2.3 Rationale for Assurance Measures
319 The coverage of the Assurance Requirements by the Assurance measures is a direct one-to-one
mapping.
7.2.4 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
320 The EAL4 was chosen to permit a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security
engineering based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not
require substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. EAL4 is
applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of
independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur
sensitive security specific engineering costs.
321 The selection of component ADV_IMP.2 provides a higher assurance for the implementation of
the MRTD’s chip especially for the absence of unintended functionality.
322 The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the
MRTD’s development and manufacturing especially for the secure handling of the MRTD’s
material.
323 The selection of the component AVA_MSU.3 provides a higher assurance of the security of the
MRTD’s usage especially in phase 3 “Personalization of the MRTD” and Phase 4 “Operational
Use”. It is imperative that misleading, unreasonable and conflicting guidance is absent from the
guidance documentation, and that secure procedures for all modes of operation have been
addressed. Insecure states should be easy to detect.
page 72 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
324 The minimal strength of function “high” was selected to ensure resistance against direct attacks
on functions based on probabilistic or permutational mechanisms. The SOF requirement applies
to the identification and authentication functionality within the TOE to fulfil the
OT.Sens_Data_Conf and OT.Chip_Auth_Proof. This is consistent with the security objective
OD.Assurance.
325 The selection of the component AVA_VLA.4 provides a higher assurance of the security by
vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration attacks performed by an attacker
possessing a high attack potential. This vulnerability analysis is necessary to fulfil the security
objectives OT.Sens_Data_Conf, OT.Chip_Auth_Proof and OD.Assurance.
326 The component ADV_IMP.2 has the following dependencies:
- ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
- ADV_RCR.1 Informal correspondence demonstration
- ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
327 The component ALC_DVS.2 has no dependencies.
328 The component AVA_MSU.3 has the following dependencies:
- ADO_IGS.1 Installation, generation, and start-up procedures
- ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
- AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
- AGD_USR.1 User guidance
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
329 The component AVA_VLA.4 has the following dependencies:
- ADV_FSP.1 Informal functional specification
- ADV_HLD.2 Security enforcing high-level design
- ADV_IMP.1 Subset of the implementation of the TSF
- ADV_LLD.1 Descriptive low-level design
- AGD_ADM.1 Administrator guidance
- AGD_USR.1 User guidance
All of these are met or exceeded in the EAL4 assurance package.
7.2.5 Security Requirements – Mutual Support and Internal Consistency
330 The following part of the security requirements rationale shows that the set of security
requirements for the TOE consisting of the security functional requirements (SFRs) and the
security assurance requirements (SARs) together forms a mutually supportive and internally
consistent whole.
331 The analysis of the TOE´s security requirements with regard to their mutual support and internal
consistency demonstrates:
page 73 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
332 The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual
support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All
dependencies between the chosen functional components are analysed, and non-satisfied
dependencies are appropriately explained.
333 The assurance class EAL4 is an established set of mutually supportive and internally consistent
assurance requirements. The dependency analysis for the additional assurance components shows
that the assurance requirements are mutually supportive and internally consistent as all
(additional) dependencies are satisfied and no inconsistency appears.
334 Inconsistency between functional and assurance requirements could only arise if there are
functional-assurance dependencies which are not met, a possibility which has been shown not to
arise. Furthermore the chosen assurance components are adequate for the functionality of the
TOE. So the assurance requirements and security functional requirements support each other and
there are no inconsistencies between the goals of these two groups of security requirements.
7.2.6 Strength of Function Level Rationale
335 Due to the requirements of the ST the level for the strength of the TOE´s security functional
requirements is claimed as SOF-high. The TOE is considered as a product with critical security
mechanisms which only have to be defeated by attackers possessing a high level of expertise,
opportunity and resources, and whereby successful attack is judged beyond normal practicability.
page 74 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
8 Glossary and Acronyms
Term
Definition
Active
Security mechanism defined in [7] option by which means the MRTD’s chip
Authenticati
proves and the inspection system verifies the identity and authenticity
on
of the MRTD’s chip as part of a genuine MRTD issued by a known
State of organization.
Application note
Optional informative part of the ST containing sensitive supporting
information that is considered relevant or useful for the construction,
evaluation, or use of the TOE (cf. CC part 1, section B.2.7).
Audit records
Write-only-once non-volatile memory area of the MRTDs chip to store the
Initialization Data and Pre-personalization Data.
Authenticity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip were
created by the issuing State or Organization
Basic
Access Security mechanism defined in [7] by which means the MRTD’s chip proves
Control
and the inspection system protects their communication by means of
secure messaging with Basic Access Keys (see there).
Basic Inspection
An inspection system which implements the terminals part of the Basic Access
System
Control Mechanism and authenticates themselves to the MRTD’s chip
(BIS)
using the Document Basic Access Keys. drawn form printed MRZ
data for reading the logical MRTD.
Biographical data
The personalized details of the bearer of the document appearing as text in the
(biodata).
visual and machine readable zones on the biographical data page of a
passport book or on a travel card or visa. [8]
Biometric reference Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
data
chip as (i) digital portrait and (ii) optional biometric reference data.
Certificate chain
Counterfeit
Country Signing CA
Certificate
(CCSCA)
Country Verifying
Certification
Authority
Current date
CVCA link
Certificate
page 75 of 82
Hierarchical sequence of Inspection System Certificate (lowest level),
Document Verifier Certificate and Country Verifying Certification
Authority Certificates (highest level), where the certificate of a lower
lever is signed with the private key corresponding to the public key in
the certificate of the next higher level. The Country Verifying
Certification Authority Certificate is signed with the private key
corresponding to the public key it contains (self-signed certificate).
An unauthorized copy or reproduction of a genuine security document made
by whatever means. [8]
Certificate of the Country Signing Certification Authority Public Key (KPuCSCA)
issued by Country Signing Certification Authority stored in the
inspection system.
The country specific root of the PKI of Inspection Systems and creates the
Document Verifier Certificates within this PKI. It enforces the Privacy
policy of the issuing Country or Organization in respect to the
protection of sensitive biometric reference data stored in the MRTD. It
is
The maximum of the effective dates of valid CVCA, DV and domestic
Inspection System certificates known to the TOE. It is used the
validate card verifiable certificates.
Certificate of the new public key of the Country Verifying Certification
Authority signed with the old public key of the Country Verifying
Certification Authority where the certificate effective date for the new
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Term
Definition
key is before the certificate expiration date of the certificate for the old
key.
Document
Basic The [7], Annex E.1 describes the Document Basic Access Key Derivation
Access Key
Algorithm on how terminals may derive the Document Basic Access
Derivation
Keys from the second line of the printed MRZ data.
Algorithm
Document
Basic Pair of symmetric Triple-DES keys used for secure messaging with encryption
Access Keys
(key KENC) and message authentication (key KMAC) of data transmitted
between the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system [7]. It is drawn
from the printed MRZ of the passport book to authenticate an entity
able to read the printed MRZ of the passport book.
Document Security A RFC3369 CMS Signed Data Structure, signed by the Document Signer
Object
(DS). Carries the hash values of the LDS Data Groups. It is stored in
(SOD)
the MRTD’s chip. It may carry the Document Signer Certificate (CDS).
[7]
Document Verifier
Eavesdropper
Enrolment
Extended Access
Control
Extended Inspection
System
Extended Inspection
System
(EIS)
Forgery
General Inspection
System
page 76 of 82
Certification authority creating the Inspection System Certificates and
managing the authorization of the Extended Inspection Systems for
the sensitive data of the MRTD in the limits provided by the issuing
States or Organizations
A threat agent with low attack potential reading the communication between
the MRTD’s chip and the inspection system to gain the data on the
MRTD’s chip.
The process of collecting biometric samples from a person and the subsequent
preparation and storage of biometric reference templates representing
that person's identity. [9]
Security mechanism identified in [7] by which means the MRTD’s chip (i)
verifies the authentication of the inspection systems authorized to read
the optional biometric reference data, (ii) controls the access to the
optional biometric reference data and (iii) protects the confidentiality
and integrity of the optional biometric reference data during their
transmission to the inspection system by secure messaging. The
Personalization Agent may use the same mechanism to authenticate
themselves with Personalization Agent Authentication Private Key and
to get write and read access to the logical MRTD and TSF data.
A General Inspection System which (i) implements the Chip Authentication
Mechanism, (ii) implements the Terminal Authentication Protocol and
(iii) is authorized by the issuing State or Organization through the
Document Verifier of the receiving State to read the sensitive
biometric reference data.
A role of a terminal as part of an inspection system which is in addition to
Basic Inspection System authorized by the issuing State or
Organization to read the optional biometric reference data and
supports the terminals part of the Extended Access Control
Authentication Mechanism.
Fraudulent alteration of any part of the genuine document, e.g. changes to the
biographical data or the portrait. [8]
A Basic Inspection System which implements sensitively the Chip
Authentication Mechanism.
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Term
Definition
Global
The capability of inspection systems (either manual or automated) in different
Interoperabi
States throughout the world to exchange data, to process data received
lity
from systems in other States, and to utilize that data in inspection
operations in their respective States. Global interoperability is a major
objective of the standardized specifications for placement of both eyereadable and machine readable data in all MRTDs. [9]
IC Dedicated
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which provides
Support
functions after TOE Delivery. The usage of parts of the IC Dedicated
Software
Software might be restricted to certain phases.
IC Dedicated Test
That part of the IC Dedicated Software (refer to above) which is used to test
Software
the TOE before TOE Delivery but which does not provide any
functionality thereafter.
Impostor
A person who applies for and obtains a document by assuming a false name
and identity, or a person who alters his or her physical appearance to
represent himself or herself as another person for the purpose of using
that person’s document. [8]
Improperly
A person who travels, or attempts to travel with: (a) an expired travel
documented
document or an invalid visa; (b) a counterfeit, forged or altered travel
person
document or visa; (c) someone else’s travel document or visa; or (d)
no travel document or visa, if required. [9]
Initialisation Data
Any data defined by the TOE Manufacturer and injected into the non-volatile
memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer (Phase 2). These data
are for instance used for traceability and for IC identification as
MRTD’s material (IC identification data).
Inspection
The act of a State examining an MRTD presented to it by a traveller (the
MRTD holder) and verifying its authenticity. [9]
Inspection system
A technical system used by the border control officer of the receiving State (i)
(IS)
examining an MRTD presented by the traveller and verifying its
authenticity and (ii) verifying the traveller as MRTD holder.
Integrated circuit
Electronic component(s) designed to perform processing and/or memory
(IC)
functions. The MRTD’s chip is an integrated circuit.
Integrity
Ability to confirm the MRTD and its data elements on the MRTD’s chip have
not been altered from that created by the issuing State or Organization
Issuing Organization Organization authorized to issue an official travel document (e.g. the United
Nations Organization, issuer of the Laissez-passer). [6]
Issuing State
The Country issuing the MRTD. [6]
Logical Data
The collection of groupings of Data Elements stored in the optional capacity
Structure
expansion technology [6]. The capacity expansion technology used is
(LDS)
the MRTD’s chip.
Data of the MRTD holder stored according to the Logical Data Structure [6] as
Logical MRTD
specified by ICAO on the contactless integrated circuit. It presents
contactless readable data including (but not limited to)
(1) personal data of the MRTD holder
(2) the digital Machine Readable Zone Data (digital MRZ data, EF.DG1),
(3) the digitized portraits (EF.DG2),
(4) the biometric reference data of finger(s) (EF.DG3) or iris image(s)
(EF.DG4) or both and
(5) the other data according to LDS (EF.DG5 to EF.DG16).
Logical travel
Data stored according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by ICAO in
page 77 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Term
document
Definition
the contactless integrated circuit including (but not limited to)
(1) data contained in the machine-readable zone (mandatory),
(2) digitized photographic image (mandatory) and
(3) fingerprint image(s) and/or iris image(s) (optional).
Machine readable
Official document issued by a State or Organization which is used by the
travel
holder for international travel (e.g. passport, visa, official document of
document
identity) and which contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and
(MRTD)
a separate mandatory data summary, intended for global use, reflecting
essential data elements capable of being machine read. [6]
Machine readable
A visa or, where appropriate, an entry clearance (hereinafter collectively
visa (MRV):
referred to as visas) conforming to the specifications contained herein,
formulated to improve facilitation and enhance security for the visa
holder. Contains mandatory visual (eye readable) data and a separate
mandatory data summary capable of being machine read. The MRV is
normally a label which is attached to a visa page in a passport. [6]
Machine readable
Fixed dimensional area located on the front of the MRTD or MRP Data Page
zone (MRZ)
or, in the case of the TD1, the back of the MRTD, containing
mandatory and optional data for machine reading using OCR methods.
[6]
Machine-verifiable A unique physical personal identification feature (e.g. an iris pattern,
biometrics
fingerprint or facial characteristics) stored on a travel document in a
feature
form that can be read and verified by machine. [8]
MRTD application
Non-executable data defining the functionality of the operating system on the
IC as the MRTD’s chip. It includes
- the file structure implementing the LDS [6],
- the definition of the User Data, but does not include the User Data itself
(i.e. content of EF.DG1 to EF.DG13 and EF.DG16) and
- the TSF Data including the definition the authentication data but except
the authentication data itself.
MRTD Basic Access
Control
Mutual authentication protocol followed by secure messaging between the
inspection system and the MRTD’s chip based on MRZ information as
key seed and access condition to data stored on MRTD’s chip
according to LDS.
MRTD holder
The rightful holder of the MRTD for whom the issuing State or Organization
personalized the MRTD.
A contactless integrated circuit chip complying with ISO/IEC 14443 and
programmed according to the Logical Data Structure as specified by
ICAO, [10], p. 14.
Software embedded in a MRTD’s chip and not being developed by the IC
Designer. The MRTD’s chip Embedded Software is designed in
Phase 1 and embedded into the MRTD’s chip in Phase 2 of the TOE
life-cycle.
Data stored for biometric authentication of the MRTD holder in the MRTD’s
chip as (i) encoded finger image(s) (EF.DG3) or (ii) encoded iris
image(s) (EF.DG4) or (iii) both. Note, that the European commission
decided to use only fingerprint and not to use iris images as optional
biometric reference data.
(i) verification of the digital signature of the Document Security Object and
MRTD’s Chip
MRTD’s chip
Embedded
Software
Optional biometric
reference
data
Passive
page 78 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Term
authentication
Personalization
Personalization
Agent
Personalization
Agent
Authentication
Information
Personalization
Agent
Authentication Key
Physical travel
document
Definition
(ii) comparing the hash values of the read LDS data fields with the
hash values contained in the Document Security Object.
The process by which the portrait, signature and biographical data are applied
to the document. [8]
The agent acting on the behalf of the issuing State or organisation to
personalize the MRTD for the holder by (i) establishing the identity
the holder for the biographic data in the MRTD, (ii) enrolling the
biometric reference data of the MRTD holder i.e. the portrait, the
encoded finger image(s) or (ii) the encoded iris image(s) and (iii)
writing these data on the physical and logical MRTD for the holder.
TSF data used for authentication proof and verification of the Personalization
Agent.
Symmetric cryptographic key used (i) by the Personalization Agent to prove
their identity and get access to the logical MRTD according to the
SFR FIA_UAU.4/BT FIA_UAU.6/BT and FIA_API.1/SYM_PT and
(ii) by the MRTD’s chip to verify the authentication attempt of a
terminal as Personalization Agent according to the SFR
FIA_UAU.4/MRTD, FIA_UAU.5/MRTD and FIA_UAU.6/MRTD.
Travel document in form of paper, plastic and chip using secure printing to
present data including (but not limited to)
(1) biographical data,
(2) data of the machine-readable zone,
(3) photographic image and
(4) other data.
Pre-personalization
Data
Any data that is injected into the non-volatile memory of the TOE by the
MRTD Manufacturer (Phase 2) for traceability of non-personalized
MRTD’s and/or to secure shipment within or between life cycle
phases 2 and 3. It contains (but is not limited to) the Active
Authentication Key Pair and the Personalization Agent Key Pair.
Pre-personalized
MRTD’s
chip
MRTD’s chip equipped with a unique identifier and a unique asymmetric
Active Authentication Key Pair of the chip.
Receiving State
Reference data
The Country to which the MRTD holder is applying for entry. [6]
Data enrolled for a known identity and used by the verifier to check the
verification data provided by an entity to prove this identity in an
authentication attempt.
Secondary image
A repeat image of the holder’s portrait reproduced elsewhere in the document
by whatever means. [8]
Secure messaging in Secure messaging using encryption and message authentication code
encrypted
according to ISO/IEC 7816-4
mode
Skimming
Imitation of the inspection system to read the logical MRTD or parts of it via
the contactless communication channel of the TOE without knowledge
of the printed MRZ data.
Terminal
Intersection of the Certificate Holder Authorizations defined by the Inspection
page 79 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
Term
Authorization
Travel document
Traveller
Definition
System Certificate, the Document Verifier Certificate and Country
Verifier Certification Authority which shall be all valid for the Current
Date.
A passport or other official document of identity issued by a State or organization which may be used by the rightful holder for international
travel. [9]
Person presenting the MRTD to the inspection system and claiming the
identity of the MRTD holder.
TSF data
Data created by and for the TOE that might affect the operation of the TOE
(CC part 1 [1]).
Unpersonalized
MRTD
User data
MRTD material prepared to produce a personalized MRTD containing an
initialised and pre-personalized MRTD’s chip.
Data created by and for the user that does not affect the operation of the TSF
(CC part 1 [1]).
The process of comparing a submitted biometric sample against the biometric
reference template of a single enrolee whose identity is being claimed,
to determine whether it matches the enrolee’s template. [9]
Data provided by an entity in an authentication attempt to prove their identity
to the verifier. The verifier checks whether the verification data match
the reference data known for the claimed identity.
Verification
Verification data
Acronyms
Acronym
Term
BIS
CC
EIS
n.a.
OSP
PT
SAR
SFR
TOE
TSF
Basic Inspection System
Common Criteria
Extended Inspection System
Not applicable
Organisational security policy
Personalization Terminal
Security assurance requirements
Security functional requirement
Target of Evaluation
TOE security functions
page 80 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
9 Literature
Common Criteria
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-001
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-002
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance
Requirements; Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-003
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005, CCMB-2005-08-004
Anwendungshinweise und Interpretationen zum Schema (AIS), AIS 20, Bundesamt für
Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Version 1.0, 2. Dezember 1999
ICAO
[6]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, Development of a Logical Data
Structure – LDS, For Optional Capacity Expansion Technologies, Revision –1.7, published by
authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization, LDS 1.7, 200405-18
[7]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version - 1.1, Date - October 01, 2004,
published by authority of the secretary general, International Civil Aviation Organization
[8]
ANNEX to Section III SECURITY STANDARDS FOR MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL
DOCUMENTS, Excerpts from ICAO Doc 9303, Part 1 - Machine Readable Passports, Fifth
Edition – 2003
[9]
BIOMETRICS DEPLOYMENT OF MACHINE READABLE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS,
TECHNICAL REPORT Development and Specification of Globally Interoperable Biometric
Standards for Machine Assisted Identity Confirmation using Machine Readable Travel
Documents, Version 1.9, ICAO TAG MRTD/NTWG, 19 May 2003
[10]
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION FACILITATION (FAL)
DIVISION, twelfth session (Cairo, Egypt, 22 March – 1 April 2004)
[11]
Machine Readable Travel Documents Technical Report, PKI for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Offering ICC Read-Only Access, Version – 0.42 - Draft, August, 2004, Dr. Kügler,
BSI
Cryptography
[12]
Geeignete Algorithmen zur Erfüllung der Anforderungen nach §17 Abs. 1 bis 3 SigG vom 22.
Mai 2001 in Verbindung mit Anlage 1 Abschnitt I Nr. 2 SigV vom 22. November 2001, Bonn,
10.8.2004 (Zieldatum der Veröffentlichung ist Januar 2005)
[13]
ISO/IEC 14888-3: Information technology – Security techniques – Digital signatures with
appendix – Part 3: Certificate-based mechanisms, 1999
[14]
FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION FIPS PUB 46-3,
DATA ENCRYPTION STANDARD (DES), Reaffirmed 1999 October 25, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology
[15]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-2 SECURE HASH STANDARD
(+ Change Notice to include SHA-224), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
page 81 of 82
Security Target lite – Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO Application", Extended Access
Control
[16]
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186-2 DIGITAL SIGNATURE
STANDARD (DSS) (+ Change Notice), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2002 August 1
[17]
AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD X9.62-1999: Public Key Cryptography For The
Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)©,
September 20, 1998
[18]
ISO/IEC 9796-2, Information Technology – Security Techniques – Digital Signature Schemes
giving message recovery – Part 2: Integer factorisation based mechanisms, 2002
[19]
ISO/IEC 15946-1. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves – Part 1: General, 2002.
[20]
ISO/IEC 15946-2. Information technology – Security techniques – Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves – Part 2: Digital signatures, 2002.
[21]
ISO/IEC 15946: Information technology — Security techniques — Cryptographic techniques
based on elliptic curves — Part 3: Key establishment, 2002
[22]
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
Protection Profiles
[23]
PP conformant to Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001; registered
and certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI) under the
reference BSI-PP-0002-2001
[24]
Smartcard Integrated Circuit Platform Augmentations, Version 1.00, March 8th, 2002
[25]
Common Criteria Protection Profile Machine Readable Travel Document with „ICAO
Application", Extended Access Control, BSI-PP-0026, 19 November 2007
Other
[26]
Technical Guideline Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents
– Extended Access Control (EAC), Version 1.01, TR-03110, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI),
[27]
Technical Guideline: Elliptic Curve Cryptography according to ISO 15946.TR-ECC, BSI
2006.
[28]
ISO 7816, Identification cards – Integrated circuit(s) cards with contacts, Part 4: Organization,
security and commands for interchange, FDIS 2004
[29]
Secured Crypto Library on the P5CD080V0B, Security Target, BSI-DSZ-CC-0417, Rev. 1.0,
24. August 2007
page 82 of 82
Was this manual useful for you? yes no
Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Download PDF

advertisement