United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
Welcome to UFRGSMUN’s 2010 United Nations Security Council! Our staff members have been working hard throughout this year to provide you the best UNSC experience, so here is a little more about them.
Camilla Corá is a third year International Relations student at UFRGS. In 2008 she participated in UFRGSMUN as the representative of Indonesia to the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) and in 2009 she participated for the first time as assistant-director of the UNSC. This year she is one of the UNSC’s directors and she is currently on exchange at Gent University.
Raquel Tebaldi has participated as a delegate of Indonesia in SPECPOL for the first time at UFRGSMUN 2008 and 2009 was her first year as a staff member as one of the assistant-directors of the UNSC. She is currently on her third year of the
International Relations course at UFRGS and has just returned from one semester of exchange under the Erasmus Mundus programme in Belgium.
Alexandre Spohr is an International Relations undergraduate student at
UFRGS. He is in his fourth semester. In 2009 he participated in UFRGSMUN as the representative of Bulgaria to the North Atlantic Council (NAC). This is his first participation as a staff member.
Isadora Loreto da Silveira is a 4th semester International Relations undergraduate student at UFRGS. She participated as a delegate of Turkey in CCPCJ at
UFRGSMUN 2009 and this is her first participation as a staff member.
Pedro Brittes is a 6th semester International Relations undergraduate student at
UFRGS. He participated as delegate of Lybia in UNSC at UFRGSMUN 2009 and as delegate of Islamic Republic of Iran in UNSC at AMUN 2010. This is his first participation as a staff member.
Athos Munhoz is a 6th semester International Relations undergraduate student at UFRGS. He participated as delegate of Croatia in SPECPOL at UFRGSMUN 2008, as delegate of Japan in CCPCJ at UFRGSMUN 2009, and as delegate of the Islamic
Republic of Iran in UNSC at AMUN 2010. This is his first participation as a staff member.
This year’s simulation will deal with two very difficult situations in the African continent: the cases of Congo and Sudan. The document we prepared is a good starting point to understanding these issues, so we strongly advise you to seek other complementary sources for you preparation.
We hope you’ll have a great experience with us!
Alexandre Spohr Athos Munhoz
Isadora Silveira Pedro Brittes
Assistant-Director Assistant-Director Assistant-Director Assistant-Director
The United Nations Security Council is the primary body of the organization in maintaining international peace and security, as defined by the UN Charter. The UNSC is formed by fifteen members, of which five are permanent and ten are selected by the
General Assembly for two year terms. The five permanent members of the Security
Council are China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States, and they hold what is commonly known as “veto power”. That means that if any of these five members vote against a resolution or clause, for instance, it will automatically fail.
The remaining 10 countries are elected by the General Assembly, which has demonstrated through the years the tendency to elect five members from Asia and
Africa, one from Eastern Europe, two from Latin America and two from Western
Europe and other states. The sessions of 2010 will be composed of the following States:
Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Japan, Lebanon,
Mexico, Nigeria, Russian Federation, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom and United
States of America. The Presidency of the Council is held by its members in turns of one calendar month each. The order of the presidencies is defined by the English alphabetical order of their names.
The main characteristic of the UNSC, which detaches it from other UN organs, is that it is the only committee in the organization with the power to impose binding resolutions on nations. It is also in the Council’s mandate the right to make use of force by authorizing military and peacekeeping operations. However, the organ’s first action, when a complaint related to a threat to peace if brought before it, is to recommend to the parties to try and reach a peaceful solution. It may also help the ceasing of the dispute by investigating or mediating the conflict if so needed. The Council has also, on many occasions in which the dispute had led to fighting, ordered cease-fires and imposed economic sanctions or collective military embargoes. At last, the UNSC may recommend the suspension or expulsion, by the General Assembly, of a Member State that continually violates the principles of the Charter. This committee is, therefore, crucial to the peacekeeping objectives of the United Nations, and its relevance goes way
beyond security and geopolitics, affecting also the lives of the populations directly involved in the conflicts it strives to solve.
TOPIC AREA A: THE SITUATION IN SUDAN
By Alexandre Spohr, Camilla Corá, Isadora Silveira and Raquel Tebaldi
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Formation of the Sudanese State
Like many other African countries, Sudan was first composed of many different ethnic groups, which gradually became united. Bearing in mind the existence of more than 300 groups
, the Sudanese population can be divided into three major religious groups: the Muslims (70%), the Animists (15%) and. the Christians (5%) (CIA
World Factbook, 2010). Furthermore, the division between North and South has always been important in Sudan, since their ethnic and religious compositions are very different. Following the patterns of North Africa, Northern Sudan is composed mainly by followers of the Islamic religion, while the South has been strongly influenced by
Christian and Animist beliefs (JANES, 2009).
The country was colonized by the Egyptians and Ottomans as of 1821, but the domination period was ended by a revolution organized by an Islamic cleric who managed to expel the dominators and unify Central and Northern Sudan in 1885. His death, however, left the country to be ruled by an administration that enforced a strict code of Islam. In 1899, an alliance between England and Egypt invaded the country and proclaimed the English-Egyptian Condominium, which consisted in the colonization of
Sudan by both countries.
After the First World War and the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, in which
Egypt achieved independence from Great Britain with Sudanese help, the movement for
Sudanese independence was initiated by nationalist groups, being kept hidden from the colonial authorities. During the following years, Egypt tried to incorporate Sudan’s territory to its own, supporting the National Unionist Party (which advocated the
North’s integration with Egypt), while England worked to insufflate Sudanese patriotism in the inhabitants of the region and defended the Umma (Islamic Nation)
Available at http://search.globescope.com/sudan/index.php?page=history-of-the-sudan . Last access: July
Party, which stood for Sudanese unity, an alliance that made independence a possible option. In 1956, the newly elected Parliament issued the Declaration of Independence.
The Emergence of the Civil War (1955 - 1972)
The way the independence was achieved did not satisfy the southerners, as the new government tried to spread Islamism throughout the entire country, which led the country into civil war between the Northern Administration and the Southern rebels in the middle of the 1950s. One of the main complaints of the Southerners was the establishment of Arabic as the only official language, which frequently excluded the southerners from the decision-making process (JANES, 2009).
Many governments ruled the country since then, but all of them had difficulties to cope with the administrative issues and the civil war. In 1969, Jaafar Muhammad el-
Nimeiri seized power and made attempts to put an end to the conflict by promising more autonomy to the South, as he no longer counted on the political support of the northern elites and was relatively isolated. In 1972, this promise was fulfilled with the
Addis Ababa agreement, which stated that the South would have its own regional assembly and would be able to vote parts of the legislation (which were considered offensive to the Southerners) not to follow. The agreement attempted to promote peace by integrating groups of rebels to the government security forces, but ended up generating more conflicts between them. A new Constitution, issued in 1973, determined Islam as the official religion of Sudan, but recognized Christianity as the religion of a large portion of the Sudanese people (MATT, 2006).
In 1983, Nimeiri provoked great discontentment, mainly in the South, when he instituted the “Islamicization” (US Department of State, 2010), which implemented the use of Islamic Law to punish certain crimes, with Southerners and other non-Muslims residing in the North also becoming susceptible to such punishments, such strong action took place in the wake of the discovery of oil in the South and of the flow of arms provided by the USA. The “Islamicization” campaign, combined with the redivision of the South in three provinces, adopted still in 1983, in an abrogation of what had been agreed on the Addis Ababa accords, triggered a general offensive of the newly formed
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), especially because such redivision was done without a popular referendum and on the sidelines of the Constitution. The country
quickly plunged into its so-called Second Civil War between the South, mainly represented by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), and the
North, represented, for its turn, by the central government.
The SPLM/A had been founded in that same year, when a Southern Sudanese
Army commander, Coronel John Garang, joined the mutinous Southern Army troops and supported the insurgency campaign against Khartoum. The SPLM/A's original objectives were to establish a united secular Sudan, where the Sudanese people could enjoy religious freedom, and some form of limited regional autonomy for the South
The Second Civil War (1983 - 2005): From Nimeiri to Bashir
Growingly isolated from popular opinion, Nimeiri’s regime did not survive much longer. He was ousted in 1985 and in the following year elections were held, under which a civilian government led by Sadiq Al Mahdi took power. In 1988, the coalition government concluded a peace agreement with the SPLA, but although the agreement delineated greater religious and political autonomy for the South and determined the end of Islamic law, the political crisis and the Southern rebellion were not significantly altered. Before the agreement’s implementation, however, a military coup – led by General Omar Al Bashir – ousted the government in June 1989.
Bashir ran the country from then on, representing the interests of the North, but only in 1993 he officially took on the title of President, when a Transitional National
Assembly was formed. However, the ruler de facto was generally believed to be the leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), Hassan Al Turabi, since his organization, which would later become the National Congress Party (NCP), provided the political support and ideological basis for Bashir's regime. Furthermore, although Bashir's government was very unpopular, power maintenance was ensured by the suppression of dissidents and expelling of opposition forces, which caused new rebellion outbreaks to arise among northern factions (MALWAL, 1990). In the 1996 elections, when the
Transitional National Assembly was replaced by the National Assembly, Turabi formalized his position, becoming the speaker of the new Parliament, which was dominated by NIF supporters.
Meanwhile, the 1990s witnessed a growing sense of alienation from Khartoum in the western and eastern regions of Sudan. Along that decade, a succession of regional efforts to bring an end to the Sudanese civil war would take place. In 1993, the leaders of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda and Kenya started seeking a peace initiative for Sudan under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)
, which promulgated the 1994 Declaration of Principles (DOP), a document that aimed at identifying the essential elements necessary to a fair and comprehensive peace settlement. However, the Sudanese Government did not sign the DOP until 1997, after suffering major losses to the SPLA on the battlefield. In that same year, Khartoum signed a series of agreements with rebel factions under the banner of "Peace from
, ending military conflict between the government and significant rebel factions. Those agreements paralleled the terms and conditions of the IGAD agreement, calling for a degree of autonomy for the South and its exercise of the right of selfdetermination and regional autonomy. Around the 1996 electoral year, the increasing pressure from the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) – an “umbrella organization”
4 for anti-government forces – and Sudan's international isolation seemed to lead the government to adopt new methods. In 1998 a new law determined the return of the multi-party system, but required parties that contested the elections to adhere to an
Islamist political agenda. Consequently, the main opposition (formed by the NDA and the SPLM) rejected these changes and, apart from the National Congress Party (the renamed NIF), only small parties registered (JANES, 2009).
In December 2000, Presidential and Parliamentary elections were held and led to Bashir’s reelection as President. The main opposition parties, including the Umma
Party and the PCP, did not take part in the elections. The Umma also turned down an
The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa was created in 1996 to supersede the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) which had been founded in 1986 by Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. The State of Eritrea became the seventh member in 1993 and suspended its membership in 2007. The main purpose of IGAD is regional development and cooperation (IGAD, 2010).
The ‘Peace from Within’ process in Sudan was a reflection of concerns that at that time the Sudan people could not rely on foreign guidance and assistance in their search for peace, given the unwillingness of several states to assist the country in the search for a lasting peace (The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council,
An umbrella organization is a body that has other organizations as members, and works to represent the collective interest of these members before other bodies such as the government and community
(HAMILTON & BARWICK, 1993, apud MELVILLE, 1999).
offer to join the government right after the poll, claiming that it would only participate in a government in which all political organizations were represented (JANES, 2009).
In 2001, increased interest in Sudan led Kenya to reinvigorate the IGAD initiative.
Between 2002 and 2004, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A met in continuous negotiations to debate on the issues concerning the Abyei area and the states of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. During this period, these parties agreed upon a series of crucial accords, which would later be compiled and generate the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
In February 2003, in addition to the historical struggles for land and power, conflict burst in the historically overlooked Darfur region. In that year insurgency broke out against the government after its forces undertook a policy of suppression of rebel groups formed by a wide range of ethnicities, spilling the fighting towards the civilian population (TANNER, TUBIANA, 2007). In this respect, two peacekeeping missions were created to act in the region, a UN mission (UNMIS) and a hybrid mission constituted of UN and African Union (AU) forces (UNAMID).
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and further developments
In January 2005, the ruling NCP and the SPLM/A signed a Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA), formally ending the civil war. The agreement provided for a
Government of National Unity, with the South being granted self-government for a sixyear period, after which there would be a referendum on the possibility of secession. In addition, it was agreed that the residents of the Abyei area would cast a separate ballot simultaneously to the southern referendum to decide whether Abyei will retain its special administrative status in the North or become a part of the South. Furthermore, it was also accorded that the Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States are to hold a popular consultation in 2011, in order to ascertain the views of the areas’ populations on the CPA.
In the following months, the NDA signed a reconciliation agreement with the central government that enabled it to become part of the power-sharing government; and
John Garang, the chairman of the SPLM/A, was sworn in as the first Vice President of
. However, his death rose political tensions, especially because he was replaced by Salva Kirr Mayardit, a former rebel in the First Civil War and a member of the
SPLM/A. This was followed by the formation of a power-sharing Government of
National Unity and the arrangement of an autonomous Government for Southern Sudan.
On March 4 th
2009, Bashir had an arrest warrant issued by the International
Criminal Court (ICC) for war crimes and crimes against humanity due to his actions regarding the Darfur conflict. He has since then had a second arrest warrant issued to include charges of genocide, but not replacing or revoking in any respect the first one
A presidential poll was held in April 2010, having as the main candidate the
NCP’s Omar al-Bashir running for presidential re-election against the SPLM representative. Despite the movements against the poll, Omar al-Bashir was declared winner, and in the semi-autonomous South, former rebel leader Salva Kiir was reelected President of the Southern region.
2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
2.1. The Oil Issue
2.1.1. The Economic and Political Importance of the Oil Sector
Sudan is considered a minor and relatively recent player among major oil producers, with proven reserves ranging between 5 to 6.4 billion barrels (SIDAHMED,
2009). Oil was first discovered in the country in the late 1970s, and exploration started in the following decade. However, due to the unstable situation of the country, the
American company Chevron, which had discovered several oil fields in the South, had to abandon its concessions in 1985. A Canadian company named Arakis took concessions in 1993, and in 1996 a limited production for the domestic market started.
According to the Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, the President of the Government of Southern
Sudan shall, inter alia, serve as First Vice President of the Republic of the Sudan in circumstances determined by that Constitution. Moreover, according to the Constitution of the Republic of Sudan
(1998), Part III, article 44 “The President of the Republic shall appoint two Vice-Presidents having the same qualification of the President, and appoint assistants and advisers, and define their seniorities and functions (…).”
The fields’ remote location, however, made export impracticable and therefore hampered exploitation. In order to be able to invest in infrastructure to improve exportation, a consortium was formed by Arakis (then purchased by another Canadian company, Talisman) with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Malaysia's
Petronas and Sudan's Sudapet (JANES, 2009). The construction of a pipeline that would transport oil from the South to Port Sudan (in the North) started in 1998, and by mid-
1999 it was already operational. In that same year exportation started.
Today, there are four oil refineries in Sudan, and the oil companies have built significant developments in infrastructure (MOGHRABY, 2009). Sudan has begun supplying oil products to Ethiopia and Kenya and eventually envisages a pipeline network to supply markets in the African Horn. However, several campaigns by human rights groups have made it difficult for Western companies to continue operations in
Sudan, at least until a settlement of the various conflicts is reached. In such scenario,
China consolidates its position as an important commercial partner to Sudan along with other Asian countries, and as the main destination of the Sudanese oil (LARGE, 2008).
2.1.2. Oil and wealth-sharing
Oil acted as one of the “driving forces” in concluding the CPA, in the sense that it was agreed that wealth should be shared and not fought for (SIDAHMED, 2009).
It was established that, starting with a transitional administration in 2004, oil revenues in the South would be divided 50% to Khartoum, 48% to the Southern administration and 2% to the producer states’ governments (idem). The accelerated growth of oil exports has transformed Sudan’s economy, which experienced GDP growth rates over
10% in 2006 and 2007 (IMF Country Report, 2009). Still according to the IMF, oil accounted for 95% of Sudan’s total exports and 60% of government revenue in 2008, thus making economy very vulnerable to the drop in oil prices. Additionally, in the
South, the government’s income is currently almost entirely originated from oil.
Therefore, with the low efficiency of governmental institutions and widespread corruption, an independent South Sudan runs the risk of becoming an import-dependent country, subject to the “resource curse” that has affected other mineral-exporting economies (HARNEIT-SIEVERS, 2010).
Nowadays, the oil industry is exceptionally profitable in Sudan since oil companies are exempted from tax payment in the country, and most contracts were negotiated when the price of oil was very low. As today’s prices are higher, foreign companies are profiting immensely and leaving Sudan with a very small share of the produced wealth (MOGHRABY, 2009).
2.1.3. Domestic and Foreign Interests
The development of Sudan's oil industry transformed the control of the oil-rich southern areas into Khartoum’s primary strategic goal. The SPLA, in turn, aimed at oil installations as legitimate targets. Even so, oil companies operating in Sudan arguably run a greater reputational than capital risk, as they are under intense criticism from human rights groups for the forced resettlement of non-Arab villages away from the exploration zones (JANES, 2009).
The strategic behavior of international oil companies in Sudan has been deeply driven by political pressures from several governments and organizations. However,
European oil companies, such as Lundin and OMV, protected by the European Union's political standpoint of "constructive engagement" in Sudan, were able to profit. Eastern parastatals, led by China, on their turn, have established a dominating presence in Sudan
(PATEY, 2007), mainly due to the NIF’s political evolution. Accordingly, Sudan is the
China National Petroleum Corporation's largest international operation (LARGE, 2009).
Since 2005, South Sudan’s regional relations have increasingly turned toward
East Africa, and an independent South Sudan is likely to interact even more closely with that region. For both North and South Sudan, the oil sector holds potential for economic development and bilateral cooperation, at the same time that it represents a tangible risk of renewed conflict, if border disputes and issues around revenue sharing remain unsolved (HARNEIT-SIEVERS, 2010).
2.2. The Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan Regions
The three regions of Abyei, Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan are dealing with the process of deciding whether they will integrate North or South Sudan after the possible secession, which will be decided by one of the 2011 referenda. The economic
importance of these regions is one of the biggest concerns for both SPLM and NCP due to the oil reserves located in those areas. They have also been the most damaged areas of Sudan during the Civil Wars.
2.2.1. Abyei’s Referendum
According to the Addis Ababa peace agreement, the Southern Provinces are
Bahr el Gazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile. However, because of ethnic and cultural similarities, Abyei has always fought together with the South, and its right of integrating the South was previewed by the same agreement (PETER, 2010).
There are two main groups in the region, the Ngok Dinka and the Misseriya.
The first group defends the Southern vision and, performing a dominant role in Abyei, favors its integration with the South (EUISS, 2009). The second group fought against the first during the Civil Wars and supports the government. Having less political expression, the Misseriya might be treated unequally if Abyei secedes with the South
The existence of big oil revenues in Abyei makes the demarcation of its borders one of the biggest worries of both North and South Sudan. The CPA established that the borders should be decided by the Abyei Border Commission (ABC), but its decision, which was ultimately taken to The Hague, was widely contested, leading to the non-implementation of the borders established. UNMIS reports showed that no improvement has been made in the boundaries demarcation (S/2010/168). The exploitation of Abyei’s oil resources is shared by the two parts of the country and other groups, with a prevalence of the North, which holds 50% of the net oil revenues (ISN,
2010). Until the 2011 referendum, Abyei shall be administered by an Executive Council elected by its residents. The referendum is scheduled to take place together with the one on the secession of South Sudan.
2.2.2. Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, their importance and current situations
Both Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, also called Nuba Mountains, are very important producers of oil and gas, besides other raw materials and precious stones
(MATUS, 2006). There have been many contentions over their possession, to which the
CPA established a balancing act by which the NCP and the SPLM would swap the rule over the two regions. Currently, Blue Nile is ruled by a SPLM governor, and South
Kordofan by a NCP one (PETER, 2010).
The support of Blue Nile to the Southern cause is mainly due to the repression of non-Muslim people and the Islamicization campaign established in 1983. As a result, the people from the south of this region joined the SPLM (PETER, 2010). Unlike
Abyei, however, the CPA has not established a referendum for these two regions; instead, popular consultations have been scheduled. This process has raised many questions, as their way of development and possible effects are unknown, and it is likely to become a reason for a future conflict (idem).
2.3. National Elections and Referendum on South’s Secession
2.3.1 The Elections and the possibility of fraud
The National Elections that took place in April 2010 were the first multiparty presidential poll since the one in 1986, which elected Omar al-Bashir. Along with the
on South’s Secession, it was supposed to determine the future of the North-
South relations. The presidential poll had initially 72 candidates, although it is said that only the main two had enough financial resources to compete properly (HAKES &
According to the CPA, the two parties, NCP and SPLM, were supposed to have implemented provisions to guarantee free and fair elections, which should have evidenced changes in the governance that proved the existence of a new democratic
Sudan. However, neither were the parties able to implement the provisions nor has the governance showed any changes (EUISS, 2009). Furthermore, these elections were considered by some as a means for the NCP to recover its old legitimacy, which has been deeply damaged by the war against the SPLM (O’BRIEN, 2009). As such, a renewed legitimacy would be the key to deal with possible threats from the rebels and to guarantee the government’s ability to implement strong measures. These possibilities are currently unlikely for the government due to the weakness of its armed forces, in comparison to the proven strength of the Southern military power, which menaces the
likelihood of survival of the regime (ICG Africa Briefing 72, 2010). In addition, the possibility of fraud was always considerable in view of the democratic history of the country.
On March 31 st
Yassir Arman, the SPLM presidential candidate, withdrew his candidacy and accompanied his party in the boycott movement, which had been initiated by other government oppositionist parties (HAKES & ELSON, 2010). The boycott was based on fraud suspicions and alleged undemocratic and unconstitutional conditions for the elections (EUISS, 2009). The opponents, mainly the ones that participated in the All Political Parties Conference (APPC)
, had proposed a set of measures to favor the democratization of the system and the elections, but these were not adopted due to the absence of the NCP in the Conference. In addition, the so-called improper conditions for the elections were partly caused by the disagreement on some points of the CPA between the NCP and the SPLM, such as the North-South border demarcation and the legal reform (O’BRIEN, 2009). Moreover, after the occurrence of the polls, the NCP was accused of defrauding the votes and of intimidating Southern and other opponent region’s voters (SuGDE and SuNDE, 2010). Nonetheless, SPLM leader Salva Kiir is said to have agreed with the results after they were announced.
2.3.2. The Secession Referendum and the Political Forces Involved
It was decided in the Machakos Protocol of 2002, and later incorporated into the CPA, that “the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter
, through a Referendum to determine their future status”. The same agreement states that, after the six year Interim period (2005-2011), there shall be an internationally monitored referendum, organized jointly by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession
(MACHAKOS PROTOCOL, 2002).
Despite worries that both the poll and the referendum wouldn’t be “free and fair according to European standards”, and that their results would be accepted mainly because of political criteria (EUISS, 2009, p.21), the occurrence of the elections
The All Political Parties Conference was the gathering of almost all Sudanese political parties, except for the NCP, organized by the SPLM in Juba in September 2009. The parties discussed a set of political matters, mainly related to the implementation of CPA, and issued a joint declaration.
increases the probability of the referendum to take place in the original schedule, even though there have been complaints of fraud. Another issue to be considered is the fact that the SPLM does not have an ultimate position on whether the idea of unity is desirable or not, which is mainly due to the party being divided in two factions, the secessionists and the unionists. In addition, it is important to consider the measures to be taken to maintain peace whether the country is divided or not. The intensive planning of the elections by both parties resulted in short-term solutions, leaving long-term issues, such as the post-referendum period, not thoroughly planned.
Thus, it is estimated that the situation of Sudan can develop into four different scenarios, with the possibilities of war and segregation at the center of the denomination. The referendum will have a key role in the development, since its terms may influence the creation of a new military conflict between the parts, as the South might fight for independence if this is not the result of the referendum. Another possibility is that the North might start a conflict for the control of the oil exploitation if secession occurs (LIJN, 2009). Hence, the possible scenarios for the post-referendum situation are basically as follows: unity and war, unity and peace, secession and war or secession and peace (idem). The chances of war will be determined by the democratic changes at the center that should occur in order to provide a peaceful future for Sudan, whether the South becomes independent or not (ibidem).
2.4. Darfur and the Destabilization of the Country
Bordering with Chad and the Central African Republic, Darfur is Sudan’s largest region, with sedentary African farmers being predominant, and the Fur and
Masalit being the dominant ethnic groups. The rest of its population consists mainly of nomadic Arab tribes. For years, the central government in Khartoum has favored the
Arabs in Darfur, distancing itself from the Fur leaders (Human Rights Watch, 2004). In addition, many governments since the 1980s have utilized militias from Darfur and
Kordofan (the “murahaleen”) against southern rebels (idem).
In 2003, conflict broke out in Darfur, after the signing of the Machakos
Protocol in the previous year and the reassurance of the neglect of Khartoum towards the region. By 2006, the death toll in Darfur was calculated at roughly 300,000 by the
UN, and refugees amounted to 2,5 million, and both numbers have risen quickly since
then (SaveDarfur Briefing Paper, 2008). The conflict arose when, seeking to put an end to the hegemony of Khartoum over the Darfurian native establishment, two rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM), advocated armed struggle to force the NCP government to allow immediate autonomous rule independent from Khartoum, as well as fair wealth sharing.
Government response came in the form of attacks against the civilian population from which these rebel groups were originated, namely the Fur and Masalit (Human Rights
In May 2006, a SPLM/A faction signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with the government, but the JEM and another SLM/A (Sudan Liberation Movement/Army) faction refused to sign it. Moreover, as the government is not willing to revise the central principles of the CPA, achieving peace in Darfur has become tactically harder than solving the North–South conflict (EL-AFFENDI, 2007). The Darfur rebels (JEM and SLM/A) have their own criticism of the CPA, for it has made a deal which would have rendered their demands for a fairer share of power practically impossible.
The Darfur conflict must be seen, however, not only as a local conflict, but also as an international crisis. Although international involvement has been significant, it has also been at times contradictory, poorly coordinated and lacking in long-term planning.
Apart from the UN missions, many countries have been involved in different degrees in the Darfur crisis. China, for example, has received heavy criticism for supporting the
Khartoum regime. The USA, on its turn, referred to the crisis as genocide in 2004 and lobbied for tougher UN resolutions. Later on, that country also pressured Sudan’s government and rebel groups to sign the DPA in 2006, and imposed bilateral sanctions in 2007 (FRIDE, 2008).
Another issue is the border of the Central African Republic (CAR) with Sudan and the region of Darfur, which is in some ways the most vulnerable of the CAR’s frontiers, as it touches the remotest part of the country. The presence of nearly 20,000
Sudanese refugees (idem) in the east of the Central African Republic has led to strained relations with Khartoum in the past, as it accused the CAR of allowing its territory to be used as a conduit for arms supply to the SPLA – which has been consistently denied by
Bangui (JANES, 2009). Despite the efforts of several African monitoring groups in
2006, the penetrability of the CAR's borders means that the country's use as a potential
rear base by rebels and spillover of conflicts from Sudan and Chad will remain a grave security issue.
2.5 The Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
The core challenge of the CPA’s implementation has been how to manage the different aspirations from NCP and SPLM. Ever since its signing, several events have made its implementation difficult and slow-paced, such as the death of South Sudan
President John Garang and his succession by Salva Kiir, known to be a secessionist; the failure in solving the Darfur crisis and the resulting diversion of diplomatic attention and aid resources; the Abyei dispute; and the issuance of two arrest warrants against
Omar Al Bashir by the International Criminal Court (DE WAAL, 2010)
In 2005, when the CPA was negotiated, the revenue projections made transformations in the socio-economic sphere a tangible possibility within six years.
With Garang dead and Ali Osman weakened, however, the CPA was reduced to a
“formula”, requiring diplomatic action by external parties (idem).
Divergent Political Interests
According to the NCP, the CPA gave the Southerners privileged status: the
SPLM not only controlled the South, but also had a major stake in the North. From the perspective of the ruling party, the implementation of the wealth-sharing and powersharing determinations of the CPA offered material incentives to the Southern elites, leading them to believe that their economic interests depended on the national unity
However, among the SPLM and its constituencies, mostly in the South, political views about the CPA diverged. Garang headed the faction that supported the idea of a “New Sudan”, defending an agenda that aimed at enabling the marginalized and non-Arab fraction of the Sudanese population to be represented at the center of state power. Nevertheless, most Southerners considered the CPA as a prelude to independence, with the formal commitment to unity as a mere concession in order to make the agreement acceptable to the international community. The SPLM electorate within Northern Sudan – including non-Arab minorities such as the Nuba and Blue Nile
people – endorsed Garang’s vision of a united and secular Sudan, but many of them did not properly understand the provisions of the CPA, as they expected to be allowed to vote in the Southern referendum, joining their areas to Southern Sudan. According to the text of the CPA, however, this is only possible for the people of Abyei.
Among the non-NCP Northern Sudanese, the CPA had yet a different significance: for the opposition political parties, the realization of national elections represented their biggest chance in politics. The rebelled Darfurians, though, related to
Garang’s “New Sudan” vision, since they considered Darfur a victim of a dominant center – much like the South – and identified the solution in a transformation of the country’s central politics (ibidem).
The Role of the SPLM/A and the NCP
The SPLM/A possesses political will but lacks political power to fully implement the dispositions of the CPA. Many of the difficulties they have faced continue to this day, all of which relate to the division of wealth and power and have a direct bearing on the 2011 referenda (ICG Africa Briefing 50, 2008). Thus, the role of the SPLM has ultimately been that of pressuring the NCP as much as possible in order to stress the importance and urgency of implementing the CPA.
On the other hand, the NCP reportedly only conceded as much as he did in the
CPA because of his expectations that an electoral partnership with the SPLM could transform the NCP’s status “from an international pariah into an internationally accepted governing party” (ibidem). Their calculations, however, were frustrated by
Garang’s death. Since then, NCP’s actions have been based on a strategy aiming at the preservation of power and control of resources, and the party’s strict control of the military forces, intelligence apparatus and oil management has allowed it to avoid the political transition promised in the CPA. Without the trust that existed between
SPLM/A leader Garang and NCP leader Taha to drive the process, and with Taha’s subsequent marginalization inside the NCP, the party’s main effort has been devoted to keeping the SPLM weak and focused on the South (ibidem).
3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION
3.1. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and previous accords
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in January 2005 and delineated the conditions for a permanent ceasefire and the implementation of security arrangements. Also, the CPA combined the following accords firmed between the
Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in previous years:
The Machakos Protocol (2002) recognizes that the Southerners have the right to “control and govern affairs in their region” and thus are entitled to determine their future through a referendum (Machakos Protocol, 2002). The Protocol determines that a transition would begin with the Pre-Interim Period, in which the cessation of hostilities and the preparation for a comprehensive ceasefire should be observed. The Interim
Period was scheduled to start six months after the beginning of the Pre-Interim Period, in 2005, and to last six years, during which time a comprehensive ceasefire should be implemented. More specifically, the Pre-Interim Period started with the signing of the
CPA, in 2005, which put an end to the 21-year-old civil war.
At the end of the Interim Period, which will take place in July 2011, there will be “an internationally monitored referendum” for the people of South Sudan to decide for either unity or secession (idem). Finally, the Protocol recognizes the religious freedom of the Sudanese population and establishes the structure of the political framework of governance in the country (ibidem).
The Protocol on Power Sharing (2004) ratifies and details the structure of governments in Sudan as first delineated in the Machakos Protocol (Protocol on Power
Sharing, 2004). According to it, the government would function at national, Southern
Sudan, state and local levels, which should collaborate and respect each other and their decisions. Furthermore, the Protocol sets a series of determinations regarding human rights, such as the right to personal liberty, the abjection of slavery and torture, the right to a fair trial and the right to vote and to be elected. Moreover, the Protocol determines the establishment of a Government of National Unity, which would be shared by the
National Congress Party, the SPLM and other northern and southern political forces
The Agreement on Wealth Sharing (2004) establishes the equitable allocation of the Sudanese wealth and the transfers made by the National Government to Southern
Sudan. The Agreement also establishes the creation of the National Land Commission
and the Southern Sudan Land Commission, which should cooperate on matters of ownership of land and subterranean natural resources. Furthermore, the Agreement delineates the principles that should be included in further negotiations on the development of the oil sector, creating a National Petroleum Commission (NPC) to formulate public policies and strategies for the oil sector, as well as monitor and assess their implementation.
The Protocol on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict (2004) asserts that this region is a “bridge between the north and the south” and thus would be granted special administrative status during the Interim Period, during which the region would belong to both Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal, and its revenues would be divided between the National Government, the Government of South Sudan, the two aforementioned regions and the two major peoples of the area (Protocol on the
Resolution of the Abyei Conflict, 2004). At the end of that period, and simultaneously with the Southern Sudan Referendum, the residents of Abyei will cast a separate ballot to decide, regardless of that referendum’s result, if the region will maintain its special administrative status in the North or become a part of Bahr el Ghazal. The Protocol also sets the creation of the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to define and demarcate the borders of the area, a process which has notably faced difficulty so far (BEKOE,
CAMPBELL & HOWENSTEIN, 2005).
The Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue
Nile States (2004) defines the borders of these states and reaffirms the democratic character of the popular consultations as a possibility to determine the future of the regions’ populations, but does not prescribe that they should take place. Instead, the
Protocol’s text determines that the comprehensive agreement should “be subjected to the will of the people of the two States through their respective democratically elected legislatures” (Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue
Nile States, 2004).
Finally, according to the Agreement on Security Arrangements (2003), should unity be the decision of the referendum, an army composed by the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF) and the SPLA would be formed. During the Interim Period these forces would remain separate, but equally respected as Sudan’s National Armed Forces.
Furthermore, the Agreement determines that an internationally monitored ceasefire would come into effect as of the signing of the CPA.
In an annex to the CPA, the parties request the UN to constitute a peace support mission to monitor the agreement, as provided for under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter. Accordingly, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was formed in
3.2. Action under the scope of the United Nations
The Security Council Resolution 1547 of 2004 is still considered one of the landmarks of UN operations in Sudan. This resolution, adopted unanimously by the
Council, represented the first concrete step towards establishing a UN Mission to aid the
CPA, which at the time still had not been signed. Therefore, the document established the deployment, for an initial period of three months, of a mission later known as UN
Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS), dedicated to preparing for the international monitoring foreseen in other accords (S/RES/1547/2004). Resolution 1556 of that same year extended the political mission in 90 days as the conflict in Darfur escalated and endorsed the efforts of the African Union regarding the monitoring of Darfur.
Furthermore, this resolution posed a series of prohibitions of sales and supplies of arms and related material “to all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur and West Darfur” (S/RES/1556/2004).
Following a series of ceasefire violations by all parties, UNSC Resolution 1564 was adopted still in 2004, calling for international support towards the efforts of the
African Union and ordering all armed groups to cease violence. The creation of an international commission of inquiry was also requested in order to investigate the reports of human rights violations and genocide in the country, especially Darfur.
Finally, by this resolution the UNSC declares that, in the event of non-compliance with its resolutions by the Government of Sudan, it “shall consider taking additional measures (…) such as actions to affect Sudan’s petroleum sector and the Government of
Sudan or individual members of the Government of Sudan” (S/RES/1564/2004).
After the signing of the CPA in 2005, the Security Council approved
Resolution 1590, which established the creation of the United Nations Mission in Sudan
(UNMIS) and determined its essential tasks, namely (i) to support the implementation of the CPA; (ii) to facilitate and coordinate the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons and to provide humanitarian assistance; (iii) to assist the
parties of the CPA in cooperation with other international actors in the mine action sector; (iv) to contribute with international efforts regarding human rights and the protection of civilians in Sudan (S/RES/1590/2005). This resolution determined also the transference of all functions previously performed by UNAMIS to UNMIS, as well as established that the UNMIS would have up to 10.000 military personnel and an appropriate civilian component, including up to 715 civilian police personnel (idem).
The deployment personnel evolved steadily but behind schedule, being close to full strength by the end of 2006.
Resolution 1591, approved a few days later, created a Committee of the
Security Council formed by its members to assist and monitor the implementation of a series of measures taken in previous Resolutions and thereafter, such as the freezing of all funds, financial assets and economic resources under the member States’ jurisdictions that related directly or indirectly to individuals who “impede the peace process” and “constitute a threat to the stability in Darfur and the region”
(S/RES/1591/2005). Through Resolution 1593 of that same year the Council decided to report the situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, which ended up leading to the conviction of Omar Al-Bashir and others for a variety of counts, including genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity in Bashir’s case
After the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May 2006, the Secretary-
General suggested to the Security Council that a UN peacekeeping force might be needed in Darfur to ensure the compliance of all parties with the accord (S/2006/1591).
In reaction to that, the Council adopted Resolution 1706 in August of the same year, deciding to expand the mandate of UNMIS to Darfur, pending authorization of the
Sudanese Government of National Unity. However, the idea of a peacekeeping operation ran solely by the UN was strongly opposed by the Sudanese Government, which led the Council to refer to the alternative of strengthening the AMIS, before eventually transferring authority to an AU/UN hybrid peacekeeping mission. This option received the consent of the Sudanese Government, and in July 2007 the UNSC determined the creation of the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in
Darfur (UNAMID), through Resolution 1769, for an initial period of 12 months, which was later extended several times. According to this document, the operation’s mandate includes: (i) the protection of personnel, facilities, installations and equipment in the
areas of deployment of its forces; (ii) to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace
Agreement, prevent armed attacks and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan (S/RES/1769/2007). In the meantime,
UNMIS has continued its mandate to support the implementation of the CPA and will now help with the preparations for the 2011 referenda.In 2008, Resolution 1812 called for the agreement on a solution for the Abyei issue, and requested the UNMIS to assist in the demarcation of the North/South border as determined by the CPA, a process which is currently behind schedule, even though it is supposed to be terminated before the referenda take place (ALMQUIST, 2010).
4. BLOC POSITIONS
believes that the stability of Sudan is vital for the whole region, and the main duty to curb weapons proliferation lies with Southern Sudan. Following the elections, all parties have to fully respect the CPA, rapidly addressing the remaining outstanding issues and refraining from unilateral actions (EU at the UN, 2010). Also,
Austrian diplomats, along with American, British and French diplomats, opposed deferral
of the ICC indictment of Bashir.
Bosnia and Herzegovina
supports the full implementation of the CPA, deserving full attention from the international community. Post-referendum arrangements and demarcation of borders must be priorities, and all parties involved in the agreement should resolve the main issues diplomatically, with respect for the diversity and equality of all regions (SC/9952).
Welcoming the new integrated approach that the United Nations and the
African Union are taking in Sudan, Brazil notes that the remaining tasks of the CPA should be the focus for South Sudan now, as well as the preparation for the postreferendum period. It is important that international actors help to bring about a stable context for the polls and the post-referendum period by addressing the issues of food
Article 16 of ICC Statute reads “n o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions”.
insecurity, intertribal clashes and fragile security institutions (idem). Brazil contributes with military and police personnel to the UNMIS.
Although China has been severely criticized for its involvement in Sudan’s internal conflicts over the last decades and for its continuous position against significant
UNSC sanctions over the country (JANES, 2009), it highlights that stability in Sudan is crucial for the entire region and that the African Union is expected to continue to play an essential role in Sudan; its involvement has provided the international community with a new model for cooperation with regional organizations (SC/9952). China is
Sudan’s biggest trade partner: China imports great amounts of oil from Sudan, whereas
Sudan imports armaments and low-cost items from China (China sold $55 million in small arms to Khartoum in 2006). State-owned China National Petroleum (CNPC) is the single largest investor in Sudan through its 40% stake in Greater Nile Petroleum, based in Khartoum.
In the context of the CPA, France has opened an embassy office in Juba, the capital of South Sudan, in April 2006, with the aim of developing relations with the autonomous government of South Sudan. The country has expressed its grave concern given the increased violence in southern Sudan, and reaffirms that peace and stability constitute essential conditions for the referendum on self-determination in 2011 (France
Diplomatie, 2010). The European Union and France are ready to assist referenda, and the UN should make expertise and logistical support available in the context of post-
issues as well.
fully supports the peace process in Darfur and Southern Sudan that was facilitated by the CPA, and recalls that other rebel groups should be encouraged to join this process. Out of the two possible post-referendum scenarios, the African Union advocates maintaining Southern Sudan in the Sudanese State, with the UN continuing to play an important role (SC/9952).
After signature of the CPA, Japan has greatly expanded its bilateral assistance to Sudan, which amounted to more than 200 million dollars in 2008. In addition, logistical and financial support must be provided to ensure the success of those
in Southern Sudan. The Japanese government has provided approximately
US$ 8 million in grants to assist Sudan in its preparations, helping ensure that the
is conducted in a transparent manner. Specifically, the fund is intended to provide voter registration materials, assist in voter education and media training, as well
as provide assistance for the protection and active participation of women. The country stresses the importance of continuing the peace and democratization process after the
2010 elections, as well as the implementation of the CPA, to which Japan will remain actively cooperative (MOFA Press Release, 2010).
stresses that the respect for all provisions of the CPA is essential for the resolution of all problems in Sudan, which should be dealt with open dialogue and negotiations. Although preparation for both post-referendum options should be done, it is important that the unity option is made attractive in the referenda in South Sudan, bearing in mind the need to respect Sudan’s sovereignty and territorial integrity
advocates that preparations and logistics for the referenda must remain a priority, as well as the protection of civilians. The international community should be prepared to react to any contingency preceding or following the referenda, and the
United Nations must consider the nature of its presence after the holding of the polls.
defends that it is important to press forward with implementation of the CPA, which should be done through dialogue rather than force. Adequate attention by the international community must be given to the security challenge posed by the post-referendum possibilities, as neither Sudan’s government nor the African Union, acting alone could meet such security needs. In this context, the Council has a key role to play, therefore, and the UN’s continued presence in the region is still essential
(ibidem). A Nigerian diplomat, Ibrahim Gambari, was appointed head of the joint U.N.-
African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Nigerian troops, along with Rwandans’, comprise the majority of the UNAMID force, and Nigeria also contributes with civilian police personnel to UNMIS. Lately, the Nigerian president threatened to withdraw his country’s troops taking part in the United Nations peacekeeping missions worldwide.
He also called on the United Nations to change the rules of engagement in order for his country to continue contributing to peacekeeping missions, due to several deaths of
Nigerian soldiers in Sudan. However, with a population of 5 million Nigerians living in
Sudan, Nigeria reiterated its commitment to international peacekeeping in that country.
The Russian Federation is recognized as a major arms supplier and military partner to Sudan. Russia is also Sudan's strongest trade partner and political ally in
Europe. Russia has opposed many important UNSC sanctions to the country (JANES,
2009), and along with Chinese leaders, opposed UN Peacekeepers in Darfur, defending
Sudan's territorial integrity and opposing the creation of an independent Darfurian state.
Nevertheless, Russia has reaffirmed that the implementation of the CPA is the irreplaceable foundation for a Sudanese settlement, and the referenda should also make the unity option attractive to the Southern Sudanese population. Statehood decisions should be made by the Sudanese themselves and the peace process in Sudan should be based on equal dialogue between the Government and the global community, with respect for principles such as territorial integrity and sovereignty (SC/9952).
is committed to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan. The CPA is also fully supported, and its relationship with the Doha process should be reinforced. The Council must ensure that choices made now are favourable to peace and prosperity. The goal is to provide a framework through which the peaceful coexistence of the North and South may be ensured (idem).
Turkey contributes to peace and stability in Sudan through its participation in the
UNMIS and the UNAMID.
Commending the progress towards peace and stability made in Sudan,
has noted, however, that the country is entering a critical stage and that key issues still need to be addressed in Southern Sudan and Darfur. In this context, the international community should give greater support to the accomplishment of the remaining tasks required by the CPA, including logistical support for the referenda
(ibidem). The country is considered the most unambiguous supporter of independence, as its trade with the South has tripled over the last years (ICG, 2010). Uganda's Lord's
Resistance Army (LRA) operates also in parts of Sudan, where it has reportedly carried out attacks in southern Sudan and on Darfuri civilians. Sudan’s government is accused of providing military assistance to the LRA, in response to the accusations of Uganda lending military support to the SPLA.
The United Kingdom advocates that “there is no greater challenge facing the
Security Council (…) than supporting the parties in securing peace and prosperity for the people of Sudan” (UK Mission to the UN, 2010). Accordingly, the UK is the second largest single country donor to Sudan, contributing with an aid package of £34.5 million and planes
. In addition, it is one of the main concerns of the British that the
UNAMID is effectively deployed in order to protect civilians (UK Mission to the UN,
. Last accessed: September 18, 2010.
2010). In 2009, British NGOs were expelled from Sudan along with several major foreign aid agencies, following the arrest warrant of al-Bashir issued by the ICC.
The United States of America have already passed law bills placing economic sanctions against Sudan, punishing the Sudanese government, which is considered a sponsor of terrorism and oppressor of its minority Christian population. The US
Department of State issued a Human Rights Report in 2009, showing serious concerns over human rights violations by the government and militia groups. US is also the main sponsor of UN resolutions pressing the Sudan government to finish civil conflicts and improving UN Operations. Lately, the US government announced a change in its policies towards Sudan, based on cooperation instead of isolation. However, it was stressed that new sanctions will be imposed, as well as other enforcement measures, if the situation in Sudan deteriorates. The US also committed almost $2.6 billion to Sudan for humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping in Darfur, figuring as the major aid donor of the country. US support the referenda in Sudan, being considered by the Sudanese
Government as a threat to Sudan's territorial integrity, as well as an ally to the SPLA.
5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER
Was the deadline determined by the CPA for the national elections and the
on the secession really enough so that the South could begin to see positively the maintenance of national unity ?
Is the secession the answer for the problems of Southern Sudan? Does it have enough political capacity to be independent and what would be the reaction of the international community over that scenario?
What will be the measures taken by the UNSC to make sure that the referendum on the secession occurs normally, without any question over its legitimacy?
In case Sudan really separates into two countries, will it be enough to conciliate both parts, or is there a risk of a new war?
CIA World Factbook. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/su.html
. Last access: 23/03/2010.
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. 2005. Available at: http://unmis.unmissions.org/
. Last access: 23/03/2010.
Country Report No. 09/218. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/ pubs/ft/scr/2009/cr09218.pdf
. Last access: 24/05/2010.
DENG, Francis Mading, War of Visions: conflict of identities in the Sudan,
DE WAAL, A, STANTON,G. Should President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan Be Charged and Arrested by the International Criminal Court?: An Exchange of Views.
Genocide Studies and Prevention
, Volume 4, Number 3, Winter 2009, pp.
329-353. 2009. Available at: http://muse.jhu.edu/ . Last access: 16/05/2010.
EL-AFFENDI, A. The View from the North: The CPA’s Hopes and Multiple
Disappointments. 2007. Available at: http://www.cprdhorn.org/Peaceand
. Last access: 16/05/2010.
EL MOGHRABY, A. Oil Development in Sudan. BERI, R, SINHA, Africa and Energy
Security: Global, Issues, Local Responses. 2009.
EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE SUDAN – Washington DC. Available at: http://search.globescope.com/sudan/index.php?page=history-of-the-sudan Last access: 25/03/2009.
EUISS (European Union Institute for Security Studies). Post-2011 scenarios in Sudan:
What role for the EU?, 2009 Available at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/ media/Post-2011_scenarios_in_Sudan.pdf
. Last access: 20/05/2010.
FRIDE (Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior). The
International Response to Darfur. 2008. Available at: http://www.cmi.no/ sudan/doc/?id=974 . Last access: 04/08/2010.
GUIA DEL MUNDO - SUDÁN. Available at: http://www.guiadelmundo.org.uy/cd/ .
Last access: 23/03 2010.
HAKES, Deborah; ELSON, Graham. Election Observation Mission – Sudan,
Presidential, Gubernatorial and Legislative, April 2010, Preliminary Statement.
The Carter Center
. Available at: http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/ pdfs/news/pr/sudan-preliminary-statement-041710.pdf
. Last access:
HANES, William Travis, Imperial diplomacy in the era of decolonization: the Sudan and Anglo-Egyptian relations, 1945-1956, Westport, 1995.
HARNEIT-SIEVERS, A. Oil in Sudan: Fueling Conflict – Fueling Development?.
Sudan – No Easy Ways Ahead, Volume 18 (English Edition) in the publication series on democracy. Heinrich Böll Foundation. 2010. Available at: http://www.boell.de/downloads/2010401Sudan_publication.pdf
. Last access:
HOGE, 2007. UN Secretary General to meet Sudanese Leader. The New York Times,
27/08/2007. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/29/world/africa/29 nations.html.
Last accessed: 12 April 2010.
Human Rights Watch. Sudan in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan. 2004. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0404/ . Last access: 22/06/2010.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. 2009. Sudan: Staff-monitored program for
ICC-02/05-01/09. Available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf
. Last access: 19/05/ 2010.International Crisis Group.
ISN International Relations and Security Network, Protocol between the Government of the Sudan (GOS) and the Sudan’s People Liberation Movement/Army
(SPLM/A) on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict. 2004. Available at: http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/21880/ipriadoc_doc/B2D55285-
Last Access: 17/05/2010.
Intergovernmental Authority on Development. Available at: http://igad.int/ . Last access:
Jane’s. Jane’s Report 2009 - Sudan – Country Profile. Available at: www.janes.com
Last access: 16/05/2010.
Jeune Afrique Hors-Série nº 21. L’État de l’Afrique 2009. 2009.
LARGE, D. Sudan’s foreign relations with Asia China and the politics of ‘looking east’.
Institute for Security Studies. 2008. Available at: http://www. humansecuritygateway.com/documents/ISS_Sudan_foreignrelationswithAsia.p
df . Last access: 04/08/2010.
LARGE, D. China’s Sudan Engagement: Changing Northern and Southern Political
Trajectories in Peace and War. China and Africa. The China Quarterly. 2009.
LIJN, Jair van der, Sudan 2012, Scenarios for the future, 2009. Available at: http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20090914_cscp_lijn.pdf
Last access: 16/05/2010.
MAHMOUD, M. Inside Darfur: Ethnic Genocide by a Governance Crisis. 2004.
Available at: http://muse.jhu.edu/ . Last access: 16/05/2010.
MALWAL, B. The agony of the Sudan. Journal of Democracy Vol.1, No.2 Spring
1990. Available at: http://muse.jhu.edu.w10002.dotlib.com.br/journals/ journal_of_democracy/v001/1.2malwal.pdf
. Last access: 11/04/2010.
MATUS, Jason (Karthoum Food Aid Forum), The Future of Food Security in the three
Areas of Sudan. 2006 Available at: http://nutrition.tufts.edu/docs/ pdf/famine/food_aid_forum_kit/papers/4_the_future_of_food_security_in_the_ three_areas_of_sudan.pdf
Last access: 17/05/2010.
O’BRIEN, Adam, Sudan’s Elections Paradox, 2009. Available at: http://www. enoughproject.org/files/publications/sudan_elections.pdf
. Last access:
PATEY, L. State Rules: Oil Companies and Armed Conflict in Sudan (Security Council and Sudan). Third World Quarterly, July 18. 2007. Available at:
. Last access: 16/05/2010.
PCA Press Release, Abyei Arbitration Final Award Rendered, 2009. Available at: http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Abyei%20Press%20Release%2022-07-
Last access: 17/05/2010.
PCA, Arbitration Agreement between The Government of Sudan and The South
People’s Liberation Movement on Delimiting Abyei Area, 2009. Available at: http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/Abyei%20Arbitration%20Agreement.pdf
Last access: 17/05/2010.
PETER, Marina. Blue Nile, Nuba Mountains and Abyei: Three Areas of Transition.
2010. Available at: http://www.boell.de/downloads/2010401Sudan_ publication.pdf
Last access: 17/05/2010.
Policy Briefing. Africa Briefing N°50. Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement:
Beyond the Crisis. 2008. Available at: www.cmi.no/sudan/doc?id=930.pdf
Last access: 04/04/2010.
SCHNEIDER, Luíza Galiazzi, As Causas Políticas do Conflito no Sudão:
Determinantes Estruturais e Estratégicos, Porto Alegre, 2008.
SCHUMANN, P. International Actors in Sudan: The Politics of Implementing
Comprehensive Peace. Sudan – No Easy Ways Ahead, Volume 18 (English
Edition) in the publication series on democracy. Heinrich Böll Foundation.
2010. Available at: http://www.boell.de/downloads/2010401
. Last access: 16/05/2010.
SIDAHMED, A. Sudan: Beyond the Oil Curse. BERI, R, SINHA, Africa and Energy
Security: Global, Issues, Local Responses. 2009.
SuGDE (Sudanese Group for Democratic Elections) and SuNDE (Sudanese Network for Democratic Elections), Elections Statement, 2010 Available at: http://www.ndi.org/files/SuNDE_SuGDE_Sudan_Statement.pdf
TANNER, V, TUBIANA J. Divided They Fall: The Fragmentation of Darfur’s Rebel
Groups. Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies. 2007.
Available at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/files/portal/spotlight/sudan/
. Last access: 17/09/2010.
The Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan, 1998. Available at: http:// www.sudanembassy.ca/Docs/THE%20CONSTITUTION%20OF%20THE%20
. Last access:
The European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council. The Search for Peace in the Sudan: A
Chronology of the Sudanese Peace Process 1989-2001. 2002. Available at: http://www.espac.org/pdf/search_for_peace.pdf
. Last access: 29/07/2010.
The Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, 2005. Available at: http://www.chr.up.ac.za/undp/domestic/docs/c_SouthernSudan.pdf
. Last access: 04/08/2010.
TOFT, M. Getting Religion? The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War. International
Security, Vol. 31, No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 97–131. Available at: http://muse.jhu.edu.w10002.dotlib.com.br/journals/international_security/v031/
. Last access: 11/04/2010.
UDOMBANA, N. When Neutrality is a Sin: The Darfur Crisis and the Crisis of
Humanitarian Intervention in Sudan. Human Rights Quarterly. 2005. Available at: http://muse.jhu.edu/ . Last access: 16/05/2010.
UN. World Food Programme – Press Release. 2001. Available at: http://one.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key=40 . Last access: 02/04/2010.
UN Media Monitoring Report. United Nations Mission in Sudan/Public Information
, 27 April 2010. Available at: http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/MMR/MMR%20-
. Last access: 17/05/2010.
US Department of State, Background Note: Sudan. 2010. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5424.htm
Last access: 04/08/2010.
USIP (United States Institute of Peace), Special Report, Scenarios for Sudan, 2009.
Available at: http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR228_0.pdf
. Last access:
WAAL, A. Sudan’s Choices: Scenarios Beyond the CPA. Sudan – No Easy Ways
Ahead, Volume 18 (English Edition) in the publication series on democracy.
Heinrich Böll Foundation. 2010. Available at: http://www.boell.de/ downloads/2010401Sudan_publication.pdf
. Last access: 16/05/2010.
WINTER, R. Sudan and the National Congress Party. Mediterranean Quarterly. 2007.
Available at: http://muse.jhu.edu.w10002.dotlib.com.br/journals/mediterranean
. Last access: 11/04/2010.
WRITENET, Sudan: "Peace From Within" and the Vicious Circle of Internal Politics.
1998. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a6b914.html .
Last access: 29/07/2010.
YOUNG, J. The Eastern Front and the Struggle against Marginalization. Small Arms
Survey, Graduate Institute of International Studies. 2007. Available at: http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/pdfs/HSBA-SWP-3-Eastern-Front.pdf
Last access: 04/08/2010.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA). Statement by Press Secretary on the general elections in Sudan. April 21, 2010. Available at: http://www.mofa. go.jp/announce/announce/2010/4/0421_01.html
. Last accessed: 30/06/2010.
UN PRESS, 2010. “Briefing Security Council on Sudan, United Nations, African Union
Officials Tout Unified Strategy, Linking Peace in Darfur to Southern Sudan
”. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/ sc9952.doc.htm.
Last accessed: 17/06/2010.
EU at the UN, 2010. “Sudan: Statement by EU HR Ashton following meeting”.
Available at: http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_9610_en.htm
Last accessed: 17/06/2010.
France Diplomatie, 2010. “Violence in southern Sudan (January 8, 2010)” Available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files_156/sudan_248/france-andsudan_5307/political-relations_6456/violence-in-southern-sudan-
. Last accessed: 17/06/2010.
US Department of State, 2009. “Sudan: A Critical Moment, A Comprehensive
Approach”. Available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2009/oct/
Last accessed: 17/06/2010.
UK Mission to the United Nations. Geographic Issues – Sudan. Available at: http://ukun.fco.gov.uk/en/uk-at-un/geographic-issues/sudan . Last accessed:
UK in Sudan 2010. Available at: http://ukinsudan.fco.gov.uk/en/about-us/working-withsudan/ddr-porgram
TOPIC AREA B: THE SITUATION IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
By Athos Munhoz, Camilla Corá, Pedro Brittes and Raquel Tebaldi
1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
From the Colonization Period to the Independence
The territory now known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo has constantly been coveted because of its natural resources, geostrategic location and the potentiality of navigation through the Congo Basin. In the late 15 th
Portuguese reached the delta of the Congo River, and their influence remained dominant in the region for the next four centuries, when other colonial powers, such as France and the United Kingdom, arrived in the territory.
In 1876, Leopold II, King of Belgium, founded the Association Internationale
, alleging that his objective was to bring civilization to the African peoples.
However, his real intention was to better explore the continent and conquer a colony
(HOCHSCHILD, 1998). A British journalist was hired by the Belgian monarch to explore the Congo Basin after taking notice of the disinterest of the British Empire in financing such project, which determined the creation, by Leopold II, of the Association
Internationale Du Congo,
in 1879. Rivalry between colonial powers led to the scheduling of a conference, to be held in Berlin, Germany, in which the nations would discuss their interests in Africa. The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 gave Leopold II the private property of the territory of Congo, which was renamed the Congo Free State.
Leopold II was known for ruling Congo ruthlessly, and although it is difficult to calculate the precise death toll of his regime, it is assumed that the population of the
Congo was halved from 1880 to 1920, meaning the loss of ten million people
(HOCHSCHILD, 1998). By 1904, Leopold’s actions started to receive attention and he began to be pressured by the international community, leading him to sell the territory to the State of Belgium in 1908, which determined that it was no longer his personal property and would now be called Belgian Congo.
After the Second World War and the subsequent creation of the United
Nations, the movements for decolonization in Africa and Asia grew strongly. In the
1950s the Congolese movement for independence began to gain strength, and after a series of riots Belgium agreed to concede independence to the country on June 30 th
1960 (YOUNG, 1966). General elections were held in May of that same year, having nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba elected as the new Prime Minister, and federalist
Joseph Kasavubu as the new President. It is important to mark the differences between these two political thoughts. While, on one hand, the nationalists defended a strong central government, on the other hand, the federalists - composed mainly by ethnically based parties and supported by Belgium - sought to give more power to regional governments (GIBBS, 1991).
The Congo Crisis
The Congo Crisis was a period of great political instability and civil war, from
1960 to 1965. The army mutinied five days after the independence, on July 5th, and
Lumumba decided, as a way to meet the demands of the soldiers, to "Africanize" the armed forces, dismissing the Belgian officers (HOSKYNS, 1965). There was, however, resistance from Belgian officers, especially in the provinces of South Kasai and
Katanga, leading to new army mutinies, which led Belgium to intervene against the
Government troops alleging the need to guarantee the lives and the properties of the
Europeans in the country (GIBBS, 1991).
On July 11th, Moïse Tshombé, provincial leader of Katanga and political opponent of Patrice Lumumba, proclaimed the independence of Katanga, and on August
South Kasai also proclaimed its independence. The reasons alleged by the two provinces to declare their independence were very similar, expressing a sense of lack of influence in the country's politics in relation to their contribution to the national economy, mainly in the form of extraction of minerals such as copper, cobalt, iron ore, gold, silver, diamond and uranium. However, it is argued that the secessionist movements were largely supported by Belgian mining companies and by the government of Belgium (GIBBS, 1991).
Lumumba requested the United Nations to take action in order to guarantee the territorial integrity of the Congo, and between July and August of 1960 the Security
Council approved three resolutions on this issue, calling upon the withdrawal of the
Belgian troops from the country and allowing the Secretary-General to take all actions
necessary to maintain law and order in the Congo (S/RES/143/1960; S/RES/145/1960;
S/RES/146/1960). The United Nations Operations in the Congo (ONUC) stayed in country from July 1960 to July 1964.
In September, the Prime Minister Lumumba asked the Soviet Union for help in fighting the secessionists, which led President Kasavubu to dismiss Lumumba,
(WEISSMAN, 1979) who, in turn, challenged the legality of the act and tried himself to dismiss Kasavubu. A series of events took place then: a few days later, Joseph-Desiré
Mobutu, chief of staff of the Army, overthrew and arrested Lumumba; Antoine
Gizenga, coreligionist of Lumumba, took control of the northeast of the country and reestablished Lumumba's cabinet; and, following this episode, Lumumba was killed by
Katangan policemen in January 1961, in Katanga (DE WITTE, 2001).
The conflict continued in South Kasai until the end of 1961 and in Katanga until January 1963, when these provinces were reintegrated into the Democratic
Republic of the Congo's territory. In 1962, after the successful takeover of Katanga by
UN forces, Moïse Tshombé was forced to flee from Congo, returning in 1964 to become President in a new coalition government that did not last for long, as the situation of instability continued until 1965, when Joseph-Desiré Mobutu took office.
"Mobutu or chaos"
In 1965, Mobutu became President through a military coup d'état, putting an end to the Congo Crisis and implementing a one-party system. During the Cold War, the West saw Mobutu as the man who could not only bring order to the Congo but also keep the country stable and fight the growth of communism in the region
(NGONZOLA-NTAJALA, 2002). This thesis and the subsequent policy of support to
Mobutu became known as "Mobutu or chaos" (SCHATZBERG, 1991). The president managed to use this situation to gain external support and legitimate his government as, according to Nzongola-Ntajala, that Mobutu was the only person capable of holding the country together was indeed music to his ears, and the dictator played on Western fears of chaos with all the skills and resources he could mobilize for purposes of retaining power (NZONGOLA-NTAJALA, 2002, p. 161).
In 1966, Mobutu started promoting the nationalization of the country, changing the names of provinces, cities, streets, and the country's name to Zaire in 1971, in an attempt to associate the country with African Nationalism. In the economy, Mobutu implemented the "Zairianization", in 1973, handing over properties of foreigners – such as enterprises, retail businesses, plantations and farms – to Zairians, especially those linked to the government (MACGAFFEY, 1987). This measure proved to be disastrous, leading the government to apply the "Radicalization", deepening the previous policy, which made the economic situation even worse (idem). Mobutu's regime is sometimes referred to as "kleptocratic", as the President was largely accused of having enriched – and allowed people close to him to do the same – by plundering natural resources of the country, while the population of Zaire became increasingly impoverished
(NZONGOLA-NTAJALA, 2002; ASKIN & COLLINS, 1993).
As an outcome of this situation, throughout the decade of 1980, the opposition to Mobutu became stronger, as well as the repression to those who opposed him
(SCHATZBERG, 1997). In 1990, however, the President had to give in to some international pressures and demands, such as the end of the one-party system, and the creation of the Sovereign National Conference, which proclaimed a new Constitution, but was not successful in democratizing the country (REYNTJENS, 2007).
The 1990s and the Great Lakes Instability
After the unsuccessful attempt of the opposition to re-democratize the country,
Mobutu began to actively expand his influence in the Great Lakes region. His position, already affected by the growing opposition in Zaire, was aggravated by the end of the
Cold War, since Mobutu lost its importance as an ally for Western countries.
In the early 1990s, many conflicts that changed the political landscape of the area took place, and the government of Zaire interfered in the ones that erupted in
Rwanda, Sudan, and Angola. In this context, another influence of Mobutu´s government was the support that was given to UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola), in total incompliance with the Lusaka Peace Accord of 1994, which had determined the end of this type of assistance (WRONG, 2000).
In 1994, the crisis in Rwanda that resulted in the Tutsis taking over the power and in 800,000 dead, led to over 1,000,000 Hutus fleeing to Zaire in fear of reprisals
(SALEHYAN, 2008). These Hutus entered in conflict with the Zairian Tutsis, supported by Mobutu (idem). Also, the Hutus, formed in great part by former Rwandan Armed
Forces (Forces Armeés Ruandaises - FAR) members, largely took control of the refugee camps, many of them located near the borders, which brought concern to the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi.
The Congo Wars
The rivalries between Zairian Tutsis and the Rwandese Hutus led to the start of a new conflict, known as the First Congo War, in 1997. Five countries (Zaire, Rwanda,
Uganda, Angola, and Burundi) and a number of armed insurgent groups were involved, culminating in the fall of President Mobutu. It is estimated that one million people died in this conflict (International Rescue Committee, 2000) which conducted the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (Alliance des Forces Democratiques
pour la Libération Du Congo
- AFDL) to power.
The fall of Mobutu was caused by a set of factors. He was politically weakened, since the impoverishment of the country led to the strengthening of the opposition movements. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, it was not essential for Western allies such as France and the United States of America to support his government. Besides that, his policy of involvement in conflicts in neighboring countries, such as Angola and Rwanda, led those countries to see Mobutu as an enemy.
And finally,, the natural resources of Zaire still generated greed.
Laurent-Desiré Kabila, leader of the AFDL, took presidency in 1997, renaming the country Democratic Republic of Congo. In July 1998, Kabila ordered the closure of the military cooperation with Rwanda and Uganda which had brought him to power, as well as the departure of foreign troops from the country. In August 1998, a rebellion in the Kivu region (backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi) broke out against President
Kabila, who was militarily supported by Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia.
This conflict is known as the Second Congo War, and it continued until 2003, finishing with a balance of five million deaths (International Rescue Committee and
Australia's Burnett Institute, 2005) and making it the longest war in the history of modern Africa. During the conflict, the international community’s concern with the refugees’ situation and the possibility of the presence of armed groups among them rose
significantly (S/RES/1208/1998). The offensive of groups opposed to Kabila, such as the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RDC), supported by Rwanda, and the Mouvement
pour la Liberation du Congo
(MLC), sponsored by Uganda, began in the region of
Goma, in the eastern Congo, dominating parts of the province of Kivu. The north of the country was invaded and occupied by troops from Uganda and Rwanda. In September
1998, troops from Zimbabwe and Angola started a movement in support of President
Kabila, attacking the opponent forces. A year later, in 1999, the Lusaka ceasefire agreement was signed by six countries (Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola,
Namibia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, and Uganda) and a joint military commission was formed to implement the accord.
The instability of the Great Lakes region and the illegal exploitation of natural resources were some of the problems that led to the creation of a special UN mission, the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which sought the full adoption of the ceasefire signed in 1999 (S/RES/1291/2000).
In 2001, President Kabila died and was replaced by his son, Joseph Kabila. A national transitional government consisting of President Joseph Kabila and four vicepresidents was formed in 2002. As Kabila assumed the presidency, he adopted the rhetoric of restoration of the peace and consolidation of the national communion
(Archives du Président de la RDC, 2002). His government sought rapprochement with the international community, especially the European Union, France, Belgium and
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue, one of the obligations under the Lukasa cease fire to implement the peace, took place in Sun City (South Africa) in 2002, assembling the government, insurgent forces, civil society and political class, and gave way to the signing of several peace agreements between DRC, Rwanda and Angola. The second civil war officially ended in June 2003, but thousands of civilian deaths were still reported since then (International Rescue Committee, 2004), most of which due to the outbursts of violence that impede the access to humanitarian aid (UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). In 2005, the violence continued to preoccupy the international community, particularly the presence of armed groups in the
Congolese territory, such as Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). A commission called Tripartite Plus One, composed by the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, sought the disarmament of those groups, especially the FDLR. Still in 2005, a Referendum on a draft constitution was conducted, in an attempt to continue with the peace process.
However, in recent years, although the conflict between the countries of the region is officially over, the activity of armed groups and militias such as the FDLR and the LRA has increased. This situation generates a major concern in the UN, as evidenced by resolutions 1843 (2008), 1856 (2008), 1896 (2009) of the Security Council. More recently, resolution 1925 of May 2010 has decided to extend the mandate of MONUC until June 2010, renaming the UN Mission in DRC to United Nations Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), with a mandate until 30 June 2011 (S/RES/1925/2010).
2. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
2.1. State of violence
2.1.1. The conflict and insurgent groups
Even though the so-called Second Congo War officially ended in 2003, outbursts of violence still occur in Congo, showing that the State is fragile and that the country has not been effectively pacified. Such violence has been caused mainly by insurgent armed groups which are scattered throughout the countryside, as the political arrangement architected at the Sun City Dialogue Summit failed at generating a stable political and institutional environment. In Congo, the western efforts to build accords of power-sharing can actually go against their own purpose and encourage rebel leaders towards insurgency, seeking inclusion into the power-sharing (TULL & MEHLER,
The situation in Congo, therefore, can be defined as a state of violence, which refers to a state of constant rampage, differing from a civil war where there is a clear goal to be reached (DUMOUCHEL, 2008). This is not what happens in the DRC, where the violence has been the way of living, not only for soldiers but for entire regions. This scenario has some characteristics that stand out in Congo. First of all, the situation is
limited to some provinces such as North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri, Katanga and
Orientale; second, there is a large number of parties, such as Government troops, militias, rebel forces, private security companies, tribal combatants, troops of neighboring countries and members of international peacekeeping forces. Another characteristic is the internationalization of the conflict, which means that the actors are not limited to the citizens of Congo. The non-State actors have an important role in prolonging the conflict, as they are directly connected to illegal exploitation of natural resources (NEST, 2006).
The Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), the National Police (PNC) and the National Intelligence Agency (ANR) have not been able to provide security to the civilian population, since they have not been capable of avoiding the advances of insurgent forces. They are also accused by the UN of being responsible for summary executions, sexual violence, torture and ill-treatment (CRS, 2009). The FDLR (Forces
Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda) and the LRA (Lord´s Resistance Army) have been accused of committing atrocities that infringe humanitarian law, that have been referred to by the UN as crimes against the humanity (S/RES/1896/2009).
The Orientale Province suffers mostly from the action of the LRA
(Lord´s Resistance Army), which has been established in DRC since the end of the
Second Congo War, and is present also in Sudan and in Central African Republic, which complicates its contention (DISARMAMENT ACT, 2009). Originated in
Uganda, this group also preoccupies the international community regarding the use of child soldiers in its troops (idem). In the Ituri region, in 2003, one thousand villagers were killed in two days of fighting, and the gold mines got under control of the
Ugandan army and the Rally of Congolese Democracy
(SPITTAELS & HILGERT,
2009), as well as other armed groups. The most significant conflict in this region is between the Nationalist and Integrationist Front (FNI) and the Union of Congolese
Patriots (UPC), which represent two different ethnical groups. Another province that is involved in conflict is Katanga, where the militias Mayi-Mayi have got out of government control. The Mayi-Mayi is a heterogeneous group that was formed during the Second Congo War, representing different factions and with hardly any unity. They have acted, also, near the border of Uganda, taking control of gold mines and
The Rally of Congolese Democracy (RCD-ML) is an insurgent group that operates in the eastern Congo.
Originates from the first Congo war when it was mainly composed by Rwandan and Ugandan forces.
participating in the arms traffic (SPITTAELS & HILGERT, 2009). It is estimated that the conflict in Katanga has produced thousands of internally displaced people and refugees (UNHCR, 2010).
North and South Kivu are perhaps the areas of greatest concern, as in those provinces the tension between Hutus and Tutsis is more evidenced, and it is the region where the FDLR acts more predominantly. The FDLR was formed in Rwanda with a
Hutu base to fight against their government, and its actions have spread terror beyond that country’s borders. Despite calls to leave the Congo made by the UNSC
(S/RES/1896/2009), the attacks against villages and other armed groups have increased in the last years. In addition, MONUC itself has faced accusations by UN internal organs of sharing intelligence with FDLR (KARUHANGA, 2009), thus contributing to the survival of the group. On the other hand, in the Kivu region, besides the FDLR, the
Mayi-Mayi and the LRA are also acting. .
This landscape of terror that is generalized in Congo can be considered a part of a proxy war
(CASTELLANO, 2009). A large number of armed groups, with different origins and objectives, justify the intervention of foreign troops, whether neighboring States or multinational forces. The control over natural resources is a problem that the government cannot fix, and that the international forces have also not been able to solve.
2.1.2 Great Lakes Instability
The Great Lakes region is composed by Rwanda, Uganda, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi and Zambia. Besides these countries, other countries that technically are not part of the region, but participate to a lesser or greater degree of territorial logic would be the Central African Republic, Congo-
Brazzaville and Angola. The proximity of these countries ultimately generates a multiplying effect, which becomes evident with the serious internal problems that came about countries of the region, which ended up leading to harmful effects in other countries.
In the beginning of the last decade, Rwanda went through a civil conflict with serious developments, in which the Hutu radical majority started a massacre against the
10 A conflict encouraged by others, where groups act with a proxy and not only for their own reasons.
minority Tutsi and moderated Hutus. Besides the population who feared the escalating violence, Hutus who participated in the massacre, anticipating retaliation, fled to
Uganda, Burundi and especially the DRC; an estimated two million people fled to the neighboring countries (UNAMIR, ANO). Between these refugees were the FDLR groups, which would influence the future Congolese situation. Uganda is also directly involved with the political landscape of the region, mainly through the presence of the
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the DRC’s territory. The LRA is a Ugandan opposition group that has an armed faction that acts in the region, sometimes inside
Uganda, sometimes in Sudan, and mainly in Congo.
Groups like the LRA and FDLR, which were originated respectively in Uganda and Rwanda, are major actors in the Congolese chain of violence, and are closely connected to the political dynamics of these countries. These groups can interfere with the exploitation of natural resources, either for the initiation of violence, either by controlling the mining of coltan and other minerals. With the presence of these groups, the regular forces of Uganda and Rwanda finally entered the territory of the Congo.
Eventually, the Congolese government uses the troops of Rwanda and Uganda as strategic partners. There is also a fundamental distinction between the practices of
Uganda and Rwanda. Intervention and interference of Uganda in the appropriation of resources and the spread of Congolese violence would be more linked to the performance of private companies than it does to a state logic, as would happen in the case of Rwanda.
It is evident, thus, that the internal problems of these countries can easily become a problem for the entire region. Besides the fact that rebel groups act in foreign territories, the refugees’ situation is another factor that leads many to think the situation can hardly be solved without a common effort (REYNTJENS, 1999).
2.1.3 The strength and reach of the State in the DRC
It is generally assumed that some of the primordial goals of the state are to keep control over its territory, maintain order and protect its citizens. The government of Congo has been facing difficulties in achieving those goals, a fact which creates a debate about its capacity and reach. .
The state in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has not been able to guarantee the monopoly of the physical force that many consider the essential characteristic of a functioning state. Non-state actors have been successfully organized and able to inflict material damage and physical violence to the population. This situation is, in great part, considered to be due to the lack of strength of the state
(GÜELL, 2008). According to Reyntjens,
Reconstructing a polity that can perform even minimal state functions will therefore be an essential condition for both national development and regional stability. In the light of the extent of the decay, the sheer size of the country, the degree of fragmentation, and indeed the nature of the politicalmilitary leadership and of political culture more generally, this is a colossal task (REYNTJENS,
2007, p. 315)
Moreover, since infrastructure in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is insufficient, especially in communications, transports, and power sectors (AICD, 2010), it is possible to say that the country suffers from a lack of "infrastructural power"
(SOIFER & VOM HAU, 2008), which is one crucial reason among the many that difficult the reestablishment of the control of the country. The recent attempts to make arrangements of power-sharing have not succeeded, as the material base (economic and military), which is essential for the construction of state sovereignty and consolidation of political institutions, has not been formed (CASTELLANO, 2009). Therefore, some consider that the real problem may be not the one of constituting a democracy, but to constitute state authority (HUNTINGTON, 1968).
2.1.4 Arms Trafficking
The easy access to weapons is considered one of the factors that contributes most to the development of armed groups. An arms embargo was determined to the
DRC by the United Nations Security Council in 2003 (S/RES/1493/2003), but it was not sufficient to stop arms trafficking into the country. Small arms are preferred by armed groups, since they are cheap, widely available, and easy to operate and to port.
The option for this weapon lays not only in its easy operation, which enables even child soldiers to handle it, but also in the availability of this kind of arm (SAS, 2004).
In what concerns the Congolese conflicts, there is still a lack of statistical data about the inflow of arms. The fact is that the embargo is being circumvented in the
DRC, as shown by the allegations that military aid has been furnished by “powerful agents” close to the Ugandan, Rwandan and the Congolese governments to armed groups in the DRC (AFR/008/2005, 2005). Besides that, small-scale transactions occur in the border zone between the DRC and Sudan, an area where the Lord's Resistance
2.2 Conflict minerals and the "natural resources curse"
The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s territory is abundant in natural resources. Mineral reserves of the DRC are estimated in US$ 24 trillion, which correspond to approximately the European and American GDPs combined (AFRICAN
BUSINESS, 2009). Among the natural resources in the territory of the DRC there are timeless symbols of wealth, such as gold and diamonds, and resources of contemporary value, like oil, and minerals such as coltan and cassiterite (Enough Project, 2009).
Gold and diamond are notably used in the manufacturing of jewels. Most mines of these minerals are located in the east of the country, especially in the province of Ituri. Oil, by its turn, is the essential input of the current civilization. The small outlet to the sea that the DRC has is located in what is called "the oil belt", in the Atlantic
Ocean, a portion of Africa which has a great amount of oil. Recently, major reserves of oil have been discovered in the Uganda-DRC border, which has caused disagreements between these two countries.
Environmental degradation linked to oil extraction, as well as increasing pressure on other natural resources such as water and land, directly impacts the fragile ecosystem and local livelihoods. Against the background of oil exploration today, the DRC and Ugandan governments have engaged in first steps to normalise their relationship, but aggressive verbal attacks and violent cross-border incidents still occur (Initiative for Peacebuilding, 2010, pg. 8).
Among the minerals with expected value in the digital age, highlights are coltan, cassiterite and wolframite, Coltan is a powerful electricity conductor, used in many essential fields, such as electronics (cellular phones, notebooks and video games) and weapons systems. It is estimated that the DRC has almost two thirds of world's coltan reserves, but it is officially responsible for only one percent of the world’s production (MONTAGUE, 2002). During the Second Congo War there was a "coltan
rush”, but by 2002 the competition from Australian coltan contributed to the emergence of the "cassiterite rush". Cassiterite is used to obtain tin, which is utilized to produce batteries for electronics, tin cans (as in containers), electrodes, among other uses, mostly in alloys. Wolframite, on its turn, is the mineral form of the metal tungsten, which is largely sought for high-temperature applications. Along with gold, these are known as
“Congo’s conflict minerals”. The minerals themselves are coltan, cassiterite and wolframite, but their importance lies in the fact that from them are processed the “3 Ts”, respectively, tantalum, tin and tungsten. The term conflict mineral comes from the association of their extraction with the funding and financing of illegal armed groups, such as the FDLR (Enough Project, 2009). The groups’ profits are attained either by controlling the mines (and thereby exploring their workers), or extracting bribes from local and international authorities connected to the trade of these minerals (idem). The
United Nations Security Council has recognized
[…] the linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in such resources and the proliferation and trafficking of arms as one of the major factors fuelling and exacerbating conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa
This is closely connected with the frequent affirmation that the DRC suffers from the "natural resources curse". This "curse" may have two meanings: the first refers to a situation in which a country with many natural resources becomes dependent on exports of commodities, hampering economic growth (BANNON & COLLIER, 2003), while the second meaning has a direct relation with greed, if it is assumed that the control over natural resources may be a cause for armed conflicts (COLLIER &
This issue has also interfered in the relations of the DRC with its neighboring countries, such as Rwanda and Uganda, which have been accused of intervening and supporting proxy groups in the DRC in order to exploit its natural resources.
International and non-governmental organizations report, however, that, at the very least, if not supporting them, these countries are inefficient in combating armed groups.
In the case of Uganda, for instance, one governmental commission concluded that there is no doubt in our minds that diamonds are being smuggled and falsely declared as sourced in Uganda.
The relation between illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade of such resources and trafficking of arms does not appear exclusively in the financing of rebel groups. Once more, the question concerning the strength of the State and its capacity to control its territory and monitor its borders is raised. The State in the DRC has been facing difficulties in establishing its authority over the territory, opening up the possibility for external interventions. In addition, international NGOs have accused the government itself of collaborating with the FDLR in the extraction and trade of conflict minerals (Global Witness, 2008). It is also argued that, while most international efforts so far have been towards peacekeeping, insufficient attention has been brought to the subject of natural resources and arms trafficking, which are the economic drivers of the conflict (Enough Project, 2009, p. 5).
2.4 Humanitarian Crisis
The DRC has been in conflict for more than a decade, generating one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Not only armed groups, but also government troops and the MONUC peacekeepers have been accused of violating human rights
(OIOS, 2009). The whole situation has been leading people to seek refuge in neighboring countries and in other places inside the DRC.
A report released in 2007 by the International Rescue Committee reveals that less than 10% of the deaths occasioned by the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were due to the battles. The majority of deaths related to the conflicts were caused by preventable and treatable diseases (IRC, 2007). According to this report, the
Democratic Republic of Congo has been mired in conflict for over a decade, with devastating effects on its civilian population. The most recent war of 1998–2002 was characterized by mass displacement, collapse of health systems and food shortages, all contributing to major elevations of mortality.
Rapes are also a very serious problem to be faced in the country, and one that contributes most to draw attention to conflicts in eastern DRC. They serve even as a method of ethnic cleansing, as well as a way of demoralizing the opponent, but have also caused the spreading of AIDS, which affected an estimate of 1 million people in
DRC by 2005 (USAID, 2008).
3. PREVIOUS INTERNATIONAL ACTION
3.1 Action during the Congo Crisis
In the days that followed Congo’s independence on 30 June 1960, Belgium sent its troops to the country without the agreement of the Congolese Government.
From July to August of 1960 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed three resolutions on the Congo question, calling upon the Belgium government to withdraw its troops from the territory and authorizing the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures in order to restore law and order in the newly independent country
(S/RES/143/1960; S/RES/145/1960; S/RES/146/1960).
Over the next four years, the task of the United Nations Operations in the
Congo (ONUC), established by UNSC Resolution 143, was to help the Congolese
Government secure the political independence and territorial integrity of the Congo, maintaining law and order and putting into effect a wide and long-range program of training and technical assistance.
The UNSC decided to strengthen the instructions given to this force after the assassination of former Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, as evidenced by resolution 161 of 1961:
[The Security Council] urges that the United Nations take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for cease-fires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort
After the reintegration of Katanga into the national territory in 1963, the termination of the force was scheduled for the end of that year; however, the General
Assembly authorized the stay of a reduced number of troops for six more months by resolution 1885 (XVIII), as requested by the Congolese Government.
Its complete withdrawal took place in June 1964, and though the military phase of ONUC had ended, civilian aid continued in what was the “largest single programme of assistance undertaken until that time by the Organization and its agencies, with some 2,000 experts at work in the nation at the peak of the programme in 1963-1964” (ONUC).
Nevertheless, after a few decades of stability under Mobutu’s regime, the country would experience another great period of disarray with the Congo Wars in the 1990’s.
3.2 The Ceasefire, MONUC and further action
By the end of August of 1999, the DRC, Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia,
Uganda, Rwanda, The Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and The Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) signed the Lusaka Accord, which called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the launching of an "Inter-Congolese
Dialogue" to form a transitional government leading to elections. In 1999, in the context of the Lusaka Accord, the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was created, having the following tasks: (i) to assist the implementation of the ceasefire by maintaining contact with its signatories and providing technical assistance; (ii) and to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring (S/RES/1279). The initial authorization was of approximately 5,500 troops, 500 military observers and appropriate civilian component, but these numbers have reached up to almost 20,000 troops, 760 military observers, nearly 400 police and
1,050 personnel of formed police units around the year of 2007 (S/RES/1856). As of early 2010, the numbers remained very similar to the ones from three years earlier, and also included 2,749 local civilian staff and over 600 UN volunteers.
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), which began in 2001, produced 37 recommendations on different issues at stake for the development of the country, but the commissions left out most of the politically sensitive issues. It was only on 2 April
2003, a year after the dialogue's main meeting ended, that South Africa hosted the closing session of the ICD in which the participants endorsed a package of agreements.
This package comprised the All-Inclusive Agreement, the Transitional Constitution, the
Memorandum on Military and Security Issues and the 36 resolutions adopted at the
ICD's 2002 session (ICD Research Information, 2005).
In the last years, the UNSC has approved resolutions which evidence concern regarding the continuous presence of armed groups and militias in the eastern part of the
DRC and the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights situation. Reflecting the increasing international pressure, the resolution 1493 (2003) gave MONUC authorization for the deployment of its armed unities within its capabilities beyond the
protection of UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, but also to protect civilians and humanitarian workers and to contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided. In the national elections of
2006, MONUC also played a crucial role within its mandate of strengthening democratic institutions by giving operational support to the electoral process and providing assistance to the Congolese authorities.
Resolution 1807 (2008) determined that all States should take all necessary measures to prevent the supply of arms and related material, as well as provision of training, advice and assistance related to military activities to all non-governmental entities and individuals operating in the DRC; this resolution also made a series of measures regarding aircraft and border control and established the immediate freeze of economic resources of a series of persons and entities determined by the Council
(S/RES/1807/2008). Resolution 1857 of the same year corroborated and extended many of those determinations, and resolution 1896 of 2009 set a new mandate for MONUC, which included (i) the protection of civilians, humanitarian and UN personnel; (ii) activities of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of Congolese armed groups, as well as repatriation and resettlement of foreign armed groups; (iii) support to the security sector reform in the DRC, with the priority being the protection of civilians.
This resolution also addressed the issue of the allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation by MONUC personnel, requesting the continuance of their full investigation (S/RES/1896/2009).
More recently, resolution 1925 (2010) extended the mandate of MONUC until the end of June 2010 and decided that, from the 1 st
of July 2010, the mission would bear the title of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), in view of the new phase that has been reached in the DRC. Furthermore, in the same resolution the Council:
2. Decides that MONUSCO shall be deployed until 30 June 2011 and authorizes that MONUSCO shall comprise, in addition to the appropriate civilian, judiciary and correction components, a maximum of 19,815 military personnel, 760 military observers, 391 police personnel and 1,050 personnel of formed police units;
3. Authorizes the withdrawal of up to 2000 United Nations military personnel by 30 June 2010 from areas where the security situation permits
Finally, the resolution ascertains that future reconfigurations of MONUSCO will be determined according to the evolution of the situation and the possible achievement of its objectives, such as: (i) minimizing the threat and instability generated by armed groups in sensitive areas; (ii) improving the Congolese government’s capacity to effectively protect the population, which will allow it to progressively take over MONUSCO’s security role; and (iii) consolidating State authority throughout the territory (S/RES/1925/2010).
4. BLOC POSITIONS
The African Union (AU), represented in the Security Council by Gabon,
Nigeria and Uganda, calls on the international community, especially Congo’s neighboring countries, to continue the support to the efforts of both the AU and the UN, respecting its sanctions and embargoes. Also, the organization emphasizes the need to reunite State authority in DRC, as well as to integrate the army and security services
The protection of civilians, especially women and children, is considered a major priority for Austria. In this sense, the country has pressed the Council for a clear safeguard on MONUC’s protection mandate, while recognizing that, despite the many successes of the Mission, the situation of the population in the DRC is still extremely difficult and dangerous (Austria Foreign Ministry, 2009). Furthermore, Austria emphasizes the important role that the advance of democracy in the Congo plays in the
African continent as a whole, since Austria considers that DRC is a key country and its development can have a decisive influence over the entire region (Austria Foreign
Having been subject of successful regional and international collaboration in peacekeeping itself, Bosnia and Herzegovina strongly believes in the cooperation of the UN with regional organizations to the achievement of peace and security. As such, the country considers the UN operations in DRC an example of the commitment to the peaceful settlement of disputes, affirming that long-term regional peace and security depends upon the internal stability of the States (Permanent Mission of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to the UN, 2010). Accordingly, Bosnia and Herzegovina currently
provides a small number of military observers and civilian staff to MONUSCO
(MONUSCO Mission Staff, 2010).
Recalling recent initiatives taken in different parts of Africa, Brazil reaffirms its commitment to the works and negotiations related to small arms trafficking in
Central Africa, asserting that while this issue may not be a problem in all regions of the world, it is of general concern, and a multilateral response to it must be sought
(SC/9886). The country currently contributes with a small number of civilian staff to
MONUSCO (MONUSCO Mission Staff, 2010), and has collaborated in the past by lending two transport planes to an emergency UN operation in the region of Ituri, in
2003 (Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003).
believes the fundamental way to eliminate conflicts in Central Africa is to help those countries eradicate poverty and achieve sustainable development, for which the UN should continue to work and to cooperate with other regional organizations such as the African Union (SC/9886). Besides contributing with a large military contingent, observers and civilian staff to MONUSCO (MONUSCO Mission
Staff, 2010), China is currently the DRC’s biggest commercial partner ever since a multibillion dollar deal was signed in 2008 (BECKER, 2010), which included a Chinese loan as well as construction of mining, transportation and humanitarian infrastructure in the DRC in exchange of copper and cobalt concessions for the Chinese (idem).
The European Union (EU) has conducted the EUSEC initiative in DRC since
2005 with views to help the defense and security of the people in the country, as well as the respect towards democracy, human rights and rule of law (EU at the UN, 2009). The
EUPOL initiative, on its turn, is a civilian mission aiming at giving technical assistance to the police of Congo under the scope of the security sector reform (EUPOL RD
While recognizing that the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo has evolved in the past ten years, France remains concerned both with humanitarian conditions and the country’s security reform. The French government considers that the security reform and professionalization of the Congolese army are the greatest challenges to be undertaken both under the scope of the UN and through bilateral cooperation with the DRC (Permanent Mission of France to the UN, 2010), which is shown by France’s participation in European initiatives EUSEC and EUPOL.
Moreover, in 2003, France was the leader of an emergency UN mission in Ituri to resolve an episode of spiraling violence (ICG Africa Report 64, 2003).
aims at pushing the Security Council towards taking account of changes and considering innovative measures to deal with the problem of illicit trade in
Central Africa. The country considers this problem a major international concern that has exacerbated crises around the world, emphasizing the need for transparency in combating the issue (SC/9886).
has shown extreme concern towards the situation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, especially regarding the eastern part of the country and the border with Rwanda. The country has provided unilateral humanitarian assistance to DRC and the region as a whole, and is willing to play an active role for peace and security in
Africa, as well as to continue encouraging the countries involved to achieve a solution to the conflict through dialogue (MOFA Press Statement, 2008).
considers that the problems of weapons trafficking, security, organized crime, human rights and development are all intertwined, and therefore the international community and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should intensify their work in establishing controls and monitoring the situation in the DRC and the entire region. Also, Lebanon believes there is a need to look for the root causes of the conflict and the illicit trade and to encourage combatants to be reintegrated with society
notes the efforts made in the last ten years regarding the issue of violence in the DRC and Central Africa, but believes that many challenges persist. The country asserts that organized crime and arms’ trafficking are a major obstacle to the development of that region, and thus calls on the United Nations to play a more active role on this subject (idem).
Calling for more cooperation with international and regional arms embargoes,
recalls the role of natural resources in fuelling conflicts and exacerbating illicit arms trafficking. The country also notes the impact that those issues have on Central
Africa and the rest of the continent, undermining good governance, tourism and investment, while at the same time jeopardizing democracy and economic development.
In that sense, the country calls for a uniform practice under the scope of the UN regarding these problems, and for the strengthening of national mechanisms to prevent the diversion of weapons to illegal markets (ibidem).
The Russian Federation believes MONUC has made important contributions to the success of the operations in the country, and recognizes the joint efforts of the
European Union and the UN in ensuring security and law in the country (SC/8936). In addition, the country calls for strict respect for the embargoes posed on the DRC and emphasizes the need for a common approach to counter illicit trade in Central Africa
(ibidem). Russia has contributed with personnel to the MONUC Police in past years and currently provides MONUSCO with civilian staff and military observers (MONUSCO
Mission Staff, 2010).
Recognizing the responsibility of every State to protect its citizens, Turkey still advocates that the transboundary nature of the region’s problems calls for a multidimensional approach to deal with it at local, regional, national and international levels. Bearing that in mind, foreign aid programmes should be encouraged, as well as the reinforcement of border and customs control (SC/9886).
believes that the problem of illicit weapons trade must be dealt with on an international basis, as the amount of resources needed to do so make any individual effort very unlikely to generate any impact. Furthermore, the country recalls the impact of the issue on the development of the entire Central African region, fuelling other cross-border activities such as drug trafficking and trade in endangered species, as well as threatening peace, reconciliation, safety and sustainable development (idem).
Nowadays, the main issue of concern between the governments of Uganda and DRC is the Uganda-based Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which still acts in the border areas of
DRC, southern Sudan and Central African Republic (Human Rights Watch, 2010).
In addition to the actions taken through the UN and the EU, especially regarding the security sector reform, the United Kingdom is also one of the major donors of humanitarian provisions to the DRC, besides providing funds to NGOs for the enhancement of the regulation of small arms use and transfer. The UK believes tackling these issues and promoting regional confidence-building, stability and security are essential to the development of the situation (UK Mission to the UN, 2010). Recently, however, the country has been accused by an international NGO of failing to report companies that trade DRC conflict minerals to the UN Sanctions Committee (Global
Witness Press Release, 2010).
currently ranks three main priorities regarding the
Democratic Republic of Congo: eliminating sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV), tackling
the issue of conflict minerals
and promoting the security reform. The US asserts that, while it is encouraged by the zero-tolerance policy announced by the DRC regarding SGBV, it believes there should be further efforts to deal with this problem. Also, the country advocates more action in stemming the illegal exploitation and trade of Congolese minerals, both because the profits benefit armed groups and because the mining sites are abundant with human rights violations. Furthermore, the US believes it is necessary that a long-term, multi-donor-supported security sector reform takes place in the Congo in order to enhance the country’s own armed forces (US Department of State, 2010). Finally, the country currently contributes with civilian staff to MONUSCO (MONUSCO Mission Staff, 2010).
5. QUESTIONS TO PONDER
Since the Second Congo War, the DRC undergoes a political transition whose purpose is to bring stability and democracy to the country. The arrangements of power-sharing were not able to promote neither the stabilization nor the democratization. Then, how can the United Nations contribute to bring state capacity to the DRC, and also contribute to improve the democratic arrangement?
Is the Security Sector Reform being conducted satisfactorily? Are the DDR
(Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) and the DDRRR
(Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration) the most effective ways to demobilize armed groups and bring stability to the
The presence of foreign mining companies in the DRC has contributed largely to the situation in the country. What can be done to prevent those companies to influence the conflicts?
How can Congo reach stabilization if the neighboring countries foment disorder and violence in its territory?
What is the role of the countries that invest on local natural resources on the country’s stabilization?
11 On July 2010, US President Barack Obama signed into law a financial reform for the country, which included a provision requiring American companies that import products containing tin, tantalum, tungstein or gold to report whether or not they come from the DRC or its neighboring countries. If they do, they must ensure that these minerals are not funding illegal armed groups in eastern Congo
CASTELLANO, Igor. Guerra irregular e Estado falido: esclarecendo conceitos para o caso da República Democrática do Congo. Trabalho apresentado no II
Seminário Nacional de Sociologia e Política. Curituba, 2009.
DE WITTE, Ludo. The Assassination of Lumumba. Verso. 2001.
HOCHSCHILD, Adam. King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Central Africa. Pan McMillan, 1998.
MACGAFFEY, Janet. Entrepreneurs and parasites: the struggle for indigenous capitalism in Zaire. Cambridge University Press. 1987.
NDIKUMANA, Léonce. The Economics of Civil War: The Case of the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Kisangani Emizet, 2003.
NZONGOLA-NTAJALA, Georges. The Congo from Leopold to Kabila: a people's history. Zed Books. 2002.
REYNTJENS, Filip. The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Kabila to Kabila. Royal
African Society, 2001. Available at: http://afraf.oxfordjouranl.org/cgi
Last accessed: September 9.
________________. Briefing: the Second Congo War: More than a remake. African
Affairs, Vol. 98, No. 391 (Apr., 1999), pp. 241-250.
________________. Briefing: Democratic Republic of Congo: Political transition and beyond. African Affairs, Vol. 106, No. 423 (Apr., 2007), pp. 307-317.
SCHATZBERG, Michael G. Mobutu or Chaos? The United States and Zaire 1960-
1990. University Press Of America. 1991.
WEISS, Herbert. War and peace in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Current African
Issues, No. 22. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. 2000.
Articles from the internet
ARCHIVES DU PRÉSIDENT DE LA RDC. Speech by his Excellency Major General
Joseph Kabila, President of the Republic of Congo before the Parliament of the
Republic of Zimbabwe Available at: http://www.presidentrdc.cd/archives.html
Last accessed: September 5.
AUTESERRE, Séverine. Postwar "Settlement" in the Eastern D.R. Congo (2003–2006).
Available at: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/african_studies_review/v049/49.3autesserre.html
. Last accessed: September 9.
ENOUGH PROJECT. A Comprehensive Approach to Congo’s Conflict Minerals. April
2009. Available at: http://www.enoughproject.org/files/publications/Comprehensive%20Approach%20to
. Last accessed: September 5.
GLOBAL SECURITY, CONGO CIVIL WAR. Available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/congo.htm
. Last accessed: June
INITIATIVE FOR PEACEBUILDING. Peacebuilding across Lake Albert. Available at: http://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu/pdf/peacebuilding_lake_albert.pdf
. Last acessed: September 18.
INTER-CONGOLESE DIALOGUE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PEACE
PROCESS AND ON TRANSITION IN THE DRC. Available at: http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2002/gov-cod-16dec-02.pdf
. Last accessed: June 21.
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE: http://www.theirc.org/
KEY PROVISIONS OF THE LUSAKA CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT. Africa
Recovery, vol. 14, n.1, April 2000. Available at: http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/ subjindx/141peac3.htm
: Last accessed:
MONUC mandate. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/ monuc/mandate.shtml
Last accessed: September 9.
MONUC. Available at: http://monuc.unmissions.org/
. Last accessed: June 21.
MONUC. Available at: http://monuc.unmissions.org/
. Last accessed: May 8;
ONUC, Republic of the Congo, ONUC background. Available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onucB.htm
. Last accessed: June 6.
Peace agreements: Angola. Available at: http://www.usip.org/resources/peace-agreementsangola
. Last accessed: May 8.
QUINTANA, Michael. Kabila's Legacy: political and military fragmentation. 24
January 2001. Available at: http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/ news/sentinel/sent010124_1_n.shtml
. Last accessed: January 8.
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue Research Information, 2005. Available at: www.democraticdialoguenetwork.org
. Last accessed: June 21.
UN News Center. DR Congo: UN peacekeepers to use ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians. Available at:
Last accessed: September 9.
USAID. Democratic Republic of Congo’s HIV/AIDS Profile. September 2008.
Available at: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_health/aids/Countries/africa/ congo_profile.pdf
. Last accessed: 05/09/2010.
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-891 http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/notas-a-imprensa/2003/03/nota-conjunta-com-oministerio-da-defesa-brasil/?searchterm=iemf http://www.globalissues.org/news/2010/05/10/5537 http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/drcongo/Congo%20Crisis%20Military%20Intervention%20in%20Ituri.ashx
http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_detail.php/1032/en/global_witness_takes_uk_gove rnment_to_court_for_fa http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/drc0310webwcover_0.pdf
* Your assessment is very important for improving the work of artificial intelligence, which forms the content of this project