PP: Card Operating System Generation 2

PP: Card Operating System Generation 2
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System Generation 2
(PP COS G2)
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
Approved by the
Federal Office for Information Security
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
Foreword
This Protection Profile ‘Card Operating System (PP COS)’ is issued by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in
der Informationstechnik, Germany.
The document has been prepared as a Protection Profile (PP) following the rules and formats of
Common Criteria version 3.1 [1], [2], [3], Revision 4.
Correspondence and comments to this Protection Profile should be referred to:
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Godesberger Allee 185-189
53175 Bonn
Telefon:
Telefax:
E-Mail:
+49 2 28 99 95 82-0
+49 2 28 99 95 82-54 00
[email protected]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
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Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Document history
Version
1.0
Date
23rd August 2013
th
Changes
Final version for evaluation
1.1
4 November 2013
1.2
20th November 2013 Package PACE for Proximity Coupling
Device added
1.3
11th February 2014
update of the packages, commands
FINGERPRINT and LIST PUBLIC KEY added,
FDP_SDI.2 for objects with transaction
protection, access control rule for PSO
VERIFY CERTIFICATE added
1.4
2nd April 2014
Clarification on antenna, update of the table
15 and package Crypto Box for trusted
channel,
FIA_SOS.1
added,
update
FIA_USB.1, FIA_API.1 is adapted to BSICC-PP-0084, access condition for command
FINGERPRINT
is
adapted
in
FDP_ACF.1/MF_DF, adaption of refinement
to ATE_FUN.1 and ATE_IND.2 due to
optional packages and application, update of
modul
length
of
RSA
in
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.V, any subject is
allowed to execute command PSO Verify
Digital Signature.
1.5
30th April 2014
Update due to BSI comments
1.6
4th June 2014
RSA 3072 public key operation removed due
to change of COS specification
1.7
25 July 2014
1.8
1.9
Commentary
Change
FIA_AFL.1/PIN
and
FMT_MTD.1/PIN in order to comply with
COS specification. GET RANDOM in Paket
Logical Channel verschoben. FDP_SDI.2
aufgenommen.
Certification-ID, update of table 19.
References are updated, references to
10 October 2014
wrapper specification, BSI-CC-PP-0084 and
JIL transition guide are added, dfSecurityList
substituted by dfSpecificSecurityList,
dfPasswordList substituted by
dfSpecificPasswordList, security attributes of
the object system included in table 18,
update of FMT_SMF.1 and
FMT_MSA.1.1/Life for LOAD APPLICATION.
18th November 2014 Corrections due to BSI comments.
Current Version: 1.9 (18th November 2014)
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
Contents
1
PP Introduction
7
1.1
PP reference
7
1.2
TOE Overview
7
1.2.1
1.2.2
1.2.3
1.2.4
TOE definition and operational usage
TOE major security features for operational use
TOE type
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
7
8
8
9
2
Conformance Claims
11
2.1
CC Conformance Claim
11
2.2
PP Claim
11
2.3
Package Claim
11
2.4
Conformance Claim Rationale
11
2.5
Conformance statement
12
3
Security Problem Definition
13
3.1
Assets and External Entities
13
3.2
Threats
14
3.3
Organisational Security Policies
16
3.4
Assumptions
17
4
Security Objectives
19
4.1
Security Objectives for the TOE
19
4.2
Security Objectives for Operational Environment
21
4.3
Security Objective Rationale
22
5
Extended Components Definition
27
5.1
Definition of the Family FCS_RNG Generation of Random Numbers
27
5.2
Definition of the Family FIA_API
28
5.3
Definition of the Family FPT_EMS TOE Emanation
28
5.4
Definition of the Family FPT_ITE TSF image export
29
6
Security Requirements
31
6.1
Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
31
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.3
6.1.4
6.1.5
6.1.6
Overview
Users, subjects and objects
Security Functional Requirements for the TOE taken over from BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
General Protection of User data and TSF data
Authentication
Access Control
32
33
47
48
53
61
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6.1.7 Cryptographic Functions
6.1.8 Protection of communication
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
84
94
94
6.2.1
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.2.4
6.2.5
6.2.6
6.2.7
6.3
96
97
97
97
98
98
98
99
Refinements of the TOE Assurance Requirements
Refinements to ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
Refinements to ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
Refinement to ADV_IMP.1
Refinements to AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Refinements to ATE_FUN.1 Functional tests
Refinements to ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
Security Requirements Rationale
6.3.1 Security Functional Requirements Rationale
6.3.2 Rationale for SFR’s Dependencies
6.3.3 Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
99
106
111
7
Package Crypto Box
113
7.1
TOE Overview
113
7.2
Security Problem Definition
113
7.2.1
7.2.2
7.2.3
7.2.4
7.3
Assets and External Entities
Threats
Organisational Security Policies
Assumptions
Security Objectives
113
113
113
113
114
7.4
Security Requirements for Package Crypto Box
114
8
Package Contactless
123
8.1
TOE Overview
123
8.2
Security Problem Definition
123
8.2.1
8.2.2
8.2.3
8.2.4
8.3
Assets and External Entities
Threats
Organisational Security Policies
Assumptions
Security Objectives
123
124
124
124
124
8.4
Security Requirements for Package Contactless
125
8.5
Security Requirements rationale
134
9
Package PACE for Proximity Coupling Device
140
9.1
TOE Overview
140
9.2
Security Problem Definition
140
9.2.1 Assets and External Entities
9.2.2 Threats
9.2.3 Organisational Security Policies
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
140
141
141
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9.2.4 Assumptions
9.3 Security Objectives
141
141
9.4
Security Requirements for Package PACE for Proximity Coupling Device
141
9.5
Security Requirements rationale
148
10
Package Logical Channel
152
10.1 TOE Overview
152
10.2 Security Problem Definition
152
10.2.1 Assets and External Entities
10.2.2 Threats
10.2.3 Organisational Security Policies
10.2.4 Assumptions
10.3 Security Objectives
152
152
152
152
153
10.4 Security Requirements for Package Logical Channel
153
10.5 Security Requirements rationale
156
11
Annex: Composite Evaluation of Smart Cards as Signature Products based on COS Smart Card
Platforms (Informative)
159
11.1 Smart Cards as Secure Signature-creation Devices based COS (Informative)
159
11.1.1 eHC as SSCD
160
11.1.2 eHPC as SSCD
161
11.2 Smart Cards as Part of Signature-creation Application based on COS Smart Card Platforms
(Informative)
166
11.2.1 gSMC-KT as part of Electronic Health Card Terminal
11.2.2 gSMC-K as part of the SCA of the Konnektor
166
167
12
Acronyms
168
13
Bibliography
170
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Card Operating System (PP COS)
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
1 PP Introduction
1
This section provides document management and overview information required to register the
protection profile and to enable a potential user of the PP to determine, whether the PP is of
interest.
1.1 PP reference
2
Title:
Sponsor:
Editor(s):
CC Version:
Assurance Level:
General Status:
Version Number:
Registration:
Keywords:
Protection Profile ‘Card Operating System Generation 2 (PP COS G2)’
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
T-Systems GEI GmbH
3.1 (Revision 4)
Assurance level for this Protection Profile is EAL4 augmented with
ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 (refer to section 6.3.3 for
more detail)
final
1.9 as of 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
Gesundheitskarte, card operating system
1.2 TOE Overview
1.2.1
3
TOE definition and operational usage
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) addressed by the current protection profile is a smart card
platform implementing the Card Operating System (COS) according [21] without any object
system. The TOE shall comprise at least
i)
the Security platform IC, i.e. the circuitry of the chip incl. the configuration data and
initialisation data related to the security functionality of the chip and - if delivered - IC
Dedicated Software 1 with the configuration data and initialisation data related to IC
Dedicated Software (the integrated circuit, IC),
ii) the IC Embedded Software (Card Operating System, COS) 2,
iii) the wrapper for interpretation of exported TSF data,
iv) the associated guidance documentation.
4
The TOE includes all excutable code running on the Security platform IC, i. e. IC Dedicated
Support Software, the Card Operating System, application specific code loaded on the smartcard
by command LOAD CODE or any other means. The TSF of the TOE defined in a ST claiming
conformance to this PP shall comprise all security functionality available after delivery of the
TOE including vendor specific commands for initialization, personalization and operational usage
allowed but not described in the specification of the COS [21]. This protection profile is written
1
usually preloaded (and often security certified) by the Chip Manufacturer
2
usually – together with IC – completely implementing executable functions
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
based on COS specification [21] but also applicable to COS meeting an updated version of this
specification if this update does not change the security functionality specified in [21]. The
wrapper interface is specified in [27]. Please consult the certification body for further information
related to the validity of the PP due to updates of the specifications.
5
Note, if the TOE support contactless communication the inlay with antenna may be or may be not
part of the TOE covered by the evaluation. The ST author shall provide precise definition of the
physical scope of the TOE and the form in which the TOE is delivered to the costumer. The
guidance documentation shall describe the security measures provided by the manufacturer and
the security measures required for protection of the TOE until reception by the end-user.
6
The TOE does not include the object system, i. e. the application specific structures like the
Master File (MF), the Applications, the Application Dedicated Files (ADF), the Dedicated Files
(DF 3), Elementary Files (EF) and internal security objects 4 including TSF data. The TOE and the
application specific object system build an initialized smart card product like an electronic Health
Card (eHC [22]), a Professional Health Card (eHPC [23]) or a Secure Module Card Type B
(SMC-B [24]), K (SMC-K [25]) and KT (SMC-KT [26]).
1.2.2
7
TOE major security features for operational use
This smart card platform provides the following main security functionality:
– authentication of human user and external devices,
– storage of and access control on user data,
– key management and cryptographic functions,
– management of TSF data including life cycle support,
– export of non-confidential TSF data of the object systems if implemented.
1.2.3
TOE type
8
The TOE type is a smart card without the application named as a whole ‘Card Operating System
Card Platform’.
9
The export of non-confidential TSF data of the object systems supports verification of correct
implementation of the object system of the smart card during manufacturing and test. The
exported TSF data include all security attributes of the object system as a whole and of all objects
but excludes any confidential authentication data. The wrapper provides communication
interfaces between the COS and the verification tool (cf. [27]). The verification tool sends
commands for the COS through the wrapper. The COS may export the TSF data in a vendor
specific format but the wrapper shall encode the data into standardized format for export to the
verification tool. The verification tool compares the response of the smart card with the object
system definition. Details of the interface will be described in the BSI Technical Guidance TR03143 „eHealth G2-COS Konsistenz-Prüftool“.
3
The abbreviation DF is commonly used for dedicated files, application and application dedicated files, which
are folders with different methods of identification, cf. [21], sec. 8.1.1 and 8.3.1.
4
containing passwords, private keys etc.
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
10 The typical life cycle phases for the current TOE type are IC and Smartcard embedded software
development, manufacturing 5, smartcard product finishing 6, smartcard personalisation and,
finally, smartcard end-usage as defined in [10]. The TOE should be delivered with completely
installed COS. Any patches of the COS may be delivered to Smart Card Integrator for completion
of COS installation. Any smartcard embedded software loaded after these processes
(i)
changes the TOE if is part of the COS, or
(ii)
is outside the TOE if is not part of the COS, and evidence shall be provided that
this executable code cannot affect the security of the TOE.
Operational use of the TOE is explicitly in the focus of current PP. Some single properties of the
manufacturing and the card issuing life cycle phases being significant for the security of the TOE
in its operational phase are also considered by the current PP. A security evaluation /certification
being conform with this PP will have to involve all life cycle phases into consideration to the
extent as required by the assurance package chosen here for the TOE (see chap. 2.3 ‘Package
Claim’ below).
1.2.4
Non-TOE hardware/software/firmware
11 In order to be powered up and to communicate with the ‘external world’ the TOE needs a
terminal (card reader) with contacts [28] or supporting the contactless communication according
to [43].
12 The specification [21] defines the options “Crypto Box”, “Contactless”, “PACE for Proximity
Coupling Device“, “Logical Channel”, and “USB” which the TOE may implement. The PP takes
account of these options in the following sections:
Option in [21]
Option_Kryptobox
Package
Crypto Box
Option_kontaktlose_ Contactless
Schnittstelle
Option_PACE_PCD PACE for
Proximity
Coupling
Device
Option_logische_Ka Logical
näle
Channel
Option_USB_Schnitt stelle
Remark
Defines additional cryptographic SFR (see
chapter 7).
Defines additional SFR for contactless interfaces
of the smartcard, i.e. PICC part of PACE.
Defines additional SFR for support of contactless
interfaces of the terminals, i.e. PCD part of PACE.
Defines additional SFR for the support of logical
channels (see chapter 9).
Defines additional communication support on the
lower layers. This option does not contain any
security related details and is therefore only listed
for the sake of completeness.
Table 1: Mapping between options and packages.
13 The Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1, Revision 4, defines a package as a
set of SFR or SAR. This approach does not necessarily fit for description of extended TSF due to
extended functionality of the TOE by means of packages. Therefore it was decided to provide an
5
IC manufacturing, packaging and testing
6
including installation of the object system
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Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
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extension of the Security Problem Definition, the Security Objectives, and the Security
Requirements as well as for the corresponding rationales for each defined package.
14 If the TOE implements one of these options the ST writer must integrate the corresponding
package definition with the update of the Security Problem Definition, Security Objectives, and
the Security Requirements defined in that package into the ST. Additionally all rationales must be
taken over into the ST.
15 Application note 1: The ST writer must describe in the chapter Conformance Claim, section
Package claim which package was chosen and in section Conformance Rationale how these
package are integrated in the ST. Note the chosen packages may require support of commands or
only special variants of the commands, cf. [21] for details.
16 Application note 2: The PP is written from the security point of view. In some cases this can
result in different interpretations how security is enforced. For example from the implementation
point of view the command ENABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT changes a security state
within the memory of the TOE. From the security point of view the change of the security state
results in a change of the access rules. The PP describes rather the requirements for the security
behaviour and does not focus on the implementation details claimed by [21]. The ST writer and
the developer reading this PP should therefore keep in mind that the PP abstracts from the
implementation.
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Card Operating System (PP COS)
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
2 Conformance Claims
2.1 CC Conformance Claim
17 This protection profile claims conformance to
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [2]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance
components; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [3]
as follows
-
Part 2 extended,
-
Part 3 conformant.
18 The
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012, [4]
has to be taken into account.
2.2 PP Claim
19 This PP claims strict conformance to protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11].
2.3 Package Claim
20 The current PP is conformant to the following security requirements package: Assurance package
EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and AVA_VAN.5 as defined in the CC,
part 3 [3].
2.4 Conformance Claim Rationale
21 This PP claims strict conformance to the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11].
22 From the Security Problem Definition (see section 3: “Security Problem Definition” [11]) of BSICC-PP-0035-2007 the threats (see section 3.2 “Threats” [11]) and the Organisational Security
Policies (see section 3.3 “Organisational Security Policies” [11]) are taken over into this
Protection Profile. Namely the following threats are taken over: T.Leak-Inherent, T.Phys-Probing,
T.Malfunction, T.Phys-Manipulation, T.Leak-Forced, T.Abuse-Func, T.RND. The OSP
P.Process-TOE is also taken over from BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007. See section 3.2 and 3.3 for more
details.
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Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
23 The assumptions A.Process-Sec-IC, A.Plat-Appl and A.Resp-Appl defined in the BSI-CC-PP0035-2007 [11] address the operational environment of the Security IC, i.e. the COS part of the
current TOE and the operational environment of the current TOE. The aspects of these
assumptions are relevant for the COS part of the current TOE, address the development process
of the COS and are evaluated according to composite evaluation approach [8]. Therefore these
assumptions are now refined in order to address the assumptions about the operational
environment of the current TOE (cf. chapter 3.4 for details).
24 The Security Objectives for the Security IC as defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 O.LeakInherent, O.Phy-Probing, O.Malfunction, O.Phys-Manipulation, O.Leak-Forced, O.Abuse-Func,
O.Identification, O.RND are included as security objectives for the current TOE. Security
Objectives for the Environment OE.Resp-Appl defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 is split into
the security objective O_Resp_Appl for the COS part of the TOE and OE.Resp-ObjS for the
object system in the operational environment of the TOE. The security objective for the
environment OE.Plat-Appl defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 is ensured by the COS part of
the TOE and verified in the composite evaluation process. It results in a similar security objective
for the object system in the operational environment of the TOE OE.Plat-COS. OE.Process-SecIC defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 is completely ensured by the assurance class ALC of the
TOE up to Phase 5 and addressed by OE.Process-Card. See chapter 4 for more details.
25 All Security Functional Requirements with existing refinements are taken over from the BSI-CCPP-0035-2007 into this PP by iterations indicated by “/SICP”. Namely this are the following
SFR:
FRU_FLT.2/SICP,
FPT_FLS.1/SICP,
FMT_LIM.1/SICP,
FMT_LIM.2/SICP,
FAU_SAS.1/SICP, FPT_PHP.3/SICP, FDP_ITT.1/SICP, FPT_ITT.1/SICP, FDP_IFC.1/SICP,
FCS_RNG.1/SCIP. See section 6.1 for more details.
26 The assurance package claim is EAL4 augmented with ALC_DVS.2, ATE_DPT.2 and
AVA_VAN.5. For rationale of the augmantations see section 6.3.3.
27 The refinements of the Security Assurance Requirements made in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 are
taken over in this Protection Profile and must be applied to the Security platform IC.
28 As all important parts of the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 are referred in a way that these are part of
this Protection Profile the rationales still hold. Please refer sections 4.3 and 6.3 for further details.
29 Therefore the strict conformance with the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] is fulfilled by this
Protection Profile.
30 Note: the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] was updated by BSI-CC-PP-0084 [48]. The TOE may
include Security platform IC certified conformant to BSI-CC-PP-0084 [48] if the transition guide
[47] is taken into account and the ST provides appropriate rationale.
2.5 Conformance statement
31 This PP requires strict conformance of any ST or PP claiming conformance to this PP.
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Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
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3 Security Problem Definition
3.1 Assets and External Entities
32 As defined in section 1.2.1 the TOE is a smart card platform implementing the Card Operating
System (COS) according [21] without any object system. In sense of the BSI-CC-PP-00352007 [11] the COS is User Data and Security IC Embedded Software.
33 In section 3.1 “Description of Assets” in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 a high level description (in
sense of this PP) of the assets (related to standard functionality) is given. Please refer there for a
long description. Namely these assets are
• the User Data,
• the Security IC Embedded Software, stored and in operation,
• the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software, and
• the random numbers produced by the IC platform.
34 In this Protection Profile these assets and the protection requirements of these assets are refined
because
• the User Data defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 are User data or TSF Data in the context of
the current PP,
• Security IC Embedded Software is part of the current TOE,
• the security services provided by the TOE for the Security IC Embedded Software are part of
the current TSF and
• the random numbers produced by the IC platform are internally used by the TSF.
35 The primary assets are User Data to be protected by the COS as long as they are in scope of the
TOE and the security services provided by the TOE.
Asset
User data in EF
Secret keys
Private keys
Public keys
Definition
Data for the user stored in elementary files of the file hierarchy.
Symmetric cryptographic key generated as result of mutual authentication
and used for encryption and decryption of user data.
Confidential asymmetric cryptographic key of the user used for
decryption and computation of digital signature.
Integrity protected public asymmetric cryptographic key of the user used
for encryption and verification of digital signatures and permanently
stored on the TOE or provided to the TOE as parameter of the command.
Table 2: Data objects to be protected by the TOE as primary assets
36 Note: elementary files (EF) may be stored in the MF, any DF, Application or Application
Dedicated File. The place of an EF in the file hierarchy defines features of the User Data stored in
the EF. User data does not affect the operation of the TSF (cf. CC part 1, para. 100).
Cryptographic keys used by the TSF to verify authentication attempts of external entities (i.e.
authentication reference data) including the verification of Card Verifiable Certificates (CVC) or
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Card Operating System (PP COS)
authenticate itself to external entities by generation of authentication verification data in a
cryptographic protocol are TSF data (cf. Tables 13, 14 and 17)
37 This protection profile considers the following external entities:
External entity
Definition
World
Any user independent on identification or successful authentication7.
Human User
A person authenticated by password or PUC.
Device
An external device authenticated by cryptographic operation
Table 3: External entities 8
3.2 Threats
38 This section describes the threats to be averted by the TOE independently or in collaboration with
its IT environment. These threats result from the assets protected by the TOE and the method of
TOE’s use in the operational environment.
39 The following threats are defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11]: T.Leak-Inherent, T.PhysProbing, T.Malfunction, T.Phys-Manipulation, T.Leak-Forced, T.Abuse-Func, T.RND. All
threats are part of this Protection Profile and taken over into this PP. Please refer BSI-CC-PP0035-2007 for further descriptions and the details. Table 4 lists all threats taken over with the
corresponding reference.
Threat name
T.Leak-Inherent
T.Phys-Probing
T.Malfunction
T.Phys-Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.RND
Reference to
paragraph in [11]
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
Short description
Inherent Information Leakage
Physical Probing
Malfunction due to Environmental Stress
Physical Manipulation
Forced Information Leakage
Abuse of Functionality
Deficiency of Random Numbers
Table 4: Overview of threats defined in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] and taken over into this
PP.
40 The TOE shall avert the threat “Forge of User or TSF data (T.Forge_Internal_Data)” as specified
below.
7
The user World corresponds to the access condition ALWAYS in [21]. An authenticated Human User or
Device is allowed to use the right assigned for World.
8
This table defines external entities and subjects in the sense of [1]. Subjects can be recognised by the TOE
independent of their nature (human or technical user). As result of an appropriate identification and
authentication process, the TOE creates – for each of the respective external entity – an ‘image’ inside and
‘works’ then with this TOE internal image (also called subject in [1]). From this point of view, the TOE itself
perceives only ‘subjects’ and, for them, does not differ between ‘subjects’ and ‘external entities’. There is no
dedicated subject with the role ‘attacker’ within the current security policy, whereby an attacker might
‘capture’ any subject role recognised by the TOE.
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T.Forge_Internal_Data
Forge of User or TSF data
An attacker with high attack potential tries to forge internal
user data or TSF data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios of smart card
forgery. The attacker may try to alter the user data e.g. to add
user data in elementary files. The attacker may misuse the TSF
management function to change the user authentication data to
a known value.
41 The TOE shall avert the threat “Compromise of confidential User or TSF data
(T.Compromise_Internal_Data)” as specified below.
T.Compromise_Internal_
Data
Compromise of confidential User or TSF data
An attacker with high attack potential tries to compromise
confidential user data or TSF data through the communication
interface of the TOE.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios e.g. guessing of
the user authentication data (password) or reconstruction the
private decipher key using the response code for chosen cipher
texts (like Bleichenbacher attack for the SSL protocol
implementation), e.g. to add keys for decipherment. The
attacker may misuse the TSF management function to change
the user authentication data to a known value.
42 The TOE shall avert the threat “Misuse of TOE functions (T.Misuse)” as specified below.
T.Misuse
Misuse of TOE functions
An attacker with high attack potential tries to use the TOE
functions to gain access to the access control protected assets
without knowledge of user authentication data or any implicit
authorization.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios e.g. the attacker
may try circumvent the user authentication to use signing
functionality without authorization. The attacker may try to
alter the TSF data e.g. to extend the user rights after successful
authentication.
43 The TOE shall avert the threat “Malicious Application (T.Malicious_Application)” as specified
below.
T.Malicious_Application
Malicious Application
An attacker with high attack potential tries to use the TOE
functions to install an additional malicious application in order
to compromise or alter User Data or TSF data.
44 The TOE shall avert the threat “Cryptographic attack against the implementation (T.Crypto)” as
specified below.
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T.Crypto
Cryptographic attack against the implementation
An attacker with high attack potential tries to launch a
cryptographic attack against the implementation of the
cryptographic algorithms or tries to guess keys using a bruteforce attack on the function inputs.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios e.g. an attacker
may try to foresee the output of a random number generator in
order to get a session key. An attacker may try to use leakage
during cryptographic operation in order to use SPA, DPA, DFA
or EMA techniques in order to compromise the keys or to get
knowledge of other sensitive TSF or User data. Furthermore an
attacker could try guessing the key by using a brute-force
attack.
45 The TOE shall avert the threat “Interception of Communication (T.Intercept)” as specified below.
T.Intercept
Interception of Communication
An attacker with high attack potential tries to intercept the
communication between the TOE and an external entity, to
forge, to delete or to add other data to the transmitted sensitive
data.
This threat comprises several attack scenarios. An attacker may
try to read or forge data during transmission in order to add
data to a record or to gain access to authentication data.
46 The TOE shall avert the threat “Wrong Access Rights for User Data or TSF Data
(T.WrongRights)” as specified below.
T.WrongRights
Wrong Access Rights for User Data or TSF Data
An attacker with high attack potential executes undocumented
or inappropriate access rights defined in object system and
compromises or manipulate sensitive User data or TSF data.
3.3 Organisational Security Policies
47 The TOE and/or its environment shall comply with the following Organisational Security Policies
(OSP) as security rules, procedures, practices, or guidelines imposed by an organisation upon its
operation.
48 The following OSP is defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11]. That OSP is part of this
Protection Profile and is taken over into this PP for the current TOE. Note the current PP includes
the embedded software which is not a part of TOE defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11].
Please refer BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 for further descriptions and the details. Table 5 lists all OSP
taken over with the corresponding reference.
OSP name
P.Process-TOE
Short description
Protection during TOE
Development and Production
Reference to paragraph in [11]
86
Table 5: Overview of OSP defined in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] and taken over into this
PP.
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3.4 Assumptions
49 The assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the TOE will be used
or is intended to be used.
50 The assumptions defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] address the operational environment
of the Security IC, i.e. the COS part of the current TOE and the operational environment of the
current TOE. The aspects of these assumptions, which are relevant for the COS part of the current
TOE, address the development process of the current TOE and are evaluated according to
composite evaluation approach [8]. Therefore these assumptions are now refined in order to
address the assumptions about the operational environment of the current TOE. The Table 6 lists
and maps these assumptions for the operational environment with the corresponding reference.
Assumptions
defined in
[11]
Reference to
paragraph in
[11]
A.ProcessSec-IC
91
Refined
assumptions for
the operational
environment of
the current TOE
A.Process-Sec-SC
A.Plat-Appl
93
removed
A.Resp-Appl
95
A.Resp-ObjS
Rationale of the changes
While the TOE of BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
is delivered after Phase 3 IC
manufactioring and Testing or Phase or
Phase 4 IC Packaging the current TOE is
delivered after Phase 5 Composite
Product Integration before Phase 6
Personalisation. The protection during
Phase 4 may and during Phase 5 shall be
addressed by security of the development
environment of the current TOE. Only
protection during Personalisation is in
responsibility of the operational
environment.
Usage of Hardware Platform as TOE of
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 as addressed by
A.Plat-Appl is covered by ADV class
related to COS as part of the current
TOE.
The user data of the TOE of BSI-CC-PP0035-2007 are the Security IC Embedded
Software, i.e. the COS part of the TOE,
the TSF data of the current TOE and the
user data of the COS. The object system
contains the TSF data and defines the
security attributes of the user data of the
current TOE.
Table 6: Overview of assumptions defined in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] and implemented
by the TOE.
51 The developer of applications for COS must ensure the appropriate “A.Process-Sec-SC
(Protection during Personalisation)” after delivery of the TOE.
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A.Process-Sec-SC
Protection during Personalisation
It is assumed that security procedures are used after delivery
of the TOE by the TOE Manufacturer up to delivery to the
end-consumer to maintain confidentiality and integrity of the
TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to prevent any
possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised
use).
52 The developer of applications for COS must ensure the appropriate “Usage of COS (A.PlatCOS)” while developing the application.
A.Plat-COS
Usage of COS
An object system designed for the TOE meets the following
documents: (i) TOE guidance documents (refer to the
Common Criteria assurance class AGD) such as the user
guidance, and the application notes, and (ii) findings of the
TOE evaluation reports relevant for the COS as documented
in the certification report.
53 The developer of applications for COS must ensure the appropriate “Treatment of User Data by
the Object System (A.Resp-ObjS)” while developing the application.
A.Resp-ObjS
Treatment of User Data by the Object System
All User Data and TSF Data of the TOE are treated in the
object system as defined for its specific application context.
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4 Security Objectives
54 This chapter describes the security objectives for the TOE and the security objectives for the TOE
environment.
4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE
55 The following TOE security objectives address the protection provided by the TOE.
56 The following Security Objectives for the TOE are defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11].
The Security Objectives for the TOE are part of this Protection Profile and are taken over into this
PP. Please refer BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 for further descriptions and the details. Table 6 lists all
Security Objectives taken over with the corresponding reference.
Security Objectives
name
O.Leak-Inherent
O.Phy-Probing
O.Malfunction
O.Phys-Manipulation
O.Leak-Forced
O.Abuse-Func
O.Identification
O.RND
Short description
Protection against Inherent Information Leakage
Protection against Physical Probing
Protection against Malfunctions
Protection against Physical Manipulation
Protection against Forced Information Leakage
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
TOE Identification
Random Numbers
Reference to
paragraph in [11]
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
Table 7: Overview of Security Objectives for the TOE defined in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] and
taken over into this PP.
57 Additionally the following Security Objectives for the TOE are defined:
58 The TOE shall provide “Integrity of internal data (O.Integrity)” as specified below.
O.Integrity
Integrity of internal data
The TOE must ensure the integrity of the User Data, the
security services and the TSF data under the TSF scope of
control.
59 The TOE shall provide “Confidentiality of internal data (O.Confidentiality)” as specified below.
O.Confidentiality
Confidentiality of internal data
The TOE must ensure the confidentiality of private keys and
other confidential User Data and confidential TSF data
especially the authentication data, under the TSF scope of
control against attacks with high attack potential.
60 The TOE shall provide a “Treatment of User and TSF Data (O.Resp-COS)” as specified below.
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O.Resp-COS
Treatment of User and TSF Data
The User Data and TSF data (especially cryptographic keys)
are treated by the COS as defined by the TSF data of the object
system.
61 The TOE shall provide “Support of TSF data export (O.TSFDataExport)” as specified below.
O.TSFDataExport
Support of TSF data export
The TOE must provide correct export of TSF data of the object
system excluding confidential TSF data for external review.
62 The TOE shall provide “Authentication of external entities (O.Authentication)” as specified
below.
O.Authentication
Authentication of external entities
The TOE supports the authentication of human users and
external devices. The TOE is able to authenticate itself to
external entities.
63 The TOE shall provide “Access Control for Objects (O.AccessControl)” as specified below.
O.AccessControl
Access Control for Objects
The TOE must enforce that only authenticated entities with
sufficient access control rights can access restricted objects and
services. The access control policy of the TOE must bind the
access control right of an object to authenticated entities. The
TOE must provide management functionality for access control
rights of objects.
64 The TOE shall provide “Generation and import of keys (O.KeyManagement)” as specified below.
O.KeyManagement
Generation and import of keys
The TOE must enforce the secure generation, import,
distribution, access control and destruction of cryptographic
keys. The TOE must support the public key import from and
export to a public key infrastructure.
65 The TOE shall provide “Cryptographic functions (O.Crypto)” as specified below.
O.Crypto
Cryptographic functions
The TOE must provide cryptographic services by
implementation of secure cryptographic algorithms for hashing,
key generation, data confidentiality by symmetric and
asymmetric encryption and decryption, data integrity protection
by symmetric MAC and asymmetric signature algorithms, and
cryptographic protocols for symmetric and asymmetric entity
authentication.
66 The TOE shall provide a “Secure messaging (O.SecureMessaging)” as specified below.
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O.SecureMessaging
Secure messaging
The TOE supports secure messaging for protection of the
confidentiality and the integrity of the commands received from
successful authenticated device and sending responses to this
device on demand of the external application. The TOE enforces
the use of secure messaging for receiving commands if defined
by access condition of an object.
4.2 Security Objectives for Operational Environment
67 This section describes the security objectives for the operational environment enforced by the
Security IC Embedded Software.
68 The following security objectives for the operational environment of the security IC are defined
in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11]. The operational environment of the Security IC as TOE in the
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 comprises the COS part of the current TOE and the operational
environment of the current TOE. Therefore these security objectives of the operational
environment are split and refined. The aspects relevant for the COS part of the current TOE shall
be fulfilled in the development process of the COS and evaluated according to composite
evaluation approach [8]. The remaining aspects of the security objectives for the operational
environment defined in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 are addressed in new security objectives for
the operational environment of the current PP. The table 8 lists and maps these security objectives
for the operational environment with the corresponding reference.
Security Objectives
for the operational
environment
defined in [11]
Reference to
paragraph
in [11]
OE.Plat-Appl
109
Refined security
objectives for the
operational
environment of the
current TOE
removed
OE.Resp-Appl
110
OE.Resp-ObjS
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Rationale of the changes
OE.Plat-Appl requires the
Security IC Embedded Software
to meet the guidance documents
of the Security IC. The Security
IC Embedded Software is part of
the current TOE. This
requirement shall be fulfilled in
the development process of the
TOE.
OE.Resp-Appl requires the
Security IC Embedded Software
to treat the user data as required
by the security needs of the
specific application context.
This objective shall be ensured
by the TOE and the object
system.
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Security Objectives
for the operational
environment
defined in [11]
Reference to
paragraph
in [11]
OE.Process-Sec-IC
111
Refined security
objectives for the
operational
environment of the
current TOE
OE.Process-Card
Rationale of the changes
The policy defined for the
Security platform IC is extended
to the current TOE.
Table 8: Overview of Security Objectives for the Operational Environment defined in BSICC-PP-0035-2007 [11] and taken over into this PP.
69 The Security IC Embedded Software shall provide “Usage of COS (OE.Plat-COS)” as specified
below
OE.Plat-COS
Usage of COS
To ensure that the TOE is used in a secure manner the object
system shall be designed such that the requirements from the
following documents are met: (i) user guidance of the COS, (ii)
application notes for the COS (iii) other guidance documents,
and (iv) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for
applications developed for COS as referenced in the
certification report.
70 The Security IC Embedded Software shall provide “Treatment of User Data (OE.Resp-ObjS)” as
specified below
OE.Resp-ObjS
Treatment of User Data
All User Data and TSF Data of the object system are defined as
required by the security needs of the specific application
context.
71 The operational environment of the TOE shall provide “Protection of Smartcard during
Personalisation (OE.Process-Card)” as specified below
OE.Process-Card
Protection of Smartcard during Personalisation
Security procedures shall be used after delivery of the TOE
during Phase 6 Smartcard personalisation up to the delivery of
the smartcard to the end-user in order to maintain
confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and to prevent any
theft, unauthorised personalization or unauthorised use.
4.3 Security Objective Rationale
72 Table 1 in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] Section 4.4 “Security Objectives Rationale” gives an
overview, how the assumptions, threats, and organisational security policies taken over are
addressed by the objectives. Please refer that table and the text following after that table justifying
this in detail for the further details.
73 The following tables provide an overview for the coverage of the defined security problem by the
security objectives for the TOE and its environment. The tables are addressing the security
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A.Process-Sec-IC
A.Process-Sec-SC
A.Plat-Appl
O.RND
O.Abuse-Func
O.Leak-Forced
O.Phys-Manipulation
O.Malfunction
O.Phys-Probing
O.Leak-Inherent
O.Identification
OE.Resp-ObjS
(SAR for COS part of the TOE)
(SAR ADV class for COS part of the TOE)
OE.Process-Sec-Card
(SAR ALC for IC part of the TOE)
problem definition as given in the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 and the additional threats,
organisational policies and assumptions defined in the current PP. It shows that all threats and
OSPs are addressed by the security objectives for the TOE and for the TOE environment. It also
shows that all assumptions are addressed by the security objectives for the TOE environment.
(X) (X)
X
(X)
A.Resp-Appl
A.Resp-ObjS
P.Process-TOE
T.Leak-Inherent
T.Phys-Probing
(X)
X
X
X
X
T.Malfunction
T.Phys-Manipulation
T.Leak-Forced
T.Abuse-Func
T.RND
X
X
X
X
X
Table 9: Security Objective Rationale related to the IC platform
74 The A.Process-Sec-IC assumes and OE. Process-Sec-IC requires that security procedures are
used after delivery of the IC by the IC Manufacturer up to delivery to the end-consumer to
maintain confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and of its manufacturing and test data (to
prevent any possible copy, modification, retention, theft or unauthorised use). Development and
production of the Security IC is part of development and production of the TOE because it
includes the Security IC. The A.Process-Sec-SC assumes and OE.Process-Sec-Card requires
security procedures during Phase 6 Smartcard personalisation up to the delivery of the smartcard
to the end-user. More precisely, the smartcard life cycle according to [10] (cf. also to BSI-CC-PP0035-2007) are covered as follows.
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•
IC development (Phase 2) and IC manufacturing and testing (Phase3) are covered as
development and manufacturing of the security ICand therefore of the TOE as well.
•
IC packaging and testing (Phase 3) may be part of the development and manufacturing
environment or the operational environment of the security IC. Even if it is part of the
operational environment of the Security IC addressed by OE. Process-Sec-IC it will be part
of the development and manufacturing environment of the current TOE and covered by the
SAR ALC_DVS.2.
•
IC packaging and testing (Phase 4) and Smartcard Packaging and finishing process (Phase 5)
are addressed by OE. Process-Sec-IC but they are part of the development and
manufacturing environment of the current TOE and covered by the SAR ALC_DVS.2.
•
Snartcard personalisation (Phase 6) up to the delivery of the smartcard to the end-user is
addressed by A.Process-Sec-IC and A.Process-Sec-SC and covered by OE.Process-SecCard.
75 The assumption A.Plat-Appl assumes that the Security IC Embedded Software is designed so
that the requirements from the following documents are met: (i) TOE guidance documents (refer
to the Common Criteria assurance class AGD) such as the hardware data sheet, and the hardware
application notes, and (ii) findings of the TOE evaluation reports relevant for the Security IC
Embedded Software as documented in the certification report. This is met by the SAR of ADV
class and the requirements for composite evaluation [8].
76 The assumption A.Resp-Appl assumes that security relevant user data (especially cryptographic
keys) are treated by the Security IC Embedded Software as defined for its specific application
context. This assumption is split into requirements for the COS part of the TSF to provide
appropriate security functionality for the specific application context as defined by SFR of the
current PP and the assumption A.Resp-ObjS that assumes all User Data and TSF Data of the
TOE are treated in the object system as defined for its specific application context. The security
objective for the operational environment OE.Resp-Obj requires the object system to be defined
as required by the security needs of the specific application context.
77 The OSP P.Process-TOE and the threats T.Leak-Inherent, T.Phys-Probing, T.Malfunction,
T.Phys-Manipulation, T.Leak-Forced, T.Abuse-Func and T.RND are covered by the security
objectives as described in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007. As stated in section 2.4, this PP claims
conformance to BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11]. The objectives, assumptions, policies and threats as
used in Table 9 are defined and handled in [11]. Hence, the rationale for these items and their
correlation with Table 9 is given in [11] and not repeated here.
78 The current PP defines new threats and assumptions for the TOE extended to the the Security
platform IC as TOE defined in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 and extends the policy P.Process-TOE to
the current TOE.
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T.Compromise_Internal_Data
X
OE.Process-Card
OE.Plat-COS
O.SecureMessaging
O.Crypto
O.KeyManagement
O.AccessControl
O.Authentication
X
X
X
T.Malicious_Application
X
X
T.Misuse
T.Crypto
X
X
X
X
X
T.Intercept
T.WrongRights
O.TSFDataExport
O.Resp-COS
O.Confidentiality
O.Integrity
T.Forge_Internal_Data
OE.Resp-ObjS
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X
X
A.Plat-COS
A.Resp-ObjS
X
X
P.Process-TOE
X
Table 10: Security Objective Rationale for the COS part of the TOE
79 A detailed justification required for suitability of the security objectives to coup with the security
problem definition is given below.
80 The thread T.Forge_Internal_Data addresses the falsification of internal user data or TSF data
by an attacker. This is prevented by O.Integrity that ensures the integrity of user data, the security
services and the TSF data. Also, O.Resp-COS addresses this thread because the user data and
TSF data are treated by the TOE as defined by the TSF data of the object system.
81 The thread T.Compromise_Internal_Data addresses the disclosure of confidential user data or
TSF data by an attacker. The objective O.Resp-COS requires that the user data and TSF data are
treated by the TOE as defined by the TSF data of the object system. Hence, the confidential data
are handled correctly by the TSF. The security objective O.Confidentiality ensures the
confidentiality of private keys and other confidential TSF data. O.KeyManagement requires that
the used keys to protect the confidentiality are generated, imported, distributed, managed and
destroyed in a secure way.
82 The thread T.Malicious_Application addresses the modification of user data or TSF data by the
installation and execution of a malicious code by an attacker. The security objective
O.TSFDataExport requires the correct export of TSF data in order to prevent the export of code
fragments that could be used for analysing and modification of TOE code. O.Authentication
enforces user authentication in order to control the access protected functions that could be
(mis)used to install and execute malicious code. Also, O.AccessControl requires the TSF to
enforce an access control policy for the access to restricted objects in order to prevent
unauthorised installation of malicious code.
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83 The thread T.Misuse addresses the usage of access control protected assets by an attacker without
knowledge of user authentication data or by any implicit authorization. This is prevented by the
security objective O.AccessControl that requires the TSF to enforce an access control policy for
the access to restricted objects. Also the security objective O.Authentication requires user
authentication for the use of protected functions.
84 The thread T.Crypto addresses a cryptographic attack to the implementation of cryptographic
algorithms or the guessing of keys using brute force attacks. This thread is directly covered by the
security objective O.Crypto which requires a secure implementation of cryptographic algorithms.
85 The thread T.Intercept addresses the interception of the communication between the TOE and an
external entity by an attacker. The attacker tries to delete, add or forge transmitted data. This
thread is directly addressed by the security objective O.SecureMessaging which requires the TOE
to establish a trusted channel that protects the confidentiality and integrity of the transmitted data
between the TOE and an external entity.
86 The thread T.WrongRights addresses the compromising or manipulation of sensitive user data or
TSF data by using undocumented or inappropriate access rights defined in the object system. This
thread is addressed by the security objective O.Resp-COS which requires the TOE to treat the
user data and TSF data as defined by the TSF data of the object system. Hence the correct access
rights are always used and prevent misuse by undocumented or inappropriate access rights to that
data.
87 The assumption A.Plat-COS assumes that the object system of the TOE is designed according to
dedicated guidance documents and according to relevant findings of the TOE evaluation reports.
This assumption is directly addressed by the security objective for the operational environment
OE.Plat-COS.
88 The assumption A.Resp-ObjS assumes that all user data and TSF data are treated by the object
system as defined for its specific application context. This assumption is directly addressed by the
security objective for the operational environment OE.Resp-ObjS.
89 The OSP P.Process-TOE addresses the protection during TOE development and production as
defined in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11]. This is supported by the security objective for the
operational environment OE.Process-Card that addresses the TOE after the delivery for phase 5
up to 7: It requires that end consumers maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the TOE and
its manufacturing and test data.
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5 Extended Components Definition
90 This protection profile uses components defined as extensions to Common Criteria part 2 [3]. The
following extensions are taken from BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] chapter 5 “Extended
Components Definition” and are part of this Protection Profile:
- Definition of the Family FMT_LIM, and
- Definition of the Family FAU_SAS.
The Definition of the Family FCS_RNG already defined in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 is updated
according to [6] and [7] by refinement of selection “hybrid” to “hybrid physical” and “hybrid
deterministic”. The families FIA_API, FPT_EMS and FPT_ITE are defined in the document on
hand.
5.1
Definition of the Family FCS_RNG Generation of Random Numbers
91 This section describes the functional requirements for the generation of random numbers, which
may be used as secrets for cryptographic purposes or authentication. The IT security functional
requirements for a TOE are defined in an additional family (FCS_RNG) of the Class FCS
(Cryptographic support).
Family Behaviour
92 This family defines quality requirements for the generation of random numbers that are intended
to be used for cryptographic purposes.
Component levelling:
FCS_RNG: Generation of random numbers
1
93 FCS_RNG.1 Generation of random numbers requires that the random number generator
implements defined security capabilities and that the random numbers meet a defined quality
metric.
Management:
Audit:
There are no management activities foreseen.
There are no actions defined to be auditable
FCS_RNG.1
Random number generation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FCS_RNG.1.1
The TSF shall provide a [selection: physical, non-physical true,
deterministic, hybrid physical, hybrid deterministic] random number
generator that implements: [assignment: list of security capabilities].
FCS_RNG.1.2
The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment: a defined
quality metric].
94 Note, this definition of FCS_RNG family is identical to the definition given in BSI-CC-PP-0035
but introduce additional RNG classes “hybrid physical” RNG and “hybrid deterministic” RNG
according to [7].
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5.2 Definition of the Family FIA_API
95 To describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE a sensitive family (FIA_API) of
the Class FIA (Identification and authentication) is defined here. This family describes the
functional requirements for the proof of the claimed identity for the authentication verification by
an external entity where the other families of the class FIA address the verification of the identity
of an external entity.
96 Application note 3: The other families of the Class FIA describe only the authentication
verification of users’ identity performed by the TOE and do not describe the functionality of the
user to prove their identity. The following paragraph defines the extended family FIA_API from
point of view of a TOE proving its identity.
97 FIA_API Authentication Proof of Identity
Family Behaviour
This family defines functions provided by the TOE to prove its identity and to be verified by an
external entity in the TOE IT environment.
Component levelling:
FIA_API.1 Authentication Proof of Identity, provides prove of the identity of the TOE to an
external entity.
Management:
Audit:
FIA_API.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_API.1.1
The following actions could be considered for the management
functions in FMT: Management of authentication information used to
prove the claimed identity.
There are no actions defined to be auditable
Authentication Proof of Identity
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a [assignment: authentication mechanism] to
prove the identity of the [assignment:object, authorized user or role] to
an external entity.
5.3 Definition of the Family FPT_EMS TOE Emanation
98 The family FPT_EMS (TOE Emanation) of the class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here
to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks
against secret data stored in and used by the TOE where the attack is based on external observable
physical phenomena of the TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE’s
electromagnetic radiation, simple power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA),
timing attacks, etc. This family describes the functional requirements for the limitation of
intelligible emanations being not directly addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [2].
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Family Behaviour
99 This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.
Component levelling:
100 FPT_EMS.1 Emanation of TSF and User data, defines limits of TOE emanation related to TSF
and User data.
Management:
Audit:
FPT_EMS.1.1
FPT_EMS.1.2
FPT_EMS.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_EMS.1.1
FPT_EMS.1.2
There are no management activities foreseen.
There are no actions defined to be auditable
Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions
enabling access to TSF data or user data
Interface Emanation requires to not emit interface emanation
enabling access to TSF data or user data
Emanation of TSF and User data
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess
of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list
of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].
The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use
the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain
access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment:
list of types of user data].
5.4 Definition of the Family FPT_ITE TSF image export
Family Behaviour
101 The family FPT_ITE (TSF image export) of the class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is defined here
to describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. This family defines rules for
export of TOE implementation fingerprints and of TSF data in order to allow verification of the
correct implementation of the IC Dedicated Software and the COS of the TOE and the TSF data
of the smartcard. The export of a fingerprint of the TOE implementation, e.g. a keyed hash value
over all implemented executable code, provides the ability to compare the implemented
executable code with the known intended executable code. The export of all non-confidential TSF
data, e.g. data security attributes of subjects and objects and public authentication verification
data like public keys, provides the ability to verify their correctness e.g. against a object system
specification. The exported data must be correct, but do not need protection of confidentiality or
integrity if the export is performed in a protected environment. This family describes the
functional requirements for unprotected export of TSF data and export of TOE implementation
fingerprints not being addressed by any other component of CC part 2 [2].
Component levelling:
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102 FPT_ITE.1 Export of TOE implementation fingerprint, provides the ability to export the TOE
implementation fingerprint without protection of confidentiality or integrity.
103 FPT_ITE.2 Export of TSF data, provides the ability to export the TSF data without protection of
confidentiality or integrity.
Management
FPT_ITE.1, FPT_ITE.2:
Audit FPT_ITE.1,
FPT_ITE.2:
There are no management activities foreseen.
FPT_ITE.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_ITE.1.1
Export of TOE implementation fingerprint
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TOE shall export fingerprint of TOE implementation given
the following conditions [assignment: conditions for export].
The TSF shall use [assignment: list of generation rules to be
applied by TSF] for the exported data.
FPT_ITE.1.2
FPT_ITE.2
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_ITE.2.1
FPT_ITE.2.2
There are no actions defined to be auditable
Export of TSF data
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TOE shall export [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
given the following conditions [assignment: conditions for
export].
The TSF shall use [assignment: list of encoding rules to be
applied by TSF] for the exported data.
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6 Security Requirements
104 This part of the PP defines the detailed security requirements that shall be satisfied by the TOE.
The statement of TOE security requirements shall define the functional and assurance security
requirements that the TOE needs to satisfy in order to meet the security objectives for the TOE.
105 The CC allows several operations to be performed on security requirements (on the component
level); refinement, selection, assignment and iteration are defined in sec. 8.1 of Part 1 [1] of the
CC. Each of these operations is used in this PP.
106 The refinement operation is used to add detail to a requirement, and, thus, further restricts a
requirement. Refinements of security requirements are denoted in such a way that added words
are in bold text and removed words are crossed out. In some cases a interpretation refinement is
given. In such a case a extra paragraph starting with “Refinement” is given.
107 The selection operation is used to select one or more options provided by the CC in stating a
requirement. Selections having been made by the PP author are denoted as underlined text.
Selections to be filled in by the ST author appear in square brackets with an indication that a
selection is to be made [selection:] and are italicised. 9
108 The assignment operation is used to assign a specific value to an unspecified parameter, such as
the length of a password. Assignments having been made by the PP author are denoted by
showing as underlined text. Assignments to be filled in by the ST author appear in square
brackets with an indication that an assignment is to be made [assignment:] and are italicised. In
some cases the assignment made by the PP authors defines a selection to be performed by the ST
author. Thus this text is underlined and italicised like this.
109 The iteration operation is used when a component is repeated with varying operations. Iteration
is denoted by showing a slash “/”, and the iteration indicator after the component identifier.
For the sake of a better readability, the iteration operation may also be applied to some single
components (being not repeated) in order to indicate belonging of such SFRs to same functional
cluster. In such a case, the iteration operation is applied to only one single component.
110 Some SFRs (including the potential exiting refinement) were taken over from the BSI-CC-PP0035-2007. A list of all SFRs taken from BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] can be found in section 2.4,
additionally the SFRs taken over are labelled with a footnote.
6.1 Security Functional Requirements for the TOE
111 In order to define the Security Functional Requirements Part 2 of the Common Criteria [2] was
used. However, some Security Functional Requirements have been refined. The refinements are
described below the associated SFR.
9
Note the parameter defined in the COS specification are printed in italic as well but without indication of
selection or assignment.
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6.1.1
Overview
112 In order to give an overview of the security functional requirements in the context of the security
services offered by the TOE, the author of the PP defined the security functional groups and
allocated the functional requirements described in the following sections to them:
Security Functional Groups
Protection against Malfunction
Protection against Abuse of Functionality
Protection against Physical Manipulation
and Probing
Protection against Leakage
Generation of Random Numbers
Security Functional Requirements concerned
FRU_FLT.2/SICP, FPT_FLS.1/SICP
FMT_LIM.1/SICP, FMT_LIM.2/SICP,
FAU_SAS.1/SICP
FPT_PHP.3/SICP
FDP_ITT.1/SICP, FPT_ITT.1/SICP,
FDP_IFC.1/SICP
FCS_RNG.1/SICP
Table 11: Security functional groups vs. SFRs related to the IC platform
Security
Functional
Groups
General
Protection of
User data and
TSF data
(section 6.1.4)
Authentication
(section 6.1.5)
Access Control
(section 159)
Cryptographic
Functions
(section 6.1.7)
Protection of
communication
(section 6.1.8)
Security Functional Requirements concerned
FDP_RIP.1, FDP_SDI.2, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_TDC.1,
FPT_ITE.1, FPT_ITE.2, FPT_TST.1
FIA_AFL.1/PIN, FIA_AFL.1/PUC, FIA_ATD.1, FIA_SOS.1, FIA_UAU.1,
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6, FIA_API.1, FMT_SMR.1,
FIA_USB.1
FDP_ACC.1/EF, FDP_ACF.1/EF, FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF, FDP_ACF.1/
MF_DF, FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Life,
FMT_MSA.1/SEF, FMT_MTD.1/PIN, FMT_MSA.1/PIN,
FMT_MTD.1/Auth, FMT_MSA.1/Auth, FMT_MTD.1/NE
FCS_RNG.1, FCS_COP.1/SHA, FCS_COP.1/COS.3TDES,
FCS_COP.1/COS.RMAC, FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM,
FCS_COP.1/COS.AES, FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM, FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FCS_CKM.1/ELC, FCS_COP.1/COS.CMAC, FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S,
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.V, FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.S,
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA, FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC, FCS_CKM.4
FTP_ITC.1/TC
Table 12: Security functional groups vs. SFRs
113 The following TSF Data are defined for the IC part of the TOE.
TSF Data
TOE prepersonalisation data
TOE initialisation data
Definition
Any data supplied by the Card Manufacturer that is injected into the
non-volatile memory by the Integrated Circuits manufacturer.
Initialisation Data defined by the TOE Manufacturer to identify the
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TSF Data
Definition
TOE and to keep track of the Security IC’s production and further lifecycle phases are considered as belonging to the TSF data.
Table 13: TSF Data defined for the IC part
6.1.2
Users, subjects and objects
114 The security attributes of human users are stored in password objects (cf. [21] for details). The
human user selects the password object by pwIdentifier and therefore the role gained by the
subject acting for this human user after successful authentication. The role is a set of access rights
defined by the access control rules of the objects containing this pwIdentifier. The secret is used
to verify the authentication attempt of the human user providing the authentication verification
data. The security attributes transportStatus, lifeCycleStatus and flagEnabled stored in the
password object define the status of the role associated with the password. E.g. if the
transportStatus is equal to Leer-PIN or Transport-PIN the user is enforced to define his or her
own password and making this password and this role effective (by changing the transportStatus
to regularPassword). The multi-reference password shares the secret with the password identified
by pwReference. It allows enforcing re-authentication for access and limitation of authentication
status to specific objects and makes password management easier by using the same secret for
different roles. The security attributes interfaceDependentAccessRules, startRetryCounter,
retryCounter, minimumLength and maximumLength are defined for the secret. The PUC defined
for the secret is intended for password management and the authorization gained by successful
authentication is limited to the command RESET RETRY COUNTER for reset of the retryCounter
and setting a new secret.
115 The following table provides an overview of the authentication reference data and security
attributes of human users and the security attributes of the authentication reference data as TSF
data.
User type
Human user
Authentication reference data and
security attributes
Password
Authentication reference data
secret
Security attributes of the user role
pwIdentifier
transportStatus
lifeCycleStatus
flagEnabled
startSsecList
Security attributes of the secret
interfaceDependentAccessRules
startRetryCounterf
retryCounter
minimumLength
maximumLength
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Comments
The following command is used by the
TOE to authenticate the human user
and to reset the security attribute
retryCounter by PIN: VERIFY.
The following command is used by the
TOE to manage the authentication
reference data secret and the security
attribute retryCounter with
authentication of the human user by
PIN: CHANGE REFERENCE DATA
(P1=’00’).
The following commands are used by
the TOE to manage the authentication
reference data secret without
authentication of the human user
CHANGE REFERENCE DATA (P1=’01’)
and RESET RETRY COUNTER (P1=’02’).
The following command is used by the
TOE to manage the security attribute
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User type
Authentication reference data and
security attributes
Comments
retryCounter of the authentication
reference data PIN without
authentication of the human user:
RESET RETRY COUNTER (P1=’03’).
The command GET PIN STATUS is used
to query the security attribute
retryCounter of the authentication
reference data PIN with password
object specific access control rules.
The following commands are used by
the TOE to manage the security
attribute flagEnabled of the
authentication reference data with
human user authentication by PIN:
ENABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT
(P1=’00’), DISABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT (P1=’00’).
The following commands are used by
the TOE to manage the security
attribute flagEnabled of the
authentication reference data without
human user authentication: ENABLE
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT
(P1=’01’), DISABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT (P1=’01’).
The commands ACTIVATE,
DEACTIVATE and TERMINATE are used
to manage the security attribute
lifeCycleStatus of the authentication
reference data password with password
object specific access control rules.
The command DELETE is used to delete
the authentication reference data
password with password object specific
access control rules.
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User type
Human user
Human user
Authentication reference data and
security attributes
Multi-Reference password
Authentication reference data
Secret is shared with the password
identified by pwReference.
Security attributes of the user role
pwIdentifier,
lifeCycleStatus,
transportStatus
flagEnabled
startSsecList.
Security attributes of the secret
The security attributes
interfaceDependentAccessRules,
minimumLength, maximumLength,
startRetryCounter and
retryCounter are shared with
password identified by
pwReference.
Personal unblock code (PUC)
Authentication reference data
PUK
Security attributes
pwIdentifier of the password 10,
pukUsage
Comments
The commands used by the TOE to
authenticate the human user and to
manage the authentication reference
Multi-Reference password data are the
same as for password.
The following command is used by the
TOE to manage the authentication
reference data secret and the security
attribute retryCounter of the
authentication reference data PIN with
authentication of the human user by
PUC: RESET RETRY COUNTER
(P1=’00’).
The following command is used by the
TOE to manage the security attribute
retryCounter of the authentication
reference data PIN with authentication
of the human user by PUC: RESET
RETRY COUNTER (P1=’01’).
Table 14: Authentication reference data of the human user and security attributes
116 The security attributes of devices depend on the authentication mechanism and the authentication
reference data. A device may be associated with a symmetric cryptographic authentication key
with a specific keyIdentifier and therefore the role gained by the subject acting for this device
after successful authentication. The role is defined by the access control rules of the objects
containing this keyIdentifier. A device may be also associated with a certificate containing the
public key as authentication reference data and the card holder authorization (CHA) in case of
RSA-based CVC or the card holder authorization template (CHAT) in case of ELC based CVC.
The authentication protocol comprise the verification of the certificate by means of the root public
key and command PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE and by means of the public key contained in the
successful verified certificate and the command EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE. The subject acting
10
The PUC is part of the password object as authentication reference data for the RESET RETRY COUNTER
command for this password.
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for this device get the role of the CHA or CHAT which is referenced in the access control rules of
the objects. The security attribute lifeCycleStatus is defined for persistently stored keys only.
User type
Device
Device
Device
Authentication reference data and
security attributes
Symmetric authentication key
Authentication reference data
macKey 11
Security attributes of the
Authentication reference data
keyIdentifier
interfaceDependentAccessRules
lifeCycleStatus
algorithmIdentifier
numberScenario
Asymmetric authentication key
Authentication reference data
Root Public Key
Certificate containing the public
key of the device 12
persistentCache,
applicationPublicKeyList 13
Security attributes of the user
Certificate Holder Reference
(CHR)
lifeCycleStatus,
interfaceDependentAccessRules,
Certificate Holder Authorization
(CHA) for RSA keys or Certificate
Holder Authorization Template
(CHAT) for elliptic curve keys
Security attributes in the certificate
Certificate Profile Identifier (CPI)
Certification Authority Reference
(CAR)
Object Identifier (OID)
Secure messaging channel key
Comments
The following commands are used by
the TOE to authenticate a device
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE , MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE and GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE.
The following commands are used by
the TOE to manage the authentication
reference data ACTIVATE, DEACTIVATE,
DELETE and TERMINATE.
The following command is used by the
TOE to authenticate a device EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE with algID equal to
rsaRoleCheck or elcRoleCheck
The following commands are used by
the TOE to manage the authentication
reference data PSO VERIFY
CERTIFICATE, ACTIVATE, DEACTIVATE,
DELETE and TERMINATE.
The TOE authenticates the sender of a
11
The symmetric authentication object contains encryption key encKey and a message authentication key
macKey.
12
The certificate of the device may be only end of a certificate chain going up to the root public key.
13
The command PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE may store the successful verified public key temporarily in the
volatileCache or persistenly in the applicationPublicKeyList or the persitentCache. Public keys in the
applicationPublicKeyList may be used like root public keys. The wrapper specification [27] and COS
specification [21] define the attribute persistentPublicKeyList as superset of all persistently stored public
key in the applicationPublicKeyList and the persitentCache.
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User type
Authentication reference data and
security attributes
Authentication reference data
MAC session key SK4SM
Security attributes of SK4SM
flagSessionEnabled equal SK4SM,
Kmac and SSCmac,
negotiationKeyInformation.
Comments
received command using secure
messaging.
Table 15: Authentication reference data of the devices and security attributes
117 The following table defines the authentication verification data used by the TSF itself for
authentication by external entities (cf. FIA_API.1).
Subject type
TSF
TSF
Authentication verification data and
security attributes
Private authentication key
Authentication verification data
privateKey
Security attributes
keyIdentifier
setAlgorithmIdentifier with
algorithmIdentifier
lifeCycleStatus
Secure messaging channel key
Authentication verification data
MAC session key SK4SM
Security attributes
flagSessionEnabled, macKey and
SSCmac, encKey and SSCenc,
flagCmdEnc and flagRspEnc
Operations
The following commands are used by
the TOE to authenticate themselves to an
external device: INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE, MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE
Responses using secure messaging. The
session keys are linked to the folder of
the keys used to them.
Table 16: Authentication verification data of the TSF and security attributes
118 The COS specification associates a subject with a logical channel and its channelContext
(cf. [21], chapter 12). The TOE may support one subject respective logical channel or more than
one independent subjects respective logical channels, cf. 9 Package Logical Channel. The
channelContext comprises security attributes of the subject summarized in the following table.
Security attribute
interface
14
Elements
Comments
The TOE detects whether the communication
uses contact based interface (value set to
kontaktbehaftet), or contactless interface (value
set to kontaktlos) 14. If the TOE does not support
contactless communication the TOE shall behave
as interfaceDependentAccess
Note the COS specification [21] describes this security attribute in the context of access control rules in
chapter 8.1.4 only. If the TOE does not support contactless communication the document in hand shall be
read assuming that this attribute is equal to “kontaktbehaftet”.
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Security attribute
Elements
currentFolder
seIdentifier
keyReferenceList
externalAuthenticate
internalAuthenticate
verifyCertificate
signatureCreation
dataDecipher
dataEncipher
macCalculation
SessionkeyContext
flagSessionEnabled
15
Comments
Rules is permanently set to “kontaktbehaftet”.
Identifier of the (unique) current folder
Security environment selected by means of
command MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 15.
If no security environment is explicitly selected
the default security environment #1 is assumed.
The list contains elements which may be empty
or may contain one pair (keyReference,
algorithmIdentifier).
keyReference and algorithmIdentifier of the key
selected by means of the command MANAGE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT to be used for device
authentication by means of commands
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE and MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE.
keyReference and algorithmIdentifier of the key
selected by means of the command MANAGE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT to be used for
authentication of the TSF itself by means of
commands INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE.
keyReference of the key selected by means of the
command MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT to
be used for PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE.
keyReference and algorithmIdentifier of the key
selected by means of the command MANAGE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT to be used for PSO
COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE.
keyReference and algorithmIdentifier of the key
selected by means of the command MANAGE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT to be used for PSO
DECIPHER or PSO TRANSCIPHER.
keyReference and algorithmIdentifier of the key
selected by means of the command MANAGE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT to be used for PSO
ENCIPHER.
keyReference and algorithmIdentifier of the key
selected by means of the command MANAGE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT to be used for PSO
COMPUTE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM and PSO
VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM if package
Crypto Box is supported.
This list contains security attributes associated
with secure messaging and trusted channels.
Value noSK indicates no session key established.
Note the COS specification [21] describes this security attribute in the informative chapter 8.8. The object
system specification of the eHCP uses this security attribute for access control rules of batch signature
creation.
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Security attribute
Comments
Value SK4SM indicates session keys established
for receiving commands and sending responses.
Value SK4TC indicates session keys established
for PSO ENCIPHER, PSO DECIPHER and PSO
COMPUTE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM, PSO
VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM if package
Crypto Box is supported.
encKey and SSCenc
Key for encryption and decryption and its
sequence counter.
macKey and SSCmac Key for MAC calculation and verification and its
sequence counter.
flagCmdEnc and
Flags indicating encryption of data in commands
flagRspEnc
respective responses.
negotiationKeyInform keyIdentifier of the key used to generate the
ation
session keys and if asymmetric key was used the
accessRigth associated with this key. The
keyIdentifier may reference to the authentication
reference data used for PACE 16 if PACE is
supported by the TOE.
accessRulesSession- Access control rules associated with trusted
keys
channel support.
globalPasswordList (pwReference,
List of 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 elements containing results
securityStatusEvaluati of successful human user authentication with
onCounter)
password in MF: pwReference and
securityStatusEvaluationCounter.
dfSpecificPasswordLi (pwReference,
List of 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 elements containing results
st
securityStatusEvaluati of successful human user authentication with
onCounter)
password for each DF: pwReference and
securityStatusEvaluationCounter.
globalSecurityList
CHA or keyIdentifier List of 0, 1, 2 or 3 elements containing results of
successful device authentication with
authentication reference data in MF: CHA as
reference to the role gained by authentication
based on certificate or keyIdentifier as reference
to the used symmetric authentication key or
keyIdentifier generated by successful
authentication with PACE protocol if PACE is
supported by the TOE.
dfSpecificSecurityList CHA or keyIdentifier List of 0, 1, 2 or 3 elements containing results of
successful device authentication with
authentication reference data for each DF: CHA
CHA as reference to the role gained by
authentication based on certificate or
keyIdentifier as reference to symmetric
authentication key or keyIdentifier generated by
16
Elements
The keyIdentifier generated by successful authentication with PACE protocol is named
“Kartenverbindungsobjekt” in the COS specification [21].
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Security attribute
Elements
bitSecurityList
Current file
securityStatusEvaluat startSsec
ionCounter
Comments
successful authentication with PACE protocol if
PACE is supported by the TOE.
List of CHAT gained by successful
authentication with CVC based on ECC. The
effective access rights are the intersection of
access rights defined in CVC of the CVC chain
up to the root.
Identifier of the (unique) current file from
currentFolder.children.
Must contain all values of startSsec and may be
empty.
Table 17: Security attributes of a subject
119 The following tables provide an overview of the objects, operations and security attributes
defined in the current PP (including the packages). All references in the table refer to the
technical specification of the card operating system [21]. The security attribute lifeCycleStatus is
defined for persistently stored keys only.
Object type
Object system
Folder (8.3.1)
Dedicated File (8.3.1.2)
Application (8.3.1.1)
Application Dedicated File
(8.3.1.3)
Elementary File (8.3.2)
Security attributes
applicationPublicKeyList,
persistentCache,
pointInTime
accessRules:
lifeCycleStatus
shareable 17
interfaceDependentAccessRules
children
Additionally to Folder:
fileIdentifier
Additionally to Folder:
applicationIdentifier
Additionally to Folder:
fileIdentifier
applicationIdentifier
children
fileIdentifier
list of shortFileIdentifier
lifeCycleStatus
shareable 19
accessRules:
17
Available with package logical channel
18
Only available with package logical channel
19
Available with package logical channel
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Operations
PSO VERIFY
CERTIFICATE
SELECT
ACTIVATE
DEACTIVATE
DELETE
FINGERPRINT
GET RANDOM 18
LOAD APPLICATION
TERMINATE DF
Identical to Folder
Identical to Folder
Identical to Folder
SELECT
ACTIVATE
DEACTIVATE
DELETE
TERMINATE
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Object type
Transparent EF
(8.3.2.1)
Structured EF (8.3.2.2)
Regular Password (8.4)
(PIN)
Multi-reference Password
(8.5) (MR-PIN)
Security attributes
interfaceDependentAccessRules
flagTransactionMode
flagChecksum
Additionally to Elementary File:
numberOfOctet
positionLogicalEndOfFile
body
Additionally to Elementary File:
recordList
maximumNumberOfRecords
maximumRecordLength
flagRecordLifeCycleStatus
lifeCycleStatus
pwdIdentifier
accessRules:
interfaceDependentAccessRules
secret: PIN
minimumLength
maximumLength
startRetryCounter
retryCounter
transportStatus
flagEnabled
startSsecList
PUC
pukUsage
channel specific:
securityStatusEvaluationCounter
lifeCycleStatus
pwdIdentifier
accessRules:
interfaceDependentAccessRules
startSsecList
flagEnabled
passwordReference
Attributes used together with referred
password (PIN):
secret: PIN
minimumLength
maximumLength
startRetryCounter
retryCounter
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Operations
Additionally to
Elementary File:
ERASE BINARY
READ BINARY
UPDATE BINARY
WRITE BINARY
Additionally to
Elementary File:
ACTIVATE RECORD
APPEND RECORD
DELETE RECORD
DEACTIVATE RECORD
ERASE RECORD
READ RECORD
SEARCH RECORD
SET LOGICAL EOF
UPDATE RECORD
ACTIVATE
DEACTIVATE
DELETE
TERMINATE
CHANGE REFERENCE
DATA
DISABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT
ENABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT
GET PIN STATUS
RESET RETRY COUNTER
VERIFY
Identical to Regular
Password
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Object type
PUC
Symmetric Key (8.6.1)
Security attributes
transportStatus
PUC
pukUsage
channel specific:
securityStatusEvaluationCounter
type pin
pukUsage
lifeCycleStatus
keyIdentifier
accessRules:
interfaceDependentAccessRules
encKey
macKey
numberScenario
algorithmIdentifier
accessRulesSessionkeys:
interfaceDependentAccessRules
Private Asymmetric Key
(8.6.4)
lifeCycleStatus
keyIdentifier
accessRules:
interfaceDependentAccessRules
privateKey
listAlgorithmIdentifier
accessRulesSessionkeys:
interfaceDependentAccessRules
algorithmIdentifier
keyAvailable
Public Asymmetric Key
(8.6.4)
lifeCycleStatus
keyIdentifier
oid
accessRules:
interfaceDependentAccessRules
Additionally to Public Asymmetric
Key:
publicRsaKey: oid or publicElcKey:
oid
CHAT
expirationDate: date
publicRsaKey: oid or publicElcKey:
Public Asymmetric Key
for signature
verification (8.6.4.2)
Public Asymmetric Key
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Operations
RESET RETRY COUNTER
ACTIVATE
DEACTIVATE
DELETE
TERMINATE
EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE
INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE
ACTIVATE
DEACTIVATE
DELETE
TERMINATE
GENERATE
ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR
or key import
EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE
INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL
SIGNATURE
PSO DECIPHER
PSO TRANSCIPHER
ACTIVATE
DEACTIVATE
DELETE
TERMINATE
Additionally to Public
Asymmetric Key:
PSO VERIFY
CERTIFICATE,
PSO VERIFY DIGITAL
SIGNATURE
Additionally to Public
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Object type
for Authentication
(8.6.4.3)
Public Asymmetric Key
for Encryption (8.6.4.4)
Card verifiable certificate
(CVC) (7.1.1)
Security attributes
oid
CHA
CHAT
expirationDate: date
Additionally to Public Asymmetric
Key:
publicRsaKey: oid
publicElcKey: oid
Certificate Profile Identifier (CPI)
Certification Authority Reference
(CAR)
Certificate Holder Reference (CHR)
Certificate Holder Autorisation (CHA)
Object Identifier (OID)
signature
Operations
Asymmetric Key:
EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE
INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE
Additionally to Public
Asymmetric Key:
PSO ENCIPHER
Table 18: Subjects, objects, operations and security attributes. The references refer to [21].
120 The TOE must support Access control lists for
• lifeCycleStatus values “Operation state(activated)”, “Operation state(deactivated)” and
“Termination state”,
• security environments with value seIdentifier selected for the folder
• interfaceDependentAccessRules for contact based communication
and may support Access control lists for
• interfaceDependentAccessRules for contactless communication (cf. chapter 8 Package
Contactless).
121 If the user communicates with the TOE through the contact based interface the security attribute
“interface” of the subject is set to the value “kontaktbehaftet” and the
interfaceDependentAccessRules for contact based communication shall apply. If the user
communicates with the TOE through the contactless interface the security attribute “interface” of
the subject is set to the value “kontaktlos” and the interfaceDependentAccessRules for contactless
communication shall apply. If the TOE does not support the contactless communication it
behaves in respect to access control like a TOE defining all interfaceDependentAccessRules
“kontaktlos” set to NEVER in the object system.
122 The user may set the seIdentifier value of the security environments for the folder by means of the
command MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. This may be seen as selection of a specific set of
access control rules for the folder and the objects in this folder. 20
123 The TOE access control rule contains
•
20
command defined by CLA, 0 or 1 parameter P1, and 0 or 1 parameter P2,
This approach is used e.g. for signature creation with eHPC: the signatory selects security environment #1 for
single signature, and security environment #2 for batch signature creation requirering additional
authentication of the signature creation application.
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Card Operating System (PP COS)
•
values of the lifeCycleStatus and interfaceDependentAccessRules indicating the set of access
control rules to be applied,
•
access control condition defined as Boolean expression with Boolean operators AND and
OR of Boolean elements of the following types ALWAYS, NEVER, PWD(pwIdentifier),
AUT(keyReference), AUT(CHA), AUT(CHAT) and secure messaging conditions (cf. [21],
chapter 10.2 for details).
Note AUT(CHAT) is true if the access right bit necessary for the object and the command is 1 in
the effective access rights calculated as bitwise-AND of all CHAT in the CVC chain verified
successfully by PSO VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE command executions.
124 The Boolean element ALWAYS provides the Boolean value TRUE. The Boolean element
NEVER provides the Boolean value FALSE. The other Boolean elements provide the Boolean
value TRUE if the value in the access control list match its corresponding security attribute of the
subject and provides the Boolean value FALSE is they do not match.
125 The following table gives an overview of the commands the COS has to implement and the
related SFR. Please note that commands or special variants of commands may be required only if
a specific package is supported by the TOE. The SFR defined in the main part of the PP are
mandatory and printed in normal style. SFR are printed in italic if they are specific for a package.
Some commands may be or may be not implemented by the COS as defined in [21] and therefore
are not addressed by SFR in this PP.
Operation
ACTIVATE
ACTIVATE RECORD
APPEND RECORD
CHANGE REFERENCE DATA
CREATE
DEACTIVATE
DEACTIVATE RECORD
DELETE
DELETE RECORD
DISABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT
ENABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT
ENVELOPE
SFR
Chapter
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Life
14.2.1
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/SEF
14.4.1
FDP_ACC.1/SEF, FDP_ACF.1/SEF
14.4.2
FIA_UAU.5, FIA_USB.1, FMT_SMF.1,
FMT_MTD.1/PIN, FMT_MSA.1/PIN,
14.6.1
FIA_AFL.1/PIN
This command is optional and therefore not
14.2.2
addressed in the SFRs of this PP.
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/PIN
14.2.3
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/SEF
14.4.3
FIA_USB.1, FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF, FDP_ACF.1/
MF_DF, FDP_ACC.1/EF, FDP_ACF.1/EF,
FDP_ACC.1/KEY, FDP_ACF.1/KEY,
14.2.4
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Life,
FCS_CKM.4,
FIA_USB.1/LC
FDP_ACC.1/SEF, FDP_ACF.1/SEF,
14.4.4
FMT_MSA.1/SEF
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/PIN, FIA_AFL.1/PIN,
14.6.2
FIA_USB.1
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/PIN, FIA_AFL.1/PIN,
14.6.3
FIA_USB.1
This command is optional and therefore not
14.9.1
addressed in the SFRs of this PP.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Operation
ERASE BINARY
ERASE RECORD
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
SFR
FDP_ACC.1/TEF, FDP_ACF.1/TEF
FDP_ACC.1/SEF, FDP_ACF.1/SEF,
FMT_MSA.1/SEF
EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_USB.1,
FCS_RNG.1, FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM,
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.V,
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.V,
FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES, FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC,
FCS_COP.1/CB.AES, FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC
FINGERPRINT
FPT_ITE.1, FDP_ACF.1/MF_DF
GENERAL AUTHENTICATE
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6,
FIA_API.1, FIA_USB.1, FCS_RNG.1,
FCS_COP.1/COS.AES, FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FIA_USB.1/PACE
GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR FDP_ACC.1/KEY, FDP_ACF.1/KEY,
FMT_MSA.3, FMT_SMF.1, FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FCS_CKM.1/ELC
GET CHALLENGE
FCS_RNG.1
GET DATA
This command is optional and therefore not
addressed in the SFRs of this PP.
GET PIN STATUS
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/PIN
21
FCS_RNG.1/GR
GET RANDOM
GET RESPONSE
This command is optional and therefore not
addressed in the SFRs of this PP.
GET SECURITY STATUS KEY
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Auth
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE
FIA_API.1, FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM,
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S,
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.S,
FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES, FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC,
FCS_COP.1/CB.AES, FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC
LOAD APPLICATION
FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF, FDP_ACF.1/MF_DF,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Life
LIST PUBLIC KEY
FPT_ITE.2, FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF,
FDP_ACF.1/MF_DF
MANAGE CHANNEL
FIA_UID.1, FIA_UAU.1, FIA_USB.1/LC,
FMT_MSA.3
MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT FIA_USB.1, FDP_ACC.1/KEY,
FDP_ACF.1/KEY, FMT_MSA.3
MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE
FIA_UAU.4, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_UAU.6,
FIA_API.1, FIA_USB.1, FCS_RNG.1,
FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM,
FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES, FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC,
FCS_COP.1/CB.AES, FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC
21
Chapter
14.3.1
14.4.5
14.7.1
14.9.2
14.7.2
14.9.3
14.9.4
14.5.1
14.6.4
10.4
14.9.6
14.7.3
14.7.4
14.2.5
14.9.7
14.9.8
14.9.9
14.7.1
If package Logical Channel is supported
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
Operation
PSO COMPUTE CRYPTOGRAPHIC
CHECKSUM 22
SFR
Chapter
FDP_ACC.1/KEY, FDP_ACF.1/KEY,
14.8.1
FIA_API.1/CB, FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC,
FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FIA_USB.1/PACE
PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL
FDP_ACC.1/KEY, FDP_ACF.1/KEY,
14.8.2.1
SIGNATURE, WITHOUT
FMT_MSA.3, FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S,
"RECOVERY"
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.S
PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL
FDP_ACC.1/KEY, FDP_ACF.1/KEY,
14.8.2.2
SIGNATURE, WITH "RECOVERY"
FMT_MSA.3, FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.S
PSO DECIPHER
FIA_USB.1,FDP_ACC.1/KEY, FDP_ACF.1/KEY, 14.8.3
FMT_MSA.3, FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA,
FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC,
FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES, FCS_COP.1/CB.AES,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE, FIA_UAU.6/PACE,
FIA_USB.1/PACE
PSO ENCIPHER
FIA_API.1, FDP_ACC.1/KEY, FDP_ACF.1/KEY, 14.8.4
FMT_MSA.3, FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA,
FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC,
FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES, FCS_COP.1/CB.AES,
FCS_COP.1/CB.RSA, FCS_COP.1/CB.ELC
PSO HASH, [ISO/IEC 7816–8]
This command is optional and therefore not
addressed in the SFRs of this PP.
PSO TRANSCIPHER USING RSA
FDP_ACC.1/KEY, FDP_ACF.1/KEY,
14.8.6.1
FMT_MSA.3, FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA,
FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC
PSO TRANSCIPHER USING ELC
FDP_ACC.1/KEY, FDP_ACF.1/KEY,
14.8.6.3
FMT_MSA.3, FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA,
FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC
PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MTD.1/Auth,
14.8.7
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.V,
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.V, FDP_ACC.1/KEY,
FDP_ACF.1/KEY
PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC
FDP_ACC.1/KEY, FDP_ACF.1/KEY,
14.8.8
23
FIA_USB.1/CB, FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC
CHECKSUM
FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC
PSO VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE FDP_ACC.1/KEY, FDP_ACF.1/KEY,
14.8.9
FMT_MSA.3, FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.V
PUT DATA
This command is optional and therefore not
14.5.2
addressed in the SFRs of this PP.
READ BINARY
FDP_ACC.1/TEF, FDP_ACF.1/TEF
14.3.2
READ RECORD
FDP_ACC.1/SEF, FDP_ACF.1/SEF
14.4.6
RESET RETRY COUNTER
FIA_AFL.1/PUC, FIA_UAU.5, FMT_SMF.1,
14.6.5
22
if package Crypto Box is supported
23
if package Crypto Box is supported
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Card Operating System (PP COS)
Operation
SEARCH BINARY
SEARCH RECORD
SELECT
SET LOGICAL EOF
TERMINATE
TERMINATE CARD USAGE
TERMINATE DF
UPDATE BINARY
UPDATE RECORD
VERIFY
WRITE BINARY
WRITE RECORD
SFR
FMT_MTD.1/PIN, FMT_MSA.1/PIN
This command is optional and therefore not
addressed in the SFRs of this PP.
FDP_ACC.1/SEF, FDP_ACF.1/SEF
FIA_USB.1, FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF, FDP_ACF.1/
MF_DF, FDP_ACC.1/EF, FDP_ACF.1/EF
FDP_ACC.1/TEF, FDP_ACF.1/TEF,
FDP_ACF.1/TEF
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Life
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Life
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/Life
FDP_ACC.1/TEF, FDP_ACF.1/TEF
FDP_ACC.1/SEF, FDP_ACF.1/SEF
FIA_AFL.1/PIN, FIA_UAU.5, FIA_USB.1,
FMT_SMF.1, FMT_MSA.1/PIN
FDP_ACC.1/TEF, FDP_ACF.1/TEF
This command is optional and therefore not
addressed in the SFRs of this PP.
Chapter
14.3.3
14.4.7
14.2.6
14.3.4
14.2.9
14.2.7
14.2.8
14.3.5
14.4.8
14.6.6
14.3.6
14.4.9
Table 19: Mapping between commands described in COS specification [21] and the SFR
126 Application note 4: An implementation has to support the data types and the limits for the data
types given in [21] exactly. If an implementation of COS supports additional values /types or
extends limits it must be guaranteed that no security objective can be undermined. A justification
for each additional difference and why it does not undermine a security objective has to be given
from the developer.
127 Application note 5: If an implementation of COS accepts objects that do not follow defined rules
it must be guaranteed that no security objective can be undermined. A justification for each
accepted object and why it does not undermine a security objective has to be given from the
developer.
128 Application note 6: If an implementation of COS implements additional functionality not
described in [21] it must be guaranteed that the additional functionality can not undermined any
security objective. A justification for added additional functionality and why it does not
undermine any security objective has to be given from the developer (cf. SAR ADV_ARC.1). If
the additional functionality implements further TSF with cryptographic mechanisms the SFR
component FCS_COP has to be iterated corresponding to the new introduced cryptographic
functionality.
6.1.3
Security Functional Requirements for the TOE taken over from BSI-CC-PP0035-2007
129 All SFRs from section 6.1 ”Security Functional Requirements for the TOE” of the BSI-CC-PP0035-2007 are part of this PP. On all SFR of the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 an iteration operation is
performed. For the iteration operation the suffix “/SICP” is added to the SFR name from BSI-CCPP-0035-2007.
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130 The complete list of the SFRs taken over from BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 follows. For further
descriptions, details, and interpretations refer section 6.1 in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11].
-
FRU_FLT.2/SICP: Limited fault tolerance.
FPT_FLS.1/SICP: Failure with preservation of secure state.
FMT_LIM.1/SICP: Limited capabilities.
FMT_LIM.2/SICP: Limited capabilities
FAU_SAS.1/SICP: Audit storage
FPT_PHP.3/SICP: Resistance to physical attack.
FDP_ITT.1/SICP: Basic internal transfer protection.
FPT_ITT.1/SICP: Basic internal TSF data transfer protection.
FDP_IFC.1/SICP: Subset information flow control.
FCS_RNG.1/SICP: Random number generation
131 Table 20 maps the SFR name in this PP to the SFR name in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11]. This
approach allows an easy and unambiguous identification which SFR was taken over from the
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 into this Protection Profile and which SFR is defined newly in this PP.
SFR name
FRU_FLT.2/SICP
FPT_FLS.1/SICP
FMT_LIM.1/SICP
FMT_LIM.2/SICP
FAU_SAS.1/SICP
FPT_PHP.3/SICP
FDP_ITT.1/SICP
FPT_ITT.1/SICP
FDP_IFC.1/SICP
FCS_RNG.1/SICP
SFR name in [11]
FRU_FLT.2
FPT_FLS.1
FMT_LIM.1
FMT_LIM.2
FAU_SAS.1
FPT_PHP.3
FDP_ITT.1
FPT_ITT.1
FDP_IFC.1
FCS_RNG.1
Reference to paragraph in [11]
140
141
150
151
152
156
159
160
161
164
Table 20: Mapping between SFR names in this PP and the SFR names in the BSI-CC-PP-00352007 [11]
132 In some cases security functional components have been added or refined. Please refer section for
details. The refinements of the security functional are only being applied for the SFR for the TOE
taken over from BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] (see Table 20).
6.1.4
General Protection of User data and TSF data
133 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset residual information protection (FDP_RIP.1)” as
specified below.
FDP_RIP.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_RIP.1.1
Subset residual information protection
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource
is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to,
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Card Operating System (PP COS)
deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: password
objects, secret cryptographic keys, private cryptographic keys, session
keys, [assignment: other data objects] 24.
134 Application note 7: The writer of the Security Target may want to use iterations of FDP_RIP.1 in
order to distinguish between data, which must be deleted already upon deallocation and those
which can be deleted upon allocation. It is recommended to delete secret/private cryptographic
keys and all passwords upon deallocation. For secret user data deletion upon allocation should be
sufficient (depending on the resistance of the concrete TOE against physical attacks). Note that
the COS specification allows management of applications during operational use. Therefore it is
theoretically possible that a newly created object uses memory areas, which belonged to another
object before. Therefore the COS must ensure that contents of the deleted objects are not
accessible by reading the new object. The open assign operation may be “none”.
135
The TOE shall meet the requirement “Stored data integrity monitoring and action (FDP_SDI.2)”
as specified below.
FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1 Stored data integrity monitoring
Dependencies: No dependencies.
FDP_SDI.2.1
The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the
TSF for [assignment: integrity errors] on all objects, based on the
following attributes:
(1) key objects,
(2) PIN objects,
(3) affectedObject.flagTransactionMode=TRUE,
(4) [assignment: other user data attributes] 25.
FDP_SDI.2.2
Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [assignment:
action to be taken].
136 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Failure with preservation of secure state (FPT_FLS.1)” as
specified below.
FPT_FLS.1
Failure with preservation of secure state
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_FLS.1.1
The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of
failures occur:
(1) exposure to operating conditions where therefore a malfunction
could occur,
(2) failure detected by TSF according to FPT_TST.1 26.
24
[assignment: list of objects].
25
[assignment: user data attributes]
26
[assignment: list of types of failures in the TSF]
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137 The TOE shall meet the requirement “FPT_EMS.1 (FPT_EMS.1)” as specified below (CC part 2
extended).
FPT_EMS.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_EMS.1.1
Emanation of TSF and User data
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to the following TSF data
(1) Regular password,
(2) Multi-Reference password,
(3) PUC,
(4) Session keys,
(5) Symmetric authentication keys,
(6) Private authentication keys,
(7) [assignment: list of additional types of TSF data] 27
and the following user data
(8) Private asymmetric keys,
(9) Symmetric keys,
(10) [assignment: list of additional types of user data] 28.
FPT_EMS.1.2
The TSF shall ensure any user 29 are unable to use the following interface
circuit interfaces30 to gain access to the following TSF data
(1)
Regular password,
(2)
Multi-Reference password,
(3)
PUC,
(4)
Session keys,
(5)
Symmetric authentication keys,
(6)
Private authentication keys,
(7)
[assignment: list of additional types of TSF data] 31
and the following user data
(8)
Private asymmetric keys,
(9)
Symmetric keys,
(10) [assignment: list of additional types of user data] 32.
138 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency (FPT_TDC.1)” as
specified below.
27
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
28
[assignment: list of types of user data]
29
[assignment: type of users]
30
[assignment: type of connection]
31
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
32
[assignment: list of types of user data]
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FPT_TDC.1
Inter-TSF basic TSF data consistency
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_TDC.1.1
The TSF shall provide the capability to consistently interpret Card
Verifiable Certificate (CVC) 33 when shared between the TSF and
another trusted IT product.
FPT_TDC.1.2
The TSF shall use [21], chapter 7 “CV-Certificate” and [21], appendix H
“CV-Certificate for ELC-keys” 34 when interpreting the TSF data from
another trusted IT product.
139 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Export of TOE implementation fingerprint (FPT_ITE.1)”
as specified below.
FPT_ITE.1
Export of TOE implementation fingerprint
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_ITE.1.1
The TOE shall export fingerprint of TOE implementation given the
following conditions execution of the command FINGERPRINT [21] 35.
FPT_ITE.1.2
The TSF shall use [selection: SHA-256 based fingerprint of the TOE
implementation, SHA-384 based fingerprint of the TOE implementation,
SHA-512 based fingerprint of the TOE implementation, CMAC based
fingerprint of the TOE implementation using [selection: AES128, AES192, AES-256] with cryptographic key size [selection: 128, 192, 256] bit
that meet the following standard FIPS180-4 [37],NIST SP800-38B [36] 36
for the exported data.
140 Application note 8: The command FINGERPRINT calculates a hash value or CMAC based
fingerprint over the complete executable code actually implemented by the TOE. The TOE
implementation includes IC Dedicated Support Software, the Card Operating System and
application specific code loaded on the smartcard by command LOAD CODE or any other means.
The hash function respective the CMAC based calculation uses the prefix send in the
command FINGERPRINT for “fresh” fingerprints over all executable code, i.e. no precomputed
values over fixed parts of the code only.
141 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Export of TSF data (FPT_ITE.2)” as specified below.
FPT_ITE.2
Export of TSF data
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
33
[assignment: list of TSF data types]
34
[assignment: list of interpretation rules to be applied by the TSF]
35
[assignment: conditions for export]
36
[assignment: list of generation rules to be applied by TSF]
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FPT_ITE.2.1
The TOE shall export
(1) all public authentication reference data,
(2) all security attributes of the object system and for all objects of
the object system for all commands,
(3) [assignment: list of all TOE specific security attributes not
described in COS specification [21]] 37
given the following conditions
(1) no export of secret data,
(2) no export of private keys,
(3) no export of secure messaging keys,
(4) no export of passwords and PUC 38.
FPT_ITE.2.2
The TSF shall use [assignment: list of encoding rules to be applied by
TSF] for the exported data.
142 Application note 9: The public TSF data addressed as TSF data in bullet (1) in the element
FPT_ITE.2.1 covers at least all root public key and other public keys used as authentication
reference data persistent stored in the object system (cf. applicationPublicKeyList and
persistentCache ) and exported by command LIST PUBLIC KEY (cf. [21], persistentPublicKeyList
in [21] and [27], applicationPublicKeyList and persistentCache in [21]). The bullet (2) in the
element FPT_ITE.2.1 covers all security attributes of the object system (cf. [21], (N019.900),
[27], objectLocator ‘E0’) and of all objects of object types listed in Table 18 and all TOE specific
security attributes and parameters (except secrets). The COS specification [21] identifies
optional functionality the TOE may support. The TOE (as COS, wrapper and guidance
documentation) must support the user to find all objects and to export all security attributes of
these objects. Note while MF, DF and EF are hierarchically structured the Application and
Application Dedicated File are directly referenced which may require special methods to find all
objects in the object system. Note the listOfApplication as security attribute of the object system
contains at least one applicationIdentifier of each Application or Application Dedicated File (cf.
[27]). The exported data shall be encoded by wrapper to allow interpretation of the TSF data. The
encoding rules shall meet the requirements of the Technical Guidance TR-03143 describing the
verification tool used for examination of the object system against the specification of the object
system.
143 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TSF testing (FPT_TST.1)” as specified below.
37
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
38
[assignment: conditions for export]
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6.1.5
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FPT_TST.1
TSF testing
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
FPT_TST.1.1
The TSF shall run a suite of self tests during initial start-up 39 to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF40.
FPT_TST.1.2
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF data 41.
FPT_TST.1.3
The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the
integrity of TSF 42.
Authentication
144 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Verification of secrets (FIA_SOS.1)” as specified below.
FIA_SOS.1
Verification of secrets
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a mechanism to verify that secrets provided by
FIA_SOS.1.1
the user for password objects meet the quality metric: length not lower
than minimumLength and not greater than maximumLength 43.
145 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1/PIN)” as
specified below.
FIA_AFL.1/PIN
Authentication failure handling
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication.
FIA_AFL.1.1/PIN
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer
within 1 to 15 44 unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to
consecutive failed human user authentication for the PIN via VERIFY,
ENABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT, DISABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT or CHANGE REFERENCE DATA command 45.
39
[selection: during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user,
at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]]
40
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], the TSF]
41
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF data], TSF data]
42
[selection: [assignment: parts of TSF], TSF]
43
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
44
[assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment:
range of acceptable values]]
45
[assignment: list of authentication events]
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FIA_AFL.1.2/PIN
When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has
been met 46, the TSF shall block the password for authentication until
successful unblock using command RESET RETRY COUNTER
(1) P1=’00’ or P1=’01’ with presenting unblocking code PUC of this
password object,
(2) P1=’02’ or P1=’03’ without presenting unblocking code PUC of
this password object 47.
146 Application note 10: The component FIA_AFL.1/PIN addresses the human user authentication by
means of a password. The configurable positive integer of unsuccessful authentication attempts is
defined in the password objects of the object system.”Consecutive failed authentication attemps”
are counted separately for each PIN and interrupted by successful authentication attempt for this
PIN, i.e. the PIN object has a retryCounter wich is initially set to startRetryCounter, decremented
by each failed authentication attempt and reset to startRetryCounter by successful authentication
with the PIN or be successful execution of the command RESET RETRY COUNTER. The command
RESET RETRY COUNTER (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,02) and (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,03) unblock the
PIN without presenting unblocking code PUC of this password object. In order to prevent bypass
of the human user authentication defined by the PIN or PUC the object system shall define access
control to this command as required by the security needs of the specific application context, cf.
OE.Resp-ObjS.
147 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication failure handling (FIA_AFL.1/PUC)” as
specified below.
FIA_AFL.1/PUC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_AFL.1.1/PUC
Authentication failure handling
No other components.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication.
The TSF shall detect when an administrator configurable positive integer
within 1 to 15 48 unsuccessful 49 authentication attempts occur related to
usage of a password unblocking code using the RESET RETRY COUNTER
command 50.
FIA_AFL.1.2/PUC
When the defined number of unsuccessful 51 authentication attempts has
been met 52, the TSF shall [assignment: list of actions, which at least
includes: block the password unblocking code] 53.
46
[selection: met, surpassed]
47
[assignment: list of actions]
48
[assignment: positive integer number], an administrator configurable positive integer within [assignment:
range of acceptable values]]
49 Refinement: not only unsuccessful but all attempts shall be counted here – obviously this refinement is valid,
because the original requirement is still fulfilled.
50
[assignment: list of authentication events]
51
Refinement: not only unsuccessful but all attempts shall be counted here – obviously this refinement is valid,
because the original requirement is still fulfilled.
52
[selection: met, surpassed]
53
[assignment: list of actions]
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148 Application note 11: The component FIA_AFL.1/PUC addresses the human user authentication
by means of a PUC. The configurable positive integer of usage of password unblocking code is
defined in the password objects of the object system.
149 Application note 12: The command RESET RETRY COUNTER can be used to change a password or
reset a retry counter. In certain cases, for example for digital signature applications, the usage of
the command RESET RETRY COUNTER must be restricted to the ability to reset a retry counter
only.
150 The TOE shall meet the requirement “User attribute definition (FIA_ATD.1)” as specified below.
FIA_ATD.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_ATD.1.1
User attribute definition
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes
belonging to individual users:
(1) for Human User: authentication state gained
a. with password: pwdIdentifier in globalPasswordList and
pwdIdentifier in dfSpecificPasswordList,
b. with Multi-Reference password: pwIdentifier in
globalPasswordList
and
pwIdentifier
in
dfSpecificPasswordList,
(2) for Device: authentication state gained
a. by CVC with CHA in globalSecurityList if CVC is stored
in MF and dfSpecificSecurityList if CVC is stored in a DF,
b. by CVC with CHAT in bitSecurityList,
c. with symmetric authentication key: keyIdentity of the key,
d. with secure messaging keys: keyIdentity of the key used for
establishing the session key 54.
151 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication (FIA_UAU.1)” as specified
below.
FIA_UAU.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.1.1
Timing of authentication
No other components.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
The TSF shall allow
(1) reading the ATR,
(2) [selection: GET CHALLENGE, MANAGE CHANNEL, MANAGE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, SELECT],
(3) commands with access control rule ALWAYS for the current
life cycle status and depending on the interface,
(4) [assignment: list of additional TSF mediated actions] 55
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
FIA_UAU.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
54
[assignment: list of security attributes]
55
[assignment: list of TSF mediated actions]
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allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
152 Application note 13: ATR means Cold ATR and Warm ATR (cf. COS specification [21],
(N019.900)b). The TOE may or may not define TOE specific access control rules for the
commands GET CHALLENGE, MANAGE CHANNEL, MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT and
SELECT, cf. COS specification [21], (N022.810). If the TOE does not define access control
limitation for a command than the TOE shall allow the access for anybody (ALWAYS) and the
ST author shall list the command in the element FIA_UAU.1.1.
153 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Single-use authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.4)” as
specified below.
FIA_UAU.4
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.4.1
Single-use authentication mechanisms
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall prevent reuse of authentication data related to
(1) external device authentication by means of executing the
command EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE with symmetric or
asymmetric key,
(2) external device authentication by means of executing the
command MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE with symmetric or
asymmetric key,
(3) external device authentication by means of executing the
command GENERAL AUTHENTICATE with symmetric or
asymmetric key.
(4) [assignment: additional identified authentication
mechanism(s)] 56.
154 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms (FIA_UAU.5)” as
specified below.
FIA_UAU.5
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.5.1
Multiple authentication mechanisms
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide
(1) the execution of the VERIFY command,
(2) the execution of the CHANGE REFERENCE DATA command,
(3) the execution of the RESET RETRY COUNTER command,
(4) the execution of the EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command,
(5) the execution of the MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE command,
(6) the execution of the GENERAL AUTHENTICATE command,
(7) a secure messaging channel,
(8) a trusted channel 57
to support user authentication.
56
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
57
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
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Card Operating System (PP COS)
FIA_UAU.5.2
The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
following rules:
(1) password based authentication shall be used for authenticating
a human user by means of commands VERIFY, CHANGE
REFERENCE DATA and RESET RETRY COUNTER,
(2) key based authentication mechanisms shall be used for
authenticating of devices by means of commands EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE, MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE and GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE,
(3) [assignment: additional rules describing how the multiple
authentication mechanisms provide authentication] 58.
155 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6)” as specified below:.
FIA_UAU.6
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.6.1
Re-authenticating
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user sender of a message 59 under the
conditions
(1) each command sent to the TOE after establishing the secure
messaging by successful authentication after execution of the
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE and EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE, or
MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE or GENERAL AUTHENTICATE
commands shall be verified as being sent by the authenticated
device 60.
156 Application note 14: The entities establishing a secure messaging channel respective a trusted
channel authenticate each other and agree symmetric session keys. The sender of a command
authenticates its message by MAC calculation for the command (cf. PSO COMPUTE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM using SK4TC, cf. Package Crypto Box) and the receiver of the
commands verifies the authentication by MAC verification of commands (using SK4SM). The
receiver of the commands authenticates its message by MAC calculation (using SK4SM) and the
sender of a command verifies the authentication by MAC verification of responses (cf. PSO
VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM using SK4TC). If secure messaging is used with encryption
the re-authentication includes the encrypted padding in the plaintext as authentication attempt of
the message sender (cf. PSO ENCIPHER for commands) and the reciever (cf. secure messaging for
responses) and verification of the correct padding as authentication verification by the message
receiver (cf. secure messaging for received commands and PSO DECIPHER for received
responses). The specification [21] states in section 13.1.2 item (N031.600): This re-authentication
is controlled by the external entity (e.g. the connector in the eHealth environment). If no Secure
Messaging is indicated in the CLA byte (see [ISO7816-4] Clause 5.1.1) and
SessionkeyContext.flagSessionEnabled has the value SK4SM, then the security status of the key
that was involved in the negotiation of the session keys MUST be deleted by means of
clearSessionKeys(...).” Furthermore item (N031.700) states that the security status of the key that
was involved in the negotiation of the session keys MUST be deleted by means of
clearSessionKeys(...) if the check of the command CMAC (cf. FCS_COP.1/COS.CMAC) or
Retail-MAC (cf. FCS_COP.1/COS.RMAC) fails. The TOE does not execute any command with
58
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
59
Refinement identifying the concrete user
60
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
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incorrect message authentication code. The TOE checks each command by secure messaging in
encrypt-then-authenticate mode based on a MAC, whether it was sent by the successfully
authenticated communication partner. The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect
MAC. Therefore, the TOE re-authenticates the communication partner connected, if a secure
messaging error occurred, and accepts only those commands received from the initially
communication partner.
157 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification (FIA_UID.1)” as specified below.
FIA_UID.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1.1
Timing of identification
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall allow
(1) reading the ATR,
(2) [selection: GET CHALLENGE, MANAGE CHANNEL, MANAGE
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT, SELECT],
(3) commands with access control rule ALWAYS for the current
life cycle status and depending on the interface,
(4) [assignment: list of TSF mediated actions] 61
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
FIA_UID.1.2
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
158 Application note 15: The TOE may or may not define TOE specific access control rules for the
commands GET CHALLENGE, MANAGE CHANNEL, MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT and
SELECT, cf. COS specification [21], (N022.810). If the TOE does not define access control
limitation for these commands then the TOE shall allow the access for anybody (ALWAYS) and
the ST author shall list the command in the element FIA_UID.1.1.
159 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1)” as specified
below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended (see section 5.1)).
FIA_API.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_API.1.1
Authentication Proof of Identity
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a
(1) INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE,
(2) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE,
(3) GENERAL AUTHENTICATE 62
to prove the identity of the TSF itself 63 to an external entity.
160 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles (FMT_SMR.1)” as specified below:
FMT_SMR.1
Security roles
61
[assignment: list of TSF mediated actions]
62
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
63
[assignment: object, authorized user or rule].
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Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_SMR.1.1
FMT_SMR.1.2
No other components.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
The TSF shall maintain the roles
(1) World as unauthenticated user without authentication reference
data,
(2) Human User authenticated by password in the role defined for
this password,
(3) Human User authenticated by PUC as holder of the
corresponding password,
(4) Device authenticated by means of symmetric key in the role
defined for this key,
(5) Device authenticated by means of asymmetric key in the role
defined by the Certificate Holder Authorisation in the CVC,
(6) [assignment: additional authorised identified roles] 64.
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
161 Application note 16: The protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 does not explicitly define role
because roles are linked to life cycle of the chip not addressed by SFR. Therefore the current PP
defines the role “World” relevant for all parts of the TOE (e.g. physical protection) and roles for
COS related SFR. The ST may add developer specific roles, e. g. for TSF data export according
to FPT_ITE.1/EXP.
162 Application note 17: Human users authenticate themselves by identifying the password or Multireference password and providing authentication verification data to be matched to the secret of
the password object or PUC depending on the command used. The role gained by authorization
with a password is defined in the security attributes of the objects and related to identified
commands. The authorization status is valid for the same level and in the level below in the file
hierarchy as the password object is stored. The role gained by authentication with a symmetric
key is defined in the security attributes of the objects and related to identified commands. The
assignment may assign additional role like the role defined for authentication by means of PACE
protocol (if PACE is supported by the TOE) or “none”.
163 The TOE shall meet the requirement “User-subject binding (FIA_USB.1)” as specified below.
FIA_USB.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_USB.1.1
64
User-subject binding
No other components.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user:
(1) for Human User authenticated with password: pwIdentifier and
Authentication Context globalPasswordList and
dfSpecificPasswordList,
(2) for Human User authenticated with PUC: pwIdentifier of
corresponding password,
(3) for Device the Role authenticated by RSA based CVC : the
Certificate Holder Authorisation (CHA) in the CVC,
[assignment: object, authorised identified roles].
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(4) for Device the Role authenticated by ECC based CVC: the
Certificate Holder Authorisation Template (CHAT),
(5) for Device the Role authenticated by symmetric key:
keyIdentifier and Authentication Context 65.
FIA_USB.1.2
FIA_USB.1.3
The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of
user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
(1) If the logical channel is reset by command Manage Channel
(INS,P1,P2)=(‘70’,’40’,’00’) the initial authentication state is
set to “not authenticated” (i.e. globalPasswordList,
dfSpecificPasswordList, globalSecurityList,
dfSpecificSecurityList and keyReferenceList are empty,
SessionkeyContext.flagSessionEnabled=noSK).
(2) If the command SELECT is executed and the newFile is an folder
the initial authentication state of the selected folder inherit the
authentication state of the folder above up the root.66
The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
(1) The authentication state is changed to “authenticated Human
User” for the specific context when the Human User has
successfully authenticated via one of the following procedures:
a) VERIFY command using the context specific password
or the context specific Multi-Reference password,
b) If the security attribute flagEnabled of password object
is set to False the authentication state for this specific
password is changed to “authenticated Human User”.
c) If the security attribute flagEnabled of Multi-Reference
password object is set to False the authentication state
for this specific Multi-Reference password is changed
to “authenticated Human User”.
(2) The authentication state is changed to “authenticated Device”
for the specific authentication context when a Device has
successfully authenticated via one of the following procedures:
a) EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE with symmetric or public
keys,
b) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE with symmetric or public
keys,
c) GENERAL AUTHENTICATE with mutual ELC
authentication and
d) GENERAL AUTHENTICATE for asynchronous secure
messaging.
(3) The effective access rights gained by ECC based CVC: the
CHAT are the intersection of the access rights encoded in the
CHAT of the CVC chain used as authentication reference data
of the Device.
(4) All authentication contexts are lost and the authentication state
65
[assignment: list of user security attributes]
66
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]
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(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
is set to “not authenticated” for all contexts if the TOE is reset.
If a DELETE command is executed for a password object or
symmetric authentication key the entity is authenticated for the
authentication state has to be set to “not authenticated”. If a
DELETE command is executed for a folder (a) authentication
states gained by password objects in the deleted folder shall be
set to “not authenticated” and (b) all entires in keyReferenceList
and allPublicKeyList related to the deleted folder shall be
removed.
If an authentication attempt using one of the following
commands failed the authentication state for the specific context
has to be set to “not authenticated”: EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE,
MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE, MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
(variant with restore).
If a context change by using the SELECT command is performed
the authentication state for all objects of the old authentication
context not belonging to the new context of the performed
SELECT command have to be set to “not authenticated”.
If failure of secure messaging (not indicated in CLA-byte, or
erroneous MAC, or erroneous cryptogram) is detected the
authentication status of the device in the current context set to
“not authenticated” (i.e. the element in globalSecurityList
respective in dfSpecificSecurityList and the used SK4SM are
deleted).
[assignment: further rules for the changing of attributes] 67.
164 Application note 18: Note the security attributes of the user are defined by the authentication
reference data. The user may chose security attributes of the subjects interface in the power on
session and seIdentifier by execution of command MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT for the
current directory. The initial authentication state is set when the command SELECT is executed
and the newFile is a folder (cf. [21], clause (N076.100) and (N048.200)).
6.1.6
Access Control
165 Application note 19: This section defines SFR for access control on User data in the object
system. The SFR FDP_ACF.1/MF_DF, FDP_ACF.1/EF, FDP_ACF.1/TEF, FDP_ACF.1/SEF
and FDP_ACF.1/KEY describe the security attributes of the subject gaining access to these
objects. The COS specification [21] describes the attributes of logical channels (i.e. subjects in
CC terminology) which is valid for the core of COS including all packages. The
globalSecurityList and dfSpecificSecurityList contain all keyIdentifier used for successful device
authentications, i.e. the list may be empty, may contain a CHA, a key identifier of a symmetric
authentication key or CAN (in form of the keyIdentifier of the derived key) used with PACE if
PACE is supported by the TOE. Because of this common structure there is no need for separate
SFR in package Contactless.
166 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF)” as specified
below.
67
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]
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FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1.1/
MF_DF
Subset access control
No other components.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
The TSF shall enforce the access control MF_DF SFP 68 on
(1) the subjects logical channel bind to users
a. World,
b. Human User,
c. Device,
d. Human User and Device,
[assignment: list of further subjects],
(2) the objects
a. all executable code implemented by the TOE,
b. MF,
c. Application,
d. Dedicated file,
e. Application dedicated file,
f. persistent stored public keys,
g. [assignment: list of further objects],
(3) the operation by command following
a. command SELECT,
b. create objects with command LOAD APPLICATION with and
without command chaining,
c. delete objects with command DELETE,
d. read fingerprint with command FINGERPRINT,
e. command LIST PUBLIC KEY,
f. [assignment: all other operations applicable to MF and
DF]. 69
167 Application note 20: Note the commands ACTIVATE, DEACTIVATE and, TERMINATE DF for
current file applicable to MF, DF, Application and Application dedicated file manage the security
life cycle attributes. Therefore access control to theses commands are described by
FMT_MSA.1/Life. The object “all executable code implemented by the TOE” includes IC
Dedicated Support Software, the Card Operating System and application specific code loaded on
the smartcard by command LOAD CODE or any other means.
168 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1/
MF_DF)” as specified below.
FDP_ACF.1/
MF_DF
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1.1/
MF_DF
68
Security attribute based access control
No other components.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
The TSF shall enforce the access control MF_DF SFP 70 to objects based
on the following
(1) the subject logical channel with security attributes
69
[assignment: access control SFP]
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
70
[assignment: access control SFP]
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a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
interface,
globalPasswordList,
globalSecurityList,
dfSpecificPasswordList,
dfSpecificSecurityList,
bitSecurityList,
SessionkeyContext,
[assignment: further subjects listed in
FDP_ACC.1.1/MF_DF with their security attributes],
(2) the objects
a. all executable code implemented by the TOE,
b. MF with security attributes lifeCycleStatus, seIdentifier and
interfaceDependentAccessRules,
c. DF with security attributes lifeCycleStatus, seIdentifier and
interfaceDependentAccessRules,
d. Application with security attributes lifeCycleStatus,
seIdentifier and interfaceDependentAccessRules,
e. Application dedicated file with security attributes
lifeCycleStatus, seIdentifier and
interfaceDependentAccessRules,
f. persistent stored public keys,
g. [assignment: list of further objects listed in
FDP_ACC.1.1/MF_DF with their security attributes] 71.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
MF_DF
71
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) SELECT is [selection:ALWAYS allowed, [assignment: supported
access control rules]].
(2) GET CHALLENGE is [selection:ALWAYS allowed, [assignment:
supported access control rules]].
(3) A subject is allowed to create new objects (user data or TSF
data) in the current folder MF if the security attributes interface,
globalPasswordList, globalSecurityList and SessionkeyContext
of the subject meet the access rules for the command LOAD
APPLICATION of the MF dependent on lifeCycleStatus,
seIdentifier and interfaceDependentAccessRules.
(4) A subject is allowed to create new objects (user data or TSF
data) in the current folder Application, Dedicated file or
Application Dedicated file if the security attributes interface,
globalPasswordList, globalSecurityList,
dfSpecificPasswordList, dfSpecificSecurityList and
SessionkeyContext of the subject meet the access rules for the
command LOAD APPLICATION of this object dependent on
lifeCycleStatus, seIdentifier and
interfaceDependentAccessRules.
(5) A subject is allowed to DELETE objects in the current folder MF
if the security attributes interface, globalPasswordList,
globalSecurityList and SessionkeyContext of the subject meet
the access rules for the command DELETE of the MF dependent
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
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(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
on lifeCycleStatus, seIdentifier and
interfaceDependentAccessRules.
A subject is allowed to DELETE objects in the current
Application, Dedicated file or Application, Dedicated file if the
security attributes interface, globalPasswordList,
globalSecurityList, dfSpecificPasswordList,
dfSpecificSecurityList and SessionkeyContext of the subject
meet the access rules for the command DELETE of this object
dependent on lifeCycleStatus, seIdentifier and
interfaceDependentAccessRules.
A subject is allowed to read fingerprint according to FPT_ITE.1
if it is allowed to execute the command FINGERPRINT in the
currentFolder.
All subjects are allowed to execute command LIST PUBLIC KEY
to export all persistent stored public keys.
[assignment: further list of subjects, objects, and operations
among subjects and objects covered by the SFP] 72.
FDP_ACF.1.3/
MF_DF
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none 73.
FDP_ACF.1.4/
MF_DF
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security
attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
169 Application note 21: The object system defines sets of access control rules depending on the life
cycle status, security environment and the used interface (i.e. contact based or contactless
interface). The security environment may be chosen for the current folder by means of command
MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. The command SELECT is therefore pre-requisite for many
other commands. The access control rule defines for each command, which is defined by CLA,
INS, P1 and P2 and acceptable for the type of the object, the necessary security state, which is
reached by successful authentication of human user and devices, to allow the access to the
selected object. Note the command FINGERPRINT process the data representing the TOE
implementation like user data (i.e. hash value calculation, no execution or interpretation as code)
and is developer specific. Therefore the ST writer shall describe the TOE specific access control
rules for these commands. The ST writer shall perform the open operations where “none” is
allowed.
170 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1/EF)” as specified
below.
FDP_ACC.1/EF
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1.1/EF
Subset access control
No other components.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
The TSF shall enforce the access control EF SFP 74 on
(1) the subjects logical channel bind to users
72
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
73
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
74
[assignment: access control SFP]
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a. World,
b. Human User,
c. Device,
d. Human User and Device,
e. [assignment: list of further subjects],
(2) the objects
a. EF,
b. Transparent EF,
c. Structured EF,
d. [assignment: list of further objects],
(3) the operation by command following
a. SELECT,
b. DELETE of the current file,
c. [assignment: further operations] 75.
171 Application note 22: Note the commands ACTIVATE, DEACTIVATE and, TERMINATE DF for
current file applicable to EF, Transparent EF and Structured EF manage the security life cycle
attributes. Therefore access control to theses commands are described by FMT_MSA.1/Life. The
commands CREATE, GET DATA, GET RESPONSE and PUT DATA are optional. If implemented by
the TOE these commands shall be added to the corresponding FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_ACF.1
SFR. The commands specific for transparent files are described in FDP_ACC.1/TEF and
FDP_ACF.1/TEF SFR. The commands specific for structured files are described in
FDP_ACC.1/SEF and FDP_ACF.1/SEF SFR.
172 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1/EF)”
as specified below.
FDP_ACF.1/EF
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1.1/EF
Security attribute based access control
No other components.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
The TSF shall enforce the access rule EF SFP 76 to objects based on the
following
(1) the subject logical channel with security attributes
a. interface,
b. globalPasswordList,
c. globalSecurityList,
d. dfSpecificPasswordList,
e. dfSpecificSecurityList,
f. bitSecurityList,
g. SessionkeyContext,
h. [assignment: further subjects listed in FDP_ACC.1.1/EF]
(2) the objects
a. EF with security attributes seIdentifier of the current folder,
lifeCycleStatus and interfaceDependentAccessRules of the
EF, and [selection: transaction protection Mode,
checksum],
b. [assignment: list of further objects listed in
75
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
76
[assignment: access control SFP]
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FDP_ACC.1.1/EF with their security attributes] 77.
FDP_ACF.1.2/EF
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) SELECT is [selection:ALWAYS allowed, [assignment: supported
access control rules]].
(2) A subject is allowed to DELETE the current EF if the security
attributes interface, globalPasswordList, globalSecurityList,
dfSpecificPasswordList, dfSpecificSecurityList and
SessionkeyContext of the subject meet the access rules for the
command DELETE of this object dependent on lifeCycleStatus,
interfaceDependentAccessRules and seIdentifier of the current
folder.
(3) [assignment: further list of subjects, objects, and operations
among subjects and objects covered by the SFP] 78.
FDP_ACF.1.3/EF
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none 79.
FDP_ACF.1.4/EF
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security
attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects].
173 Application note 23: The EF stands here for transparent EF and structured EF, which access
control is further refined by FDP_ACF.1/TEF and FDP_ACF.1/SEF. The selection of
“transaction protection Mode” and “checksum” may be empty because they are optional in the
COS specification [21].
174 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1/TEF)” as specified
below.
FDP_ACC.1/TEF
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1.1/TEF
Subset access control
No other components.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
The TSF shall enforce the access rule TEF SFP 80 on
(1) the subjects logical channel bind to users
a. World,
b. Human User,
c. Device,
d. Human User and Device,
e. [assignment: further subjects],
(2) the objects
a. Transparent EF,
b. [assignment: list of further objects],
77
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
78
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
79
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
80
[assignment: access control SFP]
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(3) the operation by the following command
a. ERASE BINARY,
b. READ BINARY,
c. SET LOGICAL EOF,
d. UPDATE BINARY,
e. WRITE BINARY,
f. [assignment: further operation] 81.
175 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1/TEF)”
as specified below.
FDP_ACF.1/TEF
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1.1/TEF
FDP_ACF.1.2/TEF
Security attribute based access control
No other components.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
The TSF shall enforce the access rule TEF SFP 82 to objects based on the
following
(1) the subjects logical channel with security attributes
a. interface,
b. globalPasswordList,
c. globalSecurityList,
d. dfSpecificPasswordList,
e. dfSpecificSecurityList,
f. bitSecurityList,
g. SessionkeyContext,
a. [assignment: further subjects listed in FDP_ACC.1.1/TEF],
(2) the objects
a. with security attributes seIdentifier of the current folder,
lifeCycleStatus and interfaceDependentAccessRules of the
current Transparent EF, and [selection: transaction
protection Mode, checksum],
b. [assignment: list of further objects listed in
FDP_ACC.1.1/TEF] 83.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) The subject is allowed to execute the command listed in
FDP_ACC.1.1/TEF for the current Transparent EF if the
security attributes interface, globalPasswordList,
globalSecurityList, dfSpecificPasswordList,
dfSpecificSecurityList and SessionkeyContext of the subject
meet the access rules of this object for this command dependent
on seIdentifier of the current folder, lifeCycleStatus and
interfaceDependentAccessRules of the current Transparent EF.
(2) [assignment: further list of subjects, objects, and operations
81
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
82
[assignment: access control SFP]
83
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
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among subjects and objects covered by the SFP] 84.
FDP_ACF.1.3/TEF
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none 85.
FDP_ACF.1.4/TEF
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: Rules defined in FDP_ACF.1.4/EF apply,
and [assignment: additional rules, based on security attributes, that
explicitly deny access of subjects to objects] 86.
176 Application note 24: The selection of “transaction protection Mode” and “checksum” may be
empty because they are optional in the COS specification [21]. If the checksum of the data to be
read by READ BINARY is malicious the TOE must append a warning when exporting. Exporting
of malicious data should be taken into account by the evaluator during evaluation of class AVA:
vulnerability assessment.
177 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1/SEF)” as specified
below.
FDP_ACC.1/SEF
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1.1/
SEF
Subset access control
No other components.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
The TSF shall enforce the access rule SEF SFP 87 on
(1) the subjects logical channel bind to users
a. World,
b. Human User
c. Device
d. Human User and Device,
e. [assignment: further subjects],
(2) the objects
a. record in Structured EF
b. [assignment: list of further objects],
(3) the operation by command following
a. APPEND RECORD,
b. ERASE RECORD,
c. DELETE RECORD,
d. READ RECORD,
e. SEARCH RECORD,
f. UPDATE RECORD,
g. [assignment: further operation] 88.
178 The command WRITE RECORD is optional. If implemented by the TOE this command shall be
added to the corresponding FDP_ACC.1/SEF and FDP_ACF.1/SEF SFR.
84
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
85
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
86
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
87
[assignment: access control SFP]
88
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
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179 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1/SEF)”
as specified below.
FDP_ACF.1/SEF
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1.1/SEF
Security attribute based access control
No other components.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
The TSF shall enforce the access rule SEF SFP 89 to objects based on the
following
(1) the subjects logical channel with security attributes
a. interface,
b. globalPasswordList,
c. globalSecurityList,
d. dfSpecificPasswordList,
e. dfSpecificSecurityList,
f. bitSecurityList,
g. SessionkeyContext,
a. [assignment: further subjects listed in FDP_ACC.1.1/SEF],
(2) the objects
a. with security attributes seIdentifier of the current folder,
lifeCycleStatus and interfaceDependentAccessRules of the
current Structured EF, and lifeCycleStatus of the record,
b. [assignment: list of further objects listed in
FDP_ACC.1.1/SEF] 90.
FDP_ACF.1.2/SEF
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) The subject is allowed to execute the command listed in
FDP_ACC.1.1/SEF for the record of the current Structered EF if
the security attributes interface, globalPasswordList,
globalSecurityList, dfSpecificPasswordList,
dfSpecificSecurityList and SessionkeyContext of the subject
meet the access rules of this object for this command dependent
on seIdentifier of the current folder, lifeCycleStatus and
interfaceDependentAccessRules of the current Structered EF,
and lifeCycleStatus of the record.
(2) [assignment: further list of subjects, objects, and operations
among subjects and objects covered by the SFP] 91.
FDP_ACF.1.3/SEF
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none. 92.
FDP_ACF.1.4/SEF
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules: Rules defined in FDP_ACF.1.4/EF apply,
and [assignment: additional rules, based on security attributes, that
89
[assignment: access control SFP]
90
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
91
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
92
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
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explicitly deny access of subjects to objects] 93.
180 Application note 25: Keys can be TSF or user data. As SFR FDP_ACC.1/KEY and
FDP_ACF.1/KEY address protection of user data the keys defined in these SFR as objects are
user keys only. Keys used for authentication are TSF data and are therefore not in the scope of
these two SFR. Please note that the PSO ENCIPHER, PSO DECIPHER, PSO COMPUTE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM, and PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM are used with the
SK4TC for trusted channel. If these commands are used in the context trusted channel the key
used is TSF data and not user data. Therefore the SFR FDP_ACC.1/KEY and FDP_ACF.1/KEY
are not applicable on the commands used for trusted channel. The commands PSO COMPUTE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM, and PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM are required if the
TOE supports the package Crypto Box
181 Application note 26: If the checksum of the record to be read by READ RECORD is malicious the
TOE must append a warning when exporting. Exporting of malicious data should be taken into
account by the evaluator during evaluation of class AVA: vulnerability assessment
182 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control (FDP_ACC.1/KEY)” as specified
below.
FDP_ACC.1/KEY
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1.1/KEY
Subset access control
No other components.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
The TSF shall enforce the access control key SFP 94 on
(1) the subjects logical channel bind to users
a. World,
b. Human User
c. Device
d. Human User and Device,
e. [assignment: further subjects],
(2) the objects
a. symmetric key used for user data,
b. private asymmetric key used for user data,
c. public asymmetric key for signature verification used for
user data,
d. public asymmetric key for encryption used for user data,
e. ephemeral keys used during Diffie-Hellmann key
exchange,
f. [assignment: list of further objects],
(3) the operation by command following
a. DELETE for private, public and symmetric key objects,
b. MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT,
c. GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR,
d. PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE,
e. PSO VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE,
f. PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE,
g. PSO ENCIPHER,
h. PSO DECIPHER,
93
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
94
[assignment: access control SFP]
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i.
j.
PSO TRANSCIPHER,
PSO COMPUTE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM if supported
by the TOE,
k. PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM if supported by
the TOE,
l. [assignment: further operation] 95.
183 The TOE shall meet the requirement
(FDP_ACF.1/KEY)” as specified below.
FDP_ACF.1/KEY
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1.1/KEY
“Security
attribute
based
access
control
Security attribute based access control
No other components.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
The TSF shall enforce the access control key SFP 96 to objects based on
the following
(1) the subjects logical channel with security attributes
a. interface,
b. globalPasswordList,
c. globalSecurityList,
d. dfSpecificPasswordList,
e. dfSpecificSecurityList,
f. bitSecurityList,
g. SessionkeyContext,
h. [assignment: further subjects listed in FDP_ACC.1.1/KEY],
(2) the objects
a. symmetric key used for user data with security attributes
seIdentifier of the current folder, lifeCycleStatus and
interfaceDependentAccessRules, the key type (encryption
key or mac key), interfaceDependentAccessRules for
session keys,
b. private asymmetric key used for user data with security
attributes seIdentifier of the current folder, lifeCycleStatus,
keyAvailable and interfaceDependentAccessRules,
c. public asymmetric key for signature verification used for
user data with security attributes seIdentifier of the current
folder, lifeCycleStatus and interfaceDependentAccessRules,
d. public asymmetric key for encryption used for user data
with security attributes seIdentifier of the current folder,
lifeCycleStatus and interfaceDependentAccessRules,
e. CVC with security attributes certificate content and
signature,
f. ephemeral keys used during Diffie-Hellmann key exchange
g. [assignment: list of further objects listed in
FDP_ACC.1.1/KEY] 97.
95
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
96
[assignment: access control SFP]
97
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
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FDP_ACF.1.2/KEY
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) MANAGE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT is [selection:ALWAYS
allowed, [assignment: supported access control rules]] in cases
defined in FDP_ACF.1.4/KEY.
(2) A subject is allowed to DELETE an object listed in
FDP_ACF.1.1/KEY if the security attributes interface,
globalPasswordList, globalSecurityList,
dfSpecificPasswordList, dfSpecificSecurityList and
SessionkeyContext of the subject meet the access rules for the
command DELETE of this object dependent on seIdentifier of the
current folder, lifeCycleStatus and
interfaceDependentAccessRules,
(3) A subject is allowed to generate a new asymmetric key pair or
change the content of existing objects if the security attributes
interface, globalPasswordList, globalSecurityList,
dfSpecificPasswordList, dfSpecificSecurityList and
SessionkeyContext of the subject meet the access rules for the
command GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR of this object
dependent on seIdentifier of the current folder, lifeCycleStatus,
key type and interfaceDependentAccessRules. In case P1=’80’
or P1=’84 the security attribute keyAvailable must be set to
FALSE.
(4) A subject is allowed to import a public key as part of a CVC by
means of the command PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE if
a) the security attributes interface, globalPasswordList,
globalSecurityList, dfSpecificPasswordList,
dfSpecificSecurityList and SessionkeyContext of the subject
meet the access rules for the command PSO VERIFY
CERTIFICATE of the signature public key to be used for
verification of the signature of the CVC dependent on
seIdentifier of the current folder, lifeCycleStatus, key type
and interfaceDependentAccessRules,
b) the CVC has valid certificate content and signature, where
the expiration date is checked against pointInTime.
(5) A subject is allowed to compute digital signatures using the
private asymmetric key for user data if the security attributes
interface, globalPasswordList, globalSecurityList,
dfSpecificPasswordList, dfSpecificSecurityList and
SessionkeyContext of the subject meet the access rules for the
command PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE of this object
dependent on seIdentifier of the current folder, lifeCycleStatus,
the key type and interfaceDependentAccessRules.
(6) Any subject is allowed to verify digital signatures using the
public asymmetric key for user data using the command PSO
VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE.
(7) A subject is allowed encrypt user data using the asymmetric key
if the security attributes interface, globalPasswordList,
globalSecurityList, dfSpecificPasswordList,
dfSpecificSecurityList and SessionkeyContext of the subject
meet the access rules for the command PSO ENCIPHER of this
object dependent on seIdentifier of the current folder,
lifeCycleStatus, the key type and
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interfaceDependentAccessRules.
(8) A subject is allowed decrypt user data using the asymmetric key
if the security attributes interface, globalPasswordList,
globalSecurityList, dfSpecificPasswordList,
dfSpecificSecurityList and SessionkeyContext of the subject
meet the access rules for the command PSO DECIPHER of this
object dependent on seIdentifier of the current folder,
lifeCycleStatus, the key type and
interfaceDependentAccessRules.
(9) A subject is allowed decrypt and to encrypt user data using the
asymmetric keys if the security attributes interface,
dfSpecificPasswordList, globalPasswordList,
globalSecurityList, dfSpecificSecurityList and
SessionkeyContext of the subject meet the access rules for the
command PSO TRANSCIPHER of both keys dependent on
seIdentifier of the current folder, lifeCycleStatus, the key type
and interfaceDependentAccessRules.
(10) If the command PSO COMPUTE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM
is supported by the TSF than the following rule applies: a
subject is allowed to compute a cryptographic checksum with a
symmetric key used for user data if the security attributes
interface, globalPasswordList, globalSecurityList,
dfSpecificPasswordList, dfSpecificSecurityList and
SessionkeyContext of the subject meet the access rules for the
command PSO COMPUTE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM of this
object dependent on seIdentifier of the current folder,
lifeCycleStatus, the key type and
interfaceDependentAccessRules.
(11) If the command PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM
is supported by the TSF than the following rule applies: a
subject is allowed to verify a cryptographic checksum with a
symmetric key used for user data if the security attributes
interface, globalPasswordList, globalSecurityList,
dfSpecificPasswordList, dfSpecificSecurityList and
SessionkeyContext of the subject meet the access rules for the
command PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM of this
object dependent on seIdentifier of the current folder,
lifeCycleStatus, the key type and
interfaceDependentAccessRules.
(12) [assignment: further list of subjects, objects, and operations
among subjects and objects covered by the SFP] 98.
FDP_ACF.1.3/KEY
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none 99.
FDP_ACF.1.4/KEY
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules
(1) If the security attribute keyAvailable=TRUE the TSF shall
prevent generation of a private key by means of the command
98
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
99
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
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GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR with P1=’80’ or P1=’84.
(2) [assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among
subjects and objects covered by the SFP] 100.
184 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF.1)” as
specified below.
FMT_SMF.1
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_SMF.1.1
Specification of Management Functions
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management
functions:
(1) Initialization,
(2) Personalization,
(3) Life Cycle Management by means of commands GENERATE
ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR, DELETE, LOAD APPLICATION,
TERMINATE, TERMINATE DF, TERMINATE CARD USAGE,
[assignment: list of further management functions to be provided by
the TSF],
(4) Management of access control security attributes by means of
commands ACTIVATE, DEACTIVATE, ACTIVATE RECORD,
DEACTIVATE RECORD, ENABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT,
DISABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT, LOAD APPLICATION,
(5) Management of password objects attributes by means of commands
CHANGE REFERENCE DATA, RESET RETRY COUNTER, GET PIN
STATUS, VERIFY, LOAD APPLICATION,
(6) Management of device authentication reference data by means of
commands PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE, GET SECURITY STATUS KEY
LOAD APPLICATION,
(7) [assignment: list of further management functions to be provided by
the TSF] 101.
185 Application note 27: The protection profile BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] describes initialisation
and personalisation as management functions. The ST author shall assign the COS commands
dedicated for these management functions.
186 Application note 28: LOAD APPLICATION creates new objects together with their TSF data (cf.
FMT_MSA.1/Life). In case of folders this includes authentication reference data as passwords
and public keys. CREATE is an optional command. The ST writer should add it to the commands
for the Life Cycle Management listed in FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_MSA.1/Life if implemented.
187 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1/Life)” as
specified below.
FMT_MSA.1/Life
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
Management of security attributes
No other components.
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
100
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
101
[assignment: list of management functions to be provided by the TSF]
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FMT_MSA.1.1/Life
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
The TSF shall enforce the access control MF_DF SFP, access control
EF SFP, access rule TEF SFP, access rule SEF SFP and access control
key SFP 102 to restrict the ability to
(1) create 103 all security attributes of the new object DF,
Application, Application dedicated file, EF, TEF and SEF 104 to
subjects allowed execution of command LOAD APPLICATION
for the MF, DF, Application, Application dedicated file where
the new object is created105,
(2) change 106 security attributes of the object MF, DF,
Application, Application dedicated file, EF, TEF and
SEF 107 by means of command LOAD APPLICATION to
[selection: none, subjects allowed execution of command
LOAD APPLICATION for the MF, DF, Application, Application
dedicated file where the object is updated] 108,
(3) change 109 the security attributes lifeCycleStatus to
„Operational state (active)“ 110 to subjects allowed execution
of command ACTIVATE for the selected object 111,
(4) change 112 the security attributes lifeCycleStatus to
„Operational state (deactivated)“ 113 to subjects allowed
execution of command DEACTIVATE for the selected
object 114,
(5) change 115 the security attributes lifeCycleStatus to
„Termination state” 116 to subjects allowed execution of
command TERMINATE for the selected EF, the key object
or the password object 117,
(6) change 118 the security attributes lifeCycleStatus to
„Termination state” 119 to subjects allowed execution of
102
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
103
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
104
[assignment: list of security attributes]
105
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
106
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
107
[assignment: list of security attributes]
108
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
109
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
110
[assignment: list of security attributes]
111 [assignment: the authorised identified roles]
112
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
113
[assignment: list of security attributes]
114
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
115
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
116
[assignment: list of security attributes]
117
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
118
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
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command TERMINATE DF for the selected DF, Application
or Application File 120,
(7) change 121the security attributes lifeCycleStatus to
„Termination state” 122 to subjects allowed execution of
command TERMINATE CARD USAGE 123,
(8) query 124the security attributes lifeCycleStatus to by means
of command SELECT 125 to [selection:ALWAYS allowed,
[assignment: supported access control rules]] 126,
(9) delete 127 all security attributes of the selected object 128 to
subjects allowed execution of command DELETE for the
selected object 129 to [assignment: list of further security
attributes with the authorised identified roles].
The subject logical channel is allowed to execute a command if the
security attributes interface, globalPasswordList, globalSecurityList,
dfSpecificPasswordList, dfSpecificSecurityList, bitSecurityList
SessionkeyContext of the subject meet the security attributes
lifeCycleStatus, seIdentifier and interfaceDependentAccessRules of
the affected object.
188 Application note 29: The refinements repeat the structure of the element in order to avoid iteration
of the same SFR. The command LOAD APPLICATION allows to create new objects and may allow
update of objects MF, DF, Application, Application dedicated file and their security attributes (cf.
[21], (N039.300)). The ST writer shall perform the selection in FMT_MSA.1.1/Life, clause (2) in
order to indicate possible security implications of changes in the TSF data of existing objects.
189 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1/SEF)” as
specified below.
FMT_MSA.1/SEF
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
Management of security attributes
No other components.
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
119
[assignment: list of security attributes]
120
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
121
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
122
[assignment: list of security attributes]
123
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
124
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
125
[assignment: list of security attributes]
126
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
127
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
128
[assignment: list of security attributes]
129
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FMT_MSA.1.1/SEF
The TSF shall enforce the access control SEF SFP 130 to restrict the
ability to
(1) change 131 the security attributes lifeCycleStatus of the selected
record to „Operational state (active)“ 132 to subjects allowed to
execute the command ACTIVATE RECORD 133,
(2) change 134 the security attributes lifeCycleStatus of the
selected record to „Operational state (deactivated)“ 135 to
subjects allowed to execute the command DEACTIVATE
RECORD 136,
(3) delete 137 all security attributes of the selected record138 to
subjects allowed to execute the command DELETE
RECORD 139,
(4) [assignment: list of further security attributes with the
authorised identified roles].
The subject logical channel is allowed to execute a command if the
security attributes interface, globalPasswordList, globalSecurityList,
dfSpecificPasswordList, dfSpecificSecurityList, bitSecurityList
SessionkeyContext of the subject meet the security attributes
lifeCycleStatus, seIdentifier and interfaceDependentAccessRules of
the affected object.
190 Application note 30: The access rights can be described in FMT_MSA.1/SEF in more detail. The
“authorised identified roles” could therefore be interpreted in a wider scope including the context
where the command is allowed to be executed. The refinements repeat the structure of the
element in order to avoid iteration of the same SFR.
191 THE TOE SHAll meet the requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)” AS SPECIFIED
BELOW.
FMT_MSA.3
HIERARCHical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.3.1
Static attribute initialisation
No other components.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The TSF shall enforce the the access control MF_DF SFP, access
control EF SFP, access rule TEF SFP, access rule SEF SFP and access
130
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
131
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
132
[assignment: list of security attributes]
133
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
134
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
135
[assignment: list of security attributes]
136
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
137
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
138
[assignment: list of security attributes]
139
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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control key SFP 140 to provide restrictive 141 default values for security
attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.
After reset the security attributes of the subject are set as follows
(1) currentFolder is root,
(2) keyReferenceList, globalSecurityList, globalPasswordList,
dfSpecificSecurityList, dfSpecificPasswordList and
bitSecurityList are empty,
(3) SessionkeyContext.flagSessionEnabled is set to noSK,
(4) seIdentifier is #1,
(5) currentFile is undefined.
FMT_MSA.3.2
The TSF shall allow the subjects allowed to execute the command LOAD
APPLICATION 142 to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
192 Application note 31: The refinements provide rules for setting restrictive security attributes after
reset.
193 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data - PIN (FMT_MTD.1/PIN)” as
specified below.
FMT_MTD.1/PIN
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1/PIN
Management of TSF data - PIN
No other components.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
The TSF shall restrict the ability to
(1) set new secret of the password objects by means of command
CHANGE REFERENCE DATA with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,24,00) 143 144
to subjects successful authenticated with the old secret of this
password object 145,
(2) set new secret and change transportStatus to regularPassword
of the password objects with transportStatus equal to LeerPIN146 147 to subjects allowed to execute the command
CHANGE REFERENCE DATA with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,24,01) 148,
(3) set new secret of the password objects by means of command
RESET RETRY COUNTER with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,00) 149 150
to subjects successful authenticated with the PUC of this
140
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
141
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
142
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
143
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
144
[assignment: other operations]
145
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
146
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
147
[assignment: other operations]
148
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
149
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
150
[assignment: other operations]
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password object 151
(4) set new secret of the password objects by means of command
RESET RETRY COUNTER with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,02) 152 153
to subjects allowed to execute the command RESET RETRY
COUNTER with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,02) 154.
194 Application note 32: The TOE provides access control to the commands depending on the object
system. The refinements repeat the structure of the element in order to avoid iteration of the same
SFR. The commands CHANGE REFERENCE DATA with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,24,01) and RESET
RETRY COUNTER (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,02) set a new password without need of authentication
by PIN or PUC. In order to prevent bypass of the human user authentication defined by the PIN
or PUC the object system shall define access control to this command as required by the security
needs of the specific application context, cf. OE.Resp-ObjS.
195 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes - PIN
(FMT_MSA.1/PIN)” as specified below.
FMT_MSA.1/PIN
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.1.1/PIN
Management of security attributes - PIN
No other components.
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
The TSF shall enforce the access control MF_DF SFP, access control
EF SFP, access rule TEF SFP, access rule SEF SFP and access control
key SFP 155 to restrict the ability to
(1) reset by means of commands VERIFY 156 157 the security attribute
retry counter of password objects 158 to subjects successful
authenticated with the secret of this password object 159,
(2) reset by means of commands CHANGE REFERENCE DATA
with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,24,00) 160 161 the security attribute
retry counter of password objects 162 to subjects successful
authenticated with the old secret of this password object 163,
151
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
152
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
153
[assignment: other operations]
154
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
155
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
156
[assignment: other operations]
157
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
158
[assignment: list of security attributes]
159
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
160
[assignment: other operations]
161
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
162
[assignment: list of security attributes]
163
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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(3) change by means of commands CHANGE REFERENCE DATA
with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,24,00) 164 165 the security attribute
transportStatus from Transport-PIN to regularPassword to
subjects allowed to execute the command CHANGE
REFERENCE DATA with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,24,00) 166,
(4) change by means of commands CHANGE REFERENCE DATA
with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,24,01) 167 168 the security attribute
transportStatus from Leer-PIN to regularPassword to
subjects allowed to execute the command CHANGE
REFERENCE DATA with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,24,01) 169,
(5) reset by means of commands DISABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,26,00) 170 171 the
security attribute retry counter of password objects 172 to
subjects successful authenticated with the old secret of this
password object 173,
(6) reset by means of commands ENABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,28,00) 174 175 the
security attribute retry counter of password objects 176 to
subjects successful authenticated with the old secret of this
password object 177,
(7) reset by means of command RESET RETRY COUNTER with
(CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,00) or (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,01) 178 179
the security attribute retry counter of password objects 180 to
subjects successful authenticated with the PUC of this
password object 181,
(8) reset by means of command RESET RETRY COUNTER with
(CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,02) or (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,03) 182 183
164
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
165
[assignment: other operations]
166
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
167
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
168
[assignment: other operations]
169
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
170
[assignment: other operations]
171
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
172
[assignment: list of security attributes]
173
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
174
[assignment: other operations]
175
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
176
[assignment: list of security attributes]
177
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
178
[assignment: other operations]
179
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
180
[assignment: list of security attributes]
181
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
182
[assignment: other operations]
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the security attribute retry counter of password objects 184to
to subjects allowed to execute the command RESET RETRY
COUNTER with (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,02) or
(CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,03) 185,
(9) query by means of command GET PIN STATUS 186 187 the
security attribute flagEnabled, retry counter,
transportStatus 188 to World 189,
(10) enable 190 the security attributes flagEnabled requiring
authentication with the selected password 191 to subjects
authenticated with passwaord and allowed to execute the
command ENABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT
(CLA,INS,P1)=(00’28,00) 192,
(11) enable 193 the security attributes flagEnabled requiring
authentication with the selected password 194 to subjects
allowed to execute the command ENABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,28,01) 195,
(12) disable 196 the security attributes flagEnabled requiring
authentication with the selected password 197 to subjects
authenticated with passwaord and allowed to execute the
command DISABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT
(CLA,INS,P1)=(00,26,00) 198,
(13) disable 199 the security attributes flagEnabled requiring
authentication with the selected password 200 to subjects
allowed to execute the command DISABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,26,01) 201.
183
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
184
[assignment: list of security attributes]
185
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
186
[assignment: other operations]
187
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
188
[assignment: list of security attributes]
189
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
190
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
191
[assignment: list of security attributes]
192
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
193
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
194
[assignment: list of security attributes]
195
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
196
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
197
[assignment: list of security attributes]
198
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
199
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
200
[assignment: list of security attributes]
201 [assignment:
the authorised identified roles]
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Card Operating System (PP COS)
196 Application note 33: The TOE provides access control to the commands depending on the object
system. The refinements repeat the structure of the element in order to avoid iteration of the same
SFR. The command DISABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT can be used to disable the need to
perform successful authentication via the selected password or Multi-Reference password, i.e.
any authentication attempt will be successful. The command ENABLE VERIFICATION
REQUIREMENT can be used to enable the need to perform an authentication. The access rights to
execute these commands can be limited to specific authenticated subjects. For example: the
execution of DISABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT should not be allowed for signing
applications. The command DISABLE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,26,01)
allows to disable the verification requirement with the PIN. The command ENABLE
VERIFICATION REQUIREMENT (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,28,01) allows anybody to enable the
verification requirement with the PIN. The commands RESET RETRY COUNTER with
(CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,02) or (CLA,INS,P1)=(00,2C,03) allows to reset the RESET RETRY
COUNTER without authentication with PUC. In order to prevent bypass of the human user
authentication defined by the PIN the object system shall define access control to these
commands as required by the security needs of the specific application context, cf. OE.RespObjS.
197 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data – Authentication data
(FMT_MTD.1/Auth)” as specified below.
FMT_MTD.1/Auth
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1/
Auth
Management of TSF data – Authentication data
No other components.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
The TSF shall restrict the ability to
(1) import by means of commands LOAD APPLICATION 202 the root
public keys to roles autorized to execute this command 203,
(2) import by means of commands PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE 204
the root public keys to roles autorized to execute this
command 205,
(3) import by means of commands PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE 206
the certificates as device authentication reference data to roles
autorized to execute this command 207,
(4) select by means of command MANAGE SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT 208 the device authentication reference data to
[selection: World, roles autorized to execute this command] 209.
The subject logical channel is allowed to execute a command if the
security attributes interface, globalPasswordList, globalSecurityList,
202
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
203
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
204
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
205
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
206
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
207
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
208
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
209
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
dfSpecificPasswordList, dfSpecificSecurityList and bitSecurityList
SessionkeyContext of the subject meet the security attributes
lifeCycleStatus, seIdentifier and interfaceDependentAccessRules of
the affected object.
198 Application note 34: The TOE provides access control to the commands depending on the object
system. The refinements repeat the structure of the element in order to avoid iteration of the same
SFR. If root public keys are imported according to clause (2) this public key will be stored in the
persistentPublicKeyList or the persistentCache of the object system.
199 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA.1/Auth)” as
specified below.
FMT_MSA.1/Auth
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.1.1/
Auth
Management of security attributes
No other components.
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
The TSF shall enforce the access control key SFP 210 to restrict the
ability to query 211 212 the security attributes access control rights set for
the key 213 to meet the access rules of command GET SECURITY STATUS
KEY of the object dependent on lifeCycleStatus, seIdentifier and
interfaceDependentAccessRules 214.
200 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data – No export (FMT_MTD.1/NE)”
as specified below.
FMT_MTD.1/NE
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1/NE
Management of TSF data – No export
No other components.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
The TSF shall restrict the ability to
(1) export TSF data according to FPT_ITE.2 215 the
(a) public authentication reference data,
(b) security attributes for objects of the object system
to [assignment: list of security attributes of subjects] 216,
(2) export TSF data according to FPT_ITE.2 217 the
[assignment: list of all TOE specific security attributes not
210
[assignment: access control SFP(s), information flow control SFP(s)]
211
[assignment: other operations]
212
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]
213
[assignment: list of security attributes]
214
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
215
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
216
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
217
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
described in COS specification [21]] 218 219 to [assignment:
list of security attributes of subjects] 220,
(3) export 221 the following TSF-data
(a) Password
(b) Multi-Reference password
(c) PUC
(d) Private keys
(e) Session keys
(f) Symmetric authentication keys
(g) Private authentication keys
(h) [assignment: list of types of TSF data]
and the following user data
(i) Private keys of the user
(j) Symmetric keys of the user
(k) [assignment: list of types of user data] 222
to nobody 223.
6.1.7
Cryptographic Functions
201 The TOE provides cryptographic services based on elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) using the
following curves refered to as COS standard curves in the following
(1) length 256 bit
(a) brainpoolP256r1 defined in RFC5639 [41],
(b) ansix9p256r1] defined in ANSI X.9.62 [42],
(2) length 384
(a) brainpoolP384r1 defined in RFC5639 [41],
(b) ansix9p384r1 defined in ANSI X.9.62 [42],
(3) length 512 bit
(a) brainpoolP512r1] defined in RFC5639 [41].
202 The Authentication Protocols produce agreed parameters to generate the message authentication
key and – if secure messaging with encryption is required - the encryption key for secure
messaging. Key agreement for rsaSessionkey4SM uses RSA only with 2048 bit modul length.
203 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Random number generation (FCS_RNG.1)” as specified
below.
FCS_RNG.1
Hierarchical to:
Random number generation
No other components.
218
[assignment: list of TSF data]
219
[assignment: other operations]
220
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
221
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
222
[assignment: list of TSF data]
223
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Dependencies:
FCS_RNG.1.1
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a [selection: deterministic, hybrid deterministic,
physical, hybrid physical] 224 random number generator [selection:
DRG.3, DRG.4, PTG.2, PTG.3] [7] that implements: [assignment: list
of security capabilities of the selected RNG class].
FCS_RNG.1.2
The TSF shall provide random numbers that meet [assignment: a
defined quality metric of the selected RNG class] 225.
204 Application note 35: This SFR requires the TOE to generate random numbers used for key
generation according to TR-03116 [19] section 3.5, requiring RNG classes identified in the
selection in element FCS_RNG.1.1 and recommending RNG of class PTG.3. Note that the RNG
of class DRG4 are hybrid deterministic and of class PTG3 are hybrid physical which are not
addressed in BSI-CC-PP-0035. The implementation of the PACE protocol requires RNG of class
PTG.3 (cf. [16]). The COS specification [21] requires to implement RNG for
- the command GET CHALLENGE,
- the command GET RANDOM if package Logical Channel is supported 226,
- the authentication protocols as required by FIA_UAU.4,
- the key agreement for secure messaging
according to TR-03116 [19] section 3.4,. The selection in the element FCS_RNG.1.1 includes
RNG of classes DRG.3 and DRG.4. The quality metric assigned in element FCS_RNG.1.2 shall
be chosen to resist attacks with high attack potential.
205 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation - SHA (FCS_COP.1/SHA)” as
specified below.
FCS_COP.1/SHA
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1.1/SHA
Cryptographic operation - SHA
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform hashing 227 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm
(1) SHA-1,
(2) SHA-256,
(3) SHA-384,
(4) SHA-512 228
and cryptographic key sizes none 229 that meet the following TR-03116
[19], FIPS 180-4[37] 230.
224
[selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid]
225
[assignment: a defined quality metric]
226
cf. chapter Package Logical Channel
227
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
228
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
229
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
206 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation – 3TDES_SM
(FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM Cryptographic key generation – 3TDES_SM
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
The TSF shall generate session cryptographic keys in accordance
FCS_CKM.1.1/
with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Key
3TDES_SM
Derivation Function specified in sec. 5.6.3 in ANSI X9.63 231 and
specified cryptographic key sizes 192 bit (168 bit effectively) 232
that meet the following: ANSI X9.63 [40] 233.
207 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation - COS for 3TDES
(FCS_COP.1/COS.3TDES)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/COS.3TDES Cryptographic operation - COS for 3TDES
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
Dependencies:
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption for secure
FCS_COP.1.1/
messaging 234 in accordance with a specified cryptographic
COS.3TDES
algorithm 3TDES in CBC mode 235 and cryptographic key sizes
192 bit (168 bit effectively) 236 that meet the following TR-03116
[19], NIST SP 800-67 [38] 237.
208 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation COS for RMAC
(FCS_COP.1/COS.RMAC)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/COS.RMAC Cryptographic operation COS for RMAC
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
Dependencies:
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform
FCS_COP.1.1/
(1) computation and verification of cryptographic checksum
COS.RMAC
230
[assignment: list of standards]
231
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
232
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
233
[assignment: list of standards]
234
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
235
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
236
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
237
[assignment: list of standards]
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
for command
a. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE,
b. EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE,
(2) computation and verification of cryptographic checksum
for secure messaging 238
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC 239 and cryptographic key sizes 192 bit (168 bit
effectively) 240 that meet the following TR-03116 [19], COS
specification [21] 241.
209 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – COS for AES
(FCS_COP.1/COS.AES)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/
COS.AES
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1.1/
COS.AES
Cryptographic operation – COS for AES
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform
1. encryption and decryption with card internal key for commands
a. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE,
b. EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE,
2. encryption with card internal key for command INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE,
3. encryption and decryption with card internal key for command
GENERAL AUTHENTICATE,
4. encryption and decryption for secure messaging 242
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES in CBC
mode 243 and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 192 bit, 256 bit 244 that
meet the following: TR-03116 [19], COS specification [21], FIPS 197
[33] 245.
210 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation – COS for SM keys
(FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.1/
AES.SM
Hierarchical to:
Cryptographic key generation – COS for SM keys
No other components.
238
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
239
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
240
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
241
[assignment: list of standards]
242
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
243
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
244
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
245
[assignment: list of standards]
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.1.1/
AES.SM
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
The TSF shall generate session cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm Key Derivation for
AES as specified in sec. 4.4.3 in [17] 246 and specified cryptographic key
sizes 128 bit, 192 bit, 256 bit 247 that meet the following TR-03111 [17],
COS specification [21], FIPS 197 [33] 248.
211 Application note 36: The Key Generation FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM is done during MUTUAL
AUTHENTICATE, EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE, INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE or GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE with establishment of secure messaging (with option Crypto Box also for trusted
channel).
212 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – COS for CMAC
(FCS_COP.1/COS.CMAC)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/
COS.CMAC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1.1/
COS.CMAC
Cryptographic operation – COS for CMAC
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform
(1) computation and verification of cryptographic checksum for
command
a. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE,
b. EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE,
(2) computation of cryptographic checksum for command
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE,
(3) computation and verification of cryptographic checksum for
secure messaging 249
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm CMAC 250 and
cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 192 bit, and 256 bit 251 that meet the
following TR-03116 [19], COS specification [21], NIST SP 800-38B
[36] 252.
213 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation – RSA key generation
(FCS_CKM.1/RSA)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
Cryptographic key generation – RSA key generation
246
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
247
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
248
[assignment: list of standards]
249
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
250
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
251
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
252
[assignment: list of standards]
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.1.1/RSA
No other components.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
The TSF shall generate cryptographic RSA keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic key generation algorithm] 253 and specified cryptographic
key 2048 bit and 3072 bit modulo length 254 that meet the following TR03116 [19] 255.
214 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation – ECC key generation
(FCS_CKM.1/ELC)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.1/ELC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.1.1/ELC
Cryptographic key generation – ECC key generation
No other components.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
The TSF shall generate cryptographic ELC keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [assignment:
cryptographic key generation algorithm] with COS standard curves 256
and specified cryptographic key 256 bit, 384 bit and 512 bit 257 that
meet the following TR-03111 [17], COS specification [21] 258.
215 Application note 37: The COS specification [21] requires the TOE to support elliptic curves listed
in COS specification [21], chapter 6.5 (refered as COS standard curves in this PP) and to
implement the command GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR. Depending on the characteristic
needs of the TOE should support the generation of asymmetric key pairs for the following
operations:
qualified electronic signatures,
authentication of external entities,
document cipher key decipherment.
The ST writer shall perform the missing operations in the element FCS_CKM.1/RSA and
FCS_CKM.1/ELC according to the implemented key generation algorithms.
216 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – RSA signature-creation
(FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S Cryptographic operation – RSA signature-creation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
Dependencies:
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
253
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
254
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
255
[assignment: list of standards]
256
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
257
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
258
[assignment: list of standards]
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
FCS_COP.1.1/
COS.RSA.S
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform digital signature generation for commands
(1) PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE,
(2) INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE 259
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
(1) RSASSA-PSS-SIGN with SHA-256,
(2) RSA SSA PKCS1-V1_5,
(3) RSA ISO9796-2 DS1 with SHA-256 (for INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE only),
(4) RSA ISO9796-2 DS2 with SHA-256 (for PSO Compute
DIGITAL SIGNATURE only) 260,
(1) and cryptographic key sizes 2048 bit modulo length,
(2) 3072 bit modulo length 261
that meet the following: TR-03116 [19], COS specification [21],
[31], [34] 262.
217 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – RSA signature verification
(FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.V)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.V Cryptographic operation – RSA signature verification
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
Dependencies:
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification for import of
FCS_COP.1.1/
RSA keys using the commands
COS.RSA.V
(1) PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE,
(2) EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE 263
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm RSA
ISO9796-2 DS1 264 and cryptographic key sizes 2048 bit modulo
length 265 that meet the following: TR-03116 [19], COS
specification [21], [31] ,[34] 266.
218 Application note 38: The command PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE may store the imported public
keys for RSA and ELC temporarily in the volatileCache or permanently in the persistentCache or
applicationPublicKeyList. These keys may be used as authentication reference data for
asymmetric key based device authentication (cf. FIA_UAU.5) or user data.
259
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
260
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
261
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
262
[assignment: list of standards]
263
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
264
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
265
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
266
[assignment: list of standards]
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Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
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219 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – ECDSA signature verification
(FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.V)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.V Cryptographic operation – ECDSA signature verification
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
Dependencies:
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform digital signature verification for import
FCS_COP.1.1/
of ELC keys for the commands
COS.ECDSA.V
(1) PSO VERIFY CERTIFICATE,
(2) PSO VERIFY DIGITAL SIGNATURE,
(3) EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE 267
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA
with COS standard curves using
(1) SHA-256,
(2) SHA-384,
(3) SHA-512 268
and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits 269 that
meet the following TR-03111 [17], TR-03116 [19], COS
specification [21], [40] 270.
220 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – ECDSA signature-creation
(FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.S)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.S Cryptographic operation – ECDSA signature-creation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
Dependencies:
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform digital signature generation for
FCS_COP.1.1/
command
COS.ECDSA.S
(1) PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE,
(2) INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE 271
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm ECDSA
with COS standard curves using
(1) SHA-256,
(2) SHA-384,
(3) SHA-512 272
and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits 273 that
meet the following TR-03111 [17], TR-03116 [19], COS
267
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
268
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
269
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
270
[assignment: list of standards]
271
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
272
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
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Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
specification [21], [40] 274.
221 Application note 39: The TOE shall support two variants of the PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL
SIGNATURE.
PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE without Message Recovery shall be used for the
signing algorithms
• RSASSA-PSS-SIGN with SHA-256 (see FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S),
• RSA SSA PKCS1-V1_5, RSA (see FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S),
• ECDSA with SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 (see FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.S)
PSO COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE with Message Recovery shall be used for the for the
following signing algorithm
• RSA ISO9796-2 DS2 with SHA-256 (see FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.S)
222 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – RSA encryption and
(FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA Cryptographic operation – RSA encryption and decryption
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
Dependencies:
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform
FCS_COP.1.1/
(1) encryption with passed key for command PSO ENCIPHER,
COS.RSA
(2) decryption with stored key for command PSO DECIPHER,
(3) decryption and encryption for command PSO TRANSCIPHER
using RSA (transcipher of data using RSA keys),
(4) decryption for command PSO TRANSCIPHER using RSA
(transcipher of data from RSA to ELC),
(5) encryption for command PSO TRANSCIPHER using ELC
(transcipher of data from ELC to RSA) 275
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
(6) for encryption:
a. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5_Encrypt ([34] section 7.2.1),
b. RSA-OAEP-Encrypt ([34] section 7.1.1]),
(7) for decryption:
a. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5_Decrypt ([34] section 7.2.2]),
b. RSA-OAEP-Decrypt ([34] section 7.1.2]) 276
and cryptographic key sizes 2048 bit and 3072 bit modulo length for
RSA private key operation, 2048 bit length for RSA public key
operation, and 256 bit, 384 bit and 512 bit for the COS standard
273
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
274
[assignment: list of standards]
275
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
276
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
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curves 277 that meet the following TR-03116 [19], COS specification
[21], [34] 278.
223 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – ECC encryption and decryption
(FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC Cryptographic operation – ECC encryption and decryption
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
Dependencies:
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform
FCS_COP.1.1/
(1) encryption with passed key for command PSO ENCIPHER,
COS.ELC
(2) decryption with stored key for command PSO DECIPHER,
(3) decryption and encryption for command PSO TRANSCIPHER
using ELC (transcipher of data using ELC keys),
(4) decryption for command PSO TRANSCIPHER using ELC
(transcipher of data from ELC to RSA),
(5) encryption for command PSO TRANSCIPHER using ELC
(transcipher of data from RSA to ELC) 279
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm
(1) for encryption ELC encryption,
(2) for decryption ELC decryption 280
and cryptographic key sizes 2048 bit and 3072 bit modulo length for
RSA private key operation, 2048 bit length for RSA public key
operation, and 256 bits, 384 bits, 512 bits for ELC keys with COS
standard curves 281 that meet the following TR-03111 [17], TR-03116
[19], and COS specification [21] 282.
224 Application note 40: The TOE can support or reject the command PSO HASH (following standard
[30]) and ENVELOPE (following standard [29]). If the command is supported the ST writer is
asked to add a SFR FCS_COP.1/CB_HASH specifying the supported hash algorithms.
225 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key destruction (FCS_CKM.4)” as specified
below.
FCS_CKM.4
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.4.1
Cryptographic key destruction
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
277
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
278
[assignment: list of standards]
279
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
280
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
281
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
282
[assignment: list of standards]
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cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key
destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
226 Application note 41: The TOE shall destroy the encryption session keys and the message
authentication keys for secure messaging after reset or termination of secure messaging session
(trusted channel) or reaching fail secure state according to FPT_FLS.1. The TOE shall clear the
memory area of any session keys before starting a new communication with an external entity in
a new after-reset-session as required by FDP_RIP.1. Explicit deletion of a secret using the
DELETE command should also be taken into account by the ST writer.
6.1.8
Protection of communication
227 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Inter-TSF trusted channel (FTP_ITC.1/TC)” as specified
below.
FTP_ITC.1/TC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FTP_ITC.1.1/TC
FTP_ITC.1.2/TC
FTP_ITC.1.3/TC
Inter-TSF trusted channel
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product 283 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
The TSF shall initiate communication via the trusted channel for
none 284.
228 Application note 42: The TOE responds only to commands establishing secure messaging
channels.
6.2 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE
229 The Security Target to be developed based upon this Protection Profile will be evaluated
according to
Security Target evaluation (Class ASE)
230 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE for the evaluation of the TOE are those taken from
the Evaluation
Assurance Level 4 (EAL4)
231 and augmented by taking the following components:
283
[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
284
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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ALC_DVS.2 (Development security)
ATE_DPT.2 (Test depth)
AVA_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).
232 The assurance requirements are:
Class ADV: Development
Architectural design
(ADV_ARC.1)
Functional specification
(ADV_FSP.4)
Implementation representation
(ADV_IMP.1)
TOE design
(ADV_TDS.3)
Class AGD: Guidance documents
Operational user guidance
(AGD_OPE.1)
Preparative user guidance
(AGD_PRE.1)
Class ALC: Life-cycle support
CM capabilities
(ALC_CMC.4)
CM scope
(ALC_CMS.4)
Delivery
(ALC_DEL.1)
Development security
(ALC_DVS.2)
Life-cycle definition
(ALC_LCD.1)
Tools and techniques
(ALC_TAT.1)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
Conformance claims
(ASE_CCL.1)
Extended components definition
(ASE_ECD.1)
ST introduction
(ASE_INT.1)
Security objectives
(ASE_OBJ.2)
Derived security requirements
(ASE_REQ.2)
Security problem definition
(ASE_SPD.1)
TOE summary specification
(ASE_TSS.1)
Class ATE: Tests
Coverage
(ATE_COV.2)
Depth
(ATE_DPT.2)
Functional tests
(ATE_FUN.1)
Independent testing
(ATE_IND.2)
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Vulnerability analysis
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Table 21: Assurance components
6.2.1
Refinements of the TOE Assurance Requirements
233 In the BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] refinements of the TOE assurance requirements were
performed. This Protection Profile takes over the refinements for the SFR listed in section 6.1.3
“Security Functional Requirements for the TOE taken over from BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007”. The
refinements must be applied for the SFR listed in section 6.1.3 (see Table 20). The refinements
and the section where the refinement in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] is specified are listed in
Table 22 . The ST writer is asked to refer the corresponding sections of the BSI-CC-PP-00352007 [11] (see Table 22).
234 For all other Security Functional Requirements the TOE assurance requirements from Common
Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance components;
CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [3] should be used. Note that it is
possible to use the TOE assurance requirements as defined in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] (see
Table 22) for all SFR in this Protection Profile. According to Common Criteria for Information
Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001,
Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012 [1] for that choice a justification of why the preferred
option was not chosen is required.
Refinements regarding
Reference to [11]
Delivery procedure (ALC_DEL)
Section 6.2.1.1 “Refinements regarding
Delivery procedure (ALC_DEL)”
Development Security (ALC_DVS)
Section 6.2.1.2 “Refinements regarding
Development Security (ALC_DVS)”
CM scope (ALC_CMS)
Section 6.2.1.3 “Refinements regarding CM
scope (ALC_CMS)”
CM capabilities (ALC_CMC)
Section 6.2.1.4 “Refinements regarding CM
capabilities (ALC_CMC)”
Security Architecture (ADV_ARC)
Section 6.2.1.5 “Refinements regarding
Security Architecture (ADV_ARC)”
Functional Specification (ADV_FSP)
Section 6.2.1.6 “Refinements regarding
Functional Specification (ADV_FSP)”
Implementation Representation (ADV_IMP)
Section 6.2.1.7 “Refinements regarding
Implementation Representation
(ADV_IMP)”
Test Coverage (ATE_COV)
Section 6.2.1.8” Refinements regarding Test
Coverage (ATE_COV)”
User Guidance (AGD_OPE)
Section 6.2.1.9 “Refinements regarding
User Guidance (AGD_OPE)”
Preparative User Guidance (AGD_PRE)
Section 6.2.1.10 “Refinements regarding
Preparative User Guidance (AGD_PRE)”
Refinement regarding Vulnerability Analysis
(AVA_VAN)
Section 6.2.1 “Refinement regarding
Vulnerability Analysis (AVA_VAN)”
Table 22: Refined TOE assurance requirements
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235 The following sections define refinements and application notes to the chosen SAR.
6.2.2
Refinements to ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
236 The ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description requires as developer action
ADV_ARC.1.1D The developer shall design and implement the TOE so that the security features
of the TSF cannot be bypassed.
and the related content and presentation element
ADV_ARC.1.5C The security architecture description shall demonstrate that the TSF prevents
bypass of the SFR-enforcing functionality.
237 The COS specification [21] allows implementation of optional features and commands. The
following refinement for ADV_ARC.1.5C defines specific evidence required for these optional
features and commands if implemented by the TOE and not being part of the TSF.
Refinement: If a feature or command identified as optional in the COS specification is
implemented in the TOE or any other additional functionality of the TOE is not part of the
TSF the security architecture description shall demonstrate that it do not bypass the SFRenforcing functionality.
6.2.3
Refinements to ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
238 The following content and presentation element of ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional
specification is refined as follows:
ADV_FSP.4.2C The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for all
TSFI.
Refinement: The functional specification shall describe the purpose and method of use for all
TSFI including
(1) the physical and logical interface of the smart card platform, both contact based and
contactless as implemented by the TOE,
(2) the logical interface of the wrapper to the verification tool.
239 Application note 43: The IC surface as external interface of the TOE provides the TSFI for
physical protection (cf. FPT_PHP.3) and evaluated in the IC evaluation as base evaluation for the
composite evaluation of the composite TOE (cf. [9], chapter 2.5.2, for details). This interface is
also analysed as attack surface in the vulnerability analysis e.g. in respect to perturbation and
emanation side channel analysis.
6.2.4
Refinement to ADV_IMP.1
240 The following content and presentation element of ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of
the TSF is refined as follows:
ADV_IMP.1.1D The developer shall make available the implementation representation for the
entire TOE.
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241 Application note 44: The refinement extends the TSF implementation representation to the TOE
implementation representation, i.e. the complete executable code implemented on the Security
platform IC including all IC Embedded Software and especially the Card Operating System,
(COS).
6.2.5
Refinements to AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
242 The following content and presentation element of AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance is
refined as follows:
AGD_OPE.1.2C The operational user guidance shall describe, for each user role, how to use the
available interfaces provided by the TOE in a secure manner.
Refinement: The operational user guidance shall describe the method of use of the wrapper
interface.
243 Application note 45: The wrapper will be used to interact with the smartcard for export of all
public TSF data of all objects in an object system according to “Export of TSF data
(FPT_ITE.2)”. Because the COS specification [21] identifies optional functionality the TOE
may support the guidance documentation shall describe method of use of the TOE (as COS,
wrapper) to find all objects in the object system and to export all security attributes of these
objects.
6.2.6
Refinements to ATE_FUN.1 Functional tests
244 The following content and presentation element of ATE_FUN.1 Functional tests is refined as
follows:
ATE_FUN.1.1C The test documentation shall consist of test plans, expected test results and
actual test results.
Refinement: The test plan shall include typical uses cases applicable for the TOE and the
intended application eHC [22], eHPC [23], SMC-B [24], SMC-K [25] or SMC-KT [26].
245 Application note 46: The developer should agree the typical uses cases with the evaluation
laboratory and the certification body in order to define an effective test approach and to use
synergy for appropiate test effort. The agreed test cases support comparable test effort for TSF
defined in the main part of this PP and the optional packages included in the security target.
6.2.7
Refinements to ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
246 The following content and presentation element of ATE_IND.2 Functional tests is refined as
follows:
ATE_IND.2.3E The evaluator shall test a subset of the TSF to confirm that the TSF operates as
specified.
Refinement: The evaluator tests shall include typical uses cases applicable for the TOE and
the intended application eHC [22], eHPC [23], SMC-B [24], SMC-K [25] and SMC-KT [26].
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247 Application note 47: The evaluator should agree the typical uses cases with the certification body
in order to define an effective test approach and to use synergy for appropiate test effort. The
agreed test cases support comparable test effort for TSF defined in the main part of this PP and
the optional packages included in the security target.
6.3 Security Requirements Rationale
248 This chapter comprises three parts:
- The SFR rationale provided by a table showing the coverage of security objective of the TOE
by security functional requirements, already provided in the current version of this PP, and
rationale explanatory text which will be provided in future versions of this PP
- The SFR dependency rationale missing in the current version and to be provided in future
versions of this PP
- The SAR rationale provided in section 6.3.3.
6.3.1
Security Functional Requirements Rationale
249 Table 2 in section 6.3.1 “Security Functional Requirements Rational” in BSI-CC-PP-00352007 [11] gives an overview, how the security functional requirements taken over are combined
to meet the security objectives. Please refer that table and the text following after that table
justifying this in detail for the further details.
FAU_SAS.1/SICP
FCS_RNG.1/SICP
FDP_IFC.1/SICP
FDP_ITT.1/SICP
FMT_LIM.1/SICP
FMT_LIM.2/SICP
FPT_FLS.1/SICP
FPT_ITT.1/SICP
FPT_PHP.3/SICP
FRU_FLT.2/SICP
O.RND
O.Abuse-Func
O.Leak-Forced
O.Phys-Manipulation
O.Malfunction
O.Phys-Probing
O.Leak-Inherent
O.Identification
250 The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage also
giving an evidence for sufficiency and necessity of the SFRs chosen.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 23: Coverage of Security Objectives for the TOE IC part by SFR
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FDP_RIP.1
FDP_SDI.2
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_TDC.1
FPT_ITE.1
FPT_ITE.2
FPT_TST.1
FIA_SOS.1
FIA_AFL.1/PIN
FIA_AFL.1/PUC
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UID.1
FIA_API.1
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_USB.1
FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF
FDP_ACF.1/MF_DF
FDP_ACC.1/EF
FDP_ACF.1/EF
FDP_ACC.1/TEF
FDP_ACF.1/TEF
FDP_ACC.1/SEF
FDP_ACF.1/SEF
FDP_ACC.1/KEY
FDP_ACF.1/KEY
FMT_MSA.3
O.SecureMessaging
O.Crypto
O.KeyManagement
O.AccessControl
O.Authentication
O.TSFDataExport
O.Resp-COS
O.Confidentiality
O.Integrity
251 As stated in section 2.4, this PP claims conformance to BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11]. The
objectives and SFRs as used in Table 23 are defined and handled in [11]. Hence, the rationale for
these items and their correlation from Table 23 is given in [11] and not repeated here.
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
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O.SecureMessaging
O.Crypto
O.KeyManagement
O.Authentication
O.TSFDataExport
O.Resp-COS
O.Confidentiality
O.Integrity
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Life
FMT_MSA.1/SEF
FMT_MTD.1/PIN
FMT_MSA.1/PIN
FMT_MTD.1/Auth
FMT_MSA.1/Auth
FMT_MTD.1/NE
FCS_RNG.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1/COS.3TDES
FCS_COP.1/COS.AES
FCS_COP.1/COS.RMAC
FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM
FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.1/ELC
FCS_COP.1/COS.CMAC
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.V
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.S
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.V
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA
FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC
FCS_CKM.4
FTP_ITC.1/TC
O.AccessControl
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 24: Mapping between security objectives for the TOE and SFR
252 A detailed justification required for suitability of the security functional requirements to achieve
the security objectives is given below.
253 The security objective O.Integrity “Integrity of internal data” requires the protection of the
integrity of user data, TSF data and security services. This objective is addressed by the SFRs
FDP_SDI.2, FPT_FLS.1 and FPT_TST.1: FPT_TST.1 requires self tests to demonstrate the
correct operation of the TSF and its protection capabilities. FDP_SDI.2 requires the TSF to
monitor user data stored in containers and to take assigned action when data integrity error are
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detected. In case of failures, FPT_FLS.1 requires the preservation of a secure state in order to
protect the user data, TSF data and security services.
254 The security objective O.Confidentiality “Confidentiality of internal data” requires the
protection of the confidentiality of sensitive user data and TSF data. This objective is addressed
by the SFRs FDP_RIP.1, FPT_FLS.1, FPT_EMS.1, FPT_TST.1 and FMT_MTD.1/NE:
FMT_MTD.1/NE restricts the ability to export sensitive TSF data to dedicated roles, some
sensitive user data like private authentication keys are not allowed to be exported at all.
FPT_EMS.1 requires that the TOE does not emit any information of sensitive user data and TSF
data by emissions and via circuit interfaces. Further, FDP_RIP.1 requires that residual
information regarding sensitive data in previously used resources will not be available after its
usage. FPT_TST.1 requires self tests to demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF and its
confidentiality protection capabilities. In case of failures, FPT_FLS.1 requires the preservation of
a secure state in order to protect the user data, TSF data and security services.
255 The security objective O.Resp-COS “Treatment of User and TSF Data” requires the correct
treatment of the user data and TSF data as defined by the TSF data of the object system. This
correct treatment is ensured by appropriate self tests of the TSF. FPT_TST.1 requires self tests to
demonstrate the correct operation of the TSF and its data treatment.
256 The security objective O.TSFDataExport “Support of TSF data export” requires the correct
export of TSF data of the object system excluding confidential TSF data. This objective is
addressed by the SFRs FPT_TDC.1, FPT_ITE.1 and FPT_ITE.2: FPT_ITE.2 requires the export
of dedicated TSF data but restricts the kind of TSF data that can be exported. Hence, confidential
data shall not be exported. Also, the TSF is required to be able to export the fingerprint of TOE
implementation by the SFR FPT_ITE.1. For Card Verifiable Certificates (CVC), the SFR
FPT_TDC.1 requires the consistent interpretation when shared between the TSF and another
trusted IT product.
257 The security objective O.Authentication “Authentication of external entities” requires the
support of authentication of human users and external devices as well as the ability of the TSF to
authenticate itself. This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:
- FIA_SOS.1 requires that the TSF enforces the length of the secret of the password
objects.
- FIA_AFL.1/PIN requires that the TSF detects repeated unsuccessful authentication
attempts and blocks the password authentication when the number of unsuccessful
authentication attempts reaches a defined number.
- FIA_AFL.1/PUC requires that the TSF detects repeated unsuccessful authentication
attempts for the password unblocking function and performs appropriate actions when the
number of unsuccessful authentication attempts reaches a defined number.
- FIA_ATD.1 requires that the TSF maintains dedicated security attributes belonging to
individual users.
- FIA_UAU.1 requires the processing of dedicated actions before a user is authenticated.
Any other actions shall require user authentication.
- FIA_UAU.4 requires the prevention of reuse of authentication data.
- FIA_UAU.5 requires the TSF to support user authentication by providing dedicated
commands. Multiple authentication mechanisms like password based and key based
authentication are required.
- FIA_UAU.6 requires the TSF to support re-authentication of message senders using a
secure messaging channel.
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FIA_UID.1 requires the processing of dedicated actions before a user is identified. Any
other actions shall require user identification.
FIA_API.1 requires that the TSF provides dedicated commands to prove the identity of
the TSF itself.
FMT_SMR.1 requires that the TSF maintains roles and associates users with roles.
FIA_USB.1 requires that the TSF associates dedicated security attributes with subjects
acting on behalf of that user. Also, the TSF shall enforce rules governing changes of these
security attributes by the implementation of commands that perform these changes.
FMT_MTD.1/PIN requires that the TSF restricts the ability to change password objects
by the implementation of dedicated commands and management functions.
FMT_MSA.1/PIN requires that the TSF enforces the access control policy to restrict the
ability to change, enable and disable and optionally perform further operations of security
attributes for password objects. For that purpose the SFR requires management functions
to implement these operations.
FMT_MTD.1/Auth requires that the TSF restricts the ability to import device
authentication reference data by the implementation of dedicated commands and
management functions.
FMT_MSA.1/Auth requires that the TSF enforces the access control policy to restrict the
ability to read security attributes for the device authentication reference data. For that
purpose the SFR requires management functions to implement this operation.
258 The security objective O.AccessControl “Access Control for Objects” requires the enforcement
of an access control policy to restricted objects and devices. Further, the management
functionality for the access policy is required. This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:
- FMT_SMR.1 requires that the TSF maintains roles and associates users with roles.
- FIA_USB.1 requires that the TSF associates dedicated security attributes with subjects
acting on behalf of that user. Also, the TSF shall enforce rules governing changes of these
security attributes by the implementation of commands that perform these changes.
- FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF requires that the TSF enforces an access control policy to restrict
operations on MF and folders objects as well as applications performed by subjects of the
TOE.
- FDP_ACF.1/
MF_DF requires that the TSF enforce an access control policy to restrict operations on
MF and folders objects as well as applications based on a set of rules defined in the SFR.
Also, the TSF is required to deny access to the MF object in case of “Termination state”
of the TOE life cycle.
- FDP_ACC.1/EF requires that the TSF enforces an access control policy to restrict
operations on EF objects performed by subjects of the TOE.
- FDP_ACF.1/EF requires that the TSF enforce an access control policy to restrict
operations on EF objects based on a set of rules defined in the SFR. Also, the TSF is
required to deny access to EF objects in case of “Termination state” of the TOE life
cycle.
- FDP_ACC.1/TEF requires that the TSF enforces an access control policy to restrict
operations on transparent EF objects performed by subjects of the TOE.
- FDP_ACF.1/TEF requires that the TSF enforce an access control policy to restrict
operations on transparent EF objects based on a set of rules defined in the SFR. Also, the
TSF is required to deny access to transparent EF objects in case of “Termination state” of
the TOE life cycle.
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FDP_ACC.1/SEF requires that the TSF enforces an access control policy to restrict
operations on structured EF objects performed by subjects of the TOE.
FDP_ACF.1/SEF requires that the TSF enforce an access control policy to restrict
operations on structured EF objects based on a set of rules defined in the SFR. Also, the
TSF is required to deny access to structured EF objects in case of “Termination state” of
the TOE life cycle.
FDP_ACC.1/KEY requires that the TSF enforces an access control policy to restrict
operations on dedicated key objects performed by subjects of the TOE.
FDP_ACF.1/KEY requires that the TSF enforce an access control policy to restrict
operations on dedicated key objects based on a set of rules defined in the SFR. Also, the
TSF is required to deny access to dedicated key objects in case of “Termination state” of
the TOE life cycle.
FMT_MSA.3 requires that the TSF enforces an access control policy that provides
restrictive default values for the used security attributes. Alternative default values for
these security attributes shall only be allowed for dedicated authorized roles.
FMT_SMF.1 requires that the TSF implements dedicated management functions that are
given in the SFR.
FMT_MSA.1/Life requires that the TSF enforces the access control policy to restrict the
ability to manage life cycle relevant security attributes like lifeCycleStatus. For that
purpose the SFRs require management functions to implement these operations.
FMT_MSA.1/SEF requires that the TSF enforces the access control policy to restrict the
ability to manage of security attributes of recorde. For that purpose the SFRs require
management functions to implement these operations.
FMT_MTD.1/PIN requires that the TSF restricts the ability to change password objects
by the implementation of dedicated commands and management functions.
FMT_MSA.1/PIN requires that the TSF enforces the access control policy to restrict the
ability to read, change, enable, disable and optionally perform further operations of
security attributes for password objects. For that purpose the SFR requires management
functions to implement these operations.
FMT_MTD.1/Auth requires that the TSF restricts the ability to import device
authentication reference data by the implementation of dedicated commands and
management functions.
FMT_MSA.1/Auth requires that the TSF enforces the access control policy to restrict the
ability to read security attributes for the device authentication reference data. For that
purpose the SFR requires management functions to implement this operation.
FMT_MTD.1/NE restricts the ability to export sensitive TSF data to dedicated roles,
some sensitive user data like private authentication keys are not allowed to be exported at
all.
259 The security objective O.KeyManagement “Generation and import of keys” requires the ability
of the TSF to secure generation, import, distribution, access control and destruction of
cryptographic keys. Also, the TSF is required to support the import and export of public keys.
This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:
- FCS_RNG.1 requires that the TSF provides a random number generator of a specific
class used for generation of keys.
- FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM, FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM, FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FCS_CKM.1/ELC, require that the TSF generates cryptographic keys with specific key
generation algorithms as stated in the SFRs. The mentioned SFRs are needed to fulfil
different requirements of the intended usage of the cryptographic keys.
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FCS_CKM.4 requires that the TSF destroys cryptographic keys in accordance with a
given specific key destruction method.
FDP_ACC.1/KEY and FDP_ACF.1/KEY controls access to the key management and the
cryptographic operations using keys.
FMT_MSA.1/Life requires restriction of the management of security attributes of the
keys to subjects authorized for specific commands.
260 The security objective O.Crypto “Cryptographic functions” requires the ability of the TSF to
implement secure cryptographic algorithms. This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:
- FCS_RNG.1 requires that the TSF provides a random number generator of a specific
class used for generation of keys.
- FCS_COP.1/SHA requires that the TSF provides different hashing algorithms that are
referenced in the SFR.
- FCS_COP.1/COS.3TDES requires that the TSF provides decryption and encryption using
3TDES for secure messaging.
- FCS_COP.1/COS.AES requires that the TSF provides decryption and encryption using
AES with different key sizes.
- FCS_COP.1/COS.RMAC requires that the TSF provides computation and verification of
cryptographic checksums using the Retail MAC algorithm.
- FCS_COP.1/COS.CMAC requires that the TSF provides computation and verification of
cryptographic checksums using the CMAC algorithm.
- FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S requires that the TSF provides the generation of digital
signatures based on the RSA algorithm and different modulus’ lengths.
- FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.V requires that the TSF provides the verification of digital
signatures based on the RSA algorithm and different modulus’ lengths.
- FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.S requires that the TSF provides the generation of digital
signatures based on the ECDSA and different hash algorithms and different key sizes.
- FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.V requires that the TSF provides the verification of digital
signatures based on the ECDSA and different hash algorithms and different key sizes.
- FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA requires that the TSF provides encryption and decryption
capabilities based on RSA algorithms with different modulus’ lengths.
- FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC requires that the TSF provides encryption and decryption
capabilities based on ELC algorithms with different key sizes.
- FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM, FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM, FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FCS_CKM.1/ELC, require that the TSF generates cryptographic keys with specific key
generation algorithms as stated in the SFRs. The mentioned SFRs are needed to fulfil
different requirements of the intended usage of the cryptographic keys.
261 The security objective O.SecureMessaging “Secure messaging” requires the ability of the TSF to
use and enforce the use of a trusted channel to successfully authenticated external entities that
ensures the integrity and confidentiality of the transmitted data between the TSF and the external
entity. This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:
- FCS_COP.1/COS.3TDES requires that the TSF provides decryption and encryption using
3TDES for secure messaging.
- FCS_COP.1/COS.AES requires that the TSF provides decryption and encryption using
AES with different key sizes. One use case of that required functionality is secure
messaging.
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FCS_COP.1/COS.RMAC requires that the TSF provides computation and verification of
cryptographic checksums using the Retail MAC algorithm. One use case of that required
functionality is secure messaging.
FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM requires that the TSF generates cryptographic keys with
specific key generation algorithms as stated in the SFR.
FTP_ITC.1/TC requires that the TSF provides a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product. The channel provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data against modification and disclosure.
Rationale for SFR’s Dependencies
262 Table 3 in section 6.3.1 “Dependencies of security functional requirements” in BSI-CC-PP-00352007 [11] lists the security functional requirements defined in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007, their
dependencies and whether they are satisfied by other security requirements defined in this
Protection Profile. Please refer that table and the text following after that table justifying this in
detail for the further details on the remaining cases.
263 The dependency analysis for the security functional requirements shows that the basis for mutual
support and internal consistency between all defined functional requirements is satisfied. All
dependencies between the chosen functional components are analysed, and non-dissolved
dependencies are appropriately explained.
264 The dependency analysis has directly been made within the description of each SFR in sec. 6.1
above. All dependencies being expected by CC part 2 and by extended components definition in
chap. 5 are either fulfilled or their non-fulfilment is justified.
265 The following table lists the required dependencies of the SFRs of this PP and gives the concrete
SFRs from this document which fulfil the required dependencies.
SFR
FDP_RIP.1
FDP_SDI.2
FPT_FLS.1
FPT_EMS.1
FPT_TDC.1
FPT_ITE.1
FPT_ITE.2
FPT_TST.1
FIA_SOS.1
FIA_AFL.1/PIN
FIA_AFL.1/PUC
FIA_ATD.1
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.4
dependent on
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication.
No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification.
No dependencies.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
fulfilled by
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
FIA_UAU.1
FIA_UAU.1
n. a.
FIA_UID.1
n. a.
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SFR
FIA_UAU.5
FIA_UAU.6
FIA_UID.1
FIA_API.1
FMT_SMR.1
FIA_USB.1
FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF
FDP_ACF.1/MF_DF
FDP_ACC.1/EF
FDP_ACF.1/EF
FDP_ACC.1/TEF
FDP_ACF.1/TEF
FDP_ACC.1/SEF
FDP_ACF.1/SEF
FDP_ACC.1/KEY
FDP_ACF.1/KEY
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MSA.1/Life
FMT_MSA.1/SEF
dependent on
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute
definition
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute
based access control.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation
FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
No dependencies.
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control],
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles,
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
fulfilled by
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
FIA_UID.1
FIA_ATD.1
FDP_ACF.1/MF_DF
FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF,
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/EF
FDP_ACC.1/EF,
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/TEF
FDP_ACC.1/TEF,
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/SEF
FDP_ACC.1/SEF,
FMT_MSA.3
FDP_ACF.1/KEY
FDP_ACC.1/KEY,
FMT_MSA.3
FMT_MSA.1/Life,
FMT_MSA.1/SEF,
FMT_MSA.1/PIN,
FMT_MSA.1/Auth,
FMT_SMR.1
n. a.
FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF,
FDP_ACC.1/EF,
FDP_ACC.1/TEF,
FDP_ACC.1/SEF,
FDP_ACC.1/KEY,
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF,
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SFR
FMT_MTD.1/PIN
FMT_MSA.1/PIN
FMT_MTD.1/Auth
FMT_MSA.1/Auth
FMT_MTD.1/NE
FCS_RNG.1
FCS_COP.1/SHA
FCS_COP.1/COS.3TDES
FCS_COP.1/COS.AES
dependent on
control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control],
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles,
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles,
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control],
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles,
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles,
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information
flow control],
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles,
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles,
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
No dependencies.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
fulfilled by
FDP_ACC.1/EF,
FDP_ACC.1/TEF,
FDP_ACC.1/SEF,
FDP_ACC.1/KEY,
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF,
FDP_ACC.1/EF,
FDP_ACC.1/TEF,
FDP_ACC.1/SEF,
FDP_ACC.1/KEY,
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF,
FDP_ACC.1/EF,
FDP_ACC.1/TEF,
FDP_ACC.1/SEF,
FDP_ACC.1/KEY,
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
FMT_SMR.1,
FMT_SMF.1
n. a.
The dependent SFRs are not
applicable here because
FCS_COP.1/SHA does not
use any keys.
FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM,
FCS_CKM.4
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SFR
FCS_COP.1/COS.RMAC
FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM
FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM
FCS_CKM.1/RSA
FCS_CKM.1/ELC
FCS_COP.1/COS.CMAC
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S
dependent on
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/COS.3TDES,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/COS.3TDES,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/COS.AES,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.S,
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.V,
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC,
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.S,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FCS_CKM.4
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SFR
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA.V
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDS
A.S
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDS
A.V
FCS_COP.1/COS.RSA
FCS_COP.1/COS.ELC
FCS_CKM.4
FTP_ITC.1/TC
dependent on
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation]
No dependencies.
fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ELC,
FCS_CKM.4
FMT_MTD.1/Auth requires
import keys as of TSF data
used by
FCS_COP.1/COS.ECDSA.V
(instead of import of user data
FDP_ITC.1 or FDP_ITC.2)
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/ELC,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM,
FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM,
FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FCS_CKM.1/ELC,
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE
n. a.
Table 25: Dependencies of the SFR
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6.3.3
Security Assurance Requirements Rationale
266 The current assurance package was chosen based on the pre-defined assurance package EAL4.
This package permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level, at which it
is likely to retrofit to an existing product line in an economically feasible way. EAL4 is applicable
in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of
independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs and are prepared to incur
additional security specific engineering costs.
267 Please refer section 6.3.3 “Rationale for the Assurance Requirements” in BSI-CC-PP-00352007 [11] for the details regarding the chosen assurance level EAL4 augmented with
ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
268 The selection of the component ATE_DPT.2 provides a higher assurance than the pre-defined
EAL4 package due to requiring the functional testing of SFR-enforcing modules. The functional
testing of SFR-enforcing modules is due to the TOE building a smartcard platform with very
broad and powerful security functionality but without object system. An augmentation with
ATE_DPT.2 only for the SFR specified in BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [11] would have been
sufficient to fulfil the conformance, but this would contradict the intention of BSI-CC-PP-00352007. Therefore the augmentation with ATE_DPT.2 is required for the complete Protection
Profile.
269 The selection of the component ALC_DVS.2 provides a higher assurance of the security of the
development and manufacturing, especially for the secure handling of sensitive material. This
augmentation was chosen due to the broad application of the TOE in security critical applications.
270 The selection of the component AVA_VAN.5 provides a higher assurance than the pre-defined
EAL4 package, namely requiring a vulnerability analysis to assess the resistance to penetration
attacks performed by an attacker possessing a high attack potential.
271 The set of assurance requirements being part of EAL4 fulfils all dependencies a priori.
272 The augmentation of EAL4 chosen comprises the following assurance components:
– ATE_DPT.2,
– ALC_DVS.2, and
– AVA_VAN.5.
273 For these additional assurance component, all dependencies are met or exceeded in the EAL4
assurance package:
Component
Dependencies required
by CC Part 3
Dependency fulfilled by
TOE security assurance requirements (only additional to EAL4)
ALC_DVS.2
no dependencies
-
ATE_DPT.2
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_TDS.3
ADV_TDS.3
ATE_FUN.1
ATE_FUN.1
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Component
AVA_VAN.5
Dependencies required
by CC Part 3
Dependency fulfilled by
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_ARC.1
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_FSP.4
ADV_TDS.3
ADV_TDS.3
ADV_IMP.1
ADV_IMP.1
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_OPE.1
AGD_PRE.1
AGD_PRE.1
ATE_DPT.1
ATE_DPT.2
Table 26: SAR Dependencies
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7 Package Crypto Box
274 The COS may support optionally additional cryptographic functionality according to [21]. This
chapter defines the Package Crypto Box to be used by the ST writer if the TOE provides this
security functionality.
7.1 TOE Overview
275 Additional to the TOE definition given in section 1.2.1 TOE definition and operational usage the
TOE is equipped with additional cryptographic functionality.
7.2 Security Problem Definition
7.2.1
Assets and External Entities
Assets
276 The assets do not differ from the assets defined in section 3.1.
Subjects and external entities
277 There are no additional external entities and subjects than those defined in section 3.1.
7.2.2
Threats
278 There are no additional threats than the threats defined in section 3.2.
7.2.3
Organisational Security Policies
279 There are no additional Organisational Security Policies than the Organisational Security Policies
defined in section 3.3.
7.2.4
Assumptions
280 There are no additional Assumptions than the Assumptions defined in section 3.4.
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7.3 Security Objectives
281 The Security Objectives for the TOE (section 4.1) and the Security Objectives for Operational
Environment (section 4.2) is supplemented for the package Crypto Box. Therefore the Security
Objective Rationale (section 4.3) is supplemented as well.
282 The TOE shall provide a “Trusted channel (O.TrustedChannel)” as specified below.
O.TrustedChannel
Trusted channel
The TOE supports trusted channel for protection of the
confidentiality and the integrity for commands to be sent to
successful authenticated device and receiving responses from
this device on demand of the external application.
283 The operational environment shall provide a “Secure messaging support of external devices
(OE.SecureMessaging)” as specified below.
OE.SecureMessaging
Secure messaging support of external devices
The external device communicating with the TOE trough a
trusted channel supports device authentication with key
derivation, secure messaging for received commands and
sending responses.
284 The security objectives O.TrustedChannel and OE.SecureMessaging mitigate the threat
T.Intercept if the operational environment is not able to protect the communication by other
means.
7.4 Security Requirements for Package Crypto Box
285 Additional to the Authentication reference data of the devices and security attributes listed in
Table 15 the following table defines the authentication reference data of subjects for the TOE
with package Crypto Box.
User type
Device
Authentication reference data
Symmetric authentication key
Operations
MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE, EXTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE, PSO DECIPHER and
PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC
CHECKSUM used for trusted channel
Table 27: Authentication reference data of the devices and security attributes
286 Additional to the Authentication verification data of the devices and security attributes listed in
Table 15 the following table defines the authentication reference data of subjects for the TOE
with package Crypto Box and the authentication verification data used by the TSF itself (cf.
FIA_API.1).
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User type
resp. Subject
type
Device
TSF
Authentication verification data and Operations
security attributes
Trusted channel
Authentication verification data
Session key SK4TC
Security attributes
SK4TC referenced in
keyReferenceList.macCalculation
and keyReferenceList.dataEncipher
Trusted channel
Authentication verification data
Session key SK4TC
Security attributes
SK4TC referenced in
keyReferenceList.macCalculation
and keyReferenceList.dataEncipher
The commands PSO VERIFY
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM and PSO
DECIPHER are used to authenticate the
responses received after establishment of
session keys SK4TC.
The commands PSO COMPUTE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM and PSO
ENCIPHER are used to generate
commands received by the authenticated
PICC with secure messaging.
Table 28: Authentication Data of the COS with package Crypto Box
287 Additional to the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE defined in section 6.1 the TOE
shall meet the following SFR.
288 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Re-authenticating (FIA_UAU.6/CB)” as specified below:.
FIA_UAU.6/CB
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.6.1/CB
Re-authenticating – Trusted channel
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user sender of a message 285 under
the conditions
(1) each message received after establishing the trusted channel by
successful authentication by execution of the a combination of
INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE and EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE, or
MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE or GENERAL AUTHENTICATE
commands shall be verified as being sent by the authenticated
device using the commands PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC
CHECKSUM and PSO DECIPHER 286.
289 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Authentication Proof of Identity (FIA_API.1/CB)” as
specified below (Common Criteria Part 2 extended (see section 5.1)).
FIA_API.1/CB
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_API.1.1/CB
Authentication Proof of Identity – Trusted channel
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a
285
Refinement identifying the concrete user
286
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
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(1) PSO ENCIPHER and PSO COMPUTE CRYPTOGRAPHIC
CHECKSUM with SK4TC used for trusted channel commands 287
to prove the identity of the TSF itself 288 to an external entity.
290 The TOE shall meet the requirement “User-subject binding (FIA_USB.1/CB)” as specified
below.
FIA_USB.1/CB
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_USB.1.1/CB
FIA_USB.1.2/CB
FIA_USB.1.3/CB
User-subject binding
No other components.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition – Trusted channel
The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user: as defined in FIA_USB.1 289.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of
user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: as
defined in FIA_USB.1 290.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
(1) If the message received in commands PSO VERIFY
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM fails the verification or the
message received in command PSO DECIPHER fail the padding
condition the authentication state of the user bound to the
SK4TC is changed to “not authenticated” (i.e. the
keyReferenceList.macCalculation, keyReferenceList.
dataEncipher and the SK4TC are deleted).
(2) [assignment: further rules for the changing of attributes] 291.
291 The TOE shall meet the requirement
(FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1.1/CB.3TDES
“Cryptographic
operation
–
CB
3TDES
Cryptographic operation – CB 3TDES
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform
(1) encryption with negotiated key for command PSO
ENCIPHER,
(2) decryption with negotiated key for command PSO
DECIPHER,
(3) encryption and decryption with card internal key for
commands
a. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATE,
287
[assignment: authentication mechanism]
288
[assignment: object, authorized user or rule].
289
[assignment: list of user security attributes]
290
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]
291
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]
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b. EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATE,
(4) encryption with card internal key for command INTERNAL
AUTHENTICATE, and
(5) encryption and decryption for trusted channel PSO
ENCIPHER and PSO DECIPHER 292
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm 3TDES in
CBC mode 293 and cryptographic key sizes 192 bit (168 bit
effectively) 294 that meet the following TR-03116 [19], NIST SP
800-67 [38] 295.
292 The TOE shall meet the requirement
(FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1.1/CB.RMAC
operation
–
CB
RMAC
Cryptographic operation – CB RMAC
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform
(1) computation of cryptographic checksum for
a. INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE,
(2) computation and verification of cryptographic checksum
for command
b. PSO COMPUTE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM,
c. PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM
(3) computation and verification of cryptographic checksum
for trusted channel 296
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm Retail
MAC 32 297 and cryptographic key sizes 192 bit (168 bit
effectively) 298 that meet the following TR-03116 [19], COS
specification [21] 299.
293 The TOE shall meet the requirement
(FCS_COP.1/CB.AES)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/CB.AES
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
“Cryptographic
“Cryptographic
operation
–
CB
AES
Cryptographic operation – CB AES
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
292
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
293
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
294
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
295
[assignment: list of standards]
296
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
297
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
298
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
299
[assignment: list of standards]
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FCS_COP.1.1/CB.AES
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform
(1) encryption with negotiated key for command PSO
ENCIPHER,
(2) decryption with negotiated key for command PSO
DECIPHER,
(3) encryption and decryption for trusted channel
a. PSO ENCIPHER,
b. PSO DECIPHER 300
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm AES in
CBC mode 301 and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 192 bit,
256 bit 302 that meet the following: TR-03116 [19], COS
specification [21], FIPS 197 [33] 303.
294 The TOE shall meet the requirement
(FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1.1/CB.CMAC
“Cryptographic
operation
–
CB
CMAC
Cryptographic operation – CB CMAC
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform
(1) computation of cryptographic checksum for command
a. INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE,
(2) computation and verification of cryptographic checksum
for trusted channel
a. PSO COMPUTE CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM,
b. PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM 304
in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm CMAC 305
and cryptographic key sizes 128 bit, 192 bit, and 256 bit 306 that
meet the following TR-03116 [19], COS specification [21],
[36] 307.
295 The TOE shall meet the requirement
(FCS_COP.1/CB.RSA)” as specified below.
300
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
301
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
302
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
303
[assignment: list of standards]
304
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
305
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
306
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
307
[assignment: list of standards]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
“Cryptographic
operation
–
CB
RSA
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FCS_COP.1/CB.RSA
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
Cryptographic operation – CB RSA
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform encryption with stored key for command
PSO ENCIPHER 308 in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm
(1) for encryption:
a. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-Encrypt ([34] section 7.2.1),
b. RSA-OAEP-Encrypt ([34] section 7.1.1]),
(2) for decryption:
a. RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5-Decrypt ([34] section 7.2.2]),
b. RSA-OAEP-Decrypt ([34] section 7.1.2]) 309
and cryptographic key sizes 2048 bit and 3072 bit modulo length
for RSA private key operation and 2048 bit length for RSA
public key operation 310 that meet the following PKCS #1
[34] 311.
FCS_COP.1.1/CB.RSA
296 The TOE shall meet the requirement
(FCS_COP.1/CB.ELC)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/CB.ELC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1.1/CB.ELC
“Cryptographic
operation
–
CB
ECC
Cryptographic operation – CB ECC
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform encryption with stored key for
command PSO ENCIPHER 312 in accordance with a specified
cryptographic algorithm ELC encryption with COS standard
curves 313 and cryptographic key sizes 256 bits, 384 bits,
512 bits 314 that meet the following TR-03111 [17], chapter
4.3.1, 4.3.3 and 5.3.1.2 315.
297 The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage also
giving an evidence for sufficiency and necessity of the SFRs chosen in the cryptobox package.
308
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
309
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
310
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
311
[assignment: list of standards]
312
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
313
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
314
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
315
[assignment: list of standards]
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O.TrustedChannel
O.SecureMessaging
O.Crypto
O.AccessControl
O.Authentication
O.TSFDataExport
O.Resp-COS
O.Confidentiality
O.Integrity
FIA_API.1/CB
FIA_UAU.6/CB
FIA_USB.1/CB
FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES
FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC
FCS_COP.1/CB.AES
FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC
FCS_COP.1/CB.ELC
FCS_COP.1/CB.RSA
O.KeyManagement
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 29: Mapping between security objectives for the TOE and SFR for Package
Cryptobox
298 Table 29 above should be taken as extension of Table 24 in order to cover the whole set of
security objectives. Hence, the mappings between security objectives and SFRs in the table above
are used as additional mappings to address the corresponding security objectives.
299 The security objective O.TrustedChannel “Trusted channel” requires cryptographic
functionality for trusted channel support as described by SFR FIA_API.1/CB, FIA_UAU.6/CB,
FIA_USB.1/CB, FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES, FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC, FCS_COP.1/CB.AES and
FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC:
- FIA_API.1/CB requires that the TSF authenticates themselves to the entity receiving
communication through trusted channel.
- FIA_UAU.6/CB requires that the TSF to authenticate the entity sending communication
through trusted channel.
- FIA_USB.1/CB requires that the TSF to bind the authentication state to the entity sending
communication through trusted channel.
- FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES requires that the TSF provides decryption and encryption using
3TDES to be used in dedicated commands.
- FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC requires that the TSF provides computation and verification of
cryptographic checksums using the Retail MAC algorithm to be used in dedicated
commands.
- FCS_COP.1/CB.AES requires that the TSF provides decryption and encryption using
AES with different key sizes to be used in dedicated commands.
- FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC requires that the TSF provides computation and verification of
cryptographic checksums using the CMAC algorithm and different key sizes to be used in
dedicated commands.
300 The security objective O.Crypto “Cryptographic functions” requires the provision of security
services by implementation of secure cryptographic algorithms and protocols. The following
SFRs provide additional cryptographic services:
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Card Operating System (PP COS)
-
-
-
FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES requires that the TSF provides decryption and encryption using
3TDES to be used in dedicated commands.
FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC requires that the TSF provides computation and verification of
cryptographic checksums using the Retail MAC algorithm to be used in dedicated
commands.
FCS_COP.1/CB.AES requires that the TSF provides decryption and encryption using
AES with different key sizes to be used in dedicated commands.
FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC requires that the TSF provides computation and verification of
cryptographic checksums using the CMAC algorithm and different key sizes to be used in
dedicated commands.
FCS_COP.1/CB.ELC requires that the TSF provides encryption capabilities based on
ELC algorithms with different key sizes to be used in dedicated commands.
FCS_COP.1/CB.RSA requires that the TSF provides encryption capabilities based on
RSA algorithms with different modulus’ lengths to be used in dedicated commands.
301 The following table lists the required dependencies of the SFRs of this PP package and gives the
concrete SFRs from this document which fulfils the required dependencies.
SFR
FIA_API.1/CB
FIA_UAU.6/CB
FIA_USB.1/CB
FCS_COP.1/CB.3TDES
FCS_COP.1/CB.RMAC
FCS_COP.1/CB.AES
FCS_COP.1/CB.CMAC
dependent on
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
fulfilled by
n. a.
n. a.
FIA_ATD.1
FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/3TDES_SM,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/AES.SM,
FCS_CKM.4
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SFR
FCS_COP.1/CB.ELC
FCS_COP.1/CB.RSA
dependent on
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with
security attributes, or FCS_CKM.1
Cryptographic key generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/ELC,
FCS_CKM.4
FCS_CKM.1/RSA,
FCS_CKM.4
Table 30: Dependencies of the SFRs for Package Cryptobox
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8 Package Contactless
302 The COS may support optionally additional functionality for contactless communication of the
Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip (PICC) using the chip part of the PACE protocol according to
[21]. This chapter defines Package Contactless to be used by the ST writer if the TOE provides
this security functionality.
303 The TSF for the Proximity Coupling Devices (PCD) is described in the Package PACE for
Proximity Coupling Device in the chapter 9. Both packages are describing TSF for different roles
in the PACE protocol. E.g. the human user input the CAN into the smartcard terminal (as PCD)
and the smartcard terminal sends the CAN to the gSMC-KT (as TOE with Package PACE for
Proximity Coupling Device) running the PACE protocol in PCD role. The terminal communicates
with a contactless smartcard (as PICC), which is a sample of the TOE but with Package
Contactless and is running the PACE protocol in PICC role.
8.1 TOE Overview
304 This package describes additional TSF used for contactless communication as PICC with a
terminal. The COS has to detect by itself if the underlying chip uses a contactless interface and
has to use interface depended access rules in that case.
8.2 Security Problem Definition
8.2.1
Assets and External Entities
Assets
305 The assets do not differ from the assets defined in section 3.1.
Security Attributes of Users and Subjects
306 The PACE protocol provides mutual authentication between a smartcard running the Proximity
Integrated Circuit Chip (PICC) role and a terminal running Proximity Coupling Devices (PCD)
role of the protocol as described in [16] part 2. The TOE supporting the package Contactless
implements the PICC role of the PACE protocol. When the TOE running the PICC role of the
PACE protocol the subject gains security attributes used by the access control and bound to the
use of the established secure messaging channel after successful authentication.
307 The support of contactless communication introduces additional security attributes of users and
subjects bound to external entities and subjects are considered.
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User type
device with contactless
communication
device authenticated using
PACE protocol in PCD role
8.2.2
Definition
An external Device communicating with the TOE trough the
contactless interface. The subject bind to this device has the
security attribute “kontaktlos” (contactless communication).
An external Device communicating with the TOE trough the
contactless interface and successful authenticated by PACE
protocol in PCD role.
Threats
308 There are no additional threats than the threats defined in section 3.2.
8.2.3
Organisational Security Policies
309 There are no additional Organisational Security Policies than the Organisational Security Policies
defined in section 3.3.
8.2.4
Assumptions
310 There are no additional Assumptions than the Assumptions defined in section 3.4.
8.3 Security Objectives
311 The Security Objectives for the TOE (section 4.1) and the Security Objectives for Operational
Environment (section 4.2) are supplemented for the package Contactless. Therefore the Security
Objective Rationale (section 4.3) is supplemented as well.
312 The TOE shall provide a “Protection
(O.PACE_CHIP)” as specified below.
O.PACE_Chip
of
contactless
communication
with
PACE
Protection of contactless communication with PACE/PICC
The TOE supports the chip part of the PACE protocol in order
to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of data
communicated through the contactless interface of the TOE.
313 The operational environment shall provide a “PACE support by terminals (OE.PACE_Terminal)”
as specified below.
OE.PACE_Terminal
PACE support by contactless terminal
The external device communicating trough a contactless
interface with the TOE using PACE shall support the terminal
part of the PACE protocol.
314 The security objectives O.PACE_CHIP and OE.PACE_Terminal mitigate the threat T.Intercept if
contactless communication between the TOE and the terminal is used and the operational
environment is not able to protect the communication by other means.
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8.4 Security Requirements for Package Contactless
315 Additional to the authentication reference data of the devices listed in Table 15 the following
table defines for the TOE with package Contactless the authentication reference data of user in
PCD role and the authentication verification data used by the TSF itself (cf. FIA_API.1) in PICC
role.
User
type
resp.
Subject
type
Device
as PCD
TOE as
PICC
Authentication reference data and security
attributes
Operations
Symmetric Card Connection Object
(SCCO)
Authentication reference data
SCCO stored in TOE and corresponding
to the CAN, MAC session key SK4SM
Security attributes
keyIdentifier of the SCCO in the
globalSecurityList if SCCO was in MF or
in dfSpecificSecurityList if the SCCO was
in the respective folder
SK4SM referenced in macKey and
SSCmac
SK4SM referenced in macKey and
SSCmac
GENERAL AUTHENTICATE with
(CLA,INS,P1,P2)=(‘x0’,’86’,’00’,’00’)
is used by TOE running PACE
protocol role as PICC to authenticate
the external device running PACE
protocol role as PCD.
SK4SM is used to generate MAC for
command responses.
Table 30: Authentication Data of the COS for Package Contactless
316 Additional to the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE defined in section 6.1 the TOE
shall meet the following SFR.
317 The security functionality for access control in case of contactless communication is covered
already by the SFR FDP_ACF.1/MF_DF, FDP_ACF.1/EF, FDP_ACF.1/TEF, FDP_ACF.1/SEF
and FDP_ACF.1/KEY because the TSF shall implement the relevant security attributes described
in table 30 even the package Contactless is not included.
318 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Random number generation – RNG for PACE” as specified
below.
FCS_RNG.1/
PACE
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_RNG.1.1/
PACE
316
Random number generation – RNG for PACE
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a [selection: physical, non-physical true,
deterministic, hybrid deterministic, hybrid physical] 316 random number
generator RNG class [selection: DRG.4, PTG.3] for PACE protocol that
implements: [assignment: list of security capabilities of the selected RNG
[selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid]
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FCS_RNG.1.2/
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class].
The TSF provide random numbers [selection: bits, octets of bits,
numbers [assignment: format of the numbers]] that meet [assignment: a
defined quality metric of the selected RNG class].
319 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – PACE secure messaging
encryption (FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.ENC)” as specified below:
Cryptographic operation – PACE secure messaging
encryption
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE.PICC.ENC The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption for secure
messaging 317 in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm AES in CBC mode 318 and cryptographic key sizes
[selection: 128, 192, 256] bit 319 that meet the following TR03110 [16], COS specification [21] 320.
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PICC.ENC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
320 Application note 49: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive AES
for secure messaging with encryption of transmitted data and encrypting the nonce in the first step
of PACE. The related session keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the
PACE protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PICC.
321 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – PACE secure messaging MAC
(FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.MAC)” as specified below.
Cryptographic operation – PACE secure messaging MAC
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PICC.MAC
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
Dependencies:
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform MAC calculation for secure messaging 321 in
FCS_COP.1.1/
PACE.PICC.MAC accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm CMAC 322 and
cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128, 192, 256] bit 323 that meet the
following TR-03110 [16], COS specification [21] 324.
317
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
318
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
319
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
320
[assignment: list of standards]
321
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
322
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
323
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
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322 Application note 50: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for
secure messaging with message authentication code over transmitted data. The related session
keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the PACE protocol according to the
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PICC.
323 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation – DH by PACE
(FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PICC)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.1/
DH.PACE.PICC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.1.1/
DH.PACE.PICC
Cryptographic key generation – DH by PACE
No other components.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [selection:
Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3, ECDH compliant to
[17] using the protocol [selection: id-PACE-ECDH-GM-AES-CBCCMAC-128 with brainpoolP256r1, id-PACE-ECDH-GM-AES-CBCCMAC-192 with brainpoolP384r1, id-PACE-ECDH-GM-AES-CBCCMAC-256 with brainpoolP512r1] 325 and specified cryptographic
key sizes [selection: 256, 384, 512] 326 that meet the following TR03110 [16], TR-03111 [17] 327.
324 Application note 51: The TOE exchanges a shared secret with the external entity during the
PACE protocol, see [16]. This protocol may be based on the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant
to PKCS#3 (i.e. modulo arithmetic based cryptographic algorithm, cf. [33]) or on the ECDH
compliant to TR-03111 [17] (i.e. the elliptic curve cryptographic algorithm ECKA). The shared
secret is used for deriving the AES session keys for message encryption and message
authentication according to [16] for the TSF as required by FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.ENC, and
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.MAC. FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PICC implicitly contains the
requirements for the hashing functions used for key derivation by demanding compliance to TR03110 [16].
325 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic
(FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PICC)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.4/
PACE.PICC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.4.1/
PACE.PICC
key
destruction
-
PACE
Cryptographic key destruction - PACE
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key
destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of
324
[assignment: list of standards]
325
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
326
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
327
[assignment: list of standards]
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standards].
326 Application note 52: The TOE shall destroy the encryption session keys and the message
authentication keys for PACE protocol after reset or termination of the secure messaging (or
trusted channel) session or reaching fail secure state according to FPT_FLS.1. The TOE shall
clear the memory area of any session keys before starting a new communication with an external
entity in a new after-reset-session as required by FDP_RIP.1.
327 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of identification - PACE (FIA_UID.1/PACE)” as
specified below:
FIA_UID.1/
PACE
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UID.1.1/
PACE
FIA_UID.1.2/
PACE
Timing of identification - PACE
No other components.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication.
The TSF shall allow
(1) reading the ATS,
(2) to establish a communication channel,
(3) [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] 328
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is identified.
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
328 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Timing of authentication - PACE (FIA_UAU.1/PACE)” as
specified below:
FIA_UAU.1/
PACE
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.1.1/
PACE
FIA_UAU.1.2/
PACE
Timing of authentication - PACE
No other components.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification.
The TSF shall allow
(1) reading the ATS,
(2) to establish a communication channel,
(3) actions allowed according to FIA_UID.1/PACE and
FIA_UAU.1,
(4) [assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions] 329
on behalf of the user to be performed before the user is authenticated.
The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before
allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.
329 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Single-use authentication mechanisms – PACE/PICC
(FIA_UAU.4/PACE.PICC)” as specified below:
328
[assignment: list of TSF-mediated actions]
329
[assignment: list of TSF mediated actions]
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FIA_UAU.4/
PACE.PICC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.4.1/
PACE.PICC
Single-use authentication mechanisms
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall prevent reuse of verification authentication data related to
(1) PACE Protocol in PCD role according to TR-03116 [19], COS
specification [21] 330.
330 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms – PACE/PICC
(FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PICC)” as specified below:
FIA_UAU.5/
PACE.PICC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.5.1/
PACE.PICC
FIA_UAU.5.2/
PACE.PICC
Multiple authentication mechanisms – PACE/PICC protocol
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide
(1) PACE protocol in PICC role according to [16] [20] using
commands GENERAL AUTHENTICATE,
(2) secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode using PACE session keys
according to [20], chapter 13, and [16], part 3, in PICC role 331
to support user authentication.
The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
the PACE protocol as PICC is used for authentication of the device using
PACE protocol in PCD role and secure messaging in MAC-ENC mode
using PACE session keys is used to authenticate its commands 332.
331 The
TOE
shall
meet
the
requirement
(FIA_UAU.6/PACE.PICC)” as specified below:
FIA_UAU.6/
PACE.PICC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.6.1/
PACE.PICC
“Re-authenticating
–
PACE/PICC
Re-authenticating – PACE/PICC protocol
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions after
successful run of the PACE protocol as PICC each command received by
the TOE shall be verified as being sent by the authenticated PCD 333.
332 Application note 53: . The TOE running the PACE protocol as PICC specified in [26] checks each
command by secure messaging in encrypt-then-authenticate mode based on CMAC whether it
was sent by the successfully authenticated terminal (see FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.ENC and
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.MAC for further details) and sends all responses secure messaging
after successful PACE authentication The TOE does not execute any command with incorrect
message authentication code. Therefore, the TOE re-authenticates the terminal connected, if a
330
[assignment: identified authentication mechanism(s)]
331
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
332
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
333
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
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secure messaging error occurred, and accepts only those commands received from the initially
authenticated terminal (see FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PICC).
333 The TOE shall meet the requirement
(FIA_USB.1/PACE.PICC)” as specified below:
FIA_USB.1/
PACE.PICC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_USB.1.1/
PACE.PICC
FIA_USB.1.2/
PACE.PICC
FIA_USB.1.3/
PACE.PICC
“User-subject
binding
–
PACE/PICC
User-subject binding – PACE/PICC protocol
No other components.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user: The authentication state for the
device using PACE protocol in PCD role with
(1) keyIdentifier of the used SCCO in the globalSecurityList if SCCO
was in MF or in dfSpecificSecurityList if the SCCO was in the
respective folder,
(2) SK4SM referenced in macKey and SSCmac 334.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: see
FIA_USB.1 335.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
(1) The authentication state for the device after successful
authenticated using PACE protocol in PCD role is set to
“authenticated” and
a. keyIdentifier of the used SCCO in the globalSecurityList if
SCCO was in MF or in dfSpecificSecurityList if the SCCO
was in the respective DF,
b. the authentication reference data SK4SM is stored in macKey
and SSCmac.
(2) If an authentication attempt using PACE protocol in PCD role
failed
a. Executing GENERAL AUTHENTICATE for PACE Version 2
[16],
b. receiving commands failing the MAC verification or
encryption defined for secure messaging,
c. receiving messages violation MAC verification or encryption
defined for trusted channel established with PACE,
the authentication state for the specific context of SCCO has to
be set to “not authenticated” (i.e. the element in
globalSecurityList respective in the dfSpecificSecurityList and the
SK4SM are deleted) 336.
334 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset residual information protection – PACE/PICC
(FDP_RIP.1/PACE.PICC)” as specified below:
FDP_RIP.1/
Subset residual information protection – PACE/PICC protocol
334
[assignment: list of user security attributes]
335
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]
336
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]
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PACE.PICC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_RIP.1.1/
PACE.PICC
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
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No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource
is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to,
deallocation of the resource from]
337 the following objects:
(1) session keys (immediately after closing related communication
session),
(2) any ephemeral secret having been generated during DH key
exchange
(3) [assignment: list of additional objects] 338.
335 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Basic data exchange confidentiality - PACE
(FDP_UCT.1/PACE)” as specified below:
FDP_UCT.1/
PACE
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_UCT.1.1/
PACE
Basic data exchange confidentiality – PACE protocol
No other components.
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
The TSF shall enforce the access control MF_DF SFP, access control EF
SFP, access rule TEF SFP, access rule SEF SFP and access control key
SFP 339 to transmit and receive 340 user data in a manner protected from
unauthorised disclosure.
336 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Data exchange integrity - PACE (FDP_UIT.1/PACE)” as
specified below:
FDP_UIT.1/
PACE
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_UIT.1.1/
PACE
Data exchange integrity - PACE protocol
No other components.
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or
FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted channel, or
FTP_TRP.1 Trusted path]
The TSF shall enforce the access control MF_DF SFP, access control EF
SFP, access rule TEF SFP, access rule SEF SFP and access control key
SFP 341 to transmit and receive 342 user data in a manner protected from
modification, deletion, insertion, and replay 343 errors.
337
[selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]
338
[assignment: list of objects]
339
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
340
[selection: transmit, receive]
341
[assignment: access control SFP(s) and/or information flow control SFP(s)]
342
[selection: transmit, receive]
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FDP_UIT.1.2/
PACE
The TSF shall be able to determine on receipt of user data, whether
modification, deletion, insertion, and replay 344 has occurred.
337 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Inter-TSF
(FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PICC)” as specified below.
FTP_ITC.1/
PACE.PICC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FTP_ITC.1.1/
PACE.PICC
FTP_ITC.1.2/
PACE.PICC
FTP_ITC.1.3/
PACE.PICC
trusted
channel
–
PACE/PICC
Inter-TSF trusted channel – PACE/PICC
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product 345 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
The TSF shall initiate enforce communication via the trusted channel for
data exchange between the TOE and the external user if required by
access control rule of the object in the object system 346.
338 Application note 54: The trusted IT product is the terminal. In FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE.PICC, the
word “initiate” is changed to “enforce”because the TOE is a passive device that can not initiate
the communication, but can enforce secured communication if required for an object in the object
system and shutdown the trusted channel after integrity violation of a received command.
339 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles – PACE/PICC (FMT_SMR.1/PACE.PICC)”
as specified below.
FMT_SMR.1/
PACE.PICC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_SMR.1.1/
PACE.PICC
Security roles – PACE/PICC protocol
No other components.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
The TSF shall maintain the roles
(1) the roles defined in FMT_SMR.1,
(2) PACE authenticated terminal,
(3) [assignment: additional authorised identified roles] 347.
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
FMT_SMR.1.2/
PACE.PICC
340 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data – PACE/PICC
(FMT_MTD.1/PACE.PICC)” as specified below.
343
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
344
[selection: modification, deletion, insertion, replay]
345
[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
346
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
347
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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FMT_MTD.1/
PACE.PICC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1/
PACE.PICC
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
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Management of TSF data – PACE/PICC protocol
No other components.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
The TSF shall restrict the ability to read 348 349 the
(1) SCCO used for PACE protocol in PICC role,
(2) session keys of secure messaging channel established using
PACE protocol in PICC role 350
to none 351.
341 Application note 55: The refinement defined an additional rule for managing the SCCO in a
special case of the PACE protocol (i.e. the PICC role). The derived session keys SM4SM shall be
kept secret.
342 The TOE shall meet the requirement Export of TSF data - PACE (FPT_ITE.2/PACE) as specified
below.
FPT_ITE.2/
PACE
Export of TSF data – PACE protocol
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
No dependencies.
The TOE shall export
(1) the public TSF data as defined in FPT_ITE.2.1 352
given the following conditions
(1) conditions as defined in FPT_ITE.2.1,
(2) no export of the SCCO 353.
The TSF shall use [assignment: list of encoding rules to be applied by
TSF] for the exported data.
FPT_ITE.2.1/
PACE
FPT_ITE.2.2/
PACE
343 The TOE shall meet the requirement “User attribute definition - PACE ” (FIA_ATD.1/PACE) as
specified below.
FIA_ATD.1/
PACE
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_ATD.1.1/
PACE
User attribute definition – PACE protocol
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging
to individual users:
348
[assignment: other operations]
349
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
350
[assignment: list of TSF data]
351
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
352
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
353
[assignment: conditions for export]
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(1) for users defined in FIA_ATD.1
(2) additionally for device: authentication state gained with SCCO 354.
344 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE emanation - PACE (FPT_EMS.1/PACE.PICC)” as
specified below (CC part 2 extended).
FPT_EMS.1/
PACE.PICC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_EMS.1.1/
PACE.PICC
FPT_EMS.1.2/
PACE.PICC
TOE emanation – PACE/PICC protocol
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to
(1) Symmetric Card Connection Object (SCCO),
(2) PACE session keys,
(3) any ephemeral secret having been generated during DH key
exchange,
(4) any object listed in FPT_EMS.1,
(5) [assignment: list of additional types of TSF data] 355
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
The TSF shall ensure any users 356 are unable to use the following
interface the contactless interface and circuit contacts 357 to gain access
to
(1) Symmetric Card Connection Object (SCCO),
(2) PACE session keys,
(3) any ephemeral secret having been generated during DH key
exchange,
(4) any object listed in FPT_EMS.1,
(5) [assignment: list of additional types of TSF data] 358
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
8.5 Security Requirements rationale
345 The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage also
giving an evidence for sufficiency and necessity of the SFRs chosen in the “Package Contactless”.
354
[assignment: list of security attributes]
355
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
356
[assignment: type of users]
357
[assignment: type of connection]
358
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
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O.Crypto
O.PACE_Chip
O.KeyManagement
O.Authentication
O.TSFDataExport
O.Resp-COS
O.Confidentiality
O.Integrity
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PICC
FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PICC
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PICC.ENC
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PICC.MAC
FCS_RNG.1/PACE
FDP_RIP.1/PACE.PICC
FDP_UCT.1/PACE
FDP_UIT.1/PACE
FIA_ATD.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/PACE.PICC
FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PICC
FIA_UAU.6/PACE.PICC
FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_USB.1/PACE.PICC
FMT_MTD.1/PACE.PICC
FMT_SMR.1/PACE.PICC
FPT_EMS.1/PACE.PICC
FPT_ITE.2/PACE
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PICC
O.AccessControl
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 31: Mapping between security objectives for the TOE and SFR for package
Contactless
346 Table 31 above should be taken as extension of Table 24 in order to cover the whole set of
security objectives. Hence, the mappings between security objectives and SFRs in the table above
are used as additional mappings to address the corresponding security objectives.
347 All SFR of the Package Contactless are implementing security functionality for the security
objective O.PACE_Chip.
348 The security objective O.Confidentiality “Confidentiality of internal data” requires the
protection of the confidentiality of sensitive user data and TSF data. The SFR
FDP_RIP.1/PACE.PICC addresses this security objective as it requires that residual information
regarding sensitive data in previously used resources will not be available after its usage. Further,
the SFR FMT_MTD.1/PACE.PICC requires that the TSF denies everyone the read access to
dedicated confidential TSF data as defined in the SFR. The SFR FPT_EMS.1/PACE.PICC
protect the confidential authentication data against compromise.
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349 The security objective O.TSFDataExport “Support of TSF data export” requires the correct
export of TSF data of the object system excluding confidential TSF data. The SFR
FPT_ITE.2/PACE requires the ability of the TOE to export public TSF data and defines
conditions for exporting these TSF data.
350 The security objective O.Authentication “Authentication of external entities” requires the
support of authentication of human users and external devices as well as the ability of the TSF to
authenticate itself. The successful authentication using PACE protocol sets the keyIdentifier in the
globalSecurityList or dfSpecificSecurityList. This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:
- FIA_ATD.1/PACE requires that the TSF maintains dedicated security attributes
belonging to individual users.
- FIA_USB.1/PACE.PICC requires that the TSF associates the security attribute
“authentication state of the PACE terminal” with subjects acting on behalf of that user.
Also, the TSF shall enforce rules governing changes of these security attributes by the
implementation of commands that perform these changes.
- FIA_UID.1/PACE requires the processing of dedicated actions before a user is identified.
Any other actions shall require user identification.
- FIA_UAU.1/PACE requires the processing of dedicated actions before a user is
authenticated. Any other actions shall require user authentication.
- FIA_UAU.4/PACE.PICC requires the prevention of reuse of authentication data related
to the PACE protocol.
- FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PICC requires the TSF to support the PACE protocol and secure
messaging based on PACE session keys. Further, the TSF shall authenticate all users
based on the PACE protocol.
- FIA_UAU.6/PACE.PICC requires the TSF to support re-authentication of users under
dedicated conditions as given in the SFR.
- FPT_EMS.1/PACE.PICC requires that the TOE does not emit any information of
sensitive user data and TSF data by emissions and via circuit interfaces.
- FMT_MTD.1/PACE.PICC requires that the TSF prevents SCCO and session keys from
reading.
- FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PICC requires that the TSF provides a communication channel
between itself and another trusted IT product established by PACE. The channel provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data against
modification and disclosure.
- FMT_SMR.1/PACE.PICC requires that the TSF maintains roles including PACE
authenticated terminal and associates users with roles.
351 The security objective O.AccessControl “Access Control for Objects” requires the enforcement
of an access control policy to restricted objects and devices. Further, the management
functionality for the access policy is required. The security attribute of the subject keyIdentifier in
the globalSecurityList or dfSpecificSecurityList is already described in the access control SFR.
This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:
- FIA_UID.1/PACE defines the TSF mediated actions alloed before a user is identified.
Any other actions shall require user identification.
- FIA_UAU.1/PACE defines the TSF mediated actions before a user is authenticated. Any
other actions shall require user authentication.
- FIA_UAU.4/PACE.PICC requires the prevention of reuse of authentication data related
to the PACE protocol.
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FIA_ATD.1/PACE requires that the TSF maintains dedicated security attributes
belonging to individual users.
FIA_USB.1/PACE.PICC requires that the TSF associates the security attribute
“authentication state of the PACE terminal” with subjects acting on behalf of that user.
Also, the TSF shall enforce rules governing changes of these security attributes by the
implementation of commands that perform these changes.
FMT_SMR.1/PACE requires that the TSF maintains roles and associates users with roles.
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PICC requires that the TSF provides a communication channel
between itself and another trusted IT product established by PACE. The channel provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data against
modification and disclosure.
352 The security objective O.KeyManagement “Generation and import of keys” requires the ability
of the TSF to secure generation, import, distribution, access control and destruction of
cryptographic keys. Also, the TSF is required to support the import and export of public keys.
This objective is addressed by the SFR FCS_RNG.1/PACE.PICC that requires that the TSF
provides a physical random number generator of class DRG.4 or PTG.3.
353 The security objective O.Crypto “Cryptographic functions” requires the ability of the TSF to
implement secure cryptographic algorithms. This security objectives is addressed by the
following SFRs that provide additional cryptographic operations:
- FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PICC requires that the TSF generate cryptographic keys with the
Diffie-Hellman-Protocol or ECDH.
- FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PICC requires that the TSF destroys cryptographic keys in
accordance with a given specific key destruction method.
- FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.ENC requires that the TSF provides decryption and encryption
using AES to be used for secure messaging.
- FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.MAC requires that the TSF provides computation and
verification of cryptographic checksums using the CMAC algorithm to be used for secure
messaging.
354 The security objective O.PACE_Chip “Protection of contactless communication with
PACE/PICC” requires the TOE support of the chip part of the PACE protocol in order to protect
the confidentiality and the integrity of data communicated through the contactless interface of the
TOE.
All
SFR,
i.e.
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PICC,
FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PICC,
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.ENC
,
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.MAC,
FCS_RNG.1/PACE,
FDP_RIP.1/PACE.PICC,
FDP_UCT.1/PACE,
FDP_UIT.1/PACE,
FIA_ATD.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.1/PACE,
FIA_UAU.4/PACE.PICC,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PICC,
FIA_UAU.6/PACE.PICC,
FIA_UID.1/PACE,
FIA_USB.1/PACE.PICC,
FMT_MTD.1/PACE.PICC,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE.PICC,
FPT_EMS.1/PACE.PICC,
FPT_ITE.2/PACE, FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PICC, are defined to implement the security objective
specific for the package Contacless.
355 The following table lists the required dependencies of the SFRs of this PP package and gives the
concrete SFRs from this document which fulfils the required dependencies.
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SFR
dependent on
fulfilled by
FCS_CKM.1/
DH.PACE.PICC
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.ENC,
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PICC.MAC,
FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PICC
FCS_CKM.4/
PACE.PICC
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PICC.ENC
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PICC.MAC
FCS_RNG.1/PACE
FDP_RIP.1/
PACE.PICC
FDP_RIP.1/PACE
FDP_UCT.1/PACE
FDP_UIT.1/PACE
No dependencies.
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted
path],
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control]
[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access
control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset
information flow control],
[FTP_ITC.1 Inter-TSF trusted
channel, or FTP_TRP.1 Trusted
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PICC
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PICC,
FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PICC
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PICC,
FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PICC
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF,
FDP_ACC.1/EF,
FDP_ACC.1/TEF,
FDP_ACC.1/SEF,
FDP_ACC.1/KEY,
FTP_ITC.1/PACE,
FDP_ACC.1/MF_DF,
FDP_ACC.1/EF,
FDP_ACC.1/TEF,
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SFR
FIA_ATD.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
FIA_UAU.4/
PACE.PICC
FIA_UAU.5/
PACE.PICC
FIA_UAU.6/
PACE.PICC
FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_USB.1/
PACE.PICC
FMT_MTD.1/PACE
FMT_SMR.1/
PACE.PICC
FMT_SMR.1/PACE
FPT_EMS.1/
PACE.PICC
FPT_ITE.2/PACE
FTP_ITC.1/
PACE.PICC
FTP_ITC.1/PACE
dependent on
fulfilled by
path]
FDP_ACC.1/SEF,
FDP_ACC.1/KEY,
n. a.
FIA_UID.1/PACE
No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification.
No dependencies.
n. a.
No dependencies.
n. a.
No dependencies.
n. a.
FIA_UAU.1 Timing of
authentication.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute
definition
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
No dependencies.
FIA_UAU.1/PACE
n. a.
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
n. a.
n. a.
No dependencies.
n. a.
FIA_ATD.1/PACE
FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_SMF.1
FIA_UID.1/PACE
FIA_UID.1/PACE
Table 32: Dependencies of the SFRs for Package Contactless
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9 Package PACE for Proximity Coupling Device
356 The COS may support optionally additional functionality for contactless communication of
Proximity Coupling Devices (PCD, named also “terminal” in the following) using the terminal
part of the PACE protocol according to [21]. This chapter defines Package PACE for Proximity
Coupling Device to be used by the ST writer if the TOE provides this security functionality.
357 The TSF for the Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip (PICC) is described in Package Contactless in
the chapter 8.
9.1 TOE Overview
358 This package describes additional TSF supporting the contactless communication of a terminal in
PCD role with the smartcard (PICC) using PACE. The TOE is part of the terminal and provides
the cryptographic functions for the terminal through its contactbased interface. The terminal
implements the contactless interface to PICC.
9.2 Security Problem Definition
9.2.1
Assets and External Entities
359 The assets do not differ from the assets defined in section 3.1.
Security Attributes of Users and Subjects
360 The PACE protocol provides mutual authentication between a smartcard running the Proximity
Integrated Circuit Chip (PICC) role and a terminal running Proximity Coupling Devices (PCD)
role of the protocol as described in [16] part 2. When the TOE running the PCD role of the PACE
protocol the subject gains security attributes defining the authentication status of the external user
communicating through the trusted channel established after successful authentication. This
authentication status is identified in the response code of the trusted channel commands PSO
DECIPHER and PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM.
361 The support of contactless communication introduces additional security attributes of users and
subjects bound to external entities and subjects are considered
User type
device with contactless
communication
Definition
An external Device communicating with the TOE trough the
contactless interface. The subject bind to this device has the
security attribute “kontaktlos” (contactless communication).
device authenticated using
An external Device communicating with the TOE trough the
PACE protocol in PICC role contactless interface and successful authenticated by PACE
protocol in PICC role.
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9.2.2
Threats
362 There are no additional threats than the threats defined in section 3.2.
9.2.3
Organisational Security Policies
363 There are no additional Organisational Security Policies than the Organisational Security Policies
defined in section 3.3.
9.2.4
Assumptions
364 There are no additional Assumptions than the Assumptions defined in section 3.4.
9.3 Security Objectives
365 The TOE shall provide a “Protection of contactless communication with PACE/PCD
(O.PACE_Terminal)” as specified below.
O.PACE_Terminal
Protection of contactless communication with PACE/PCD
The TOE supports the terminal part of the PACE protocol in
order to protect the confidentiality and the integrity of data
communicated through the contactless interface of the terminal.
366 The operational environment shall provide a “PACE support by chip (OE.PACE_Chip)” as
specified below.
OE.PACE_Chip
PACE/PICC support by contactless chip
The external device communicating trough its contactless
interface using PACE shall support the chip part of the PACE
protocol.
367 The security objectives O.PACE_Terminal and OE.PACE_Chip mitigate the threat T.Intercept if
contactless communication between the terminal and the chip is used and the operational
environment is not able to protect the communication by other means.
9.4 Security Requirements for Package PACE for Proximity Coupling
Device
368 Additional to the authentication reference data of the devices listed in Table 15 the following
table defines the authentication reference data for the TOE with package PACE for user PICC
including the authentication verification data used by the TSF itself as Proximity Coupling
Device (cf. FIA_API.1).
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User
type
resp.
Subject
type
device
as
PICC
TOE
acting
for
human
user as
PCD
Authentication reference data and security
attributes
Operations
Card Access Number (CAN)
Authentication verification data
Card Access Number (CAN) provided to
the TOE,
ENC and MAC session keys SK4TC
generated running PACE
Security attributes
flagSessionEnabled equal SK4TC
negotiationKeyInformation
SK4TC referenced in
keyReferenceList.macCalculation and
keyReferenceList.dataEncipher
The command GENERAL
AUTHENTICATE with
(CLA,INS,P1,P2)=(‘x0’,’86’,’00’,’00’)
is used by TOE running PACE
protocol role as PCD to authenticate
the external device running PACE
protocol role as PICC.
Note, the commands PSO VERIFY
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM and PSO
DECIPHER supported by TOE with
package Cryptobox are used to
authenticate the responses received
after establishment of session keys
SK4TC.
The commands PSO COMPUTE
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM and PSO
ENCIPHER are used to generate
commands received by the
authenticated PICC with secure
messaging.
SK4TC referenced in
keyReferenceList.macCalculation and
keyReferenceList.dataEncipher
Table 33: Authentication Data of the COS with Package PACE for Proximity Coupling
Device
369 Additional to the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE defined in section 6.1 the TOE
shall meet the following SFR.
370 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – PACE trusted channel
encryption (FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.ENC)” as specified below:
Cryptographic operation – PACE secure messaging
encryption
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes,
or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
FCS_COP.1.1/PACE.PCD.ENC The TSF shall perform decryption and encryption for trusted
channel 359 in accordance with a specified cryptographic
algorithm AES in CBC mode 360 and cryptographic key sizes
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PCD.ENC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
359
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
360
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
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[selection: 128, 192, 256] bit 361 that meet the following TR03110 [16], COS specification [21] 362.
371 Application note 49: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive AES
for secure messaging with encryption of transmitted data and encrypting the nonce in the first step
of PACE. The related session keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the
PACE protocol according to the FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PCD.
372 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic operation – PACE secure messaging MAC
(FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.MAC)” as specified below.
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PCD.MAC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_COP.1.1/
PACE.PCD.MAC
Cryptographic operation – PACE secure messaging MAC
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction
The TSF shall perform MAC calculation for trusted channel 363 in
accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm CMAC 364 and
cryptographic key sizes [selection: 128, 192, 256] bit 365 that meet the
following TR-03110 [16], COS specification [21] 366.
373 Application note 50: This SFR requires the TOE to implement the cryptographic primitive for
secure messaging with message authentication code over transmitted data. The related session
keys are agreed between the TOE and the terminal as part of the PACE protocol according to the
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PCD.
374 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic key generation – DH by PACE
(FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PICC)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.1/
DH.PACE.PCD
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.1.1/
DH.PACE.PCD
Cryptographic key generation – DH by PACE/PCD
No other components.
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation]
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key destruction.
The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a
specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [selection:
Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant to PKCS#3, ECDH compliant to
[17] using the protocol [selection: id-PACE-ECDH-GM-AES-CBCCMAC-128_PCD with brainpoolP256r1, id-PACE-ECDH-GMAES-CBC-CMAC-192_PCD with brainpoolP384r1, id-PACE-
361
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
362
[assignment: list of standards]
363
[assignment: list of cryptographic operations]
364
[assignment: cryptographic algorithm]
365
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
366
[assignment: list of standards]
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ECDH-GM-AES-CBC-CMAC-256_PCD with brainpoolP512r1]367
and specified cryptographic key sizes [selection: 256, 384, 512]368
that meet the following TR-03110 [16], TR-03111 [17] 369.
375 Application note 51: The TOE exchanges a shared secret with the external entity during the
PACE protocol, see [16]. This protocol may be based on the Diffie-Hellman-Protocol compliant
to PKCS#3 (i.e. modulo arithmetic based cryptographic algorithm, cf. [33]) or on the ECDH
compliant to TR-03111 [17] (i.e. the elliptic curve cryptographic algorithm ECKA). The shared
secret is used for deriving the AES session keys for message encryption and message
authentication according to [16] for the TSF as required by, FCS_COP.1/ PACE.PCD.ENC, and
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.MAC.
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PCD
implicitly contains the
requirements for the hashing functions used for key derivation by demanding compliance to TR03110 [16].
376 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Cryptographic
(FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PCD.PICC)” as specified below.
FCS_CKM.4/
PACE.PCD
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_CKM.4.1/
PACE.PCD
key
destruction
-
PACE
Cryptographic key destruction - PACE
No other components.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation]
The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified
cryptographic key destruction method [assignment: cryptographic key
destruction method] that meets the following: [assignment: list of
standards].
377 Application note 52: The TOE shall destroy the encryption session keys and the message
authentication keys for PACE protocol after reset or termination of the secure messaging (or
trusted channel) session or reaching fail secure state according to FPT_FLS.1. The TOE shall
clear the memory area of any session keys before starting a new communication with an external
entity in a new after-reset-session as required by FDP_RIP.1.
378 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Multiple authentication mechanisms - PACE
(FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PCD)” as specified below:
FIA_UAU.5/
PACE.PCD
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.5.1/
PACE.PCD
Multiple authentication mechanisms – PACE/PCD protocol
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide
(1) PACE protocol in PCD role according to [16] [20] using
commands GENERAL AUTHENTICATE,
(2) trusted channel using PACE session keys according to [20],
chapter 13, and [16], part 3, in PCD role 370
367
[assignment: cryptographic key generation algorithm]
368
[assignment: cryptographic key sizes]
369
[assignment: list of standards]
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FIA_UAU.5.2/
PACE.PCD
to support user authentication.
The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the
the PACE protocol as PCD is used for authentication of devices using
PACE protocol in PICC role and trusted channel in MAC-ENC mode
using PACE session keys is used and messages received in commands
PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM and PSO DECIPHER 371.
379 The
TOE
shall
meet
the
requirement
(FIA_UAU.6/PACE.PCD)” as specified below:
FIA_UAU.6/
PACE.PCD
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_UAU.6.1/
PACE.PCD
“Re-authenticating
–
PACE/PCD
Re-authenticating – PACE/PCD protocol
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall re-authenticate the user under the conditions after
successful run of the PACE protocol as PCD each message received in
commands PSO VERIFY CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM and PSO
DECIPHER shall be verified as being sent by the authenticated PICC 372.
380 Application note 53: The PACE protocol as PCD specified in [26] starts trusted channel used for
all commands and responses exchanged after successful PACE authentication. The TOE decrypts
and verifies each response whether it was sent by the successfully authenticated chip to the
terminal (see FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.ENC and FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.MAC for further
details). The TOE executes these verifications only on demand of the terminal. Therefore, the
TOE re-authenticates the chip connected, if a trusted channel error occurred, and accepts only
those responses received from the initially authenticated chip (see FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PCD).
381 The TOE shall meet the requirement
(FIA_USB.1/PACE.PCD)” as specified below:
“User-subject
binding
–
PACE/PCD
FIA_USB.1/
PACE.PCD
Hierarchical to:
User-subject binding – PACE/PCD protocol
Dependencies:
FIA_USB.1.1/
PACE/PCD
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user: The authentication state for the
device using PACE protocol in PICC role with SK4TC referenced in
keyReferenceList.macCalculation and keyReferenceList.dataEncipher 373.
FIA_USB.1.2/
PACE.PCD
The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user
security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: see
FIA_USB.1 374.
No other components.
370
[assignment: list of multiple authentication mechanisms]
371
[assignment: rules describing how the multiple authentication mechanisms provide authentication]
372
[assignment: list of conditions under which re-authentication is required]
373
[assignment: list of user security attributes]
374
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]
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FIA_USB.1.3/
PACE.PCD
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user
security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users:
(1) The authentication state for the device successfully authenticated
using PACE protocol in PICC role is set to “authenticated” and
the authentication reference data SK4TC is stored in
keyReferenceList.macCalculation
and
keyReferenceList.
dataEncipher.
(2) If the message received in commands PSO VERIFY
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CHECKSUM fails the verification or the
message received in command PSO DECIPHER fail the padding
condition the authentication state of the user gained using PACE
protocol in PICC role and bound to the SK4TC is changed to
“not authenticated” (i.e. the keyReferenceList.macCalculation,
keyReferenceList. dataEncipher and the SK4TC are deleted) 375.
382 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset residual information protection – PACE/PCD
(FDP_RIP.1/PACE.PCD)” as specified below:
FDP_RIP.1/
PACE.PCD
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_RIP.1.1/
PACE.PCD
Subset residual information protection – PACE/PCD protocol
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource
is made unavailable upon the [selection: allocation of the resource to,
deallocation of the resource from]
376 the following objects:
(1) trusted channel keys (immediately after closing related
communication session),
(2) any ephemeral secret having been generated during DH key
exchange,
(3) [assignment: list of additional objects] 377.
383 The TOE shall meet the requirement “TOE emanation – PACE/PCD (FPT_EMS.1/PACE.PCD)”
as specified below (CC part 2 extended).
FPT_EMS.1/
PACE.PCD
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FPT_EMS.1.1/
PACE.PCD
TOE emanation – PACE protocol
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of
[assignment: specified limits] enabling access to
(1) CAN,
(2) PACE session keys,
(3) any ephemeral secret having been generated during DH key
exchange,
375
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]
376
[selection: allocation of the resource to, deallocation of the resource from]
377
[assignment: list of objects]
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FPT_EMS.1.2/
PACE.PCD
(4) any object listed in FPT_EMS.1
(5) [assignment: list of additional types of TSF data] 378
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
The TSF shall ensure any users 379 are unable to use the following
interface the contactless interface and circuit contacts 380 to gain access
to
(1) CAN,
(2) PACE session keys,
(3) any ephemeral secret having been generated during DH key
exchange,
(4) any object listed in FPT_EMS.1,
(5) [assignment: list of additional types of TSF data] 381
and [assignment: list of types of user data].
384 The TOE shall meet the requirement
(FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PCD)” as specified below.
FTP_ITC.1/
PACE.PCD
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FTP_ITC.1.1/
PACE.PCD
FTP_ITC.1.2/
PACE.PCD
FTP_ITC.1.3/
PACE.PCD
“Inter-TSF
trusted
channel
–
PACE/PCD
Inter-TSF trusted channel – PACE/PCD
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from modification or disclosure.
The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product 382 to initiate
communication via the trusted channel.
The TSF shall initiate enforce communication via the trusted channel for
data exchange between the TOE and the external user after successful
establishing the trusted channel by means of PACE383.
385 Application note 54: The trusted IT product is the terminal. In FTP_ITC.1.3/PACE.PCD, the
word “initiate” is changed to “enforce”because the TOE is a passive device that can not initiate
the communication, but can enforce secured communication if required the terminal and
shutdown the trusted channel after integrity violation of the received data for decryption or MAC
verification.
386 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security roles – PACE/PCD (FMT_SMR.1/PACE.PCD)”
as specified below.
378
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
379
[assignment: type of users]
380
[assignment: type of connection]
381
[assignment: list of types of TSF data]
382
[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
383
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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FMT_SMR.1/
PACE.PCD
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_SMR.1.1/
PACE.PCD
FMT_SMR.1.2/
PACE/PCD
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Security roles – PACE/PCD protocol
No other components.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification
The TSF shall maintain the roles
(1) the roles defined in FMT_SMR.1,
(2) PACE authenticated PICC,
(3) [assignment: additional authorised identified roles] 384.
The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.
387 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Management of TSF data – PACE/PCD
(FMT_MTD.1/PACE.PCD)” as specified below.
FMT_MTD.1/
PACE.PCD
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MTD.1.1/
PACE.PCD
Management of TSF data – PACE/PCD protocol
No other components.
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
The TSF shall restrict the ability to
(1) read 385 386 the keys of trusted channel established using PACE
protocol in PCD role 387 to none 388,
(2) define 389 390 the CAN used for PACE protocol in PCD role to
everybody 391.
388 Application note 55: The refinement defined an additional rule for managing the CAN in a special
case of the PACE protocol (i.e. the PCD role). The derived session keys SM4SM and SM4TC
shall be kept secret.
9.5 Security Requirements rationale
389 The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage also
giving an evidence for sufficiency and necessity of the SFRs chosen in the “Package Contactless”.
384
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
385
[assignment: other operations]
386
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
387
[assignment: list of TSF data]
388
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
389
[assignment: other operations]
390
[selection: change_default, query, modify, delete, clear, [assignment: other operations]]
391
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
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O.Crypto
O.PACE_Terminal
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
O.KeyManagement
O.Authentication
O.TSFDataExport
O.Resp-COS
O.Confidentiality
O.Integrity
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PCD
FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PCD
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.ENC
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PCD.MAC
FDP_RIP.1/PACE:PCD
FPT_EMS.1/PACE.PICC
FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PCD
FIA_UAU.6/PACE.PCD
FIA_USB.1/PACE.PCD
FMT_MTD.1/PACE.PCD
FMT_SMR.1/PACE.PCD
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PCD
O.AccessControl
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 34: Mapping between security objectives for the TOE and SFR for Package PACE for
Proximity Coupling Device
390 Table 34 above should be taken as extension of Table 24 in order to cover the whole set of
security objectives. Hence, the mappings between security objectives and SFRs in the table above
are used as additional mappings to address the corresponding security objectives.
391 All SFR identified in this PACE for Proximity Coupling Device” are implementing security
functionality for the security objective O.PACE_Terminal.
392 The security objective O.Confidentiality “Confidentiality of internal data” requires the
protection of the confidentiality of sensitive user data and TSF data. The SFR
FDP_RIP.1/PACE.PCD addresses this security objective as it requires that residual information
regarding sensitive data in previously used resources will not be available after its usage. The
FMT_MTD.1/PACE.PCD requires to protect the confidentiality of the trusted channel keys
against reading. The SFR FPT_EMS.1/PACE.PCD protect the confidential authentication data
against compromise.
393 The security objective O.Authentication “Authentication of external entities” requires the
support of authentication of human users and external devices as well as the ability of the TSF to
authenticate itself. The successful authentication using PACE protocol sets the keyIdentifier in the
globalSecurityList or dfSpecificSecurityList. This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:
- FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PCD requires the TSF to support the PACE protocol and secure
messaging based on PACE trusted channel keys. Further, the TSF shall authenticate all
users based on the PACE protocol.
- FIA_UAU.6/PACE.PCD requires the TSF to support re-authentication of users under
dedicated conditions as given in the SFR.
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FPT_EMS.1/PACE.PCD requires that the TOE does not emit any information of
sensitive user data and TSF data by emissions and via circuit interfaces.
FMT_MTD.1/PACE..PCD requires that the TSF restricts the ability to change password
objects by the implementation of dedicated commands and management functions.
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PCD requires that the TSF provides a communication channel
between itself and another trusted IT product established by PACE. The channel provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data against
modification and disclosure.
FMT_SMR.1/PACE.PCD requires that the TSF maintains roles and associates users with
roles.
394 The security objective O.AccessControl “Access Control for Objects” requires the enforcement
of an access control policy to restricted objects and devices. Further, the management
functionality for the access policy is required. The security attribute of the subject keyIdentifier in
the globalSecurityList or dfSpecificSecurityList is already described in the access control SFR.
This objective is addressed by the following SFRs:
- FMT_SMR.1/PACE.PCD requires that the TSF maintains roles and associates users with
roles.
- FIA_USB.1/PACE.PCD requires that the TSF associates the security attribute
“authentication state of the PACE terminal” with subjects acting on behalf of that user.
Also, the TSF shall enforce rules governing changes of these security attributes by the
implementation of commands that perform these changes.
- FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PCD requires that the TSF provides a communication channel
between itself and another trusted IT product established by PACE. The channel provides
assured identification of its end points and protection of the channel data against
modification and disclosure.
395 The security objective O.Crypto “Cryptographic functions” requires the ability of the TSF to
implement secure cryptographic algorithms. This security objectives is addressed by the
following SFRs that provide additional cryptographic operations:
- FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PCD requires that the TSF generate cryptographic keys with the
Diffie-Hellman-Protocol or ECDH.
- FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PCD requires that the TSF destroys cryptographic keys in
accordance with a given specific key destruction method.
- FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.ENC requires that the TSF provides decryption and encryption
using AES to be used for secure messaging.
- FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.MAC requires that the TSF provides computation and
verification of cryptographic checksums using the CMAC algorithm to be used for secure
messaging.
396 The security objective O.PACE_Terminal “Protection of contactless communication with
PACE/PCD” requires the TOE support of the terminal part of the PACE protocol in order to
protect the confidentiality and the integrity of data communicated through the contactless
interface of the terminal. All SFR, i.e. FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PCD, FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PCD,
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.ENC,
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.MAC,
FDP_RIP.1/PACE.PCD,
FPT_EMS.1/PACE.PCD,
FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PCD,
FIA_UAU.6/PACE.PCD,
FIA_USB.1/PACE.PCD,
FMT_MTD.1/PACE.PCD,
FMT_SMR.1/PACE.PCD,
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PCD, are defined to meet this security objective specific for the package
PACE for Proximity Coupling Device.
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397 The following table lists the required dependencies of the SFRs of this PP package and gives the
concrete SFRs from this document which fulfils the required dependencies.
SFR
FCS_CKM.1/
DH.PACE.PCD
FCS_CKM.4/
PACE.PCD
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PCD.ENC
FCS_COP.1/
PACE.PCD.MAC
FIA_UAU.5/PACE.PCD
FIA_UAU.6/PACE.PCD
FIA_USB.1/PACE.PCD
FPT_EMS.1/PACE.PCD
FTP_ITC.1/PACE.PCD
FDP_RIP.1/PACE.PCD
FMT_SMR.1/PACE.PCD
FMT_MTD.1/PACE.PCD
dependent on
[FCS_CKM.2 Cryptographic key
distribution, or
FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic
operation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction.
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
[FDP_ITC.1 Import of user data
without security attributes, or
FDP_ITC.2 Import of user data
with security attributes, or
FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key
generation],
FCS_CKM.4 Cryptographic key
destruction
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute
definition
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
No dependencies.
FIA_UID.1 Timing of
identification
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
FMT_SMF.1 Specification of
Management Functions
fulfilled by
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.ENC,
FCS_COP.1/PACE.PCD.MAC,
FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PCD
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PCD
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PCD,
FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PCD
FCS_CKM.1/DH.PACE.PCD,
FCS_CKM.4/PACE.PCD
n. a.
n. a.
FIA_ATD.1/PACE
n. a.
n. a.
n. a.
FIA_UID.1/PACE
FMT_SMR.1/PACE,
FMT_SMF.1
Table 35: Dependencies of the SFRs
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10 Package Logical Channel
10.1 TOE Overview
398 Additional to the TOE definition given in section TOE definition and operational usage the TOE
is equipped with additional logic channels. The extension is purely functional. The command GET
RANDOM is included in optional package Logical Channel in [21].
10.2 Security Problem Definition
10.2.1 Assets and External Entities
Assets
399 The assets do not differ from the assets defined in section 3.1.
Subjects and external entities
400 There are no additional external entities and subjects than those defined in section 3.1.
10.2.2 Threats
401 There are no additional threats than the threats defined in section 3.2.
10.2.3 Organisational Security Policies
402 There are is an additional Organisational Security Policy additional to those defined in section
3.3.
OSP.LogicalChannel
Logical channel
The TOE supports and the operational environment uses logical
channels bound to independent subjects.
403 Application note 56: The COS specification [21] describes the concept of logical channels in
chapter 12.
10.2.4 Assumptions
404 There are no additional Assumptions than the Assumptions defined in section 3.4.
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10.3 Security Objectives
405 The Security Objectives for the TOE (section 4.1) and the Security Objectives for Operational
Environment (section 4.2) are supplemented for the package contactless interface. Therefore the
Security Objective Rationale (section 4.3) is supplemented as well.
406 The TOE shall provide a “Support of more than one logical channel (O.LogicalChannel)” as
specified below.
O.LogicalChannel
Support of more than one logical channel
The TOE supports more than one logical channel each bound to
an independent subject.
407 The operational environment shall provide a “Use of logical channels (OE.LogicalChannel)” as
specified below.
OE.LogicalChannel
Use of logical channels
The operational environment manages logical channels bound
to independent subjects for running independent processes at
the same time.
408 The security objectives
OSP.LogicalChannel.
O.LogicalChannel
and
OE.LogicalChannel
implement
the
10.4 Security Requirements for Package Logical Channel
409 Additional to the Security Functional Requirements for the TOE defined in section 6.1 the TOE
shall meet the following SFR.
410 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Random number generation – Get random command
(FCS_RNG.1/GR)” as specified below.
FCS_RNG.1/GR
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FCS_RNG.1.1/GR
FCS_RNG.1.2/GR
Random number generation – Get random command
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a physical 392 random number generator [selection:
PTG.2, PTG.3] [6] for GET RANDOM that implements: [assignment: list
of security capabilities of the selected RNG class].
The TSF shall provide random numbers [selection: bits, octets of bits,
numbers [assignment: format of the numbers]] that meet [assignment: a
defined quality metric of the selected RNG class].
411 Application note 48: If the TOE will provide random numbers by means of command GET
RANDOM for key generation of external devices like the connector (i.e. usage as gSMC-K) or the
eHealth card terminals (i.e. usage as SMC-KT) the provided random numbers shall meet TR03116 [19] section 3.5. If the command GET RANDOM will be used to seed another deterministic
392
[selection: physical, non-physical true, deterministic, hybrid]
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RNG the external device the TOE shall implement RNG of class PTG.2 or PTG.3 for this
purpose.
412 The TOE shall meet the requirement “User-subject binding – Logical channel (FIA_USB.1/LC)”
as specified below.
User-subject binding – Logical channel
No other components.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with
subjects acting on the behalf of that user:
(1) The authentication state for the context as specified in
FIA_USB.1,
(2) The authentication state for a context is bound to the
logical channel the authentication took place393.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association
of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of
users:
(1) If a new logical channel is opened the authentication state
is “not authenticated” for all contexts within that logical
channel 394.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the
user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf
of users:
(1) Every logical channel has its own context. The rules as
specified in FIA_USB.1.3 for the context shall be enforced
for each logical channel separately.
(2) After a logical channel is closed or reseted, e.g. by the use
of a MANAGE CHANNEL command, the authentication state
for all contexts within the closed logical channel must be
“not authenticated”.
(3) The execution of a DELETE command has to be rejected if
more than one channel is open.
(4) [assignment: rules for the changing of attributes] 395.
FIA_USB.1/LC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FIA_USB.1.1/LC
FIA_USB.1.2/LCs
FIA_USB.1.3/LC
413 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Subset access control – Logical channel
(FDP_ACC.1/LC)” as specified below.
FDP_ACC.1/LC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1.1/LC
Subset access control – Logical channel
No other components.
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control.
The TSF shall enforce the Logical Channel SFP 396 on
(1) the subjects FDP_ACF.1/EF and FDP_ACF.1/
MF_DF,
(2) the objects
393
[assignment: list of user security attributes]
394
[assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes]
395
[assignment: rules for the changing of attributes]
396
[assignment: access control SFP]
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a. logical channel,
b. objects as defined in FDP_ACF.1/EF,
c. objects as defined in FDP_ACF.1/MF_DF,
(3) the operation by command following
a. command SELECT,
b. command MANAGE CHANNEL to open, reset and close a
logical channel 397.
414 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Security attribute based access control – Logical channel
(FDP_ACF.1/LC)” as specified below.
FDP_ACF.1/LC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1.1/LC
FDP_ACF.1.2/LC
FDP_ACF.1.3/LC
FDP_ACF.1.4/LC
Security attribute based access control – Logical channel
No other components.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
The TSF shall enforce Logical Channel SFP 398 to objects based on the
following
(1) the subjects as defined in FDP_ACF.1/EF and FDP_ACF.1/
MF_DF with security attribute “logical channel”,
(2) the objects
a. logical channel with channel number,
b. as defined in FDP_ACF.1/EF and FDP_ACF.1/
MF_DF with security attribute “shareable” 399.
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
(1) The command MANAGE CHANNEL is [selection: ALWAYS
allowed, [assignment: supported access control rules]].
(2) An subject is allowed to open, reset or close a logical channel
with channel number higher than 1 if a logical channel is
available and the subject fulfils the access conditions for
command MANAGE CHANNEL with the corresponding
parameter P1.
(3) An subject is allowed to select an object as current object in
more than one logical channel if it the security attribute
“shareable” is set to “True” 400.
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none 401.
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
following additional rules:
(1) if the security attribute of an object is set to “not shareable” this
object is not accessible as current object in more than one
logical channel 402.
397
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
398
[assignment: access control SFP]
399
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
400
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
401
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
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415 Application note57: The COS specification [21] claims that the security attribute “shareable” is
always “True”.
416 The TOE shall meet the requirement “Static attribute initialisation (FMT_MSA.3)” as specified
below.
FMT_MSA.3/LC
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FMT_MSA.3.1/LC
FMT_MSA.3.2/LC
Static attribute initialisation – Logical channel
No other components.
FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
The TSF shall enforce the Logical Channel SFP 403 to provide
restrictive 404 default values for security attributes that are used to
enforce the SFP. After a logical channel is opened the security
attributes of the subject associated with this logical channel are set
as follows
(1) currentFolder is root,
(2) keyReferenceList, globalSecurityList, globalPasswordList,
dfSpecificSecurityList, dfSpecificPasswordList bitSecurityList
are empty,
(3) SessionkeyContext.flagSessionEnabled to noSK,
(4) seIdentifier is #1,
(5) currentFile is undefined.
The TSF shall allow the subjects allowed to execute the command LOAD
APPLICATION 405 to specify alternative initial values to override the
default values when an object or information is created.
10.5 Security Requirements rationale
FCS_RNG.1/GR
FIA_USB.1/LC
X
X
X
402
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
403
[assignment: access control SFP, information flow control SFP]
404
[selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]]
405
[assignment: the authorised identified roles]
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
O.LogicalChannel
O.SecureMessaging
O.Crypto
O.KeyManagement
O.AccessControl
O.Authentication
O.TSFDataExport
O.Resp-COS
O.Confidentiality
O.Integrity
417 The following table provides an overview for security functional requirements coverage also
giving an evidence for sufficiency and necessity of the SFRs chosen in the Logical Channel
package.
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O.LogicalChannel
O.SecureMessaging
O.Crypto
O.AccessControl
O.Authentication
O.TSFDataExport
O.Resp-COS
O.Confidentiality
O.Integrity
FDP_ACC.1/LC
FDP_ACF.1/LC
FMT_MSA.3/LC
O.KeyManagement
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X
X
X
X
X
X
Table 36: Mapping between security objectives for the TOE and SFR for the package
Logical Channels
418 Table 36 above should be taken as extension of Table 24 in order to cover the whole set of
security objectives. Hence, the mappings between security objectives and SFRs in the table above
are used as additional mappings to address the corresponding security objectives.
419 The security objectives O.AccessControl “Access Control for Objects” and O.LogicalChannel
“Support of more than one logical channel” require the enforcement of an access control policy to
restricted objects and devices in more than one logical channel. Further, the management
functionality for the access policy is required. This security objective is addressed by the
following SFRs:
- FCS_RNG.1/GR providing secure random numbers for external entities, these are the
same as using more than one logical channel,
- FIA_USB.1/LC requires that the TSF associates the user authentication state with
subjects acting on behalf of that user. Also, the TSF shall enforce rules governing
changes of these security attributes by the implementation of commands that perform
these changes.
- FDP_ACC.1/LC requires that the TSF enforces an logical channel control policy to
restrict operations on dedicated EF and DF objects performed by subjects of the TOE.
- FDP_ACF.1/LC requires that the TSF enforce an logical channel control policy to restrict
operations on dedicated EF and DF objects based on a set of rules defined in the SFR.
Also, the TSF is required to deny access to dedicated EF and DF objects in case that the
security attribute of the object is set to “not sharable”.
- FMT_MSA.3/LC requires that the TSF assign restrictive security attributes to the
subjects of new opened logical channel.
420 The following table lists the required dependencies of the SFRs of this PP package and gives the
concrete SFRs from this document which fulfils the required dependencies.
SFR
FCS_RNG.1/GR
FIA_USB.1/LC
FDP_ACC.1/LC
FDP_ACF.1/LC
dependent on
No dependencies.
FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based
access control.
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control,
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute
initialisation
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
fulfilled by
n. a.
FIA_ATD.1
FDP_ACF.1/LC
FDP_ACC.1/LC,
FMT_MSA.3
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SFR
FMT_MSA.3/LC
dependent on
FMT_MSA.1 Management of
security attributes,
FMT_SMR.1 Security roles
fulfilled by
FMT_MSA.1/Life,
FMT_MSA.1/PIN,
FMT_MSA.1/Auth,
FMT_SMR.1
Table 37: Dependencies of the SFRs
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11 Annex: Composite Evaluation of Smart Cards as Signature
Products based on COS Smart Card Platforms (Informative)
421 The TOE of the protection profile in hand may be used as smart card platform for smart cards
used as secure signature-creation devices (SSCD) and as parts of signature-creation applications
(SCA). The SSCD shall and SCA should be evaluated for approval as signature product according
to the German Signature Ordinance [46]. This evaluation may be performed as composite
evaluation [8] with a TOE certified conforming to the protection profile in hand as Certified
Platform and the object system of the smart card as Application.
422 This informative annex discuss how security targets for such composite evaluation may be written
on the examples of the electronic Health Card (eHC), electronic health professional card (eHPC)
as SSCD and the secure module cards of KT (gSMC-KT) and K (gSMC-K) as part of SCA. It
uses the CEN standards [12], [14] and [15] as protection profiles describing security requirements
for SSCD.
423 Note however, that the German Digital Signature Ordinance does not require conformance to any
protection profile in order to evaluate a product for qualified digital signatures. Therefore an ST
author may also consider relevant contents from one of these PPs without claiming formal
conformance.
11.1 Smart Cards as Secure Signature-creation Devices based COS
(Informative)
424 The preparation of a smart card as SSCD includes the following steps.
(1) The personalisation as SSCD comprises the definition of the signatory as authorized user of
the signature-creation data (SCD) in the SSCD i.e. a private signature key.
(2) The initialization of the SSCD comprises the loading into or generation by the SSCD of the
signature key pair. The SSCD shall implement the SCD and should implement the signature
verification data (SVD), i.e. the public key e.g. for verification of the digital signature
generated with the private key as self-test.
(3) The generation of the qualified certificate by Certification Service Provider for qualified
certificates (CSP-QC) containing the SVD which correspond to the SCD under the control of
the signatory, the name of the signatory or a pseudonym, which is to be identified as such, an
indication of the beginning and end of the validity period of the certificate. The qualified
certificate shall be verifiable by means of the directory services of the CSP-QC. The CSPQC SSCD should load certificate info or the certificate into the SSCD for signatory
convenience.
425 The following sections assume that the eHC and the eHPC implement the MF and the DF.QES as
defined in the object system specifications [22] for eHC and [23] for eHPC. 406
406
Note the smart card platform, the MF and the DF.QES define the security features of the eHC and eHPC in
respect of the qualified electronic signature. The other parts of the object system must not affect this security
functionality. The MF and the DF.QES specification are expected being stable and independent on updates
of the object system specifications.
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426 The ST for the eHC and eHPC as SSCD may claim conformance to the protection profile in hand
and appropriate SSCD protection profile depending on the method of the initialization and the
method of use as SSCD.
11.1.1 eHC as SSCD
427 The eHC are issued by the German health insurance companies to patients insured by them for
use health care services. If the patient as cardholder wishes the eHC shall be prepared by a CSPQC as SSCD where the patient is the signatory.
428 The object system specification of the eHC [22] already specifies in DF.QES
(1) the user Signatory by means of the PIN object PIN.QES,
(2) the signature-creation data as Pr.CH.QES.R2048
Pr.CH.QES.R3072 and Pr.CH.QES.E384,
(mandatory)
and
optional
(3) the EF.C.CH.QES.R2048 and optional additional files for other certificates.
429 The role Signatory is different from role cardholder defined by regular password PIN.CH in MF
and the roles defined by multi-reference password referencing to the secret of the PIN.CH.
430 The eHC may be initialized in three different ways:
(1) The CSP-QC may generate the signature key pair by the eHC and export the public key from
the SSCD to the certificate-generation application in its trusted environment. In this case the
ST author should claim conformance to the Protection profiles for secure signature creation
device — Part 2: Device with key generation, BSI-CC-PP-0059 [12].
(2) The CSP-QC may generate the signature key pair and load the private key as signaturecreation data into the SSCD. In this case the ST author should claim conformance to the
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 3: Device with key import,
BSI-CC-PP-0075 [13]. The CSP-QC will send the public key to the certificate-generation
application in its trusted environment.
(3) The CSP-QC or the signatory may generate the signature key pair by the eHC and export the
public key from the SSCD to the certificate-generation application through trusted channel
after delivery of the smart card to the cardholder. In this case the ST author should claim
conformance to the Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 4:
Extension for device with key generation and trusted communication with certificate
generation application, BSI-CC-PP-0071 [14].
431 Note the object specification of the eHC [22] does not specifies the access control rule for
Pr.CH.QES.x and command GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR and therefore allows for
product and CSP-QC specific solutions.
432 The regular password PIN.QES shall be protected by setting the security attribute transportStatus
to Transport-PIN in time of delivery of the eHC to the cardholder and before personalization as
SSCD by changing the transportStatus to regularPassword. The security attribute “SCD
operational” defined in the SSCD PP [13] and [12] and referenced by conformance claim [14] is
implemented by means of the security attribute transportStatus of the PIN.QES, where the value
Transport-PIN of the security attribute transportStatus meets the value “no” of the security
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attribute “SCD operational” and the value Reguläres Passwort of the security attribute
transportStatus meets the value “yes” of the security attribute “SCD operational”.
433 The access control rules of the signature-creation data Pr.CH.QES.R2048, Pr.CH.QES.R3072 and
Pr.CH.QES.E384 for the signature-creation function by means of command PSO COMPUTE
DIGITAL SIGNATURE defined in [22] meet the SFR FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation as
defined in the SSCD PP [12], [13] and [14].
11.1.2 eHPC as SSCD
434 The eHPC is mandatory issued as SSCD. The eHPC supports
(1) local PIN entry, i.e. it is assumed that the PIN is entered at the same smart card terminal as
the eHPC is used and send to the eHPC in clear text,
(2) remote PIN entry, i.e. the smart card terminal used as PIN entry device transmits the PIN
through a trusted channel to the eHPC in another (or even the same) smart card terminal,
(3) single signature-creation, i.e. creation of only one signature after authentication as signatory,
(4) batch signature creation, i.e. creation of one or more signature after authentication as
signatory.
435 The object system specification of the eHPC [23] already specifies in DF.QES
(1) the user Signatory by means of PIN object PIN.QES,
(2) the signature-creation data as Pr.CH.QES.R2048
Pr.CH.QES.R3072 and Pr.CH.QES.E384,
(mandatory)
and
optional
(3) the EF.C.CH.QES.R2048 and optional files for other certificates.
436 The role Signatory is different from role cardholder defined by regular password PIN.CH in MF
and the roles defined by multi-reference password referencing to the secret of the PIN.CH.
437 The eHPC may be initialized in three different ways:
(1) The CSP-QC may generate the signature key pair by the eHPC and export the public key
from the SSCD to the certificate-generation application in its trusted environment. In this
case the ST author should claim conformance to the Protection profiles for secure signature
creation device — Part 2: Device with key generation, BSI-CC-PP-0059 [12].
(2) The CSP-QC may generate the signature key pair and load the private key as signaturecreation data into the SSCD. In this case the ST author should claim conformance to the
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 3: Device with key import,
BSI-CC-PP-0075 [13]. The CSP-QC will send the public key to the certificate-generation
application in its trusted environment.
(3) The CSP-QC or the signatory may generate the signature key pair by the eHPC and export
the public key from the SSCD to the certificate-generation application through trusted
channel after delivery of the smart card to the cardholder. In this case the ST author should
claim conformance to the Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 4:
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generation application, BSI-CC-PP-0071 [14].
438 Note the object specification of the eHPC [23] does not specifies the access control rule for
Pr.CH.QES.x and command GENERATE ASYMMETRIC KEY PAIR but leave the access
control rule up to the CSP-QS. Because of mandatory initialization of eHPC as SSCD the case (3)
is unlikely of practical use for the first SCD but may be considered for update of DF.QES with
meaw SCD and corresponding certificates.
439 The regular password PIN.QES shall be protected by setting the security attribute transportStatus
to Transport-PIN in time of delivery of the eHPC to the cardholder and before personalization as
SSCD by changing the transportStatus to regularPassword. The security attribute “SCD
operational” defined in the SSCD PP [13] and [12] and referenced by conformance claim [14] is
implemented by means of the security attribute transportStatus of the PIN.QES, where the value
Transport-PIN of the security attribute transportStatus meets the value “no” of the security
attribute “SCD operational” and the value Reguläres Passwort of the security attribute
transportStatus meets the value “yes” of the security attribute “SCD operational”.
440 The PIN authentication using a remote smart card terminal as PIN entry device requires the
confidentiality protection of the PIN transmitted between this terminal and the eHPC. This
confidentiality protection is enabled by the Konnektor controlling mutual authentication between
gSMC-KT as PIN sender and eHPC as PIN receiver and establishing a secure messaging channel
between them. Note because the eHPC supports both local PIN entry and remote PIN entry and
cannot distinguish between them the eHPC does not enforce secure messaging as PIN receiver for
the PIN.QES.
441 The access control rules for the single signature creation function with signature-creation data
Pr.CH.QES.R2048, Pr.CH.QES.R3072 and Pr.CH.QES.E384 and command PSO COMPUTE
DIGITAL SIGNATURE defined in [23] requires successful authentication with PIN.QES only
and meet the SFR FDP_ACF.1/Signature_Creation as defined in the SSCD PP [12], [13] and
[14].
442 The access control rules for the batch signature creation function with signature-creation data
Pr.CH.QES.R2048, Pr.CH.QES.R3072 and Pr.CH.QES.E384 and command PSO COMPUTE
DIGITAL SIGNATURE defined in [23] enforces
(1) successful authentication of the signatory with PIN.QES, and
(2) successful device authentication with CHA ‘D2760000400033’, i.e. gSMC-K as
representative of the SCA of the Konnektor as sender of the data to be signed (DTBS) (cf.
chapter 10.2.2 gSMC-K as part of the SCA of the Konnektor for details) and secure
messaging with protection of integrity and confidentiality.
443 The security requirements for protected communication between SSCD (with key generation) and
SCA are described in the prEN 14169-5:2012: Protection profiles for secure signature creation
device — Part 5: Extension for device with key generation and trusted communication with
signature creation application, BSI-CC-PP-0072 [15]. The ST writer for TOE as SSCD with key
import (cf. [13]) may use the SFR in analogous way.
444 Note the BSI-CC-PP-0072 [15] requires the SSCD or human interface device (i.e. the smart card
terminal) to initiate the trusted channel for protection of the signature verification data as required
by the method of authentication used (i.e. of confidentiality and integrity in case of PIN), cf. SFR
FTP_ITC.1/VAD. Furthermore this PP requires the SSCD to detect manipulation and insertion of
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DTBS received, cf. FDP_UIT.1/DTBS, and establishment of trusted channel between SCA and
SSCD for signature-creation cf. FTP_ITC.1/DTBS. Therefore the ST writer cannot claim
conformance to BSI-CC-PP-0072 [15] for the ST describing the eHCP as SSCD.
445 The ST writer shall instead describe more precise security objectives for the operational
environment to address optional usage of trusted channel for remote PIN entry like this.
OE.TC_PIN
Trusted channel for remote PIN entry
The PIN entry device shall authenticate themselves as PIN
sender and the TOE as PIN receiver, and send the PIN of the
signatory in trusted channel to the TOE.
446 The ST writer may describe more precise security objectives for the TOE and the operational
environment and similar but not identical SFR in order
(1) to allow for single signature-creation without trusted channel for DTBS and
(2) to enforce the authentication and the transmission of DTBS in the established trusted channel
for as access control condition for batch signature-creation
like these.
447 The TOE shall fulfil the security objective “Batch signature support (O.BatchSignature)” as
specified below.
O.BatchSignature
Batch signature support
The TOE enforces the authentication of SCA and the
transmission of DTBS in the established trusted channel for as
access control condition for batch signature-creation.
448 The operational environment shall fulfil the security objective “Batch signature control
(OE.BatchSignature)” as specified below.
OE.BatchSignature
Batch signature control
The SCA authenticates themselves to the TOE and transmits
the DTBS for batch signature-creation in the established trusted
channel to the TOE.
449 The TOE shall meet the requirements “Subset Access Control (FDP_ACC.1)” and “Security
attribute based access control (FDP_ACF.1)”as specified below.
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450 FDP_ACC.1/BatchSign Subset access control – Batch signature-creation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control
FDP_ACC.1.1/
BatchSign
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP 407 on
1. subjects:
(a) signatory,
(b) signature-creation application,
2. objects:
(a) Signature-creation data PrK.HP.QES,
(b) DTBS-representation,
3. operations:
(a) command PSO: COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE 408.
451 FDP_ACF.1/BatchSign Security attribute based access control– Signature-creation
Hierarchical to:
No other components.
Dependencies:
FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation
FDP_ACF.1.1/
The TSF shall enforce the Signature-creation SFP 409 to objects based on
BatchSign
the following:
1. subjects:
(a) human user with authentication status,
(b) signature-creation application with authentication status,
2. objects:
(a) Signature-creation data PrK.HC.QES with security attribute
lifeCycleStatus set to “Operation state(activated)”,
(b) DTBS-representation 410.
FDP_ACF.1.2/
BatchSign
The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation
among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:
1. the human user successfully authenticated with PIN.QES is allowed
to create 1 signatures using PrK.HP.QES with lifeCycleStatus set to
“Operation state(activated)” by means of the command PSO:
COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE in security environment #1
2. the human user successful authenticated with PIN.QES and using
signature-creation application successfully authenticated with CHA
‘D2760000400033’ with trusted channel to the TOE is allowed to
create n signatures using PrK.HP.QES with lifeCycleStatus set to
“Operation state(activated)” by means of the command PSO:
COMPUTE DIGITAL SIGNATURE in security environment #2 411.
407
[assignment: access control SFP]
408
[assignment: list of subjects, objects, and operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP]
409
[assignment: access control SFP]
410
[assignment: list of subjects and objects controlled under the indicated SFP, and for each, the SFP-relevant
security attributes, or named groups of SFP-relevant security attributes]
411
[assignment: rules governing access among controlled subjects and controlled objects using controlled
operations on controlled objects]
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FDP_ACF.1.3/
BatchSign
FDP_ACF.1.4/
BatchSign
The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on
the following additional rules: none 412.
The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the
rule:
1. to create signature without security attribute lifeCycleStatus of
PrK.HP.QES set to “Operation state(activated)”,
2. to create more than one signature with PrK.HP.QES after successful
authentication with PIN.QES by sending the DTBS-representation
without secure messaging provided by signature-creation application
successfully authenticated with CHA ‘D2760000400033’ 413.
452 The secure messaging channel may be described like this:
FTP_ITC.1/
SM_BatchSig
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FTP_ITC.1.1/SM_BatchSig
Inter-TSF trusted channel – Secure Messaging for batch signature
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification
or disclosure.
414
FTP_ITC.1.2/SM_BatchSig The TSF shall permit the TSF to initiate communication via the
trusted channel.
415
FTP_ITC.1.3/SM_BatchSig The TSF shall initiate enforce communication via the trusted
channel with SK4SM for receiving of commands from the SCA
and sending responses to the SCA 416.
453 The selection in the element FTP_ITC.1.2/SM_BatchSig is based on the first command GET
CHALLENGE sent to the TOE in order to initiate the mutual authentication protocol generating
the secure messaging keys SK4SM of the TSF (cf [21], chapter 15.4.1).
454 The refinement in the element FPT_ITC.1.3/SM_BatchSig describes that the eHPC uses secure
messaging with SK4SM. Note the COS specification distinguishes (simplified) between
(1) secure messaging for smart cards
(a) verifying the MAC of received commands and decrypting received data and
(b) encrypting and MAC calculating the responses, and
(2) trusted channel for smart cards
(a) encrypting the data of commands and MAC calculating for the commands and
(b) MAC verification and decrypting the data of the responses.
The CC terminology summarizes the communication under the term “trusted channel”.
412
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects]
413
[assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]
414
[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
415
Refinement: The trusted IT product is the terminal. The word “initiate” is changed to ‘enforce”, as the TOE
is a passive device that can not initiate the communication. All the communication are initiated by the
Terminal, and the TOE enforce the trusted channel.
416
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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11.2 Smart Cards as Part of Signature-creation Application based on COS
Smart Card Platforms (Informative)
11.2.1 gSMC-KT as part of Electronic Health Card Terminal
455 The Electronic Health Card Terminal (eHCT) may be used as PIN entry device for the PIN.QES
of the signatory to be sent to the SSCD eHPC. In this case the eHKT is part of the SCA. The
eHKT may use gSMC-KT for
•
protection of confidentiality and integrity of the PIN.QES by sending the PIN commands
through a trusted channel,
•
protected storage of asymmetric key material and other security critical data in DF.KT used
for establishing the TLS channel between the eHKT and the Konnektor as describe in the
Technical guidance for batch signature creation [18].
The security functionality of trusted channel used by the gSMC-KT is already described in
chapter 7 Package Crypto Box.
456 The private key for authentication as PIN sender to the SSCD eHPC is
PrK.SMC.AUTD_RPS_CVC.R2048 and PrK.SMC.AUTD_RPS_CVC.E256 for the SMC-KT
stored in MF. The authentication reference data are certificates C.SMC.AUTD_RPS_CVC.R2048
and C.SMC.AUTD_RPS_CVC.E256 for the SMC-KT stored also in MF. The establishment of
the trusted channel between these smart cards is controlled by the Konnektor. The ST writer may
describe the SFR for this trusted channel by means of the component FTP_ITC.1 like this.
457 The trusted channel provided by the gSMC-KT may be described like this:
FTP_ITC.1/
TC_PIN
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FTP_ITC.1.1/TC_PIN
Inter-TSF trusted channel – Trusted channel for batch signature
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself and
another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its end
points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
417 to initiate
FTP_ITC.1.2/TC_PIN The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product
communication via the trusted channel.
418
FTP_ITC.1.3/TC_PIN The TSF shall initiate enforce communication via the trusted
channel with SK4TC for sending of PIN commands to the SSCD and
receiving responses from the SSCD 419.
417
[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
418
Refinement: The trusted IT product is the terminal. The word “initiate” is changed to ‘enforce”, as the TOE
is a passive device that can not initiate the communication. All the communication are initiated by the
Terminal, and the TOE enforce the trusted channel.
419
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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458 The private keys PrK.SMKT.AUTD_RPS_CVC.R2048 and PrK.SMKT.AUTD_RPS_CVC.E256
are used for the command PSO DECIPHER by the eHKT. The certificates
C.SMKT.AUTD_RPS_CVC.R2048 and C.SMKT.AUTD_RPS_CVC.E256 are used by the
external device as authentication reference data for the eHKT.
11.2.2 gSMC-K as part of the SCA of the Konnektor
459 The Konnektor implements a SCA and includes a gSMC-K for
•
protection of confidentiality and integrity of the DTBS by means of a trusted channel for
sending the signature-creation commands and receiving the digital signature for batch
signature-creation by the eHPC (cf. chapter 10.1.2 eHPC as SSCD),
•
protected storage of asymmetric key material and other security critical data in DF.KT used
for establishing the TLS channel between the eHKT and the Konnektor as describe in the
Technical guidance for batch signature creation [18].
The security functionality of trusted channel used by the gSMC-KT is already described in
chapter 7 Package Crypto Box.
460 .The private key for authentication gSMC-K as SCA is PrK.SAK.AUTD_CVC.E256 (alternative
PrK.SAK.AUTD_CVC.E384) stored in DF.SAK. The authentication reference data are
certificates C.SAK.AUTD_CVC.E256 (optional C.SAK.AUTD_CVC.E384) stored also in
DF.SAK. The establishment of the trusted channel between these smart cards is controlled by the
SCA. The ST writer may describe the SFR for this trusted channel provided by the gSMC-K like
this.
461 The trusted channel be described like this:
FTP_ITC.1/
TC_BatchSig
Hierarchical to:
Dependencies:
FTP_ITC.1.1/TC_BatchSig
Inter-TSF trusted channel – Trusted channel for batch signature
No other components.
No dependencies.
The TSF shall provide a communication channel between itself
and another trusted IT product that is logically distinct from other
communication channels and provides assured identification of its
end points and protection of the channel data from modification or
disclosure.
420 to initiate
FTP_ITC.1.2/TC_BatchSig The TSF shall permit another trusted IT product
communication via the trusted channel.
421
FTP_ITC.1.3/TC_BatchSig The TSF shall initiate enforce communication via the trusted
channel with SK4TC for sending of commands to the SSCD and
receiving responses from the SSCD 422.
420
[selection: the TSF, another trusted IT product]
421
Refinement: The trusted IT product is the terminal. The word “initiate” is changed to ‘enforce”, as the TOE
is a passive device that can not initiate the communication. All the communication are initiated by the
Terminal, and the TOE enforce the trusted channel.
422
[assignment: list of functions for which a trusted channel is required]
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12 Acronyms
462 The terminology and abbreviations of Common Criteria version 3.1 [1], [2], [3], Revision 4 and
the specification [21] apply.
Acronyms
CAP
CC
CCRA
CM
COS
CSP-QC
CVC
EAL
EF
DF
eHC
eHCT
eHPC
IC
MF
OS
OSP
PC
PCD
PICC
PKI
PP
SAR
SCA
SCD
SEF
SFP
SFR
SICP
SMC-B
SMC-K
SMC-KT
SPD
SSCD
SVD
Term
Composed Assurance Package
Common Criteria
Arrangement on the Recognition of Common Criteria Certificates in the field
of IT Security
Configuration Management
Card operating system
Certification Service Provider for qualified certificates
Card verifiable certificate
Evaluation Assurance Level
elementary file
Folder, i.e. Application, Dedicated file and Application Dedicated file
Electronic health care card (elektronische Gesundheitskarte)
Electronic Health Card Terminal
Electronic professional card (elektronischer Heilberufsausweis)
Integrated Circuit
Master file
Operating System
Organisational Security Policy
Personal Computer
Proximity Coupling Device (as defined in [16] part 2)
Proximity Integrated Circuit Chip (as defined in [16] part 2)
Public Key Infrastructure
Protection Profile
Security Assurance Requirement
Signature creation applications
Signature creation data
Structured elementary file
Security Function Policy
Security Functional Requirement
Secure integrated chip platform
Secure modul card type B
Secure modul card type K
Secure modul card type KT
Security Problem Definition
Secure signature-creation device
Signature verification data
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Acronyms
ST
TEF
TOE
TSF
TSFI
Term
Security Target
transparent elementary file
Target of Evaluation
TOE Security Functionality
TSF Interface
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13 Bibliography
Common Criteria
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and
General Model; CCMB-2012-09-001, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional
Components; CCMB-2012-09-002, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security assurance
components; CCMB-2012-09-003, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation
Methodology; CCMB-2012-09-004, Version 3.1, Revision 4, September 2012
AIS20: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for deterministic random number
generators, Version 2.1, 02.12.2011, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
AIS31: Functionality classes and evaluation methodology for true (physical) random number
generators, Version 2.1, 02.12.2011, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
W. Killmann, W. Schindler, „A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number
generators“, Version 2.0, September 18, 2011
CC Supporting Document, Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices,
April 2012, Version 1.2, CCDB-2012-04-001
Supporting Document Mandatory Technical Document: The Application of CC to Integrated
Circuits, March 2009, Version 3.0, Revision 1, CCDB-2009-03-002
Supporting Document Guidance, Smartcard Evaluation, February 2010, Version 2.0, CCDB2010-03-001
Protection Profiles
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile developed by Atmel, Infineon
Technologies AG, NXP Semiconductors, Renesas Technology Europe Ltd.,
STMicrocontrolles, Registered and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007, Version 1.0,
15.06.2007
prEN 14169-2:2012: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 2: Device
with key generation, BSI-CC-PP-0059
prEN 14169-3:2012: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 3: Device
with key import, BSI-CC-PP-0075
prEN 14169-4:2012: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 4:
Extension for device with key generation and trusted communication with certificate
generation application, BSI-CC-PP-0071
prEN 14169-5:2012: Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 5:
Extension for device with key generation and trusted communication with signature creation
application, BSI-CC-PP-0072
Technical Guidelines and Specifications
[16]
Technical Guideline TR-03110 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel
Documents Part1 – eMRTDs with BAC/PACEv2 and EACv1, Part 2, Part 2 – Extended
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
page 170 of 172
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
Access Control Version 2 (EACv2), Password Authenticated Connection Establishment
(PACE),and Restricted Identification (RI), Part 3 – Common Specifications, TR-03110,
version 2.10, 24.03.2012, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Technical Guideline TR-03111 Elliptic Curve Cryptography, TR-03111, version 2.0,
28.08.2012, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Technische Richtlinie TR-03114 Stapelsignatur mit dem Heilberufsausweis, BSI, Version:
2.0, 22.10.2007
Technische Richtlinie TR-03116, eCard-Projekte der Bundesregierung, Version 3.18 vom
30.01.2014, Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
Technische Richtlinie TR-03143 „eHealth G2-COS Konsistenz-Prüftool“ (in Vorbereitung)
423
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
Einführung der Gesundheitskarte, Spezifikation des Card Operating System (COS),
Elektrische Schnittstelle, Version 3.7.0 vom 26.08.2014, gematik Gesellschaft für
Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte GmbH einschließlich der Errata zu Release
1.4.0 Online-Rollout (Stufe 1) Erprobung und Produktivbetrieb führt zu Release 1.4.1 vom
02.10.2014 und 2. Errata zu Release 1.4.0 Online-Rollout (Stufe 1) Erprobung und
Produktivbetrieb führt zu Release 1.4.2 vom 06.10.2014
Einführung der Gesundheitskarte Spezifikation der elektronischen Gesundheitskarte eGKObjektsystem,
Version
3.8.0
vom
26.08.2014,
gematik
Gesellschaft
für
Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte GmbH
Einführung der Gesundheitskarte Spezifikation des elektronischen Heilberufsausweises HBAObjektsystem,
Version
3.7.0
vom
26.08.2014,
gematik
Gesellschaft
für
Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte GmbH
Einführung der Gesundheitskarte Spezifikation der Secure Module Card SMC-B
Objektsystem,
Version
3.7.0
vom
26.08.2014,
gematik
Gesellschaft
für
Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte GmbH
Einführung der Gesundheitskarte Spezifikation der gSMC-K Objektsystem, Version 3.7.0
vom 26.08.2014, gematik Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte
GmbH
Einführung der Gesundheitskarte Spezifikation gSMC-KT Objektsystem, Version 3.7.0 vom
26.08.2014, gematik Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte GmbH
Einführung der Gesundheitskarte Spezifikation Wrapper, actual version424, gematik
Gesellschaft für Telematikanwendungen der Gesundheitskarte GmbH
Cryptography
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
ISO/IEC 7816-3: 2006 (2nd edition), Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards with
contacts Part 3: Electrical interface and transmission protocols
ISO/IEC 7816-4: 2013 (2nd edition) Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards - Part 4:
Organisation, security and commands for interchange
ISO/IEC 7816-8: 2004 (2nd edition) Identification cards - Integrated circuit cards- Part 8:
Commands for security operations
ISO/IEC 9796-2:2010 Information technology -- Security techniques - Digital signature
schemes giving message recovery - Part 2: Integer factorization based mechanisms
423
Please note that this Technical Guideline may annually be updated, see www.bsi.bund.de (e.g. Publikationen
-> Technische Richtlinien -> Technische Richtlinie fuer die eCard-Projekte der Bundesregierung (BSI
TR-03116)).
424
The version 1.6.0 was actual on 12th of November 2014.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
page 171 of 172
Common Criteria Protection Profile
Card Operating System (PP COS)
[32]
[33]
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
Version 1.9, 18th November 2014
BSI-CC-PP-0082-V2
ISO/IEC 9797-1 Information technology - Security techniques - Message Authentication
Codes (MACs) – Part 1: Mechanisms using a block cipher
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 197, ADVANCED ENCRYPTION
STANDARD (AES), U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards
and Technology, November 26, 2001
PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Standard, RSA Laboratories, Version 2.2, October 27, 2012
(http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125)
PKCS #3: Diffie-Hellman Key-Agreement Standard, An RSA Laboratories Technical Note,
Version 1.4, Revised November 1, 1993
Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CMAC Mode for
Authentication, NIST Special Publication 800-38B, National Institute of Standards and
Technology, May 2005
Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 180-4 SECURE HASH STANDARD
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE/National Institute of Standards and Technology,
2011 February, 11
NIST SP 800-67, Recommandation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) Block
Cipher, National Institute of Standards and Technology
American National Standard X9.62-2005, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry, The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), November 16, 2005
American National Standard X9.63-2001, Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services
Industry, Key Agreement and Key Transport Using Elliptic Curve Cryptography, November
16, 2005
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation, RFC
5639, March 2010, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5639
ANSI X9.62 Public Key Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry, The Elliptic Curve
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA), 2005
Other Sources
[43]
ISO 14443, Identification cards – Contactless integrated circuit(s) cards – Proximity cards,
2000
[44]
ISO 7498-2 (1989): Information processing systems - Open Systems Interconnection - Basic
Reference Model - Part 2: Security Architecture
[45]
Law Governing Framework Conditions for Electronic Signatures of 16 May 2001 (Federal
Law Gazette I page 876), last amended by Article 4 of the Act of 17 July 2009 (Federal Law
Gazette I page 2091)
[46]
Ordinance on Electronic Signature of 16 November 2001 (Federal Law Gazette I page 3074),
last amended by the Act of 15 November 2010 (Federal Law Gazette I page 2631)
Additional references
[47]
Joint Interpretation Library: PP0084: Changes and Compliance to PP0035 and Transition
Phase, JIL application note on the transition from BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007-2007 to BSI-CCPP-0084-2014, Version 1.1, August 2014
[48]
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile with Augmentation Packages
developed by Inside Secure Infineon Technologies AG NXP Semiconductors Germany
GmbH STMicroelectronics, Registered and Certified by Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik (BSI) under the reference BSI-CC-PP-0084-2014, Version 1.0
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
page 172 of 172
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