Certification Report: 0700a_pdf

Certification Report: 0700a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
for
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B,
P5CC080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC073V0B
each with specific IC Dedicated Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
CC-Zert-326 V4.4
BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CC080V0B,
P5CN080V0B and P5CC073V0B each with specific IC Dedicated
Software
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance:
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version
1.0, July 2001, BSI-PP-0002-2001
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3
and AVA_VLA.4
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the Certification Body
for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance to the
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 25 October 2011
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Bernd Kowalski
Head of Department
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
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Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................14
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................17
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................17
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................18
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................18
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................19
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................20
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................20
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................20
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................22
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................22
11 Security Target............................................................................................................23
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................23
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................23
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................24
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................26
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................29
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................37
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A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005) 5 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
●
Advice from the Certification Body on methodology for assurance components above
EAL4 (AIS 34)
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 10 May 2006 in the Bundesanzeiger dated 19
May 2006, p. 3730
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It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp.E3 (basic). In Addition, certificates issued
for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of the recognition agreement.
As of September 2011 the new agreement has been signed by the national bodies of
Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. Details on recognition and the history of the agreement can be found
at https://www.bsi.bund.de/zertifizierung.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement by the nations listed above.
2.2
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of September 2011 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom, United States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved
certification schemes can be seen on the website: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org.
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement by the nations listed
above.
This evaluation contains the components ACM_SCP.3, ADV_FSP.3, ADV_HLD.3,
ADV_IMP.2, ADV_INT.1, ADV_RCR.2, ADV_SPM.3, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2,
ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.2, AVA_CCA.1, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 that are not
mutually recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual
recognition the EAL4-components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CC080V0B,
P5CN080V0B and P5CC073V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software has undergone
the certification procedure at BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-06802010. Specific results from the evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0680-2010 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B,
P5CC080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC073V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software
was conducted by T-Systems GEI GmbH. The evaluation was completed on 20. October
2011. The T-Systems GEI GmbH is an evaluation facility (ITSEF) 6 recognised by the
certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
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Certification Report
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
5
Publication
The product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CC080V0B,
P5CN080V0B and P5CC073V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software has been
included in the BSI list of the certified products, which is published regularly (see also
Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de) and [5]. Further information can be obtained from BSIInfoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
7
NXP Semiconductors GmbH
Business Unit Identification
Stresemannallee 101
D-22529 Hamburg
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
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Certification Report
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B,
P5CC080V0B, P5CN080V0B and P5CC073V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software.
The TOE is the hardware of the microcontroller chip P5CD080V0B (short name of the
TOE) of the Smart Card Controller IC family produced by NXP. The TOE includes also IC
Dedicated Test Software for test purposes and IC Dedicated Support Software, both stored
in the Test-ROM of the microcontroller. The Smart Card Controller hardware comprises an
8-bit processing unit, volatile and non-volatile memories accessible via a memory
management unit, cryptographic co-processors, security components and three
communication interfaces.
The TOE includes a Data Sheet [12], a document describing the Instruction Set [15] and
the Guidance Document [11]. This documentation contains a description of the
architecture, the secure configuration, and usage of the hardware platform by the
Smartcard Embedded Software.
The security measures of the P5CD080V0B are designed to act as an integral part of the
complete security system in order to strengthen the design as a whole. Several security
measures are completely implemented in and controlled by the hardware. Other security
measures are controlled by the hardware and allow a configuration by software or software
guided exceptions. With the different CPU modes and the memory management unit the
TOE is intended to support multi-application projects.
The non-volatile EEPROM can be used as data or program memory. It contains high
reliability cells which guarantee data integrity. This is ideal for applications requiring nonvolatile data storage and important for the use as memory for native programs. Security
Functions protect data in the on-chip ROM, EEPROM and RAM. In particular when being
used in the banking and finance market or in electronic commerce applications the
smartcard must provide high security.
Hence the TOE shall
●
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of code and data stored in the memories of
it and
●
maintain the different CPU modes with the related capabilities for configuration and
memory access and
●
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
These features are ensured by the construction of the TOE and the Security Functions it
provides. The "NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart Card Controller mainly provides a
hardware platform for a smartcard with
●
functions to calculate the Data Encryption Standard (Triple-DES) with up to three keys,
●
functions to calculate the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with different key
lengths,
●
support for large integer arithmetic (multiplication, addition and logical) operations,
suited for public key cryptography and elliptic curve cryptography,
●
a random number generator,
●
memory management control features,
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Certification Report
●
cyclic redundancy check calculation (CRC),
●
ISO 7816 contact interface with UART,
●
contact-less interface supporting MIFARE and ISO 14443A (configuration P5CD080V0B)
or S²C interface (configuration P5CN080V0B).
In addition several security features independently implemented in hardware or controlled
by software will be provided to ensure proper operation as well as integrity and
confidentiality of stored data. This includes for example measures for memory protection
and sensors to allow operation only under specified conditions.
Please note that the arithmetic co-processor for large integer arithmetic operations is
intended to be used for the calculation of asymmetric cryptographic algorithms. Any
asymmetric cryptographic algorithm needs to be implemented in software by using the
calculation functions provided by the co-processor. Therefore the co-processor without
software does not provide a Security Function itself e.g. cryptographic support. This
means that Smartcard Embedded Software that implements e.g. the RSA cryptographic
algorithm is not included in the evaluation. Nevertheless the co-processor is part of the
Smartcard IC and therefore a security relevant component of the TOE that must resist to
the attacks mentioned in the Security Target and that must operate correctly as specified in
the Data Sheet. The same scope for the evaluation is applied to the CRC module.
The TOE can be delivered in different configurations. This influences the availability of the
contact-less interface (including the functions provided by the MIFARE Operating System)
and other not security relevant features.
The results of this evaluation are valid for the major product configurations called
P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B, P5CC080V0B and P5CC073V0B. The following table
provides an overview about the differences between the P5CD080V0B and its major
configurations (see also ST [6] and [7], chapter 2.2.1 to 2.2.4):
TOE
contact-less interface
I/O Pads for
ISO 7816
EEPROM size
in kByte
P5CD080V0B
enabled, configured for ISO 14443A
3
80
P5CN080V0B
enabled, configured for NFC
2
80
P5CC080V0B
disabled
3
80
P5CC073V0B
disabled
3
Reduced to 72
Table 1: Major configurations of the TOE
The Security Target [6] and [7] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, BSIPP-0002-2001 [9].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the Assurance Requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 5.1.1. They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined in the Protection Profile [9]. Thus the TOE is CC Part
2 extended.
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The Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the IT-Environment of the TOE
are outlined in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 5.2.1.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functions:
TOE Security Function
Addressed issue
F.RNG
Random Number Generator
F.HW_DES
Triple-DES Co-Processor
F.HW_AES
AES Co-Processor
F.OPC
Control of Operating Conditions
F.PHY
Protection against Physical Manipulation
F.LOG
Logical Protection
F.COMP
Protection of Mode Control
F.MEM_ACC
Memory Access Control
F.SFR_ACC
Special Function Register Access Control
Table 2: TOE Security Functions
For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.
The claimed TOE’s Strength of Functions 'High' (SOF-High) for specific functions as
indicated in the Security Target [6] and [7], chapter 6.1 is confirmed. The rating of the
Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). For details see chapter 9 of this
report.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [7],
chapter 3.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Environment is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [7], chapter 3.2 to 3.4.
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CC080V0B, P5CN080V0B and
P5CC073V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
No
Type
Identifier
Release
Date
1
HW
NXP P5CD080V0B,
P5CN080V0B ,P5CC080V0B and
P5CC073V0B Secure Smart Card
Controller
V0B
GDS 2 File:
Wafer, modules and
T035B_20060 packages (see ST)
904.gds2
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No
Type
Identifier
Release
Date
Form of Delivery
2
SW
Test ROM Software (the IC
Dedicated Test Software)
63
29 November
2006
Included in Test ROM on the
chip (tmfos_63.lst)
3
SW
Boot ROM Software (part of the IC
Dedicated Support Software)
63
29 November
2006
Included in Test ROM on the
chip (tmfos_63.lst)
4
SW
Mifare Operating System (part of
2.0
the IC Dedicated Support Software)
24 August
2006
Included in Test ROM on the
chip (tmfos_63.lst)
5
DOC
Data Sheet
P5Cx02x/040/073/080/144 family,
Secure Dual Interface PKI Smart
Card Controller, Product Data
Sheet, NXP Semiconductors,
Revision 3.8, Document Number:
126538, June 17th, 2011 [12]
3.8
17 June 2011
Electronic document [12]
6
DOC
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family,
Secure and PKI Smart Card
Controller, Philips Semiconductors,
Revision 1.1, Document Number:
084111 [15]
1.1
04 July 2006
Electronic document [15]
7
DOC
Guidance, Delivery and Operation
Manual for the
P5Cx012/02x/040/073/080/144
family, NXP Semiconductors,
Version 1.9, Document Number:
129919, 31 May 2011 [11]
1.9
31 May 2011
Electronic document [11]
Table 3: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is identified by P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B ,P5CC080V0B
and P5CC073V0B and its specific GDS-file. A so-called nameplate (on-chip identifier) is
coded in a metal mask onto the chip during production and can be checked by the
customer, too. The nameplate T035B is specific for the SSMC (Singapore) production site
as outlined in the guidance documentation [11]. This nameplate identifies Version V0B of
the hardware, but does not identify the possible TOE configurations. For identification of a
specific configuration, the Device Coding Bytes stored in the EEPROM can be used (see
Data Sheet [12], chapter 11.8):
●
The Device Coding value 0x21, 0x07, 0x28 identifies the chip P5CD080V0B(with
contact-less interface enabled, configured for ISO 14443),
●
The Device Coding value 0x61, 0x07, 0x27 identifies the chip P5CN080V0B (with
contact-less interface enabled, configured for NFC),
●
The Device Coding value 0x11, 0x07, 0x26 identifies the chip P5CC080V0B (with
contact-less interface disabled),
●
The Device Coding value 0x11, 0x07, 0x16 identifies the chip P5CC073V0B (with
contact-less interface disabled).
Items 2, 3 and 4 in table 3 are not delivered as single pieces, but included in the Test ROM
part of the hardware platform. They are identified by their unique version numbers.
Note that the product specific Order Entry Forms [16], [17], [18] and [19] include additional
guidance for the handling of FabKey data and Wafer Initialisation data. The related
templates were subject of the evaluation.
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UA
UA
UA
U3
U3
U3
P5CC073V0B
P5CC080V0B
P5CN080V0B
P5CD080V0B
The TOE hardware is available in different package formats. The following list of package
types is supported in this certification. Package types not included in the following table
are not subject of this certificate. Note that the package type is part of the commercial type
name and the customer specific commercial product name.
UA
Package description
150µm sawn wafer, inkless
150µm unsawn wafer on sticky
tape, inkless
U4
150µm unsawn wafer, inkless
UE
75µm sawn wafer, inkless
XA
Opaque Hard Glob Top
XF
Opaque Hard Glob Top
XS
Note
XS
PCM1.1 module, Dual Source
Delivery
Dual Source means they are either
assembled at NXP Semiconductors
(Thailand), Bangkok or at NedCard.
(For the list of all relevant sites please read
annex B of this report.)
XT
XT
XT
Dual Source Delivery, silver
Dual Source means they are either
assembled at NXP Semiconductors
(Thailand), Bangkok or at NedCard.
(For the list of all relevant sites please read
annex B of this report.)
A4
MOB4 module
A6
MOB6 module
HN
Ai
HN
TS
TS
SSOP20 package
HN
HN
HVQFN32 SMD Package
Inlay (index i contains capital
character [A-Z])
Table 4: Package types of the TOE
The delivery process from NXP to their customers (to phase 4 or phase 5 of the life cycle)
guarantees, that the customer is aware of the exact versions of the different parts of the
TOE as outlined above.
TOE documentation is delivered either as hardcopy or as softcopy (encrypted) according
to defined mailing procedures.
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To ensure that the customer receives this evaluated version, the delivery procedures
described in the Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual [11] have to be followed.
3
Security Policy
The security policy of the TOE is to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the
smartcard operating system and the smartcard application thus providing an overall
smartcard system security. Therefore, the TOE will implement symmetric cryptographic
block cipher algorithms (Triple-DES, AES) to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by
encryption and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random
number generation of appropriate quality.
As the TOE is a hardware platform, the security policy of the TOE provides protection
against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic keys
during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), protection against physical probing,
malfunctions, physical manipulations, against access to code and data stored in the
memories and against abuse of functionality. Hence the TOE shall:
●
maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
●
maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Functions
(security mechanisms and associated functions) provided by the TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The smartcard operating system and the application software stored in the User ROM and
in the EEPROM are not part of the TOE. The code in the Test ROM of the TOE (IC
Dedicated Software) is used by the manufacturer of the smartcard to check the
functionality of the hardware platform before TOE Delivery. This was considered as part of
the evaluation under the CC assurance aspects ALC for relevant procedures and under
ATE for testing.
The TOE is delivered as a hardware unit at the end of the hardware platform
manufacturing process (phase 3 of the life cycle defined) or at the end of the IC packaging
into modules (phase 4 of the life cycle defined). At these specific points in time the ROM
part of the operating system software is already stored in the ROM of the hardware
platform and the test mode is completely disabled.
The smartcard applications need the Security Functions of the smartcard operating system
based on the security features of the TOE. With respect to security the composition of this
TOE, the operating system and the smartcard application is important. Within this
composition, the Security Functionality is only partly provided by the TOE and causes
dependencies between the TOE Security Functions and the functions provided by the
operating system or the smartcard application on top. These dependencies are expressed
by environmental and secure usage assumptions as outlined in the user documentation.
Within this evaluation of the TOE, several aspects were specifically considered to support
a composite evaluation of the TOE together with an embedded smartcard software (i.e.
smartcard operating system and application). This was necessary as NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH, Business Line Identification is the TOE developer and manufacturer and
responsible for specific aspects of handling the embedded smartcard application software
in its development and production environment. For those aspects refer to chapter 9 of this
report.
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The full evaluation results are applicable for chips produced at the IC fabrication SSMC in
Singapore indicated by the nameplate (on-chip identifier) T035B.
5
Architectural Information
The NXP P5CD080V0B secure smart card controller is an integrated circuit (IC) providing
a hardware platform to a smartcard operating system and Smartcard Embedded Software.
A top level block diagram and a list of subsystems can be found within the TOE description
of the Security Target [6] and [7]. The complete hardware description and the complete
Instruction Set of the NXP P5CD080V0B smartcard controller can be found in the Data
Sheet, P5Cx02x/040/073/080/144 family [12] and Instruction Set [15].
For the implementation of the TOE Security Functions basically the components 8-bit
CPU, Special Function Registers, Triple-DES Co-Processor, AES co-processor, FameXE
Co- Processor, Random Number Generator (RNG), Power Module with Security Sensors
and Filters are used. The hardware platform is equipped with a Memory Management Unit
and provides different CPU Modes in order to separate different applications running on
the TOE. Security measures for Physical Protection are realized within the layout of the
whole circuitry.
The Special Function Registers provide the interface to the Security Functions of the TOE
when they can be configured or used by the smartcard operating system and the
Smartcard Embedded Software. The P5CD080V0B provides different levels of access
control to the Special Function Register with the different CPU Modes and additional –
configurable – access control to Special Function Registers in the least-privileged CPU
Mode, the User Mode.
The FameXE does not provide a cryptographic algorithm itself. The modular arithmetic
functions are suitable to implement different asymmetric cryptographic algorithms.
The TOE executes the IC Dedicated Support Software (Boot Software) during the start up
to configure and initialise the hardware. This software is executed in the Boot Mode that is
not accessible after the start up is finished.
The Mifare Operating System supports the functions to exchange data in the contact-less
mode with other Mifare components. The Mifare Operating System is executed in the
Mifare Mode to ensure a strict separation between IC Dedicated Support Software and
Smartcard Embedded Software. Based on the partitioning of the memories the Mifare
Operating System is not able to access the Smartcard Embedded Software and the data
stored in the EEPROM area that is not reserved for the Mifare Operating System. In the
same way the access to the program and the data of the Mifare Operating System is
denied for the Smartcard Embedded Software. A limited RAM memory area for the data
exchange (between Smartcard Embedded Software and Mifare Operating System) and
the access to components of the hardware (by the Mifare Operating System) must be
configured by the Smartcard Embedded Software.
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 3 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
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7
Certification Report
IT Product Testing
The tests performed by the developer can be divided into the following categories:
1. technology development tests as the earliest tests to check the technology against the
specification and to get the technology parameters used in simulations of the circuitry
(this testing is not strictly related to Security Functions);
2. tests which are performed in a simulation environment with different tools for the
analogue circuitries and for the digital parts of the TOE;
3. regression tests of the hardware within a simulation environment based on special
software dedicated only for the regression tests;
4. regression tests which are performed for the IC Dedicated Test Software and for the IC
Dedicated Support Software on emulator versions of the TOE and within a software
simulation of chip in special hardware;
5. characterisation and verification tests to release the TOE to production:
6.
●
used to determine the behaviour of the hardware platform with respect to
different operating conditions and varied process parameters (often also referred
to as characterisation tests)
●
special verification tests for the Security Functions which were done with
samples of the TOE (referred also as developers security evaluation) and which
include also layout tests by automatic means and optical control, in order to
verify statements concerning the layout;
functional production tests, which are done for every chip to check its correct
functionality as a last step of the production process (phase 3).
The developer tests cover all Security Functions and all security mechanisms as identified
in the functional specification, and in the high and low level designs.
The evaluators were able to repeat the tests of the developer either using the library of
programs, tools and prepared chip samples delivered to the evaluator or at the developers
site. They performed independent tests to supplement, augment and to verify the tests
performed by the developer. The tests of the developer are repeated by sampling, by
repetition of complete regression tests and by software routines developed by the
evaluators and computed on samples with evaluation operating system. For the developer
tests repeated by the evaluators other test parameters are used and the test equipment
was varied. Security features of the TOE realised by specific design and layout measures
were checked by the evaluators during layout inspections both in design data and on the
final product.
The evaluation provides evidence that the actual version of the TOE (refer to chapter 2
and section 3.2 for details on the TOE configuration) provides the Security Functions as
specified by the developer. The test results confirm the correct implementation of the TOE
Security Functions.
For penetration testing the evaluators took all Security Functions into consideration.
Intensive penetration testing was planned based on the analysis results and performed for
the underlying mechanisms of Security Functions using bespoke equipment and expert
know how. The penetration tests considered both the physical tampering of the TOE and
attacks which do not modify the TOE physically.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
Evaluated Configuration
This certification covers the following configurations of the TOE:
●
The Device Coding value 0x21, 0x07, 0x28 identifies the chip P5CD080V0B(with
contact-less interface enabled, configured for ISO 14443),
●
The Device Coding value 0x61, 0x07, 0x27 identifies the chip P5CN080V0B (with
contact-less interface enabled, configured for NFC),
●
The Device Coding value 0x11, 0x07, 0x26 identifies the chip P5CC080V0B (with
contact-less interface disabled),
●
The Device Coding value 0x11, 0x07, 0x16 identifies the chip P5CC073V0B (with
contact-less interface disabled).
For identification of a specific configuration, the Device Coding Bytes stored in the
EEPROM can be used (see Data Sheet [12], chapter 11.8). The TOE is identified by the
nameplate T035B and specific EEPROM coding as outlined in chapter 2.
All TSF are active and usable. Information on how to use the TOE and its Security
Functions by the software is provided within the user documentation.
The different CPU modes are: Boot Mode, Test Mode, Mifare Mode, System Mode and
User Mode. For more details please refer to [6] and [7], chapter 2.1.1.
As the TOE operates after delivery in System Mode or User Mode and the application
software being executed on the TOE can not use the Test Mode, the evaluation was
mainly performed in the System Mode and User Mode. For all evaluation activities
performed in Test Mode, there was a rationale why the results are valid for the System
Mode and User Mode, too.
The commercial product name is the name that the customer of NXP BUID uses to order
the TOE in the respective package. Note that the commercial type names contain
placeholders for the customer specific parts (i.e. the Smartcard Embedded Software,
Fabkey, minor configuration options, etc.) of the TOE. A specification of the placeholders is
given by the developer in section 2.3 of the Security Target [6] and [7].
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [8] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL4
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(ii)
Application of Attack Potential to Smartcards and
(iii)
ETR for Composition and
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(iv)
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ETR for Composition: Annex A Composite smartcard evaluation: Recommended
best practice
(see [4, AIS 25, AIS 26 and AIS 36]) and [4, AIS 31] (functionality classes and evaluation
methodology for physical random number generators) were used. The assurance
refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of the evaluation of
the TOE.
To support composite evaluations according to AIS 36 the document ETR for composite
evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This document provides details of this
platform evaluation that have to be considered in the course of a composite evaluation on
top.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the class ASE
●
All components of the EAL 5 package as defined in the CC (see also part C of this
report)
●
The components ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4 augmented for this TOE
evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a reevaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0680-2010, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of the re-evaluation was on the pre-personalisation (wafer
initialisation) of the TOE and the inclusion of two additional production sites. In addition the
data sheet and the guidance were updated to cover the changes regarding the UID and
the hardware specific countermeasures against attacks.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Smartcard IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001,
BSI-PP-0002-2001 [9]
●
for the Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2, AVA_MSU.3 and AVA_VLA.4
The following TOE Security Functions fulfil the claimed Strength of Function:
●
F.RNG (random number generator), according to AIS 31 Functionality class P2 High,
F.LOG (Logical Protection) contributing to the leakage attacks especially for F.HW_DES
(Triple-DES Co-processor) and F.HW_AES (AES Co-processor) by SPA/DPA
countermeasures. The scheme interpretations AIS 26 and AIS 31 (see[4]) were used.
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
Results of cryptographic assessment
The rating of the Strength of Functions does not include the cryptoalgorithms suitable for
encryption and decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
F.HW_DES and F.HW_AES.
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of the product
certification (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But cryptographic functionalities with
a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks
with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for these
functions it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for the
intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the 'Technische
Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionalities: 2-key Triple DES (2TDES) provided by the TOE
achieves a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
10
Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The operational documents as outlined in table 3 contain necessary information about the
usage of the TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all
aspects of assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered
by the TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and require additional
configuration or control or measures to be implemented by the IC Dedicated Support
Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 3) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the Embedded Software on how to securely use the
microcontroller chip and which measures have to be implemented in the software in order
to fulfil the security requirements of the Security Target of the TOE.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correctly and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE:
The guidance documentation [11], Data Sheet [12] and Instruction Set [15], contain all
necessary information about the usage of the TOE. NXP will also provide either the
Security Target [6] to customers or a “light” version of the Security Target [7], which omits
some technical details within the rational but contains the relevant information about the
TOE itself. This includes the assumptions about the environment and usage of the TOE
and the Security Functions provided by the TOE. Note that the light version of the ST is
conformant to [4, AIS 35].
Further requirements are
●
to follow the instructions in the user guidance documents,
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Certification Report
●
to ensure fulfilment of the assumptions about the environment in the Security Target,
and
●
to follow the guidance of the order entry forms regarding wafer initialisation data.
Please note that the Mifare Operating System is included in the NXP specific part of the
ROM as part of the TOE (see table 3). Mifare configurations A, B1 and B4 are subject of
the certificate.
11
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [7] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
12
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Errichtungsgesetz, Act setting up the Federal Office for Information
Security
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CPU
Central Processing Unit
CRC
Cycle redundancy Check Calculation
DEA
Data Encryption Algorithm
DES
Data Encryption Standard; symmetric block cipher algorithm
DPA
Differential Power Analysis
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
EEPROM
Electrically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
FIPS
Federal Information Processing Standard
IC
Integrated Circuit
I/O
Input/Output
IT
Information Technology
ISO
International Organization for Standardization
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
MMU
Memory Management Unit
NFC
Near Field Communication
PP
Protection Profile
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RAM
Random Access Memory
RNG
Random Number Generator
ROM
Read Only Memory
SF
Security Function
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
Security Functional Requirement
SOF
Strength of Function
SPA
Simple Power Analysis
ST
Security Target
S²C
Smart card interface standard, complying with ISO-IEC-18092.
TDEA
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
TOE
Target of Evaluation
Triple-DES Symmetric block cipher algorithm based on the DES
TSC
TSF Scope of Control
TSF
TOE Security Functions
TSP
TOE Security Policy
TSS
TOE Summary Specification
UART
Universal Asynchronous Receiver and Transmitter
USB
Universal Serial Bus
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more assurance component(s) from CC Part 3 to
an EAL or assurance package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An entity within the TSC that contains or receives information and upon which
subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent set of security requirements for a
category of TOEs that meet specific consumer needs.
Security Function - A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a
closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.
Security Target - A set of security requirements and specifications to be used as the basis
for evaluation of an identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
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Strength of Function - A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum
efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking
its underlying security mechanisms.
SOF-basic - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers
possessing a low attack potential.
SOF-medium - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the
function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.
SOF-high - A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function
provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE
security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.
Subject - An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.
Target of Evaluation - An IT product or system and its associated administrator and user
guidance documentation that is the subject of an evaluation.
TOE Security Functions - A set consisting of all hardware, software, and firmware of the
TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the TSP.
TOE Security Policy - A set of rules that regulate how assets are managed, protected and
distributed within a TOE.
TSF Scope of Control - The set of interactions that can occur with or within a TOE and
are subject to the rules of the TSP.
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13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 2.3,
August 2005
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 2.3, August 2005
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE. 8
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148, BSI 7149), periodically updated list
published also on the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target, Evaluation of the P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B, P5CC080V0B,
P5CC073V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors, Business Unit
Identification, Version 2.3, 5. August 2011 (confidential document)
[7]
Security Target Lite, Evaluation of the P5CD080V0B, P5CN080V0B,
P5CC080V0B,P5CN080V0B Secure Smart Card Controller, NXP Semiconductors,
Business Line Identification, Version 2.3, 5. August 2011 (sanitized public
document)
[8]
Evaluation Technical Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0700 NXP P5CD080V0B Secure Smart
Card Controller, Version 1.6, 20. October 2011, (confidential document)
[9]
Smart Card IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, July 2001, registered at the
German Certification Body under number BSI-PP-0002-2001
[10]
ETR for composition, NXP P5CD080V0B Secure 8-bit Smart Card Controller,
BSIDSZ-CC-0700, T-Systems GEI GmbH, Version 1.41, 15. September 2011
(confidential document)
8
specifically
26 / 40
•
AIS 20, Version 1, 2 December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte
Schaltungen including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 September 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie
für physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes
for EAL5+ (CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and
CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
Certification Report
[11]
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual for the P5Cx012/02x/040/073/080/144
family, NXP Semiconductors, Version 1.9, Document Number: 129919, 31. May
2011 (confidential document)
[12]
Data Sheet, P5Cx02x/040/073/080/144 family, Secure Dual Interface PKI Smart
Card Controller, Product Data Sheet, NXP Semiconductors, Revision 3.8,
Document Number: 126538, 17. June 2011 (confidential document)
[13]
Configuration
List
for
composite
evaluation
of
the
P5Cx012/02x/040/073/080/144V0B family, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 1.3, 31
August 2007
[14]
Customer specific Appendix of the Configuration List for the composite evaluation of
the P5Cx012/02x/040/073/080/144V0B family, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 1.4, 9
July 2008
[15]
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006
[16]
Order Entry Form, P5CD080, Release 4.8, Date: 21.04.2011, NXP Semiconductors
Hamburg
[17]
Order Entry Form, P5CC080, Release 4.8, Date: 21.04.2011, NXP Semiconductors
Hamburg
[18]
Order Entry Form, P5CN080, Release 4.8, Date: 21.04.2011, NXP Semiconductors
Hamburg
[19]
Order Entry Form, P5CC073, Release 4.8, Date: 21.04.2011, NXP Semiconductors
Hamburg
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C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance results (chapter 7.4)
“The conformance result indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a TOE or PP that passes its evaluation. This conformance result is presented with
respect to CC Part 2 (functional requirements), CC Part 3 (assurance requirements) and, if
applicable, to a pre-defined set of requirements (e.g., EAL, Protection Profile).
The conformance result consists of one of the following:
–
CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 conformant if the functional
requirements are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2.
–
CC Part 2 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 2 extended if the functional
requirements include functional components not in CC Part 2.
plus one of the following:
–
CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 conformant if the assurance
requirements are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
–
CC Part 3 extended - A PP or TOE is CC Part 3 extended if the assurance
requirements include assurance requirements not in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance result may include a statement made with respect to sets of
defined requirements, in which case it consists of one of the following:
–
Package name Conformant - A PP or TOE is conformant to a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) include all components in the packages listed as part of the conformance
result.
–
Package name Augmented - A PP or TOE is an augmentation of a pre-defined named
functional and/or assurance package (e.g. EAL) if the requirements (functions or
assurance) are a proper superset of all components in the packages listed as part of
the conformance result.
Finally, the conformance result may also include a statement made with respect to
Protection Profiles, in which case it includes the following:
–
PP Conformant - A TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.“
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CC Part 3:
Protection Profile criteria overview (chapter 8.2)
“The goal of a PP evaluation is to demonstrate that the PP is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as a statement of requirements for one or
more evaluatable TOEs. Such a PP may be eligible for inclusion within a PP registry.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (APE_DES)
Security environment (APE_ENV)
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation
PP introduction (APE_INT)
Security objectives (APE_OBJ)
IT security requirements (APE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (APE_SRE)
Table 3 - Protection Profile families - CC extended requirements”
Security Target criteria overview (Chapter 8.3)
“The goal of an ST evaluation is to demonstrate that the ST is complete, consistent,
technically sound, and hence suitable for use as the basis for the corresponding TOE
evaluation.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
TOE description (ASE_DES)
Security environment (ASE_ENV)
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation
ST introduction (ASE_INT)
Security objectives (ASE_OBJ)
PP claims (ASE_PPC)
IT security requirements (ASE_REQ)
Explicitly stated IT security requirements (ASE_SRE)
TOE summary specification (ASE_TSS)
Table 5 - Security Target families - CC extended requirements ”
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Assurance categorisation (chapter 7.5)
“The assurance classes, families, and the abbreviation for each family are shown in Table
1.
Assurance Class
Assurance Family
CM automation (ACM_AUT)
ACM: Configuration management
CM capabilities (ACM_CAP)
CM scope (ACM_SCP)
ADO: Delivery and operation
Delivery (ADO_DEL)
Installation, generation and start-up (ADO_IGS)
Functional specification (ADV_FSP)
High-level design (ADV_HLD)
ADV: Development
Implementation representation (ADV_IMP)
TSF internals (ADV_INT)
Low-level design (ADV_LLD)
Representation correspondence (ADV_RCR)
Security policy modeling (ADV_SPM)
AGD: Guidance documents
Administrator guidance (AGD_ADM)
User guidance (AGD_USR)
Development security (ALC_DVS)
ALC: Life cycle support
Flaw remediation (ALC_FLR)
Life cycle definition (ALC_LCD)
Tools and techniques (ALC_TAT)
Coverage (ATE_COV)
ATE: Tests
Depth (ATE_DPT)
Functional tests (ATE_FUN)
Independent testing (ATE_IND)
Covert channel analysis (AVA_CCA)
AVA: Vulnerability assessment
Misuse (AVA_MSU)
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF)
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA)
Table 1: Assurance family breakdown and mapping”
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Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 11)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 11.1)
“Table 6 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in chapter 7 of this Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be extended with explicitly
stated assurance requirements.
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Assurance
Class
Certification Report
Assurance
Family
Assurance
Components
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Configuration
management
EAL2
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
2
2
3
4
4
5
5
1
2
3
3
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
ACM_AUT
ACM_CAP
1
2
ACM_SCP
Delivery
operation
and ADO_DEL
Development
EAL3
ADO_IGS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ADV_FSP
1
1
1
2
3
3
4
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
3
1
2
3
1
1
2
2
1
2
2
3
1
3
3
3
ADV_HLD
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_LLD
ADV_RCR
1
1
1
ADV_SPM
Guidance
documents
Life
support
AGD_ADM
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
AGD_USR
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
ALC_LCD
1
2
2
3
ALC_TAT
1
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
2
2
3
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
1
2
2
cycle ALC_DVS
Tests
ALC_FLR
ATE_COV
1
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
ATE_IND
Vulnerability
assessment
1
AVA_CCA
AVA_MSU
1
2
2
3
3
AVA_SOF
1
1
1
1
1
1
AVA_VLA
1
1
2
3
4
4
Table 6: Evaluation assurance level summary”
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 11.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation, and that it provides useful protection against identified
threats.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 11.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practice. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked
(chapter 11.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practices.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 11.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practices which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested
(chapter 11.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practices supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 11.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.“
Strength of TOE security functions (AVA_SOF) (chapter 19.3)
“Objectives
Even if a TOE security function cannot be bypassed, deactivated, or corrupted, it may still
be possible to defeat it because there is a vulnerability in the concept of its underlying
security mechanisms. For those functions a qualification of their security behaviour can be
made using the results of a quantitative or statistical analysis of the security behaviour of
these mechanisms and the effort required to overcome them. The qualification is made in
the form of a strength of TOE security function claim.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VLA) (chapter 19.4)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether vulnerabilities identified,
during the evaluation of the construction and anticipated operation of the TOE or by other
methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses), could allow users to violate the TSP.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that a user will be able to discover flaws that
will allow unauthorised access to resources (e.g. data), allow the ability to interfere with or
alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
"Application notes
A vulnerability analysis is performed by the developer in order to ascertain the presence of
security vulnerabilities, and should consider at least the contents of all the TOE
deliverables including the ST for the targeted evaluation assurance level. The developer is
required to document the disposition of identified vulnerabilities to allow the evaluator to
make use of that information if it is found useful as a support for the evaluator's
independent vulnerability analysis.”
“Independent vulnerability analysis goes beyond the vulnerabilities identified by the
developer. The main intent of the evaluator analysis is to determine that the TOE is
resistant to penetration attacks performed by an attacker possessing a low (for AVA_VLA.2
Independent vulnerability analysis), moderate (for AVA_VLA.3 Moderately resistant) or
high (for AVA_VLA.4 Highly resistant) attack potential.”
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
D
Certification Report
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
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Certification Report
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BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product NXP Secure Smart Card Controller P5CD080V0B, P5CC080V0B,
P5CN080V0B and P5CC073V0B each with specific IC Dedicated Software (Target of
Evaluation, TOE) has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common
Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 2.3 extended by advice of the
Certification Body for components beyond EAL 4 and guidance specific for the technology
of the product for conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC),
Version 2.3 (ISO/IEC 15408:2005).
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 25 October 2011, the following results regarding
the development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria Security
Assurance Requirements
●
ACM – Configuration management (i.e. ACM_AUT.1, ACM_CAP.4, ACM_SCP.3),
●
ADO – Delivery and operation (i.e. ADO_DEL.2, ADO_IGS.1) and
●
ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.2, ALC_TAT.2),
are fulfilled for the development and production sites of the TOE listed below:
Site
Address
Function
NXP Semiconductors
GmbH
Hamburg, Germany
NXP Semiconductors GmbH
Business Unit Identification
Stresemannallee 101
D-22529 Hamburg
Development
and customer
support
NXP Semiconductors
GmbH
Gratkorn, Austria
NXP Semiconductors GmbH
Business Unit Identification
Document Control Office
Mikron-Weg 1
A-8101 Gratkorn
Document
control
SSMC Singapore
Systems on Silicon Manufacturing Co. Pte. Ltd. (SSMC)
70 Pasir Ris Drive 1
Singapore 519527
Singapore
Wafer fab
Photronics Singapore
Photronics Singapore Pte. Ltd.
6 Loyang Way 2
Loyang Industrial Park
Singapore 507099
Singapore
Mask shop
PSMC
Taiwan R.O.C.
Photronics Semiconductors Mask Corp. (PSMC)
1F, No.2, Li-Hsin Rd.
Science-Based Industrial Park
Hsin-Chu City, Taiwan R.O.C.
Mask shop
Chipbond
Taiwan R.O.C
Chipbond Technology Corporation
No. 3, Li-Hsin Rd. V
Wafer Bumping
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Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0700-2011
Site
Address
Function
Science Based Industrial Park
Hsin-Chu City, Taiwan R.O.C
NXP Semiconductors
GmbH
Hamburg, Germany
NXP Semiconductors GmbH
IC Manufacturing Operations
Test Center Hamburg (TeCH)
Stresemannallee 101
D-22529 Hamburg
Test Center,
assembly, delivery
NXP Semiconductors
(Thailand)
Bangkok, Thailand
NXP Semiconductors (Thailand)
303 Chaengwattana Rd.
Laksi Bangkok 10210
Thailand
Test Center,
assembly, delivery
NedCard B.V.
Wijchen
The Netherlands
NedCard B.V.
Bijsterhuizen 25-29
6604 LM Wijchen
The Netherlands
Module Assembly
Smartrac Technology
LTD, Thailand
Smartrac Technology LTD
142 Moo 1 Hi-Tech Industrial Estate
Tambon Ban, Amphor Bang-Pa-in,
Phra Nakorn Si Ayutthaya 13160, Thailand
Inlay assembly
Smartrac Technology
Germany GmbH,
Germany
Smartrac Technology Germany GmbH
Gewerbeparkstr. 10
51580 Reichshof-Wehnrath, Germany
Inlay assembly
HID Global Galway,
Irland
HID Global Galway
Paic Tionscail na Tulaigh, Balle na hAbhann
Co. Galway, Ireland
Inlay Assembly
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] and [7]). The evaluators verified, that the Threats, Security
Objectives and Requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the
Security Target [6] and [7] are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
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