Certification Report: 0750a_pdf

Certification Report: 0750a_pdf
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
for
Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO/
P5CC145V0A, MSO / P5CD128V0A, MSO /
P5CC128V0A, MSO
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
BSI - Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, Postfach 20 03 63, D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0, Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477, Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report V1.0
CC-Zert-327 V4.5
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO/ P5CC145V0A, MSO /
P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO
from
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
PP Conformance:
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0,
15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007
Functionality:
PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
Common Criteria
Recognition
Arrangement
for components up to
EAL 4
The IT product identified in this certificate has been evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification
Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for conformance
to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
This certificate applies only to the specific version and release of the product in its evaluated configuration
and in conjunction with the complete Certification Report.
The evaluation has been conducted in accordance with the provisions of the certification scheme of the
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) and the conclusions of the evaluation facility in the
evaluation technical report are consistent with the evidence adduced.
This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for Information Security or any
other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by the
Federal Office for Information Security or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, is either expressed or implied.
Bonn, 11 April 2011
For the Federal Office for Information Security
Joachim Weber
Head of Division
L.S.
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
Godesberger Allee 185-189 - D-53175 Bonn
-
Postfach 20 03 63 - D-53133 Bonn
Phone +49 (0)228 99 9582-0 - Fax +49 (0)228 9582-5477 - Infoline +49 (0)228 99 9582-111
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
This page is intentionally left blank.
4 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Certification Report
Preliminary Remarks
Under the BSIG1 Act, the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) has the task of
issuing certificates for information technology products.
Certification of a product is carried out on the instigation of the vendor or a distributor,
hereinafter called the sponsor.
A part of the procedure is the technical examination (evaluation) of the product according
to the security criteria published by the BSI or generally recognised security criteria.
The evaluation is normally carried out by an evaluation facility recognised by the BSI or by
BSI itself.
The result of the certification procedure is the present Certification Report. This report
contains among others the certificate (summarised assessment) and the detailed
Certification Results.
The Certification Results contain the technical description of the security functionality of
the certified product, the details of the evaluation (strength and weaknesses) and
instructions for the user.
1
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
5 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Contents
A Certification........................................................................................................................7
1 Specifications of the Certification Procedure.................................................................7
2 Recognition Agreements................................................................................................7
2.1 European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA).........................7
2.2 International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)...........................................8
3 Performance of Evaluation and Certification..................................................................8
4 Validity of the Certification Result...................................................................................9
5 Publication......................................................................................................................9
B Certification Results.........................................................................................................11
1 Executive Summary.....................................................................................................12
2 Identification of the TOE...............................................................................................13
3 Security Policy..............................................................................................................15
4 Assumptions and Clarification of Scope.......................................................................15
5 Architectural Information...............................................................................................15
6 Documentation.............................................................................................................16
7 IT Product Testing.........................................................................................................16
8 Evaluated Configuration...............................................................................................17
9 Results of the Evaluation..............................................................................................17
9.1 CC specific results.................................................................................................17
9.2 Results of cryptographic assessment....................................................................18
10 Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE.......................................................19
11 Security Target............................................................................................................19
12 Definitions...................................................................................................................20
12.1 Acronyms.............................................................................................................20
12.2 Glossary...............................................................................................................21
13 Bibliography................................................................................................................22
C Excerpts from the Criteria................................................................................................25
D Annexes...........................................................................................................................35
6 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
A
Certification
1
Specifications of the Certification Procedure
Certification Report
The certification body conducts the procedure according to the criteria laid down in the
following:
●
BSIG2
●
BSI Certification Ordinance3
●
BSI Schedule of Costs4
●
Special decrees issued by the Bundesministerium des Innern (Federal Ministry of the
Interior)
●
DIN EN 45011 standard
●
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125) [3]
●
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1 5 [1]
●
Common Methodology for IT Security Evaluation, Version 3.1 [2]
●
BSI certification: Application Notes and Interpretation of the Scheme (AIS) [4]
2
Recognition Agreements
In order to avoid multiple certification of the same product in different countries a mutual
recognition of IT security certificates - as far as such certificates are based on ITSEC or
CC - under certain conditions was agreed.
2.1
European Recognition of ITSEC/CC – Certificates (SOGIS-MRA)
The SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement (SOGIS-MRA) Version 3 became effective in
April 2010. It defines the recognition of certificates for IT-Products at a basic recognition
level and in addition at higher recognition levels for IT-Products related to certain technical
domains only.
The basic recognition level includes Common Criteria (CC) Evaluation Assurance Levels
EAL1 to EAL4 and ITSEC Evaluation Assurance Levels E1 to E3 (basic). For higher
recognition levels the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices has been defined.
It includes assurance levels beyond EAL4 resp. E3 (basic).
The new agreement was initially signed by the national bodies of Finland, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
2
Act on the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI-Gesetz - BSIG) of 14 August 2009,
Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 2821
3
Ordinance on the Procedure for Issuance of a Certificate by the Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI-Zertifizierungsverordnung, BSIZertV) of 07 July 1992, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 1230
4
Schedule of Cost for Official Procedures of the Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik
(BSI-Kostenverordnung, BSI-KostV) of 03 March 2005, Bundesgesetzblatt I p. 519
5
Proclamation of the Bundesministerium des Innern of 12 February 2007 in the Bundesanzeiger dated
23 February 2007, p. 3730
7 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Within the terms of this agreement the German Federal Office for Information Security
(BSI) recognises
●
for the basic recognition level certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national
certification bodies of France, The Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom.
●
for the higher recognition level in the technical domain Smart card and similar Devices
certificates issued as of April 2010 by the national certification bodies of France, The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
In addition, certificates issued for Protection Profiles based on Common Criteria are part of
the recognition agreement.
The SOGIS-MRA logo printed on the certificate indicates that it is recognised under the
terms of this agreement.
Historically, the first SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement Version 1 (ITSEC only)
became initially effective in March 1998. It was extended in 1999 to include certificates
based on the Common Criteria (MRA Version 2). Recognition of certificates previously
issued under these older versions of the SOGIS-Mutual Recognition Agreement is being
continued.
2.2
International Recognition of CC – Certificates (CCRA)
An arrangement (Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement) on the mutual recognition of
certificates based on the CC Evaluation Assurance Levels up to and including EAL 4 has
been signed in May 2000 (CCRA). It includes also the recognition of Protection Profiles
based on the CC.
As of January 2009 the arrangement has been signed by the national bodies of: Australia,
Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, The Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Pakistan, Republic of Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United
States of America. The current list of signatory nations and approved certification schemes
can be seen on the web site: http://www.commoncriteriaportal.org
The Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement logo printed on the certificate indicates
that this certification is recognised under the terms of this agreement.
This evaluation contains the components ADV_FSP.5, ADV_INT.2, ADV_TDS.4,
ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DVS.2, ALC_TAT.2, ATE_DPT.3 and AVA_VAN.5 that are not mutually
recognised in accordance with the provisions of the CCRA. For mutual recognition the
EAL4 components of these assurance families are relevant.
3
Performance of Evaluation and Certification
The certification body monitors each individual evaluation to ensure a uniform procedure, a
uniform interpretation of the criteria and uniform ratings.
The product Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO/ P5CC145V0A, MSO /
P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO has undergone the certification procedure at
BSI. This is a re-certification based on BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010. Specific results from the
evaluation process BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010 were re-used.
The evaluation of the product Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO/ P5CC145V0A,
MSO / P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO was conducted by Brightsight BV. The
8 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Certification Report
evaluation was completed on 4 March 2011. The Brightsight BV is an evaluation facility
(ITSEF)6 recognised by the certification body of BSI.
For this certification procedure the sponsor and applicant is: NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH.
The product was developed by: NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH.
The certification is concluded with the comparability check and the production of this
Certification Report. This work was completed by the BSI.
4
Validity of the Certification Result
This Certification Report only applies to the version of the product as indicated. The
confirmed assurance package is only valid on the condition that
●
all stipulations regarding generation, configuration and operation, as given in the
following report, are observed,
●
the product is operated in the environment described, where specified in the following
report and in the Security Target.
For the meaning of the assurance levels please refer to the excerpts from the criteria at
the end of the Certification Report.
The Certificate issued confirms the assurance of the product claimed in the Security Target
at the date of certification. As attack methods evolve over time, the resistance of the
certified version of the product against new attack methods needs to be re-assessed.
Therefore, the sponsor should apply for the certified product being monitored within the
assurance continuity program of the BSI Certification Scheme (e.g. by a re-certification).
Specifically, if results of the certification are used in subsequent evaluation and certification
procedures, in a system integration process or if a user's risk management needs regularly
updated results, it is recommended to perform a re-assessment on a regular e.g. annual
basis.
In case of changes to the certified version of the product, the validity can be extended to
the new versions and releases, provided the sponsor applies for assurance continuity (i.e.
re-certification or maintenance) of the modified product, in accordance with the procedural
requirements, and the evaluation does not reveal any security deficiencies.
5
Publication
The product Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO/ P5CC145V0A, MSO /
P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO has been included in the BSI list of the certified
products, which is published regularly (see also Internet: https://www.bsi.bund.de and [5]).
Further information can be obtained from BSI-Infoline +49 228 9582-111.
Further copies of this Certification Report can be requested from the developer 7 of the
product. The Certification Report may also be obtained in electronic form at the internet
address stated above.
6
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
7
NXP Semiconductors Germany GmbH
Stresemannallee 101
22529 Hamburg
9 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
This page is intentionally left blank.
10 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
B
Certification Results
The following results represent a summary of
●
the Security Target of the sponsor for the Target of Evaluation,
●
the relevant evaluation results from the evaluation facility, and
●
complementary notes and stipulations of the certification body.
11 / 38
Certification Report
Certification Report
1
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Executive Summary
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO/
P5CC145V0A, MSO / P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO. The Crypto Library and
the Hardware NXP SmartMX P5CD145V0A, MSO/ P5CC145V0A, MSO / P5CD128V0A,
MSO / P5CC128V0A Secure Smart Card Controller comprise a composite TOE and are
providing together a platform for security applications.
The Crypto Library on SmartMX is a cryptographic library, which provides a set of
cryptographic functionalities that can be used by the Smartcard embedded Software. The
cryptographic library consists of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to
the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Crypto Library on SmartMX provides additional
functionality to the developer of Smartcard Embedded Software. It is a supplement of the
basic cryptographic features provided by the hardware platform. The Crypto Library on
SmartMX implements cryptographic algorithms with countermeasures against the attacks
described in the Security Target [8] using the co-processors of the SmartMX to provide a
software programming interface for the developer of the Smartcard Embedded Software. A
Smartcard embedded Software developer may create Smartcard Embedded Software to
execute on the NXP SmartMX hardware. This software is stored in the User ROM of the
NXP SmartMX hardware and is not part of this TOE as defined. For more details refer to
the Security Target [8, chp. 1.2 and 1.4]
The Security Target [6] is the basis for this certification. It is based on the certified
Protection Profile Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSICC-PP-0035-2007 [7].
The TOE Security Assurance Requirements (SAR) are based entirely on the assurance
components defined in Part 3 of the Common Criteria (see part C or [1], Part 3 for details).
The TOE meets the assurance requirements of the Evaluation Assurance Level EAL 5
augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements (SFR) relevant for the TOE are outlined in the
Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 4.1 They are selected from Common Criteria Part 2
and some of them are newly defined. Thus the TOE is CC Part 2 extended.
The TOE Security Functional Requirements are implemented by the following TOE
Security Functionalities:
TOE Security Functionality
Addressed issue
F.LOG
Extended Logical Protection
F.AES
AES encryption and decryption
F.DES
DES encryption and decryption
F.RSA_encrypt
RSA encryption and decryption
F.RSA_sign
RSA signature generation and verification
F.RSA_public
computation of an RSA public key
F.ECC_GF_p_ECDSA
ECC Signature Generation and Verification
F.ECC_GF_p_DH_KeyExch
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
F.SHA
compute Secure Hash Algorithms
F.RSA_KeyGen
generate RSA key pairs
F.ECC_GF_p_KeyGen
ECC Key Generation
12 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Certification Report
TOE Security Functionality
Addressed issue
F.RNG_Access
software RNG
F.Object_Reuse
clearing memory areas
F.COPY
copy memory contents
Table 1: TOE Security Functionalities
These functionalities are based on the IT security functionalities of the chip platform as
outlined in the Hardware Security Target and certified as outlined in the certification report
[23]. For more details please refer to the Security Target [6] and [8], chapter 5.
The assets to be protected by the TOE are defined in the Security Target [6] and [8],
chapter 2.1. Based on these assets the TOE Security Problem is defined in terms of
Assumptions, Threats and Organisational Security Policies. This is outlined in the Security
Target [6] and [8], chapter 2.2 to 2.4.
This certification covers the Crypto Library V2.7 on the following hardware: NXP SmartMX
P5CD145V0A, MSO / P5CC145V0A, MSO / P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO
Secure Smart Card Controllers. For more details please refer to chapter 8.
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2).
The certification results only apply to the version of the product indicated in the certificate
and on the condition that all the stipulations are kept as detailed in this Certification
Report. This certificate is not an endorsement of the IT product by the Federal Office for
Information Security (BSI) or any other organisation that recognises or gives effect to this
certificate, and no warranty of the IT product by BSI or any other organisation that
recognises or gives effect to this certificate, is either expressed or implied.
2
Identification of the TOE
The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is called:
Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO/ P5CC145V0A, MSO / P5CD128V0A,
MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO
The following table outlines the TOE deliverables:
Type
Name
Release
Date
Form of delivery
V0A
T051A_20090820.
gds2
wafer, module,inlay,
package (dice have
nameplate T051A)
IC
Hardware
NXP Secure Smart Card
Controllers P5Cx128V0A /
P5Cx145V0A, MSO
IC
Dedicated
Test
Software
Test-ROM Software
97
9 December 2009
Test-ROM on the
chip acc. To
tmfos_97_collected.
ms3
IC
Dedicated
Support
Software
Boot-ROM Software
97
9 December 2009
Test-ROM on the
chip acc. To
tmfos_97_collected.
ms3
13 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
IC
Dedicated
Support
Software
MIFARE Operating System
97
9 December 2009
Test-ROM on the
chip acc. To
tmfos_97_collected.
ms3
Document
Data Sheet P5Cx128/P5Cx145
family, Secure dual interface and
contact PKI smart card controller
Revision
3.2
25 January 2011
Electronic document
Document
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family
1.1
4 July 2006
Electronic document
Document
Guidance, Delivery and
Operation Manual NXP Secure
Smartcard Controllers
P5CD016/021/041 and P5Cx08
Revision
1.4
25 January 2011
Electronic document
2.7
26 March 2010
Electronic file
Secured Crypto Library on the
P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family,
Overview, User Guidance Manual
[12]
Revision
1.2
3 February 2011
Electronic document
Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX, RSA Library, User
Guidance Manual [13]
Revision
4.5
15 April 2010
Electronic document
Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX, ECC over GF(p), User
Guidance Manual [14]
Revision
1.4
30 March 2010
Electronic document
Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX, AES Library, User
Guidance Manual [15]
Revision
1.2
19 August 2010
Electronic document
Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX, DES Library, User
Guidance Manual [16]
Revision
3.0
24 August 2007
Electronic document
Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX, Random Number
Generator, User Guidance
Manual [17]
Revision
5.0
24 August 2007
Electronic document
Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX, RSA Key Generation,
User Guidance Manual [18]
Revision
4.3
30 March 2010
Electronic document
Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX, SHA Library, User
Guidance Manual [19]
Revision
4.1
12 June 2008
Electronic document
Secured Crypto Library on the
SmartMX, Utility Library, User
Guidance Manual [20]
Revision
1.0
24 August 2007
Electronic document
Software
Documents
Crypto Library
Table 2: Deliverables of the TOE
The hardware part of the TOE is delivered by NXP either as wafers or in packaged form.
The hardware part of the TOE will be delivered with the IC Dedicated Support Software.
The Crypto Library is delivered in Phase 1 as a software package (a set of binary files) to
the developers of the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software
may comprise in this case an operating system and/or other smart card software
(applications). The Software developers can incorporate the Crypto Library into their
product.
14 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Certification Report
As explained in the user guidance, as part of the delivery procedure, the customer shall
verify the correctness of the delivered files by calculating the SHA-256 hash value of the
delivered files and comparing them to the reference values provided in the user guidance.
For the identification of the Hardware please refer to chapter 8.
3
Security Policy
The Security Policy is expressed by the set of Security Functional Requirements and
implemented by the TOE. It covers the following issues: The security policy of the TOE is
to provide basic Security Functions to be used by the smart card operating system and the
smart card application thus providing an overall smart card system security. Therefore, the
TOE will implement algorithms to ensure the confidentiality of plain text data by encryption
and to support secure authentication protocols and it will provide a random number
generator.
The TOE is a hardware security platform, the security policy of the TOE is also to provide
protection against leakage of information (e.g. to ensure the confidentiality of cryptographic
keys during cryptographic functions performed by the TOE), against physical probing,
against malfunctions, against physical manipulations and against abuse of functionality.
Hence the TOE shall
● maintain the integrity and the confidentiality of data stored in the memory of the TOE
and
● maintain the integrity, the correct operation and the confidentiality of Security Features
provided by the TOE.
4
Assumptions and Clarification of Scope
The Assumptions defined in the Security Target and some aspects of Threats and
organisational Security Policies are not covered by the TOE itself. These aspects lead to
specific security objectives to be fulfilled by the TOE-Environment. The following topics are
of relevance:
Protection during Packaging, Finishing and Personalization, Usage of Hardware Platform,
Treatment of User Data, Check of Initialisation Data by the Smartcard Embedded
Software, Usage of Key-dependent Functions. Details can be found in the Security Target
[6] resp. [8], chapter 2 and the Protection Profile BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007.
The subsequent use of the Crypto Library by Smartcard Embedded Software Developers
is out of the control of the developer NXP Semiconductors, Business Line Identification;
the integration of the Crypto Library into Smartcard Embedded Software is not part of this
certification.
5
Architectural Information
This chapter provides a high-level description of the IT product and its major components
based on the evaluation evidence described in the Common Criteria assurance family
entitled “TOE design (ADV_TDS)”. The intent of this chapter is to characterise the degree
of architectural separation of the major components and to show dependencies between
the TOE and products using the TOE in a composition.
15 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
The TOE contains a chip hardware and a Crypto Library. For architectural information on
the hardware please refer to the certification report [23]. The Crypto Library provides a set
of cryptographic functionalities that can be used by the Smartcard Embedded Software.
The Crypto Library consists of several binary packages that are intended to be linked to
the Smartcard Embedded Software. The Smartcard Embedded Software developer links
the binary packages that he needs to his Smartcard Embedded Software program code to
be implemented into the chip User ROM or EEPROM.
The TOE is implemented as a set of subsystems. The division into subsystems is chosen
according to the cryptographic algorithms provided: RSA Key Generation, RSA, DES, ECC
over GF(p), SHA, Random Numbers, AES, Utility. Finally, the TOE provides a secure copy
routine and includes internal security measures for residual information protection. The
functionality of the Crypto Library relies on the functionality of the underlying hardware.
6
Documentation
The evaluated documentation as outlined in table 2 is being provided with the product to
the customer. This documentation contains the required information for secure usage of
the TOE in accordance with the Security Target.
Additional obligations and notes for secure usage of the TOE as outlined in chapter 10 of
this report have to be followed.
7
IT Product Testing
For the Crypto Library, the developer has defined an extensive test set. The test set covers
all TOE interfaces, and all modes of operation of the implemented algorithms, as well as
available parameters. The evaluator was provided with a copy of the required software and
hardware, together with the means required to generate the TOE. This allowed the
evaluator to perform the complete test set as defined by the developer, in addition to the
tests defined by the evaluator.
The hardware test results are extendable to composite evaluations on this hardware TOE,
provided that the TOE is operated according to its guidance and the composite evaluation
requirements are met.
The following tests are performed: RSA, ECC over GF(p) and SHA functionality, leakage
protection against SPA, DPA and timing attacks and sensitivity to fault injection. All test
results were as expected. Please refer for side channel resistance to ST Lite [8], chapter
4.1.1, particularly Table 7.
All security functionalities have been tested by repeating the extensive set of fullautomated tests of the developer. Furthermore, the evaluator performed additional test
cases.
The testing was largely automated using a test-OS that allows access to the functions.
Test scripts were extensively used to verify that the functions return the expected values.
Side channel protection has been assessed as part of the vulnerability analysis.
The overall conclusion is that the Crypto Library is protected against attackers possessing
a high attack potential for all scenarios considered provided that the key length has been
selected according to notes outlined in chapter 9.2 of this report.
For the testing of the Hardware platform please refer to the results of the certification
procedure BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010 [23].
16 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
8
Certification Report
Evaluated Configuration
The TOE is the “Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO / P5CC145V0A, MSO /
P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO”. The TOE consists of a hardware part and a
software part. This certification covers the Crypto Library V2.7 on:
–
P5CD145V0A with hardware device coding byte DC(0): 21 Hex, DC(1): 17 Hex,
DC(2): 4B Hex
–
P5CC145V0A with hardware device coding byte DC(0): 11 Hex, DC(1): 17 Hex,
DC(2): 4A Hex
–
P5CD128V0A with hardware device coding byte DC(0): 21 Hex, DC(1): 17 Hex,
DC(2): 49 Hex
–
P5CC128V0A with hardware device coding byte DC(0): 11 Hex, DC(1): 17 Hex,
DC(2): 48 Hex
A so-called nameplate (on-chip identifier) is coded in a metal mask onto the chip during
production and can be checked by the customer, too. The nameplate T051A is specific for
the SSMC (Singapore) production site.
The Crypto Library is an additional part that provides cryptographic functions that can be
operated on the hardware platform. Note that it is possible, under certain conditions
described in the user guidance, for users of the TOE to use only a selection of the crypto
library modules.
9
Results of the Evaluation
9.1
CC specific results
The Evaluation Technical Report (ETR) [9] was provided by the ITSEF according to the
Common Criteria [1], the Methodology [2], the requirements of the Scheme [3] and all
interpretations and guidelines of the Scheme (AIS) [4] as relevant for the TOE.
The Evaluation Methodology CEM [2] was used for those components up to EAL 5
extended by advice of the Certification Body for components beyond EAL 5 and guidance
specific for the technology of the product [4] (AIS 34).
The following guidance specific for the technology was used:
(i)
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of deterministic random number
generators
(ii)
Composite product evaluation for Smart Cards and similar devices
(iii)
The Application of CC to Integrated Circuits
(iv)
Application of Attack Potential to Smart Cards
(v)
Functionality classes and evaluation methodology of physical random number
generators
(see [4], AIS 20, AIS 25, AIS 26, AIS 31,AIS 36)
To support further composite evaluations according to AIS 36 on top of this composed TOE
the document ETR for composite evaluation [10] was provided and approved. This
document provides details of this platform evaluation that have to be considered in the
course of a composite evaluation on top.
17 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
The assurance refinements outlined in the Security Target were followed in the course of
the evaluation of the TOE.
As a result of the evaluation the verdict PASS is confirmed for the following assurance
components:
●
All components of the EAL 5 package including the class ASE as defined in the CC (see
also part C of this report)
●
The components ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 augmented for this TOE evaluation.
As the evaluation work performed for this certification procedure was carried out as a reevaluation based on the certificate BSI-DSZ-CC-0633-2010, re-use of specific evaluation
tasks was possible. The focus of this re-evaluation was on vulnerability assessment
related to the changed hardware platform and the key length changes.
The evaluation has confirmed:
●
PP Conformance:
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007,
BSI-CC-PP-0035-2007 [7]
●
for the Functionality: PP conformant plus product specific extensions
Common Criteria Part 2 extended
●
for the Assurance:
Common Criteria Part 3 conformant
EAL 5 augmented by ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5
For specific evaluation results regarding the development and production environment see
annex B in part D of this report.
The results of the evaluation are only applicable to the TOE as defined in chapter 2 and
the configuration as outlined in chapter 8 above.
9.2
Results of cryptographic assessment
The vulnerability assessment results as stated within this certificate do not include a rating
for those cryptographic algorithms and their implementation suitable for encryption and
decryption (see BSIG Section 9, Para. 4, Clause 2). This holds for:
–
the TOE Security Functionality F.AES
–
the TOE Security Functionality F.DES
–
the TOE Security Functionality F.RSA_encrypt
–
the TOE Security functionality as outlined in the certification report of the hardware
platform DSZ-CC-0645-2010 [23].
The strength of the cryptographic algorithms was not rated in the course of this certification
procedure (see BSIG Section 4, Para. 3, Clause 2). But Cryptographic Functionalities with
a security level of 80 bits or lower can no longer be regarded as secure against attacks
with high attack potential without considering the application context. Therefore for this
functionalities it shall be checked whether the related crypto operations are appropriate for
the intended system. Some further hints and guidelines can be derived from the
'Technische Richtlinie BSI TR-02102' (https://www.bsi.bund.de).
The Cryptographic Functionalities DES, 2-key Triple DES (2TDES), RSA 256 to RSA 1024,
ECC 128 to ECC 160, SHA1 used as collision-resistent hash function provided by the TOE
achieves a security level of maximum 80 Bits (in general context).
18 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
10
Certification Report
Obligations and Notes for the Usage of the TOE
The documents as outlined in table 2 contain necessary information about the usage of the
TOE and all security hints therein have to be considered. In addition all aspects of
assumptions, threats and policies as outlined in the Security Target not covered by the
TOE itself need to be fulfilled by the operational environment of the TOE.
The customer or user of the product shall consider the results of the certification within his
system risk management process. In order for the evolution of attack methods and
techniques to be covered, he should define the period of time until a re-assessment for the
TOE is required and thus requested from the sponsor of the certificate.
The limited validity for the usage of cryptograhic algorithms as outlined in chapter 9 has to
be considered by the user and his system risk management process.
Some security measures are partly implemented in the hardware and/or cryptographic
library and require additional configuration or control or measures to be implemented by
the IC Dedicated Software or Embedded Software.
For this reason the TOE includes guidance documentation (see table 2) which contains
guidelines for the developer of the IC Dedicated Software and Embedded Software on how
to securely use the microcontroller chip and the cryptographic library and which measures
have to be implemented in the software on top in order to fulfil the security requirements of
the Security Target of the TOE. This includes the guidance documents on the hardware
itself and on the cryptographic library as well.
In the course of the evaluation of the composite product or system it must be examined if
the required measures have been correct and effectively implemented by the software.
Additionally, the evaluation of the composite product or system must also consider the
evaluation results as outlined in the document ETR for composite evaluation [10].
In addition, the following aspects need to be fulfilled when using the TOE: The user of the
Crypto Library must implement the advices of the hardware user guidance [24]. Important
to mention are
•
Section 4.3.2 limit the use of a single key for AES operations under certain
circumstances;
•
Section 4.4: appropriate handling of sensor resets and exceptions;
•
Section 5.1: error counter mechanism.
Furthermore, for proper functioning of the countermeasures, the user must ensure that the
RNG is properly seeded, as described in [12], section 6.13. Finally, in all circumstances,
user guidance must be followed and be carefully considered when certain interfaces are
used, in particular [13] and [14].
11
Security Target
For the purpose of publishing, the Security Target [8] of the Target of Evaluation (TOE) is
provided within a separate document as Annex A of this report. It is a sanitised version of
the complete Security Target [6] used for the evaluation performed. Sanitisation was
performed according to the rules as outlined in the relevant CCRA policy (see AIS 35 [4])
19 / 38
Certification Report
12
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Definitions
12.1 Acronyms
AES
Advanced Encryption Standard (symmetric crypto-algorithm)
AIS
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme
BSI
Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik / Federal Office for
Information Security, Bonn, Germany
BSIG
BSI-Gesetz / Act on the Federal Office for Information Security
CBC
Cipher Block Chaining (a block cipher mode of operation)
CBC-MAC
Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code
CCRA
Common Criteria Recognition Arrangement
CC
Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation
CEM
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation
DEA
Data Encryption Algorithm
DES
Data Encryption Standard
DRNG
Deterministic Random Number Generator
EAL
Evaluation Assurance Level
ECB
Electronic Code Book (a block cipher mode of operation)
ECC
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (i.e. cryptosystems based on elliptic curves)
GF(p)
Finite field or Galois field that contains p elements and p is a prime number
IC
Integrated Circuit
ETR
Evaluation Technical Report
IT
Information Technology
ITSEF
Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
PP
Protection Profile
SAR
Security Assurance Requirement
SFP
Security Function Policy
SFR
1. as a CC-term: Security Functional Requirement
2. as a technical term of the SmartMX-family: Special Function Register
SHA
Secure Hash Algorithm. SHA-1 returns hash-values with 160 bits length,
SHA-224 (sometimes called SHA-2) returns hash-values with 224 bits length
and SHA-256 (sometimes called SHA-3) returns hash-values with 256 bits
length.
ST
Security Target
TOE
Target of Evaluation
TRNG
True Random Number Generator
TSF
TOE Security Functionalities
20 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Certification Report
12.2 Glossary
Augmentation - The addition of one or more requirement(s) to a package.
Extension - The addition to an ST or PP of functional requirements not contained in part 2
and/or assurance requirements not contained in part 3 of the CC.
Formal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics based on wellestablished mathematical concepts.
Informal - Expressed in natural language.
Object - An passive entity in the TOE, that contains or receives information, and upon
which subjects perform operations.
Protection Profile - An implementation-independent statement of security needs for a
TOE type.
Security Target - An implementation-dependent statement of security needs for a specific
identified TOE.
Semiformal - Expressed in a restricted syntax language with defined semantics.
Subject - An active entity in the TOE that performs operations on objects.
Target of Evaluation - A set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly accompanied
by guidance.
TOE Security Functionality - combined functionality of all hardware, software, and
firmware of a TOE that must be relied upon for the correct enforcement of the SFRs
21 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
13
Bibliography
[1]
Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Version 3.1,
Part 1: Introduction and general model, Revision 3, July 2009
Part
2:
Security
functional
components,
Revision
3,
July
2009
Part 3: Security assurance components, Revision 3, July 2009
[2]
Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation (CEM),
Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Rev. 3, July 2009
[3]
BSI certification: Procedural Description (BSI 7125)
[4]
Application Notes and Interpretations of the Scheme (AIS) as relevant for the TOE 8.
[5]
German IT Security Certificates (BSI 7148), periodically updated list published also
in the BSI Website
[6]
Security Target “Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO / P5CC145V0A, MSO /
P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO”, Rev 1.1, 17 February 2011, BSI-DSZCC-0750-2011 (confidential document)
[7]
Security IC Platform Protection Profile, Version 1.0, 15 June 2007, BSI-CC-PP0035-2007
[8]
Security Target Lite “Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO / P5CC145V0A,
MSO / P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO”, Rev 1.1, 17 February 2011, BSIDSZ-CC-0750-2011 (sanitised public document)
[9]
Evaluation Technical Report Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO /
P5CC145V0A, MSO / P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO, Version 4, 4
March 2011, brightsight (confidential document)
[10]
ETR for composition for Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO /
P5CC145V0A, MSO / P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO according to
AIS36, brightsight, Version 6, March 4th, 2011
8
specifically
•
AIS 20, Version 1, 2. December 1999, Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
deterministische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 25, Version 6, 7 September 2009, Anwendung der CC auf Integrierte Schaltungen including JIL
Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 26, Version 7, 3 August 2010, Evaluationsmethodologie für in Hardware integrierte Schaltungen
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document
•
AIS 31, Version 1, 25 Sept. 2001 Funktionalitätsklassen und Evaluationsmethodologie für
physikalische Zufallszahlengeneratoren
•
AIS 32, Version 6, 3 August 2010, CC-Interpretationen im deutschen Zertifizierungsschema
•
AIS 34, Version 3, 3 September 2009, Evaluation Methodology for CC Assurance Classes for EAL5+
(CCv2.3 & CCv3.1) and EAL6 (CCv3.1)
•
AIS 35, Version 2.0, 12 November 2007, Öffentliche Fassung des Security Targets (ST-Lite)
including JIL Document and CC Supporting Document and CCRA policies
•
AIS 36, Version 3, 19 October 2010, Kompositionsevaluierung including JIL Document and CC
Supporting Document
•
AIS 38, Version 2.0, 28 September 2007, Reuse of evaluation results
22 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Certification Report
[11]
List of Configuration Items, Version 1.1, February 24th, 2011
[12]
Secured Crypto Library on the P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family, Overview, User Guidance
Manual, Rev. 1.2, 3 February 2011
[13]
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX, RSA Library, User Guidance Manual, Rev.
4.5, 15 April 2010
[14]
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX, ECC over GF(p), User Guidance Manual,
Rev. 1.4 – 30 March 2010
[15]
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX, AES Library, User Guidance Manual, Rev.
1.2 – 19 August 2010
[16]
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX, DES Library, User Guidance Manual, Rev.
3.0 – 24 August 2007
[17]
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX, Random Number Generator, User
Guidance Manual, Rev. 5.0 – 24 August 2007
[18]
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX, RSA Key Generation, User Guidance
Manual, Rev. 4.3 – 30 March 2010
[19]
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX, SHA Library, User Guidance Manual, Rev.
4.1 – 12 June 2008
[20]
Secured Crypto Library on the SmartMX, Utility Library, User Guidance Manual,
Rev. 1.0 – 24 August 2007
[21]
ETR for composition for NXP P5Cx128V0A/P5Cx145V0A, MSO Secure Smart Card
Controller, BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010, T-Systems, version 1.1, July 15th, 2010
(confidential document)
[22]
Security Target Lite BSI-DSZ-0645, Version 1.7, 16 December 2010,
P5Cx128V0A/P5Cx145V0A, MSO NXP Smart Card Controllers, NXP
Semiconductors (sanitised public document)
[23]
Certification report BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010 for NXP Secure PKI Smart Card
Controllers P5CD145V0A, MSO; P5CC145V0A, MSO; P5CD128V0A, MSO and
P5CC128V0A, MSO; each including IC Dedicated Software from NXP
Semiconductors Germany GmbH, BSI, version 1.0, 23 July 2010 amended by
Maintenance Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010-MA01, BSI, version 1.0, 11 April 2011
[24]
Guidance, Delivery and Operation Manual NXP Secure Smart Card Controllers
P5Cx128V0A/P5Cx145V0A, MSO, NXP Semiconductors, Business Line
identification, Rev. 1.4, Document Number 185114, 25 January 2011
[25]
Data Sheet P5Cx128/P5Cx145 family, Secure dual interface and contact PKI smart
card controller, NXP Semiconductors, Rev. 3.2, Document Number 177932, 25
January 2011
[26]
Instruction Set, SmartMX-Family, Secure and PKI Smart Card Controller, Philips
Semiconductors, Revision 1.1, Document Number: 084111, July 04, 2006
23 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
This page is intentionally left blank.
24 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
C
Certification Report
Excerpts from the Criteria
CC Part1:
Conformance Claim (chapter 10.4)
„The conformance claim indicates the source of the collection of requirements that is met
by a PP or ST that passes its evaluation. This conformance claim contains a CC
conformance claim that:
●
describes the version of the CC to which the PP or ST claims conformance.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 2 (security functional requirements) as either:
– CC Part 2 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 conformant if all SFRs in that
PP or ST are based only upon functional components in CC Part 2, or
– CC Part 2 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 2 extended if at least one SFR in
that PP or ST is not based upon functional components in CC Part 2.
●
describes the conformance to CC Part 3 (security assurance requirements) as either:
– CC Part 3 conformant - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 conformant if all SARs in that
PP or ST are based only upon assurance components in CC Part 3, or
– CC Part 3 extended - A PP or ST is CC Part 3 extended if at least one SAR in
that PP or ST is not based upon assurance components in CC Part 3.
Additionally, the conformance claim may include a statement made with respect to
packages, in which case it consists of one of the following:
●
Package name Conformant - A PP or ST is conformant to a pre-defined package
(e.g. EAL) if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST are identical to the SFRs in the package, or
– the SARs of that PP or ST are identical to the SARs in the package.
●
Package name Augmented - A PP or ST is an augmentation of a predefined package
if:
– the SFRs of that PP or ST contain all SFRs in the package, but have at least
one additional SFR or one SFR that is hierarchically higher than an SFR in the
package.
– the SARs of that PP or ST contain all SARs in the package, but have at least
one additional SAR or one SAR that is hierarchically higher than an SAR in the
package.
Note that when a TOE is successfully evaluated to a given ST, any conformance claims of
the ST also hold for the TOE. A TOE can therefore also be e.g. CC Part 2 conformant.
Finally, the conformance claim may also include two statements with respect to Protection
Profiles:
●
PP Conformant - A PP or TOE meets specific PP(s), which are listed as part of the
conformance result.
●
Conformance Statement (Only for PPs) - This statement describes the manner in
which PPs or STs must conform to this PP: strict or demonstrable. For more
information on this Conformance Statement, see Annex D.”
25 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
CC Part 3:
Class APE: Protection Profile evaluation (chapter 10)
“Evaluating a PP is required to demonstrate that the PP is sound and internally consistent,
and, if the PP is based on one or more other PPs or on packages, that the PP is a correct
instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the PP to be
suitable for use as the basis for writing an ST or another PP.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
APE_INT.1 PP introduction
APE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class APE: Protection
APE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Profile evaluation
APE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
APE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
APE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
APE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
APE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
APE: Protection Profile evaluation class decomposition”
Class ASE: Security Target evaluation (chapter 11)
“Evaluating an ST is required to demonstrate that the ST is sound and internally
consistent, and, if the ST is based on one or more PPs or packages, that the ST is a
correct instantiation of these PPs and packages. These properties are necessary for the
ST to be suitable for use as the basis for a TOE evaluation.”
26 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Assurance Class
Certification Report
Assurance Components
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims
Class ASE: Security
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition
Target evaluation
ASE_OBJ.1 Security objectives for the operational environment
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition
ASE_REQ.1 Stated security requirements
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification
ASE_TSS.2 TOE summary specification with architectural design
summary
ASE: Security Target evaluation class decomposition
Security assurance components (chapter 7)
“The following Sections describe the constructs used in representing the assurance
classes, families, and components.“
“Each assurance class contains at least one assurance family.”
“Each assurance family contains one or more assurance components.”
The following table shows the assurance class decomposition.
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
ADV: Development
ADV_ARC.1 Security architecture description
ADV_FSP.1 Basic functional specification
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification
ADV_FSP.3 Functional specification with complete summary
ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification
ADV_FSP.5 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional error information
ADV_FSP.6 Complete semi-formal functional specification with
additional formal specification
ADV_IMP.1 Implementation representation of the TSF
ADV_IMP.2 Implementation of the TSF
ADV_INT.1 Well-structured subset of TSF internals
ADV_INT.2 Well-structured internals
ADV_INT.3 Minimally complex internals
ADV_SPM.1 Formal TOE security policy model
ADV_TDS.1 Basic design
ADV_TDS.2 Architectural design
ADV_TDS.3 Basic modular design
ADV_TDS.4 Semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.5 Complete semiformal modular design
ADV_TDS.6 Complete semiformal modular design with formal highlevel design presentation
27 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Assurance Class
Assurance Components
AGD:
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance
Guidance documents
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures
ALC_CMC.1 Labelling of the TOE
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system
ALC_CMC.3 Authorisation controls
ALC_CMC.4 Production support, acceptance procedures and
automation
ALC_CMC.5 Advanced support
ALC: Life cycle support
ALC_CMS.1 TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage
ALC_CMS.3 Implementation representation CM coverage
ALC_CMS.4 Problem tracking CM coverage
ALC_CMS.5 Development tools CM coverage
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures
ALC_DVS.1 Identification of security measures
ALC_DVS.2 Sufficiency of security measures
ALC_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation
ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation
ALC_LCD.1 Developer defined life-cycle model
ALC_LCD.2 Measurable life-cycle model
ALC_TAT.1 Well-defined development tools
ALC_TAT.2 Compliance with implementation standards
ALC_TAT.3 Compliance with implementation standards - all parts
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage
ATE_COV.2 Analysis of coverage
ATE_COV.3 Rigorous analysis of coverage
ATE: Tests
ATE_DPT.1 Testing: basic design
ATE_DPT.2 Testing: security enforcing modules
ATE_DPT.3 Testing: modular design
ATE_DPT.4 Testing: implementation representation
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing
ATE_FUN.2 Ordered functional testing
ATE_IND.1 Independent testing – conformance
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample
ATE_IND.3 Independent testing – complete
AVA: Vulnerability
assessment
AVA_VAN.1 Vulnerability survey
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.3 Focused vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.4 Methodical vulnerability analysis
AVA_VAN.5 Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis
Assurance class decomposition
28 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Certification Report
Evaluation assurance levels (chapter 8)
“The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs) provide an increasing scale that balances the
level of assurance obtained with the cost and feasibility of acquiring that degree of
assurance. The CC approach identifies the separate concepts of assurance in a TOE at
the end of the evaluation, and of maintenance of that assurance during the operational use
of the TOE.
It is important to note that not all families and components from CC Part 3 are included in
the EALs. This is not to say that these do not provide meaningful and desirable
assurances. Instead, it is expected that these families and components will be considered
for augmentation of an EAL in those PPs and STs for which they provide utility.”
Evaluation assurance level (EAL) overview (chapter 8.1)
“Table 1 represents a summary of the EALs. The columns represent a hierarchically
ordered set of EALs, while the rows represent assurance families. Each number in the
resulting matrix identifies a specific assurance component where applicable.
As outlined in the next Section, seven hierarchically ordered evaluation assurance levels
are defined in the CC for the rating of a TOE's assurance. They are hierarchically ordered
inasmuch as each EAL represents more assurance than all lower EALs. The increase in
assurance from EAL to EAL is accomplished by substitution of a hierarchically higher
assurance component from the same assurance family (i.e. increasing rigour, scope,
and/or depth) and from the addition of assurance components from other assurance
families (i.e. adding new requirements).
These EALs consist of an appropriate combination of assurance components as described
in Chapter 7 of this CC Part 3. More precisely, each EAL includes no more than one
component of each assurance family and all assurance dependencies of every component
are addressed.
While the EALs are defined in the CC, it is possible to represent other combinations of
assurance. Specifically, the notion of “augmentation” allows the addition of assurance
components (from assurance families not already included in the EAL) or the substitution
of assurance components (with another hierarchically higher assurance component in the
same assurance family) to an EAL. Of the assurance constructs defined in the CC, only
EALs may be augmented. The notion of an “EAL minus a constituent assurance
component” is not recognised by the standard as a valid claim. Augmentation carries with
it the obligation on the part of the claimant to justify the utility and added value of the
added assurance component to the EAL. An EAL may also be augmented with extended
assurance requirements.
29 / 38
Certification Report
Assurance
Class
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Assurance
Family
Assurance Components by
Evaluation Assurance Level
EAL1
Development
ADV_ARC
ADV_FSP
1
EAL2
EAL3
EAL4
EAL5
EAL6
EAL7
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
5
6
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
ADV_IMP
ADV_INT
ADV_SPM
ADV_TDS
1
2
3
4
5
6
Guidance
AGD_OPE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Documents
AGD_PRE
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Life cycle
ALC_CMC
1
2
3
4
4
5
5
Support
ALC_CMS
1
2
3
4
5
5
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
3
ALC_DEL
ALC_DVS
ALC_FLR
ALC_LCD
ALC_TAT
Security Target
Evaluation
ASE_CCL
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_ECD
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_INT
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
ASE_OBJ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
ASR_REQ
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
1
1
1
1
2
2
ASE_SPD
ASE_TSS
Tests
1
ATE_COV
ATE_DPT
ATE_FUN
Vulnerability
assessment
ATE_IND
1
2
2
2
2
2
3
AVA_VAN
1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Table 1: Evaluation assurance level summary”
30 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 1 (EAL1) - functionally tested (chapter 8.3)
“Objectives
EAL1 is applicable where some confidence in correct operation is required, but the threats
to security are not viewed as serious. It will be of value where independent assurance is
required to support the contention that due care has been exercised with respect to the
protection of personal or similar information.
EAL1 requires only a limited security target. It is sufficient to simply state the SFRs that the
TOE must meet, rather than deriving them from threats, OSPs and assumptions through
security objectives.
EAL1 provides an evaluation of the TOE as made available to the customer, including
independent testing against a specification, and an examination of the guidance
documentation provided. It is intended that an EAL1 evaluation could be successfully
conducted without assistance from the developer of the TOE, and for minimal outlay.
An evaluation at this level should provide evidence that the TOE functions in a manner
consistent with its documentation.”
Evaluation assurance level 2 (EAL2) - structurally tested (chapter 8.4)
“Objectives
EAL2 requires the co-operation of the developer in terms of the delivery of design
information and test results, but should not demand more effort on the part of the
developer than is consistent with good commercial practise. As such it should not require a
substantially increased investment of cost or time.
EAL2 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
low to moderate level of independently assured security in the absence of ready
availability of the complete development record. Such a situation may arise when securing
legacy systems, or where access to the developer may be limited.”
Evaluation assurance level 3 (EAL3) - methodically tested and checked (chapter 8.5)
“Objectives
EAL3 permits a conscientious developer to gain maximum assurance from positive
security engineering at the design stage without substantial alteration of existing sound
development practises.
EAL3 is applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a moderate
level of independently assured security, and require a thorough investigation of the TOE
and its development without substantial re-engineering.”
31 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Evaluation assurance level 4 (EAL4) - methodically designed, tested, and reviewed
(chapter 8.6)
“Objectives
EAL4 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from positive security engineering
based on good commercial development practises which, though rigorous, do not require
substantial specialist knowledge, skills, and other resources. EAL4 is the highest level at
which it is likely to be economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line.
EAL4 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
moderate to high level of independently assured security in conventional commodity TOEs
and are prepared to incur additional security-specific engineering costs.”
Evaluation assurance level 5 (EAL5) - semiformally designed and tested (chapter 8.7)
“Objectives
EAL5 permits a developer to gain maximum assurance from security engineering based
upon rigorous commercial development practises supported by moderate application of
specialist security engineering techniques. Such a TOE will probably be designed and
developed with the intent of achieving EAL5 assurance. It is likely that the additional costs
attributable to the EAL5 requirements, relative to rigorous development without the
application of specialised techniques, will not be large.
EAL5 is therefore applicable in those circumstances where developers or users require a
high level of independently assured security in a planned development and require a
rigorous development approach without incurring unreasonable costs attributable to
specialist security engineering techniques.”
Evaluation assurance level 6 (EAL6) - semiformally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.8)
“Objectives
EAL6 permits developers to gain high assurance from application of security engineering
techniques to a rigorous development environment in order to produce a premium TOE for
protecting high value assets against significant risks.
EAL6 is therefore applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in high
risk situations where the value of the protected assets justifies the additional costs.”
32 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Certification Report
Evaluation assurance level 7 (EAL7) - formally verified design and tested
(chapter 8.9)
“Objectives
EAL7 is applicable to the development of security TOEs for application in extremely high
risk situations and/or where the high value of the assets justifies the higher costs. Practical
application of EAL7 is currently limited to TOEs with tightly focused security functionality
that is amenable to extensive formal analysis.”
Class AVA: Vulnerability assessment (chapter 16)
“The AVA: Vulnerability assessment class addresses the possibility of exploitable
vulnerabilities introduced in the development or the operation of the TOE.”
Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN) (chapter 16.1)
"Objectives
Vulnerability analysis is an assessment to determine whether potential vulnerabilities
identified, during the evaluation of the development and anticipated operation of the TOE
or by other methods (e.g. by flaw hypotheses or quantitative or statistical analysis of the
security behaviour of the underlying security mechanisms), could allow attackers to violate
the SFRs.
Vulnerability analysis deals with the threats that an attacker will be able to discover flaws
that will allow unauthorised access to data and functionality, allow the ability to interfere
with or alter the TSF, or interfere with the authorised capabilities of other users.”
33 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
This page is intentionally left blank
34 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
D
Annexes
List of annexes of this certification report
Annex A:
Security Target provided within a separate document.
Annex B:
Evaluation results regarding development
and production environment
35 / 38
Certification Report
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
This page is intentionally left blank.
36 / 38
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Certification Report
Annex B of Certification Report BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
Evaluation results regarding
development and production
environment
The IT product Crypto Library V2.7 on P5CD145V0A, MSO/ P5CC145V0A, MSO /
P5CD128V0A, MSO / P5CC128V0A, MSO (Target of Evaluation, TOE) has been
evaluated at an approved evaluation facility using the Common Methodology for IT
Security Evaluation (CEM), Version 3.1 extended by advice of the Certification Body for
components beyond EAL 5 and guidance specific for the technology of the product for
conformance to the Common Criteria for IT Security Evaluation (CC), Version 3.1.
As a result of the TOE certification, dated 11 April 2011, the following results regarding the
development and production environment apply. The Common Criteria assurance
requirements ALC – Life cycle support (i.e. ALC_CMC.4, ALC_CMS.5, ALC_DEL.1,
ALC_DVS.2, ALC_LCD.1, ALC_TAT.2) are fulfilled for the development and production
sites of the TOE listed below:
a)
The development and production sites as outlined in the certification report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0645-2010 are of relevance for the composed TOE
b)
For the development of the Crypto Library, only the site NXP Semiconductors
Germany GmbH, Business Line Identification, Stresemannallee 101, D-22529
Hamburg (Development Center) is in scope.
For the sites listed above, the requirements have been specifically applied in accordance
with the Security Target [6] ). The evaluators verified, that the threats, security objectives
and requirements for the TOE life cycle phases up to delivery (as stated in the Security
Target [6] and [8]) are fulfilled by the procedures of these sites.
37 / 38
Certification Report
BSI-DSZ-CC-0750-2011
This page is intentionally left blank.
38 / 38
Was this manual useful for you? yes no
Thank you for your participation!

* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project

Download PDF

advertisement