Download version 0.1 of EM 1110-1-4009 Engineering and Design Military Munitions Response Actions.pdf

Download version 0.1 of EM 1110-1-4009 Engineering and Design Military Munitions Response Actions.pdf
EM 1110-1-4009
15 June 2007
ENGINEERING AND DESIGN
MILITARY MUNITIONS RESPONSE
ACTIONS
ENGINEERING MANUAL
“Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.”
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
AVAILABILITY
Electronic copies of this and other U.S. Army Corps of Engineers publications are available on
the Internet at http://www.usace.army.mil/inet/usace-docs/. This site is the only repository for
all official USACE engineer regulations, circulars, manuals, and other documents originating
from HQUSACE. Publications are provided in portable document format (PDF).
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Washington, DC 20314-1000
CEMP-CE
Manual
No. 1110-1-4009
EM 1110-1-4009
15 June 2007
Engineering and Design
MILITARY MUNITIONS RESPONSE ACTIONS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paragraph
Chapter 1.
Project Planning and Execution
Introduction.............................................................1-1
Project Delivery Team (PDT).................................1-2
Technical Project Planning (TPP)...........................1-3
Safety ......................................................................1-4
Chapter 2.
2-1
2-1
2-5
2-7
Site Visit
Introduction.............................................................3-1
Site Visit Objectives and Planning .........................3-2
Site Visit Attendees.................................................3-3
Site Visit Requirements ..........................................3-4
Site Visit Information Collection............................3-5
Chapter 4.
1-1
1-1
1-2
1-6
Project Contracting Requirements
Introduction.............................................................2-1
Developing the SOW ..............................................2-2
Cost Estimating Process..........................................2-3
Project Schedule......................................................2-4
Chapter 3.
Page
3-1
3-1
3-2
3-2
3-3
Work Plans
Introduction.............................................................4-1
Performance Objectives ..........................................4-2
Work Plan Review ..................................................4-3
Work Plan Contents ................................................4-4
Work Plan Acceptance............................................4-5
i
4-1
4-1
4-1
4-1
4-4
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Paragraph
Chapter 5.
Geospatial Data Systems (GDS)
Introduction.............................................................5-1
Requirements for the Acquisition and Access of
Geospatial Data.......................................................5-2
Data Quality Objectives..........................................5-3
QC ...........................................................................5-4
SOW........................................................................5-5
GDS Plan ................................................................5-6
Planning Considerations .........................................5-7
Mapping ..................................................................5-8
Deliverables ............................................................5-9
Chapter 6.
5-1
5-1
5-4
5-4
5-6
5-7
5-9
5-10
6-1
6-1
6-3
Site Characterization
Introduction.............................................................7-1
MRS Footprint Identification..................................7-2
Sectorization ...........................................................7-3
Geophysical Site Characterization Strategies .........7-4
Sampling Methods ..................................................7-5
Excavation ……………………………………......7-6
Data Interpretation, Resectorization, and
Decision Making.....................................................7-7
Geophysical Investigation Planning Tools .............7-8
Chapter 8.
5-1
Geophysical Planning Strategies for Response Actions
Introduction.............................................................6-1
Specific Response Goals and Needs to be
Addressed by Geophysical Investigation................6-2
Specify the Removal Decision Strategy .................6-3
Chapter 7.
Page
7-1
7-1
7-8
7-9
7-11
7-13
7-14
7-14
Geophysical Investigation
Introduction.............................................................8-1
Geophysical Systems ..............................................8-2
Geophysical Tools ..................................................8-3
Positioning and Navigation Techniques .................8-4
Geophysical Systems Deployment Platforms.........8-5
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8-1
8-1
8-2
8-13
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Paragraph
Anomaly Selection Criteria and Anomaly
Prioritization…………………………………… ...8-6
Anomaly Resolution ...............................................8-7
Special Considerations for Planning Geophysical
Investigations ..........................................................8-8
Geophysical System Capabilities and MEC
Detection Capabilities…………………………….8-9
Digital Data Format and Storage and Coordinate
Reporting.................................................................8-10
Geophysical Prove-Out Planning............................8-11
Data Analysis and Interpretation ............................8-12
Geophysical Work Plans.........................................8-13
Chapter 9.
8-36
8-37
8-39
8-40
8-44
8-46
9-1
9-2
9-16
9-18
9-20
MC Sampling
Introduction.............................................................10-1
Objective .................................................................10-2
Initial MC Investigation Planning...........................10-3
Sampling and Analysis Considerations ..................10-4
Types of MC Analyses............................................10-5
Sampling and Analysis Plan ...................................10-6
Data Interpretation, Validation, Reporting, and
Decision Making.....................................................10-7
Quality Management...............................................10-8
Chapter 11.
8-27
8-34
Quality Control of Geophysical Systems and Related Operations
Introduction.............................................................9-1
Process Quality Management .................................9-2
Product Quality Management .................................9-3
Managing Quality Control Failures ........................9-4
Special Considerations for Quality Control
Programs .................................................................9-5
Chapter 10.
Page
10-1
10-1
10-2
10-3
10-8
10-18
10-19
10-21
Blast and Fragment Protection................................
Introduction.............................................................11-1
DQOs ......................................................................11-2
Explosives Safety Considerations...........................11-3
Explosive Effects ....................................................11-4
iii
11-1
11-1
11-1
11-3
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Paragraph
MSDs ......................................................................11-5
Unintentional Versus Intentional Detonation
Minimum Separation Criteria .................................11-6
Unintentional Detonations ......................................11-7
Intentional Detonations...........................................11-8
Explosives Siting Plan ............................................11-9
Engineering Controls ..............................................11-10
Chapter 12.
11-6
11-6
11-6
11-7
11-10
12-1
12-1
12-1
12-4
12-5
12-6
Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP)
Purpose and Overview ............................................13-1
Responsibilities .......................................................13-2
QASP Overview......................................................13-3
QASP Metrics .........................................................13-4
QASP Surveillance .................................................13-5
QASP Non-Conformances......................................13-6
QASP Review Documentation ...............................13-7
Chapter 14.
11-5
Risk Characterization
Introduction.............................................................12-1
CSM ........................................................................12-2
MEC Risk Pathway.................................................12-3
Risk Management Principles ..................................12-4
Risk Characterization Methods...............................12-5
Risk Communication ..............................................12-6
Chapter 13.
Page
13-1
13-1
13-2
13-3
13-3
13-4
13-5
Corps of Engineers Contractors MPPEH Inspection, Certification, and Final
Disposition Procedures
MPPEH – Contractor Responsibilities and
Procedures...............................................................14-1
MPPEH – Certification and Verification................14-2
Maintaining the Chain of Custody and Final
Disposition ..............................................................14-3
Material that is still MPPEH after inspection may
be released only to a qualified receiver...................14-4
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14-1
14-3
14-4
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APPENDICES
Appendix A – References .................................................................................................. A-1
Appendix B – Checklist Tables ..........................................................................................B-1
Appendix C – QASP Template ..........................................................................................C-1
Appendix D – QASP Metrics ............................................................................................ D-1
Appendix E – Surveillance Activities Table......................................................................E-1
Appendix F – Corrective Action Request (CAR) ............................................................... F-1
Appendix G – Generic On-Site QA Checklist................................................................... G-1
Appendix H – EE/CA Work Plan Review Matrix ............................................................. H-1
Appendix I – EE/CA Report Review Matrix.......................................................................I-1
Appendix J – Removal Action Work Plan Review Matrix..................................................J-1
Appendix K – Sample Quality Assurance Report (QAR) ................................................. K-1
Appendix L – After Action or Final Quality Assurance Report Content ...........................L-1
Glossary
......................................................................................................... Glossary-1
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CHAPTER 1
PROJECT PLANNING AND EXECUTION
1-1. Introduction.
a. General.
(1) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) conducts munitions responses under
the Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP) in accordance with (IAW) the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). The guidance
provided in this Engineer Manual (EM) applies to all USACE munitions response projects.
Refer to ER 1110-1-8153 and EP 1110-1-18 for additional information on the MMRP process.
Refer to the ER 200-3-1 for specific requirements for Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS).
(2) This EM guides a project delivery team (PDT) through the engineering and design
requirements that will be addressed while planning a project involving munitions response.
This EM also addresses the execution aspects of MMRP. This EM is subdivided into chapters
representing the major components of a munitions response project that require PDT
consideration. Checklists are provided in Appendix B to assist the PDT in assuring that all
necessary items have been considered.
(3) The engineering considerations presented in this EM primarily address the actions
taken to reduce the explosives safety risks associated with MEC. For additional information on
the procedures for USACE personnel to follow when planning and executing a munitions
response, review the USACE website for new guidance. For specific guidance on projects
involving Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel (RCWM), see EP 75-1-3.
b. Phases of the Military Munitions Response Process. The different phases of the
munitions response process, for both remedial actions and removal actions, are summarized in
Figures 1-1 and 1-2. These phases are described in detail in the ER 200-3-1. In accordance
with the ER 200-3-1, the removal process alone cannot be used to make closeout decisions; all
decisions regarding the need for further action or closeout will be based on the result of
decisions made using the remedial process.
c. Application of these procedures may vary depending on the type of contracting
methodology being used to execute the work; however, they should be used to the extent
practicable.
1-2. Project Delivery Team (PDT). The PDT includes the Project Manager (PM), technical
experts within or outside the local USACE activity, specialists, consultants/contractors, the
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customer(s), stakeholders, representatives from other federal and state agencies, and vertical
members from division and headquarters that are necessary to effectively develop and deliver
the project. The roles and responsibilities of the PDT with respect to the munitions response
process are defined in ER 200-3-1. Where PDT involvement is specified in this document, the
PM will be responsible for determining specifically which members of the PDT should be
involved in each particular part of the process. The PDT will implement the public
involvement requirements specified in EP 1110-3-8 during the planning phase.
1-3. Technical Project Planning (TPP). During Military Munitions Response Program
response actions (including investigation, removal and remedial actions to address the
explosives safety, human health, or environmental risks presented by MEC and MC), PDT
members implement the TPP process. This process is performed in accordance with EM 2001-2, which describes the TPP process in detail and provides related documentation tools. In
summary, the TPP process is a four phased approach involving a series of meetings during
which the project goals and objectives, project data needs and data collection methods, and data
quality objectives (DQOs) are discussed and agreed upon. The results of these meetings are
recorded in a living document that is constantly updated based on the investigation’s findings.
Appropriate implementation of the TPP process ensures that all PDT members, including
stakeholders, understand and agree upon the project’s objectives, and that they concur with
what is required to achieve project completion.
a. Phase I – Identify Project.
(1) The first phase of the TPP process involves the definition of the overall response
objective for the project, as well as other related project objectives. It is crucial that the PDT
clearly defines the response objective at the beginning of the process because all other elements
of the TPP process are established based on this initial step and all subsequent project decisions
will be made with the ultimate response objective in mind.
(2) To ensure that the response objective is appropriate for the project, all members of the
PDT (technical personnel, decision makers, and stakeholders) are involved in the
determination. It is at this time that the type(s) of response action(s) (remedial and/or removal)
are discussed. The type of response action may differ based upon the different areas of interest
or projects within a project property but the PDT ensures that the project’s response action
objectives are consistent with the overall project property response objective.
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Preliminary
Assessment (1)
NO
HTRW
confirmed or
confirmed/potential
MEC or MC?
Remedial Site
Inspection (2)
YES
Is a
Removal Response
appropriate?
YES
NO
Feasibility
Study (2)
YES
Does the
RI require response
action (3)?
NO
Public Notice
Proposed Plan
Public Comment
Period
Remedial Design/
Remedial Action
Remedy In Place/
Response Complete
(6)
LTM/
Five-Year Review
ROD/DD Response
to Public Comment
YES
Remedial
Investigation (2)(4)
From Figure 1-2
for projects undergoing
a Removal Response
See Figure 1-2
Removal Response
Process (8)
Does the
ROD/DD require further
response action?
(5)
NO
Completion
Report (7)
Pursue Project
Closeout and Regulatory
Concurrence
Figure 1-1. Remedial Response Process for MMRP Projects
Notes:
1. For new Inventory Project Reports, a Preliminary Assessment will be performed for eligible FUDS properties.
If no hazards are identified during the PA, pursue property closeout and regulatory concurrence.
2. A removal response may be performed at any time during the process up until the ROD/DD signature.
3. Response action may include land use controls (LUCs).
4. If the removal response taken adequately addresses the risk or safety concerns at the project, the Remedial
Investigation (RI) may be abbreviated. If LUC/5-Year Review/Long Term Monitoring (LTM) is required,
evaluate them in the Feasibility Study (FS).
5. LUC/5-Year Reviews/LTM are required to be documented in the Remedial Design (RD).
6. See definitions in paragraph 4-4.7.2 and Figure 4-3 of the ER 200-3-1, April 2004.
7. Required by USACE FUDS policy.
8. Regardless of whether additional investigation/response is required following the removal action, the projects
will transition back to the remedial response process.
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Transition from Remedial
Response Process when a
Removal Response is
appropriate. See
Figure 1-1 (2)
Does
response require less
than six months
planning time?
YES
Action
Memorandum
NO
Approval
Memorandum (AM)
Execute Time-Critical
Removal Action (3)
Engineering Evaluation/
Cost Analysis (1)
Public Comment
Period
Action
Memorandum
Removal Action
-Construction
Removal Design
including ESS
YES
Does AM
require further
response?
NO
Transition to Remedial
Response Process
See Figure 1-1 (2)
Prepare ESS for
DDESB approval
Figure 1-2. Removal Response Process for MMRP Projects
Notes:
1.
A Time Critical Removal Action (TCRA) may be initiated during the EE/CA in which case an Action
Memorandum is required prior to executing the TCRA. Then return to complete the EE/CA.
2.
Regardless of whether or not additional investigation/response is required following the removal response, the
project will transition to the remedial response process.
3.
Transition to either the remedial (RI) or back to the removal process (EE/CA) after the TCRA.
4.
A removal response cannot be used to achieve the Remedy-In-Place (RIP) or Response Complete (RC)
milestones and property or project closeout cannot occur directly from a removal response. To achieve the
RIP or RC milestones or property or project closeout requires a decision made through the remedial process.
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(3) Available project property data is also gathered during Phase I of the TPP process.
This data is used to prepare the preliminary conceptual site model (CSM), as well as to help in
the identification of data gaps during the second phase of the TPP process. The preliminary
CSM is a written and/or graphical representation that describes the current state of knowledge
or assumptions concerning the explosive safety, human health, or environmental risks
presented by MEC and MC at the project property. The CSM is a “living document” that is
intended to be updated as the project progresses and new data becomes available. The actions
involved with developing a CSM are described in EM 1110-1-1200.
(4) In addition to the preliminary CSM, documentation produced during this phase of the
TPP process includes a Phase I Memorandum for Record (MFR). The Phase I MFR includes
information concerning the TPP team members and their roles and responsibilities, the overall
response objective for the project, and the individual project objectives, including closeout
goals, schedule, and available project budget.
b. Phase II – Determine Data Needs.
(1) Following the definition of the response objective during the first phase of the TPP,
the PDT identifies the data needs for the project. All potential data users will be involved in
the identification of data needs. Data needs are determined by reviewing the project objectives
and the available project property data discussed during Phase I. This process allows for the
identification of data gaps, which in turn determines the data needs (type and quantity) for the
current project.
(2) Before defining new data needs for the project, the data users will evaluate the
usability of existing data, as these data may be suitable for qualitative and quantitative uses.
For example, site reconnaissance data may be sufficient to indicate that a removal action is
required in a given area; however, it may not provide enough information to evaluate the costs
of conducting that removal action. In this case, the data need would be to determine both the
lateral extent and depth of the MEC as they relate to the end use of the project property. To
determine the lateral extent of the MEC additional field characterization activities may be
needed. However, the expected depth of the MEC may be determined through documented
past use of the project property. Another data need could be to determine where MEC are not
present. This may allow for certain portions of the project property to meet the overall
response objective sooner and consequently enable focus on those areas where MEC have been
confirmed to be present.
c. Phase III – Develop Data Collection Options. The third TPP phase involves the
development and documentation of the data collection methods that will be used to provide the
data identified during Phase II. Selection of data collection methods will consider all decisions
made and information collected throughout Phases I and II of the TPP process.
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d. Phase IV – Finalize Data Collection Program.
(1) The final phase in the TPP process is to finalize and document the selected data
collection options. The first step in this process involves the development of site-specific DQO
statements for each identified data need. DQOs are qualitative and quantitative statements that
describe the intended data use(s), the data need requirements, and the means to achieve
acceptable data quality for the intended use(s). When data collection is complete, the DQOs
will be evaluated to assure that the data need, and consequently the related project objective,
has been met. Documentation of DQOs will ensure efficient project execution and attainment
of project property-closeout in a timely fashion with minimal rework. DQOs are relevant to all
aspects of the work performed on a project property. There are DQOs for location surveying
and mapping, geophysical investigations, MC sampling, and geospatial data systems as
described in Chapters 5, 6, 8, and 10.
(2) Based upon the defined DQOs, the investigation and sampling approaches are
selected to meet the project data needs, based upon the data collection options identified during
Phase III of the TPP process. When planning sampling approaches, the PDT considers
potential sources of errors to ensure the data will meet the DQOs. The PDT then decides the
most appropriate tools to determine the most appropriate data collection methods for the project
property. Available tools for collecting the necessary data are also discussed in Chapters 5, 6,
8, and 10.
(3) The establishment of DQOs, as well as the selection of investigation and sampling
approaches for a project results in the development of a data collection program that best meets
the project objectives agreed upon during Phase I. The end product of the TPP process is the
documentation of this final data collection program.
1-4. Safety. Safety is a critical component of all USACE activities and operations. Not all
safety requirements for munitions response projects are addressed in this document, but the
requirements are discussed in detail in ER 385-1-95, EP 385-1-95a, EP 75-1-3, DoD 6055.9Std and applicable DA safety regulations. The MM CX may also be contacted for assistance.
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CHAPTER 2
PROJECT CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS
2-1. Introduction.
a. This chapter provides guidance to the PDT concerning government planning activities
for projects involving munitions response. The purpose of government planning is to develop a
strategy for each project that will ensure the achievement of project goals in a manner that is
safe, timely, and cost-effective. Topics discussed in this chapter include the Statement of Work
(SOW), cost estimate, and project schedule.
b. Government planning activities require input from many different disciplines and
customers and should therefore be prepared in a manner that fully involves all affected parties.
Quality excellence is achieved in government planning activities through the conscientious and
cooperative efforts of each PDT member.
c. The following SOW requirements also apply to Performance Work Statement (PWS).
The primary difference between an SOW and a PWS is that a SOW is more prescriptive in
nature whereas a PWS describes outcomes desired.
2-2. Developing the Statement of Work (SOW). An SOW will be prepared for each project,
whether it will be completed as a delivery order/task order to a contractor or as a work effort by
an Army element.
a. Performance Objectives. The SOW identifies the specific work requirements for a
particular project. The PDT’s performance objective is to develop a SOW that will serve as the
basis for:
(1) Developing a cost estimate either for budgetary purposes or for use in contract
negotiations.
(2) Defining clear, achievable, and contractually enforceable project requirements.
(3) Obtaining successful project performance.
(4) Ensuring fair and effective administration of a contract or delivery order/task order.
b. Preparation.
(1) The PDT is responsible for the preparation of SOWs for all munitions response
activities in coordination with the PM. The MM Design Center (DC) should ensure that the
PM and all appropriate members of the PDT are included in the preparation of the SOW.
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(2) When preparing the SOW, the PDT should consult the Inventory Project Report
(INPR), Preliminary Assessment (PA) Report, Site Inspection (SI) report, Public Involvement
Plan, TPP meeting minutes, Archives Search Report (ASR), State Management Action Plan
(SMAP), previous investigation reports, and information gathered during the site visit (see
Chapter 3 of this manual for site-specific information). Table B-1 in Appendix B is a checklist
to aid in the preparation of the SOW.
c. Contents. The contents of a SOW depend on the type of munitions response project,
the type of munitions response that will be performed, and site-specific requirements. The
following topics should generally be included in a SOW:
(1) General responsibilities.
(2) Project description.
(3) Scope of services.
(4) Schedule and deliverables.
(5) Reviews and conferences.
(6) Technical criteria and standards, including government-furnished information.
(7) Administrative instructions.
(8) General provisions.
(9) References.
d. SOW for Project Phases. The PDT may need to develop a SOW for specific phases of
a project. PDT considerations for site visit, Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS),
Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA), and removal and remedial action SOWs are
discussed below. More detailed information on SOW preparation is provided in subsequent
chapters of this manual.
(1) SOW for Site Visit. A site visit may be required prior to the initiation of or as the
first task of a project involving munitions response. Site visits are discussed in more detail in
Chapter 3 of this manual.
(2) Statement of Work for RI/FS or EE/CA. The Project Delivery Team may begin
preparation of the SOW for the EE/CA phase once the Approval Memorandum has been
signed. Typical tasks included in a RI/FS or EE/CA SOW are:
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(a) Performing a Records Review and an Assessment of Land Use Restrictions.
(b) Conducting a Site Visit.
(c) Preparation of a Work Plan.
(d) Performing TPP Activities.
(e) Prepare Explosives Siting Plans (ESP) for submittal to DDESB.
(f) Performing Site Preparation Activities.
(g) Performing Site Characterization Activities (see Chapters 5, 6, and 7).
(h) Preparation of an Institutional Analysis and Support Agreements for Land Use
Controls.
(i) Maintenance of the Administrative Record.
(j) Preparation of the Recurring Review Plan.
(k) Identification of Safety Risks to Human Health and the Environment (see Chapter
12).
(l) Preparation of the RI/FS or EE/CA report.
(m) Preparation of the Decision Document (DD), Record of Decision (ROD), or Action
Memorandum.
(n) Performing Community Relations Activities.
(3) Remedial/Removal Design Phase. The remedial/removal design phase includes the
development of workplans, design specifications, and bid documents for conducting the
remedial/removal actions. For MEC/MC projects, the remedial/removal design requires
preparation of an Explosives Safety Submission (ESS) or Chemical Safety Submission (CSS)
approved by the Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) after review by the
U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety (USATCES) and the MM CX. Refer to EP
385-1-95a and EP-385-1-95b for safety concepts and considerations for MMRP projects.
Appropriate engineering evaluations of the remedial/removal process should be applied
whenever possible in accordance with existing regulations. The development of
remedial/removal design must ensure that applicable Federal and state requirements have been
identified and incorporated, including meeting any conditions or waivers to Applicable or
Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs). Coordinating the remedial/removal design
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with the lead regulatory agency at an early stage is essential for eliminating costly delays.
Technical reviews should be coordinated to ensure that the design specifications include all the
elements necessary to comply with the environmental and safety standards identified in the
applicable DD/ROD/Action Memorandum.
(4) Statement of Work for Removal/Remedial Action. Once funds have been received,
the PDT may begin preparation of the SOW for the Removal/Remedial Action. The SOW may
not be awarded until the Action Memorandum (for a removal action), Record of Decision (for a
National Priorities List (NPL) site, or Decision Document (for a non-NPL site) has been signed.
The SOW must comply with the approved decision document. Typical tasks included in a
SOW for a Munitions Response removal/remedial action include:
(a) Site visit (see Chapter 3).
(b) Work Plan development (see Chapter 4).
(c) Location surveying and mapping (see Chapter 5).
(d) Site preparation (see Chapter 8).
(e) Geophysical investigation prove-out (see Chapter 8).
(f) Geophysical investigations (see Chapter 8).
(g) Anomaly reacquisition (see Chapter 8).
(h) MC sampling requirements (see Chapter 10).
(i) Removal action.
(j) Land use control activities and recurring reviews.
(k) Turn-in of inspected and certified munitions debris.
(l) Preparation of the Site-Specific Removal Report.
e. Review and Approval. The MM DC will ensure that the SOW is in compliance with
the signed Approval Memorandum (EE/CAs), Action Memorandum (Removal Actions) or
DD/ROD (Remedial Actions). The MM DC will direct SOWs to the appropriate personnel,
including the PM and appropriate members of the PDT, for review. Review comments will be
provided in writing to the MM DC. For remedial actions executed by the MM Remedial
Districts, the SOW will be provided to the appropriate MM DC for review. Following review
and approval, the MM DC will submit the final SOW to the Contracting Officer (CO).
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2-3. Cost Estimating Process.
a. General.
(1) Once the SOW is approved, a cost estimate will be prepared by personnel having
expertise in the type of work involved in the project. The cost estimator will develop the
estimate based on a detailed analysis of the SOW, assuming reasonable economy and
efficiency, and modern and effective methods. Government estimates will be required on many
of the MMRP projects but not all. An estimate may not be required if a cost analysis of the
contractors proposal (s) can be performed by the cost estimating branch without developing an
IGE.
(2) In developing cost estimates, whether for budgets or contractor procurement
purposes, a number of tools are available. Cost engineering offices at each district have cost
estimating software, databases, and documents available to use in developing cost estimates at
various project phases. When there is little information available on a site, such as during the
INPR or ASR phases of a project, parametric cost estimating tools are used. The recommended
USACE parametric cost estimating software program is Remedial Action Cost Engineering and
Requirements System (RACER) 2003, version 5.0.0. When more detailed information is
available on a project property, such as after the EE/CA field investigation has been completed,
then more site-specific data would be used. This more specific information would then be used
to determine the costs to implement the removal or remedial action phase of a project.
b. Performance Objectives. The PDT’s performance objective is to prepare a cost
estimate that is complete and of sufficient detail such that it can be used to:
(1) Obtain program funding.
(2) Negotiate the award of a contract at a price that is fair and reasonable to the
government.
c. PDT Considerations and Cost Estimating Checklist.
(1) The PDT will first identify the purpose of the cost estimate. If the purpose of the cost
estimate is to obtain program funding, then a rough order-of-magnitude estimate may be
prepared. If the purpose of the cost estimate is to award a contract, then a detailed cost estimate
is required.
(2) Once the intended use of the estimate is identified, the cost estimator will consider the
phase of the project and the following items which will impact project cost (this list is not
intended to be all inclusive):
(a) Size of areas of concern.
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(b) Site risk.
(c) Type of MEC.
(d) Soil type.
(e) Topography.
(f) Vegetation type.
(g) MEC density.
(h) Required removal depth.
(i) Amount of scrap.
(j) MC sampling requirements.
(k) Special environmental and safety concerns (e.g., presence of RCWM, requirements
for engineering controls, sampling and analysis requirements such as air monitoring, etc.).
(l) Production rates.
(m) In-house or contracted.
(n) Percent of property to be investigated.
(o) Surveying methods (e.g., “mag and flag,” geophysical).
(p) Data format requirements (i.e., digital or non-digital).
(q) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) level required.
(r) Type of operation to be performed (e.g., search only or search and recovery).
(s) Number and type of Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) technicians required.
(t) Equipment and vehicles required (e.g., magnetometer, towed array, earth moving
machinery, recovery vehicles).
(u) Expected time duration.
(v) Access restrictions.
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(w) Political considerations.
(x) Start date.
(3) This information may be derived from historical reports (e.g., the INPR and ASR)
and previous investigations of the project property. Table B-2 in Appendix B provides a
checklist that may be used by the cost estimator to aid in preparing a cost estimate for a project
involving munitions response.
2-4. Project Schedule. The project schedule should be included in the Statement of Work. The
Military Munitions Design Center (MMDC) should develop the project schedule in
coordination with the District Project Manager. The Project Delivery Team should provide the
MM DC with estimates for the duration of each task required in the SOW. These estimates
should be used by the PM to establish dates for the overall project schedule. The PDT should
provide agreement or comments on the schedule established by the PM.
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CHAPTER 3
SITE VISITS
3-1. Introduction.
a. This chapter describes the elements that will be addressed by the PDT when planning
and conducting site visits prior to preparation of the Work Plan. The purpose of these site visits
is to gather current information on the conditions of the project property, fill any data gaps, and
make more informed decisions about project requirements.
b. All site visits will be conducted using MEC avoidance techniques, and using an
approved Abbreviated Accident Prevention Plan (AAPP) as required. The AAPP will be
completed following Military Munitions Center of Expertise Interim Guidance Document 0606, Abbreviated Accident Prevention Plan(s) ( AAPP) for Sites with Suspected or Confirmed
Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC), dated 12 April 2006. This interim guidance is
for performing non-intrusive activities on potential Military Munitions Response Program sites
prior to the approval of an Accident Prevention Pan as an integral part of the work plan.
3-2. Site Visit Objectives and Planning.
a. Objectives. The PDT will consider the following objectives when planning and
executing the site visit:
(1) Identify specific elements that should be discussed in the SOW.
(2) Identify and review existing information on past activities at the project property
including site-specific reports, aerial photos, maps, and geospatial data systems information.
(3) Coordinate with local and/or state entities to discuss data sharing if data gaps have
been identified.
(4) Determine the actions required to assist project execution at the project property.
(5) Perform sector prioritization, if possible.
(6) Identify factors influencing the cost estimate and project schedule.
b. Planning. For reasons of cost effectiveness and convenience, the site visit may take
place during the first TPP meeting. This allows the government and contractor to meet with
local leaders, obtain information from them, and then visit the project property, possibly
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being accompanied by local leaders and/or citizens. EP 1110-1-18 describes site visits in
further detail. Table B-3 in Appendix B provides a checklist to assist the PDT with planning a
site visit.
3-3. Site Visit Attendees. The PM will ensure that the appropriate organizations are
represented at the site visit. The personnel requirements for site visits are discussed below.
a. The site visit will not be conducted with less than two people.
b. The primary attendees for the site visit include, but are not limited to:
(1) PM.
(2) MM DC representative(s).
(3) Ordnance and Explosives Safety Specialist (OESS) or qualified UXO Safety Officer
(see below).
(4) Project engineer(s).
(5) Cost estimator.
(6) Contractor representative(s) (if the prospective contractor is known at the time of the
site visit).
c. An OESS or qualified UXO Safety Officer is required to accompany the site visit team
whenever MEC safety hazards are known or suspected. The requirement of first-aid and CPR
trained member participation is governed by EM 385-1-1, Section 3. The OESS or UXO Safety
Officer will not have responsibility for more than eight other team members. If more support is
needed, an additional team will be established that will be supervised by another OESS or UXO
Safety Officer. Where there is more than one team, a supervisory OESS or UXO Safety
Officer will be designated.
d. Contractor representatives performing site visits will be accompanied by a
representative of the PDT.
3-4. Site Visit Requirements. The PDT will ensure that the following requirements for the site
visit are fulfilled.
a. Site-Specific Reports. Prior to the site visit, the PDT will review existing project
property information and identify data gaps. Sources of project property data available to the
PDT include:
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(1) SI Report.
(2) Previous site investigation reports.
(3) Information from previous district contractors that have worked on the project
property.
(4) Preliminary Assessment Report.
b. Right-of-Entry. As applicable, the PM is responsible for contacting the property
owner/operator to determine the need for and arrange for the preparation of a right-of-entry.
c. ASSHP. Since the site visit is conducted in MEC avoidance mode (i.e., intrusive work
is not permitted), an ASSHP is sufficient for site visits. EP 1110-1-18 discusses the ASSHP in
further detail.
d. Training. Site visit participants are not required to have Hazardous Waste Operations
and Emergency Response (HAZWOPER) training.
e. The site visit will be conducted IAW the safety requirements described in EP 385-195a.
3-5. Site Visit Information Collection. During the site visit, the PDT will ensure that the
information needed to prepare the SOW, cost estimate, and planning documents is gathered as
needed. Potential information to be gathered during the site visit(s) include(s), but is not
limited to:
a. Project property topography, soil type, and vegetation.
b. Preliminary identification of environmental concerns and environmental resources data
(e.g., wetlands, endangered species, archaeological, and cultural resources).
c. Accessibility to the project property.
d. Utility locations.
e. Potential locations for staging areas, offices, etc.
f. Clear distances to inhabited buildings.
g. Coordination with local airport and Federal Aviation Administration.
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h. Coordination with local police/sheriff/military police to assess security and fencing
requirements for explosives storage magazines.
i. Location for support zone and explosives storage magazines.
j. Location of any potential MC sampling areas (targets, firing lines, etc.).
k. Logistical coordination for lodging, equipment and vehicle rental, office space,
explosives dealers, etc.
l. Coordination with Range Control, Defense Reutilization Management Office,
Ammunition Supply Point, and Post Provost Marshall, if applicable.
m. Acquire digital pictures and Global Positioning System (GPS) spot points or project
property maps that will be included in the SOW for clarification. This information is valuable
for both the government and contractor prior to SOW writing and proposal development, and
helps document some of the information collected during the site visit.
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CHAPTER 4
WORK PLANS
4-1. Introduction.
a. This chapter presents guidance for the PDT regarding the preparation and review of
Work Plans for munitions response actions. The purpose of developing Work Plans is to
ensure that project goals will be achieved in a safe, timely, and cost-effective manner.
b. A Work Plan is required for all munitions response projects. The contractor will
prepare the Work Plan following the site visit. The approved Work Plan will be the basis for
all contractor activities during the execution of the munitions response.
4-2. Performance Objectives. Performance Objectives of a Work Plan will describe the goals,
methods, procedures, and personnel used for:
(1) Field investigation and data gathering activities for the SI.
(2) RI/FS.
(3) EE/CA phase of a munitions response or other munitions related project.
(4) Field activities for all Munitions Response remedial or removal actions or other
munitions related actions.
4-3. Work Plan Review. The contractor will submit the draft Work Plan to the PM and the
MM DC for review and comment. Each project should be assessed individually to determine
which specific areas of expertise should be involved in the review and approval process. For
remedial actions executed by the MMRP Remedial Action District, the SOW will be provided
to the appropriate MM DC for review. The draft Work Plan will undergo an interdisciplinary
technical review by the PDT.
4-4. Work Plan Contents. The content requirements for Work plans are contingent upon the
type of contracting mechanism being used. The PDT will ensure that the following
components, as applicable, have been adequately presented in the Work Plan. Not all
requirements will be applicable to all projects. It is the responsibility of the entity preparing the
Work Plan to determine inapplicable requirements, or requirements that are not listed in this
outline but that should be included in the Work Plan. These will be identified in the SOW or
discussed in the government meeting. Table B-4 in Appendix B presents a checklist of general
requirements for the Work Plan. Additional details on Work Plan requirements are provided in
subsequent chapters of this manual. The requirements for Work Plans involving munitions
response actions include, but are not limited to:
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a. Introduction. This chapter will include a brief description of the project authorization,
purpose and scope, Work Plan organization, project location, project property description,
project property history, current and projected land use, previous investigations of the project
property, initial summary of MEC risk, and the potential for presence or absence of MC.
b. Technical Management Plan. This chapter will document the technical approach and
procedures to be used to execute project tasks, and will include a discussion of the following
project details: objectives, organization, personnel, communication and reporting, deliverables,
schedule, periodic reporting, costing and billing, public relations support, subcontractor
management procedures, and field operation management procedures. Application of technical
procedures to execute project tasks may vary depending on the type of contracting
methodology being used to execute the work, however they should be used to the extent
practicable. Data management procedures and DQOs will also be included (general
information on DQOs is provided in Chapter 1).
c. Field Investigation Plan. This chapter will include the following sections:
(1) Overall Approach to Munitions Response Activities. This chapter will include the
site characterization goals; DQOs; data incorporation into the SI; RI/FS; or EE/CA reports;
MEC exposure analysis, MC investigation planning, use of time critical removal actions during
the munitions response project; and follow-on activities.
(2) Identification of Areas of Concern.
(3) Geophysical Prove-out Plan and Report (see Chapter 8).
(4) Geophysical Investigation Plan (see Chapter 8).
(5) Location Surveys and Mapping Plan (see Chapter 5).
(6) Geographic Information System (GIS) Plan (see Chapter 5).
(7) Intrusive Investigation. This chapter will include a discussion of the overall intrusive
investigation methodology; establish the procedures for MEC accountability and records
management; discuss UXO personnel qualifications; identify MEC sampling locations; specify
MEC sampling procedures; identify the Munition with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance
(MGFD); identify the Minimum Separation Distances (MSDs) to be used; discuss MEC
identification, removal, storage, disposal procedures (including general and specific procedures
for MEC, Material Potentially Presenting an Explosive Hazard (MPPEH), munition debris,
etc.); and identify disposal alternatives.
(8) Geospatial information and electronic submittals (see Chapter 5).
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(9) Investigation Derived Waste (IDW) Plan (see EP 75-1-3).
(10) Risk Characterization and Analysis (see Chapter 12, for RCWM see EP 75-1-3).
(11) Analysis of Land Use Controls (see EP 75-1-4).
(12) Preparation of the Five-year Review Plan (see EP 1110-1-24).
d. Quality Control (QC) Plan. This chapter will discuss QC procedures for all elements
of the project. It shall include audit procedures, and corrective/preventive action procedures
for: data management, digital geophysical operations, anomaly acquisition and reacquisition,
field operations, equipment maintenance/calibration, air monitoring and personal protective
equipment and contract submittals. The QC Plan shall document pass/fail criteria for quality
audits and the records generated (i.e., logs, minutes, forms etc.) and the process for capturing
and submitting lessons learned to the government. The QC plan shall also address site-specific
and routine training requirements for contractor personnel and site visitors. If applicable the
QC Plan shall contain a Chemical Data Quality Management sub plan in accordance with ER
1110-1-263. QC requirements for MC sampling may be documented in the QC Plan or in the
MC Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP).
e. Explosives Management Plan. This chapter will describe how demolition explosives
will be managed, planned, and implemented during munitions response operations using
appropriately qualified personnel, equipment, and procedures. This plan should also describe
management of recovered MEC.
f. Explosives Siting Plan. This chapter will describe the safety criteria for siting
explosives operations at the project property. This will include a description of explosives
storage magazines including the Net Explosive Weight (NEW) and Quantity-Distance (Q-D)
criteria, Munitions Response Sites (MRSs) (including separation distances), and planned or
established demolitions areas. These demolitions areas will be identified on a site map. The
Explosives Siting Plan will also address footprint areas for blow-in-place, collection points, and
in-grid consolidated shots, although these footprint areas do not need to be shown on the site
map. When a project requires an ESS, the data from the Explosives Siting Plan will be
incorporated into the Q-D section of the ESS. Additional details are provided in Chapter 11 of
this manual.
g. Environmental Protection Plan (EPP). This chapter will describe the procedures and
methods to be implemented during the project’s activities to minimize pollution, protect and
conserve natural resources (wetlands, threatened and endangered species, coastal zones),
cultural resources, archaeological resources, water resources, restore damage, and control noise
and dust within reasonable limits. An EPP review checklist is included in Table B-4 in
Appendix B.
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h. Property Management Plan. This chapter will detail procedures for the management
of government property IAW Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Part 45.5 and its
supplements.
i. Interim Holding Facility (IHF) Siting Plan for RCWM Projects (see EP 75-1-3). This
chapter will describe siting and security measures for the IHF.
j. Physical Security Plan for RCWM Sites (see EP 75-1-3). This chapter will describe
the areas of security interest related to the project property and specify the equipment, forces,
and devices used to protect RCWM.
k. References. This chapter will provide references used throughout the Work Plan.
l. Appendices. The Work Plan will include the following information as appendices and
will reference and integrate all appendices throughout the Work Plan:
(1) Appendix A: SOW.
(2) Appendix B: Site Maps.
(3) Appendix C: Points of Contact.
(4) Appendix D: Accident Prevention Plan (APP). (see EM 385-1-1)
(5) Appendix E: MC Sampling and Analysis Plan (see Chapter 7).
(6) Appendix F: Contractor Forms.
(7) Appendix G: MSD Calculation Sheets.
(8) Appendix H: Resumes (when required). These will include resumes of key
personnel or personnel in other core labor categories not listed in the U.S. Army Engineering
and Support Center, Huntsville (USAESCH) database.
(9) Appendix I: TPP Work Sheets.
4-5. Work Plan Acceptance. The Work Plan acceptance process is applicable to all Work
Plans prepared for munitions response actions. Acceptance is dependent on the type of work
and the contract mechanism being used. Performance based criteria for deliverables such as
draft and final work plans are dependent on quality of product submitted and are evaluated
based on reviews by the PDT. Following the review of the draft Work Plan, the PDT will
provide comments to the MM DC for incorporation into the final Work Plan. Following the
final acceptance of the Work Plan from the PDT and CO, a Notice-to-Proceed will be issued.
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If any proposed changes occur to the accepted Work Plan, the PDT will review them prior to
implementation. If the PDT accepts the changes, the modifications will be forwarded to the
CO for acceptance. The CO will then issue the modification to the contractor. The work plan
acceptance process is defined in ER 1110-1-8153.
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CHAPTER 5
GEOSPATIAL DATA SYSTEMS (GDS)
5-1. Introduction.
a. The purpose of this chapter is to describe and discuss the geospatial data and
geospatial data system (GDGDS) considerations including location surveying and mapping that
should be addressed by the PDT for a munitions response project. The PDT should develop
project-specific GDGDS, location surveying and mapping requirements for inclusion in the
SOW for each munitions response project. Application of procedures required for surveying
and mapping may vary depending on the type of contracting methodology being used to
execute the work, however they should be used to the extent practicable. Table B-5 in
Appendix B is a checklist of GDGDS and location surveying and mapping considerations.
b. USACE has various contract vehicles that may be used for obtaining location
surveying and mapping services. Services may be supplied by the government as GovernmentFurnished Information (GFI) / Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) or may be requested
within the SOW of the munitions response. Some munitions response projects may not require
any specialized capabilities, while others may require comprehensive capabilities.
5-2. Requirements for the Acquisition and Access of Geospatial Data.
a. This chapter presents guidance in developing GDS requirements associated with a
munitions response, specific SOW requirements, and technical or management considerations.
ER 1110-1-8156 - Engineering and Design - Policies, Guidance, and Requirements for
Geospatial Data Systems establishes general criteria and presents guidance for the acquisition,
processing, storage, distribution, and utilization of geospatial data.
b. EM 1110-1-2909 - Geospatial Data and Systems identifies standards for GDS
acquired, produced, and/or utilized in support of a munitions response project. There are many
techniques that may be used to acquire the geospatial data required in support of a munitions
response. Requirements for obtaining this data should be result-oriented and not overly
prescriptive or process oriented IAW EM 1110-1-2909. Project requirements will set forth the
end results to be achieved and not the means, or technical procedures, used to achieve those
results. They will succinctly define GDGDS requirements as derived from the functional
project requirements developed by the PDT, and they will reference EM 1110-1-2909 and other
applicable industry standards.
5-3. Data Quality Objectives. The PDT will review the archival records of the project area or
installation in which the project is located and inventory all existing GDS information prior to
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developing site-specific DQOs. Chapter 7 – Geospatial Data Issues and Standards, from
EM1110-1-2909, shall be used as guidance when no other standards or legacy system exists.
a. Geospatial Data System. The PDT will review the extent of Geospatial Data System
(GDS) currently utilized by the MM CX, MM DC, district, customer, and stakeholders. Any
automated system that employs or references data using absolute, relative, or assumed
coordinates is considered a GDS. These include GIS, Land Information Systems (LIS),
Remote Sensing or Image Processing Systems, Computer Aided Design and Drafting (CADD)
systems, and Automated Mapping/Facilities Management (AM/FM) systems. The selected
GDS should accomplish today’s mission, but also allow for future reuse or use of the geospatial
data by others without translation. Production of geospatial data in multiple formats for
distribution or use should be avoided wherever possible. This means that the data formats
selected should be open rather than proprietary. For example, Tagged Image File Format
(TIFF, or “.tif”) files should be used to store imagery rather than Photographic Experts Group
(JPEG) (or “.jpg”) files or bitmap (BMP, or “.bmp”) files, as TIFF is considered an open
standard. Compatible formats for spatial data should also be selected wherever possible (e.g.
ArcView shapefiles, which can usually be shared between several software applications).
Project requirements may dictate the use of a particular proprietary software package and/or
database format. In these cases, the final data product should be exported to an open format at
the close of the project to ensure long-term data survivability and compatibility. For example,
tabular databases should be exported to an American Standard Code for Information
Interchange (ASCII) format, with appropriate documentation. Spatial data should be exported
at the close of the project to an open format such as Spatial Data Transfer Standard (SDTS) or
Drawing Interchange File (DXF) format.
b. Spatial Coordinate Reference System. All munitions response projects should be
adequately connected to nationwide or worldwide geographic reference systems. All geospatial
data should be indexed to existing local, state or national control monuments and referenced to
an appropriately recognized installation, local, state, or worldwide coordinate system as
specified by the PDT. The PDT should select a spatial coordinate reference system that is
compatible with existing district or customer GDS activities. Unless otherwise indicated, it is
recommend that all spatial data be stored using the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM)
Coordinate System, using either North American Datum of 1983 (NAD83) or World Geodetic
System of 1984 (WGS84) for horizontal control. Horizontal coordinates will be stored using
metric units. Vertical control, if required, will also be based on metric units and referenced to
North American Vertical Datum of 1988 (NAVD88). Project-specific requirements may
dictate the use of an alternate coordinate system, datum, and measurement units, but deviations
from this standard should only be made after careful deliberation and with full recognition of
the potential impacts. For projects located outside the continental United States, local
conditions may warrant the use of an alternate vertical datum.
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c. Geospatial Data Standards. GDS users need geospatial data standards to manage this
data, reduce redundant data, make systems more efficient, and lower project costs. The TriService CADD/GIS Technology Center’s Spatial Data Standards for Facilities, Infrastructure,
and the Environment (SDSFIE) should be specified for all deliverables of collected geospatial
data. The SDSFIE data standard is available from the CADD/GIS Technology Center, and
online at http://tsc.wes.army.mil. The PDT should develop additional site-specific standards
for the format, transfer, and storage of all geospatial data consistent with EM 1110-1-2909.
Factors influencing formulation of project-specific standards include:
(1) Compatibility with selected GDS without modification or additional software.
(2) Format of existing digital data and geospatial-referenced mapping.
(3) Usability by all parties of concern, including stakeholders.
d. Measurement Units. Geospatial data produced in support of a munitions response
project should be recorded and plotted in the units prescribed for the project by the district or
customer. The use of metric units is recommended unless superseded by project-specific
requirements.
e. Control Markers. Project control markers may consist of markers and/or benchmarks
established by any Federal, state, local, or private agency with positional data within the
minimum acceptable accuracy standards prescribed by the PDT. The PDT may require an
increase in existing project control markers. Ties to local USACE or installation project
control and/or boundary markers are absolutely essential and critical except when unfeasible or
cost prohibitive. In order to minimize scale and orientation errors, at least two existing markers
should be used as a baseline for the project geospatial coordinate reference system.
f. Accuracy. Every observed or measured spatial data element contains errors of a
certain magnitude due to a variety of causes. The PDT should evaluate data requirements and
develop acceptable limits of error (accuracy and precision) based upon the nature and purpose
of each location surveying and mapping activity or product. Engineering and construction
surveys are normally specified and classified based on the minimum acceptable horizontal
(linear) point closure ratio and vertical elevation difference standard. Standardization of
equipment and instruments used in acquiring geospatial data and producing location survey and
mapping products is required to improve the accuracy of the integrated conclusions.
g. Reliability. The development of an effective GDS facilitates a systemized approach to
a munitions response project using all digital data and life cycle management of all applicable
geospatial data. Provision should be made for larger-scale projects to facilitate the sharing and
dissemination of data using web-based tools and applications where possible (i.e. web-based
mapping services such as ArcIMS or Geosoft’s Oasis Montaj for data review and analysis).
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This will avoid data duplication and will serve to centralize and standardize database
stewardship functions IAW the overall goal of improved life cycle data management. The
project GDS should provide a full digital record of all on-site activities with a reproducible trail
to support ongoing and future Administrative Record decisions. The GDS designated in the
SOW by the PDT should provide reliable results, support greater overall productivity, and
lower total project costs.
h. Data Preservation. The closeout of a project should include steps to archive the data
using open data formats as described above, and using stable digital media to ensure long-term
survivability. The specific media chosen will change as the technology changes, but care
should be taken to select only the most stable and widely used formats. These media will be
refreshed on a regular 5 to 10 year cycle, and it is of utmost importance that the media be
readable and accessible when the scheduled refresh occurs.
5-4. QC. The primary goal of data quality management is to ensure a consistent and
measurable accuracy throughout the database. Consistency is achieved through the use of
documented, approved production procedures. Following production, an assessment of the
quality of the data set should be conducted to measure the level of achievement of the expected
results.
a. The PDT should establish the level of production control and rigor with which quality
assessments should be made consistent with the project-specific GDS requirements. GDS with
stringent accuracy and consistency requirements may need to have detailed procedural
documentation, a completion signature for each production step, and a comprehensive
assessment of accuracy. Conversely, smaller-scale GDS developed for production of
background geospatial data may have much less stringent production documentation
requirements and only a cursory accuracy assessment.
b. The PDT should state in the SOW that QC of the GDS activities and products should
be performed by the contractor and include independent tests which may be periodically
reviewed by the government. Therefore, USACE Quality Assurance (QA) and testing
functions will focus on whether the contractor meets the required project requirements.
5-5. SOW.
a. General. The GDS standards and requirements for each munitions response project
SOW should be prepared by PDT personnel with detailed knowledge of the project history,
archival information, various GDS platforms, location survey and mapping methodologies, and
project-specific data requirements. The SOW will require consideration of the following in
development of the Work Plan:
(1) Project and property boundaries.
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(2) MEC types, hazard levels, and contamination levels.
(3) Potential Sources of MC including firing lines, targets, OB/OD areas, etc.
(4) Project location, size, topography, and vegetative cover.
(5) Extent of existing planimetric features.
(6) Density and accuracy of existing control markers.
(7) Mission and objectives of the munitions response.
(8) Positioning requirements of proposed geophysical detection systems.
(9) Data formatting, transfer, and storage.
b. Personnel Requirements. The PDT should ensure that the munitions response project
SOW specifies that a qualified GIS manager should manage all GDS activities. The PDT will
ensure that the SOW also discusses personnel requirements for a Registered or Professional
Land Surveyor and a qualified UXO technician for locational surveys.
(1) GIS Manager. The SOW should specify that the individual will have a minimum of
three years of direct experience managing geospatial data systems within the specified system
environment (i.e., ArcGIS, GeoMedia, or Modular GIS Environment (MGE)).
(2) Registered or Professional Land Surveyor (RLS/PLS). The PDT will ensure that the
Munitions Response SOW specifies that boundary work, legal descriptions or parcel closure
information will be completed under the responsible charge of a RLS/PLS. The RLS/PLS
should be registered and/or licensed by the appropriate Board of Registration, or an acceptable
equivalent, for the state in which this work will be conducted. The RLS/PLS will only be
required to sign drawings that contain boundaries, legal descriptions, or parcel closure
information. Signatures are not required for site characterization grid coordinates and ordnance
location data and these tasks can be overseen by an RLS/PLS registered in any state. In
addition, the Field Surveyor assigned to the munitions response project will have a minimum of
five years experience as a Survey Party Chief.
(3) UXO Technician II. The PDT should also assure that the SOW requires a qualified
UXO Technician II to accompany the Field Surveyor during all field surveying and mapping
activities. The UXO Technician II will conduct visual surveys for surface MEC prior to the
Field Surveyor entering a suspected MEC-impacted area. A survey with a geophysical
instrument will be performed at each intrusive activity location to ensure that the location is
anomaly-free prior to the installation of monuments, driving stakes, or performing any other
intrusive activity. Based on site conditions, it is possible that a UXO Technician II will not be
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required in all areas at all times after the initial site visit. However, such a decision will be
made jointly by the UXO Technician II and the USACE OE Safety Specialist who may rescind
or modify this decision at any time.
c. Safety. It is the responsibility of the PDT to assure that the contractor is informed in
the SOW to follow the safety requirements in EM 385-1-1.
d. Resources. For general guidance on the development of surveying and mapping
requirements, the PDT may reference EM 1110-1-2909. GPS surveying services may be
required as an integral part of the location surveying and mapping effort. EM 1110-1-1003
provides technical requirements and procedural guidance for surveying with GPS and includes
a guide specification for development of SOWs with GPS survey requirements.
5-6. GDS Plan.
a. General. Prior to initiating project activities, a Geospatial Data & Systems Plan will be
prepared. This plan, which is a chapter in the Work Plan, is prepared to describe the project
requirements, proposed technical methodologies and procedures, and equipment
recommendations for all GDGDS activities that will take place during a munitions response
project.
b. Contents. When reviewing the Geospatial Data & Systems Plan, the PDT will ensure
that the following elements are addressed:
(1) Locating existing Geospatial Data (types and accuracy).
(2) Collection of additional geospatial data including data from locational surveys (types,
accuracy and location).
(3) Proposed system methods and procedures (hardware and software, personnel, work
instructions/data formats and standards, data processing, analysis support, communication/data
transfer, data sharing, and data storage and archival).
(4) QC (data validation).
(5) Deliverables.
c. Review and Approval. The Geospatial Data & Systems Plan will be submitted as a
chapter of the Work Plan to the PM and the MM DC. The MM DC will route the plan to the
appropriate USACE technical staff for review and comment. Once approved by the PDT and
CO, the Location Geospatial Data & Systems Plan represents the standard to which all
geospatial activities are compared to assure compliance during the project. In the case of
contractor execution, the approved Geospatial Data & Systems Plan is contractually binding.
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5-7. Planning Considerations. Each munitions response project requires selection of an
appropriate GDGDS that will accomplish the end objective without wasting manpower, time,
and money. The PDT will ensure that the following items are considered when planning for
the location surveying and mapping task.
a. Spatial Data Reference System. Unless otherwise indicated, it is recommend that all
spatial data be stored using the UTM Coordinate System, using either NAD83 or WGS84 for
horizontal control. Horizontal coordinates will be stored using metric units. Vertical control, if
required, will also be based on metric units and referenced to NAVD88. Project-specific
requirements may dictate the use of an alternate coordinate system, datum, and measurement
units, but deviations from this standard should only be made after careful deliberation and with
full recognition of the potential impacts. For projects located outside the continental United
States, local conditions may warrant the use of an alternate vertical datum.
b. Project Control Markers.
(1) The requirements for new or additional project control markers should be based on
the availability of existing control markers, the type of location surveying equipment proposed,
and the level of accuracy required for the type of activities proposed under the specific
munitions response project. Permanent concrete monuments are typically used for project
control. Requirements for permanent markers are set forth in EM 1110-1-1002 and should be
reviewed in consideration of the following:
(a) Located within the project limits with a minimum separation of 100 meters.
(b) Set 10 meters from the edge of any existing road inside the project limits.
(c) Constructed with the top set flush with the ground and the bottom at a minimum of
0.6 meters below frost depth.
(2) Accuracy.
(a) The minimum accuracy standards for horizontal and vertical control will be Class I,
Third Order or better. Unless otherwise specified, all spatial data will be stored using the UTM
Coordinate System, using either NAD83 or WGS84 for horizontal control. Horizontal
coordinates will be stored using metric units. Vertical control, if required, will also be based on
metric units and referenced to NAVD88. Project-specific requirements may dictate the use of
an alternate coordinate system, datum, and measurement units, but deviations from this
standard should only be made after careful deliberation and with full recognition of the
potential impacts. For projects located outside the continental United States, local conditions
may warrant the use of an alternate vertical datum, and WGS84 is the preferred horizontal
datum.
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(b) If aerial photographs or orthophotography are used to provide the survey, the aerial
targets used for control points will meet the same horizontal and vertical accuracy requirements
detailed above.
(3) Monument Caps.
(a) The caps for any new monuments established will be 3-1/4 to 3-1/2 inch domed brass,
bronze or aluminum alloy and stamped in a consecutively numbered sequence. The proposed
identification stamping for each monument will be provided in the Location Surveys and
Mapping Plan consistent with the following:
(Project Name) - (Numerical Sequence) - (Year) (Contracting MM DC)
(b) The dies for stamping the numbers and letters into these caps will be 1/8 inch to
3/16 inch in size. All coordinates and elevations will be shown to the closest one-thousandth of
a meter (0.001m) and one-hundredth of a foot (0.01 feet).
(4) Monument Descriptions. Monument descriptions will be required for all control
monuments established or used for the munitions response. These descriptions will be captured
within the GIS database, in a standard relational database, or in a spreadsheet. Accompanying
maps will show the location of the monument relative to other spatial features so that the
monument can be easily recovered. The monument descriptions and map(s) will include the
following:
(a) Map showing location relative to reference marks, buildings, roads, railroads, towers,
trees, etc. Map will include north arrow and scale.
(b) A text description in the database or spreadsheet telling how to locate the monument
from a well known and easily identifiable point.
(c) The monument’s name or number (stored in the database or spreadsheet).
(d) The final adjusted coordinates and elevations in meters and feet (to the closest
0.001m and 0.01 feet) stored in the database or spreadsheet.
c. Project Boundaries. Project boundaries will be delineated with permanent or semipermanent markers, such as iron pipe or pins consistent with state or local subdivision
requirements. The accuracy standards for the location of project boundaries will be equal or
greater than minimum standards for property boundary surveys established by the state within
which the project is located.
d. Local Control Points. Local control points (i.e., grid corners, aerial targets) will be
established using plastic or wooden hubs unless otherwise specified by the PDT. The accuracy
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standards for aerial targets established as control points for aerial photographs or
orthophotography will be the same as those prescribed for project control monuments.
Accuracy standards for grid corners should be consistent with the mission and objectives of the
munitions response effort.
e. Anomalies, Recovered MEC, and Environmental Samples. All recovered MEC,
environmental samples, and any subsurface geophysical anomalies not completely investigated
should be located. Each location will be estimated or measured for an approximate accuracy of
plus or minus one foot.
5-8. Mapping. The PDT should review the extent of mapping requirements to be included in
each munitions response project SOW. The PDT should assure that the SOW states that all
maps and drawings to be provided under the task are sealed and signed by the RLS/PLS. The
Tri-Service CADD/GIS Technology Center’s SDSFIE should be specified for all location
survey and mapping deliverables of CADD, GIS, and other spatial and geospatial data IAW
EM 1110-1-2909. The PDT will ensure that the following maps are provided:
a. Location Maps. A location map showing the project location and surrounding points
of interest will be required. The map(s) should be produced at a scale no smaller than 1:2400 or
1”:200’ (or 1:2500 for metric scale).
b. Hard Copy Project Maps.
(1) A map of all project-related points of interest should be produced and delivered at a
scale specified by contract requirements. The Project Map should show the location and
identification of all of the project control monuments recovered and/or established at the
project property in support of the munitions response, local project controls, significant
planimetric features, project boundaries, and property boundaries (if in close proximity to
project boundaries). The location of recovered MEC should also be plotted and identified on
the map unless individual grid maps are also required.
(2) General Project Map requirements should also include grid, magnetic, and true north
arrows with their angular differences; grid lines or tic marks at systematic intervals with values
shown on the edges of the map; and a legend showing the standard symbols used for the
mapping. Each sheet will also have a standard border, a revision block, and a complete index
sheet layout.
(3) Grid Maps. If required, individual maps for each grid should be prepared at a scale
no smaller than 1:2,400 or 1”:200’ (or 1:2500 for metric scale). The Grid Maps will include
the plotted location of each surface MEC and verified subsurface MEC recovered, and each
subsurface geophysical anomaly within the grid not completely investigated and any
environmental samples. Other notable planimetric features within the grid will also be
sketched on the individual Grid Maps.
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(4) All production and work files, as well as all supporting data, will be fully documented
into a concise data manual. This manual will include all specific information required for an
outsider to be able to recreate all products and determine the location, names, structures and
association of the data. The manual will be included as an ASCII file titled READ.ME that is
included with all distributed digital data.
5-9. Deliverables. All deliverables will be submitted IAW contract requirements. When
applicable, deliverables will be submitted in electronic format. The following deliverables will
be submitted to the PDT following the location survey and mapping task (the submittal dates
should be specified for each delivery order):
a. Original copies of all field books, layout sheets, computation sheets, abstracts and
computer printouts.
b. Tabulated listing of all project control markers established and/or used in support of
the munitions response showing adjusted horizontal and vertical positional values in meters and
feet.
c. Tabulated listing of all MEC recovered and any specific anomalies not completely
investigated.
d. Tabulation of MC sample locations included in project.
e. Completed monument descriptions, stored in the GIS database, spreadsheet, etc.
f. Unique items created and/or used to create the end products and the narrative and
description required by the SOW.
g. Required location, project, and grid maps.
h. The negatives and three sets of prints of the aerial photographs taken for the project, if
aerial photography is required in the SOW.
i. All maps will be prepared using industry standard sheet sizes and formats. Projectspecific reporting requirements may dictate the use of a variety of sheet sizes to show relevant
information. The PDT will determine the number of maps and copies of digital data to be
delivered to the MM DC.
j. No digital data will be acceptable until proven compatible with the GDS designated in
the SOW. All revisions required to achieve compatibility with the SOW-designated GDS will
be done at the contractor’s expense.
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k. Deliverables will be submitted to the PDT IAW contract requirements. Whenever
appropriate, deliverables should be submitted electronically. Deliverables which should be
submitted upon completion of the munitions response project include:
(1) Unique items created and/or used to create the end products and the narrative and
description required by the SOW.
(2) Digital data in the media as specified in the SOW (non-proprietary data file formats
on stable digital media) along with all other supporting files and a data manual documenting all
production and work files.
1. In all development of GDS data, consideration shall be made to address the Life Cycle
Data Management aspects of the development, modification, storage, and re-use of geospatial
data. Meta-data shall be complete and thorough to allow publication of individual dataset
through any one of the following sources:
(1) National Geospatial Data Clearinghouse (Clearinghouse) - a distributed, electronic
network of geospatial data producers, managers, and users operating on the Internet. The
Clearinghouse is a key element of EO 12906 and will allow its users to determine what
geospatial data exist, find the data they need, evaluate the usefulness of the data for their
applications, and obtain or order the data as economically as possible.
(2) USACE Clearinghouse Node – HQUSACE established and maintains a computer
network server on the National Geospatial Data Clearinghouse. This node functions as the
primary point of public entry to the USACE geospatial data discovery path in the
Clearinghouse. A separate electronic data page for each USACE Command has been
established on the server. The Internet Universal Resource Locator (URL) address for the
USACE Clearinghouse node is http://corps_geo1.usace.army.mil.
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CHAPTER 6
GEOPHYSICAL PLANNING STRATEGIES FOR RESPONSE ACTIONS
6-1. Introduction.
a. Planning geophysical investigations for MEC response actions requires an investigation
strategy be developed to efficiently and effectively meet project needs. Developing the
investigation strategy is a collaborative effort of all PDT members. The strategy defines which
geophysical system or combinations of systems are needed to meet project needs and objectives,
and how the systems are intended to be used to meet those needs and objectives. Included when
developing strategies, the geophysical prove-out should be performed to demonstrate
geophysical system(s) capabilities, define geophysical and project data needs, and provide initial
criteria for defining both quality control metrics and anomaly selections.
b. Geophysics used for response actions is very similar to that used for characterization,
but the critical goals and needs are specific to detecting and removing MEC, and project
decisions are focused on clearly demonstrating those goal and needs have been met.
6-2. Specify response goals and needs to be addressed by geophysical investigations.
a. Key elements of the response objectives must be specified before undertaking
geophysical planning because significant cost savings can be achieved by tailoring the
geophysical investigation plan to the response needs. The following are the most critical issues
that affect geophysical investigation planning for removal or remedial actions:
(1) Based on the Decision Document or Record of Decision, what are the project-specific
MEC response requirements? (List all items and their expected detection depths.)
(2) Of the geophysical systems capable of detecting project-specific MEC, what is the
effectiveness of each, and how easy or difficult is it to prove or demonstrate that effectiveness?
(3) How critical is it that each anomaly detected be positively resolved? See Chapter 8 for
more information regarding anomalies reported as false positives or hot rocks.)
(a) The methods used to detect and select anomalies require each anomaly detected be
positively resolved. This is common in analog mapping surveys and digital mapping surveys that
use simplistic anomaly selection methods.
(b) The methods used to detect and select anomalies require each anomaly having MEC
characteristics be positively resolved, a percentage of anomalies not having MEC characteristics
must also be positively resolved. This is common in digital geophysical mapping surveys that
use advanced anomaly characteristic analysis in their selection criteria and the MEC
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contamination characteristics are clearly defined (e.g. the types of MEC and their depths are well
known, and they all will produce anomalies with high signal to noise ratios).
(c) Anomaly dig priorities will be developed and all MEC-priority anomalies will be
positively resolved, various percentages of each other priority, as defined by the PDT, will be
positively resolved. This is common in digital geophysical mapping surveys that use advanced
anomaly characteristic analysis in their selection criteria and the MEC contamination
characteristics are not clearly defined. This is also common when MEC can be expected below
the required project response depth.
(4) Will project quality control and/or quality assurance procedures require all detected
anomalies having MEC characteristics be removed or be otherwise recorded as previously
investigated?
(a) Yes, QC and/or QA failure criteria include detection of any anomalies having MEC
characteristics that have not been recorded as previously investigated.
(b) No, QC and/or QA failure criteria will not be affected by detecting anomalies having
MEC characteristics that have not been recorded as previously investigated.
(5) Do total numbers of anomalies need to be reported? If yes, will “binning” anomaly
counts according to geophysical characteristics be accepted?
(a) All detected anomalies must be reported.
(b) All detected anomalies, grouped by category or priority, must be reported.
(c) Only those anomalies listed on dig sheets need be reported (not recommended).
(6) Will high-precision position reporting suffice for project needs or will geophysical data
require high-accuracy position reporting as well?
(a) Measurement positions must be reported with high precisions, high accuracies are not
required because reacquisition procedures are not affected by coordinate accuracy.
(b) Measurement positions must be reported with high accuracies because of the
reacquisition procedures being used.
(7) Will the project schedule support a multi-phase field effort (e.g. mapping followed by
anomaly resolution?)
(a) Yes, a multi-phase approach is supported so that digging resources can be tailored to
maximize efficiency.
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(b) No, all work must be performed concurrently to minimize disruption to the community.
(c) No, all required work is clearly defined and planned and no efficiencies will be gained
through a phased approach.
(8) Will reacquisition procedures be affected by the passage of time after data collection?
(a) No. Digging will occur soon after data collection and reacquisition will be performed
before temporary survey markers are lost or removed.
(b) No. Digging will occur at some later time and reacquisition procedures will not require
recovery of survey markers used to collect geophysical data.
(c) Yes. Digging will occur at some later time and reacquisition procedures require
recovery of low order accuracy survey markers used to collect geophysical data.
(9) What are the vegetation conditions and are there constraints on vegetation removal
(cost, habitat, endangered species, etc.)?
(a) Vegetation removal is constrained and/or costly. Some response objectives may not be
met due to these constraints.
(b) Vegetation removal is constrained and/or costly. All response objectives must be met
regardless of vegetation constraints or costs.
(c) Vegetation removal is not constrained but is costly. Some response objectives may not
be met due to these constraints.
(10) What are the cultural and/or access constraints?
(a) Cultural and/or access constraints will impede production rates, some response
objectives may not be met due to these constraints.
(b) Cultural and/or access constraints will impede production rates. All response objectives
must be met regardless of cultural and/or access constraints or costs.
6-3. Specify the Removal Decision Strategy.
a. Strategies should be centered around exactly how much data are needed to support the
decision that the removal is complete.
b. The Project Delivery Team (PDT) must decide what findings will constitute delineating
an area as complete. A combination of statistical tools, geophysical anomaly patterns, excavation
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results and QC testing results should be factored into the decision logic. The decision logic
should include all reasonable sources of evidence. Listed below are some possible sources, the
PDT must determine which are basic sources, which are optimal, and which are excessive.
(a) Dig results for all anomalies selected for excavation.
(b) Distribution patterns of recovered MEC from throughout the site
(c) Detection depth capabilities for each target MEC
(d) Deepest depth each type of MEC was recovered from
(e) Numbers of non-MEC anomalies investigated and their dig results
(g) Geophysical anomaly densities (e.g. anomalies per acre)
(f) Visual observations
(h) QC results
(i) Findings from post-removal verification of anomaly locations and dig results
(j) Findings from post-removal verification using mapping techniques.
(k) Previous work performed in the project area
c. Once all sources of information are defined, the PDT must then identify the assumptions
for each source used and this information must be conveyed to all team members. One tool for
conveying this information is a decision diagram, illustrated below. This diagram presents a
simplified decision logic that uses MEC anomaly characteristics, dig sheet results, QC results,
and QASP results to explain how decisions will be derived to declare areas cleared of detectable
MEC hazards.
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Figure 6-1: Example excavation project decision diagram.
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CHAPTER 7
SITE CHARACTERIZATION
7.1 Introduction.
a. When planning geophysical investigations for MEC at current and former military
installations, it is necessary to determine the limits of the area to be investigated. Military
installations are often extremely large and not all areas are likely to have buried MEC. The
ASR, historical aerial photographs, range-control records, facility engineering and master
planning documents, personnel interviews, and other pertinent documents will be carefully
evaluated in order to locate evidence of how, when and where munitions might have been used at
a project property.
7.2. MRS Footprint Identification.
a. Footprint Analysis is a logical process of selecting areas for further site characterization
activities that are likely to contain MEC. The Footprint Analysis is conducted in the planning
phases of a project, as it is important to gain customer, stakeholder, and regulatory consensus
early on in order to achieve site-closeout.
b. Footprint Analysis is the set of tools, techniques, and processes that are used to narrow
and focus MEC investigations to those areas that have at least some evidence of potential MEC
impact. Footprint analysis can also be used to help identify potential MC sampling locations.
Figure 7-1 shows the workflow steps that are typically used in conducting a Footprint Analysis.
The workflow presented here is intended to identify the procedures that can be performed at any
type of project property. Footprint Analysis is very site-specific, however, and the workflow
should be modified based on the unique site conditions and circumstances encountered at each
project property as well as to the specific goals and objectives of each project.
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Figure 7-1. Footprint Analysis Workflow.
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c. “Footprint” refers to the geographical extent of areas to be investigated for MEC and,
during later phases of a project, subjected to response actions. The purpose of the Footprint
Analysis is to evaluate past and present site conditions and activities in an attempt to define, to
the greatest practicable extent, the boundaries of this footprint. Footprint analysis can also be
used to help identify potential MC sampling locations. An excessively large footprint can
impose unneeded costs for additional investigation and response, as well as pose an
inconvenience to landowners. An erroneously small footprint, on the other hand, can increase
the public risk posed by undetected MEC. The major steps in conducting a Footprint Analysis
include:
(1) Evaluate Historical Usage.
(2) Document Current Conditions.
(3) Evaluate Changed Conditions.
(4) Adjust Boundaries.
(5) Conduct Field Investigations.
d. Evaluate Historical Usage.
(1) The Footprint Analysis begins with an evaluation of historical information regarding
the past uses of the project property. Historical usage includes the period during which the
project property was used for DOD activities, as well as subsequent uses until the present.
Only project property usage is evaluated during this stage of the workflow; physical conditions
of the project property are evaluated during a later stage.
(2) All available historical information regarding uses of the project property should be
compiled and reviewed in order to locate potential areas of MEC use. This data may include
historical maps, ordnance usage records, newspaper articles, and interviews with former project
property personnel.
(3) Historical information may be documented in an ASR, which may also identify areas
of potential concern (AOPC) for further investigation. However, the ASR should not be relied
upon as the sole source of historical information. Neither should the AOPCs be construed as
representing the final footprint for field investigations. The ASR should only be viewed as a
starting point for further historical research.
(4) Prepare Base Map Showing MRS Boundary.
(a) The MRS boundary will usually be known and documented even before the historical
information review is conducted. However, the boundary should be verified through historical
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records. The historical review may reveal that the current MRS boundary was incorrectly
defined, that mapping errors occurred and that the true boundary is misrepresented on existing
maps, or that other reasons exist for modifying the boundary.
(b) Once a good degree of confidence is reached regarding the MRS boundary, a base
map should be prepared with the boundary clearly identified. This base map will form the
basis of the subsequent GIS activities that will be conducted in the remaining Footprint
Analysis tasks. This base map may be constructed using aerial photographs, satellite images,
or U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Topographic Quad Maps as a background.
(5) Add Areas of Known Military Munitions Use. Areas of known military munitions
use, or those areas in which there is a high degree of confidence that military munitions were
used, should be added to the base map. These will usually be areas where authoritative
documentation identifies specific areas of military munitions use, such as firing fans, bombing
targets, MEC storage areas, disposal pits, etc. Authoritative documentation could include range
maps and other historical records from the former military facility that governed the project
property. The level of confidence in the use of military munitions in these areas should be
indicated on the map. The identified AOPCs could be buffered to show the accuracy of the
boundary (e.g., if the accuracy of the boundary is known to be +/- 20 feet, then show a 20 foot
buffer around the AOPC).
(6) Add Areas with Potential for MEC Presence. Unconfirmed accounts of military
munitions use in certain areas will often be found during the historical information review.
Ambiguous documents, unsubstantiated narratives from interviewees, and other information
from dubious sources may point to areas potentially impacted by MEC. This information
should be thoroughly reviewed and, if not discounted, should be identified on the map. These
areas should be identified differently to indicate the low level of confidence in the information.
This may include attribution in the GIS to indicate the source, and a larger buffer to indicate the
lower confidence in the spatial accuracy.
(7) Conduct Historical Photo Analysis. An historical photo analysis can assist in
confirming suspected areas of ordnance use, substantiating questionable information on
unconfirmed areas of ordnance use, and in identifying AOPCs. Guidance on conducting
historical photo analyses is outside the scope of this document.
(8) Add Additional AOPCs from Historical Photo Analysis. Additional AOPCs that
were identified in the historical photo analysis, if one was conducted, should be added to the
base map. Such AOPCs may be identified by ground scars, areas of soil discoloration, or other
features that indicate possible past military munitions use or disposal at the MRS. Secondary
military munitions-related features such as historical firing fans can also be added to the
database. Such features assist in refining the model and improving the confidence in the
results.
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(9) Photogrammetry and Digitizing.
(a) When using photogrammetry products such as aerial photos, it is important to
determine which DQOs are being fulfilled. This determination will help decide which type of
product to use. For example, black and white historical aerial photographs may be sufficient to
delineate suspicious areas such as ground scars, even though color aerial photography may also
be available. The black & white aerial photos should be used for this task as they provide the
required data elements and are less expensive than color.
(b) Once the data type is determined, it is important to consider how processing will
affect the accuracy. When performing digitization and/or orthorectification the root mean
square (RMS) error should be considered as a guide to determining the total accuracy of the
layer. Or, if receiving information digitally, such as USGS digital orthophoto quarter-quads
(DOQQs), the stated absolute accuracy is +/– 23 feet. USGS Topographic Quadrangle maps
are +/– 40 feet. Also, it is important to bear in mind that these numbers represent accuracy at a
scale of 1:24,000. When presenting data at a larger or smaller scale, this will need to be noted.
e. Document Current Conditions.
(1) After the historical use has been thoroughly reviewed and AOPCs have been marked
on the map to show potential MEC use and disposal areas, current conditions should be
documented. Documentation of the current conditions will aid in planning for the field
investigations and response actions.
(2) Gather Information on Current Site Conditions. Necessary information concerning
current site conditions includes natural features such as topography, water features, and ground
cover. Cultural features such as roads and highways, buildings, fences and other developments
should also be shown. Institutional information, such as land use, demographics, and access
controls, may also play an important part in Footprint Analysis as it pertains to conducting field
investigations and implementing response actions.
(3) Conduct a Site Visit to Identify Ground Features. It is usually appropriate to conduct
a site visit to identify any additional AOPCs that were not revealed by other investigation
methods.
(4) Add Newly-Identified AOPCs (scars, pits, craters, soil discolorations). During the
site visit, additional AOPCs may be identified. These could include ground scars, soil
discoloration, and evidence of disposal pits, firing fans, or other military munitions use. Any
AOPCs that were not identified as a result of the historical information review should be placed
on the map and further evaluated.
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(5) At this stage in the Footprint Analysis, another iteration of earlier steps may need to
be conducted in order to evaluate AOPCs identified during the site visit. Information that may
have been previously overlooked or discounted may indicate whether the new AOPCs should
be included in the MRS footprint.
(6) Identify Areas with Institutional Restrictions that May Limit Current Use and/or
Access. Institutional restrictions may restrict the ability to conduct field investigations or
response actions. Access restrictions and land use restrictions are examples of institutional
restrictions that would impact further actions. Although institutional restrictions would not
change the actual footprint, the restricted areas should be identified on the map.
(7) Identify Cultural/Natural Features Impacting Ability to Investigate the MRS. As with
institutional restrictions, cultural and natural features may restrict the ability to conduct field
investigations. These features may also impact the need for response actions; therefore, these
areas may be removed from the MRS footprint. Buildings, roadways, and parking lots are
examples of cultural features that could be removed from the footprint. Rivers, lakes, and
wetlands are natural features that may be removed from the footprint. Natural features,
however, must be evaluated much more carefully, as investigation and response in these areas
may still be necessary. Archaeological features may also influence the footprint.
f. Evaluate Changed Conditions.
(1) The evaluation of historical and current conditions will usually identify the vast
majority of AOPCs that define the MRS footprint. However, an evaluation should be made of
how the changes have been made over time.
(2) Overlay Cultural and Natural Features from Initial Through Present Use. Time series
mapping may be conducted by overlaying cultural and natural features from all periods for
which information is available. An evaluation of how these features have changed over time
may help to further define the MRS footprint.
(3) Identify Excavation Areas Within AOPCs. A time comparison of topographic and
other features may reveal the presence of areas that have been excavated from within the
AOPCs. Excavation areas can also be identified from historical photo analysis and historical
records. If the depth of excavation can be determined with a high degree of certainty, these
areas may be able to be removed from the MRS footprint if the depth of excavation exceeds the
maximum depths at which MEC could be expected. For firing fans and bombing targets, this
would be the maximum penetration depth of military munitions that might have been fired or
dropped at the AOPC. For other areas, such as disposal pits and burn areas, the depths would
be dependent on the specific circumstances surrounding the past uses of the AOPC.
(4) Identify Fill Areas Within AOPCs. Fill areas may also be identified as noted above.
Two concerns exist with fill areas: the placement of MEC along with the fill material, and the
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burying of existing MEC beneath the fill material. If the fill material was excavated from an
AOPC, MEC could have possibly been moved along with the fill. In this case, the filled area
may need to be included in the MRS footprint. If clean fill was placed in an AOPC, then the
fill depth must be evaluated for its impact on the ability to conduct, and need for, field
investigations and response actions.
(5) Identify Areas Impacted by Changed Waterway Features. The time comparison
should also include an evaluation of changes in water features, as appropriate. Meandering
streams, drained wetlands, and new or drained lakes are examples of water features that could
either increase or decrease the MRS footprint.
g. Adjust Boundaries.
(1) Introduction. The purpose of the earlier steps in the Footprint Analysis was to add
areas to and remove areas from the MRS footprint. In this step, the locations and existence of
mapped MRS features are checked and the footprint is adjusted to account for any inaccuracies.
(2) Conduct a Site Visit to Confirm Mapped Objects.
(a) After AOPCs have been selected through the evaluation of historical and current
conditions, a site visit may be necessary to confirm the locations and existence of the features
that have been identified. A handheld GPS receiver is useful in confirming the approximate
locations of mapped features.
(b) A site visit can be used to evaluate features identified in the historical photo analysis,
such as ground scars and burial pits, and to help increase the confidence of the data obtained
from the historical documents and interviews.
(3) Adjust Boundaries Based on Field Checking During Site Visit. The site visit may
reveal that mapped locations vary from actual locations. Historical facility maps often show
planned locations, and actual locations may vary. Fence lines may be mapped as
approximations and the actual fence lines vary due to topography and ground cover. Likewise,
planned target fans may have been adjusted to account for site-specific conditions, and as-built
maps were never prepared. When actual locations and boundaries can be accurately surveyed
and mapped, the footprint should be adjusted accordingly.
(4) Adjust Boundaries to Account for Inherent Mapping Errors. As ground features are
placed on the map during the Footprint Analysis, there will be inherent inaccuracies in the
locations. This inaccuracy results from variations in scale and the precision of accurately
identifying points on maps and aerial photos. These variations should be evaluated, and
variance areas should be identified on the footprint map.
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(5) Increase Boundaries to Account for Possible Off-Target Military Munitions. Firing
fans and bombing targets should be evaluated to identify adjacent areas where off-target
military munitions may have landed. This evaluation should be based on the types of military
munitions used, how the military munitions were fired or dropped, and the directions in which
the military munitions were fired. The site visit discussed above may also identify off-target
areas where shrapnel or impact effects are noted outside the identified firing fans and bombing
targets. The MRS footprint should be adjusted as necessary to show the off-target areas.
h. Conduct Field Investigations. The MRS footprint that is developed from the preceding
steps can be used as a basis for planning focused field investigations. The information derived
from the field investigations should be used to reevaluate the footprint and update the CSM. In
an iterative process, one or more of the preceding steps may need to be conducted again in
order to refine the footprint. Geophysical surveys are frequently used to provide data on the
footprint by gathering new field information and are usually implemented as part of the site
characterization process.
7.3 Sectorization.
a. Once the review of historical documents has been accomplished, the project property
will be sectorized. Sectorization is the process by which large, non-homogenous areas of a
military installation are subdivided into smaller, more homogenous areas. When defining
sectors, the following factors will be considered:
(1) Former military use.
(2) Anticipated MEC type.
(3) Anticipated MEC distribution.
(4) Terrain and vegetation.
(5) Current land use.
(6) Natural and cultural boundaries.
b. Obviously, it is not possible to define a sector that is completely uniform and
homogenous throughout. However, the goal is to define sectors such that any necessary future
munitions response actions can be applied to the entire sector. It will be noted that
sectorization is an active process. As the project continues and more data is collected, it is
likely that sector boundaries will need to be modified to reflect actual site conditions. The
selection of the sectors should be in accordance with the current understanding of the project
property as defined in the CSM. Geophysical surveying only attempts to characterize the MEC
sources that contribute to the risk, however, issues such as what the likelihood of people
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encountering MEC as defined in the CSM should also be taken into account when deciding on
how to sectorize the project property.
7-4. Geophysical Site Characterization Strategies. Geophysical site characterization strategies
are used to define the extent and nature of the MEC impact at AOPCs such as ranges, bombing
targets, or burial pits. Characterizing known AOPCs will determine the location of the
geophysical sampling using prior knowledge. In many cases historical information will
provide general locations and usages of ranges and other training areas and these historical
locations can be used to locate geophysical sampling.
a. Sampling Methods – Sampling methods include transects, meandering path, and
specific grid locations. Each of these geophysical survey techniques is discussed in greater
detail below:
(1) Transects. Geophysical investigation transects are one approach used to characterize
AOPCs. Transects are also a good approach to determine the boundaries of MEC-impacted
areas of a sector or to locate an impact area or to locate AOI’s whose exact location and extent
is not known. The transects should be oriented perpendicular to the long axis of the AOPC in
order to maximize the chances of defining the AOPC. Transects are best utilized at project
properties with easy terrain and vegetation. In areas of rough terrain and increased vegetation,
the positional inaccuracies of the method will likely lead to significant increases of cost in the
reacquisition task. The transects follow a semi-fixed path with defined start and end points.
An example of transect surveying for determining the extent of a range is shown in -Figure 7-2.
Surveying Path
Area with MEC
Figure 7-2. Transect Surveying for a known AOPC
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(2) Meandering Path Surveying. Meandering path surveying is a process where a
geophysical investigation instrument is integrated with a navigation instrument, usually
differential GPS that links positional data with the geophysical readings. Then, a geophysical
team “meanders” randomly throughout a location, until the total area geophysically mapped
equals the area that would have been required if surveying grids were used. Afterwards, the
geophysical data is analyzed, anomalies are located and then excavated and evaluated. If the
purpose of the meandering path survey is to estimate the number of anomalies in a given area,
then the method can offer large cost savings on project properties with difficult vegetation and
terrain since vegetation removal costs are virtually eliminated and surveying costs are greatly
reduced. However, if the sampling plan requires that the anomalies be reacquired and
intrusively investigated, then the method becomes much more expensive because of poor
positional accuracy that is associated with this method. The poor positional accuracy can
significantly increase the cost of the reacquisition task of the project. An example of
meandering path surveying is shown in Figure 7-3.
(3) Fixed Grid Surveying. Fixed grid surveying is used when the location of the AOPC
is known and the objective is to determine the amount and type of MEC impact. One or more
fixed grids could be located within a range to determine the type of ammunition used and/or the
condition of the MEC impact. An example of fixed grid surveying is shown in Figure 7-4.
Surveying Path
Area with MEC
Figure 7-3. Meandering Path Surveying for a known AOPC
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Firing Point
Area with MEC
Fixed Grid Survey Location
Figure 7-4. Fixed Grid Surveying for a known AOPC
7-5. Sampling Methods.
a. When geophysically characterizing a sector, an initial decision will be made regarding
where the geophysical investigations will occur. Basically, there are two choices: either
investigate the entire sector, or sample a representative portion of the sector and infer the
results across the whole. On relatively small sectors it can be efficient in terms of cost,
schedule, and environmental impact to geophysically map the entire area. However, larger
project properties can present significant cost, schedule, access and environmental impact
challenges that preclude 100 percent surveying. In these cases, the sampling program design
must incorporate the CSM and project objectives established during the TPP process. It is often
appropriate to establish minimum and maximum distances between sampling locations (i. e
transects or grids) to achieve a distribution that efficiently characterizes the site for the possible
sources described in the CSM. Various surveying methodologies and situations where they
may be used are discussed below.
(1) 100 Percent Surveying. Complete geophysical mapping is a good approach for small
project properties. At such locations the mobilization/demobilization and other fixed costs can
be relatively high when compared to the actual mapping costs. In these cases, the most costeffective approach might be to map the entire project property. Such an approach is
particularly recommended for project properties smaller than about 20 acres.
(2) Biased Surveying. The locations for biased surveying are selected based on historical
information to determine where the geophysical surveys will be performed. This type of
surveying will only be considered when the objectives of the investigation are not of a
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statistical nature. Generally, conclusions drawn from biased surveying apply only to the
individual survey areas and aggregation may result in severe bias and erroneous conclusions.
(3) Probability Surveying.
(a) When the study objectives involve estimation or decision making, some form of
probability surveying is required. Probability surveying is surveying where every member of
the target population has a known probability of being included in the surveying. This does not
preclude the use of an expert’s knowledge of the project property in designing a probabilitybased surveying plan; however, valid statistical inferences require that the plan incorporate
some form of randomization in selecting the surveying locations. An efficient probability
surveying design is one that uses all available existing information to stratify the region and set
appropriate probabilities of selection. For example, probability surveying can take into
consideration prior knowledge of areas with higher potential for MEC presence (e.g., targets)
by weighting such areas more heavily in the sample selection and data analysis.
(b) Probability surveying can be of various types, but in some way they all make use of
randomization, which allows valid probability statements to be made about the quality of
estimates that are derived from the resultant data. USACE has developed a statistical process,
known as UXO Calculator to determine the amount of geophysical mapping necessary to
characterize a homogenous sector of an MRA. For a discussion of this methodology, refer to
Chapter 10 of this manual. The statistical approach is designed to characterize “dispersed”
MEC such as occurs at impact areas, bomb target areas, kick-out from open burn/open
detonation (OB/OD) operations, dispersal from munitions magazine explosions, and similar
activities. It is not designed to statistically characterize activities that do not have random
patterns, such as MEC intentionally buried, purposely hidden contraband munitions, and
similar activities. Other methods such as the Visual Site Planner are currently being developed.
The USAESCH website should be checked for tools that may have come available.
(c) The amount of surveying necessary within a sector is determined by USAESCH's
geophysical surveying protocols. The larger the sector, the smaller a percentage of surveying is
necessary as long as the location is homogeneous with respect to the likelihood of ordnance
occurrence. UXO Calculator is a statistical tool that can be used to estimate the percentage of
surveying needed in addition to best professional judgment. The amount of sampling is also
based on the objectives of the project. When UXO Calculator is used, site specific assumptions
need to be considered to determine appropriate surveying percentages. The two main
assumptions that are used with UXO Calculator are that the MEC has been deposited randomly
and there is a uniform probability of MEC occurrence over the entire MRS. Table 7-1 indicates
the approximate amount of surveying (random plus directed) that can be anticipated using the
UXO Calculator.
(d) Table 7-1 only provides rough guidance of how much area is to be surveyed, and it
must be stressed the table reflects recommended coverage based on the assumptions explained
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above. Not all CSMs will fit those assumptions. More detailed information is obtainable on the
USAESCH website. The final selection of the amount of area to be geophysically investigated
depends on the project’s objectives (for example if the objective is to define the extent/location
of Area of Interest (AOI) or to determine if unknown AOI exists within sector.) The sampling
methods and the amount of geophysical surveying to be performed should be defined in the
TPP and take into account the current CSM.
Table 7-1. Typical Geophysical Surveying Requirements
Sector Size,
Acres
< 50
51 –100
101 – 150
151 – 1000
> 1000
Basic Minimum
Area Investigated
5.0%
3.0%
2.0%
1.0%
0.5%
Recommended Minimum
Area Investigated
7.5%
4.5%
3.0 %
1.5%
0.75%
(e) It should be remembered that mobilization/ demobilization and other fixed costs can
be relatively high when compared to total geophysical investigation costs at small project
properties. Therefore, at small project properties it is often more cost-effective to
geophysically investigate the entire location, rather than use statistical surveying.
7-6. Excavation.
a. After a grid, or other area, has been geophysically mapped, multiple "anomalies" are
likely to have been located. For mag & flag projects, these anomalies will be marked as flags
at the location of each subsurface anomaly. For projects where digital geophysical methods are
used, the geophysicist will pick and evaluate anomalies with the help of analytical software. In
either case, qualified UXO personnel will excavate the anomalies in order to determine if the
anomaly represents MEC, or some other feature. On many grids, the number of anomalies will
be manageable and all will be excavated in order to characterize the grid. However, at some
project properties, particularly those within impact areas, the number of anomalies may range
from several dozen to several thousand anomalies per acre, most of which will be small
metallic fragments. When this occurs, statistical sampling of the grid for site characterization
may be necessary.
(1) 100 Percent Excavation. When there are, on average, fewer than approximately 50
anomalies per acre, all anomalies will be excavated and evaluated.
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(2) Statistical. When there are, on average, more than 50 anomalies per acre then it may
be necessary to statistically sample the anomalies. Statistical sampling should be applied such
that the results of the sampling will meet the data needs and the DQOs of the characterization
project. The method for statistically sampling the anomalies should take into the account the
objectives of the characterization effort. Different sampling strategies should be employed if
the objective is to confirm the presence of MEC or the number of MEC related items.
Furthermore, if the statistical sampling is based on anomaly characteristics (amplitude or size)
then some sampling of anomalies which don’t meet the criteria should be sampled to validate
the selection process.
7-7. Data Interpretation, Resectorization, and Decision Making.
a. After a project property undergoes an analysis of historical information, is sectorized,
sampling grids placed, geophysical sampling performed, and anomalies identified, excavated
and evaluated, it is necessary to carefully interpret all the data and determine if project
objectives have been met. Original sector boundaries may need to be changed, new sectors
may need to be added, and data gaps may exist that will be filled prior to subsequent decisions
being made.
b. The geophysical data and evaluations are usually incorporated into a larger study (e.g.,
EE/CA, RI/FS, Site Characterization) and involve project stakeholders making decisions
regarding future work to be performed.
7-8. Geophysical Investigation Planning Tools.
a. Characterization Planning. In this sub-section we first explain how project needs and
project objectives are developed and then we describe the various elements to be included in a
GIP to document and explain the decisions made by the PDT in developing the characterization
strategy. This subsection also provides detailed considerations for such planning elements as:
survey coverage, geophysical system accessibility, MEC characteristics, terrain and vegetation
characteristics, cultural features, and anomaly decision criteria. The contents of this chapter
assume site characterization is designed in coordination with the needs and objectives of the
MRS Conceptual Site Model.
b. Define Project Needs and Objectives. This sub-section discusses the PDT’s role in
developing specific geophysical data needs and objectives to characterize a munitions response
site. Topics will generally be limited to statements describing strategies to characterize
different areas of concern or areas of potential concern. Here the PDT will state the purpose of
each planned survey in each AOC/AOPC, how much surveying needs to be done in each area,
and what data and information is needed. This sub-section also explains the need for all PDT
data users to understand the reasoning in how geophysical systems and geophysical data will be
used, and how it will factor in subsequent site-characterization tasks such as hazard assessment
and remedial/removal cost estimating. Most MEC characterization goals and decisions are
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based on geophysical investigations. PDT input in the design and implementation of
geophysical field work is strongly recommended.
c. Key elements of the characterization objectives must be specified before undertaking
geophysical planning because significant cost savings can be achieved by tailoring the
geophysical investigation plan to the characterization needs. The following lists most
characterization needs that affect geophysical investigation planning:
(1) Based on the CSM, what is the smallest semi-minor axis or smallest footprint of the
target/impact area likely to be for each AOC/AOPC?
(2) What is the minimum MEC diameter on a project-specific, site-specific or even
range-specific basis?
(3) How much geophysical data is needed within the footprint?
(a) Only a single grid or transect need pass within any hypothetical footprint. Objective is
to detect evidence of MEC contamination through investigating all anomalies detected, which
would include MEC and MEC debris (such as frag)
(b) At least X grids or transects need pass within any hypothetical footprint. Objective is
to detect evidence of MEC contamination through investigating only anomalies that could be
MEC, small potential frag anomalies will not be investigated.
(c) At least X grids or transects need pass within any hypothetical footprint. Objective is
to define boundaries of suspected MEC contaminated areas by calculating anomaly rates per
grid or per linear transect length. Biased grid locations will be used to characterize
contamination based on transect data.
(4) How critical is it that each anomaly be positively resolved?
(a) The hazard assessment requires each anomaly detected be positively resolved
(b) The hazard assessment requires each anomaly having MEC characteristics be
positively resolved
(c) Each anomaly must be positively resolved in each grid or transect or AOC/AOPC
until the first MEC is recovered.
(d) The hazard assessment requires certain percentages of each priority of prioritized
anomalies be positively resolved.
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(e) Transect anomalies will not be resolved. Only all anomalies in grids must be
positively resolved, grid locations will be determined based on transect anomaly densities.
(5) To maximize site coverage and minimize project cost, what is the closest distance any
two transects or grids should have between them? [This distance may require supporting
statistical calculations]
(6) To maximize the likelihood of finding a suspected target or impact area, what is the
greatest distance any two transects or grids should have between them? [This distance may
require supporting statistical calculations]
(7) To maximize field efficiency and minimize project cost, what are the minimum and
maximum grid sizes that will support both the characterization needs and project budget
constraints?
(8) How accurate must grid centroids and/or transect control points be reported?
(a) Grid centroids and/or transect control points must be reported to a high order
accuracy
(b) Grid centroids and/or transect control points can be reported to a low order accuracy,
distances between grid corners and/or transect control points need to be known to a higher
degree of accuracy
(9) Do decisions require all detected anomalies to be dug or will a subset of anomalies
provide sufficient characterization data? (Can anomaly discrimination be used?)
(a) All anomalies meeting MEC criteria must be dug
(b) Anomaly dig priorities will be developed and various percentages of each priority, as
defined by the PDT, must be dug
(10) Do total numbers of anomalies need to be reported? If yes, will “binning” anomaly
counts according to geophysical characteristics be needed?
(a) All detected anomalies must be reported
(b) All detected anomalies, grouped by category or priority, must be reported
(c) Only those anomalies listed on dig sheets need be reported (this is rare)
(11) Will high-precision position reporting suffice for project needs or will geophysical
data require high-accuracy position reporting as well?
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(a) Measurement positions within grids or along transects must be reported with high
precisions, high accuracies are not required because reacquisition procedures are not affected
by position accuracy.
(b) Measurement positions within grids or along transects must be reported with high
accuracies because of the reacquisition procedures being used.
(12) Will the project schedule support a multi-phase field effort (e.g. transect
mapping/anomaly rate calculations followed by biased grid sampling?)
(a) Yes, a multi phase approach is supported so that digging resources can be tailored to
maximize efficiency
(b) No, all work must be performed concurrently to minimize disruption to the
community
(c) No, all required work is defined and no efficiencies will be gained through a phased
approach.
(13) Will reacquisition procedures be affected by the passage of time after data
collection?
(a) No. Digging will occur soon after data collection and reacquisition procedures will
not be affected
(b) No. Digging will occur at some later time and reacquisition procedures will not
require recovery of grid markers and/or transect markers
(c) Yes. Digging will occur at some later time and reacquisition procedures require
recovery of low order accuracy grid markers and/or transect markers
(14) What are the vegetation conditions and are there constraints on vegetation removal
(cost, habitat, endangered species, etc.)?
(a) Vegetation removal is constrained and/or costly. The locations and sizes of grids
and/or transects needs to be flexible, some characterization objectives may not be met due to
these constraints
(b) Vegetation removal is not constrained but is costly. The locations and sizes of grids
and/or transects needs to be flexible, some characterization objectives may not be met due to
these constraints
(15) What are the cultural and/or access constraints?
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(a) Cultural and/or access constraints will impede production rates, some characterization
objectives may not be met due to these constraints
d. Specify the Characterization Decision Strategy
(1) The term characterization decision strategy is used to define how various decisions
will be made during field operations such that project objectives are met while at the same time
allowing flexibility in resource management and scheduling. Specifically, characterization
decision strategies should be centered around exactly how much data is needed to support a
given decision in a given AOC or AOPC, and specifically what that data must include.
Decision strategies must factor for the goals and needs detailed above, as appropriate.
(2) The PDT must decide what findings will constitute delineating an area as
contaminated with MEC and what findings will support a determination of no contamination
indicated. To address the former, finding a single UXO, elevated concentrations of MEC
fragments, or even simply increased densities of geophysical anomalies, could be used to
delineate an area as either contaminated with MEC or suspected of being contaminated with
MEC. Once such a determination is made, all subsequent data collected in that area should be
focused to answer more specific questions about the types of MEC present, the lateral extents
and concentrations of contamination and the vertical extents and concentrations of
contamination.
(3) To address what is needed to support a determination of no contamination indicated,
a combination of statistical tools, geophysical sampling patterns and decision logic should be
developed. Decision logic should include all reasonable sources of evidence. Listed below are
some possible sources, the PDT must determine which are basic sources, which are optimal,
and which are excessive, and identify other sources as appropriate.
(a) Known/confirmed features from the CSM
(b) Geophysical anomaly densities per acre or anomaly rates per linear transect length
(c) Dig results and percentages of anomalies investigated
(d) Reconnaissance results
(e) Visual observations
(f) Lidar
(g) Multispectral or hyperspectral analysis (to include visible spectrum digital
orthophotography)
(h) Topography maps/DEMs
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(4) Once all sources of information are defined, the PDT must then identify the
assumptions for each source used and this information must be conveyed to all team members.
One tool for conveying this information is a decision diagram, illustrated below. This diagram
presents a simplified decision logic that uses geophysical data, dig results, visual observations
and GIS information to explain how decisions will be derived during field work. This diagram
also shows how geophysical system needs are defined and tailored to maximize efficiency and
minimize cost.
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Figure 7-5. Example characterization project decision diagram.
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CHAPTER 8
GEOPHYSICAL INVESTIGATION
8-1. Introduction.
a. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader an in-depth understanding of how
geophysics is used to detect metals, and Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC). We first
introduce the reader to various systems used to collect and position geophysical data. We then
explain in general terms the capabilities and limitations of geophysical and positioning systems.
Next, we explain the various elements involved in planning and then executing geophysical
investigations. Chapter 9 explains the different aspects of quality control and quality assurance
of geophysical systems and presents various approaches for demonstrating and documenting
quality control of geophysical systems.
b. In this chapter we use the term geophysical system to define the entire “package” of
tools and procedures used for a given project, or used to meet a specific project goal. The term
geophysical system therefore can be thought of as the collection of tools and procedures that are
finally selected for use from the array of technologies and deployment options available.
8-2. Geophysical Systems.
a. Geophysical systems are comprised of geophysical tools, positioning and navigation
tools, deployment platforms and data management and interpretation techniques. Instrument
operators are also considered components of the geophysical system when their tasks are
essential to the system’s performance. Geophysical systems are broken down into the six fully
integrated components, as follows. If any of these components are lacking, the overall
geophysical system may not be able to locate MEC effectively. It is important to carefully plan
and integrate all aspects of each component into the geophysical investigation and not to start
field work prematurely.
(1) Experienced Personnel. Personnel experienced with the theoretical and practical
aspects of detecting relatively small MEC and selecting likely MEC anomalies from multiple
non-MEC anomalies that are also likely to be present. The selection and utilization of
geophysical equipment is complex and requires qualified, experienced individuals. A qualified
geophysicist will manage all geophysical investigations for MEC. A “qualified geophysicist”
is a person with a degree in geophysics, engineering geophysics, or closely related field and
who has a minimum of five years of directly related MEC geophysical experience.
(2) Site Preparation. Site preparation for geophysical investigations at MRAs includes
making the ground surface safe for personnel to perform their tasks and removing vegetation
and obstacles to meet equipment use needs.
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(3) Geophysical Systems Instrumentation. Geophysical instrumentation and related
detection capabilities and limitations are discussed in sub chapters below.
(4) Deployment Platforms. Geophysical platforms are discussed in the sub chapter
below.
(5) Analysis Procedures. Procedures for accurately documenting the geophysical data
collected, steps used in analyzing the geophysical data, and different options available for
interpreting the data.
(6) Anomaly resolution procedures. These procedures define how the PDT will verify
each anomaly selected for intrusive excavation is completely resolved. The term anomaly
resolution is used to describe all tasks and actions to be taken in verifying or confirming the dig
results fully explain the source of the anomaly.
8-3. Geophysical Tools.
a. Detection and location of MEC primarily depends on the ability of geophysical
instruments to distinguish the physical characteristics of MEC from those of the surrounding
environment. The best currently available detection systems all detect the metallic content of
the MEC, not the explosive filler. There are several instruments currently under development
to detect the explosive materials; however, they are in the conceptual design and testing phase,
and have not yet been proven as reliable technologies for detecting buried MEC in the field. In
this chapter, we focus on the various geophysical detection systems currently available and
widely used to detect MEC. We briefly describe some of the lesser used systems, and explain
why their use is limited to specific missions within the MEC detection arena. This chapter does
not address explosives “sniffers” or other technologies formulated around detecting the
explosive components of MEC.
b. These various geophysical technologies are packaged in many ways. For simplicity,
geophysical detectors are grouped into two main families of detectors based on how their data
is interpreted. Analog geophysical tools are defined in this document as instruments that
produce an audible output, a meter deflection, and/or numeric output, which are interpreted in
real-time by the instrument operator. Digital geophysical mapping tools are defined in this
document as instruments that digitally record geophysical measurements and where the
recorded data can be geo-referenced to where each measurement occurred. This family of tools
can either be interpreted in real-time, near real-time, or any later time after data collection work
is complete.
(1) Analog Geophysical Tools. This family of detectors includes all hand-held metal
detectors and coin detectors, and hand-held ferrous locators. This family also includes those
digital tools that can be operated as analog tools as defined above.
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(a) Analog Geophysical Surveys (“Mag & Flag” or “Mag & Dig”). This methodology is
the approach used primarily by active EOD personnel to locate buried ordnance. Hand-held
metal detectors, usually magnetometers, are used to screen an area. Whenever the instrument
detects an anomaly, the operator places a small flag in the ground. Advantages of analog
geophysical surveys include:
•
Ability of geophysical operator to use real-time field observations.
•
Provides a precise anomaly location.
•
Provides a real-time indication of anomaly location.
•
Anomalies can be excavated immediately following the survey.
•
Can be operated with fewer vegetation and topographic constraints.
(b) Analog geophysical surveys are particularly effective in areas where vegetation and
terrain limit the use of larger digital systems. Also, analog approaches will be considered for
use when there is insufficient difference between MEC at the MRA and other metallic
fragments and debris at the project property such that digital mapping is ineffective.
Challenges for analog surveys include:
•
Quality is dependent on operator training and demonstrated performance.
Quality is also affected by human factors such as attentiveness/distraction
factors and hearing ability,
•
Defining rigorous QC measures that are capable of assessing the consistency of
the operator’s effectiveness for the duration of the survey.
•
Higher percentage of small, non-MEC items typically detected during mag &
flag surveys. This results in a higher number of intrusive investigations vs.
digital geophysical surveys.
•
Inability to evaluate electronic data further.
•
No permanent electronic record.
•
Hand-held magnetometers are less sensitive to small amplitude anomalies and
anomalies with low horizontal gradients than their digital counterparts.
•
Hand-held magnetometers are limited to detecting ferrous items only.
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•
Hand-held electromagnetic induction metal detectors’ depth of detection
capabilities are related to the size of the coils (typically small) and transmitter
power (typically low) which cause hand-held systems to typically have a
shallower maximum depth of detection.
(2) Digital Geophysical Tools. This family of detectors includes all geophysical tools
capable of recording and geo-referencing geophysical measurements and includes all land
borne, airborne and marine detectors.
(a) Digital Geophysical Surveys. Most magnetic and electromagnetic instruments have
the capability to output a digital signal to a data logger that can be co-registered with positional
information to develop a two-dimensional map of the characteristic that the instrument is
measuring. Digital geophysical surveys are able to capitalize on the use of sensors with higher
sensitivity, application of noise reduction techniques, and advanced data-analysis techniques.
Advantages of digital geophysical surveys include:
•
Uniform process for data collection and analysis.
•
Geo-referenced location of data and anomalies.
•
Removes operator subjectivity (to place or not to place a flag).
•
Ability to further evaluate electronic data.
•
Permanent electronic record.
•
Ability to define rigorous QC measures that are capable of detecting all/most
possible failure modes for the geophysical survey.
(b) Challenges for performing digital geophysical mapping include:
•
Decreased effectiveness in high clutter areas.
•
Vegetation and topographic constraints.
•
Defining anomaly selection criteria that meet the project team’s needs in terms
of identifying all MEC while not selecting large numbers of non-MEC
anomalies.
(3) Specific Types of Geophysical Instruments. Geophysical equipment can also be
divided into two broad classes of instruments: passive and active. Passive instruments measure
existing magnetic fields and the fluctuations within those fields. Passive instruments
commonly used to detect MEC include all types of magnetometers. Active instruments
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typically transmit an electromagnetic field and measure responses from the ground in the
immediately vicinity of the detector. The active instruments most commonly used for MEC
detection include electromagnetic induction metal detectors.
(a) Magnetometers. Magnetometers were one of the first tools used for locating buried
munitions. Most military munitions contain iron (ferromagnetic metal). When these types of
MEC are in the presence of the earth’s magnetic field, a disturbance in the field is generated
which magnetometers can detect. Some magnetometers use two magnetic sensors (called
gradiometers) configured to measure the difference over a fixed distance of the magnetic field,
rather than the absolute magnetic field. This configuration allows the gradiometer to perform
with greater tolerance to cultural interference and improves detectability of some small MEC
items. Since magnetometers respond to ferromagnetic metals, they will not be used to try to
detect MEC that does not have a significant ferromagnetic metallic content. In addition,
magnetometers are sensitive to many iron-bearing minerals and "hot-rocks" which sometimes
cause a high "false-positive" count. Currently, two types of magnetometers are most often used
to detect buried munitions.
•
Fluxgate Magnetometers. Fluxgate magnetometers are inexpensive, reliable,
rugged, and have low energy consumption. Fluxgate magnetometers have long
been a standard of Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units as a quick,
inexpensive field reconnaissance tool.
•
Optically Pumped Magnetometers. Optically pumped magnetometers (common
commercial types include the cesium-vapor and potassium-vapor
magnetometers) utilize digital technology and are more expensive to purchase
than fluxgate instruments. However, their high sensitivity, speed of operation,
and high quality digital signal output make them a good choice for situations
where digital data or digital post-processing is required. These magnetometers
are often used in conjunction with proton precession magnetometers that provide
information on the time varying changes in the Earth’s magnetic field (diurnal
variations) so that these changes can be removed from the magnetic field data.
Proton precession magnetometers are less costly than optically pumped
magnetometers and have less sensitivity and slower measurement rates but are
suited for recording the relatively slow diurnal variations.
(b) Electromagnetic Induction Metal Detectors. Electromagnetic induction metal
detectors work by either rapidly turning the current on and off or a sinusoidally varying current
within a coil on the instrument. This varying current generates a changing primary magnetic
field into the ground and induces electrical eddy currents in any nearby metallic objects. These
currents then produce a secondary magnetic field that is measured by the instrument. They
differ from magnetometers in that they are not limited to detecting ferrous items and can detect
any conductive metal. In addition, electromagnetic induction metal detectors are usually less
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affected by geologic sources than are magnetometers. There are numerous types of
electromagnetic induction metal detectors available. However, two types are most commonly
used in the search for MEC: time domain electromagnetic detectors (TDEMI) and frequency
domain electromagnetic detectors (FDEMI).
•
Time Domain Electromagnetics. TDEMI instruments work by pulsing an
electrical signal in the transmitter coils which produces a primary magnetic field
that induces an eddy current in the ground. The transmitting coil is turned off
and the secondary magnetic field produced from the resulting eddy current
decay is then measured at predefined times. The eddy current decays much
more slowly in conductive targets (such as metallic items) than in resistive
materials (most soils). Such instruments provide a capability to locate all types
of metallic military munitions. Because the signal from the buried metallic
objects is recorded during a time when the signal from the instrument is off and
the signal from the geology is attenuated, TDEMI instruments are one of the
more reliable methods of detecting buried metallic items.
•
Frequency Domain Electromagnetics (FDEMI). FDEMI instruments work by
transmitting a sinusoidally varying electro-magnetic signal at one or more
frequencies through a transmitter coil. A separate receiver coil measures a
signal that is a function of the primary signal and the induced currents in the
subsurface. Depending on the size of the instrument and the frequencies
generated, the system can detect metallic objects at varying depths and sizes.
Because the signal from the buried metallic objects are recorded during a time
when the primary signal is still on, these instruments measure the induced
currents in the subsurface metallic objects differently than the TDEMI
instruments. FDEMI instruments measure differences in the phase and
amplitude between the received signal and the transmitted signal. The presence
of subsurface metallic items will result in changes in the measured parameters.
The depth at which FDEMI instruments can detect metallic objects is dependent
on antenna loop size and transmitter power. However, if careful measurements
are made at multiple frequencies, this information can often provide diagnostic
information on the type of buried metallic objects as well as the size of the
object. Most commercial coin detectors are FDEMI instruments.
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Table 8-1. Geophysical Detection Technologies (as of January 2007)
Technology
Flux-Gate
Magnetometers
Effectiveness
Implementability
Cost
Medium:
High:
Lower than
average on
most terrain
Have been used as the primary
detector in traditional Mag-andflag and mag-and-dig operations.
High industry familiarization.
Detects ferrous objects only
Light and compact. Can be used
in any traversable terrain. Widely
available from a variety of sources
Representative
Systems
Schonstedt 52-CX
Schonstedt 72-CX
Foerster FEREX 4.032
Notes
Analog output not
usually coregistered with
positional data
Ebinger MAGNEX 120
LW
Vallon EL 1302D1 or
1303D
Chicago Steel Tape
(magna-trak 102)
Optically Pumped
Magnetometers
High:
Standard detector for digital
magnetic data collection for MEC
detection. High industry
familiarization. Detects ferrous
objects only
Medium to High:
Relatively light and compact and
can easily be used in open areas.
Can be used in most traversable
terrain. Widely available from a
variety of sources. Processing and
interpretation requires trained
specialists. Discrimination
8-7
Average in
typical terrain.
Much below
average when
arrays of
multiple
detectors are
used
Geometrics G-858
Geometrics G-822
Scintrex Smart Mag
Gem Systems GSMP40
Digital signal
should be coregistered with
positional data for
best results.
EM 1110-1-4009
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Technology
Effectiveness
Implementability
Cost
Representative
Systems
Notes
possibilities are limited to
magnetic susceptibility/magnetic
moment estimates and depth
estimates. Detection capabilities
are negatively influenced by ironbearing soils.
Cryogenic
Magnetometers
TDEMI Metal
Detectors
High:
Low:
Research instrument that has
promise for improving detection
depth. Low industry
familiarization. Detects ferrous
objects only.
Research instrument currently
undergoing testing and
modifications and only useful in
open, level terrain. Minimal
availability, still requires
validation testing before being
implemented on MEC field
surveys.
High:
Medium to High:
Standard detector for EM. High
industry familiarization. Detects
both ferrous and non-ferrous
metallic objects.
Typically utilizes one meter wide
by 0.5 meter or one meter for
transmitter and receiver coils, but
alternate sizes are available. Can
be used in most traversable terrain.
Most commonly used instrument
is widely available. Processing and
interpretation are relatively
straight forward. Discrimination
possibilities exist for multi-
8-8
Limited
Commercially
Available
Much Higher
than average.
Very low
availability.
Average in
typical terrain.
Below average
when arrays of
multiple
detectors are
used
Geonics EM61
Geonics EM 61-hh
Geonics EM61-MK2
Geonics EM63
G-tek/GAP TM5-EMU
Vallon VMH3
Schiebel AN PSS-12
Digital signal
should be coregistered with
positional data for
best results.
Detection depths
are highly
dependent on coil
size(number of
turns and wire
resistance are
important), and
EM 1110-1-4009
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Technology
Effectiveness
Implementability
Cost
Representative
Systems
channel systems
Frequency-Domain
Electromagnetic
Induction Metal
Detectors
Sub Audio Magnetics
Low-Medium:
High:
These systems have not been the
primary detector in any highlyranked MEC detection systems.
However, experience
demonstrates capability of
detecting small items and potential
for improved discrimination
information with multi-frequency
digital units. Not good for
detecting deeply buried, single
items. High industry
familiarization. Detects both
ferrous and non-ferrous metallic
objects.
Hand-held detectors are light and
compact. Can be used in any
traversable terrain. Widely
available from a variety of
sources. Discrimination
possibilities exist among some
multi-channel systems.
Medium:
Low:
Detects both ferrous and nonferrous metallic objects. Capable
tool for detection of deep MEC.
Detects deepest MEC. Low
industry familiarization
High data processing
requirements. Available from one
source. High power requirements.
Longer than average setup times.
8-9
Notes
transmitter power.
Lower than
average cost in
typical terrain,
with the
exception of
the Geophex
GEM3 which
is Average.
White's All Metals
Detector
Fisher 1266X
Garrett
Geophex GEM3
Foerster Minex
Analog output not
usually coregistered with
positional data
Digital output
should be coregistered with
positional data.
Minelabs Explorer II
Higher than
average. Very
low
availability.
GAP Geophysics PTY SAM
Not Commercially
Available
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Technology
MagnetometerElectromagnetic
Detection Dual Sensor
Systems
Effectiveness
Implementability
Cost
Representative
Systems
Notes
Higher:
Medium:
ERDC EM61HH & G822
Not Commercially
Available
Detects both ferrous and nonferrous metallic objects. Medium
industry familiarization. Higher
potential for discrimination.
High data processing
requirements. Available from few
sources.
Higher than
average.
Lower costs
using a towed
array platform.
SAIC STOLS /
VSEMS (vehicular)
Available
SAIC MSEMS (manportable)
Marine Side-Scan
Sonar
Airborne Multi- or
Hyper- spectral
Imagery and Infrared
Sensors
Low:
Medium:
Visualizes shapes of both metallic
and non-metallic objects. Only
detects items on surface of water
body floor. Medium Low industry
familiarization
Requires boat, trained operator,
experienced field drivercrew, low
vegetatiocalm water may be
needed n Vegetation can hinder
acoustic signal propagation
Low to Medium:
Medium:
Detects both metallic and nonmetallic objects. Only detects
largest MEC. Requires line of
sight. Low industry
familiarization. Effectiveness
increases when used for wide area
assessment in conjunction with
Requires aircraft and an
experienced pilot. Substantial data
processing and management
requirements. Available from few
sources.
8-10
Average for
marine
investigations
Klein 5500, EdgeTech
DF-1000, Triton Elics
Sonar Suite,
GeoAcoustics, Fishers
still under
development
Few have applied
these technologies
to the UXO
problem.
SSS-100K/600K,
Marine Sonic
Technologies,
Low-Medium
per acre when
surveying large
areas (>500
acres).
Aircraft and
maintenance
costs.
Processing
Active area of
growth for
application to the
UXO problem.
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Technology
Effectiveness
Implementability
other airborne technologies
Airborne Synthetic
Aperture Radar
Airborne LIDAR
Cost
Representative
Systems
Notes
costs.
Low:
Low:
Detects large surface metallic
objects. Requires line of sight.
Medium industry familiarization
Requires a specialized aircraft and
an experienced pilot. Unique and
substantial data processing and
management requirements.
Available from very few sources.
Low to High:
Medium:
Detects both metallic and nonmetallic large surface objects.
High industry familiarization.
Effectiveness increases when used
for wide area assessment in
conjunction with other airborne
technologies.
Requires aircraft and an
experienced pilot. Substantial data
processing and management
requirements. Available from
increasing number of sources.
8-11
Higher than
average due to
aircraft
operation and
maintenance
costs and data
processing and
validation
costs.
Few have applied
these technologies
to the UXO
problem.
Low-Medium
per acre when
surveying large
areas (>500
acres). aircraft
and
maintenance
costs.
Processing
costs.
Active area of
growth for
application to the
UXO problem.
EM 1110-1-4009
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Technology
Ground Penetrating
Radar
Effectiveness
Implementability
Cost
Representative
Systems
Notes
Low:
Low:
GSSI, SIR2, SIR3,
SIR8, SIR10
Many mine detection systems use
ground penetrating radar as one
detector, however, has very low
never successful success rates as a
stand-alone MEC detection
system. Detects both metallic and
non-metallic objects. Susceptible
to variable
environmental/geological
conditions. Medium industry
familiarization.
Large, bulky, Requires trained
operator and is slow to operate.
Difficult to use in any but the
easiest terrain. Widely available
from a variety of sources.
Higher than
average.
Systems are
slow. and
Required
survey
coverage is
expensive
Data output is
usually viewed in
either transects,
not maps
Software and Sensors
and Software
RAMAC
Note: Data positioning is a significant factor that can substantially affect the success of any geophysical technology. The effectiveness and
implementability of data positioning technologies must also be considered when evaluating a geophysical technology.
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8-4. Positioning and Navigation Techniques.
a. The precision, and often the accuracy, of measured geophysical data positions are
critical components of the geophysics products. Because the ultimate goal of magnetometer and
EM surveys is to reproduce the actual potential field that exists over a given site, the success of
the surveys relies heavily on how well the geophysical system can accurately and precisely
locate where each measurement was actually taken.
b. We define precision as how well a positioning system can register where one
measurement was taken with respect to all other neighboring measurements that were taken
(see figure below). We define accuracy as how well a positioning system can register where
measurements were taken with respect to a geographic coordinate system. This term is used to
define how close reported coordinates are to the actual, physical locations on the earth where
the measurements were taken. In most cases, the terms precision and accuracy need not be
differentiated, and only the term accuracy need be used. However, there could be some cases,
for example during site characterizations, where the accuracy of a group of measurements is
not critical to a project’s objectives, but where their precision is.
Direction of data collection
Figure X-Y
Example of Positioning Precision
X+
+X
10 cm
X+
X+
X = actual location where a measurement was taken
+ = positioning system's reported location of the measurement
= 1 cm radius error circle
Figure 8.1: Example of Positioning Precision
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c. There are three levels of accuracy needed for Geophysics to support the MMRP
program:
(1) Screening level to determine areas of interest as implemented by airborne sensors or
characterization efforts by ground based sensors by corridors, transects or meandering
pathways. Typical accuracies will be sub-meter to tens of meters.
(2) Area mapping as performed by man portable and towed arrays. Typical accuracies
will be sub-meter to several decimeters.
(3) Interrogation where highly accurate dense data is acquired to interrogate and then by
post processing the accurate layered data, discriminate a previously located target anomaly.
Typical accuracies will be centimeter to sub-decimeter.
d. The remainder of this sub-chapter describes various positioning options for
geophysical surveys.
(1) Line and Fiducial. Line and fiducial (also referred to as line and station, conventional
positioning, or straight-line profiling) positioning is the simplest form of geophysical data
positioning, and has been in use for the longest period of time. The premise of line and fiducial
positioning is that the geophysical instruments are operated in straight lines between fixed,
known locations. Often, a rectangular coordinate system is used to define a local Cartesian
coordinate system over a given area. These areas are usually called grids, and each grid is
uniquely identified. The normal convention is to assign Cartesian coordinates of zero east (or
zero “x”) and zero north (or zero “y”) to the southwesternmost corner of a grid. Grid
dimensions can be tens of meters to several hundred meters on a side. The geophysical
measurement positions in the grid are calculated by collecting data in a straight line from one
known location in the grid to another known location in the grid. Most often, fiberglass
measuring tapes are stretched along either the southern and northern edges of the grid, or along
the western and eastern edges of the grid, from one grid corner to the next. In this manner, the
distance gradations on the fiberglass tapes provide the known locations along the grid
boundaries, and the geophysical operator can traverse the grid from one known point to another
with relative ease. As the operator traverses the grid to collect data, the geophysical
instrumentation is setup to either collect data at regular intervals in time (time-based
triggering), or at regular intervals in distance by use of an odometer trigger (distance-based
triggering). Note that these are triggering mechanisms only, and are used to cause the
instruments to take and record a measurement. Common time-based triggering intervals are 0.1
sec (10Hz measurement rate) and common distance triggering intervals are 20cm. The data
logging system is configured to capture the starting location, the direction of travel, the
measurement triggering parameters and any other instrument-specific information that is
needed to calculate positions of individual geophysical measurements that are recorded. Since
the distance traveled along each survey line is known, all measurements recorded along a linear
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segment can be equally spaced between the known points between which the data were
collected. Often, intermediate known points, or fiducial marker lines, will also be established
within a grid by stretching additional fiberglass measuring tapes parallel to, and at equal
intervals between, the fiberglass tapes placed along the grid’s boundary. These intermediate
markers are used by the operators to help maintain straight survey lines and to allow them to
make “fiducial marks” at known points within the data stream. Data that is “marked” with a
fiducial mark (often a special character appearing in a marker column within the data stream)
signifies the sensor was at a known location at the time that measurement was made. Figure 8-2
illustrates a grid setup over a 50m by 50m area. In this example, there is one intermediate
fiducial line setup between the southern and northern grid boundaries, and data is to be
collected along parallel, north and south oriented lines. The arrows along the lines indicate the
planned direction of travel along each line.
Figure 8-2: Line and Fiducial Grid Setup
(a) Referring to the figure above, data is collected in the following manner:
•
The operator aligns the equipment along the line to be traversed and enters line
specific coordinate and triggering information into the data logger.
8-15
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•
The operator places the sensor directly over the marker along the grid boundary
and begins collecting data along the line immediately as he/she begins moving.
Or, the operator places the sensor outside of the area to be surveyed and begins
moving along the line to be traversed. As the sensor crosses over the grid
boundary, the operator immediately begins data collection.
•
The operator maintains a straight line traverse along the line to be surveyed, and
uses a toggle switch or other momentary switch to enter fiducial marks when the
sensor moves directly over a fiducial line. If a time-based triggering system is
being used, the operator must maintain a constant pace between all known
locations (i.e. between the start of line location and the first fiducial mark, the
first and next fiducial mark, etc., and the last fiducial mark and the end of line
location. If distance-based triggering is being used, then the operator need not
maintain a constant pace, but he/she must maintain forward travel at all times.
•
When the sensor passes over the boundary that defines the end of the line, the
operator immediately ceases collecting data.
(b) Figure 8-3 illustrates a typical data stream of EM61-MK2 data collected using
distance-based triggering. This figure is provided to help the reader understand how data is
collected, and what the collected data looks like when the line and fiducial method is used. In
this example, the line number (e.g. Line 0) corresponds to the Easting, or x coordinate, along
which data were collected. Data were collected in north-south directions.
(2) DGPS & RTK DGPS. This method of navigation has increased in popularity in
recent years, as the accuracy of the positions has increased. Software for most geophysical
systems now includes a means of integrating GPS positions with geophysical data. GPS
equipment varies drastically in price and quality, therefore a minimum standard for equipment
to be used in Digital Geophysical Mapping (DGM) surveys must be defined. The level of
accuracy required for a specific project depends on the goals. For characterization surveys,
accuracy within 10 meters may be acceptable, while a more detailed investigation may have
more demanding requirements.
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Figure 8-3: EM61-MK2 data stream
(a) Small hand-held units manufactured for recreational use are not acceptable for most
DGM work. These units typically cost $150 to $400, and while helpful for finding general
locations, are not capable of the level of precision necessary for most DGM surveying. One
exception to this is that these units can normally provide the needed accuracy for performing
initial characterization work. When Selective Availability (SA) is not in use by the Department
of Defense, these types of GPS units can achieve accuracies of approximately 10 meters. With
SA activated, accuracy drops to approximately 100 meters. Wide Area Augmentation System
(WAAS) is a system of satellites and ground stations originally developed for aviation, that
provide GPS signal corrections. WAAS enabled handheld GPS receivers are reported to have
accuracy of 3-5m.
(b) The use of Differential GPS (DGPS) allows for the correction of errors in
positioning from SA and other sources, which include clock errors, atmospheric effects, and
signal reflections. Sub- meter accuracy is possible using DGPS, given favorable conditions.
Three types of DGPS are in use: 1) utilizing GPS base stations that transmit corrections via
radio, commonly known as Real Time Kinematic (RTK), 2) using U.S. Coast Guard or
Department of Transportation beacons transmitting corrections, 3) using a satellite based
service such as the OmniSTAR system. Post-collection processing of GPS data is also possible
using data collected by a nearby base station whose data is made available to the public.
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•
Differential GPS makes use of the Carrier Phase that allows accuracies within 120 centimeters. Correction of bias factors may be accomplished in real time,
using a Real Time Kinematic (RTK) GPS system, or through Post Processing
(PP). Both RTK and PP systems utilize a base station, set up on a known point,
which then transmits corrections to a roving GPS unit via radio (RTK), or
records base station data that is used to apply differential corrections to the
recorded roving GPS data (PP). DGPS is the most accurate and common form
of GPS surveying performed for MEC detection.
•
The United States Coast Guard Navigation Center (NAVCEN) operates the most
widely used real-time Differential GPS (DGPS) service, utilizing two control
centers and a network of broadcast stations, or “beacons”. Real-time differential
correction requires a GPS receiver that is tuned to the frequency of the broadcast
real-time correction message. When a real-time correction message is present,
the receiver will apply the differential correction to GPS data concurrently with
the collection of field data. An effort is underway to expand DGPS coverage
through a seven-agency partnership, for the Nationwide Differential GPS
(NDGPS) program. The data can be accessed for free and an accuracy of 1-10m
is normally possible using the transmitted corrections. Visit the Coast Guard
website (http://www.navcen.uscg.gov./dgps/coverage/Default.htm) to view
current coverage for the NDGPS system.
•
Subscription based correction methods, such as the OmniSTAR system, use a
network of reference stations to measure atmospheric interference inherent in
the GPS system. Reference data is transmitted to global network control centers
where it is checked for integrity and reliability. The data is then up-linked to
geo-stationary satellites that distribute the data over their respective footprints.
Using satellite re-broadcast overcomes the range limitations of ground-based
transmissions. Additionally, wide-area solutions, such as those provided by
OmniSTAR, correct for errors associated with a single reference station
solution. The result is consistently high quality differential corrections available
anywhere within the continental United States plus much of Canada and
Mexico. With the OmniSTAR system, two levels of service are available:
OmniSTAR VBS, and OmniSTAR HP. The VBS service provides sub-meter
accuracy, while the HP offers improved accuracy but its capabilities have not
been evaluated for the MMRP.
(c) Minimum Standards for Data Quality: The number and location of satellites visible to
the antenna, and the presence of obstructions influence the level of accuracy for a GPS reading.
Depending on the project specific needs, different levels of GPS data quality may be
acceptable. Factors that affect GPS data quality are discussed below:
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•
A factor called DOP (dilution of precision) is a measure of the level of precision
that can be expected for a particular arrangement of satellites. The DOP is
computed from a number of factors, including: HDOP (horizontal), VDOP
(vertical), TDOP (time). Together these factors are used to compute the PDOP
(position dilution of precision). Lower DOP values indicate better accuracies
are being achieved by the DGPS system. Although PDOP is commonly used,
HDOP and TDOP may be more applicable to DGM work, in which the x,y
coordinates are used to map anomalies. GPS accuracy in the vertical dimension
is less than in the horizontal. Most GPS receivers can be programmed to output
the calculated DOP values (HDOP, PDOP, etc.). For DGM surveys, DOP
values should be below 6 when using code-only systems and the DOP values
should be below 12 when computing code and phase solution. These values are
based on information provided by several DGPS vendors, alternative DOP
maxima may be acceptable based upon the system’s published technical
specifications.
•
Although PDOP (or HDOP) gives some indication of data quality, an important
indicator of data quality is the number of satellites used for determining position
and the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of each that is being detected by the GPS
receiver. It is possible to have a low PDOP and still have significant errors in
positioning, especially with few satellites and/or low SNRs from one or more
satellites. A minimum of four satellites is needed to determine a 3D position,
however accuracy increases with additional satellites. For DGM surveys, a
minimum of 4 satellites should be used at all times for GPS data collection.
(d) Time Synchronization: If recording geophysical data in a separate device from the
GPS data, all measurements in each data file must have an associated time stamp, which is later
used to merge the position readings with the geophysical data. This introduces a potential
source of error that can be difficult to detect and to correct, and therefore, data collection in this
manner is not recommended. Rather, all data from geophysical and navigation instruments
should be streamed into a single recording device (typically a field computer), which generates
time stamps for all data streams using the same system clock.
•
When navigation and geophysical data are collected independently, it is crucial
that the times be synchronized to permit accurate location of the data. GPS
satellites use atomic clocks capable of extremely accurate time keeping. Most
code only and code and phase systems use the satellite clock information to
continuously correct any drift in the time basis of the land-based receivers.
Geophysical instruments use less sophisticated clocks, which may drift in
relation to the GPS clocks. Prior to collecting data, the times between all
instruments must be synchronized to within 0.25 seconds for surveys performed
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at normal walking speeds. Tighter synchronizations will be required for surveys
performed at greater speeds. When finishing a grid, transect, etc, check the
synchronization of the data recorders again, and record any difference noted. If
the difference has increased by more than 0.25 seconds (for at total difference of
more than 0.5 seconds), the time differences will require correcting. A linear
clock drift can usually be assumed.
(3) Robotic Total Station, example is the Leica 1200. A Robotic Total Station (RTS)
operates under a different concept than the other positioning systems. The RTS essentially is an
automated laser survey station that derives its position from traditional survey methodology by
determining the station coordinate position and orientation based upon reference to two existing
known points establishing a baseline. The RTS tracks a prism attached to the geophysical
sensor and computes the location. See figure 8-4. The robotic portion maintains track on the
moving prism and records relative position and elevation in reference to the survey baseline.
Dynamic positions may be recorded at several times a second.
Figure 8-4: RTS Single point position tracking
(a) The technology must have constant line-of-sight from the single point RTS station to
the roving prism. Position gaps must be interpolated with loss of line-of-sight. With the use of
the appropriate firmware and operation procedures the RTS can maintain lock in moderate
wooded areas by predicting the location of the sensor and then reacquiring it following the
obstructions. The technology can provide sub-centimeter accuracy for static positioning in open
areas. This precision gets diluted by interpolations for areas with loss of line-of-sight such as
obstructions caused by tree trunks and branches. For visibility, the prism is generally on an
extended pole above the geophysical sensor. Error can be introduced by sloped terrain where
the sensor lean provides a variable offset in relation to the actual sensor location. A position
accuracy of .07- .27 meters has been consistently demonstrated in field trials.
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(4) Laser Fan Systems, example is the ArcSecond UXO Constellation. This system uses
the precision of laser measurements in a different way than the RTS. Rather than taking a range
and angle measurement to the rover from the RTS instrument as referenced from an established
baseline, the Laser Transmitter System takes angular measurements in reference to multiple
laser transmitters or beacons. A scale factor is applied during setup by the system hardware, by
reference to a known distance or by known points to establish distances and known points
which are referenced to establish the coordinate reference. These angles are solved to the
rover’s geometric location and scales applied for coordinate positional output. Three
dimensional position and in some configurations also attitude and orientation, are determined at
up to 40 Hz. Generally four transmitters are set up around the perimeter of the work area. See
Figure 8-5.
Figure 8-5: Laser Transmitter typical layout
(a) Since this system is laser based it requires line-of-sight for the rover but it is more
accurate than the RTS in open and obstructed areas because of the high positional sampling rate
and the redundancy of measurements from multiple transmitter locations. Like the RTS, three
dimensional positions must be interpolated for times when the rover does not have visibility by
two transmitters. Unlike the RTS, the rover is not affected by instrument lean. The system
projects the position to the desired spatial instrument reference point. Some configurations also
capture attitude and orientation to permit advanced geophysical sensor modeling which
provides local high 3D accuracy for anomaly interrogation. A disadvantage is the additional
hardware for the multiple transmitters and a maximum range with the external transmitter
strobes of 100 m. A position accuracy of .01- .18 meters has been consistently demonstrated in
field trials (average .01m interrogations, .04m area navigation & .11m as picked from the
geophysics).
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(5) Radio Frequency (RF), example is the ENSCO Ranger. The RF system exploits a
unique direct sequence spread spectrum measuring system to provide precision geolocation and
simultaneous data communications. Multiple base-station radios are used to measure their
distance to one or more mobile radios. These multiple distance measurements can then be used
to compute the coordinates of the mobile radios. Repeated, sequential distance measurements
and coordinate computation enables tracking the mobile radio’s path. This navigation system is
directly integrated with a data logger and geophysical instrumentation. See Figure 8-6.
Optional
Optional
Sensors
Sensors
Fixed Unit
Fixed Unit
PDA
d2
d3
Mobile Unit
d1
d4
Fixed Unit
Real-time
Graphical
Display
Fixed Unit
Figure 8-6: RF positioning system
(a) The RF system communications architecture is based on direct sequence spread
spectrum (DSSS) in the 2.4 GHz Industrial, Scientific, and Medical (ISM) band. This allows
the system to operate as unlicensed transmitters under FCC rules with a 1-watt transmit power.
Core circuitry takes advantage of widely available and inexpensive components commonly
used in 802.11b wireless network products. The key element of the system is the ability to
accurately measure distance. Methods for using a DSSS radio for semi-precise time-of-flight
measurement are well understood for coarse measurement. This system differs in that a fine
measurement is made to estimate more precisely the time-of-arrival (and hence the distance
traveled) of a signal. It is this fine measurement that provides the sub-meter accuracy.
(b) An improvement to this system is having the radio navigation system augmented with
an inertial navigation system (INS). The INS systems use the Ranger (specific ENSCO
instrument?) position as a starting point and the INS to acquire a high accuracy relative position
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for 3D instrument tracking. A position accuracy of .17-.57 meters, similar to dynamic DGPS,
was demonstrated for Ranger. The INS enhancement for the interrogation areas has
demonstrated a relative position accuracy of .03-.05 meters.
(6) Acoustic. Example system is the Ultrasonic Ranging and Data System (USRADS).
This navigation system utilizes ultrasonic techniques to determine the location of a geophysical
instrument each second. It consists of three basic elements: a Data Pack, up to 15 Stationary
Receivers (SRs) and a Master Receiver. The Data Pack is mounted on the geophysical sensor
back pack with the ultrasonic transducer mounted approximately 1 meter above the sensor. The
Data Pack fires the transducer and by monitoring the time-of-flight the location of the
geophysical sensor can be determined. The SRs are placed throughout the survey area with
about 9 required per acre. A minimum of two are required to be on known points. The system
software automatically determines the locations of the SRs by utilizing the time-of-flight
information between all SRs. Finally, the Master Receiver and laptop computer acts as the
master timer between the components, as the data processor and as the data collector. The
computer computes the sensor position location and displays the survey data. Position accuracy
of 0.15 m is expected with proper SRs distributed at up to a 150’ spacing.
Figure 8-6: Acoustic
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(7) Other Geophysical Systems Positioning Components Some geophysical systems
incorporate additional equipment to improve positioning accuracies. These include digital tilt
meters to record roll and pitch of sensor platforms and digital or gyro compasses to record
platform bearing.
8-5. Geophysical System Deployment Platforms. Geophysical instruments can be deployed
using various platforms in order to collect data in the most efficient manner over a particular
project property.
a. Man-Portable Systems. Many geophysical instruments can be deployed using
individuals to carry or pull the equipment across the survey area.
Figure 8-7
b. Multiple Instrument Arrays. In cases where a particular geophysical instrument
provides good detection results and the terrain permitting, several sensors can be joined in an
array that is pulled behind a vehicle to achieve greater data density and greater production rates
than possible with a single sensor system. However, due to access and mobility limitations,
such arrays are generally limited to large, open areas with relatively flat terrain.
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Figure 8-8
c. Airborne Systems. Recent developments in sensor technology, computers, and
navigation techniques have led to the effective use of airborne techniques for geophysical
surveys at MRAs. Successful airborne techniques have included magnetic, electromagnetic,
and Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) surveys. Potential airborne techniques include
infrared, hyperspectral imaging and synthetic aperture radar but require further validation
testing using both helicopter and fixed-wing platforms. Airborne surveys have the potential to
achieve greater data density and production rates than possible with ground-based systems.
However, due to access and site-specific requirements, airborne surveys are generally limited to
large open areas and relatively large MEC targets, because the increased distance from the
targets to the sensor reduces the ability to detect smaller objects. At project properties where
large areas exist that allow the platform to fly close to the ground (i.e. grasslands or agricultural
areas), airborne systems can provide a method for footprint analysis to identify the high MEC
density areas or the location of large items.
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Figure 8-9
d. Underwater Systems. Recent developments in sensor technology, computers, and
navigation techniques have also led to the effective use of geophysical surveying for UXO in
shallow marine environments. The surveys have included magnetic, electromagnetic and side
scan sonar methods.
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Magnetometer sensors
Support spars
ballast
Figure 8-10
8-6. Anomaly Selection Criteria and Anomaly Prioritization. Geophysical systems produce
data that offer several advantages in how a PDT can design criteria for detecting anomalies and
analyzing the characteristics of those anomalies to decide whether or not they should be placed
on dig lists. Using their characteristics as the basis, anomalies can further be categorized
between “more likely to be associated with MEC” and “less likely to be associated with MEC”.
In some cases, it is possible to categorize an anomaly as “Not likely to be MEC”. Depending on
how an anomaly is categorized, a decision can be made as to whether or not the PDT should
proceed and excavate that anomaly. These types of decisions are normally described in detail in
anomaly prioritization plans, also referred to as “prioritizing anomalies”, “anomaly
prioritization” or “anomaly ranking”. We use the term anomaly prioritization in this subsection. It should be noted that the concept of anomaly prioritization is often captured within
the framework of how anomalies are detected and selected onto dig lists, and an anomaly
prioritization plan may not needed. We first discuss how anomalies are detected and selected
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for intrusive investigation, we then discuss how anomaly prioritization methods are developed
and used.
a. Anomaly Characteristics. A geophysical anomaly is defined as geophysical
measurement(s) that are distinguishable from nearby background measurements. Quantifiable
anomaly characteristics are limited to digital geophysical mapping systems and some analog
systems that provide a digital readout of the instrument’s measurements. Quantifiable
characteristics are identified below. All other systems offer only the ability to use qualitative
characteristics to detect and select anomalies. We use the terms “anomaly detection” and
“anomaly selection” independently, though in some systems, and in particular analog systems,
these two actions occur simultaneously. Anomaly detection is used in reference to how abovebackground measurements (anomalies) are identified. The term anomaly selection is used in
reference to how above-background measurements are selected onto dig lists or otherwise
selected for intrusive investigation (such as in mag and dig operations.)
(1) Detecting and selecting anomalies with analog systems. Analog systems used in
audio mode or by monitoring meter deflections only offer the ability to discern relative size and
relative signal strength. An experienced operator can sometimes use these characteristics to
estimate source depth and source size, but such estimates are subjective in nature. Often the
option for selecting or rejecting anomalies detected with these devices is limited to rejecting
only those anomalies with very small spatial extent (small size) and high signal strength
characteristics. Such anomalies are expected to be associated with small near-surface metallic
sources because the strength is high (if the small piece of metal were deep, the strength would
be much less) and the spatial extend is small (if the source were a large piece of metal, the
spatial extent would be large). If small MEC are a target objective, this approach would not be
valid. Due to their inherent limitations, analog systems do not offer any additional options for
differentiating MEC from non-MEC anomaly sources based on anomaly characteristics. All
claims made by Contractors or field personnel regarding their ability to discriminate MEC-like
anomalies from non-MEC anomalies should be demonstrated on the GPO and accepted by the
project’s Government geophysicist.
(2) Detecting anomalies from DGM data. Digital mapping systems offer the ability to
quantify the following anomaly characteristics:
(a) Anomaly peak response for all channels of data recorded
(b) Spatial extent (area) of above-background measurements
(c) Estimated target depth
(d) Estimated signal to noise ratio based on all above-background measurements (also
referred to as the anomaly power SNR)
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(e) Estimated magnetic moment (for magnetometer systems)
(f) Estimated time-constant and related decay-curve characteristics (for TDEMI systems)
(g) Estimated conductivity and susceptibility (FDEMI)
(h) Estimated shape parameters
(i) Estimated location of the item’s center
(j) Estimated weight
(k) Estimated remanence (for magnetometer systems)
(l) One or more of these characteristics are used to distinguish whether the characteristic
values for one measurement or a group of two or more contiguous measurements are
distinguishable from other surrounding measurements. This process is often automated using
tools such as the automatic anomaly picking tool available in Geosoft’s UXDetect.
(3) Selecting DGM anomalies onto dig lists. The most common approach to select
anomalies is referred to as “threshold picking”. Often these approaches are applied in a simple
manner and base anomaly selections from a single channel of data, and are performed using the
automated tools described above. This approach is not recommended unless supported by
project needs. Recommended approaches will use either more sophisticated methods to detect
and select anomalies, or a phased approach to first detect above-background measurements and
then quantify one or more anomaly characteristics to select anomalies onto dig lists based on
multiple criteria. In all cases, the methodology for detecting and selecting anomalies should be
completely documented and reviewed by Government geophysicists for compliance with PDT
needs and project objectives. Listed below are common issues to consider when developing
methods for selecting DGM anomalies onto dig lists.
(a) Factor for measurement variability. Many selection criteria are initially based on GPO
data, which can not capture all possible burial scenarios. It is also known that there is a high
degree of variability in responses from different MEC of the same model when buried in the
same orientation and at the same depth. Therefore, anomaly selection criteria may require a
degree of conservatism be included in their definitions.
(b) Factor for variability in how data may be collected. Many selection criteria are based
on GPO data collected under conditions that will differ from those encountered on-site. It is
critical that the manner in which anomaly characteristics are defined factor for slight variations
in data quality such as: changes in instrument height, changes in survey speeds, variations in
coverage densities, variations in background levels, and changes in filtering/leveling
parameters that are used. The goal is to demonstrate the field data is of the same quality, and
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was collected and processed using the same parameters as the data used to define the anomaly
selection criteria. Normally, the quality control plan will include tests to confirm these
parameters in field datasets do not vary significantly from those of the datasets used to define
the anomaly selection criteria.
(c) Identify critical characteristics or combinations of characteristics that will require
placing an anomaly on a dig list. For example, estimated shape parameter or estimated time
constant (for TDEMI systems) alone will normally not be critical characteristics, whereas the
combination of peak response value and spatial extent would be a critical combination for
selecting anomalies onto dig lists.
b. Defining and Using Anomaly Prioritization Methods. One of the greatest challenges
on many MEC projects is differentiating anomalies associated with MEC from those not
associated with MEC, in particular small pieces of fragments from functioned ordnance. One of
the tools available to the PDT in this regard is the use of anomaly prioritization methods.
Anomaly prioritization methods are developed in response to the need to minimize project
costs and minimize schedule impacts and disruptions to local stakeholders and area residents.
Anomaly prioritization plans will make use of one or more of the following prioritization tools:
(1) Anomaly characteristics,
(2) Statistical information,
(3) Anomaly dig results,
(4) Previous investigation data, and
(5) Historical information
(6) These tools are used to provide justifications and explanations for not excavating all
anomalies that may meet one or more non-critical characteristic criteria (see example in last
bullet item above for definition and explanation of critical characteristic criteria). Basically,
when anomaly selection criteria are defined, certain assumptions are attached to those criteria
because it is not technically feasible to unambiguously define each MEC anomaly characteristic
for each scenario (item condition, item depth and orientation, local clutter, geology variations,
etc.) on an individual project site. The solution is to define selection criteria that are
conservative enough to reliably select MEC anomalies onto dig lists. Most solutions also
include selecting small to medium quantities, typically between 5% to 20%, of these anomalies
that otherwise would not be selected onto dig lists as a measure of continuous checking the
assumptions used in developing the anomaly selection criteria. Some example prioritization
plans are presented below.
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(7) Example 1: Excavation project, target MEC is 60mm and larger. Characterization
data indicate MEC is located from the surface to 0.3m depth. DGM system is demonstrated to
reliably detect all target MEC to a depth of 0.7m, and some MEC in certain orientations are
detected to a depth of 1.2m. Criteria for anomaly characteristics are defined for peak response
value for an aggregate of all channels of data, anomaly SNR, and anomaly spatial size. The
table below provides an example summary of how anomaly characteristic criteria can be
defined. The anomaly prioritization plan is outlined below:
(a) All anomalies meeting all selection criteria will be placed on dig lists
(b) All anomalies meeting both the SNR and size criteria will be placed on dig lists
(c) For anomalies located around target locations, 20% of those not meeting the above
criteria but which have characteristics in the range of target objectives at 1.2m depth will be
selected onto dig lists. Only those anomalies meeting all three criteria will be selected. If MEC
are found in this group of anomalies, the remaining 80% will be evaluated against the new
criteria.
(d) For anomalies located outside target locations, 15% of those not meeting the above
criteria but which have characteristics in the range of target objectives at 1.2m depth will be
selected onto dig lists. Only those anomalies meeting all three criteria will be selected. If no
MEC are found in this group of anomalies after a statistically representative number have been
investigated, the percentage of these investigated anomalies will be adjusted down with PDT
concurrence. If MEC are found, the selection criteria will be adjusted using the characteristics
of the MEC anomalies found. The percentage investigated may also be adjusted up with PDT
concurrence.
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Table 8.2: Example GPO Results and Anomaly Selection Criteria (Prioritization Example #1)
Burial Conditions
Anomlay
Characteristics
Minimum values
measured above
background
Maximum values
measured above
background
Target objectives at 0.7m
Peak response (sum
of all channels)
17mV
155mV
SNR
32
420
Size
1.5 m2
1.9 m2
Peak response (sum
of all channels)
7mV
55mV
SNR
4
175
Size
.9 m2
1.3 m2
Peak response (sum
of all channels)
750mV
2200mV
SNR
1600
4750
Size
2.1 m2
2.7 m2
Peak response (sum
of all channels)
8mV
88mV
SNR
2.5
210
Size
.7 m2
1.65 m2
Peak response (sum
of all channels)
19mV
SNR
24
Size
1.1 m2
Target objectives at 1.2m
Target objectives at 0.3m
Small clutter items, various
depths
Anomaly Selection Criteria
(based on 75% of values from
target objectives buried at 0.7m)
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(8) Example 2: Characterization project, target MEC is 40mm projectile and larger, to a
size of 155mm. Expected MEC depths are not known. DGM system is demonstrated to reliably
detect all target MEC to a depth of 0.3m, and some MEC in certain orientations are detected to
a depth of 1.5m. Criteria for anomaly characteristics are defined for peak response values for
two channels of data. The figure below illustrates the logic in assigning anomaly priorities
based on the two channels of data, whether all channels were above background or not, and
whether one or both channels were in the range of values detected in the GPO. The anomaly
prioritization plan that was utilized is outlined below:
(a) Place all rank 1a anomalies on dig lists
(b) Place 50% of rank 1b anomalies on dig lists
(c) Place 15% of rank 2 anomalies on dig lists
(d) Place 10% of rank 3 anomalies on dig lists
(e) If a rank 2 or rank 3 anomaly produces MEC, revise criteria in concurrence with PDT.
Figure 8-11: Prioritization Example #2
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8-7. Anomaly Resolution. The term anomaly resolution is used in reference to all activities
related to reacquiring previously detected anomalies and/or excavating anomalies to the point
they are unambiguously explained. There are two key aspects to anomaly resolution, anomaly
reacquisition and anomaly excavation, which also include reporting dig results.
a. Anomaly Reacquisition. Anomaly reacquisition is a critical element of DGM systems
because this task must physically match anomalies on dig lists with their sources. This is
achieved by using a method to navigate to the selected location, reproducing a signal at that
location and placing a plastic pin flag and/or painting the ground surface above the reacquired
source. The challenge is in matching selected anomalies with their true sources because those
sources are often buried or otherwise obscured from view. In cases where an anomaly being
sought has no other nearby anomalies or other sources of interference, and the anomaly has a
high SNR, this task can be fairly straight forward and have little likelihood of reacquiring the
wrong source. In other circumstances, reacquiring the originally interpreted anomaly will be
difficult and reacquisition procedures will need to be explained in great detail. The following
are critical factors to consider in planning and performing anomaly reacquisition procedures.
All procedures should be demonstrated in the GPO, including simulated failure scenarios.
(1) What is the accuracy of the reported dig list coordinates and what is the
accuracy of the navigation system used to reacquire those points? What is the allowable
distance between reacquired location and interpreted location? Often the sum of errors in
the DGM positioning will be between 0.5m to 1.5m and the accuracy of navigation tools used
to reacquire anomalies will typically be between 2cm and 30cm. The accuracy of the
interpreted coordinates can be even greater when closely detected anomalies are aggregated
together. Therefore, search radii for locating the true anomaly source must factor the sum of all
potential positioning and reporting errors in interpreted anomaly locations.
(2) If the reacquisition team will be able to reproduce the originally interpreted
response, what are the tolerances for the reproduced response? Anomalies detected in
dynamic DGM surveys will often have detected amplitudes that are less than those observed
during reacquisition. Further, if weaker signals are present in proximity to a selected anomaly
location, criteria must be established to either flag all nearby anomalies regardless of reacquired
amplitude, or reacquire all anomalies meeting project-specific criteria, typically peak
amplitude. Criteria must also be established for minimum and maximum allowed signal
strength of reacquired anomalies, any location where a source cannot be located within those
criteria should be labeled as an ambiguous reacquisition result.
(3) If the reacquisition team will not be able to reproduce the originally interpreted
response, what measures are used to provide confidence the correct anomaly is actually
reacquired? What will constitute an ambiguous reacquisition result and what procedures
are in place to resolve such results? Reacquisition procedures that use geophysical systems
not having the same detection capabilities as those used to collect the original data must have
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very specific procedures in place to prevent the wrong anomaly from being reacquired. Typical
criteria to include in such procedures are: limits on how far a suspect source location can be
placed from the originally interpreted location, requiring all detectable anomalies within the
total error radius be flagged for excavation, that all dig results must be reviewed by the
interpreting geophysicist or other designated geophysical personnel, that a percentage of all
anomalies will be verified using the original geophysical system during post-excavation
verification, and including the requirement to return to all ambiguous reacquisition results.
b. Excavation and Reporting. Anomaly excavation routines are covered under the
intrusive operations section(s) of the work plan. This topic is included herein as it pertains to
the meeting project objectives of unambiguously resolving geophysical anomalies. The
disposition and final location details of each anomaly are normally recorded on the final dig
sheets, which should be submitted to all PDT members in accordance with project needs and/or
SOW/PWS requirements. The reported dig results should be reviewed by the interpreting
geophysicist or other designated geophysical personnel, and those personnel must have
authority to require additional reacquisition and/or excavation activities be performed for any
and all anomalies having characteristics that are not unambiguously explained by the reported
dig results. These reviews can include automated searches to compare reported findings with
predetermined threshold criteria. For example, the dig team can be required to report an
anomaly source as large (greater than 5 pounds or greater than 18 inches in length), medium
(between 1 and 5 pounds or between 6 to 18 inches in length), or small (less than 1 pound or
less than 6 inches in length). Automated routines can then be developed to compare those
reported results to preset anomaly criteria of large (SNR greater than 500), medium (SNR
between 50 and 500) or small (SNR less than 50). Tests where a match is not made between
reported finding and anomaly characteristics would be flagged for further review by project
geophysicists. Any combination of anomaly characteristics can be developed into any number
of tests to compare dig results with various anomaly characteristics. Tools are available in
Geosofts UXProcess for simplifying these tests. Relational databases are also good tools for
automating these tests. Excavation reporting should be demonstrated during the GPO including
simulated failure scenarios.
8-8. Special Considerations for Planning Geophysical Investigations.
a. Survey Coverage Considerations. Survey coverage issues will arise when competing
project objectives are defined within the framework of the project’s DQOs. As an example,
survey coverage issues will arise in situations where a project objective to not disrupt protected
or endangered species is stated, but complying with that objective restricts vegetation clearance
and therefore limits or precludes geophysical mapping. Other situations will arise where
accessibility is hindered by terrain conditions, cultural interferences, or other natural or
manmade impediments. Another common conflict arises in resources required to meet some
stated objectives, such as wanting all detected anomalies investigated during a characterization
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project. Often the resources required and costs associated with such an objective will be very
high, but the “value-added” to the characterization outcome would be minimal in doing so.
(1) Sometimes compromises can be reached, such as using less sensitive detectors that
require less vegetation removal and therefore minimize impact to native or listed species, or
using anomaly selection schemes that provide representative samples of each different anomaly
type. Sometimes no compromise can be reached and either the areas in question will be left
unmapped or the requisite steps will be taken to make all areas accessible to the mapping and
response technologies.
(2) Issues impacting survey coverage should be identified as early as possible during
planning phases. If none are immediately identified during planning, but the potential exists for
such issues to arise, it may be beneficial for the project team to plan for such cases and include
any such plans in the geophysical work plan. In the event compromise strategies are used, it is
critical that all project team members completely understand the benefits and limitations of the
compromise strategy in terms of what MEC will likely be detected, and what MEC may go
undetected. The characterization and excavation needs listed in Geophysical Investigation
Strategies can help in identifying and resolving survey coverage issues during project planning.
b. Managing False Positives, No Contacts, “Hot Rock” Contacts and Geology Contacts.
Many geophysical instruments detect anomalies associated with geology and cultural features
such as power lines. When such anomalies are repeatable they are usually associated with
geologic sources, also referred to as “hot rocks”. When the sources are not repeatable, or are
detected with highly varying signal strengths they are usually associated with cultural features
such as power lines, or vehicles passing by. In many cases, small MEC near the surface or large
MEC buried deep can have anomaly characteristics similar to anomalies that could be
associated with local geology. In other instances, MEC responses will almost never have
responses similar to local geology, such as when power lines are present over or near a project
site. Such anomalies can usually be interpreted as cultural interference, however, on occasion,
these may manifest themselves in geophysical data with characteristics similar to MEC.
(1) For any project where the field teams may encounter any of these situations, the
contractor should develop, and submit for Government concurrence, a plan for accepting and/or
rejecting the reported findings for anomalies that have characteristics of geology/cultural
features and MEC. Normally, such plans will be confined to managing low-amplitude and/or
small spatial extent anomalies reported as false positives, no contacts or geology (hot rock).
These types of anomalies are more prone to have response characteristics that could be
associated with either a metallic source or some other noise source. This plan should define
specific metrics for accepting or rejecting anomalies in this category, and the plan should
identify quantity thresholds that will trigger a re-evaluation of the project methodologies to
address increased, or unexpected high quantities of false positives and/or no contacts.
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8-9. Geophysical System Capabilities and MEC Detection Capabilities. In this sub-section, we
describe how MEC detection rates and detection depths are evaluated on a project-specific
basis.
a. MEC “detectability” is dependant upon numerous factors, but the general rule is, the
larger the MEC, the deeper it can be detected. Many factors must be considered when
evaluating whether a given geophysical system or technique can detect a given MEC item at a
specified burial depth. Factors that are specific to MEC items that affect how deep they can be
detected include their length, diameter, surface area, volume, weight, and their 3D orientation
with respect to the geophysical sensor when the sensor is passed over them. Factors of the
geophysical systems that are relevant to the detection depths of MEC include, for EMI
detectors, the physical size of the instrument’s transmitter and receiver coils, the operating
power of the transmitter coil, the sensitivity of the receiver(s), the measurement/sampling
densities, the speed of the survey platform, the distance of the coils above the ground, and the
geologic conditions and environmental conditions at the site. For magnetic detectors, the
relevant factors are the sensitivity of the magnetometer, the measurement/sampling densities,
the distance of the sensor(s) above the ground, and the geologic conditions and environmental
conditions at the site. Lastly, a factor common to all geophysical surveys, both analog and
digital, is how the criteria for anomaly selections are established. Often a trade-off must be
made between the total number of anomalies that can be selected for excavation and the
number of low-amplitude anomalies that can be selected which may be associated with smaller,
deep-buried MEC if they occur on the project site. Often, the GPO is used to estimate how deep
MEC can be detected under the site-specific geologic and environmental conditions.
b. For performance based contracts, the factors described above must be evaluated and,
in most instances, written into the project execution plan and/or project quality management
plan as part of the project’s geophysics performance metrics.
c. When the types of MEC at a site are unknown, or are only suspected, and the PDT
needs to establish initial minimum detection capability requirements, the generalized formula
below can be used as a screening tool during geophysical system selections. However, it must
be noted that this formula does not account for MEC item composition, weight or length, nor
does it account for the item’s burial orientation (i.e. pointing down, laying flat, etc.) or adverse
geological or environmental conditions (i.e. ultra-mafic geology or MEC detection in urban
environments.) This formula is based, in part, upon evaluations performed at JPG and at other
locations, and only provides an initial estimate of how deeply MEC can be expected to be
detected, provided the assumptions stipulated with the formula are valid.
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Table 8-3: Simplified Expression for Estimating MEC Detection Depths
Using Geophysical Techniques
Estimated Detection Depth (meters) = 11*diameter (mm)/1000
Assumptions:
Item length is at least two times its diameter
Item is not constructed of thin-walled metal
Item is in a “worst-case” orientation with respect to the sensor (e.g. for EMI
instruments, the item’s long axis is co-planar with the system’s coils)
Definitions:
Depth = actual depth to top of buried MEC, in meters.
Diameter = diameter of minor axis of MEC, in millimeters.
Length = length of major axis of MEC.
d. Actual detection capabilities encountered at the site will be different than those
estimated by the formula above; any item not buried in a worst-case orientation should be
detected at depths greater than those estimated by this formula. Also, items having lengths that
are less than twice their diameter, or items manufactured with thin-walled metals, will only be
reliably detected at depths that are shallower than those estimated by this formula. Conversely,
items that are very long compared to their diameter, such as most rockets, or thick-walled
items, such as some projectiles, will be reliably detected at depths that are greater than those
estimated by this formula.
e. Penetration Depth Considerations. The maximum possible depth of MEC is an
important consideration in the selection of an appropriate detection system. If MEC is
intentionally buried, factors affecting burial depth may include type of soil, mechanical vs.
hand-excavation, depth of water table, etc. If the munition was fired or dropped, then the depth
of penetration can be estimated by considering soil type, munition type and weight, and impact
velocity. There are many cases where MEC can penetrate deeper than geophysical systems can
currently reliably detect. At such locations, it is possible that undetected MEC remains deeper
than it can be detected. The topic of ordnance penetration is still under discussion in the
MMRP community. For up-to-date information on this topic contact the MM CX. Figure 8-12
shows the depth of recovery for thousands of MEC items. The curve indicates that while the
maximum depth of penetration of MEC will resemble the depth predicted in the penetration
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analysis, the actual depth of penetration for most items is much lower. In fact, Figure 8-12
shows that most items were located less than two feet deep.
Figure 8-12: Actual Depth of Recovery of Fired UXO
Reference: UXO Recovery Database, NDCEE, 2003. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Task 307.
8-10. Digital Data Format and Storage and Coordinate Reporting.
There are two types of data typically generated during MEC investigations: geophysical
mapping data and geographic information systems (GIS) data. Though geophysical data can be
considered as geographic information, it is often not practical to treat all geophysical mapping
data as GIS data. Specifically, the databases used to store and interpret geophysical
measurements are designed to work with specialized geophysical processing and interpretation
software and often are not easily reformatted to meet GIS storage and reporting standards, and
rarely does the need arise to do so. However, geophysical maps and anomaly databases
produced as the result of geophysical data interpretations are often key components to the
project GIS, and these will often be produced according to the guidelines defined for the project
GIS.
For project specific requirements, refer to the DID and/or PWS/SOW.
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8-11. Geophysical Prove Out Planning. The following paragraphs describe the PDT’s
responsibilities during the geophysical system selection process or geophysical prove-out. The
GPO can be a complex and time-consuming effort, the PDT must collaborate to confine the
scope of the GPO to basic project needs.
a. GPO Purpose. There can be many purposes to a geophysical prove-out, as follows. It
is necessary to state the prove-out objectives and to describe how these objectives will be met
in the GPO Work Plan.
(1) Determine if a particular geophysical system will work at a particular site. There are
geologic, terrain and other differences that can cause proven geophysical systems to not work
at particular project properties.
(2) Determine the optimum geophysical system configuration and SOPs for a particular
project property. All geophysical systems have inherent strengths and weaknesses. Very
seldom will one instrument or system have the best absolute detection rate, the lowest false
alarm rate, the highest production rate, and the lowest cost. Test plots provide information used
to select an optimum geophysical system(s).
(3) Prove detection depth capabilities. This objective is not recommended, but is
provided here in the event the PDT has no information on a particular MEC item that is
uncommon in current MRS projects. The reason this is not recommended is that a large
population of data from national test sites and other GPO sites are available, and the cost for
such a test are generally prohibitive. A more reasonable objective would be to demonstrate that
the system is meeting typical detection performance capabilities for a given target of interest,
and/or that the project objectives, as stated by the PDT in the PWS/SOW, are technically
feasible.
(4) Prove detection depths at which the probability of detection should be approximately
one hundred percent for MEC items of a given size or grouping. This objective is not
recommended, but is provided here in the event insufficient information on a particular MEC
item is available to estimate depths at which probability of detection should be approximately
one hundred percent. A more reasonable objective would be to demonstrate the system is
meeting typical detection performance capabilities for a given target of interest. Normally, a
buried MEC item must produce a geophysical anomaly with relatively high signal to noise
ratios in order to be detected with high certainty. However, all magnetic and electromagnetic
detection technologies measure potential fields whose magnitudes (or “strengths”) are inversely
proportional to the distance cubed (or more) between the sensor and the buried item. See
Section 8.3 for more information on geophysical detection capabilities.
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(5) Assure contractor compliance with the contract. Test plots provide a safe area for the
geophysical investigation team to develop site-specific field and evaluation procedures
necessary to demonstrate compliance with project requirements.
(6) Evaluate the PDT’s data collection, data transfer method(s), and data transfer rates.
(7) Establish site-specific geophysical data needs and site-specific data quality measures
and protocols for all work tasks involving geophysics and all work tasks that use geophysical
data. The GPO provides the PDT the opportunity to describe how they define “good data.”
Elements that affect data usability will often focus on coverage, measurement densities (alongtrack and across-track measurement intervals), and accuracies or precisions of reported
measurement locations. These elements often assume instrument function checks were
successful. For example, based on GPO results, a response action designed to detect 81mm
mortars in an open field may require 100% coverage of the site, that sensor line spacing be 0.8
meters (typical) and not exceed 1m, that along-track measurement intervals be 25cm (typical)
and not exceed 80cm, and that positioning accuracy be 20cm (typical) and not exceed 30cm.
(8) Establish site-specific anomaly characteristics for selection criteria.
(9) Demonstrate anomaly resolution procedures to assure contractor SOPs will achieve
both project requirements and quality control and quality assurance requirements. Many
anomaly resolution procedures use geophysical systems with different detection capabilities,
and the Contractor must demonstrate their SOPs account for such differences. See Section 8.2.5
for more information on the topic of anomaly resolution. GPO sites located outside of project
boundaries are best suited to demonstrate all anomaly resolution procedures.
b. Factors in GPO Site Selection.. Selection of the GPO site(s) will be based upon the
technical and site-specific considerations developed and finalized during the TPP process
and/or PDT meetings. Factors to be considered include:
(1) Similarity of terrain, vegetation, and geologic conditions to actual field conditions.
(2) Proximity to the project property.
(3) Isolation from overhead power lines, radio transmitters, underground utilities, etc.
(4) Convenient access.
(5) Likelihood that area will remain undisturbed during period of use.
(6) Rights-of-Entry.
(7) Possibility of pre-existing buried MEC.
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(8) Need to excavate known and/or unknown anomalies
c. Factors in GPO design.
(1) Pre-Seeding (Background) Geophysical Mapping. After a location has been selected
and the surface prepared, a pre-seeding geophysical survey will be performed in order to
determine and document base-line geophysical conditions at the location.
(2) Size and Configuration. Each plot is unique, but for project properties where a
significant amount of geophysical mapping is anticipated, then a test plot of one-quarter acre to
one acre in size and with 20 to 50 separate buried items, would be typical. For project
properties with limited geophysical mapping, much smaller and less complex plots will be
considered. Test plots need not be square; they can be any convenient shape. For projects
where transect data collection is expected, the GPO should be configured to test this
methodology, including turning points. It may be necessary to prepare more than one proveout grid, mini-grid, or test strip if site conditions vary significantly.
(3) Survey Accuracy. The basic need is to determine the centroid of each item to high
enough precision to test positioning accuracy. Survey accuracy of the test plot corners and of
all items buried in the test plot will typically be to the nearest 3 cm as referenced to the control
point(s) or reference point(s) used. Additional information may be required, such as position of
nose and tail if advanced processing or discrimination is planned.
(4) Layout. Test plots will have items or areas designated as “known” items or areas.
The geophysical mapping team will be provided all pertinent information about the known
items or areas so they can optimize their equipment and procedures. Government PDT
members can use items placed at locations unknown to the Contractor to independently
evaluate Contractor procedures and claims.
(5) Seeded Items. A listing of probable military munitions to be seeded in the grid will
be developed by the PDT. After the list is developed, sources of inert items will be determined.
Any inert munitions used as seed items should be painted blue and tagged with a nonbiodegradable label identifying the items as inert and providing a contract reference, a point of
contact address, phone number, and a target identifier. It is preferable that inert ordnance or
similar items be utilized in the GPO grid. However, due to the difficulty in locating and
transporting such items it will often be necessary to manufacture surrogate items of
approximately the same composition, size and shape for use in the test plot. If such surrogate
items are used, it is necessary to demonstrate that each item is reproducing the geophysical
characteristics of the actual munition(s) of interest, based on in-grid comparisons or references
to signature libraries. In many cases, multiple types of military munitions have been utilized at
an area and it will not be feasible to duplicate all of them. In such cases the geophysicist(s) and
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UXO technician(s) will work together to determine when different types of military munitions
may be consolidated into one class, or group, for GPO purposes.
(6) Depths and Orientation. The seed items will be buried at various depths and
orientations. There is seldom a reason to bury the seed items excessively shallow or deep.
Rather, the seed items will be buried at depths to demonstrate that the project objectives, as
stated by the PDT in the PWS/SOW are technically feasible. The orientation of the item will
also affect the instrument’s ability to detect that item. In general, duplicate items will be buried
in an East-West orientation, a North-South orientation, and an up-down orientation, at each
depth studied. The number of seeded items will be sufficient to provide a representative
sampling of probable munitions (type, orientation, condition, and depth). Generally, the
number of seeded items placed in the GPO will not be sufficient to prove a probability of
detection (Pd) of the geophysical survey instruments for all items at each of the various depths.
The number of items needed to demonstrate the Pd of the geophysical systems for all MEC at
all expected depths and orientations would be far too numerous, and the construction of the
GPO far too expensive. The number, orientation, and depths of the seed items used in the GPO
will be sufficient to characterize the capabilities and limitations of the proposed geophysical
systems and to evaluate the ability of the proposed geophysical equipment to locate each type
of MEC at the anticipated depths and orientations. After the seed items are buried, care will be
taken to blend excavation locations back to natural conditions.
(7) In-Field Seed Item Depth Testing. In some circumstances, it may be beneficial to
perform open-hole tests over seeded items before they are interred, the purpose being to
confirm they are indeed detectable. For instance, if seed item response at some predetermined
SNR is identified as a project need, open-hole tests are effective for confirming any particular
deep buried items are at least detectable at those SNRs prior to interment. Signal to noise ratios
are not expected to increase as a result of interment; rather, they are likely to remain the same
or decrease. Other useful information is recording maximum response of seed items placed on
the ground surface. For such tests, the seed items are placed along the ground surface and data
collected over them when placed at both their “best” and “worst” orientations. For example,
these orientations would be horizontal and vertical for horizontal-loop TDEMI detectors.
(8) Cultural Interference. Some field locations will have significant cultural interference.
In such cases, consideration will be given to duplicating that interference in the test plot.
Sources of this cultural interference could include proximity to buildings and power lines
and/or cultural debris (metallic trash items).
(9) Munitions Debris Interference. At most impact areas there are many times more
pieces of munitions debris (frag) than there are MEC. This frag often results in a serious
degradation in the capability of the geophysical systems to detect MEC. In such cases,
consideration will be given to duplicating the effects of frag in the test plot, either through the
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use of artificially placed frag, or by the actual establishment of the test plot in an area
containing frag.
(10) Data Collection Variables. It is important to collect and analyze test plot data using
the same equipment, personnel and procedures that are planned for field use. Multiple
geophysical surveys using each proposed geophysical instrument will be performed. When
collecting data for a prove-out, the following elements are subject to modification and
evaluation. It will not be necessary to evaluate every factor at every location. However,
sufficient data should be collected to analyze changes in anomaly responses as functions of
typical variability expected for each element as a result of differing site conditions. The PDT
will determine the elements to be evaluated for a particular project:
(a) Instrument Height. The height of the detection portion of the instrument can be
modified. Generally speaking, the closer the detector is to the MEC, the more pronounced the
instrument response will be. When the intended target is small items, it may be beneficial to
move the detector closer to the ground. On the other hand, if the intended target is large, it
might be beneficial to raise the detector in order to minimize the influence of small items.
(b) Instrument Orientation and Direction of Travel. Instrument orientation and direction
of travel can have a pronounced effect, particularly with magnetometry. A magnetometer can
measure different values over a single location, depending on direction of travel and
orientation. When precise surveys are being performed it is necessary to add a "heading
correction" to each data point in order to account for this variation.
(c) Measurement Interval. Instrument readings will be collected at intervals sufficient to
meet project objectives, depending on the type of instrument used. Typically, measurement
interval range between 0.1m and 0.5 m. In most cases the highest available data collection
frequency should be used. There is rarely a reason to use a lower frequency given current data
storage capabilities and computer processing speeds.
(d) Lane or Line Width. Lane width is usually specified for mag and flag type surveys
and refers to the distance between operators. Line width is typically specified for digital
surveys and refers to the distance between the lines along which the geophysical data is being
collected. The widths may be modified depending on the size and/or orientation of the
intended MEC. For large items such as 500 lb bombs or 5-inch rockets, a lane or line width of
5.0 feet may be acceptable. For small items or items with anticipated vertical orientations, lane
widths of 3 feet or line widths of only one 1.0 foot may be necessary.
8-12. Data Analysis and Interpretation. The ability to analyze and interpret the geophysical
data collected at the prove-out grid will be demonstrated by the PDT using the methods of its
choice. The digital data collected at the prove-out grid from each geophysical instrument will
be post-processed and analyzed. The results of mag and flag performed using different process
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variables, such as variable lane widths or instrument settings, will be assessed individually. A
final listing of selected target anomalies will be prepared and provided to the PDT for
comparison with seeded item locations.
a. Many software packages can be used to evaluate geophysical data. Often the
geophysical equipment manufacturers provide specialized software for specific systems. This
software is primarily used to transfer the data from the instrument to the computer and perform
corrections to the data. Corrections such as navigation adjustments and rotation and translation
of coordinate systems are necessary before analyzing the data. The corrected data is then
transferred into a software package designed to facilitate contouring, mapping and selection of
anomalous data potentially representing MEC.
b. Field editing of the data will include removal of data spikes, correcting for fiducial
marks, and exporting ASCII data files.
c. Initial processing (sometimes referred to as “pre-processing”) of the geophysical data
will include incorporation of navigation and positional information, instrument drift and
leveling, heading error corrections, and latency corrections.
d. Additional processing of the geophysical data may include digital filtering and
enhancement techniques, development of threshold and anomaly selection criteria, and
anomaly prioritization.
e. All processing needs to be well documented so that results can be checked and
procedures verified.
f. Anomaly Selection Variables. Different anomaly characteristics can be used to
discriminate anomalies more likely to be associated with MEC from those less likely to be
associated with MEC. As part of the GPO, all available anomaly characteristics should be
evaluated to determine how different combinations of characteristics and different criteria for
each may be used to reduce the level of digging required for a given project. Many anomaly
characteristics can be calculated automatically, and these include: peak anomaly response,
signal to noise ratio of the anomaly power (based on all above-background measurements),
spatial area of contiguous above-background measurements, and model fit parameters. Other
characteristics exist that are system-dependent.
g. Data Evaluation. The geophysical data will be evaluated and scored so that the
different geophysical approaches can be compared and ranked. Scoring criteria will include, as
a minimum, the following: detection rate; false alarm rate; production rate; cost per unit area;
equipment durability and safety. No single geophysical system is likely to achieve maximum
scores in all evaluated areas. Therefore, the evaluation team will determine which approach is
likely to be the most efficient for the project property and project objectives.
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h. Selection of Detection Systems. The PDT, based upon the results of the GPO, and, if
appropriate, experiences at other project properties having similar geophysical conditions, will
select one or more systems for use. Factors influencing the selection may include detection
rates, false positive rates, production rates, required operating protocols/SOPs, equipment
durability, and safety. The GPO report will contain all supporting information required by the
PDT to support their selection decisions.
8-13. Geophysical Work Plans.
a. The Geophysical Investigation Plan, a component of the Work Plan, will be submitted
to the PM and MM DC. The MM DC will route the plan to the appropriate technical staff for
review, comment and approval. Once approved by the DC and CO, the Geophysical
Investigation Plan represents the standard to which all geophysical activities are compared to
assure compliance during the project.
b. Prior to initiating field activities, a Geophysical Investigation Plan will be prepared.
This plan, which is a subsection of the Work Plan, is prepared to describe the project
requirements for all activities related to geophysical operations and those tasks that rely on
geophysical data and interpretations. The Geophysical Investigation Plan will include, either
by inclusion or by reference (usually to the GPO), justification for using the proposed
geophysical system(s) and related methodologies. The plan will also explain how the proposed
methods and procedures will be tailored to anticipated site conditions, technical requirements,
applicable safety and security regulations, and strategies. The Geophysical Investigation Plan
will include procedures for a geophysical instrument prove-out, if one is required and was not
previously completed.
c. For project specific requirements, refer to the DID and/or PWS/SOW.
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CHAPTER 9
QUALITY CONTROL OF GEOPHYSICAL SYSTEMS AND RELATED
OPERATIONS
9-1. Introduction.
a. The general objective of geophysical investigations during a munitions response is to
efficiently locate buried MEC so it can be properly evaluated, recovered and disposed. Specific
geophysical investigation objectives of a project are defined by the PDT and will be measurable
and attainable. They may also be risk-based, meaning finding MEC during QC or QA
inspections that are deeper and more difficult to reliably detect may not always constitute a
major defect.
b. In this chapter we discuss quality in the context of the geophysical system as defined in
the introduction to Chapter 8. Since MEC geophysical systems make use of both digital
geophysical mapping (DGM) and/or analog geophysical mapping (also referred to as “mag and
flag” or “mag and dig” operations), this chapter will often highlight whether a particular topic
is relevant to DGM systems, analog systems, or both. When a topic is specific to systems using
digital techniques, we either put the word “digital” or the term “DGM” in parentheses after the
topic, for systems using analog tools, we put the word “analog” in parentheses. Topics relevant
to both types of systems will have the words “analog and digital” in parentheses. The reader is
referred to Chapter 8 of this document for more details on digital and analog geophysical
systems.
c. On munitions response projects, there are two elements subject to Geophysical
QC/QA: processes and products. "Processes" are the project-specific geophysical planning and
data collection/data analysis procedures and all related field activities performed. "Products"
are the final project-specific deliverables and results that are achieved. The products must be
defined by the PDT and will vary depending on the type of project being performed. For
example, the remedial action product of having a cleared parcel of land is more important than
it is for a characterization project, which may only require a parcel be characterized as having
MEC contamination or not. Other possible deliverable products include properly formatted
raw and processed geophysical data, legible geophysical maps, complete interpretations,
complete dig sheets with all relevant geophysical data and intrusive results, complete project
reports, and complete quality control documentation in accordance with the quality control
plan.
d. Both the project processes and the project products will be part of a formal quality
management process in order to demonstrate that project objectives are met. In most instances
where geophysical systems are used, whether digital or analog, emphasis will be placed upon
process quality management because the success, or failure, of geophysical products is highly
dependent upon how the systems are used. The intent of this chapter is to provide a guide for
the PDT in identifying the important aspects of geophysical systems that will require
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monitoring for quality. When formulating a quality control plan or quality assurance activities,
this chapter provides options that can be selected and tailored to the specific geophysical
system(s) that will be used by the PDT. Details on how to plan and manage specific quality
assurance activities are provided in the Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans Chapter. The QC
plans and QC tests that are designed as a function of the guidance in this chapter will often be
reflected as elements of a project’s quality assurance surveillance plan.
9-2. Process Quality Management.
a. Quality control of the processes used to perform geophysical operations should focus
on demonstrating “good data” and “good results” are produced. The PDT should explicitly
define what “good data” means. Statements such as “a clean site” or “a well characterized site”
are ambiguous and can not be used to develop rigorous quality control or quality assurance
programs. Typically, the term “good data” is used to identify specific work products or specific
definable features of work that are the result of specific work tasks or work functions. These
tasks and functions can be viewed as “key procedures” in QC programs, and the individual
components of the geophysical systems used in performing those procedures are referred to as
sub-systems. Breaking the work processes into key procedures and key sub-systems helps the
PDT identify “how the work will be done” as well as “which tools will be used”. Doing so
helps the PDT develop QC functions for each and helps focus attention to those procedures or
tools that may be prone to failure or degradation in the quality of their product(s). The
following are key procedures requiring special attention when developing QC programs:
(1) Site preparation procedures
(2) Data acquisition procedures
(3) Data processing procedures,
(4) Anomaly selection processes,
(5) Anomaly reacquisition and marking procedures
(6) Anomaly excavation and resolution procedures
b. Critical sub-systems requiring specific monitoring and/or testing in QC programs
include:
(1) The geophysical instruments
(2) The operators
(3) Positioning systems
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(4) Geodetic surveys
c. Once these critical components and their failure modes have been identified, the PDT
technical personnel will develop QC methods and measures (or tests) to ensure or demonstrate
that the processes, as used by the contractor, achieve project objectives and produce good data.
The QC tests and their related failure criteria must be specifically designed to test one or more
key procedures or sub-systems. Rarely will a single QC test provide a thorough check of all
possible failure modes for a given geophysical system. In many instances two or more QC
methods will be used to monitor critical procedures and sub-systems. The PDT should verify
all QC measures have been implemented and all QC tests meet their pass/fail criteria. Any test
that fails should be fully addressed through root-cause analyses and corrective actions, before
being accepted by the Government.
d. Listed below are elements of critical procedures and sub-systems that can be used to
define what is meant by “good data”. These elements, if applicable, would be critical to the
quality of all geophysical surveys performed to detect MEC. The frequency any one QC test
should be performed to monitor these procedures should be determined by the PDT. Typical
frequencies to be considered include: beginning of project, daily, start and end of day, start and
end of collecting a dataset, per parcel of land basis, per operator basis (for analog systems),
and/or per team basis (for analog systems, reacquisition and resolution operations).
(1) Define Geophysical Systems Function Checks: Purpose is to verify the geophysical
system has not malfunctioned. Checked by performing repeatability tests, standard response
tests, evaluating background noise levels, evaluating positioning accuracies and precisions, and
re-sweeping or digitally mapping sections of analog geophysics lanes.
(2) Define Survey Coverage Requirements: Purpose is to clearly define overall survey
coverage needs for all possible terrain/vegetation/obstruction conditions on-site. This topic
must also address allowable gaps between adjacent DGM survey lines. Methods of checking
coverage include reviewing track plots (non line-and-fiducial methods), calculating sizes of
data gaps, implementing a blind seeding program using small metallic objects, and visual
observations of line-and-fiducial, odometer and analog surveys.
(3) Define Along-Track Measurement Interval Requirements: Purpose is to clearly
define along-track data density needs. Methods of checking along-track data density include
calculating along-track sampling intervals (digital), calculating instantaneous point-to-point
velocities (digital), visual observations (analog), and logging time-in-lane (analog).
(4) Define MEC Detection and Anomaly Selection Criteria: Purpose is to verify that
anomaly selection criteria meet project needs. Criteria are normally defined during project
planning and/or the GPO. Tested by reviewing documentation of anomaly selection criteria
used for each dataset interpreted (digital), blind seeding for MEC detection and anomaly
selection using inert or simulated MEC at or near maximum required burial depths (digital and
analog), blind seeding using metallic objects that produce analog detection responses similar to,
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or identical to MEC, digitally mapping sections of analog geophysics lanes to prove no MEClike anomalies remain, re-sweeping analog geophysics lanes using analog tools to prove no
MEC-like anomalies remain.
(5) Define Anomaly Reacquisition Requirements: Purpose is to verify detected and
selected anomalies are marked for excavation. Checked by setting Pass/Fail anomaly
repeatability criteria, setting Pass/Fail maximum allowable offset distances, testing efficacy of
procedures for marking all localized anomalies during project planning and/or the GPO, and
testing implementation of the false positives and no-contacts management plan during project
planning and/or the GPO.
(6) Define Anomaly Resolution Requirements: Purpose is to verify the excavated
item(s) adequately explain anomaly characteristics. This topic must also include criteria for
accepting dig results reported as false positives, no-contacts, “geology” or “hot rocks”.
Methods for testing anomaly resolution procedures include defining size/depth/weight criteria
for various categories of anomaly characteristics, post excavation verifications using
appropriate geophysical systems, and inspection of dig results and anomaly maps.
(7) Define Process Specific Requirements for specialized or unique processes or subsystems: Purpose is to verify that procedures specific to a particular system are performed to
meet project needs. Examples include: defining not-to-exceed survey speeds for systems
sensitive to survey velocity, defining specific setup procedures for specialized positioning
systems, and defining specialized function check requirements for systems requiring
specialized function-checks or calibration.
e. Known Failure Modes of Common Geophysical Procedures. Tabulated below are
possible failure modes for several key procedures and key sub-systems that are commonly
used. The table also includes suggested quality control measures that can be implemented to
monitor for possible failures.
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Table 9-1: Common procedures and their related failure modes
Procedure
Failure Mode or Cause
Geophysical Mapping, General
Contractor using un-authorized and/or untested equipment and/or unauthorized field
procedures
1. Visual observations,
Broken equipment or bad cable connections
1. Static background test,
Instrument set-up
Valid QC Checks
2. Verify the QC Plan is specific to the geophysical
system(s) accepted/authorized for the project.
2. Static spike,
3. Cable shake tests,
4. Other system-specific function tests
5. Personnel Tests
Geophysical Mapping, General
Mapping coverage is not achieving required
coverage goals
1. For analog methods and line and fiducial methods,
visual observations
2. For digital methods, plot track-plots and review
for coverage
3. For digital methods, use automated tools to
calculate actual coverage achieved.
Line and Fiducial DGM,
Insufficient or excessive measurements
odometer trigger mode or time- accrued along a segment
based trigger mode
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1. Check count of measurements at each end-of-line,
2. Check distance between along-line readings during
post processing.
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Procedure
Failure Mode or Cause
Valid QC Checks
3. Collect repeat data
Line and Fiducial DGM,
odometer trigger mode
Data gaps mis-positioned (e.g. gaps due to
trees or other common obstructions) due to
poor procedure or incorrectly entered values
during acquisition or post-processing.
1. Measure actual location of gaps in the field and
compare to those shown during processing.
2. Check track-plot maps for inconsistent along-line
measurement spacing on both sides of gaps.
3. Collect repeat data
Line and Fiducial DGM, timebased trigger mode
Fiducial marks and/or start or end locations
were mis-placed during acquisition or
incorrectly entered during post-processing.
1. Create a map showing survey speeds or track-plots
to check for line segments with inconsistent
velocities or inconsistent measurement spacing
2. Collect repeat data
Line and Fiducial DGM,
odometer and time-based
trigger mode
Operator deviates laterally from the planned
path
1. Visual observation during acquisition.
2. Placement of blind positioning seeds and
confirming seeds are not detected on lines too far
(laterally) from where they were placed.
3. Collect repeat data
Line and Fiducial DGM,
odometer and time-based
trigger modes
Data mis-positioned due to unsquare grid
setup and/or grid dimensions are not as
reported
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1. Measure diagonals across grid to confirm 90
degree grid corners.
2. Measure lengths of grid boundaries
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Procedure
Failure Mode or Cause
Valid QC Checks
DGM field procedures using
automated positioning system
Data mis-positioned due to spikes or “erratic
behavior” in the positioning solutions.
1. Create a map showing survey speeds and check for
areas with inconsistent velocities.
2. If available, check positioning solution quality,
such as HDOP, number of reference stations or
satellites used, signal strength.
3. Collect repeat data
DGM field procedures using
automated positioning systems
Data mis-positioned due to incorrectly entered
sensor-to-positioning antenna offsets or
incorrectly entered positioning system
reference coordinates.
1. Place blind seeds throughout survey area and
check they are detected within expected
accuracies.
DGM field procedures using
automated positioning systems
Data mis-positioned due to incorrect base
station coordinates or base station set-up over
wrong location
1. Perform and record daily static positioning checks
over known control points.
Digital Geophysical Mapping,
Data Processing
Processing yields anomalies with atypical
shape characteristics
1. Visual reviews of DGM maps for anomaly shape
characteristics,
2. Perform the “clover-leaf” test over a known
point(s) and verify the trackplots cross at proper
coordinates.
2. check interpreted locations of QC and/or QA seed
items,
3. verify sensor to positioning antenna offsets,
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Procedure
Failure Mode or Cause
Valid QC Checks
4. check latency values used and check for changes
in survey speed if simple “lag” corrections are
used.
5. Perform latency tests
Digital Geophysical Mapping,
Anomaly selections
Processing and anomaly selection methods
produce excessive anomaly selections and/or
anomalies are the result of gridding artifacts.
1. Visual review and/or automated verification of
anomaly proximities,
2. overlay track-plots on gridded data to confirm all
anomalies are real,
3. check drift corrections or filtering results in high
gradient areas.
Anomaly Reacquisition,
General
Low amplitude and/or small area anomalies
reacquired beyond their footprint shown on
DGM maps.
1. Define critical search radius (maximum not-toexceed search radius) to encompass all possible
anomaly size scenarios, or
2. provide anomaly-specific critical search radius
(Rcrit) based on anomaly footprint size.
Anomaly Reacquisition,
General
Large and/or high amplitude anomalies
reported as No-Contact or False-Positive.
1. Define threshold values above which additional
reviews and/or field actions are required before
being accepted.
2. If the reacquisition procedure does not use the
exact same instrument model used to detect and
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Procedure
Failure Mode or Cause
Anomaly Reacquisition,
process uses a system with
inferior detection capabilities
compared to those of the
original mapping survey
Wrong anomaly is reacquired
Valid QC Checks
interpret anomalies, return to the location with the
same model instrument.
1. Define limits for acceptable location offsets
between interpreted location and flagged location,
based on systems and processes used.
2. Compare dig results for each anomaly with the
associated geophysical anomaly characteristics
3. After excavations, return with original detection
system, to original interpreted location, for a
portion or all anomalies and confirm no anomalies
remain.
Analog geophysics (mag &
flag operations)
Analog geophysics (mag &
flag operations)
Geophysical anomaly remains after mapping
and digging operations are complete, anomaly
source is unknown.
1. Re-map a portion or all of the area with a digital
geophysical system and/or an analog system,
Large piece(s) of metal having MEC-like
physical characteristics or that could be
masking nearby MEC remains after mapping
and digging operations are complete.
1. Re-map a portion or all of the area and excavate
anomalies to confirm they do not meet failure
criteria or to confirm all large pieces of surface
metal have no MEC buried beneath them,
2. Place blind seed items at depths required to be
cleared, place blind seed items at locations that are
difficult to access.
2. Place blind seed items throughout project area.
Analog geophysics (mag &
flag operations)
Operator not achieving proper coverage, not
using good sweep techniques, or not properly
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Procedure
Failure Mode or Cause
interpreting instrument measurements
Valid QC Checks
2. re-sweeping by second party for presence of MEClike anomalies,
3. Blind seeding to produce MEC-like signals similar
to the MEC of concern.
QC Tests
Insufficient documentation or documentation
not provided to COE within required
deliverable schedule.
1. Verify PWS/SOW and contract states that QC
documentation will be submitted to COE and the
deliverable schedule,
2. Ensure COE has input into required QC
documentation.
3. Ensure COE is notified of all root-cause analyses
and that COE has authority to reject incomplete
root-cause analyses and/or incomplete corrective
actions.
Documenting excavation
activities and dig results
Incomplete and/or inaccurate information
recorded
1. Visual observations
2. Review information on recovered seed items
3. Check for consistent nomenclature in reported
information
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f. Example quality standards for geophysical procedures and how they are used. Some
typical quality Pass/Fail tests for geophysical operations are listed below. Each is identified as
applicable to digital mapping, analog mapping, or both. Normally, Pass/Fail criteria will be
quantified or defined for each test performed. A brief description of how each test is
implemented is also provided. When a specific test is used, it will normally be tailored to sitespecific and contract-specific needs and requirements. Where applicable, Pass/Fail criteria
should be defined based upon the current knowledge of the project site(s). The Pass/Fail criteria
would normally be revised in the event new information about a site is discovered over the
course of the project. If the examples below are used by the PDT, the example Pass/Fail criteria
must be tailored to project objectives and the geophysical system(s) used.
(1) All “positioning seed items” (e.g. 8 to 10-inch nails) shall be detected and their
locations interpreted within [specify distance] meter of their burial locations. Applicable to
DGM. This test can be incorporated into QC and/or QA programs. The purpose of this test is to
verify all operations related to data positioning are performed to meet project positioning needs.
The distance specified is normally one-half the across-line line spacing objective, although
smaller criteria values can be used if feasible and needed. For example, if a line spacing of
0.8m (2.5ft) is used, this criterion would be set to 0.4m. This test is implemented by placing
small metallic items throughout a project site using high-accuracy surveying techniques. The
goal is to use pieces of metal that will produce relatively large amplitude anomalies over small
areas. Failure of the contractor to properly position the associated anomalies will normally
require re-processing the data or re-collecting the data.
(2) All coverage seed items (e.g. 4 to 8-inch nails) shall be detected and removed.
Applicable to analog mapping. This test can be incorporated into QC and/or QA programs. The
purpose of this test is to verify analog mapping coverage. This test is implemented by placing
small metallic items throughout a project site. Accuracy of placement will normally not be
critical. The protocol for placing these seed items can be on a per operator basis or on a per
team basis. The frequency for placing these items can be on a per parcel of land basis, per team
per day basis, per operator per day basis, per lane basis, or other shorter or longer intervals of
time. The goal is to use pieces of metal that will produce relatively large amplitude anomalies
over small areas. Failure of the contractor to properly recover all coverage seed items will
normally require re-mapping all affected parcels of land (if on a per team basis) or all affected
lanes (if on a per operator basis).
(3) All inert MEC seeds and simulated MEC seeds shall be detected, their locations
interpreted within [specify distance] meter of their burial points, and selected for placement on
dig lists, or excavated during analog operations. Applicable to DGM and analog mapping. This
test can be incorporated into QC and/or QA programs. The purpose of this test is to verify
geophysical operations meet the project’s MEC detection and anomaly resolution needs. The
distance specified is normally one-half the across-line line spacing objective, although smaller
criteria values can be used if feasible and needed. For example, if a line spacing of 0.8m (2.5ft)
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is used, this criterion would be set to 0.4m. Note that most MEC are long and create large
anomalies. Therefore, the objective should be to have any part of the buried item within the
specified distance of the dig location; the specified distance need not be measured to the center
of the item. This test is implemented by placing inert MEC or simulated MEC items throughout
a project site using high-accuracy surveying techniques. Items must be placed at depths that test
both the procedures and detection capabilities. To test procedures, seed items must be placed at
depths that produce sufficient SNR such that the item can unambiguously be detected and
resolved. To test detection capabilities, seed items must be placed at depths that test either the
maximum contract-required detection depth or the maximum achievable detection depth, as
determined by the PDT during project planning. Seeding rates will vary, but optimum rates
would test each DGM dataset or each analog instrument operator daily. Failure of the
contractor to properly detect, select and resolve the associated anomalies will require processspecific root cause analysis and corrective actions. For DGM operations corrective actions may
include re-processing the data or re-collecting the data. For analog operations corrective actions
may include re-mapping by the sweep team, or DGM mapping of affected areas.
(4) DGM maps shall represent as best as possible the actual potential field as it existed at
the time of data collection. Applicable to DGM. Tests associated with this statement are
normally incorporated into the QC program. This statement is intended to capture all typical
field and processing steps needed to address known failure modes common to most geophysical
systems. Tests include checking that all measurement positioning corrections (latency and
sensor offset corrections) are implemented, diurnal corrections (for magnetics) are performed,
repeatability tests are successful, sensor response tests (commonly referred to as the “spike”
test) are within tolerance, personnel tests are successful, noise level tests are successful, drift
corrections are properly applied, and cable tests are successful. Failure of any one test will
normally result in either re-processing the data or re-collecting the data. The reader is referred
to the Ordnance and Explosives Digital Geophysical Mapping Guidance – Operational
Procedures and Quality Control Manual (USAESCH, 2003) and Quality Assurance Made
Easy: Working With Quantified, Site-Specific QC Metrics (Proceedings of the
UXO/Countermine Forum, 2004) for more details and examples of how these individual QC
tests are designed and implemented.
(5) Discovery of undocumented data coverage gaps that exceed the maximum allowable
data gap distance of [enter distance] meter(s,) or excessive data gaps between the [enter project
line spacing objective] and the maximum allowable data gap distance. Applicable to DGM
mapping. This test can be incorporated into QC and/or QA programs. The purpose of this test is
to verify geophysical operations meet the project’s survey coverage objectives. The distances
specified are normally defined during project planning, or may be specified in the SOW/PWS.
The project’s “line spacing objective” is defined as the design line spacing, such as 0.8m
(2.5ft). Since most geophysical systems do not collect data along perfect straight lines, some
tolerance may be factored into the QC/QA test criteria. For example, if the line spacing
objective is 0.8m (2.5ft), and a 1m diameter sensor is being used, infrequent deviations from
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the 0.8m objective may be tolerated to a limit of 1.3m while maintaining high confidence all
MEC will be detected (the 1.3m distance being the “maximum allowable data gap distance”,
which would normally be defined from GPO data). Such allowable gaps are usually reported as
a sum of all the areas not covered by the objective line spacing. Limits on the amount of “gap
space” (missed areas) are typically set between 0.1% and 0.3% of the total area surveyed. If the
total area “missed” exceeds this limit, data are collected in the gap areas. This test is
implemented by calculating survey coverage using automated computer routines such as
Geosoft’s UXProcess. Failure of the contractor to properly cover the site will require processspecific root cause analysis and corrective actions and will require mapping missed areas.
(6) Discovery of undocumented or unresolved non-conformance or non-compliance as
defined in the accepted QC plan. Applicable to DGM and analog mapping. Tests associated
with this statement are normally incorporated into the QA program. The purpose of this
statement is to clearly assure that the Contractor shall be responsible for performing and
documenting all tasks required in the QC program. This test is usually performed by reviewing
some or all of the Contractor’s QC documentation for thoroughness and completeness. Failure
of the contractor to detect a failed QC test or failure of the contractor to have initiated a rootcause analysis after detecting a QC failure will normally result in the Government’s rejecting
all associated work products until all required QC tasks are complete. QC Pass/Fail criteria
should be developed, as applicable, for each QC test specified in the QC Plan. Table 9-1
presents examples of common QC tests currently used.
(7) Verify all above-background anomalies are uniquely identified [optional: with the
following anomaly characteristics calculated: centroid location, area of contiguous abovebackground measurements, peak responses and the SNR (calculated as signal power above
estimated background power) based upon all above-background measurements]. Applicable to
DGM. These tests can be incorporated into QC and/or QA programs. Tests associated with this
statement will normally be devised to verify that instrument responses with above-background
signatures are identified for further analysis and possible placement onto dig lists. Most tests
will involve reviewing some or all geophysical data to confirm all above-background signatures
meeting project specifications are tabulated in an anomaly table. Failure of the contractor to
meet anomaly detection requirements will normally result in re-processing and/or reinterpreting the data.
(8) Verify all [MEC-like or Project-required] anomalies are selected and loaded into dig
lists. Applicable to DGM mapping. These tests can be incorporated into QC and/or QA
programs. Tests associated with this statement will normally be designed to check that
anomalies selected on dig lists meet project needs. Most tests will involve reviewing some or
all anomaly dig lists and associated geophysical data and/or maps to confirm those anomalies
listed have anomaly characteristics meeting project specifications and to confirm those not
listed do not have characteristics that meet project specifications. Tests may also include
verifying appropriate anomaly selections to confirm automatic anomaly picking routines do not
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adversely increase the number of anomalies listed on dig sheets, which is of particular concern
on characterization projects where the number of contracted excavations is limited or projects
where anomaly excavations are a time and materials task. Failure of the contractor to meet
anomaly selection requirements will normally result in re-processing and/or re-interpreting the
data.
(9) Discovery of a geophysical anomaly that was not detected through normal
mapping/sweeping operations, and which has characteristics similar to, or greater than, those
defined from target objectives buried at depths specified [by the PDT or in the PWS/SOW].
Applicable to DGM and analog mapping. Tests associated with this statement are normally
incorporated into the QC and/or QA program. Tests will normally be based on finding
anomalies during QC or QA inspection having characteristics associated with MEC buried at
depths determined to be “detectable” (e.g. the probability of detection is high.) Initial projectspecific anomaly characteristics can be defined from the GPO and may include signal-to-noise
ratios (digital), spatial extent of above background measurements (analog and digital), fitcoefficients from modeling software (digital), peak amplitude responses (analog and digital), or
any other quantifiable measure of anomaly characteristics specific to the instrumentation used.
For QC or QA inspections that use DGM, these characteristics should not be limited to simple
threshold characteristics of peak amplitude response. For QC or QA inspections using analog
instruments, these characteristics will likely be limited to simple peak threshold responses (e.g.
audio tone or needle deflection) and may include spatial extent of above-background
measurements. Failure of the contractor to detect and resolve MEC-like anomalies that are
easily detected will normally result in re-processing or re-interpreting the data or re-mapping
the associated area(s).
g. Example quality standards for anomaly resolution procedures and how they are used.
(1) Typical quality Pass/Fail tests for anomaly resolution activities are listed below. Each
is identified as applicable to digital mapping, analog mapping or both. A brief description of
how each is implemented is also provided. When any specific test is used, it will normally be
tailored to site-specific and contract-specific needs and requirements. Where applicable,
Pass/Fail criteria should be defined using current knowledge of the project site(s). The Pass/Fail
criteria would normally be revised in the event new information about a site is discovered over
the course of the project. These tests will be designed around how the Contractor performs their
anomaly resolution processes. Those processes should be capable of successfully excavating or
otherwise positively resolving all anomalies tabulated on dig lists or anomalies identified
during analog mapping. The purpose of the Contractor’s QC Plan for anomaly resolution
should be to define what is meant by “resolved anomaly” and verify each anomaly is
unambiguously resolved. The Contractor’s work plan or QC plan should include a detailed plan
for managing anomalies reported as false positive, no contact, “hot-rock” or “geology”. If the
examples below are used by the PDT, the example Pass/Fail criteria must be tailored to project
objectives and the procedures used.
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(2) Note: for most analog mapping projects, the Government’s QA tasks can be
simplified by requiring the Contractor to leave the lane markers in the grid until all field-level
QA is complete. For all projects, the Government’s QA tasks can be simplified by requiring the
Contractor to flag all excavated locations and to leave all flags in the excavated location until
field-level QA is complete. Where appropriate, the flags should be labeled with the unique
anomaly identifier.
(a) Discovery of an unresolved anomaly listed on a dig list or at a location previously
identified during analog mapping operations. The term unresolved is defined as 1) a
geophysical signature of unknown source is still present at a location specified on a dig list or
an excavated location after it has been declared complete and accepted through the project QC
program, or 2) an anomaly is reported as no-contact, false positive, hot-rock or geology but
does not meet the requirements for such under the management plan for reporting the falsepositives, no-contact, hot-rock and geology. Applicable to DGM and analog procedures. Tests
associated with this statement are normally incorporated into the QA program. Tests for case
(1) will normally be based on QA inspections at locations tabulated on dig lists. Anomalies at
such locations having characteristics associated with MEC buried at depths determined to be
“easy” to detect (same as item (7) above), for which the source is not known, will result in
failure. Tests for case (2) will normally involve reviewing some or all anomalies reported as
false-positive, no-contact, hot-rock or geology for compliance with project-specific criteria.
Failure of the contractor to unambiguously resolve anomalies will normally result in the
Government’s rejecting all associated work products until all associated root-cause-analyses are
complete and all corrective actions have been performed.
(b) Discovery of undocumented or unresolved non-conformance or non-compliance as
defined in the accepted QC plan. Applicable to DGM and analog mapping. Tests associated
with this statement are normally incorporated into the QA program. The purpose of this
statement is to clearly assert the Contractor shall be responsible for performing and
documenting all tasks required in the QC program. This test is usually performed by reviewing
some or all of the Contractor’s QC documentation for thoroughness and completeness. Failure
of the contractor to detect a failed QC test or failure of the contractor to have initiated a rootcause analysis after detecting a QC failure will normally result in the Government’s rejecting
all associated work products until all required QC tasks are complete. QC Pass/Fail criteria
should be developed, as applicable, for each QC test specified in the QC Plan. Table 9-1
presents examples of common QC tests currently used.
(c) Verification of excavated anomaly locations using geophysical sensors to confirm
anomalies are resolved. Applicable to DGM and analog mapping. This is similar to item (2)
above. Tests associated with this statement are normally incorporated into the QC and/or QA
program. Tests will normally be based on finding unresolved anomalies during QC or QA
inspections using geophysical sensors. For this test, unresolved is defined as a geophysical
sensor still detects an above background signal over an excavated location, and that signal has
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characteristics similar to those of MEC. Failure of the contractor to unambiguously resolve
anomalies will normally result in the Government’s rejecting all associated work products until
all associated root-cause-analyses are complete and all corrective actions have been performed.
(d) Verify dig result findings are reviewed and approved by a qualified Geophysicist.
Applicable to DGM and analog mapping. Tests associated with this statement are normally
incorporated into the QC and/or QA program. Tests for this activity may be similar to those for
item (1) above as these are related topics. Tests will normally focus on confirming the
descriptions of items recovered during anomaly excavations adequately explain the anomaly
characteristics observed in the geophysical data. Tests will also involve reviewing the reported
excavation results for compliance with management plan for reporting findings of false
positives, no contacts, hot rocks and geology. Tests may also include reviewing reported
information for compliance with standardized reporting nomenclature. Failure of the contractor
to verify reported dig findings will normally result in the Government’s rejecting all associated
work products until all associated root-cause-analyses are complete and all corrective actions
have been performed.
9-3. Product Quality Management. The PDT must define what the project-specific final
products will be and what results must be achieved for each. The PDT will then need to
determine how best to assess the quality of those products. There are two types of products
produced from geophysical surveys for MEC projects: tangible products, such as reports and
work plans, and intangible products such as instrument interpretations and declarations that
work in a parcel is “complete”.
a. Common Tangible Geophysical Products and Related Standards. Listed below are
common tangible products that can be included in the geophysical quality management
programs:
(1) Complete work plans and quality control plans
(2) Complete GPO reports
(3) Complete geophysical investigation reports
(4) Fully completed dig sheets
(5) Properly formatted and documented geophysical data
(6) Legible and complete maps showing the geophysical survey’s results and
interpretations
(7) Fully supported anomaly selection criteria and decisions.
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(8) Quality standards for the products listed above will normally include adherence to
standard reporting formats (such as DIDs), completeness requirements, and may include
requirements that documents be legible, concise, accurate and use proper grammar. For
completed dig lists, acceptance sampling using guidance from MILSTD-1916 can be used for
verification purposes. This may require returning to a prescribed number of anomaly locations
to confirm those anomalies are indeed resolved. The reader is referred to MILSTD-1916 for
detailed guidance on acceptance sampling. For most cases, a tangible product that does not
meet a quality standard (as defined by the PDT and/or in the SOW/PWS) will not be accepted
by the Government until all deficiencies have been corrected.
b. Common Intangible Geophysical Products and Related Standards. Listed below are
intangible products from MEC projects that may be included in the geophysical quality
management program:
(1) One or more parcels of land declared “clean” or declared as meeting project
objectives, also referred to as “QC Complete, turned over to the Government for QA
acceptance”
(2) Geophysical interpretations based on professional judgment, sometime also referred
to as “manual” interpretations.
(3) Quality control and quality assurance of these products often takes the form of
verification/acceptance sampling. In this context, verification/acceptance sampling is defined as
any procedure used to validate a product after it has been turned over for government
acceptance. Typical procedures currently include digitally mapping or re-mapping (to include
re-sweeping for analog approaches) a portion of an area after it is declared free of MEC
contamination. These current verification/acceptance sampling methods of intangible
geophysical products are generally limited to re-mapping (or re-sweeping) sub-portions of a
parcel of land; however, these approaches are not statistically meaningful unless large subportions (in the 85% to 95% range) of land are re-mapped. Further, the failure criteria must be
the discovery of unresolved or undetected MEC-like geophysical anomalies. Re-mapping small
sub-portions does not provide statistically significant information regarding the success or
failure of an intangible analog or digital geophysics product. Failure criteria that do not factor
for unresolved or undetected MEC-like anomalies provide little confidence in the product if
such MEC-like anomalies are detected and do not result in root-cause analyses and corrective
actions, as appropriate. If the PDT chooses to use re-mapping as a verification/acceptance
sampling tool for quality control or quality assurance, they should do so only when process
quality controls have a reasonable expectation of delivering uniform products and the PDT
agrees on the definitions of production units and lot sizes. The terms production units and lot
sizes are terms defined in MILSTD-1916, however, the reader is cautioned that statistically
valid definitions for production units or lot sizes of intangible geophysical products are under
discussion within the MRP community as of the date of this publication. The reader should
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contact the MMRP CX for up-to-date information on this topic. It should further be emphasized
that re-mapping of land parcels mapped using analog geophysical system should have failure
criteria defined in terms of previously undiscovered or unidentified MEC-like geophysical
anomalies, and not in terms of physical sizes of excavated objects. The reason this type of
failure criteria is required is that the presence of such anomalies indicates either the analog
geophysical mapping interpretations or coverage do not meet project objectives, or that
instruments malfunctioned. If unexplained MEC-like anomalies are detected, a product failure
exists. For properly designed QC plans of analog systems, a mechanism will be needed within
the work plan for either removing all recovered MEC-like anomaly sources from the project
site or otherwise identify them as previously discovered. This can be achieved by leaving pin
flags at each such location, painting each item recovered, or specifying that any item
discovered shall be left on the ground surface. This latter approach would prove difficult to
implement if the density of such items is high and may mask sub-surface MEC still present, or
if digital mapping techniques are used for QC or QA and the density of surface metal is high.
9-4. Managing Quality Control Failures.
a. This sub-section introduces the topic of managing QC failures and presents ideas of
how to establish the meaning of QC failures. Because no geophysical system can guarantee all
MEC are detected under all conditions, specific understandings of what a given QC failure
indicates should be agreed upon up-front by the PDT. Not all QC failures indicate a breakdown
in field processes or that defective or non-conforming products will result, sometimes they
simply indicate local site conditions are less amenable to detecting MEC than others. In all
instances, the quality control personnel should perform a root-cause analysis and determine to
what degree the QC failure affects project decisions. QC failures that do not affect project
decisions are less significant than those that directly impact project decisions. This sub-section
provides some examples of how some QC criteria can be managed under different conditions.
The list below is not all inclusive. The PDT should review each quality control test included in
the quality control plan and outline a plan for managing failures in the event they occur. It may
be beneficial to identify those types of failures that are minor in nature, those that are critical in
nature, and those that could be either minor or critical depending on how it will affect project
decisions.
(1) Undocumented Survey Coverage Gap Too Large: For many characterizations, the
important factor is acreage investigated. If some datasets have gaps larger than that acceptable
to the PDT, simply surveying an extra grid or transect may suffice, rather than needing to reoccupy small gaps in multiple grids or transects, which can be costly and time consuming. For
response actions, the gaps need to be properly surveyed. Root cause analyses will normally
focus on the source of the gap to determine if it is due to instrumentation (which is often visible
in the track-plot maps), due to a breakdown in following field procedures (the track-plots are
accurate, the data was simply collected along the wrong lines), or due to undocumented
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obstacles. Gaps due to documented obstacles, such as trees or fences, should be addressed
during project planning.
(2) Along-track data density does not meet a project objective or metric: In
circumstances where no anomalies are detected in the affected area, the project needs may not
warrant spending the time to correct this failure as it will not impact PDT decisions. If
anomalies are present on the affected portions, these types of failures would likely not be
allowed and appropriate actions required. Root cause analyses will be similar to those described
in item (1) above.
(3) Contractor fails to detect a seeded anomaly: Some seed items may go undetected if
they are buried at depths difficult for the geophysical system to detect. If all other data quality
tests and system checks indicate the data is of high quality, it may not be possible to reliably
detect that seed item under the conditions it is buried in. In this circumstance, the PDT should
be notified of the failure as it may affect the project’s detection capability objectives or PDT
expectations. Root cause analyses will normally focus on reviewing the geophysical and related
QC data, reviewing the anomaly detection and selection criteria. They may include recollecting data over the location to confirm it indeed can not be detected.
(4) Calculated background noise levels for a dataset exceed a QC threshold: It is
common for background noise levels to change over a project site. Normally, this metric is
used as an indicator that instrument platform integrity is degrading, or that instrument failure
may be occurring. The root-cause analyses will normally focus on reviewing the affected
dataset(s) and associated areas for abnormal measurement spikes (indicative of degrading
instrument platform integrity or instrument failure), local terrain conditions, local geology
conditions, or an increase in “clutter” due to proximity to a target area. If local terrain, geology
or clutter is suspected, the analyses will normally include re-collecting small amounts of data in
one or more affected datasets to prove the increased noise levels are repeatable. If the increased
noise levels are reproduced, adjusting the threshold upward for such areas may be warranted. If
they are not, then either problems with the integrity of the instrument platform is the cause or
instrument failures occurred.
(5) Anomaly reacquisition team reports a false positive for a large amplitude
anomaly, or anomaly resolution team reports a small piece of metal for a large amplitude
anomaly: For site characterizations, a small number of such failures may be acceptable,
particularly if returning to the anomaly location for more thorough excavations would not
affect project decisions. Such a scenario would exist if the anomaly is located in an area already
confirmed as being contaminated with MEC, or if large numbers of surrounding anomalies are
reported as unrelated to DoD activities and there is reasonable statistical justification that the
missed anomaly is not MEC or MEC-related. In these circumstances, even though the failure
indicates a possible significant process failure, or possibly a significant instrument failure,
returning to the actual anomaly would not affect decisions for that area. For response actions
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these types of failures would likely not be allowed and appropriate actions would be required
for each such anomaly. Root cause analyses will normally focus on the procedures the
contractor uses to document excavation results and how that information is provided, reviewed
and accepted by geophysical and QC personnel.
(6) QC mapping (using either digital or analog systems) of an analog geophysics
lane detects an undocumented or previously undiscovered MEC-like geophysical signal.
Since analog systems benefit only from being able to discriminate very small and shallow
anomaly sources from very large and deep sources, most signals must be excavated in order to
determine if the source is MEC or not. If during a QC re-sweep a signal is detected that must be
excavated to determine if it is MEC or not, the finding indicates a significant failure in how the
analog geophysical system detected MEC. For characterization surveys, this finding may not be
significant for the same reasons explained in example (5) above. Similarly, for response
actions, this finding would likely constitute a significant failure requiring appropriate actions be
taken. Root cause analyses will focus on why the operator’s interpretation of his or her
geophysical instrument was in error, why their coverage of their lanes does not meet project
objectives, or if their geophysical sensor failed. Typically, the analyses will include reviewing
field logs for discrepancies, interviewing the responsible team leader, and re-sweeping
additional portions of the affected area, or additional lanes mapped by the responsible
individual(s).
(7) A QC Function Check exceeds a QC threshold. Most QC function checks are
designed to demonstrate whether the instruments are functioning properly or not. If all reviews
of the associated data and all other function checks indicate proper instrument functionality,
then the QC failure is not likely to affect project decisions. The root cause analyses will
normally include reviewing all associated data for indications of instrument failure, reviewing
all other QC function check results for evidence of instrument failure, and review of how the
field team implements the QC function check procedures. The analyses may also include recollecting data over small portions of associated areas to prove whether or not instrument
failure occurred.
9-5. Special Considerations for Quality Control Programs.
a. MEC Characteristics and Burial Characteristics That Affect QC
(1) The characteristics of the target MEC and how it could be buried must be factored
into the quality control plan. For example, most MEC have shapes that are axially symmetric,
similar to tear drops (mortars and bombs), elongated egg-like shapes (MK2 grenades) circular
or dumbbell shaped (rockets) or bullet shaped (large caliber projectiles). These types of items
produce responses with very different SNR in most detectors when they are buried at different
angles but at the same depths. For instance, most commonly used horizontal-loop TDEMI
detectors can detect most projectiles at much greater depths when buried in a vertical
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orientation as opposed to a horizontal orientation. What this means is that a MEC item that may
go undetected at one depth when buried in one orientation will produce a high SNR and be
easily detected if buried in another orientation at the same depth. For this reason, QC
inspections should not focus only on the physical size of items recovered, but rather should
focus on the instrument measurements recorded or observed during the QC inspections.
(2) The QCP must differentiate between detection capabilities and task results. The term
task results refers to results from all field activities associated with the detection and removal of
MEC, and includes geophysical mapping, anomaly reacquisition and anomaly resolution. The
QCP must therefore factor for the limitations of the geophysical system to effectively detect all
MEC as stated in the project objectives. Essentially, the QCP must differentiate quality
elements that define what is meant by “good data” from quality elements that are affected by
technology limitations. As an example, the QCP may need to differentiate MEC anomaly
characteristics that must always be detected from MEC anomaly characteristics that may
sometimes go undetected or unselected. For the former (good data), quality control measures
are developed to verify all such signatures are detected and selected. Finding such a signature
during QC inspections would strongly suggest a major defect in work task products. For the
latter (technology limitations), QC measures will focus on how project decisions are made, and
finding such signatures during QC inspections may or may not suggest defects in work task
products. As an example, if a weak anomaly is detected that may be MEC or may be geologic
noise turns out to be MEC, then finding such a signature during QC inspection either suggests a
product defect or a limitation of the technology. It would be deemed a product defect if, during
the root-cause analysis, it is found the quality of the underlying geophysical data does not meet
project needs (such as having too many data gaps, or the sensor noise levels are too high and
could have been reduced). If, on the other hand, the quality of the data is good, then finding a
MEC suggests not all project objectives can be achieved using current technologies because the
probability of detecting that MEC under those site-specific conditions is less than 1. Another
possibility in this scenario is that the project decision criteria are not sufficiently stringent to
meet all project objectives (i.e. the anomaly selection criteria were set too high) and more
anomalies with lower signals must now be selected using adjusted criteria. Whatever the cause
of quality failures, whether related to data quality or technology limitations, root-causeanalyses will be system-specific, and should be thorough. The Government geophysicist should
verify that all possible causes of the failure have been identified and, if appropriate, each is
tested to confirm or refute each possibility. As an example, one common QC test used to
monitor sensor performance is to quantify the variations in background measurements by
calculating their standard deviation. This metric is used as one of several means to monitor for
instrument malfunction, and QC pass/fail criteria will typically be established using GPO data
at a time when the sensor was proven to be functioning properly. However, as site conditions
vary, often as the areas surveyed approach a target zone or the underlying geology changes, the
calculated background variations will increase to the point where the noise pass/fail test fails.
The root cause analysis will likely include testing system cables for shorts, testing sensors for
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broken components or bad connections, and if no obvious sources are found and geology or site
conditions are suspected, the sensor will likely be re-deployed over the area to confirm the
increased noise levels are reproduced. If confirmed as such, the corrective actions will normally
be limited to adjusting anomaly selection criteria to factor for increased noise levels in affected
areas.
b. MEC Detection Variabilities That Affect QC
(1) The types of issues presented above in MEC Burial Characteristics stem from the fact
that most detectors can not reliably discriminate MEC from non-MEC and non-MEC items can
produce very large geophysical signatures, though their physical size may be smaller than
project target objectives. Since such non-MEC geophysical signatures can not be differentiated
from MEC signatures, all such signatures must be investigated. More importantly, these are the
types of anomalies that should not be present in any post-removal quality control or quality
assurance inspection, or post-removal verification data.
(2) For each type of MEC, the project team should define anomaly characteristics that
must always be detected. Many MEC are sufficiently large that, under certain burial conditions,
will always produce anomalies with unambiguous characteristics. Here the term unambiguous
will normally be associated with high SNR, high peak amplitude, and/or large spatial area of
above-background measurements. Other clearly definable, instrument-specific characteristics
can also be used. Anomalies having signatures with these characteristics represent buried target
items that may or may not be MEC. MEC associated with such anomalies will almost always
be buried at depths shallower than the maximum detection depth the geophysical system is
capable of detecting. The PDT must decide which anomaly characteristics will constitute a
“process” failure if they go undetected or unresolved, and must also agree that anomalies with
other characteristics may be present in QC, QA or post-verification data, even if those other
characteristics can sometimes be associated with MEC. These latter characteristics will usually
be associated with MEC that are buried at depths or orientations that are difficult to detect with
certainty, and are commonly referred to as “difficult to detect anomalies” or “anomalies near
the limit of detection” for a given geophysical system.
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CHAPTER 10
MC SAMPLING
10-1. Introduction.
a. This chapter has been prepared to address the planning and performing of MC
investigations by USACE MM DCs, Removal Districts, and their contractors at MRAs under
the MMRP. It is focused on FUDS, but could be applied to Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) or Installation Restoration Program (IRP) sites with MC concerns. An overview of
the environmental chemistry of military munitions and appropriate sampling and analyses at
MRAs is provided. Table B-7 in Appendix B is a checklist for the PDT to follow when
planning MC investigations.
10-2. Objective.
a. Project-specific sampling requirements should be determined by development of clear
project objectives, definition of data needs, and establishing specific data quality objectives
through the TPP process. An appropriate sampling design, including the type and number of
samples, should be developed based on those project-specific objectives. A multi-disciplinary
PDT is needed to adequately develop appropriate sampling designs.
b. MC investigations are typically performed at MRAs for one of two purposes:
(1) Determining Presence or Absence of MC Contamination. If MEC is present (or
suspected) at a site and the presence of MC in environmental media is unknown, sampling is
conducted to determine whether it exists. This type of investigation is typically biased to look
at areas where contamination is suspected to be the worst case. Limited sampling to evaluate
the presence or absence of MC contamination should be conducted during the SI phase of a
munitions response project. Determination of presence of MC at a site is not sufficient to make
a decision, its significance in terms of potential threat to human health and the environment
should be determined through screening level risk assessment in the SI.
(2) Establishing Nature and Extent of MC Contamination. If MC contamination is
determined to exist, further investigation may be required to determine the nature and extent of
the contamination, as well as to define the risk to human health and the environment. This
investigation would typically be conducted during the RI/FS phase of a munitions response
project and should support preparation of a baseline risk assessment.
c. Risk assessments prepared for MC contamination should comply with applicable
USACE and USEPA requirements for HTRW risk assessments as defined in, but not limited to,
EM 200-1-4 and EP 200-1-15.
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d. The requirements provided in this document focus on scoping and executing
investigations to determine the presence or absence of MC contamination. The sampling
requirements for all projects should be determined on a project-specific basis by the PDT
through the TPP process (see EM 200-1-2) and development of a CSM (see EM 1110-1-1200).
e. Most of the requirements outlined in this document also apply to investigations to
determine the nature and extent of MC contamination, but those investigations will also include
additional requirements not described here. If evaluation of presence or absence of MC
contamination is delayed until the RI/FS phase, it is recommended that sampling be conducted
in a phased approach within the RI/FS (i.e., that initial samples be collected to determine
whether contamination is present with additional samples being collected prior to the
completion of the RI/FS to establish the nature and extent of contamination). For additional
information on RI/FS requirements, see US Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s)
Guidance on Conducting Remedial Investigations and Feasibility Studies under CERCLA, EM
1110-1-502, Technical Guidelines for Hazardous and Toxic Waste Treatment and Cleanup
Activities, and EP 1110-1-18.
f. Additionally, Long-Term Management (LTM) activities may be required for the MC
portion of MMRP projects following the Remedial Action Operation (RA-O) phase. If
sampling and analysis is required during the LTM phase, many of the requirements and
recommendations provided in this document would also apply.
10-3. Initial MC Investigation Planning.
a. An MC investigation process that is capable of effectively identifying MC
contamination must employ three fully integrated components, as follows:
(1) Experienced Personnel. Personnel involved with the MC investigation should be
experienced with the theoretical and practical aspects of military munitions chemistry, field
sampling, laboratory analyses, and risk assessment. The selection of laboratories and analytical
methodology, determination of appropriate screening levels, and preparation of screening level
or baseline risk assessment require qualified and experienced individuals. A qualified chemist
and a qualified risk assessor should actively participate in the management of all MC
investigations beginning with the initial planning and formulation of project objectives. A
“qualified chemist” is a person with a minimum of a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry or a
closely related field and at least 5 years of directly related environmental chemistry experience,
preferably involving military munitions. A “qualified risk assessor” is a person with a
minimum of a Bachelor’s degree in chemistry, biology, or toxicology [or a closely related field]
and at least 5 years of directly related environmental risk assessment experience. Sampling
personnel should be trained in appropriate sampling procedures and associated documentation
requirements. If field analytical methods are used, personnel executing these methods should
have documented training and experience performing the planned methodology.
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(2) Experienced Laboratory. The laboratory used should have experience in handling
military munitions samples. The analytical laboratory should be identified early in the project
planning (preferably at the proposal stage). The laboratory must be identified in the Sampling
and Analysis Plan (SAP) and hold applicable state certifications to perform the analytical
methods required (if available). Laboratories must also meet the requirements of the
Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive Waste (HTRW) Chemical Data Quality Management
(CDQM) Policy for Environmental Laboratory Testing, to include National Environmental
Laboratory Accreditation Program (NELAP) accreditation for all applicable and available
fields of testing (FoT) and self declaration of compliance with the Department of Defense
(DoD) Quality Systems Manual (QSM) (latest version). For a list of current NELAP accredited
labs, please see http://www.nelac-institute.org/.
(a) Any laboratory performing chemical analysis must provide their self declaration and
supporting documentation to the applicable MM DC in order to be approved by that MM DC.
The determination of qualifications of the laboratory should be at the discretion of the MM DC
Project Chemist. If the laboratory fails to meet project-specific requirements at any time, the
Contracting Officer (CO) or Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) may request use of
the laboratory be discontinued and analytical services be procured from another qualified
laboratory that can meet project-specific requirements. Samples may not be subcontracted to
another laboratory without the approval of the MM DC PDT. The subcontracted laboratory
must meet all requirements for the contract laboratory.
(3) Accuracy and Precision of Sample Locations. The personnel performing the MC
investigation must have the ability to accurately and precisely locate a sample location to other
known points, preferably using a common survey grid and/or datum. Sample locations should
be recorded to within 3 feet of the actual survey location.
b. If any of the above three components is lacking, the overall MC process may be unable
to meet the project’s objectives. Therefore it is important to carefully plan and integrate all
aspects of an MC investigation and not to start fieldwork prematurely.
10-4. Sampling and Analysis Considerations.
a. Sampling and analysis requirements will vary based upon site-specific conditions and
must be addressed during TPP activities. Safety concerns must be addressed. If sampling is
performed in a potential MEC environment, all requirements from EP 75-1-2, MEC Support
during HTRW and Construction Activities, apply unless sampling is performed during intrusive
MEC operations. If that is the case, the procedures for sampling should be included in the Work
Plan along with other MEC operations procedures.
b. Further considerations that may affect sampling and analysis activities include:
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(1) MEC Depth. If MEC items are located on the surface, generally, initial sampling
should be surficial. Research data has shown the most secondary explosives are found in the
top 2” of soil. The sample depth that constitutes “surface” soils should be defined during the
TPP taking this information, as well as data use, into consideration, as the definition of what
constitutes surface soils varies. Alternate depths would be appropriate in conditions of shifting
sands, erosion, etc. If MEC items are also found in the subsurface, initial sampling should also
be taken from subsurface soil near the identified MEC location.
(2) MEC Item Composition. Analytical requirements for MC should be based on the
anticipated MEC item composition, if known. If unknown, some assumptions may be made
regarding typical composition to establish the analytical requirements for MC. In either case,
the anticipated MEC items, along with fill information, if available, should be tabulated in the
Work Plan. Information on MEC item composition is available from the MIDAS database
(available at https://midas.dac.army.mil/; access requires registration and is restricted to DoD
personnel and DoD contractors), various Technical Manuals, and the Common Range
Operations Reports (contact HTRW CX - CENWO-HX-M - for more information). An
ammunition composition database for FUDS era munitions is also in development by USACE
(contact HTRW CX - CENWO-HX-M - for more information). Many types of filler used in
MEC items are composition explosives, consisting of two or more explosive compounds mixed
to produce an explosive with more suitable characteristics for a particular application. Some
typical examples are listed in Table 10-1. Exact compositions vary; they are documented in TM
9-1300-214, Military Explosives.
Table 10-1. Composition Explosive Makeup (1)
Composition
Explosive
Amatol
Explosive Compounds
Other Ingredients (2)
Ammonium nitrate and TNT
Composition A
(A, A2, A3, A4,
A5, A6)
RDX
Beeswax, synthetic wax,
desensitizing wax, stearic
acid, or polyethylene
Composition B
(Cyclotol, B, B2,
B3)
RDX and TNT
Wax, calcium silicate
Composition C
(C, C2, C3, C4)
RDX, explosive plasticizer (C2 contained
nitrotoluenes, dinitrotoluenes,
trinitrotoluene, nitrocellulose,
dimethylformamide; C3 contained
nitrotoluenes, dinitrotoluenes, TNT, tetryl,
Nonexplosive oily
plasticizer (included
lecithin) or
polyisobutylene, may also
contain lead chromate, and
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and nitrocellulose)
lamp black
Octol
HMX and TNT
Pentolite
PETN and TNT
Picratol
Ammonium picrate and TNT
Tetrytol
Tetryl and TNT
Tritonal
TNT
Flaked aluminum
RDX, TNT (3), nitrocellulose
Calcium chloride, calcium
silicate, aluminum, wax,
and lecithin
Minol
TNT and ammonium nitrate
Aluminum
Torpex
RDX and TNT
Aluminum powder and
wax
HBX (HBX-1,
HBX-3, HBX-6)
(1) Source: TM 9-1300-214
(2) Varies by type, may contain any or all other ingredients listed
(3) HBX-6 does not contain TNT
(3) Background Conditions. In some locations, native or anthropogenic background
concentrations of metals, perchlorate, or PAHs may exceed non-site specific risk based
screening levels or regulatory limits that are commonly used for screening purposes or response
action decision making. If these parameters are analyzed and no appropriate regional or sitespecific background data are available for the project property, background samples should be
collected and analyzed.. Some available resources for background condition evaluation
include:
(a) Guidance for Environmental Background Concentration Analysis Volume I: Soil
(NAVFAC UG-2049-ENV, April 2002) https://portal.navfac.navy.mil/
(b) Guidance for Environmental Background Concentration Analysis Volume II:
Sediment (NAVFAC UG-2054-ENV, April 2003) https://portal.navfac.navy.mil/
(c) Guidance for Environmental Background Concentration Analysis Volume III:
Groundwater (NAVFAC UG-2059-ENV, April 2004) https://portal.navfac.navy.mil/
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(d) Guidance for Comparing Background and Chemical Concentrations in Soil for
CERCLA Sites (EPA 540-R-01-003 OSWER 9285.7-41, September 2002)
http://www.epa.gov/oswer/riskassessment/pdf/background.pdf
(4) Regulatory Requirements. Varying state and local requirements and requests for
sampling and analysis may exist. These should be considered and addressed during TPP and
the development stage of overall project objectives and Data Quality Objectives (DQOs).
(5) Chemical-Specific Screening Levels, Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate
Requirements (ARARs) and To Be Considereds (TBCs). Chemical-specific screening levels,
ARARs, and TBCs can impact the choices of the appropriate analytical methodology as part of
the DQO process. Anticipated criteria should be established during the planning process to
ensure proper sampling procedures can be applied; appropriate analytical methodologies can be
utilized; meaningful data can be collected; and DQOs can be achieved. These should be
documented in planning documents along with the reporting limits/method detection limits
specific to the project laboratory to allow comparison/confirmation that methodology is
adequate.
(6) Site Hydrology. If significant releases of MC are believed to have occurred,
groundwater sampling should be considered. The decision to sample groundwater should be
made based on depth to groundwater and its susceptibility to contamination from surface
releases, potential receptors, the magnitude of the suspected MC release, and the type of MC
suspected at the site. If surface water is located on or near the project property and receives
runoff from suspected MC source areas, surface water/sediment sampling should be
considered.
c. Collecting a Representative Soil Sample from a Range
(1) Cold Regions Research Engineering Laboratory (CRREL), a USACE Engineering
Research and Development Center (ERDC) laboratory, has conducted numerous studies to
determine the best means to collect a representative sample on testing and training ranges.
These studies have been conducted at primarily active or BRAC sites as part of a Research and
Development (R&D) effort. Their current recommendations are documented in full in the Field
Analytic Technologies Encyclopedia (FATE) Explosives Module located at http://cluin.org/char/technologies/exp.cfm and in Appendix A of SW8330B located at
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/test/new-meth.htm. It should be noted that sampling
performed under these studies to date have included nitroaromatic/nitramines/nitrate ester
explosives, but not metals or other MC, with the exception of one limited study that did include
metals.
(2) All research in the area of secondary explosives contamination at ranges has
supported the use of composite sampling (also referred to as multi-increment sampling) rather
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than discrete sampling. The recent update of SW8330B specifically includes multi-increment
sampling. As the performance capability and regulatory acceptance of SW8330B increase, this
method is expected to become the standard for evaluating secondary explosives contamination
at ranges.
(3) SW8330B recommends collecting a 1000 g of soil and sieving and grinding the entire
sample prior to subsampling. The sieving and grinding may occur in the field or in the
laboratory. Grinding samples that will be analyzed for metals is not recommended at this time.
For additional information on laboratory subsampling, see Guidance for Obtaining
Representative Laboratory Analytical Subsamples from Particulate Laboratory Samples,
EPA/600/R-03/027, http://www.clu-in.org/download/char/epa_subsampling_guidance.pdf.
(4) Typically, vegetation (grass, sticks, leaves, moss, etc.) is removed from soil samples
prior to laboratory processing, frequently during actual field sampling. SW8330B recommends
retaining the vegetation within the processed sample in order to account for any particles that
may cling to the vegetation. Depending upon the concentrations of concern and the laboratory’s
chromatographic separation, this may be problematic for the analysis. For FUDS site
characterization projects, this is not recommended, given the time elapsed between the
distribution of the explosives and the characterization. For post-BIP samples, this would be
appropriate, but it may not be feasible analytically.
(5) SW8330B also recommends sieving samples with #10 (2 mm) sieves rather that the
30 mesh sieves specified in SW8330. It also recommends processing 10 grams of soil rather
than 2 grams. For FUDS, this portion of the method should be implemented even if SW8330B
is not implemented in full.
(6) The compositing scheme, degree of processing, vegetation inclusion/exclusion, and
sieve size must be discussed by the PDT, contractor (if applicable), the laboratory, and the
applicable regulatory agencies to ensure acceptance of data to the data users. The regulatory
acceptance should be documented to ensure future acceptance of the data.
d. General Guidance for Sampling to Determine Presence or Absence of MC
Contamination.
(1) Analysis should be based on MEC fill, if known.
(2) Sampling requirements should be determined by development of clear project
objectives, definition of data needs, and establishing specific data quality objectives through the
TPP process. An appropriate sampling design, including the type and number of samples,
should be developed based on those project-specific objectives.
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(3) Soil samples should be collected from each area suspected to contain MC, such as
known target impact areas, firing lines, open burn/open detonation areas, hand grenade courts,
and areas with high concentrations of MEC.
(4) Sample representativeness should be maximized to the extent practical. Multiincrement sampling and sample processing IAW SW8330B, Appendix A, should be
implemented for secondary explosives, unless there are state or local requirements to the
contrary. If the MIS approach is not implemented, the rationale for its lack of implementation
should be documented. If sampling is to be conducted in a high density MEC environment,
MC sampling density must be evaluated relative to safety issues for sampling personnel.
(5) If the site Conceptual Site Model indicates potentially complete pathways, collecting
surface water, sediment, and/or groundwater sampling should be considered.
e. General Guidance for Sampling during Blow in Place or Consolidated Shot
Operations.
(1) This type of sampling is typically required during site characterization efforts that
require ordnance disposal (more likely at the RI/FS stage during intrusive operations) and
during removal/remedial actions.
(a) Analysis should be based on MEC fill, if known.
(b) Before and/or after (pre-and post-detonation) soil samples should be collected at the
location of each specific type of MEC destroyed.
(c) Pre-detonation samples should be composite samples located as near to the identified
MEC to be detonated as is safe and feasible unless there are state or local requirements to the
contrary. Pre-detonation samples are used for comparison with post-detonation samples to
determine whether any residual MC is due to existing contamination or contamination left due
to the detonation.
(d) Post-detonation samples should be biased multi-increment samples unless there are
state or local requirements to the contrary. Sample representativeness should be maximized to
the extent practical.
10-5. Types of MC Analyses.
a. There are several types of constituents that may require analyses. The actual selection
of MC for analysis should be based upon anticipated or known MEC items, as discussed in
Section 10.4. Potential MC include, but are not limited, to primary explosives, nitrogen-based
explosives, perchlorate, chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and agent breakdown products
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(ABPs), white phosphorous (WP), and metals. Primary explosives are of concern primarily at
manufacturing sites, so they are not discussed further here.
b. For sampling to determine the presence or absence of MC contamination, fixed
laboratory sampling is typically used, but project requirements may make field laboratory
methods more cost-effective. Field laboratory methods may be used, but it is recommended that
at least 10 percent of analyses be confirmed by fixed laboratory methods.
c. Nitrogen-Based Explosives. Commonly evaluated nitrogen-based explosives, cocontaminants, and breakdown products are shown in Table 10-2. Nitrocellulose (NC),
nitroguanidine (NQ), pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), ammonium picrate (AP), picric acid,
and RDX breakdown products (typically hexahydro-1-nitroso-3,5-dinitro-1,3,5-triazine
(MNX); hexahydro-1,3-dinitroso-5-nitro-1,3,5-triazine (DNX); and hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitroso1,3,5-triazine (TNX)) may be required, but are not part of current methods published by the
EPA. Each of these analytes except NC can be analyzed with a modification to either method
SW8330 or SW8321; however, ammonium picrate is typically reported based on the analysis of
picric acid. If analytes that are not part of methods published by the EPA are included in the
project, proposed methodology must be accepted by the PDT and stakeholders and
documentation regarding any method modifications or unpublished methods should be
provided in the project SAP.
(1) Field Tests. Field tests for nitrogen-based explosives are shown in Table 10-3. Fate
and transport properties of the analytes should be considered prior to the use of field tests,
particularly if the use of TNT or RDX as an indicator compound is intended. It is anticipated
that for a range that has been out of use for a substantial period of time, most, if not all TNT,
would have broken down due to photodegradation and biodegradation. RDX is less likely to
have broken down but may not be an appropriate indicator compound depending upon the age
of the range.
(a) Immunoassays have been developed for 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT) and hexahydro1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazine (RDX). The commercially available tests have little cross-reactivity
with other nitroaromatic/nitramines explosives.
(b) Colorimetric analyte-specific tests are commercially available for TNT, RDX, and
octahydro-1,3,5,7-tetranitro-1,3,5,7-tetrazocine (HMX). They may be used to analyze for other
analytes but require documentation of method modifications used to acquire the other analytes.
Additionally, one colorimetric test for general analyte classes is available (EXPRAY™).
EXPRAY™ may be used in the field or in the laboratory to determine whether nitroaromatic
explosives, nitramine and nitrate ester explosives, or inorganic nitrates are present. It is
typically used qualitatively, although it can be used semi-quantitatively with sufficient
expertise, as documented in SW8330B and in ERDC/CRREL TN-05-2, Pre-Screening for
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Explosives Residues in Soil Prior to HPLC Analysis Utilizing Expray™
(http://www.crrel.usace.army.mil/techpub/CRREL_Reports/reports/TN05-2.pdf).
(2) Fixed Laboratory Tests.
(a) Several technologies are used to analyze for nitroaromatic/nitramine explosives.
Currently available methods are provided in Table 10-4. A version of SW8330 is typically
used unless significant interferences are anticipated. Some laboratories are unable to perform
quantitative second column confirmation for explosives per DoD QSM/EM 200-1-3/SW8000C
(i.e., five-point calibrations must be performed for each target analyte for the primary and
confirmatory columns and quantitative results for each column must be reported). This
requirement should not be waived for MC projects. Based upon project requirements,
exceptions may be considered for the following co-eluting pairs: 2-amino-4,6-dinitrotoluene (2Am-DNT)/4-amino-2,6-dinitrotoluene (4-Am-DNT), 2-nitrotoluene (2-NT)/4-nitrotoluene (4NT), and 2,4-dinitrotoluene (2,4-DNT)/2,6-dinitrotoluene (2,6-DNT), but the exception should
be evaluated based upon review of relevant ARARs and TBCs. SW8095 may be recommended
if lower reporting limits are required, but it is not widely available commercially. SW8321 is
typically used for complex matrices where there is concern regarding confirmation of positive
results. It may also be used by laboratories with coelution problems for SW8330; however,
routine use of liquid chromatography/mass spectrometry (LC/MS) confirmation to compensate
for the laboratory’s failure to properly execute SW8330 should not incur additional cost to the
government. For all aqueous samples, sample preparation should be performed in accordance
with SW3535A solid phase extraction (SPE) rather than by the SW8330 salting out procedure
unless a reasonable technical rationale (i.e. SPE disk clogging) is documented.
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Table 10-2. Common Nitrogen-Based Explosives, Co-Contaminants, and Breakdown Products
Abbreviation
CAS
Number (2)
HMX
2691-41-0
RDX
121-82-4
TNT co-contaminant and breakdown product
1,3,5-TNB
99-35-4
DNT breakdown product and TNT cocontaminant
1,3-DNB
99-65-0
Methyl-2,4,6trinitrophenylnitramine
Nitramine explosive
Tetryl
479-45-8
Nitrobenzene
DNT co-contaminant
NB
98-95-3
2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene
Nitroaromatic explosive
2,4,6-TNT
118-96-7
4-Amino-2,6-dinitrotoluene
TNT breakdown product
4-Am-DNT
1946-51-0
2-Amino-4,6-dinitrotoluene
TNT breakdown product
2-Am-DNT
355-72-78-2
2,4-DNT
121-14-2
2,6-DNT
606-20-2
Compound
Octahydro-1, 3, 5, 7-tetranitro1,3,5,7-tetrazocine
Hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5triazine
1,3,5-Trinitrobenzene
1,3-Dinitrobenzene
2,4-Dinitrotoluene
2,6-Dinitrotoluene
Description (1)
Nitramine explosive; also RDX cocontaminant
Nitramine explosive; also HMX cocontaminant
Nitroaromatic explosive/ propellant; also TNT
co-contaminant
Nitroaromatic explosive/ propellant; also TNT
co-contaminant
2-Nitrotoluene (o-Nitrotoluene)
DNT co-contaminant
2-NT
88-72-2
3-Nitrotoluene (m-Nitrotoluene)
DNT co-contaminant
3-NT
99-08-1
4-Nitrotoluene (p-Nitrotoluene)
DNT co-contaminant
4-NT
99-99-0
Nitrate ester explosive/propellant
NG
55-63-0
Ammonium Picrate
Nitroaromatic explosive
AP
131-74-8
Picric Acid
Nitroaromatic explosive
PA
88-89-1
Nitrate ester explosive
PETN
78-11-5
RDX breakdown product
MNX
5755-27-1
RDX breakdown product
DNX
80251-29-2
RDX breakdown product
TNX
13980-04-6
Nitroaromatic/nitramine explosive/ propellant
NQ
556-88-7
Nitroglycerine
Pentaerythritol Tetranitrate
Hexahydro-1-nitroso-3,5-dinitro1,3,5-triazine
Hexahydro-1,3-dinitroso-5-nitro1,3,5-triazine
Hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitroso-1,3,5triazine
Nitroguanidine
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Compound
3,5-Dinitroaniline
Description (1)
Abbreviation
CAS
Number (2)
TNB breakdown product
3,5-DNA
618-87-1
1
Information gathered from TM 9-1300-214, Military Explosives; ATSDR Toxicological Profiles for 2,4- and 2,6-Dinitrotoluene and
for 2,4,6-Trinitrotoluene (located at http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxpro2.html) and the Hazardous Substances Data Bank (located at
http://toxnet.nlm.nih.gov/).
2
Chemical Abstracts Service registry number.
Table 10-3. Field Tests for Nitrogen-Based Explosives
Method No.
Title
SW4050
TNT Explosives in Soil by Immunoassay
SW4051
RDX in Soil by Immunoassay
SW8515
Colorimetric Screening Method for TNT in Soil
SW8510
Colorimetric Screening Procedure for RDX and HMX in Soil
N/A
Expray™
Table 10-4. Fixed Laboratory Tests for Nitrogen-Based Explosives, Co-Contaminants,
and Breakdown Products
Method No.
Title
SW8330B
Nitroaromatics, Nitramines, and Nitrate Esters by High Performance
Liquid Chromatography (HPLC)
SW8332
Nitroglycerine by HPLC
SW8095
Explosives by Gas Chromatography (GC)
SW8321A (1)
Explosives by HPLC/Mass Spectrometry (MS)
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Method No.
Title
EPA 529
Determination of Explosives and Related Compounds in Drinking Water
by Solid Phase Extraction and Capillary Column Gas
Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GC/MS)
1
This method is typically cited for HPLC/MS of explosives. However, no published version includes explosives. An effort is
underway to update SW8321 that would address explosives.
d. Perchlorate. Perchlorate (CAS Number 14797-73-0) is the anion of perchloric acid.
Two salts of primary concern are Ammonium Perchlorate (CAS Number 7790-98-9, NH4ClO4)
and Potassium Perchlorate (CAS Number 7778-74-7, KClO4). The latest perchlorate policies
and guidance can be found at http://www.dodperchlorateinfo.net/. Current guidance includes:
(1) Policy on DoD Required Actions Related to Perchlorate, January 26, 2006
(2) DoD Perchlorate Handbook, March 2006
(3) Interim Army Guidance on Perchlorate for Restoration/Cleanup Activities, May 25,
2006
(4) EPA Assessment Guidance for Perchlorate, January 26, 2006
e. Additional information on perchlorate is available from the Interstate Technology
Regulatory Council (ITRC) Perchlorate Team
(http://www.itrcweb.org/teampublic_Perchlorate.asp), to include Perchlorate: Overview of
Issues, Status, and Remedial Options (September 2005), available at
http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/PERC-1.pdf.
(1) Field Tests. Field tests based on an ion-selective electrode (ISE), colorimetry,
capillary electrophoresis, and ion mobility/mass spectroscopy exist for perchlorate, but they
have not been widely used at this time. The ISE method is documented in Perchlorate
Screening Study: Low Concentration Method for the Determination of Perchlorate in Aqueous
Samples Using Ion Selective Electrodes: Letter Report of Findings for the Method
Development Studies, Interference Studies, and Split Sample Studies, including Standard
Operating Procedure, available at http://www.clu-in.org/programs/21m2/letter_of_findings.pdf.
The colorimetry test is documented in CRREL TR 04-8, Field Screening Method for
Perchlorate in Water and Soil, available at
http://www.crrel.usace.army.mil/techpub/CRREL_Reports/reports/TR04-8.pdf.
(2) Fixed Laboratory Tests. All fixed laboratory tests for perchlorate are based on ion
chromatography or liquid chromatography. The DoD Perchlorate Handbook requires that
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detections of perchlorate above reporting levels be confirmed with mass spectrum
confirmation. Fixed laboratory tests for perchlorate are shown in Table 10-5.
Table 10-5. Fixed Laboratory Tests for Perchlorate
Title
DoD Perchlorate
Handbook Status
EPA 314.0
Determination of Perchlorate in Drinking Water by Ion
Chromatography
Not recommended.
Only allowed for existing
NPDES permits.
EPA 314.1
Determination of Perchlorate in Drinking Water Using
Inline Column Concentration/Matrix Elimination Ion
Chromatography with Suppressed Conductivity Detection
Not recommended.
All results above the
method reporting limit
must be confirmed using
MS.
Determination of perchlorate using ion chromatography
with chemical suppression conductivity detection
Not recommended.
All results above the
method reporting limit
must be confirmed using
MS.
EPA 331.0
Determination of Perchlorate in Drinking Water by
Liquid Chromatography Electrospray Ionization Mass
Spectrometry
Recommended for drinking
water
EPA 332.0
Determination of Perchlorate in Drinking Water by Ion
Chromatography with Suppressed Conductivity and
Electrospray Ionization Mass Spectrometry
Recommended for drinking
water
SW6850
Perchlorate in Water, Soils and Solid Wastes Using High
Performance Liquid Chromatography/ Electrospray
Ionization/Mass Spectrometry
Recommended for drinking
water, groundwater, soil,
and wastewater
SW6860
Perchlorate In Water, Soils And Solid Wastes Using Ion
Chromatography/ Electrospray Ionization/Mass
Spectrometry
Recommended for drinking
water, groundwater, soil,
and wastewater
Method No.
Draft
SW9058
f. CWAs and ABPs. CWAs and ABPs are listed in Table 10-6. No methods published by
EPA exist for CWAs or ABPs. Methods available have primarily been developed by Edgewood
Chemical Biological Center (ECBC). Analyses are performed based on ECBC (or commercial
laboratory) standard operating procedures. Most are based on GC/MS or GC/Flame
Photometric Detection (FPD). Several ABP methods are in development by HPLC and
Capillary Electrophoresis. CWA analysis must go to either ECBC or a commercial laboratory
with a Bailment Agreement. Additional requirements for sampling and analysis related to
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CWAs and ABPs are found in EP 75-1-3. Note that if CWA-contaminated soil is suspected, the
Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM) Design Center should be contacted, as a Chemical Safety
Submission for DoD Explosives Safety Board (DDESB) review and concurrence may be
required.
g. White Phosphorus. WP (CAS 7723-14-0, P4) reacts with air and requires special
handling for sampling and analysis. Typically, if significant levels of WP are present in soil
that is excavated, visible smoke will be observed. If visible smoke is observed, notify contract
laboratory and confirm willingness to accept for analysis.
(1) Field Tests. No field tests have been developed for WP, although the fixed laboratory
test has been used on a limited basis in the field, to include use of Solid-phase micro-extraction
(SPME) as discussed in SW7580.
(2) Fixed Laboratory Tests. Fixed laboratory tests for WP are all based on gas
chromatography. The only published method for WP is SW7580, a GC method with a
nitrogen-phosphorus detector (NPD). A GC/MS method is also available, but is not published.
Due to increased regulation of WP by the Drug Enforcement Agency, the standard is currently
unavailable. Therefore, analytical capabilities for this compound are very limited. Contact the
MM CX for methodology recommendations.
(3) Other Considerations. If dewatering in an identified WP area or decontamination of
WP contaminated equipment is required, water may need to be collected and analyzed prior to
disposal. Appropriate disposal procedure should be followed according to the analytical results.
WP is considered a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) reactive waste;
therefore, careful planning is required prior to conducting an investigation. Planning
considerations, to include disposal options, should be discussed in the Work Plan
Table 10-6. Chemical Warfare Agents and Agent Breakdown Products
Compound
Description
Abbreviation
CAS Number (1)
Analytical
Technology
Chemical Warfare Agents
Sulfur Mustard
(bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide)
Blister Agent
H, HS, HD
505-60-2
GC/MS
Lewisite
(Dichoro(2-chlorovinyl)arsine)
Blister Agent
L
541-25-3
GC/MS (2)
Nitrogen Mustard
(bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine)
Blister Agent
HN-1
538-07-8
GC/MS
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Compound
Nitrogen Mustard
(tris(2-chloroethyl)amine)
Tabun
(Ethyl n, ndimethylphosphoramidocyanidate)
Sarin
(Isopropyl
methylphosphonofluoridate)
Soman
(Pinacolyl
methylphosphonofluoridate)
o-Ethyl S-(2-diisopropylaminoethyl)
Methylphosphonothiolate)
Description
Abbreviation
CAS Number (1)
Analytical
Technology
Blister Agent
HN-3
555-77-1
GC/MS
Nerve Agent
GA
77-81-6
GC/MS
Nerve Agent
GB
107-44-8
GC/MS
Nerve Agent
GD
96-64-0
GC/MS
Nerve Agent
VX
50782-69-9
GC/MS
Agent Breakdown Products
1,4-Dithiane
HD ABP
505-29-3
GC/MS
1,4-Thioxane
HD ABP
15980-15-1
GC/MS
Thiodiglycol
HD ABP
TDG
540-63-6
GC/MS or HPLC
2-Chlorovinyl Arsenous Acid
L ABP
CVAA
85090-33-1
GC/MS (2)
2-Chlorovinyl Arsenous Oxide
L ABP
CVAO
3088-37-7
GC/MS (2)
Triethanolamine
HN-3 ABP
TEA
102-71-6
CE
Ethyldiethanolamine
HN-1 ABP
139-87-7
CE
IMPA
1832-54-8
IC
MPA
993-13-5
IC
DMMP
756-79-6
GC
Isopropyl methyl phosphonic acid
Methylphosphonic Acid
Dimethyl methylphosphonate
GB
GB, GD, and
VX ABP
GB simulant
and precursor
Ethyl methylphosphonic acid
VX ABP
EMPA
1832-53-7
IC
Diisopropyl methylphosphonate
GB ABP
DIMP
1445-75-6
GC
Pinacolyl methylphosphonic acid
GD ABP
PMPA
616-52-48
IC
S-(2-diisopropylaminoethyl)methylphosphonothioic acid
VX ABP
EA2192
73207-98-4
GC/MS
1
Chemical Abstracts Service registry number.
2
L, CVAA, and CVAO must be derivatized and form the same derivative. They are analyzed and reported together.
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h. Metals. Metals are found in all military munitions. Certain munitions only contain
metals (i.e., incendiaries). Metal analyses may be based on a limited list if the type(s) of
ordnance are known or can be reasonably assumed. If not, it is recommended to analyze for the
23 Total Analyte List (TAL) metals (aluminum, antimony, arsenic, barium, beryllium,
cadmium, calcium, chromium, cobalt, copper, iron, lead, magnesium, manganese, mercury,
nickel, potassium, selenium, silver, sodium, thallium, vanadium, and zinc), unless a statespecific list exists. Depending upon munitions used on the site, zirconium, titanium, and
strontium may also be potential metals of concern. If metals are analyzed, establishing
background conditions should be discussed by the PDT and stakeholders during TPP. For
additional discussion of background considerations, see 10-4b(3).
(1) Field Tests. There are two published field tests available for metals: SW4500,
Mercury in Soil by Immunoassay and SW6200, Field Portable X-Ray Fluorescence
Spectrometry for the Determination of Elemental Concentrations in Soil and Sediment.
SW6200 is appropriate for some, but not all of the metals of interest. Other field tests may be
used on munitions response projects, if appropriate, but their use must be approved by the MMDC.
(2) Fixed Laboratory Tests. There are several published methods for metals other than
mercury. Currently available tests for metals are shown in Table 10-7. Determination of the
appropriate method should depend upon the established DQOs. For soil analysis, SW6010B is
typically appropriate, although it may require the use of “Inductively Coupled Plasma (ICP)
trace” rather than ICP. For lower reporting limits, SW6020 or SW7000 series (to be replaced
by SW7010) may be required.
Table 10-7. Fixed Laboratory Tests for Metals
Method Number
Title
SW6010C
Inductively Coupled Plasma-Atomic Emission Spectrometry (ICP-AES)
SW6020A
Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectrometry (ICP-MS)
SW7010
Graphic Furnace Atomic Absorption (GFAA) Spectrophotometry
SW7000 series
Individual Metals by GFAA
SW7470A/
SW7471A
Mercury by Cold Vapor Atomic Absorption (CVAA)
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(3) Small arms-specific Considerations. There has been a considerable amount of study
performed at small arms ranges. These studies have focuses on where the contamination is
likely to be and on how best to measure it. One key aspect to characterizing soils at a small
arms range is reaching consensus on whether to sieve the soil samples prior to analysis. One of
the primary reasons to sieve is to remove bullet fragments. Retaining bullet fragments would
yield a higher concentration of lead; however, the lead in the fragments would not be readily
available to receptors. This subject is recommended for discussion at project TPP sessions. If
additional sample preparation is planned, it should be thoroughly described in project work
plans. Prior to conducting site characterization or remediation at small arms ranges, review of
the following publications is recommended.
(a) Army Environmental Center (AEC) software/documentation for small arms ranges,
available through AEC:
•
“REST” (Range Evaluation Software Tool)
•
“ASAP” (Army Sampling and Analysis Plan)
(b) ITRC Guidance: Characterization and Remediation of Soils at Closed Small Arms
Firing Ranges, available at http://www.itrcweb.org/Documents/SMART-1.pdf
(c) EPA Region 2 Guidance: Best Management Practices for Lead at Outdoor Shooting
Ranges, available at http://www.epa.gov/region02/waste/leadshot/
(d) TRW Recommendations for Performing Human Health Risk Analysis on Small Arms
Shooting Ranges (OSWER #9285.7-37), available at
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/lead/products/firing.pdf
10-6. Sampling and Analysis Plan (SAP). Prior to initiating field activities, a SAP should be
prepared. The SAP may be a stand-alone document or be an appendix of the Work Plan. It
describes the project requirements for all sampling and analysis activities that should take place
during a munitions response project. The SAP must consist of the Field Sampling Plan (FSP)
and Quality Assurance Project Plan (QAPP) when sampling for MC as required by ER 200-3-1.
A SAP Review Checklist is provided in Appendix J of EM 200-1-3.
a. SAP Requirements. The SAP should:
(1) Address each requirement as identified in ER 1110-1-263.
(2) Be prepared in accordance with (IAW) EM 200-1-3.
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(a) Additional reference material on QAPPs may be found in the Intergovernmental Data
Quality Task Force Uniform Federal Policy for QAPPs – QAPP Manual, located at
http://www.epa.gov/fedfac/documents/qualityassurance.htm
(3) Include the laboratory Quality Assurance/Quality Control (QA/QC) plan and
applicable Standard Operating Procedures as an appendix (Compact Disk (CD) submittal
preferred).
(4) Clearly identify any DoD QSM requirements that a laboratory cannot meet.
(5) Document DoD QSM self declaration of compliance
b. Previously prepared Work Plans for the project property should be used as much as
possible in the preparation of the SAP. As a minimum, the level of data quality and QC
requirements should be equivalent to what is required in the existing Work Plans with the
addition of any new requirements that have been added to improve the defensibility of the data
quality since the last work plan submittal.
c. The laboratory must meet all of the requirements specified in the DoD QSM, unless
approved in advance in the SAP. As noted above, the requirement for the laboratory to provide
quantitative second column confirmation for explosives per DoD QSM/EM 200-1-3/SW8000C
should not be waived.
d. SAP Review and Approval. The SAP should be submitted to the Life Cycle Project
Manager (LCPM) at the FUDS Geographic District and the MM DC. The MM DC should
route the plan to the appropriate MM DC technical staff for review, comment, and approval.
For FUDS, SAPs must be submitted to the lead regulatory agency for notice and opportunity to
comment IAW ER 200-1-3. For other projects, this is recommended also. Once approved by
the CO, the SAP represents the standard to which all sampling and analysis activities will be
compared to assure compliance for the project.
10-7. Data Interpretation, Validation, Reporting, and Decision Making.
a. Data Interpretation. After a project property undergoes sampling and analysis, it is
necessary to carefully interpret all data and determine if project objectives have been met.
Project related information such as possible MEC composition (if available) and donor
explosive composition should be provided as part of data interpretation. If numeric DQOs, such
as screening levels, have been identified for the project, a comparison of those DQOs must take
place. Environmental Data Management System (EDMS) software is available to USACE
personnel and contractors for DQO comparison. Data gaps may exist and should be identified
and explained. Data gaps may require additional action as part of the remedial response.
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b. Data Review. The contractor should perform data review according to their approved
SAP requirements. Review procedures should be based on EM 200-1-10, Guidance for
Evaluating Performance-Based Chemical Data; the latest versions of the CLP National
Functional Guidelines (EPA 540-R-99-008 and EPA 540-R-04-004, available at
http://www.epa.gov/oerrpage/superfund/programs/clp/guidance.htm); and any applicable state
or regional requirements. During TPP, the amount of review should be coordinated with
regulatory agencies. The review should be documented in the draft and final engineering
reports. Review documentation should address review of laboratory and field QC results.
Persons performing the data validation should have appropriate experience as determined by
their contractual requirements.
c. Data Reporting. Laboratories and contractors each have data reporting responsibilities.
(1) Laboratories must provide data reporting elements for definitive data IAW DoD QSM
Appendix DoD-A – Reporting Requirements”. They should report all analytical results greater
than the Method Detection Limit (MDL) that, in the analyst’s professional judgment, are
believed to be reliably detected. Concentrations reported between the MDL and the Practical
Quantitation Limit (PQL) must be flagged as estimated. PQLs must be at least 3 times MDLs
for all analytes, as required by the DoD QSM. Non-detect results should be reported to the
PQL unless the laboratory has demonstrated the ability to report non-detects to smaller
concentrations by means such as detection limit check samples. Data packages should be
organized and assembled such that the analytical results are reported on a per-batch basis.
(2) Contractors should submit the complete data packages to the MM DC and reference
them as part of the large study report. They should include the analytical data in the draft and
final engineering reports in tabular data summary table format. There should be, at a minimum,
two types of data summary tables. The first should include all analytical results for all samples
collected. The second should include all analytical results greater than the MDL for all samples
collected. Both tables should include for each analyte, medium of concern, and study area, the
decision limits (e.g., risk based screening limits and background thresholds, if any), the MDL,
the reporting limit for non-detects, and the PQL (if different from the reporting limit for nondetections). Both tables should be sorted by sample field ID, method, analyte, and include
appropriate data flags resulting from laboratory review and contractor’s data validation. Results
on all tables should be reported with an appropriate number of significant figures, e.g., Jqualified results below the PQL should be reported to one significant figure. If there are PQLs
that exceed the applicable decision limit, these should be annotated.
(3) The analytical data should also be provided electronically to the MM DC by the
Contractor in the Staged Electronic Data Deliverable (SEDD) format for all FUDS projects.
The SEDD stage and specification version required should be stated in project Statements of
Work (SOWs)/Performance Work Statements (PWSs). Other project-specific Electronic Data
Deliverable requirements should be documented in project SOWs/PWSs. For more
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information on the SEDD format, see http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/clp/sedd.htm.
The SEDD formatted deliverable can be evaluated by the Automated Data Review (ADR)
software. ADR software is intended to automate certain data review functions that are strictly
comparisons to numeric criteria (i.e., holding time compliance, comparison to recovery/relative
percent difference limits, etc.) Use of the ADR software will require that the contractor
develop a comprehensive library file for all of the methods to be analyzed under the
SOW/PWS. The library file should accurately reflect all of the analytical quality requirements
as documented in the final SAP for the project and should be provided to both MM DC and the
subcontract lab for use in screening Electronic Data Deliverable (EDD) submittals. The
electronic deliverable must include appropriate data flags resulting from laboratory review and
contractor’s data validation. All electronic data submitted by the contract laboratory is required
to be error-free, and in complete agreement with the hardcopy data. Data files are to be
delivered IAW contract requirements. They should be submitted with a transmittal letter from
the laboratory that certifies that the file is in agreement with hardcopy data reports and has been
found to be free of errors using the latest version of ADR evaluation software provided to the
laboratory. The contract laboratory, at their cost, should correct any errors identified by MM
DC. The contractor is responsible for the successful electronic transmission of field and
laboratory data. The laboratory is responsible for archiving the electronic raw data, associated
software, and sufficient associated hardcopy data (e.g., sample login sheets and sample
preparation log sheets) to completely reconstruct the analyses that were performed for the
period specified after completion of the applicable contract. If no period is specified,
laboratories should keep data for 10 years.
d. Decision Making. The sampling and analysis data and evaluations are usually
incorporated into a larger study (e.g., SI, Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA),
RI/FS, Site Characterization, etc.) and the USACE PDT, contractors, and project stakeholders
are involved in making decisions regarding future work to be performed.
10-8. Quality Management.
a. Data Quality. The contractor must provide data quality of a level sufficient to support
the project’s objectives as defined in the SAP. The contractor must provide QC of the various
analytical tasks performed. The contractor is responsible for achieving data quality as defined
in the SAP. Analytical data that does not meet QC requirements may be rejected by the
government. Re-sampling and re-analysis may be required, with contract type determining
whether there are additional costs to the government.
b. Quality Control. It is recommended that field duplicates be collected. The PDT
should determine the rate per matrix per analysis per sampling event. Each project sample
designated for a field duplicate must be homogenized thoroughly, and then divided equally (if
sampling and analysis of volatile organic compounds is required for an MC site, the duplicate
should be collocated). Both portions should be sent to the contractor’s laboratory, but the
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identity of the duplicate should not be provided to the laboratory. The QC samples should
include all sample matrices and analytical parameters except disposal parameters (i.e., Toxicity
Characteristic Leaching Procedures (TCLP), reactivity, corrosivity, and ignitability). The
contractor should administer all QC sample handling and custody requirements in a similar
manner to that used for the environmental samples.
c. Coordination with QA Laboratory. If contractual requirements include collection of
QA samples, the contractor must provide coordination and QA samples (collected and
transported by the contractor) to the QA laboratory identified in the SOW/PWS. The PDT
should determine the rate per matrix per analysis per sampling event for the QA splits. The
contractor should provide sample containers, shipping, etc. for QA samples. QA samples
should be taken as splits of the same samples as QC duplicates (i.e., sample should be
homogenized and split in triplicate) (if sampling and analysis of volatile organic compounds is
required for an MC site, the QA split should be collocated). The QA split samples should
include the same matrices and parameters as QC duplicate samples. The QA laboratory should
be provided a list of measurement quality objectives (MQOs). The MQOs should include, but
should not be limited to, identification of extraction and analysis method numbers and a list of
analytes with required limits. All QA sample handling and custody requirements should be
administered by the contractor similar to the environmental samples. The QA samples should
be sent to the QA Laboratory by overnight delivery for government contract compliance
monitoring. See EM 200-1-6 for additional guidance.
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CHAPTER 11
BLAST AND FRAGMENT PROTECTION
11-1. Introduction.
a. This chapter describes the blast and fragment protection requirements for unintentional
and intentional detonations. These requirements should be addressed by the PDT when
planning and conducting a munitions response. A checklist of planning considerations has
been provided as Table B-8.
b. The MSD calculated to perform work at an MRA may include the MSD for
unintentional detonations, intentional detonations, or both depending on the SOW. Preliminary
site work performed at an MRA, such as surveying, laying out search lanes, and non-intrusive
geophysical investigations, do not require the establishment of a MSD. The MSD requirements
for intentional and unintentional detonations are discussed in paragraph 11-5.
11-2. DQOs. When evaluating the blast and fragment protection components of a munitions
response project, the PDT should consider DQOs in the following areas:
a. Establishing MSDs IAW DOD 6055.9-STD.
b. Proper design and approval of any required engineering controls.
c. Procedures for reviewing government and contractor planning documentation.
11-3. Explosives Safety Considerations.
a. General. When developing the SOW for a munitions response project, the PDT will
need to evaluate several resources to find information relating to the current characteristics of
the project property, the type of munitions response project being proposed, the historical use
of the project property, and the nature of the military munitions that were used at the location.
These resources may include:
(1) INPR.
(2) SI Report.
(3) Historical records relating to the operation of the installation.
(4) Previous site investigation reports.
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(5) Other historical or investigative reports that may give an indication of the current
state of the project property.
b. Specific site characteristics that should be examined when reviewing these reports
include:
(1) Project property layout.
(2) Land use of the project property and the surrounding area.
(3) Physical characteristics of the project property (e.g., topography, vegetation).
(4) Man-made structures at the project property (e.g., buildings, roads).
(5) Type of MEC present or suspected to be present.
c. Munitions Response. The type of munitions response proposed for a project property
will influence the type and amount of blast and fragment protection requirements for a project.
The PDT will need to consider the type of munitions response being proposed for the project
property, such as:
(1) Anomaly Avoidance.
(2) Construction Support.
(3) RI or EE/CA.
(4) Remedial/Removal Action.
d. Probable Military Munitions Characteristics. The PDT will need to consider the type
of MEC that could potentially be found at the project property. This information may be
obtained from any archival information available on the project property or from any other
reports that have previously been generated. Some of the elements to be considered in this
category include:
(1) Conventional versus chemical MEC.
(2) MEC versus munition debris.
(3) The type and amount of MEC anticipated.
(4) The potential age, condition, and burial depth of MEC.
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(5) The potential fuzing of the MEC.
e. MGFD. For all MRAs and MRSs, an MGFD will be determined. The MGFD is the
munition that has the greatest fragmentation distance of the MEC items that are reasonably
expected to be found at the MRA or MRS, based on research or site characterization. The PDT
should select the correct MGFD for the project property based on the available historical
information such as that listed in paragraph 11-3a.
f. Explosive Soils. For explosive soils, the MGFD concept does not apply. Instead, the
concept of Maximum Credible Event (MCE) applies. For soil, the MCE is the concentration of
explosives times the weight of the mix. For example, 1,000 pounds of soils containing
15 percent Trinitrotoluene (TNT) has an MCE of 150 pounds. When the concentration varies
within the area, weighted averages or any other valid mathematical technique can be used, as
long as the technique is explained and technically supported in the submission. Overpressure
and soil ejecta radius will be considered when determining the Q-D for explosive soils. For
additional information on explosive soils, contact the MM CX .
11-4. Explosive Effects.
a. A major component of the MM CX’s involvement during a munitions response project
is the calculation of MSDs for unintentional and intentional detonations of MEC items. A
review of the explosive effect calculations that should be used by the PDT in the determination
of MSDs is provided in this paragraph. This paragraph also provides the source documentation
for these MSD calculations.
b. There are six factors of a MEC detonation that should be considered by the PDT when
either siting an area for intentional MEC detonations (such as when setting up an OB/OD area)
or when the possibility exists of an unintentional detonation during the course of a munitions
response investigation. These six factors include:
(1) Fragmentation.
(2) Overpressure.
(3) Thermal flux.
(4) Ground shock.
(5) Noise.
(6) Ejected soil.
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c. Controlling Factors. To determine the appropriate MSD, the PDT should use the
explosion effect calculation that yields the greatest MSD, unless an engineering control will be
used to limit the explosion effect. Typically, either fragmentation or overpressure is the
controlling factor in determining the necessary MSD. However, thermal flux and soil ejecta
may become controlling factors if a buried detonation is planned, as discussed in paragraph 114d.
(1) Fragmentation. The method to be used to determine the separation distances due to
fragmentation is identified in DDESB Technical Paper (TP) 16. This TP contains the
methodology of calculations for determining fragmentation distances for many of the MEC
items that have been encountered on past and present USACE project sites. These specific
distances should be used for those specific MEC types in lieu of DOD 6055.9-STD. TP 16 also
includes tables and charts to be used for determining the fragmentation distances when the item
is unknown. Generally speaking, the maximum horizontal fragmentation distance is to be used
for all unexploded ordnance (UXO) items as the MSD for all non-essential personnel for both
intentional and unintentional detonations. This distance may be lessened when using authorized
fragmentation reducing engineering controls, see DDESB TP 15 for a listing of all approved
engineering controls for this purpose. All personnel will be located outside of the maximum
horizontal fragmentation distance when intentional detonations are taking place. For MEC
items, other than UXO, the use of the hazardous fragmentation distance (HFD) may be
authorized during activities that may produce an unintentional detonation. The OE-CX will
provide assistance to the USACE districts in determining when this is permissibile.
(2) Overpressure. The method to be used by the PDT in determining the MSD for
overpressure is the same for both unintentional and intentional detonations. In both
circumstances, the equation D=KW1/3 is used. However, the safety factor ‘K’ differs
depending on whether the circumstance is an unintentional or intentional detonation. For
unintentional detonations a K value of 50 should be used, while for intentional detonations a K
value of 328 should be applied. Generally speaking, the overpressure factor is used when the
MEC item identified for the project site does not have a fragment producing effect, e.g., some
practice bombs and munitions use black powder as signal indicator and the design of the MEC
is to produce a visual effect such as a puff of smoke or a large sound report to enable the firing
crew to see where the munition hit or landed. These types of munitions will usually use the
K328 factor when determining the MSDs for the site activities. Normally the net explosive
weight of the donor charge will be added to explosive weight of the MEC item to come up with
a total explosive weight when figuring the K328 factor.
d. Secondary Factors. The following secondary factors are considered in calculating
MSDs. These factors are typically not controlling factors in MSD determinations.
(1) Thermal Flux. Thermal flux will rarely be a controlling factor in MSD
determinations. However, in some instances, the thermal flux generated from the exothermic
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reactions that result from the detonation of certain MEC may generate a MSD greater than
either the fragmentation or overpressure distance. The PDT should use the same method for
determining the MSD based on thermal considerations for both unintentional and intentional
detonations. The PDT should use the standards listed in DOD 6055.9-STD to determine the
MSD due to thermal flux. If the MSD due to thermal flux listed in DOD 6055.9-STD cannot
be met, then shields complying with MIL-STD-398 should be used to provide an acceptable
level of thermal protection.
(2) Ejected Soil. The PDT should reference DDESB TP 16 to calculate the distance that
soil may be ejected as a result of an intentional detonation. In addition to the hazards posed by
ejected soil during a subsurface MEC detonation, the burial depth calculation may also assist in
determining the amount of earth cover necessary to defeat the fragmentation generated during a
MEC detonation. A computer model has been created to assist in determining the amount of
earth cover necessary to mitigate the fragmentation hazard from a MEC detonation. The PDT
should reference HNC-ED-CS-S-97-7, Revision 1, for additional details on the use of this
computer model.
(3) Ground Shock. The PDT should use the same method for determining the MSD
based on ground shock for both unintentional and intentional detonations. In those areas where
vibration damage may occur due to a MEC detonation, the PDT should consult the
requirements listed in TM 5-1300. In addition, state and local regulations may exist that are
more stringent than the Federal regulations. As a result, local regulators should be contacted
during the planning process to determine the level of ground shock allowed according to any
local codes.
(4) Noise. The PDT should use the same method for determining the MSD based on
noise for both unintentional and intentional detonations. The PDT should use the criteria
presented in DA Pam 385-64. In addition, state and local regulators should be contacted during
the planning process to determine if there are more stringent local regulations in regards to
noise generated as a result of a MEC detonation.
11-5. MSDs.
a. The PDT should ensure the appropriate MSDs are used, as identified in DDESB TP 16
and DOD 6055.9-STD.
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11-6. Unintentional Versus Intentional Detonation Minimum Separation Criteria. When the
PDT or the UXO contractor determines the MSD to be used on a munitions response project,
two sets of MSD criteria may need to be considered.
a. The first set of criteria has been established for unintentional detonations. An
unintentional detonation is a detonation that is not planned in advance. Unintentional
detonations are discussed in paragraph 11-7.
b. The second set of criteria has been established for intentional detonations of MEC. An
intentional detonation is a planned, controlled detonation. Intentional detonations are discussed
in paragraph 11-8.
11-7. Unintentional Detonations.
a. The MSD for unintentional detonations is the distance non-project personnel must
maintain from intrusive operations, and they are:
(1) For UXO items, it is the maximum horizontal fragment distance, as identified in
DDESB 16, for fragment producing munitions.
(2) For other MEC items that produce fragments, it may be permissible to use the
hazardous fragment distance (HFD), contact the OE-CX for additional information.
(3) For MEC items that do not produce fragments (by design), but contain explosives,
use the K328 distance of the item.
b. These distances may be reduced by using approved engineering controls.
c. Team Separation Distance (TSD). The TSD is the greater distance of:
(1) Overpressure value of K50, or
(2) 200 feet.
11-8. Intentional Detonations. The MSD for intentional detonations is the distance that both
project personnel and the public will be from the intentional detonation. The MSD for
intentional detonations is calculated by taking the greatest value of the following:
a. Overpressure at K value of 328. Ensure the explosive weight of the donor charge is
added to the net explosive weight of the MEC item when making this calculation.
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b. Maximum horizontal fragmentation distance as determined IAW DDESB TP 16,
unless engineering controls are being employed. The item having the greatest fragment
distance will become the MGFD for intentional detonations for a MRS.
11-9. Explosives Siting Plan.
a. General.
(1) The proposed MSDs for unintentional detonations, intentional detonations, and siting
of critical project components are discussed in the Explosives Siting Plan, a component of the
project Work Plan. The Explosives Siting Plan will be reviewed by the PDT to ensure that the
appropriate minimum separation standards have been applied. The PDT should review the
Explosives Siting Plan to ensure that it properly describes the MSDs and other safety criteria
that will be employed during a munitions response. All ESPs must be reviewed and approved
by the OE-CX, as delegated by HQUSACE. The OE-CX will provide the MACOM/Direct
Reporting Unit (DRU) approval in accordance with the delegation authority. DOD 6055.9-STD
requires all explosive safety plans to have a MACOM/DRU approval. The following
explosives operations will be described in the plan and located on a map:
(a) MRSs.
(b) Explosives storage magazines.
(c) Planned or established demolition areas.
(2) The site map should be scaled at 1-inch equals 400 feet. However, a larger scale may
be used if available and the map can be logistically included in the work plan. Also, a smaller
scale is acceptable as long as the distances can be shown accurately. If an unscaled map is
used, all relevant distances will be labeled.
(3) The MSDs calculated for the operation should be discussed in the text of the plan and
Q-D arcs for the above-listed project elements drawn on the map.
b. Explosive Safety Quantity-Distance (ESQD) Requirements. DOD 6055.9-STD
provides many tables, in Chapter 9, on this topic. Explosive Storage QD for the BATF Type II
magazines, used predominantly on USACE MMRP locations, is normally derived from Table
C9.T2 for hazard division (HD) 1.1 explosives. Select the Net Explosive Weight (NEW) you
want to store, look to the right in the "Structure" column and that will be your ESQD arcs
around your potential exposure site (PES) for, non-fragmenting, bulk high explosives or nonfragmenting MEC. If recovered, fragmenting MEC is being stored pending disposal, you must
site the magazine using the same table but use the "Open" column distances. See DOD 6055.9-
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STD for other storage configurations and PESs.If the PDT is going to establish an OB/OD area
within the MRS, the provisions of EP 1110-1-17 apply.
c. MRSs. The PDT should confirm that the MSDs during intrusive operations are
determined IAW the criteria discussed in paragraphs 11-7 and 11-8.
d. Explosives Storage Magazines. The PDT should ensure that the following items are
discussed in the Explosives Siting Plan in regards to the Explosives Storage Magazine:
(1) Type of explosives storage magazine, (e.g., portable commercial, above ground, shed,
and earth-covered).
(2) NEW and hazard division to be stored in each magazine, (generally, recovered MEC
is considered to be Hazard Division 1.1).
(3) Q-D criteria used to site the magazine.
(4) Design criteria for any proposed engineering controls if the Q-D criteria cannot be
met.
(5) Designation of commercial explosives into a DOD Hazard Classification and Storage
Compatibility Group by USATCES prior to being stored in a DOD facility. (See DA Pam 38564 for procedure.)
(6) Lightning Protection.
(a) FUDS. Lightning protection is not required if the following criteria are met:
•
The magazine is constructed of metal that is 3/16-inch steel or larger (reference
Appendix L of National Fire Protection Association 780).
•
The magazine is grounded (see Figure 11-1).
•
The magazine is located at least 6-1/2 feet from the nearest fence.
•
The grounding system will be inspected and tested IAW the requirements of DA
Pam 385-64.
(b) BRAC and Active Installations. Lightning protection for BRAC and active
installations will meet the appropriate requirements identified in the service regulations.
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Figure 11-1.
Magazine Grounding Detail
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e. Planned or Established Demolition Areas. The PDT should confirm that the MSDs are
established IAW the provisions of this chapter (this document).
f. The contained detonation chamber will have a DDESB-approved siting plan prior to
operation at an MRA.
g. Footprint Areas. The PDT will ensure that the following footprint areas are addressed
in the Explosives Siting Plan. These areas, however, do not have to be shown on the map:
(1) Blow-in-Place Areas. MSDs for all personnel should be determined using the
requirements for intentional detonations discussed in paragraph 11-7.
(2) Collection Points. Collection points, if used, should have the same MSD as that
identified for unintentional detonations, as discussed in paragraph 11-8.
(3) In-Grid Consolidated Shots. MSDs for all personnel should be determined using the
requirements for intentional detonations, as discussed in DOD 6055.9-STD. The procedures
for in-grid consolidated shots are presented in the USAESCH document titled Procedures for
Demolition of Multiple Rounds (Consolidated Shots) on Ordnance and Explosives Sites. This
document and the corresponding DDESB approval letter will be available on-site.
11-10. Engineering Controls. Engineering controls are used to mitigate the effects of
unintentional or intentional explosions if the calculated MSD for the MEC to be destroyed
cannot be met. The primary goals of using engineering controls are to improve personnel
safety and/or to reduce the exclusion zone. This section discusses engineering controls that can
be used by the PDT for either an unintentional or intentional explosion scenario. DDESB TP 15
contains a listing of the approved engineering controls that can be used on USACE MMRP
locations.
a. Engineering Controls for Unintentional Detonations. Engineering controls used for
unintentional detonations include various barricades. The PDT should design barricades IAW
approved DOD standards. To implement a barricade that has been previously-approved by
DDESB, the PDT should contact the MM CX. If a barricade has not been previously approved,
a complete structural design package will be submitted to the MM CX as part of the Explosives
Siting Plan/ESS. The structural design package will include design drawings, design details,
calculations, drawings, and relevant testing details. The design will show how fragmentation is
captured and overpressure is reduced. The design package, as part of the Explosives Siting
Plan/ESS, is forwarded through appropriate channels to DDESB for approval.
b. Engineering Controls for Intentional Detonations. The most common engineering
controls used during intentional detonations are either soil cover or sandbags. If controls are
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required for intentional explosions, the MM DC should be contacted to arrange for the
preparation of a design (or the review of a design already prepared) with the MM CX.
(1) Soil Cover. If soil is proposed to be used over a to-be-detonated MEC item, the PDT
may use one of several computerized models to determine the required thickness of soil cover
necessary for the intentional detonation of MEC (see 8-5d(2)). The Buried Explosion Module
is one such computerized model. The methodology used in this software is documented in
HNC-ED-CS-S-97-7, Revision 1 and DDESB TP 16. The use of soil as an engineering control
reduces the fragment and soil ejecta distances.
(2) Sandbags. Sandbags may be used for MEC no larger than 155 mm. If sandbags are
proposed to be used as an engineering control to mitigate the fragmentation and overpressures
generated during an intentional MEC detonation, the PDT should refer to HNC-ED-CS-S-98-7.
(3) Barricades. There are a number of approved barricades that may be used for the
mitigation of fragments, such as the open front barricade, enclosed barricade, and the miniature
open front barricade. A comparison, siting, and selection procedure for various barricades can
be found in HNC-ED-CS-S-96-8, Revision 1.
(4) Water Barriers. In some instances it may be necessary to use water as a mitigating
agent for the control of blast effect and fragment containment resulting from the intentional
detonation of munitions. HNC-ED-CS-S-00-3 contains the requirements necessary when using
water as a mitigating agent.
(5) Contained Detonation Chambers. Another engineering control that may be proposed
for the intentional detonation of MEC is a Contained Detonation Chamber (CDC). CDCs are
designed to capture all fragmentation from the detonated MEC and will be approved by
DDESB for the intentional detonation of MEC.
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CHAPTER 12
RISK CHARACTERIZATION
12-1. Introduction.
a. This chapter describes risk characterization for MMRP and is limited to risk from
MEC. A risk assessment is used to describe and estimate the likelihood of adverse outcomes
from an encounter with MEC. Several methods exist for performing a MEC risk assessment
for MRSs; however, there is no single MEC risk assessment methodology that is applicable to a
variety of MRSs that has been widely accepted, tested, and fully implemented.
b. An explosives safety hazard is the probability that MEC might detonate and potentially
cause harm as a result of human activities. An explosives safety hazard exists if a person can
come near to or into contact with MEC and then energy of some sort is applied to it to cause it
to detonate. The energy could be applied by the person, by external forces not associated with
the person’s contact, or an internal mechanism within the MEC item itself.
c. Most MEC risk assessments will concentrate on the explosive hazards associated with
MEC. However, there may also be a risk associated with the presence of MCs. This risk
would be characterized IAW with the procedures used to assess HTRW risk; which may
include an assessment of both human and ecoreceptors. See EM 200-1-4 for additional
guidance on HTRW risk process.
12-2. CSM. The CSM is used to communicate and describe the current state of knowledge and
assumptions about the MEC risk at a project property. The CSM presents the exposure
pathway analysis by integrating information on the MEC source, receptors, and receptor/MEC
interaction. See EM 1110-1-1200 for additional guidance.
12-3. MEC Risk Pathway.
a. The potential for an explosives safety hazard depends upon the presence of three
critical elements to complete the risk pathway. If any one of these three elements is missing,
there is no completed pathway and, therefore, no resulting MEC risk. Each of the three
elements also provides a basis for implementing effective risk management response actions.
The three critical elements include:
(1) A source of MEC (or the presence of MEC).
(2) A receptor or person.
(3) The potential for interaction between the source and the receptor (such as picking up
the item or disturbing the item by plowing).
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b. Source of MEC.
(1) The factors affecting risk associated with the MEC source are the quantity or density
of the MEC. The more MEC present at a project property, the greater the likelihood for an
interaction between a receptor and MEC. If there is no MEC present, there is no completed
pathway and, consequently, no explosives safety hazard.
(2) At military training facilities, it was customary to conduct training exercises using
practice munitions, including those ranges designated for use of High Explosive- (HE-) filled
munitions. Only after troops demonstrated proficiency in firing tactics were troops allowed to
use HE-filled munitions. As a result, training ranges contain a preponderance of practice
munitions.
(3) The primary release mechanisms resulting in the occurrence of MEC are related to
the type of military munition activity, or result from the improper functioning of the military
munition. For example when a military munition (HE artillery shell) is fired it will do one of
three things:
(a) It will detonate completely. This is called a high order detonation.
(b) It will undergo incomplete detonation. This is called a low order detonation.
(c) It will fail to function. This results in UXO.
(4) Military munitions may be lost, abandoned, or buried, resulting in unfired munitions
that could be fuzed or unfuzed.
(5) In addition there are military munitions that will have a delayed function and may be
hidden by design resulting in a deployed, armed, and fuzed muntion.
(6) Military munitions demilitarization through OB/OD is used to destroy excess,
obsolete, or unserviceable munitions by combustion (OB) or by detonation (OD). An OD
operation can result in a high order detonation or a low order detonation. In addition, the
munitions may possibly be spread beyond the immediate vicinity by the detonation (“kickouts”). Incomplete combustion or low/high order detonation failure can leave uncombusted
explosives.
c. Receptor. Receptors are people that have the potential to contact MEC. The factors
affecting risk associated with the receptor include the number of people that access the area
containing MEC and the accessibility of the property containing MEC. The more receptors that
use the location and the easier it is to access the property, the greater the potential for MEC
contact. The converse is also true: the fewer the people that are present and the harder it is to
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access the property due to man-made or natural barriers, the lower the potential for MEC
contact.
d. Interaction. The factors affecting risk that are associated with the interaction with the
MEC include: MEC contact potential; energy application; and MEC sensitivity and potential
severity.
(1) The MEC contact potential is affected by: the depth of the MEC; site stability
(erosion); and the depth and type of receptor activity. For instance if the project property is
unstable there is a greater likelihood the MEC will be brought closer to the surface and increase
the potential for interaction. Also the greater the depth of intrusion by the receptor the greater
likelihood there will be receptor and MEC interaction.
(2) The energy application factor affects the likelihood that a receptor will apply enough
energy to a MEC item causing it to function. The risk to the receptor increases greatly the
more energy is applied to a MEC. Examples include an item is picked up, hit with a hammer,
thrown in a fire, etc. However, there may also be the case where the type of MEC requires no
force be applied to it by the receptor in order to function.
(3) Sensitivity and Severity.
(a) The greater the sensitivity, the greater the likelihood for a MEC item to function. The
type of MEC affects the likelihood and severity of injury if a MEC functions. The hazard from
MEC typically results from a single interaction between a receptor and a MEC source and may
have one of three outcomes: no effect, injury, or death. The consequence of a military
munitions detonation is associated with physical forces resulting from blast pressure,
fragmentation hazards, thermal hazards and shock hazards. The type of hazard threat and the
severity of the hazard depend on the type of MEC.
(b) Different types of military munitions vary in their likelihood of detonation and their
potential for harm. The classification of energetic materials used in military munitions can be
divided by their primary uses: explosives, propellants, and pyrotechnics. Explosives and
propellants, if properly initiated, will evolve into large volumes of gas over a short period of
time. The key difference between explosives and propellants is the reaction rate. Explosives
react rapidly, creating a high-pressure shock wave and are designed to break apart a munitions
casing and cause injury. Propellants react at a slower rate, creating a sustained lower pressure.
Propellants are designed to provide energy to deliver a munition to its target. Pyrotechnics
produce heat, but less gas than explosives or propellants. Pyrotechnics are used to send signals,
to illuminate areas, simulate other weapons during training, and are used as ignition elements
for certain weapons. When initiated, pyrotechnics produce heat, noise, smoke, light or infrared
radiation. Incendiaries are a class of pyrotechnics that are highly flammable and are used to
destroy a target by fire.
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(c) Explosives can be further subdivided into low explosive and high explosive based on
the velocity of the explosion. When a HE munition is initiated, it decomposes almost
instantaneously and the detonation can be lethal. Low explosives undergo decomposition or
combustion at rates from a few centimeters per minute to approximately 400 meters per second
(EPA, 2002). Black powder is a common low explosive and when used as a spotting charge it
can cause injury or burns. In a 37mm projectile, the black powder is fully encased and can be
lethal if initiated.
(d) Some practice munitions contain an energetic, (low explosive or pyrotechnic charge)
and include a fully functional fuzing system, while other practice munitions are wholly inert. A
practice munition poses less of a hazard than an HE-filled UXO item. The hazard from a
practice munition may result from a fuze or spotting charge contained in the munition in order
to produce a flash or smoke upon impact. Unexpended spotting charges may cause a flesh
burn. The wholly inert practice items have no explosive parts, including fuze components, and
do not pose an explosive safety hazard.
12-4. Risk Management Principles.
a. Risk management consists of a two-part response, those munitions response actions
that remove the hazard such as physical removals and those munitions response actions that
manage the residual hazards such as land use controls (LUCs). Physical removal involves
reducing the quantity of MEC at the property, which directly lowers the risk. However, there
frequently is residual risk at MRAs since it is technically and financially impracticable to
provide 100 percent removal of all items. However, LUCs can be used to effectively manage
the residual risk.
b. LUCs are an important component of the overall risk management strategy. LUCs
may consist of educational awareness programs, legal restrictions on land use, and physical
access controls. See EP 1110-1-24 for procedural information on establishing and maintaining
land use controls. The educational awareness program should be the cornerstone of the LUC
program because of the paramount importance of effective risk communication. Controlling or
altering the behavior of receptors can reduce the potential for interaction with MEC and reduce
the risk. Defense Environmental Network & Information Exchange provides an Internet webbased Educational Program, available at
https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/Library/Explosives/UXOSafety/uxosafety.html. LUCs
such as access and activity restrictions can also be used to decrease the number of receptors and
the potential for interaction with MEC. If you reduce the number of receptors on-site and the
activities that cause interaction the risk is reduced.
c. In summary, if there is potential for a completed MEC pathway the following risk
management principles can be applied to mitigate the risk:
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(1) Reducing the quantity of MEC on-site lowers the risk.
(2) Reducing the number of potential receptors on-site lowers the risk.
(3) Reducing the potential for interaction between receptors and MEC lowers the risk.
(4) Modifying or controlling the behavior of the receptors lowers the risk.
12-5. Risk Characterization Methods.
a. Risk characterizations are site-specific evaluations and may vary in both detail and
extent to which qualitative and quantitative inputs are used. The risk characterizations depend
on the complexity and particular circumstances of the project property, as well as the
availability of Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements and other guidance. The
risk characterization should consider the potential risks associated with current land use and
activities, as well as reasonably anticipated future land use. Existing site conditions should be
evaluated to provide a baseline risk in the absence of any actions to control or mitigate that risk.
b. EPA has developed general risk assessment methods for evaluating human health and
environmental risks at HTRW-contaminated locations. These general risk assessment methods
are conducted using four basic steps: (1) hazard identification, (2) dose response modeling, (3)
exposure assessment, and (4) risk characterization. These methods are typically used to
quantify risk from long-term, chronic exposure to low levels of contamination. EPA has no
provisions for evaluating explosives safety risk.
c. The risk assessment processes that have been developed for chemical contaminants do
not lend themselves to a MEC risk characterization because of the unique properties of the
MEC pathway. The MEC pathway, including the potential for human interaction with military
munitions, needs to be evaluated differently than processes developed for chemical
contaminants.
d. Both quantitative and qualitative methods have been used to evaluate MEC risk.
Information on available risk tools can be found on the OE Directorate website. Additional
guidance on recommended models can be obtained by contacting the MM CX.
e. The results of the risk characterization should be used to evaluate potential munitions
response alternatives. Specifically, risk characterization results can be an input to the
evaluation of the Protectiveness of Human Health and the Environment criterion in an EE/CA
or RI/FS. The risk characterization is used to communicate the magnitude of the risk at the
location and the primary causes of that risk, and to aid in the development, evaluation, and
selection of appropriate response alternatives.
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12-6. Risk Communication.
a. Risk communication is an integral part of risk management. Early, effective
communication of risk will allow the public to have a stake in the decisions made and increase
the likelihood that the decisions made will be supported by the community. When the public
perceives the government as being unresponsive and community relationships are poor, the
public will tend to judge the risk as being more serious. Without effective risk communication,
the level of risk will have little effect on the public’s perception of risk and increasing the
amount of technical detail will have no effect on the perceived risk.
b. Critical to effective risk communication is early stakeholder involvement. Restoration
Advisory Boards (RABs) are the cornerstone of public involvement for implementing effective
communication. RABs are advisory groups for the environmental restoration process and may
involve representatives from the DOD, EPA, state and local governments, tribal governments
and the affected local community. Although RABs are not decision-making bodies, the RAB
members share community views and enable the continuous flow of information. The PDT
should plan to have a risk assessment presentation to the RAB provided by an expert from the
MM CX. Additional information on developing a public participation plan can be found in EP
1110-3-8.
c. There are many ways to effect risk communication and because of the differences in
the education, interest level, and knowledge of the audience, more than one communication
venue may be appropriate. The PDT should consider designating one person as a
communications coordinator. This person could be from the public affairs office or a RAB
member and does not necessarily have to be a technical expert. The communications
coordinator should become knowledgeable about MEC risk assessment issues and know when
and where to go for additional expertise. The PDT and communications coordinator should
develop at the beginning of a project a site-specific risk communications plan. Components of
the plan may utilize different methods of risk communication including presentations, videos,
partnering meetings, public information forums, and printed media.
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CHAPTER 13
QUALITY ASSURANCE SURVEILLANCE PLANS
13-1. Purpose and Overview.
a. This Chapter describes the roles and responsibilities of the Project Delivery Team with
regard to development and implementation of the project specific Quality Assurance
Surveillance Plan (QASP). A QASP which directly corresponds to a contract’s specified
performance standards, is used to measure contractor performance and to ensure that the
Government receives the quality of services called for under the contract and pays only for the
acceptable levels of services received. Each PDT member has an important part to play to
ensure quality products are received from the contractor.
b. ER 5-1-11 requires every project to have a Project Management Plan. As part of the
PMP, each USACE element must document its quality policies, procedures, and responsibilities
in a Quality Management Plan (QMP). The development of a QASP may satisfy all QMP
requirements and should be incorporated into the PMP.
c. Effective QA is comprehensive (i.e., it involves all aspects of the entire life cycle of
projects), and:
(1) Ensures people accomplish appropriate tasks at the appropriate time.
(2) Ensures customer objectives and expectations are met or exceeded.
(3) Includes the use of a multidisciplinary team of trained personnel.
(4) Includes using a comprehensive and systematic approach to project planning (e.g.,
Technical Project Planning).
(5) Includes reviewing project documents and project status.
(6) Includes observing field operations.
13-2. Responsibilities. The responsibilities detailed herein are specific to Formerly Used
Defense Site projects and are specific to the QA process. General responsibilities for the safe
execution of MMRP projects are detailed in ER 200-3-1 and ER 1110-1-8153.
a. Project Manager.
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(1) Oversee the development and implementation of the QASP. Specific surveillance
activities for project managers will vary depending upon the type of project. Common
responsibilities for projects are provided in the QASP template provided in Appendix C.
b. PDT.
(1) Provides technical input to the PM to be included in the QASP.
(2) Implements the QASP as specified in the particular project QASP. Specific QASP
responsibilities for the PDT team members will vary depending upon the type of project.
Common responsibilities for various PDT members are also provided in the QASP template
provided in Appendix C.
(3) Provides the contracting office any specifications for inspection, testing, and other
contract quality requirements essential to ensure the integrity of the product or service. For
service contracts, like most MMRP contracts, these quality requirements are documented in a
QASP.
13-3. QASP Overview.
a. What is a QASP? All service contracts require the development and implementation
of a QASP. A QASP describes how government personnel will evaluate and assess contractor
performance. The purpose of the QASP is to describe how project performance will be
measured and assessed against performance standards. It is based on the premise that the
contractor, not the government, is responsible for managing quality control.
b. When is a QASP done? The QASP is intended to measure performance against the
standards in the Performance Work Statement (PWS) or Statement of Work. As such, these
interdependent documents must be coordinated. Since the PWS/SOW and QASP are
intertwined, it is both effective and efficient to write them simultaneously.
c. What should be considered when developing a QASP?
(1) The QASP is a requirement of FAR Part 46.103(a) for service contracts.
(2) The QASP describes the contract technical quality requirements, including inspection
and testing requirements.
(3) Preliminary QASPs should be developed for each project in conjunction with the
development of the PWS/SOW. The QASP should be revised and modified to fit site-specific
conditions and requirements and the contractor’s QC Plan. Effective use of the QASP, in
conjunction with the contractor’s QC Plan, will allow the government to evaluate the
contractor’s success in meeting the project objectives.
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(4) The entire PDT should meet to discuss the project’s objectives and to have input on
the final measures contained in the QASP.
(5) The majority of effort in developing the QASP is tailoring the QASP Metrics and
Surveillance Activities Table to project specific needs. Note that the QASP Metrics and
Surveillance Activities Table are the most time-consuming part of the QASP development
process.
d. What does the QASP consist of? The QASP identifies roles and responsibilities, the
Surveillance Activities Table identifies the "work" that will be done and how it will be
documented, the QASP Metrics identify how the contracting officer will rate the contractor's
performance of the activities monitored in the Surveillance Activities Table, and the Corrective
Action Request identifies how the government will communicate non-conformances it
observes. A template for a QASP is provided in Appendix C.
13-4. QASP Metrics.
a. Periodic assessment of contractor performance should emphasize clear
communication, with the objective of encouraging and maintaining high standards of
performance. The metrics should be consistent with past performance assessments.
b. Performance metrics must be as objective as possible and measurable. They must be
modified to meet site-specific objectives. The contractor shall be provided an opportunity for
input into all metrics. Instructions on how to develop performance metrics, as well as a sample
QASP Performance Metrics Table is provided in Appendix D.
13-5. QASP Surveillance.
a. As mentioned, the QASP identifies roles and responsibilities. The completion of the
activities identified in the QASP can be documented through the Surveillance Activities Table
(e.g., whether those activities have been completed, how often, etc.). An example Surveillance
Activities Table is provided in Appendix E.
b. The PDT should always ask "why" when determining the frequency and types of QA
surveillance methods and the associated performance metrics.
c. The frequency of surveillance, or on-site presence of the USACE project team, will be
determined on a case-by-case basis considering:
(1) The types of MEC.
(2) Stakeholder concerns.
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(3) Project dynamics (is this something new, different approach, unusual conditions etc.).
(4) The type of Task Order (TO)/contract (e.g., performance-based, cost plus fixed fee,
Time and Materials, etc.).
(5) Hazard severity.
(6) Accident probability.
(7) Available resources (e.g., personnel, dollars).
(8) Accident history.
(9) Past performance.
d. Other criteria for inclusion as performance indicators in the QASP include:
(1) Criticality of the process and its output.
(2) How the performance indicator will be monitored and how frequently it must be
monitored.
(3) Availability and cost of internal QA manpower necessary to monitor each
performance indicator.
(4) The cost to the government of monitoring each performance indicator.
13-6. QASP Non-Conformances.
a. Non-conformances will be documented on a Corrective Action Request (CAR) form
(see Appendix F). The contractor will be provided a copy of the CAR. Generally, the
contractor has the option of re-performing the work at no additional cost to the Government.
However, there are circumstances where re-performance is not an option.
b. Each CAR will be annotated as a critical nonconformance, major nonconformance, or
minor nonconformance. The PDT determines appropriate contractor response times on a
project-by-project basis. Contractor response times provided below are for illustrative purposes
only. Note that any life or mission threatening safety issues must be corrected immediately.
The following definitions are derived from FAR 46.101.
(1) Critical Nonconformance: a nonconformance that is likely to result in hazardous or
unsafe conditions for individuals using, maintaining, or depending upon the supplies or
services; or is likely to prevent performance of a vital agency mission. Include in the QASP
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that the contractor will typically be provided 24 hours (1 business day) to provide a written
response to the CAR.
(2) Major Nonconformance: a nonconformance, other than critical, that is likely to result
in failure of the supplies or services, or to materially reduce the usability of the supplies or
services for their intended purpose. Include in the QASP that the contractor will be provided
not more than 5 business days to provide a written response to the CAR.
(3) Minor Nonconformance: a nonconformance that is not likely to materially reduce the
usability of the supplies or services for their intended purpose, or is a departure from
established standards having little bearing on the effective use or operation of the supplies or
services. Include in the QASP that the contractor will be provided not more than 15 business
days to provide a written response to the CAR.
13-7. QASP Review Documentation.
a. Various forms may be used to document review activities that can be incorporated as
part of the QASP. The review documentation forms that are used should be individually
tailored to the project as circumstances warrant.
b. The following are some examples of commonly used review documentation forms:
(1) Generic On-Site QA Checklist (see Appendix G).
(2) EE/CA Work Plan Review Matrix (see Appendix H).
(3) EE/CA Report Review Matrix (see Appendix I).
(4) Removal Action Work Plan Review Matrix (see Appendix J).
(5) Sample Quality Assurance Report (see Appendix K).
(6) After Action or Final Quality Assurance Report Content (see Appendix L).
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CHAPTER 14
CORPS OF ENGINEERS CONTRACTORS MPPEH INSPECTION,
CERTIFICATION, AND FINAL DISPOSITION PROCEDURES
14-1. MPPEH – Contractor Responsibilities and Procedures.
a. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) contractors executing projects will
comply with the following procedures for processing MPPEH for final disposition. The
objective of these procedures is to ensure that an inspection procedure of the exterior and
interior surfaces of all recovered MPPEH is in place to ensure these items do not present an
explosive hazard. These USACE contractor responsibilities and procedures will be contained,
or referenced, in the project work plan.
(1) Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Sweep Personnel will only mark suspected items and
will not be allowed to perform any assessment of a suspect item to determine its status.
(2) Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Tech I can tentatively identify a located item as
MPPEH, followed by a required confirmation by a UXO Tech II or III
(3) UXO Technician II will:
(a) Perform a 100% inspection of each item as it is recovered and determine the
following:
•
Is the item a UXO, a DMM, munitions debris, or range related debris?
•
Does the item contain explosives hazards or other dangerous fillers?
•
Does the item require detonation?
•
Does the item require demilitarization (demil) or venting to expose dangerous
fillers?
•
Does the item require draining of engine fluids, illuminating dials and other
visible liquid hazardous, toxic or radiological waste (HTRW) materials?
(b) Segregate items requiring demil or venting procedures from those items ready for
certification.
(c) Items found to contain explosives hazards or other dangerous fillers will be processed
in accordance with applicable procedures.
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(4) UXO Technician III will:
(a) Perform a 100% re-inspection of all recovered items to determine if free of explosives
hazards or other dangerous fillers and engine fluids, illuminating dials and other visible liquid
HTRW materials?
(b) Supervise detonation of items found to contain explosive hazards or other dangerous
fillers and venting/demil procedures.
(c) Supervise the consolidation of MPPEH for containerization and sealing. Munitions
Debris and Range-related Debris will be segregated.
(5) UXO Quality Control (QC) Specialist will:
(a) Conduct daily audits of the procedures used by UXO teams and individuals for
processing MPPEH.
(b) Perform and document random sampling ( by pieces, volume or area ) of all MPPEH
collected from the various teams to ensure no items with explosive hazards, engine fluids,
illuminating dials and other visible liquid HTRW materials are identified as munitions debris
or range-related debris as required for completion of the Requisition and Turn-in Document,
DD Form 1348-1A.
(6) UXO Site Safety Officer (UXOSO) will:
(a) Ensure the specific procedures and responsibilities for processing MPPEH for
certification as munitions debris or range-related debris specified in the work plan are being
followed.
(b) All procedures for processing MPPEH are being performed safely and consistent with
applicable regulations.
(7) Senior UXO Supervisor will:
(a) Be responsible for ensuring work and Quality Control (QC) Plans specify the
procedures and responsibilities for processing MPPEH for final disposition as munitions debris
or range-related debris.
(b) Ensure a Requisition and Turn-in Document, DD Form 1348-1A is completed for all
munitions debris and range-related debris to be transferred for final disposition.
(c) Perform random checks to satisfy that the munitions debris and range -related debris
is free from explosive hazards necessary to complete the Form, DD 1348-1A.
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(d) Certify all munitions debris and range-related debris as free of explosive hazards,
engine fluids, illuminating dials and other visible liquid HTRW materials.
(e) Be responsible for ensuring that inspected debris is secured in a closed, labeled and
sealed container and documented as follows;
•
The container will be closed and clearly labeled on the outside with the
following information: The first container will be labeled with a unique
identification that will start with USACE/Installation Name/Contractor’s
Name/0001/Seal’s unique identification and continue sequentially.
•
The container will be closed in such a manner that a seal must be broken in
order to open the container. A seal will bear the same unique identification
number as the container or the container will be clearly marked with the seal’s
identification if different from the container.
•
A documented description of the container will be provide by the contractor
with the following information for each container; contents, weight of container;
location where munitions or range-related debris was obtained; name of
contractor, names of certifying and verifying individuals; unique container
identification; and seal identification, if required. The contractor in a separate
section of the final report will also provide these documents.
14-2. MPPEH Certification and Verification.
a. The contractor will ensure that MPPEH is properly inspected in accordance with the
procedures in I. above. Only personnel who are qualified UXO personnel will perform these
inspections. The Senior UXO Supervisor will certify and the USACE OE Safety Specialist will
verify that the debris is free of explosive hazards.
b. DD form 1348-1A will be used as certification/verification documentation. All DD
1348-1A must clearly show the typed or printed names of the contractor’s Senior UXO
Supervisor and the USACE OE Safety Specialist, organization, signature, and contractor’s
home office and field office phone number(s) of the persons certifying and verifying the debris
as free of explosive hazards.
(1) Local directives and agreements may supplement these procedures. Coordination
with the local concerns will identify any desired or requested supplementation to these
procedures.
(2) In addition to the data elements required and any locally agreed to directives, the DD
1348-1A must clearly indicate the following for scrap metal:
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(a) Basic material content (Type of metal; e.g., steel or mixed)
(b) Estimated weight
(c) Unique identification of each of the containers and seals stated as being turned over.
(d) Location where munitions debris or range-related debris was obtained.
(e) Seal identification, if different from the unique identification of the sealed container.
(3) The following certification/verification will be entered on each DD 1348-1A for turn
over of Munitions debris or range-related debris and will be signed by the Senior UXO
Supervisor and the USACE OE Safety Specialist. This statement will be used on any ranges
where Range Related Debris is being processed along with munitions debris: "This certifies
that the material listed has been 100 percent properly inspected and, to the best of our
knowledge and belief, are free of explosive hazards, engine fluids, illuminating dials and other
visible liquid HTRW materials.
(4) The following certification/verification will be entered on each 1348-1A for turn over
of munitions debris and will be signed by the Senior UXO Supervisor on properties where only
munitions debris is being processed: “This certifies and verifies that the material listed has been
100 percent inspected and to the best of our knowledge and belief, are inert and/or free of
explosives or related materials.”
14-3. Maintaining The Chain Of Custody And Final Disposition.
a. The contractor, in coordination with the Corps of Engineers, will arrange for
maintaining the chain of custody and final disposition of the certified and verified materials.
The certified and verified material will only be released to an organization that will:
(1) Upon receiving the unopened labeled containers each with its unique identified and
unbroken seal ensuring a continued chained of custody, and after reviewing and concurring
with all the provided supporting documentation, sign for having received and agreeing with the
provided documentation that the sealed containers contained no explosive hazards when
received. This will be signed on company letterhead and stating that the contents of these
sealed containers will not be sold, traded or otherwise given to another party until the contents
have been smelted and are only identifiable by their basic content.
(2) Send notification and supporting documentation to the sealed container-generating
contractor documenting the seal containers have been smelted and are now only identifiable by
their basic content.
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(3) This document will be incorporated by the contractor into the final report as
documentation for supporting the final disposition of munitions debris and range-related debris.
(4) If the chain of custody is broken, the affected MPPEH must undergo a second 100
percent inspection, a second 100 percent re-inspection, and be documented to verify its
explosives safety status (identified as either munitions debris or range related debris).
b. Material that has been documented as safe in no longer considered MPPEH as long as
the chain of custody remains intact. A legible copy of inspection, re-inspection, and
documentation must accompany the material through final disposition and be maintained for a
period of 3 years thereafter.
14-4. Material that is still MPPEH after inspection may be released only to a qualified receiver.
The following must be accomplished prior to release of the property:
a. Ensure that MPPEH that has been documented as hazardous is only transferred or
released to those entities that:
(1) Have the licenses and permits required to receive, manage, or process the materials.
(2) Have technical experts about the known or suspected explosive hazards associated
with the MPPEH.
(3) Are qualified to receive, manage, and process MPPEH in accordance with DoD
Instruction 4140.62.
(4) Have personnel who are:
(a) Experienced in the management and processing of hazardous materials equivalent to
the MPPEH.
(b) Trained and experienced in the identification and safe handling of used and unused
military and/or any potential explosive hazards that may be associated with the specific
MPPEH.
b. The receiver must be advised of all of the potential hazards associated with the
MPPEH and agree to receive and process the material IAW with DoD Instruction 4141.62.
c. All MPPEH shipments over public transportation routes must comply with DoD
guidance that implements hazardous material transportation regulations.
d. Ensure that chain of custody and accountability records are maintained through final
disposition of MPPEH. A legible copy of inspection, re-inspection, and documentation must
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accompany MPPEH through final disposition and be maintained for a period of 3 years
thereafter.
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APPENDIX A
REFERENCES
Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1988, Public Law (PL) 100-526, 102 Stat. 2632.
Common Range Operations Reports (in press, contact HTRW CX for further information)
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of
1980, PL 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767, 42 USC 9601.
Defense Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1990, PL 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808.
Defense Environmental Restoration Program, PL 99-499, Section 211, 100 Stat. 1719, 10 USC
2701, et seq.
National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)
Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 300, February 1990.
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976, PL 94-580, 90 Stat 2796, 42 USC
6901, et seq., as amended.
Sampling and Testing for Perchlorate at DoD Installations – Interim Guidance, February 2004.
http://www.navylabs.navy.mil/Archive/PerchlorateInterim.pdf
Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, PL 99-499, 100 Stat 1613,
amending CERCLA, 42 USC 9601 et seq., and miscellaneous other sections.
29 CFR 1910
OSHA Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response
40 CFR Part 260, et al
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Military Munitions Rule
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 9.106-4(d)
DAIM-ZA, Department of Army Guidance for Assessing Potential Perchlorate Contamination,
11 June 2004, http://www.epa.gov/swerffrr/pdr/armyguidance_062004.pdf
DDESB TP 16
Methodologies for Calculating Primary Fragment Characteristics
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DOD 6055.9-STD
Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards
DOD Quality Systems Manual (DoD QSM) (latest version).
https://www.denix.osd.mil/deniz/DOD/Working/EDQW/admin.html
DUSD(ATL), Interim Guidance on Perchlorate Sampling, 23 September 2003
https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/DOD/Library/Water/Perchlorate?policy/perchlorate_sampling
_policy.pdf
HQDA Interim Guidance
Interim Guidance for Biological Warfare Materiel (BWM) and Non-Stockpile Chemical
Warfare Materiel (CWM) Response Activities, April 19, 1998.
HQDA Interim Guidance
Interim Guidance for Biological Warfare Materiel (BWM) and Non-Stockpile Chemical
Warfare Materiel (CWM) Response Activities, March 13, 1998.
HQDA Interim Guidance
Interim Guidance for Biological Warfare Materiel (BWM) and Non-Stockpile Chemical
Warfare Materiel (CWM) Response Activities, September 5, 1997.
HQ USACE Memorandum: HTRW Chemical Data Quality Management (CDQM) Policy for
Environmental Laboratory Testing, September 30, 2004.
http://www.environmental.usace.army.mil/info/technical/chem/chemval/HTRW_CDQM_Polic
y_for_Lab_Testing.pdf
DAIM-ZA, Department of Army Guidance for Assessing Potential Perchlorate Contamination,
11 June 2004
http://www.epa.gov/swerffrr/pdf/armyguidance_062004.pdf
DUSD (ATL), Interim Guidance on Perchlorate Sampling, 23 September 2003
https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/DOD/Library/Water/Perchlorate/Policy/perchlorate_sampling
_policy.pdf
DOD EDQW, Sampling and Testing for Perchlorate at DOD installations, Interim Guidance,
February 2004, http://www.navylabs.navy.mil/Perchlorate.htm
AR 385-10
The Army Safety Program
AR 385-61
Army Chemical Agent Safety Program
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AR 385-64
U.S. Army Explosives Safety Program
AR 405-90
Disposal of Real Estate
DA Pam 385-61
Toxic Chemical Agent Safety Standards
DA Pam 385-64
Ammunition and Explosives Safety Standards
TM 5-1300
Structures to Resist the Effects of Unintentional Explosions
MIL-STD-398
Shields, Operational for Ammunition Operations, Criteria for Design of and Tests for
Acceptance
MM CX Technical Update on RI/FS for MMRP projects (in press, contact MMCX for further
information)
ER 5-1-11
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Business Process
ER 200-3-1
Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) Program Policy
ER 385-1-95
Safety and Health Requirements for Ordnance and Explosives (OE) Operations
ER 1110-1-12
Quality Management
ER 1110-1-263
Chemical Data Quality Management for Hazardous, Toxic, Radioactive Waste Remedial
Activities
ER 1110-1-8153
Ordnance and Explosives Response
ER 1110-1-8156
Policies, Guidance, and Requirements for Geospatial Data and Systems
A-3
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
EP 75-1-2
Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC) Support during Hazardous, Toxic, and
Radioactive Waste (HTRW) and Construction Activities
EP 75-1-3
Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel (RCWM) Response
EP 385-1-95a
Basic Safety Concepts and Considerations for Munitions Response to Munitions and
Explosives of Concern Operations
EP 1110-1-17
Establishing a Temporary Open Burn and Open Detonation Site for Conventional Ordnance
and Explosives Projects
EP 1110-1-18
Ordnance and Explosives Response
EM 200-1-2
Technical Project Planning (TPP) Process
EM 200-1-3
Requirements for the Preparation of Sampling and Analysis Plans
EM 200-1-4 (Volume I and II)
Risk Assessment Handbook: Volume I - Human Health Evaluation
Risk Assessment Handbook: Volume II - Environmental Evaluation
EM 385-1-1
Safety and Health Requirements
EM 1110-1-502
Technical Guidelines for Hazardous and Toxic Waste Treatment and Cleanup Activities
EM 1110-1-1000
Photogrammetric Mapping
EM 1110-1-1002
Survey Markers and Monumentation
EM 1110-1-1003
NAVSTAR Global Positioning System Surveying
A-4
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
EM 1110-1-1200
Conceptual Site Models for Ordnance and Explosives (OE) and Hazardous, Toxic, and
Radioactive Waste (HTRW) Projects
EM 1110-1-1802
Geophysical Exploration for Engineering and Environmental Investigations
EM 1110-1-2909
Geospatial Data and Systems
EM 1110-1-4009
Ordnance and Explosives
EC 1110-1-73
Standards and Specifications for Surveys, Maps, Engineering Drawings, and Related Spatial
data Products and Software
CEHNC 1115-3-86
Ordnance and Explosives Cost Estimating Risk Tool Standard Operating Procedures
HNC-ED-CS-S-96-8 - Revision 1
Guide For Selection and Siting of Barricades for Selected Unexploded Ordnance
HNC-ED-CS-S-97-7 - Revision 1
Buried Explosion Module (BEM): A Method for Determining the Effects of Detonation of a
Buried Munition
HNC-ED-CS-S-98-7
Use of Sandbags for Mitigation of Fragmentation and Blast Effects Due to Intentional
Detonation of Munitions
HNC-ED-CS-S-00-3
Use of Water for Mitigation of Fragmentation and Blast Effects Due to Intentional Detonation
of Munitions
Military Munitions Center of Expertise Interim Guidance Document 06-06, Abbreviated
Accident Prevention Plan(s) ( AAPP) for Sites with Suspected or Confirmed Munitions and
Explosives of Concern (MEC), dated 12 April 2006.
http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/oew/policy/IntGuidRegs/IGD%2006-06.pdf
Ordnance and Explosives (OE) Center of Expertise (CX ) Interim Guidance Document 01-01
Ordnance and Explosives (OE) Risk Impact Assessment for OE Engineering Evaluation/Cost
A-5
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Analysis (EE/CA) Evaluations This document is available on the MM CX website at
http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/oew/CX_refdocs.aspx.
USAESCH Procedural Document
Procedures for Demolition of Multiple Rounds (Consolidated Shots) on Ordnance and
Explosives (OE) Sites. August 1998 (Terminology update March 2000) This document is
available on the MM CX website at http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/oew.
NDCEE, 2003
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Task 307; Subtask 4: UXO Recovery Database [Computer
Software]. Limited-access database visited June 2nd, 2004. This software is available on the
World Wide Web at http://uxords.ctcgsc.org.
ERDC/CRREL SR 96-15
Jenkins, Thomas F., Clarence L. Gant, Gurdarshan S. Brar, Philip G. Thorne, Thomas A.
Ranney, and Patricia W. Schumaker (1996) Assessment of Sampling Error Associated with
Collection and Analysis of Soil Samples at Explosives-Contaminated Sites. This document is
available on the CRREL website at http://www.crrel.army.mil/library.
ERDC/CRREL TR-02-1 Thiboutot, Sonia, Guy Ampleman, and Alan D. Hewitt (2002). Guide
for Characterization of Sites Contaminated with Energetic Materials.
http://www.crrel.usace.army.mil/techpub/CRREL_Reports/reports/TR02-1(ERDC-CRL).pdf
ERDC/CRREL TR-04-8 Thorne, Philip (2004). Field Screening Method for Perchlorate in
Water and Soil.
http://www.crrel.usace.army.mil/techpub/CRREL_Reports/reports/TR04-8.pdf
TM 9-1300-214, Military Explosives.
NFPA 780
Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems
EPA/540/G-89/004, OSWER Directive 9355.3-01, Guidance for Conducting Remedial
Investigations and Feasibility Studies under CERCLA, Interim Final, October 1988,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/resources/remedy/pdf/540g-89004-s.pdf
OSWER Directive 9345.1-05, Guidance for Performing Site Inspections under CERCLA;
Interim Final, September 1992.
A Guide to Preparing Superfund Proposed Plans, Records of Decision, and Other Remedy
Selection Decision Documents, OSWER 9200.1-23P, EPA 540-R-98-031 July 1999,
http://www.epa.gov/supfund/resources/remedy/rods/index.htm
A-6
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Risk Assessment Guidance for Superfund (RAGS) (Parts A-E)
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/risk/tooltrad.htm
Guidance for Obtaining Representative Laboratory Analytical Subsamples from Particulate
Laboratory Samples, EPA/600/R-03/027, November 2003. http://www.cluin.org/goto.cfm?link=%2Fdownload%2Fchar%2Fepa%5Fsubsampling%5Fguidance%2Epdf&i
d=482
Perchlorate Screening Study: Low Concentration Method for the Determination of Perchlorate
in Aqueous Samples Using Ion Selective Electrodes: Letter Report of Findings for the Method
Development Studies, Interference Studies, and Split Sample Studies, including Standard
Operating Procedure, ”available at
http://www.clu-in.org/programs/21m2/letter_of_findings.pdf.
A-7
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A-8
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
APPENDIX B
CHECKLIST TABLES
Table B-1. SOW Preparation Checklist
Project Name:
Project Location:
MM DC Representative
Preparer’s Name and Title:
Date of Preparation:
Y
All SOWs
1. Has the authorization and funding been received for
SOW preparation?
2. Has the MM-DC DC held pre-scoping meeting with
PDT to discuss project requirements and to
determine required resources?
3. Have project requirements been identified through
interfacing with the PM?
4. Do the personnel responsible for preparing the SOW
have a detailed knowledge of the project history, site
conditions, and characteristics of MEC and MC
anticipated and of geophysical methods?
5. Has existing site information been provided to the
PDT (may include ASR, previous site investigation
reports, information from site visits, information
from district contractors that have worked on the site
in the past, etc.)?
6. Have the requirements for the site visit been met
(i.e., right of entry, ASSHP, etc. - see Chapter 3 of
this manual)?
7. Have Federal, state and local regulatory requirements
been identified in the SOW?
8. Has an appropriate schedule been included in the
SOW?
B-1
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
9. Has the MM CX reviewed the SOW when required
by ER 1110-1-8153?
10. Are the following general topics included in the
SOW:
•
General responsibilities of the contractor?
•
Project description?
•
Scope of services?
•
Schedule and deliverables?
•
Reviews and conferences?
•
Technical criteria and standards, including
government furnished information?
•
Administrative instructions?
•
General provisions?
•
References?
11. Have review comments been obtained from
appropriate personnel, including PM and PDT
members, IAW ER 1110-1-8153?
12. Has the SOW been approved IAW ER 1110-1-8153
and has the final SOW been submitted to the CO?
13. Has an external review of the SOW been performed?
14. If the SOW is prepared for a removal action, did it
clearly identify if the contractor is responsible for the
preparation of an ESS?
SOW for RI/FS
1. Have the following typical tasks, as applicable, been
included in the RI/FS SOW:
B-2
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Records review and land restriction
assessment?
•
Project Work Plan including SSHP (see
Chapter 3 of this manual)?
•
Site preparation?
•
Site characterization (see Chapters 5 and 6 of
this manual)?
•
Environmental Sampling?
•
Customer’s safety and public risk assessment
(see Chapter 9 of this manual)?
•
Preparation of the RI/FS report?
•
Preparation of the Action Memorandum/
Record of Decision?
•
Community relations?
•
Maintain Administrative Record?
•
TPP?
•
Scheduling?
2. Is the SOW in compliance with the Approval
Memorandum?
•
Site visit (see Chapter 3 of this manual)?
•
Work Plan development (see Chapter 4 of
this manual)?
•
Location surveying and mapping (see
Chapters 5 and 8 of this manual)?
•
Site preparation (see Chapter 6 of this
manual)?
•
Geophysical investigation prove-out (see
Chapter 6 of this manual)?
B-3
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Geophysical investigation (see Chapter 6 of
this manual)?
•
Anomaly reacquisition (see Chapter 6 of this
manual)?
•
Remedial action?
•
LUC activities and recurring reviews?
•
Scrap turn-in?
SOW for EE/CA
1. Have the following typical tasks, as applicable, been
included in the EE/CA SOW:
•
Records review
assessment?
•
Project Work Plan including SSHP and
Institutional Analysis Plan (see Chapter 3 of
this manual)?
•
Site preparation?
•
Site characterization (see Chapters 5 and 6 of
this manual)?
•
Environmental Sampling?
•
Customer’s safety and public risk evaluation
(see Chapter 9 of this manual)?
•
Preparation of the EE/CA report?
•
Preparation of the Action
Memorandum/Decision Document?
•
Community relations?
•
Maintain Administrative Record?
•
TPP?
and
land
restriction
B-4
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Scheduling?
2. Is the SOW in compliance with the Approval
Memorandum?
•
Site visit (see Chapter 3 of this manual)?
•
Work Plan development (see Chapter 4 of
this manual)?
•
Location surveying and mapping
Chapters 5 and 8 of this manual)?
•
Site preparation (see Chapter 6 of this
manual)?
•
Geophysical investigation prove-out (see
Chapter 6 of this manual)?
•
Geophysical investigation (see Chapter 6 of
this manual)?
•
Anomaly reacquisition (see Chapter 6 of this
manual)?
•
Removal action?
•
LUC activities and recurring reviews?
•
Scrap turn-in?
•
Preparation of site-specific removal report?
•
Is the SOW in compliance with the Action
Memorandum?
•
Site visit (see Chapter 3 of this manual)?
•
Work Plan development (see Chapter 4 of
this manual)?
•
Location surveying and mapping
Chapters 5 and 8 of this manual)?
B-5
(see
(see
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Site preparation (see Chapter 6 of this
manual)?
•
Geophysical investigation prove-out (see
Chapter 6 of this manual)?
•
Geophysical investigation (see Chapter 6 of
this manual)?
•
Anomaly reacquisition (see Chapter 6 of this
manual)?
•
Removal action?
•
LUC activities and recurring reviews?
•
Scrap turn-in?
•
Preparation of site-specific removal report?
3. Is the SOW in compliance with the Action
Memorandum?
SOW for GDS
1. Has the GDS task in the SOW been prepared by PDT
personnel with a detailed knowledge of project
history, site conditions, site-specific data
requirements and location survey and mapping
methodologies?
2. Does the SOW specify the GDS to be used on the
project:
• Were the systems currently utilized by the
MM CX , MM DC, district, project sponsor
and stakeholders considered in choosing the
project GDS?
• Will the chosen system avoid production of
geospatial data in multiple formats for
distribution or use?
B-6
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
• Will the chosen system accomplish the current
mission but also allow for future reuse or use
of the geospatial data by others without
translation?
3. Does the SOW specify the spatial coordinate
reference system to be used?
4. Is the chosen spatial coordinate reference system
compatible with the existing district or project
sponsor GDS activities?
5. Does the SOW state that all GDS activities should be
managed by a qualified GIS manager with a
minimum of 3 years direct experience managing
geospatial data systems within the system
environment to be used for the project (e.g., ArcInfo,
ArcView, or Microstation MGE)?
6. Does the SOW state that all surveying and mapping
activities must be conducted under the responsible
charge of a Registered or Professional Land
Surveyor registered and/or licensed in the state in
which the work will be conducted?
7. Does the SOW state that the Field Surveyor assigned
to the project must have a minimum of 5 years
experience as a Survey Party Chief?
8. Does the SOW require that a qualified UXO
Technician II accompany the Field Surveyor at all
times, unless it is decided by the UXO Technician II
and the OE Safety Specialist that the UXO
Technician II is not required?
9. Does the SOW state that the contractor must follow
the safety requirements in EM 385-1-1?
10. Does the SOW specify the requirements for control
point establishment?
B-7
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
11. Does the SOW state the specifications for monument
caps and monument identification?
12. Does the SOW give procedures for plotting the
control points?
13. Does the SOW give requirements for grid corner
establishment?
14. Does the SOW state that the Registered Land
Surveyor/Professional Land Surveyor should sign
drawings that contain boundaries, legal descriptions,
or parcel location information?
15. Does the SOW prescribe the units to be used for
recording and plotting location survey and mapping
activities, as specified by the district or customer?
(note: units of measure – 1 US survey foot =
0.3048006096 meters)
16. Does the SOW require that location surveys be
connected to existing local, state or national control
monuments and reference d to an appropriately
recognized installation, local state, or worldwide
coordinate system as specified by the PDT?
17. Does the SOW specify the minimum acceptable
accuracy standards for positional data for project
control markers (i.e., monuments, benchmarks)?
18. Is densification of the existing project control
markers required?
19. If densification of existing project control markers is
required, is this specified in the SOW?
20. Does the SOW specify that at least two existing
markers will be used as a baseline for the project
geospatial coordinate reference system?
21. Has the PDT specified acceptable limits of error in
B-8
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
terms of accuracy and precision based on the nature
and purpose of each location surveying and mapping
activity or product?
22. Has the PDT developed site-specific standards for
the format, transfer and storage of all location
surveying and mapping data? (including digital data
collector (raw) files)
23. Does the SOW specify that Tri-Service CADD/GIS
Technology Center SDSFIE standard will be used for
all deliverables?
24. Does the SOW specify additional site-specific
standards developed by the PDT for the format,
transfer, and storage of all geospatial data consistent
with EM 1110-1-2909?
25. Were the following factors considered by the PDT
when developing site-specific standards:
•
Compatibility with selected GDS without
modification or additional software?
•
Format of existing digital data and geospatial
referenced mapping?
•
Usability by all parties of concern including
stakeholders?
26. Does the SOW prescribe the units to be used in
recording and plotting geospatial data, as specified
by the district or project sponsor? (note:
transformation between datums and coordinate
systems may be based on different programs (e.g.,
CORPSCON, Blue Marble, Geosoft) and small
differences in the final coordinates may occur
because of this.
27. Does the SOW specify the minimum acceptable
limits for accuracy and precision based on the nature
B-9
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
and purpose of the GDS?
28. Does the SOW require contractor QC of GDS
activities and products, including independent tests
that may be periodically reviewed by the
government?
29. Has the PDT established the level of production
control and rigor with which quality assessments
must be made consistent with the project-specific
GDS requirements?
30. Are the following deliverables specified in the SOW:
•
Unique items created and/or used to create
the end products and the narrative and
description required?
•
Digital data in the media as specified in the
SOW along with all other supporting files?
•
Data manual as an ASCII file documenting
all production and work files necessary for an
outsider to recreate all products and
determine the location, names, structures and
associations of the data, such as layer
description, file references (as appropriate),
etc.?
•
Completed monument descriptions (as part of
GIS/database or spreadsheet).
•
Unique items created and/or used to create
the end products and the narrative and
description required?
•
Required location, project and grid maps?
•
The negatives and three sets of prints of the
aerial photographs taken for the project, if
aerial photography is required in the SOW?
B-10
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Two hard copies of each final map and two
copies of the digital data delivered to the MM
DC?
B-11
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Table B-2. Cost Estimate Preparation Checklist
Project Name:
________________________________________________
Project Location:
________________________________________________
MM DC Representative:
________________________________________________
Preparer’s Name and Title:
________________________________________________
Date of Preparation:
________________________________________________
Y
Prior to beginning work on cost estimate
1. Is the cost estimate being prepared for internal
budgetary purposes (i.e., to obtain program funding)?
If yes, a rough order of magnitude estimate may be
prepared.
2. Is the cost estimate being prepared for contract
procurement (i.e., for use in contract negotiations)?
If yes, a detailed cost estimate is required.
3. Has the SOW been developed and approved?
4. Have the phase of the project and the following items
that will impact the project’s cost been considered
(this list is not all inclusive):
Note: This checklist is only to be used to show
whether items have been considered in the estimate,
and not as a cost worksheet.
•
Size of areas of concern?
•
Site risk?
•
Type of MEC?
•
Soil type?
B-12
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Topography?
•
Vegetation type?
•
MEC density?
•
Required removal depth?
•
Amount of munitions debris?
•
MC Sampling Analyses?
•
Special environmental and safety concerns
(e.g., presence of CWM, requirements for
engineering controls, sampling and analysis
requirements such as air monitoring, etc.)?
•
Production rates?
•
In-house or contracted?
•
Percent of property to be investigated?
•
Surveying methods?
•
Data format requirements (i.e., digital or nondigital)?
•
PPE level required?
•
Type of operation to be performed (e.g.,
search only or search and recovery)?
•
Number and type of UXO technicians
required?
•
Equipment and vehicles required (e.g.,
magnetometer, towed array, earth moving
machinery, recovery vehicles)?
B-13
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Expected time duration?
•
Access restrictions?
•
Political considerations?
•
Start date?
B-14
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Table B-3. Site Visit Review Checklist
Project Name: ______________________________________________________________
Project Location:____________________________________________________________
MM DC Representative: ______________________________________________________
Reviewer’s Name and Title: ___________________________________________________
Date of Review: ____________________________________________________________
Y
General.
1. Will the initial site visit be a:
•
Government site visit?
•
Contractor site visit?
•
Combined government and contractor site
visit?
Government Site Visit Attendees.
1. Are the following personnel attending the
government site visit:
•
PM (optional)?
•
MM DC Representative(s) (optional)?
•
OE Safety Specialist?
•
Project Engineers (optional)?
•
Cost estimator (optional)?
•
Project Geophysicist (optional)?
B-15
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
* Government geophysicist may bring along
geophysical equipment to assess the capabilities
of different instrumentation at the site.
•
Project Chemist (optional - applies primarily
to sites with significant MC concerns)?
Contractor Site Visit Attendees.
1. Are the following personnel, at a minimum,
attending the contractor site visit:
•
Contractor PM?
•
Contractor UXO Technician III?
•
Project Geophysicist (optional)?
•
PM (government) (optional*)?
•
MM DC Representative (optional*)?
•
OE Safety Specialist (optional*)?
•
Project Chemist (optional - applies primarily
to sites with significant MC concerns)?
*
One PDT representative, at a minimum, is
required to accompany the contractor during
the site visit.
2. Has the PM determined that the contractor is limited
to a certain number of personnel to attend the site
visit? (If yes, state maximum number allowable.)
3. Has the PM confirmed that the contractor personnel
are qualified IAW USACE Personnel/Work
Standards?
Site Visit Requirements. Prior to the site visit, the PDT
should ensure that the following requirements are
B-16
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
fulfilled:
•
Have site-specific reports been reviewed?
•
Have any data gaps in the existing site data
been identified?
•
Has the PM obtained rights of entry, if
applicable?
ASSHP. Has the PDT ensured that an ASSHP has been
prepared and approved prior to the site visit?
B-17
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Table B-4. Work Plan Review Checklist
Project Name: ________________________________________________________________
Project Location:______________________________________________________________
MM DC Representative: ________________________________________________________
Reviewer’s Name and Title: _____________________________________________________
Date of Review: ______________________________________________________________
Y
General
1. Have the following PDT members, at a minimum,
reviewed the Work Plan:
•
PM?
•
MM DCDC?
•
Project engineers in relevant subject matter
areas?
•
OE Safety Specialist?
•
Industrial Hygienist?
•
Cost Engineer?
•
Project Geophysicist?
•
Project Chemist?
2. Is the Work Plan in compliance with the project
SOW?
3. Is the Work Plan in compliance with contract
requirements?
Work Plan Checklist
1. The PDT will ensure that the Work Plan has been
prepared IAW the SOW and contract specifications. The
Work Plan will generally include the following chapters:
•
Project purpose and scope?
•
Work plan organization?
B-18
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Project location?
•
Site description, including site location,
topography, climate, vegetation, and site geology?
•
Site history?
•
Current and projected land use?
•
Summary of previous site investigations?
•
Fill Information for anticipated MEC?
•
Initial summary of MEC risk at the site?
•
Risk Assessment Subplan (for MC risk
assessments conducted with RI/FSs)?
2. Technical Management Plan. Are the following
topics discussed in this chapter:
•
Project objectives?
•
Project organization?
•
Project personnel?
•
Project communication and reporting?
•
Deliverables?
•
Schedule?
•
Periodic Reporting?
•
Costing and billing?
•
Public relations support?
•
Subcontractor management procedures?
•
Field operation management procedures?
•
Data Management Procedures?
•
DQOs?
3. Field Investigation Plan. Are the following topics
discussed in this chapter:
•
Overall Approach?
B-19
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Identification of Areas of Concern?
•
Location Surveys and Mapping Plan?
•
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Plan?
•
Geophysical Prove-out Plan and Report?
•
Geophysical Investigation Plan?
•
Intrusive Investigation. Does this subchapter
discuss the planning and implementation of the
following:
− General methodology?
− MEC accountability and record management?
− UXO personnel and qualifications?
− MEC sampling locations?
− MEC sampling procedures?
− Munition with the Greatest Fragmentation
Distance (MGFD)?
− Minimum separation distances (MSDs)?
− MEC identification?
− MEC removal?
− MEC storage?
− MEC disposal procedures?
− MEC disposal alternatives?
•
Investigation Derived Waste Plan?
•
Risk Characterization and Analysis?
•
Analysis of Land Use Controls?
•
Preparation of Recurring Review Plan?
B-20
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
4. Quality Control Plan.
•
Does this chapter adequately discuss quality
control procedures for the munitions response
project?
5. Explosives Management Plan.
•
Does this chapter describe how demolition
explosives will be managed, planned and
implemented during MEC operations?
6. Explosives Siting Plan.
•
Does this chapter adequately describe the safety
criteria for siting explosives operations at the site?
7. Environmental Protection Plan.
•
Is a list of potential applicable or relevant and
appropriate requirements (ARARs) provided?
•
Is an initial determination provided as to the actual
applicability of these ARARs to the project?
•
Is the procedure by which ARARs will be
identified and complied with during field
investigation activities described?
•
Does the EPP note that evaluation of ARARs is an
iterative process to be performed throughout the
life of the project?
•
Does the EPP detail the identification and location
of, as well as provide procedures and methods to
protect and/or mitigate resources/sites of all
known:
− Endangered/threatened species within the
project site?
− Wetlands within the project site?
− Cultural, archaeological, and water resources
within the project site?
− Coastal zones within the project site?
B-21
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
− Trees and shrubs that will be removed within
the project site?
− Existing waste disposal sites within the project
site?
•
Does the EPP include a description of the joint
environmental survey conducted prior to the start
of any on-site work by the contractor and
CO/COR or other government personnel?
•
Does the EPP detail mitigation procedures for the
following:
− All manifesting, transportation, and disposal of
wastes?
− All burning activities?
− Dust and emission control?
− Spill control and prevention?
− All storage areas and temporary facilities?
− Access routes?
− Trees and shrubs protection and restoration?
− Control of water run-on and run-off?
− Decontamination and disposal of equipment?
− Minimization of areas of disturbance?
•
Does the EPP describe procedures for post-activity
clean up to be accomplished?
8. Property Management Plan.
•
Does this chapter detail procedures for the
management of government property in
accordance with FAR Part 45.5 and its
supplements?
9. Interim Holding Facility Siting Plan.
•
Does this chapter describe siting and security
measures for the IHF?
B-22
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
10. Physical Security Plan.
•
Does this chapter describe the areas of security
interest related to the site?
•
Does this chapter specify the equipment, forces,
and devices used to protect RCWM?
11. References.
•
Does the Work Plan include appropriate
references?
12. Appendices. Are the following documents included
as appendices to the Work Plan:
•
SOW?
•
Site maps?
•
Points of contact?
•
Site Safety and Health Plan?
•
Environmental Sampling and Analysis Plan?
(Refer to Table B-7 and EM 200-1-3)
•
Forms?
•
MSD calculation sheets?
•
Resumes for key personnel and personnel filling
core labor categories, EOD school graduation
certificates if applicable?
•
Technical Project Planning Work Sheets?
B-23
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Table B-5. Geospatial Data Systems
Project Name: ______________________________________________________________
Project Location:____________________________________________________________
MM DC Representative: ______________________________________________________
Preparer’s Name and Title: ____________________________________________________
Date of Preparation: _________________________________________________________
Y
1. Locating of Existing Geospatial Data:
•
Types?
•
Accuracy?
2. Newly Collected Geospatial Data:
•
Types?
•
Accuracy?
•
Location?
3. Proposed System Methods and Procedures:
•
Hardware and Software?
•
Personnel?
•
Work Instructions/Data Format?
•
Data Processing?
•
Analysis Support?
•
Communication/Data Transfer?
•
Data Storage?
B-24
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
4. Quality Control:
•
Data Validation?
•
Quality control should be provided by the
surveying contractor if used.
•
If the contractor is conducting the surveying
themselves, documented quality control
metrics should be used. Examples of possible
metrics include:
- Specifying closure metrics on the survey
- Specifying backsight tolerances on angular
closure (i.e., 15 sec for distance less than 100feet, 10 sec. for longer distances)
5. Interim Deliverables?
6. Final Deliverables?
Planning Considerations
1. Spatial Reference System:
2. Existing Control Markers:
•
Density?
•
Accuracy?
•
Accessibility?
3. Project and Grid Controls (New):
•
Requirements?
•
Material?
•
Location?
•
Construction?
B-25
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Identification?
•
Accuracy?
4. Proposed Methods and Procedures:
•
Equipment?
•
Personnel?
•
Safety?
•
Work Instruction?
•
Data Processing?
•
Production Rates?
5. QC:
•
Instrument Calibration?
•
Data Validation?
6. Interim Reporting?
Electronic Submittal
1. Are disks readable?
2. Are the disks labeled and dated?
3. Are the files in the correct format, as requested in
SOW? (e.g., DOS, Win 95/98/NT, UNIX, etc.)
4. Do they follow the SDSFIE, if required?
5. Are all of the detailed files included on the disks to
make a complete data set?
6. Is each individual file readable and useable?
B-26
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
7. Is the file located electronically (geospatially) at the
correct location on the ground?
8. Is the coordinate system correct?
9. Are all files geographically located in the correct
plane and datum?
10. Are the X, Y, and Z coordinates correct within the
file?
11. Have the correct number of copies been submitted,
depending on the submittal stage?
Paper or Hard Copy Submittal
1. Is the sheet the requested size?
2. Does it contain a standard border?
3. Is the correct grid system and associated control
shown on the sheet?
4. Has the title block been completed (i.e., all required
blocks filled in)?
5. Is the sheet plotted at the scale shown in the title
block?
6. Are there grid marks or tics (meters, feet, both,
Lat/Lon, Local, etc.)?
7. Is there a North arrow (magnetic declination, true
North, and grid North) and graphical scale shown on
the sheet, both graphically and printed text?
8. Is there a legend for associated symbols on the sheet?
Or, are all symbols used in a project shown on one
legends and notes page?
B-27
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
9. If the drawing is to be certified or stamped, are the
correct seals, stamps, and signatures contained on the
sheet and legible?
10. Is the state registration seal and associated state
registration number shown on the sheet?
11. Are all the sheets plotted and an index sheet prepared
to make a complete set of drawings to convey a
completed mapping product?
12. Are all sheets numbered in a sequential order in the
set?
13. Are all sheets included in the set?
14. Have the correct number of copies been submitted?
15. Are boundaries of required removal or remediation
areas shown?
16. Are grids of areas investigated shown?
17. Are the coordinates of grid corners shown on
drawing or in a table?
18. Was the GIS submittal required? If so:
•
Are all required databases and map layers
submitted?
•
Is the data submitted in the agreed-upon
format (ArcView, Intergraph Modular GIS
Environment [MGE], MapInfo, etc.)?
•
Is the Users Manual modified for any project
specific requirements or software
modification from the standard?
B-28
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Table B-6. Geophysical Investigations Checklist
Project Name:
Project Location:
MM DC Representative:
Preparer’s Name and Title:
Date of Preparation:
Y
Geophysical Planning Considerations:
1. Is the geophysical planning being performed by or under
the supervision of a “qualified” geophysicist?
2. Have objectives been considered for the geophysical
investigation in the following areas:
•
Analog Geophysical surveying (Mag and Dig)?
•
Digital Geophysical mapping?
•
Geophysical interrogation?
3. Has the geophysical investigation planning process been
addressed:
•
Experienced personnel?
•
Geophysical systems?
•
Analysis procedures?
•
Navigational accuracy and precision?
Geophysical Instrument Considerations:
1. Were the following factors which affect geophysical
systems been considered:
B-29
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
• Military munition composition?
• Military munition size?
• MEC depth?
• Military munition fuzing?
• Background interference from metallic scrap?
• Soil composition and geology?
• Vegetation and terrain?
• Cultural features?
Selection of Geophysical Systems
1. Which type of geophysical instrument is most appropriate:
•
Active (TDEM or FDEM)?
•
Passive (magnetometer or gradiometer)?
MEC Detection Capabilities
1. Have the following factors been considered in determining
the detection capabilities in the field for a geophysical
instrument?
•
Vegetation?
•
Terrain?
•
Geologic noise/gradients?
•
Cultural noise?
•
Munitions debris?
B-30
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
MEC penetration beyond detection?
•
QA items detected?
MEC Detection Depths
1. Have maximum MEC detection depths been estimated in
accordance with Table 6.1?
2. Has the maximum possible depth of MEC at the site been
estimated?
Geophysical Systems and Electric Fuze Safety
Have the following safety precautions been applied to the
project?
1. Passive Systems:
•
Are the passive systems being used in accordance
with the manufacturer’s instructions?
2. Active Systems:
•
Prior to using an active instrument, has the operator
determined if any fuzing systems exist at the sites
that contain any electrical components?
•
If a MEC site does not contain electrical fuzes, are
the active systems being used IAW the
manufacturer’s instruction?
•
Has the latest version of the Active EMI Effect on
Electronic Fuzes been reviewed to determine the
expected effect of the instrumentation on fuzes
suspected to be on-site?
B-31
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
If a MEC site does contain or is reasonably
expected to contain electrical fuzes, has the
instrument operator submitted a request for a waiver
from the Design Center Safety Manager?
Analysis Software
1. Has the appropriate analysis software been selected for the
specific instrument?
2. Prior to using the software, have navigation adjustments
been made?
3. Are the data in the correct, project-specific coordinate
system?
4. Are the geophysical data in the units specified by the
software’s instruction manual?
Navigation System
1. Which type of coordinate system was selected:
•
Temporary (local coordinate system)?
•
Permanent (UTM or State Plane)?
2. What type of positional system was used?
ƒ Line and Fiducial
ƒ DGPS
ƒ Laser Based RTS
ƒ Ultrasonic
ƒ RF
ƒ Other
B-32
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
3. Are there sufficient horizontal and vertical control
points and/or bench marks at the project site?
ƒ Are the accuracies of the control point/bench
mark coordinates sufficient for the needs of the
selected positioning system?
ƒ Are the coordinates of the control points/bench
marks available in the project-specific coordinate
system?
ƒ Have the limitations (or assumptions) of the
selected positioning system(s) been considered
and evaluated against their intended use?
GPO Planning
1. Have DQOs been developed?
2. Has a Work Plan been developed for the prove-out?
3. Does the GPO Work Plan describe the following:
•
GPO grid location and construction?
•
Factors influencing prove-out grid location and
construction:
− Terrain, vegetation, geological conditions?
− Proximity to the field site?
− Isolation from overhead power lines, radio
transmitters, underground utilities, etc?
ƒ
The establishment of project specific QC measures
and metrics for selected detection and navigation
instruments as well as processing and
interpretation methods?
B-33
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
− Convenient access?
− Likelihood that the area will be disturbed
during use?
− Rights-of-Entry?
− Possibility of pre-existing buried MEC?
•
Pre-Seeding geophysical mapping?
•
Have the following items been considered regarding
pre-seeding:
− Size and configuration?
− Survey accuracy?
− Layout?
− Seeded items?
− Depths and orientations?
− Cultural interference?
− Munitions debris interference?
•
Data collection variables, including:
− Instrument height?
− Instrument orientation?
− Direction of travel?
− Measurement interval?
− Lane width?
•
Data analysis and interpretation?
B-34
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Data evaluation?
•
Selection of detection systems?
•
Establish project specific QC measures and/or
metrics for the selected detection instruments?
Geophysical Investigation Plan
1. Does the Geophysical Investigation Work Plan address the
following:
•
Site Description:
− Geophysical DQO measures and metrics as
well as their frequencies and reporting
requirements?
− Specific Area(s) to be investigated,
including a Survey Mission Plan Map?
− Past, current and future use?
− Anticipated MEC type, composition and
quantity?
− Depth anticipated?
− Digital Topographic Maps?
− Vegetation?
− Geologic conditions (including bedrock
type, mineralization and depth)?
− Soil conditions (including soil
type/composition, typical moisture content,
and thickness)?
B-35
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
− Surface water conditions (does area to be
surveyed include ponds, lakes, streams or
shallow water coastlines?)
− Man-made features potentially affecting
geophysical investigations?
− Site-specific dynamic events such as tides,
unusually strong winds, or other unusual
factors affecting site operations?
− Overall Site Accessibility and Impediments?
− Potential Worker Hazards?
•
Geophysical Investigation Methods:
− Survey Type?
− Equipment?
− Procedures?
− Personnel?
− Production Rates?
− Data Spatial Density?
•
Instrument Standardization:
− Instrument drift?
− Standardization procedures?
− Abbreviated standardization checks?
− Instrument response to a known standard?
•
Data Processing, Correction and Analysis:
B-36
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
− Instrument drift correction?
− Diurnal drift correction?
− Digital filtering and enhancement?
− Anomaly selection process?
− Correlation with ground truth?
•
Dig Sheet Development?
•
Anomaly Reacquisition?
•
Feedback Process?
•
Quality Control?
•
Corrective Measures?
•
Records Management?
•
Interim Reporting?
•
Map Format?
Sectorization
1. When defining sectors, were the following factors
considered?
•
Former military use?
•
Anticipated MEC type?
•
Anticipated MEC distribution?
•
Terrain and vegetation?
•
Current land use?
B-37
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Natural and cultural boundaries?
Surveying within a Sector
1. Which surveying methodology is appropriate for the sector:
•
100 percent surveying?
•
Biased surveying?(Increased data density in areas of
interest)
•
Probability surveying?
•
If probability surveying is selected, which type of
strategy will be used in the sector:
− Random pattern grid surveying?
− Hybrid surveying?
− Transect surveying?
− Meandering path surveying?
Geophysical Data Acquisition
1. Are SOPs provided for all processes and procedures
associated with the geophysical data acquisition program?
Excavating Anomalies within a Grid
1. Which methodology for selecting anomalies for excavation
is appropriate for the grid?
•
100 percent anomaly excavation?
•
Statistical anomaly excavation?
•
100% having predefined anomaly characteristics
with statistical sampling of all others.
B-38
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
Data Interpretation
1. Was the geophysical data interpreted after the geophysical
investigation?
2. Were the project objectives met?
Geophysical Anomaly Dig Sheets
1. Are standard operating procedures (SOPs) provided for all
processes and procedures associated with the geophysical
mapping program?
2. Are the frequencies and reporting needs of the quality
control measures included in the geophysical mapping
plan?
3. Do the dig sheets contain the following information:
•
Project site?
•
Grid number?
•
Anomaly number?
•
Name of the geophysical contractor?
•
Name of the responsible field geophysicist?
•
Date geophysical mapping occurred?
•
Name of the responsible analyst?
•
Date the data was geophysically analyzed?
•
Predicted location coordinates?
•
Predicted depth to top of item (optional)?
•
Comments.
B-39
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
Anomaly Reacquisition and Marking
1. Was the same type of instrument used for reacquisition as
that used in the geophysical survey? (Does the instrument
used in reacquisition measure the same property (magnetic
field or conductivity) as the original instrument? No
contacts should still be investigated using the original
instrument. If a similar, but not the same instrument is used
in reacquisition, a method for checking anomaly amplitudes
between the two similar instruments must be developed and
documented.
2. Were discrepancies between the re-acquired locations of
anomalies as shown on the dig-sheet and final excavated
location recorded and included in the geophysical report?
3. Were discrepancies between the anomaly amplitudes
recorded on the digsheet and the anomaly amplitudes
recorded during the reacquisition resolved and recorded on
the digsheet?
Anomaly Excavation
1. Was the following post-excavation information collected?
•
Project site?
•
Grid number?
•
Anomaly number?
•
Excavation contractor?
•
Name of the responsible OE Safety Specialist?
•
Date of excavation?
•
Final excavated location coordinates?
•
Weather conditions?
B-40
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Anomaly identification?
•
Actual depth to top of item?
•
Soil type?
•
Actual length (optional)?
•
Actual diameter (optional)?
•
Actual azimuth (optional)?
•
Item material composition (optional)?
•
Comments.
Digital Data Format and Storage
1. Were the requirements and standards for a digital data
management system tailored for the specific ordnance
investigative needs of the project?
2. Has the geophysical data been stored in a format and media
that permits loading, storage and use of GIS workstations
without modification or additional software?
Quality Management
1. Were all of the quality control measures and metrics met?
•
If not all measures and metrics were met, for those
that failed, were root-cause analyses performed and
corrective actions taken?
2. Were procedures for product quality management followed
for:
•
Delivering a completed, cleared Grid?
•
Producing a completed investigation report?
B-41
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
Producing a completed GPO report with the
specified as-built details?
•
Delivering completed dig sheets?
•
Delivering properly formatted and documented raw
and final geophysical data?
•
Including complete and legible maps of the data and
interpretations
B-42
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Table B-7. Munitions Constituents Sampling Checklist
Project Name:
Project Location:
MM DC Representative:
Preparer’s Name and Title:
Date of Preparation:
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
________________________________________________
Y
Objective
Has the objective for the munitions response
investigation been identified?
Initial MC Investigation Planning
Has the MC investigation system employed the
following components:
•
Experienced personnel?
•
Experienced laboratory (e.g., NELAP accreditation
and DoD QSM compliance self-declaration)?
•
Navigational accuracy and precision?
Sampling and Analysis Considerations
Have the following factors been considered for
sampling and analysis:
•
MEC depth?
•
MEC composition?
•
Background conditions?
•
Regulatory requirements?
Sampling and Analysis Plan
1. Has the SAP been prepared prior to initiating field
activities?
B-43
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
2. Has the SAP been prepared IAW ER 1110-1-263,
and EM 200-1-3?
3. Are the Laboratory QA/QC plan and applicable
Standard Operating Procedures included in the SAP?
4. Has the SAP submitted to PM and MM DC been
approved?
Data Interpretation, Validation, Reporting, and Decision
Making
Have the requirements outlined in Section 7-8 been
met?
Quality Management
1. Has the QC of the various analytical tasks been
provided?
2. Have the handling and custody requirements for all
QC samples been administered?
Electronic Data Deliverables
1. Has EDD been specified in SOW?
2. Is implementation included in the Work Plan?
3. If ADR (or similar EDD) specified, does Work Plan
address automated portions of data review?
B-44
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Table B-8. Blast and Fragmentation Protection Review Checklist
Project Name: ______________________________________________________________
Project Location:____________________________________________________________
MM DC Representative: ______________________________________________________
Reviewer’s Name and Title: ___________________________________________________
Date of Review: ____________________________________________________________
Y
Engineering Considerations for SOW Preparation
1. Has the SOW properly taken into account the physical
characteristics of the site?
2. Has the SOW taken into account the type of munitions
response being contemplated?
3. Has the SOW taken into account the characteristics of
the probable MEC items that will be encountered at the
site?
4. Has the correct MGFD been identified for the site?
Minimum Separation Distances
1. Are there MSDs being proposed for the site?
2. Have the following criteria for an unintentional
detonation been evaluated:
•
MSD for unintentional detonations: Which will
provide the greatest distance?
− Overpressure at a K value of 50?
− Maximum fragmentation distance?
− 200 feet?
•
Team Separation Distance: Which will provide the
greatest distance?
− Overpressure at a K value of 50?
− 1/600 distance?
B-45
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
•
If the 1/600 distance is being used:
− Has justification been provided?
− Has approval been given by the MM CXCX?
3. Have the following criteria for an intentional
detonation been evaluated:
•
MSD: Which will provide the greatest distance?
− Maximum fragmentation distance?
− Overpressure at a K value of 328?
− 200 feet?
Explosives Siting Plan Review Considerations
1. Has a map been included with the Explosives Siting
Plan and is it at an appropriate scale?
2. Does the map identify the MRSs, the location for the
explosives storage magazine, and any planned or
established demolition areas?
3. Has the MRS been properly identified and has an
appropriate MSD been calculated for the area?
4. Have the Q-D arcs for the MRS been drawn from the
outermost edge of each area?
5. Has the proposed explosives storage magazine been
properly sited?
6. Has the proposed demolition area been properly sited?
7. Have footprint areas for any Blow-in-Place areas,
Collection Points, or In-Grid Consolidated Shots been
discussed in the Explosives Safety Plan?
8. Has an appropriate team separation distance been
identified between intrusive investigation teams in the
Explosives Safety Plan?
9. Have any engineering controls been proposed in the
Explosives Safety Plan?
10. Does the CDC have a DDESB-approved siting plan for
the site, if a CDC is to be used?
B-46
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Y
Engineering Controls for Unintentional/Accidental
Detonations
Barricades. The PDT will consider the following elements
regarding barricade selection:
•
Have barricades been specified for the project?
•
Has the correct barricade been specified for the
application IAW the DOD standards?
•
If the proposed barricade has not been previously
approved, has a complete structural design package
been submitted to the MM CXCX?
•
Has the design package been forwarded through
appropriate channels to DDESB for review?
Engineering Controls for Intentional Detonations
1. Is soil being proposed as an engineering control for an
intentional detonation?
2. Has the amount of soil to be placed on top of the MEC
been properly calculated?
3. Are sandbags being proposed as an engineering control
to limit the fragmentation and overpressure from an
intentional MEC detonation?
4. Has the amount of sandbags being proposed been
properly calculated based on the type of MEC to be
destroyed?
5. Is a water barrier being proposed as an engineering
control for an intentional detonation?
6. Have the requirements for water barricades detailed in
HNC-ED-CS-S-00-3 been followed?
7. Has a CDC been specified for use on the site?
8. Is the CDC capable of safely containing the blast and
fragmentation effects of the MEC to be found at the
site?
B-47
N
N/A
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Table B-9. Munitions Constituents Sampling Checklist
Project Name:
Project Location:
MM DC Representative:
Preparer’s Name and Title:
Date of Preparation:
Y
N
N/A
Y
N
N/A
Objective
Has the objective for the munitions response investigation
been identified?
Initial MC Investigation Planning
Has the MC investigation system employed the
following components:
• Experienced personnel?
• Experienced laboratory?
• Navigational accuracy and precision?
Sampling and Analysis Considerations
Have the following factors been considered for sampling
and analysis:
• MEC depth?
• MEC composition?
• Background conditions?
• Regulatory requirements?
Sampling and Analysis Plan
1. Has the SAP been prepared prior to initiating field
activities?
2. Has the SAP been prepared IAW ER 1110-1-263, ER
200-3-1, and EM 200-1-3?
3. Are the Laboratory QA/QC plan and applicable
Standard Operating Procedures included in the SAP?
4. Has the SAP submitted to PM and MM DC been
approved?
B-48
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Data Interpretation, Validation, Reporting, and Decision
Making
Have the requirements outlined in Section 7.8 been met?
Quality Management
1. Has the QC of the various analytical tasks been
provided?
2. Have the handling and custody requirements for all
QC samples been administered?
Electronic Data Deliverables
1. Has EDD been specified in SOW/PWS?
2. Is implementation included in the Work Plan?
3. If SEDD (or similar EDD) specified, does Work Plan
address automated portions of data review?
B-49
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
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B-50
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
APPENDIX C
QASP TEMPLATE
C-1. General. The following is a QASP template that shall be modified for specific project
needs.
QUALITY ASSURANCE SURVEILLANCE PLAN
[City, State]
1. INTRODUCTION
This Performance-Based Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP) has been developed
pursuant to the requirements of the Performance-Based Statement of Work in Contract No.
[Insert specific project contract No.]. This plan sets forth procedures and guidelines that the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) will use in evaluating the technical and safety
performance of the Contractor. A copy of this plan will be furnished to the Contractor so that the
Contractor will be aware of the methods that the Government will employ in evaluating
performance on this contract and address any concerns that the Contractor may have prior to
initiating work.
2. PURPOSE OF THE QASP
•
•
•
•
•
•
Confirm that the action is conducted utilizing proper procedures and in
accordance with the approved work and safety plans;
Define the roles and responsibilities of participating Government officials;
Define the types of work to be performed with required end results;
Document the evaluation methods that will be employed by the Government in
assessing the Contractor’s performance;
Provide the Surveillance Activities Table and Corrective Action Request (CAR)
form that will be used by the Government in documenting and evaluating the
Contractor’s performance; and
Describe the process of performance documentation.
3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS
The USACE Design Center Project Manager (MM DC POC): [Shall be modified for project
needs]
• Provides overall guidance to the contractor when necessary or requested for
purposes of PWS/SOW clarification.
C-1
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Reviews vouchers and makes recommendations to the Contracting Officer for
payment action based on completion of designated milestones.
Reports problems or discrepancies to the Contracting Officer as soon as possible.
Oversees the implementation of the QASP.
Reviews contractor submittals.
Initiates periodic contractor evaluations in the Past Performance Information
Management System (PPIMS).
Provide periodic site inspection to review and witness the conduct of MEC
procedures for compliance with the PWS/SOW and for the review of the
economy and efficiency of project execution as required by FAR Subpart 16.6
and the PMBP Manual.
Responsible for the execution of the work on schedule, within budget, in a safe
manner, and at a level of quality consistent with the customer’s requirements.
Periodically reviews contractor performance relative to the contract schedule and
budget.
The USACE Contract Specialist: [Shall be modified for project needs]
• Monitors contract performance.
• Maintains central repository for all QA documents required for payment.
• Issues all acceptance/rejection statements.
The Project Engineer or Technical Manager: [Shall be modified for project needs]
• Reviews contractor’s Technical Management Plan.
• Ensures that all necessary subject matter experts are involved in technical
decisions.
• Conducts reviews of contractor submittals for compliance with contract
requirements.
• Conducts or supports other surveillance activities as required by the project team.
• Supports all on-site QA activities.
• Develops the “after action” or “final” Quality Assurance Report.
• Provides periodic site inspection to review and witness the conduct of MEC
procedures for compliance with the PWS/SOW and for the review of the economy
and efficiency of project execution as required by FAR Subpart 16.6 and the
PMBP Manual.
The USACE Safety Specialist: [Shall be modified for project needs]
• Conducts reviews of contractor submittals for compliance with DOD, DA and
USACE explosives safety requirements.
• Performs Periodic Inspections of contractor compliance with DOD, DA, and
USACE explosives safety requirements and explosives related procedures
described in the work plan.
• Conducts or supports other surveillance activities as required by the project team.
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•
Supports all on-site QA activities.
The USACE Geophysicist: [Shall be modified for project needs]
• Reviews contractor's Geophysical Investigation Plan, GPO Plan and Report.
• Performs, or coordinates with USACE team members to perform periodic
inspections of contractor's compliance with the Geophysical Investigation Plan.
• Reviews Quality Control Plan (QCP) reporting requirements and accepts reported
QC measures/standards.
• Performs tasks as specified to support the project’s quality goals (placing and
evaluating anomaly selections over blind seed items, randomly selects anomalies
for reacquisition and/or excavation, etc.)
• Provides periodic site inspection to review and witness the conduct of MEC
procedures for compliance with the PWS/SOW and for the review of the economy
and efficiency of project execution as required by FAR Subpart 16.6 and the
PMBP Manual.
The USACE Chemist: [Shall be modified for project needs]
• Evaluates acceptability of contract laboratory through review of their self
declaration of DoD QSM compliance along with their method-specific SOPs
• Reviews the work plan for compliance with standard protocols for Environmental
Sampling and Chemical Analysis.
• Conducts reviews of Environmental Sampling and Chemical Analysis Data.
• Conducts Periodic Inspections of contractor compliance with environmental
sampling requirements of the work plan to ensure that contractors are utilizing
appropriate sampling techniques, collecting the quantity of primary and QA/QC
samples as stated in the work plan, and completing the COC correctly with the
approved analytical methodology.
• Reviews contractor Investigative Derived Waste (IDW) Plan.
• Conducts, or coordinates with USACE Team members to conduct, Periodic
Inspections of contractor compliance with the IDW Plan.
• Reviews QCP reporting requirements and accepts reported QC
measures/standards.
• Review Daily Quality Control Reports for Environmental Sampling.
The USACE Industrial Hygienist: [Shall be modified for project needs]
• Reviews contractor submittals for compliance with DOD, DA, USACE, and
OSHA safety and health requirements.
• Performs unscheduled inspections of on-site activities for compliance with safety
and health requirements.
• Coordinates medical support training and medical support (as required).
The USACE GIS team member: [Shall be modified for project needs]
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•
•
•
Reviews contractor's Geospatial Information and Electronic submittals.
Reviews QCP reporting requirements and accepts reported QC
measures/standards.
Reviews the work plan for compliance with standards and protocol for Geospatial
Information and Electronic requirements.
The USACE Chemist: [Should be modified for project needs]
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Participates in preparation of SOW/PWS to ensure that MC requirements are
adequately addressed.
Evaluates acceptability of contract laboratory through review of their self
declaration of DoD QSM compliance along with their method-specific SOPs.
Participates in proposal review to evaluate MC-related tasks.
Participates in TPP meetings, as appropriate.
Reviews the work plan for compliance with standard protocols for Environmental
Sampling and Chemical Analysis.
Conducts reviews of Environmental Sampling and Chemical Analysis Data.
Conducts Periodic Inspections of contractor compliance with environmental
sampling requirements of the work plan to ensure that contractors are utilizing
appropriate sampling techniques, collecting the quantity of primary and QA/QC
samples as stated in the work plan, and completing the COC correctly with the
approved analytical methodology.
Reviews contractor Investigative Derived Waste (IDW) Plan.
Conducts, or coordinates with USACE Team members to conduct, Periodic
Inspections of contractor compliance with the IDW Plan.
Reviews QCP reporting requirements and accepts reported QC
measures/standards.
Review Daily Quality Control Reports for Environmental Sampling.
Coordinates with PDT and Contractor regarding collection of QA splits.
Coordinates with QA laboratory regarding analysis and reporting of QA split
results.
Evaluates QA split data with respect to primary data and prepares Chemical
Quality Assurance Report.
Reviews all submittals containing MC sampling data, to include quality
evaluations or decision-making regarding MC results
The USACE Risk Assessor: [Should be modified for project needs]
•
•
•
•
•
Participates in preparation of SOW/PWS to ensure that risk assessment
requirements are adequately addressed.
Participates in proposal review to evaluate risk assessment-related tasks.
Participates in TPP meetings, as appropriate.
Evaluates screening levels for environmental media
Reviews the work plan to ensure that planned effort will support the level of risk
assessment intended.
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•
•
•
Conducts reviews of human health and ecological risk assessments.
Reviews QCP reporting requirements and accepts reported QC
measures/standards.
Reviews reports containing risk assessments, to include decision-making
regarding results of risk assessments.
[Other team members may be added as required or needed (e.g., Blast Effects Analyst,
Surveyor, Geologist, etc.).]
4. METHODOLOGIES TO BE USED TO MONITOR THE CONTRACTOR’S
PERFORMANCE
Even though the Government will be monitoring the contractor’s performance on a continuing
basis, the volume of tasks performed by the contractor makes technical inspections of every task
and step impractical. Accordingly, USACE will use the Surveillance Activities Table
(Attachment A) as the basis for monitoring the contractor’s performance under this contract.
The contractor’s performance will be evaluated by the Contracting Officer using the performance
metrics provided in Attachment B.
5. QUALITY ASSURANCE REPORTING FORMS
The primary form used to document surveillance activities will be the Quality Assurance Report
(QAR) provided in Attachment C. The QAR will be used by all team members to document
surveillance activities conducted. All nonconformances will be documented on a Corrective
Action Request (CAR), see Attachment D. [NOTE: The PDT determines appropriate
contractor response times on a project-by-project basis. Contractor response times provided
below are for illustrative purposes only. Note that any life or mission threatening safety issues
must be corrected immediately.] Each CAR will be annotated as a Critical nonconformance,
Major nonconformance, or Minor nonconformance. Definitions and required contractor
response times are:
Critical Nonconformance*: a nonconformance that is likely to result in hazardous or
unsafe conditions for individuals using, maintaining, or depending upon the supplies or
services; or is likely to prevent performance of a vital agency mission.
Contractor is provided 24 hours to provide written response to the CAR.
Major Nonconformance*: a nonconformance, other than critical, that is likely to result in
failure of the supplies or services, or to materially reduce the usability of the supplies or
services for their intended purpose.
Contractor is provided 5 calendar days to provide written response to the CAR.
Minor Nonconformance*: a nonconformance that is not likely to materially reduce the
usability of the supplies or services for their intended purpose, or is a departure from
established standards having little bearing on the effective use or operation of the supplies
or services.
Contractor is provided up to 15 calendar days to provide written response to the CAR.
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* [NOTE: The definitions for nonconformance are derived from FAR 46.101.]
Upon completion of field work and acceptance of all final reports, the Project
Engineer/Technical Manager will document QA activities in an “after action” or “final” Quality
Assurance Report in accordance with Attachment E.
Checklists may be used to support surveillance activities such as the Generic On-Site QA
checklist provided in Attachment F or those generated for use during pre-op/table top exercises.
These forms, when completed, will document the contractor's compliance with contract
requirements and completion of milestone activities. The Contracting Officer will evaluate
contractor performance using the definitions (Exceptional, Very Good, Satisfactory, Marginal,
and Unsatisfactory) contained in the Past Performance Information Management System
(PPIMS) and the metrics identified in Attachment B.
Completed forms will be consolidated and provided to the Contracting Officer at the end of each
month for that month's surveillance activities. A copy of each CAR will be forwarded to the
Contracting Officer by COB of the next full workday after it is provided to the contractor. Note
that any life or mission threatening safety issues must be corrected immediately, and that
contractor response times are determined by the PDT on a project-by-project basis. All other
CARs will provide a reasonable suspense date for the contractor to review and take appropriate
action. The contractor is required to provide written responses to all CARs.
Attachment A
Surveillance Activities Table
Attachment B
Performance Metrics
Attachment C
Quality Assurance Report
Attachment D
Corrective Action Request
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Attachment E
After Action or Final Quality Assurance Report
Attachment F
Generic On-site QA Checklist
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APPENDIX D
QASP METRICS
D-1. General. The following appendix provides: (1) instructions for developing performance
metrics; (2) a blank table for a QASP Performance Metrics Table for Performance Assessment
Record (PAR); and (3) a sample QASP Performance Metrics Table that was completed for a
particular project.
D-2.
Instructions.
a.
The PPIMS is the Army's central repository for the collection and utilization of
Army-wide contractor Past Performance Information (PPI). Available to authorized Government
personnel, PPIMS is used to support both the Contracting Performance Review process and
future award decisions. For further information on PPIMS go to:
https://apps.altess.army.mil/ppims/prod/ppimshp.cfm
b.
Performance metrics are developed for each project to assure project objectives
are met and as a basis for periodically evaluating contractor performance using the PAR in the
PPIMS.
c.
The primary PAR Categories evaluated in PPIMS are identified in the table
below. Other categories may be utilized if deemed necessary by the project team.
d.
Each Definable Feature of Work identified in the Surveillance Activity Table,
Column 1, will have at least one performance metric associated with it. Also, more than one
Definable Feature of Work can be evaluated within a given PAR Category. For example: the
overall rating given the contractor for the PAR Category "Quality of Product or Service" will
most likely be a combination of ratings of different Definable Features of Work, such as Draft
Work Plan Quality, QC Plan Execution, Regulatory or Process Compliance, etc. However, each
of these Definable Features of Work has their own Basic Performance Indicators (Column 7 of
the Surveillance Activities Table). The contractor may receive a "Marginal" for Draft Work Plan
Quality, an "Exceptional" for QC Plan Execution, and a "Satisfactory" for Regulatory
Compliance, which may translate to an overall rating of "Very Good" for the PAR Category of
"Quality of Product or Service."
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Table D-1. QASP Performance Metrics for Performance Assessment Record (PAR) –
Blank Table
Note:
Exceptional
Very Good
Satisfactory
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
PAR Category: Quality of Product or Service (See Column 6 of Surveillance Activities Table)
Performance Indicator (See Column 7 of Surveillance Activities Table)
PAR Category: Schedule (See Column 6 of Surveillance Activities Table)
Performance Indicator (See Column 7 of Surveillance Activities Table)
PAR Category: Cost Control (See Column 6 of Surveillance Activities Table)
Performance Indicator (See Column 7 of Surveillance Activities Table)
PAR Category: Business Relations (See Column 6 of Surveillance Activities Table)
Performance Indicator (See Column 7 of Surveillance Activities Table)
PAR Category: Management of Key Personnel and Resources (See Column 6 of Surveillance Activities Table)
Performance Indicator (See Column 7 of Surveillance Activities Table)
PAR Category: Safety (See Column 6 of Surveillance Activities Table)
Performance Indicator (See Column 7 of Surveillance Activities Table)
*From Section C of Basic contract #W111WW-11-W-0000, Amendment 0001 (may be
included, but are not limited to these)
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The following guidelines are provided for issuing ratings that are subjective in nature; these
ratings will be supported by the weight of evidence documented during the government's
surveillance efforts. Note: These adjectival ratings are defined in the PPIMS.
Exceptional: Performance meets contractual requirements and exceeds many to the Government's
benefit. The contractual performance of the element or sub-element being assessed was
accomplished with few minor problems for which corrective actions taken by the contractor were
highly effective.
Very Good: Performance meets contractual requirements and exceeds some to the Government's
benefit. The contractual performance of the element or sub-element being assessed was
accomplished with some minor problems for which corrective actions taken by the contractor
were effective.
Satisfactory: Performance meets contractual requirements. The contractual performance of the
element or sub-element contains some minor problems for which corrective actions taken by the
contractor appear or were satisfactory.
Marginal: Performance does not meet all contractual requirements. The contractual performance
of the element or sub-element being assessed reflects a serious problem for which the contractor
has not yet identified corrective actions. The contractor's proposed actions appear only
marginally effective or were not fully implemented.
Unsatisfactory: Performance does not meet most contractual requirements and recovery is not
likely in a timely manner. The contractual performance of the element or sub-element contains
serious problems for which the contractor's corrective actions appear or were ineffective.
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Table D-2. QASP Performance Metrics Table for Performance Assessment Record (PAR) –
Sample Table
NOTE: The following is a sample QASP Metrics Table developed for a particular project. Names of the project
property, personnel, and contract references have been changed for security purposes. The following is provided for
sample purposes only and shall be modified for project-specific needs.
QASP Performance Metrics Table
Exceptional
Very Good
Satisfactory
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
One or more
documents or
subplans required
revisions to be
resubmitted for
approval prior to
proceeding.
Resubmission of
an entire document
or subplan was not
required.
One or more
documents or
subplans
required
revisions to be
resubmitted
for approval
prior to
proceeding.
Resubmission
of an entire
document or
subplan was
required.
One or more
documents or
subplans did not
comply with
contract
requirements, or
one or more
documents or
subplans
required more
than one
resubmission of
the entire
document or
subplan prior to
its approval.
6 or more CARS
for
non-critical
violations
(no
impact to overall
cost and schedule
resulting from the
non-compliance)
>1
CAR
where
noncompliance
adversely
impacted
overall cost or
schedule
Repeated noncompliance
with
WP
requirements
resulted in cost
overruns
or
repeated
schedule
extensions
PAR Category: Quality of Product or Service
Performance indicator: Document Reviews
Draft Plans
and Reports
All contractmilestone
documents
approved as
submitted
One or more
documents or
subplans were
approved as
submitted, but
exceptions were
noted.
Resubmissions
were not required.
Performance indicator: Project Execution
Process
Compliance
Zero
Corrective
Action Requests
(CAR)
1-5 CARs for noncritical
WP
violations
(no
impact to overall
cost and schedule
resulting from the
non-compliance)
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Table D-2. QASP Performance Metrics Table for Performance Assessment Record (PAR) –
Sample Table
NOTE: The following is a sample QASP Metrics Table developed for a particular project. Names of the project
property, personnel, and contract references have been changed for security purposes. The following is provided for
sample purposes only and shall be modified for project-specific needs.
QASP Performance Metrics Table (Continued)
Quality Control
Exceptional
Very Good
Satisfactory
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
.25% QA failure
rate,
80% or
more
QC
measures/standa
rds
accepted,
zero repetitive
QC failures
.5% QA failure
rate, 80% or
more
QC
measures/standa
rds
accepted,
one or more
repetitive
QC
failures
occurred
1% QA failure
rate, less than
80% of QC
measures/standar
ds accepted, or,
one or more nonrepetitive
QA
failures occurred
.2% QA failure
rate,
1-3
repetitive QA
failures
occurred
4% QA failure
rate, >3 repetitive
QA
failures
occurred
project closed
out/final invoice
approved on
T.O. date
Project closed
out/final
invoice
approved
within 30
calendar days
after T.O. date.
Project closed
out/final invoice
approved more
than 30 calendar
days after T.O.
date.
Yes
If the
contractor fails
to meet the
requirement
some of the
No
PAR Category: Schedule
Performance indicator: Timely completion of tasks
Final
Work
Plans
and
Reports, project
milestones, T.O.
invoices
All document
submittals and
task order
milestones and
invoices
complete and
approved by
T.O. date,
project closed
out/final invoice
approved ahead
of schedule
Project closed
out/final invoice
approved ahead
of schedule
Monthly status
reports accurate
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Table D-2. QASP Performance Metrics Table for Performance Assessment Record (PAR) –
Sample Table
NOTE: The following is a sample QASP Metrics Table developed for a particular project. Names of the project
property, personnel, and contract references have been changed for security purposes. The following is provided for
sample purposes only and shall be modified for project-specific needs.
QASP Performance Metrics Table (Continued)
Exceptional
Very Good
Satisfactory
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
time and
corrects the
performance
when required
by the
Contracting
Officer.
Delays
to
schedule caused
by contractor or
other
causes
identified,
in
writing, in a
timely manner to
apply acceptable
corrective
actions.
Yes
If the
contractor fails
to meet the
requirement
some of the
time and
corrects the
performance
when required
by the
Contracting
Officer.
No
PAR Category: Cost Control
Performance indicator: No unauthorized cost overruns
Unauthorized
cost overruns
Total
Costs
Project
No
Total contract
invoices less
than 70% of
initial T.O.
authorized
amount
Total contract
invoices greater
than 70% but
less than 90%of
initial T.O.
authorized
amount
Total contract
invoices between
90% and 100%
of initial T.O.
authorized
amount
D-6
Yes
Total contract
invoices
greater than
100% but less
than 110% of
initial T.O.
authorized
amount
Total contract
invoices greater
than 110% or less
than 120% of T.O.
authorized amount
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Table D-2. QASP Performance Metrics Table for Performance Assessment Record (PAR) –
Sample Table
NOTE: The following is a sample QASP Metrics Table developed for a particular project. Names of the project
property, personnel, and contract references have been changed for security purposes. The following is provided for
sample purposes only and shall be modified for project-specific needs.
QASP Performance Metrics Table (Continued)
Exceptional
Very Good
Satisfactory
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
Yes
If the
contractor fails
to meet the
requirement
some of the
time and
corrects the
performance
when required
by the
Contracting
Officer.
No
Yes
If the
contractor fails
to meet the
requirement
some of the
time and
corrects the
performance
when required
by the
Contracting
Officer.
No
Performance indicator: Monthly cost report
Monthly
cost
reports accurate
Performance indicator: Impacts to cost
Impacts caused
by contractor or
other
causes
identified,
in
writing, in a
timely manner to
apply acceptable
corrective
actions.
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Table D-2. QASP Performance Metrics Table for Performance Assessment Record (PAR) –
Sample Table
NOTE: The following is a sample QASP Metrics Table developed for a particular project. Names of the project
property, personnel, and contract references have been changed for security purposes. The following is provided for
sample purposes only and shall be modified for project-specific needs.
QASP Performance Metrics Table (Continued)
Exceptional
Very Good
Satisfactory
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
Yes
If the
contractor fails
to meet the
requirement
some of the
time and
corrects the
performance
when required
by the
Contracting
Officer.
No
Zero letters of
reprimand,
grievances,
or
formal
complaints
One letter of
reprimand,
grievance
or
formal
complaint that
was resolved
through
negotiation
More than one
letter
of
reprimand,
grievance
or
formal complaint
that were resolved
through
negotiation
OR
removal of one or
more
project
personnel as a
result of a letter of
reprimand,
grievance
or
formal complaint.
PAR Category: Business Relations
Performance indicator: Met contractual responsibilities
Corrective
Actions
taken
were timely and
effective (Refer
to CARs issued
to contractor)
Performance indicator: Professional and Ethical Conduct
Meetings
and
correspondences
with
public,
project delivery
team and other
stakeholders
Zero letters of
reprimand,
grievances, or
formal
complaints AND
one or more
unsolicited
letters
of
commendation
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Table D-2. QASP Performance Metrics Table for Performance Assessment Record (PAR) –
Sample Table
NOTE: The following is a sample QASP Metrics Table developed for a particular project. Names of the project
property, personnel, and contract references have been changed for security purposes. The following is provided for
sample purposes only and shall be modified for project-specific needs.
QASP Performance Metrics Table (Continued)
Exceptional
Very Good
Satisfactory
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
2.0-2.9
<2.0
Performance indicator: Customer has overall satisfaction with work performed
Customer survey
results for rating
period
5.0-6.0
4.0-4.9
3.0-3.9
Performance indicator: Personnel responsive and cooperative
Key
personnel
responsive, and
cooperative
Always
Most Times
Almost Never
PAR Category: Management of Key Personnel and Resources
Performance indicator: Personnel knowledgeable and effective in their areas of responsibility
Personnel
assigned to tasks
All personnel
proposed by
contractor were
assigned to
project, some
personnel were
substituted by
higher qualified
individuals.
All personnel
proposed by
contractor were
assigned to
project, some
personnel were
substituted by
lesser qualified
individuals.
All personnel
proposed by
contractor were
assigned to
project, some
personnel were
substituted by
equally qualified
individuals.
Performance indicator: Personnel able to manage resources efficiently
Instances when
resource
management had
negative impact
on
project
0
1-2
3-4
D-9
5-6
>6
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Table D-2. QASP Performance Metrics Table for Performance Assessment Record (PAR) –
Sample Table
NOTE: The following is a sample QASP Metrics Table developed for a particular project. Names of the project
property, personnel, and contract references have been changed for security purposes. The following is provided for
sample purposes only and shall be modified for project-specific needs.
QASP Performance Metrics Table (Continued)
Exceptional
Very Good
Satisfactory
Marginal
Unsatisfactory
execution
PAR Category: Safety
Performance indicator: Accidents and Violations
*Number
Class
Accidents,
contractor
fault
of
A
0
1 or more
at
*Major
safety
violations
0
1
>1
*Minor
safety
violations
1
2-4
>4
*From Section C of Basic contract #A123BC-00-D-0000, Amendment 0001 (may be included but are not limited to these)
The following guidelines are provided for issuing ratings that are subjective in nature, these
ratings will be supported by the weight of evidence documented during the government's
surveillance efforts:
Exceptional: Performance meets contractual requirements and exceeds many to the Government's
benefit. The contractual performance of the element or sub-element being assessed was
accomplished with few minor problems for which corrective actions taken by the contractor were
highly effective.
Very Good: Performance meets contractual requirements and exceeds some to the Government's
benefit. The contractual performance of the element or sub-element being assessed was
accomplished with some minor problems for which corrective actions taken by the contractor
were effective.
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Satisfactory: Performance meets contractual requirements. The contractual performance of the
element or sub-element contains some minor problems for which corrective actions taken by the
contractor appear or were satisfactory.
Marginal: Performance does not meet all contractual requirements. The contractual performance
of the element or sub-element being assessed reflects a serious problem for which the contractor
has not yet identified corrective actions. The contractor's proposed actions appear only
marginally effective or were not fully implemented.
Unsatisfactory: Performance does not meet most contractual requirements and recovery is not
likely in a timely manner. The contractual performance of the element or sub-element contains
serious problems for which the contractor's corrective actions appear or were ineffective.
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APPENDIX E
SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES TABLE
E-1.
General. The following appendix provides: (1) instructions for documenting
surveillance activities; and (2) a sample Surveillance Activities Table. The sample Surveillance
Activities Table was completed for a particular project and is provided for informational
purposes only and shall be modified for project-specific needs.
E-2.
Instructions for Documenting Surveillance Activities Table.
a.
General. The Surveillance Activities Table is used to document the project
delivery team's QA activities. Results of these government activities fulfill two primary
functions:
(1)
Assures that project objectives have been met, and
(2)
Supports annual and/or closeout contractor performance ratings in the PPIMS.
b.
Column 1 - Definable Feature of Work. Definable features of work are those
products or processes that can be identified as having results that can be measured. For the
purposes of QA Surveillance activities, only those definable features of work that impact the
overall quality or safety of the project should be included.
c.
Column 2 - Reference - Contract/Task Order requirement or other applicable
reference that requires the stated Definable Feature of Work from Column 1.
d.
Column 3 - Method of Surveillance - Common accepted surveillance methods
are:
(1)
Random Sampling: Random Sampling is a statistically based method that
assumes receipt of acceptable performance if a given percentage or number of scheduled
surveillance activities have found the product or service to be acceptable. If performance is
considered marginal or unsatisfactory, the project team should document the discrepancy or
finding on a Corrective Action Request (CAR). If performance is satisfactory, very good, or
exceptional, the project team should consider adjusting the sample size or sampling frequency.
Random sampling is the most appropriate method for frequently recurring tasks. It works best
when the number of instances is very large and a statistically valid sample can be obtained.
(2)
Periodic Inspection - Periodic inspection (i.e., Weekly, Monthly, Quarterly, etc.)
consists of the evaluation of tasks selected on other than a 100% or random basis. It may be
appropriate for tasks that occur infrequently, and where 100% inspection is neither required nor
practicable. A predetermined plan for inspecting part of the work is established using subjective
judgment and analysis of agency resources to decide what work to inspect and how frequently to
inspect it. Selecting this tool to determine a contractor's compliance with contract requirements
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can be quite effective and it allows for assessing confidence in the contractor without consuming
a significant amount of time.
(3)
100 Percent Inspection - This is usually the most appropriate method only for
infrequent tasks or tasks with stringent performance requirements. With this method,
performance is inspected/evaluated at each occurrence. The cost-benefit of one hundred percent
inspection should be considered prior to its implementation.
(4)
Customer Feedback - Customer feedback is firsthand information from the actual
users of the service or product. It should be used to supplement other forms of evaluation and
assessment, and it is especially useful for those areas that do not lend themselves to the typical
forms of surveillance. However, customer feedback information should be used prudently.
Sometimes customer feedback is complaint-oriented, likely to be subjective in nature, and may
not always relate to actual requirements of the contract. Such information requires thorough
validation.
(5)
Third-party Audits - The term "third-party audits" refers to a contractor evaluation
made by a third-party organization that is independent of the government and the contractor. All
documentation supplied to, and produced by, the third party should be made available to both the
government and the contractor.
e.
Column 4 - Documentation of Surveillance Activities Performed. Identify the
document(s) to be used by the project team to record that specified surveillance activities have
been performed and describe the results of those surveillance activities.
f.
Column 5 - QA Surveillance Record File. Identify where the Quality
Assurance Reports (or other documentation, from Column 4) are filed by the project team. The
preferred method is to have a central location or file for all QA Surveillance documentation, but
if multiple files/locations (i.e., project team members) will be used, identify them in this column.
g.
Column 6 - PPIMS Performance Assessment Record (PAR) Category. This
column is used to identify the PAR category under which the associated Definable Feature of
Work will be rated. More than one PAR Category may apply to a given Definable Feature of
Work. PAR Categories may include, but are not limited to:
(1)
Quality of Product or Service - Assess the contractor's conformance to contract
requirements, specifications and standards of good workmanship (e.g., commonly accepted
technical or professional standards).
(2)
Schedule - Assess the timeliness of the contractor against the completion of the
contract, task orders, milestones, delivery schedules, administrative requirements, etc. Assess
the contractor's adherence to the required delivery schedule by assessing his/her efforts during
the assessment period that contribute to or effect the schedule variance.
E-2
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15 Jun 07
(3)
Cost Control - Assess the contractor's effectiveness in forecasting, managing, and
controlling contract cost. Assess for all contracts except Firm Fixed Price (FFP) or Firm Fixed
Price with Economic Price Adjustment contracts.
(4)
Business Relations - Assess the timeliness, completeness, and quality of problem
identification, corrective action plans, proposal submittals, the contractor's history of reasonable
and cooperative behavior, and customer satisfaction. Assess the contractor's success with timely
award and management of subcontracts, including whether the contractor met small/small
disadvantaged and women-owned business participation goals. Assess the extent to which the
contractor discharges its responsibility for integration and coordination for all activity needed to
execute the contract.
(5)
Management of Key Personnel - (For Services and Information Technology
Business Sectors Only) - Assess the contractor's performance in selecting, retaining, supporting,
and replacing, when necessary, key personnel.
(6)
Safety- Assess any elements not covered in this section or provide additional
comments on the contractor's overall performance level. For MMRP projects, this is where
Safety is rated. Assess the contractor's adherence to approved safety plans, explosives/chemical
agent safety requirements, and ability to prevent safety related incidents/accidents.
h.
Column 7 - Basic Performance Indicators. Performance indicators are the
standards and measures by which the project delivery team determines acceptability of contractor
performance regarding the associated Definable Feature of Work (Column 1). For example: If
"Draft Plans and Reports" is the Definable Feature of Work, then Basic Performance Indicators
might be "Plans and Reports are concise and technically accurate, plans are in accordance with
applicable regulations, reports are logical and support subsequent decisions." The associated
Performance Metric when rating contractor performance might be related to the number and
seriousness of comments generated and/or the need for subsequent government reviews.
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E-4
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Table E-1. Surveillance Activities Table
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Definable Feature of Work
Reference
(Self explanatory)
Documentation of
Surveillance
Activities
Performed
QA Surveillance
Record File
PPIMS Performance
Assessment Record
(PAR) Category
Basic Performance Indicator(s)
(Product or Process being
Rated)
Method of
Surveillance
(100%, Random
Sampling, Periodic(i.e., Weekly,
Monthly, Quarterly
etc.,)
(Each Definable Feature of
Work should have at least
one corresponding metric
associated with it.)
(Objective
Evidence)
(Identify what
documentation will
be generated as
evidence that
surveillance
activities were
conducted)
(e.g. CARs in
Contract file,
Form-7
comments in PM
file, QARs in
project engineer
files, etc.)
(One or more
categories may apply,
but each definable
feature of work,
Column 1, must be
directly linked to at
least one
Performance Metric)
(To be used as the basis for
contractor ratings described in the
performance metrics when
completing the Contractor
Performance Assessment Record
(PAR) in PPIMS)
Project
Documents/Submittals
1. Draft Work Plan
T.O. para 3.2
100% review of
submitted documents.
CEHNC Form 7,
Contracting Officer
Transmittal Memo
Official Contract
File
Quality of Product or
Service
Resubmissions required based on
amount and nature of government
comments regarding formatting,
completeness, technical accuracy,
regulatory compliance, conciseness,
decisions supported by data.
T.O. para. 4.2
Periodic Inspection
(Monthly)
Trip Reports,
Geophysical QA
Report, QAR,
Corrective Action
Requests (CAR)
Project Engineer
and PM Project
file
1. Quality Of Product
or Service.
Number and type of Corrective
Actions required based on government
observation regarding:
2. Draft Final Report
3. Draft Explosives Safety
Submissions
Work Plan Execution
Technical Management Plan
2. Management of
Key Personnel and
Resources
1. Compliance with approved plans,
personnel knowledgeable and effective
regarding their responsibilities,
2. Personnel meeting position
qualifications and resources managed
efficiently.
Explosives Management Plan
DOD 6055.9-STD, EP
385-1-95
Periodic Inspection
(Monthly)
QARs, CARs
Project Safety
Specialist file
1. Safety
2. Quality of Product
or Service.
Number of violations and/or accidents
and incidents regarding contractor lack
of:
1. Compliance with explosives safety
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Table E-1. Surveillance Activities Table
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Definable Feature of Work
Reference
(Self explanatory)
Documentation of
Surveillance
Activities
Performed
QA Surveillance
Record File
PPIMS Performance
Assessment Record
(PAR) Category
Basic Performance Indicator(s)
(Product or Process being
Rated)
Method of
Surveillance
(100%, Random
Sampling, Periodic(i.e., Weekly,
Monthly, Quarterly
etc.,)
(Each Definable Feature of
Work should have at least
one corresponding metric
associated with it.)
(Objective
Evidence)
(Identify what
documentation will
be generated as
evidence that
surveillance
activities were
conducted)
(e.g. CARs in
Contract file,
Form-7
comments in PM
file, QARs in
project engineer
files, etc.)
(One or more
categories may apply,
but each definable
feature of work,
Column 1, must be
directly linked to at
least one
Performance Metric)
3. Management of
Key Personnel and
Resources.
(To be used as the basis for
contractor ratings described in the
performance metrics when
completing the Contractor
Performance Assessment Record
(PAR) in PPIMS)
requirements, OSHA requirements.
2. Personnel knowledgeable and
practicing safe behavior.
3. Personnel meeting position
qualifications and resources being
managed efficiently.
Quality Control Plan
(QC Reports)
T.O. para. 5.3 and
Work Plan Chapter 11
1. GIS-Periodic
Inspection
1. Trip Report,
CARs, QA Checklist
1. Project GIS
manager file
1. Quality of Product
or Service.
Number and type of QC and/or QA
failures observed or uncorrected
regarding:
1. Reporting examples: Line types,
symbology, geodatabase integrity.
2. Geodetic
Surveying-100%
Inspection of QC
reports for all
submittals
2. Trip Report,
CARs, QA Checklist
2. Project
Surveyor file
2. Quality of Product
or Service.
2. Reporting examples: Loop
closures, re-occupations, reporting
coordinate systems, datums, units &
delivery of data collector files.
3. Geophysical data
collection and
processing and
anomaly
reacquisition-100%
inspection of
3. CARs, QA
Checklist,
Geophysical QA
Report
3. Project
Geophysicist file
3. Quality of Product
or Service.
3. Meeting Project DQOs regarding:
noise limits, speed limits, processing
SNR compliance, appropriate data
density & data coverage, blind seed
item detections, anomaly reacquisition
tolerances, etc.
E-6
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Table E-1. Surveillance Activities Table
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Definable Feature of Work
Reference
(Self explanatory)
Documentation of
Surveillance
Activities
Performed
QA Surveillance
Record File
PPIMS Performance
Assessment Record
(PAR) Category
Basic Performance Indicator(s)
(Product or Process being
Rated)
Method of
Surveillance
(100%, Random
Sampling, Periodic(i.e., Weekly,
Monthly, Quarterly
etc.,)
(Each Definable Feature of
Work should have at least
one corresponding metric
associated with it.)
(Objective
Evidence)
(Identify what
documentation will
be generated as
evidence that
surveillance
activities were
conducted)
(e.g. CARs in
Contract file,
Form-7
comments in PM
file, QARs in
project engineer
files, etc.)
(One or more
categories may apply,
but each definable
feature of work,
Column 1, must be
directly linked to at
least one
Performance Metric)
(To be used as the basis for
contractor ratings described in the
performance metrics when
completing the Contractor
Performance Assessment Record
(PAR) in PPIMS)
submitted QC reports
for all data sets.
4. Environmental
Sampling and
Chemical Analysis
data submittal-100%
of each QC submittal.
4. QARs, CARs, QA
Checklist
4. Project
Chemist file
4. Quality of Product
or Service.
4. Data submittals pass Automated
Data Review. Meet project DQOs for
sampling methods, data analyses and
validation.
Explosives Siting Plan
ESS (appl. to
removal/remedial
actions), DOD 6055.9STD, DA Pam 385-64
(appl. to active
installations)
Periodic inspection of
field operations
(Monthly)
Trip Reports, QARs,
CARs
Project Safety
Specialist file
Safety
Number and type of violations
regarding compliance with explosives
safety requirements.
Geophysical Investigation
Plan
T.O. para. 6.3 and
work plan chapter 5
Periodic inspection of
field operations
(Monthly)
Trip Reports,
Geophysical QA
Report
Project
Geophysicist file
1. Quality Of Product
or Service.
Number and type of corrective action
requests based on government
observation regarding contractor:
2. Management of
Key Personnel and
Resources
1. Compliance with approved plans,
personnel knowledgeable and effective
regarding their responsibilities,
2. Personnel meet position
qualification and resources managed
efficiently.
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Table E-1. Surveillance Activities Table
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Definable Feature of Work
Reference
(Self explanatory)
Documentation of
Surveillance
Activities
Performed
QA Surveillance
Record File
PPIMS Performance
Assessment Record
(PAR) Category
Basic Performance Indicator(s)
(Product or Process being
Rated)
Method of
Surveillance
(100%, Random
Sampling, Periodic(i.e., Weekly,
Monthly, Quarterly
etc.,)
(Each Definable Feature of
Work should have at least
one corresponding metric
associated with it.)
Environmental Sampling and
Chemical Analyses
Section C, Chapter 2,
Sub-section 2.8,
Chapter 4, Sub-section
4.5, T.O. para 3.2
Periodic Inspection
(during sampling
events)
100% review of all
DID MR005-10
Section 1.4 submittals
except the Chemistry
Data Package.
(Objective
Evidence)
(Identify what
documentation will
be generated as
evidence that
surveillance
activities were
conducted)
Trip reports, CARs,
QARs, and/or
statements of
reviewed chemical
data
(e.g. CARs in
Contract file,
Form-7
comments in PM
file, QARs in
project engineer
files, etc.)
Project Chemist
file
(One or more
categories may apply,
but each definable
feature of work,
Column 1, must be
directly linked to at
least one
Performance Metric)
Quality of Product or
Service.
Management of Key
Personnel and
Resources
5% review of the
Chemistry Data
Package
(To be used as the basis for
contractor ratings described in the
performance metrics when
completing the Contractor
Performance Assessment Record
(PAR) in PPIMS)
Data submittals pass Automated Data
Review. Meet project DQOs for
sampling methods, data analyses and
validation. Number and type of
corrective action requests based on
government observation regarding
contractor: Compliance with approved
plans, personnel knowledgeable and
effective regarding their
responsibilities.
Personnel meet position qualification
and resources managed efficiently.
Other Definable Features of
Work to be included based
on project objectives and
project delivery team needs.
Cost/Schedule
Project Management: Cost
and Schedule
Control/Reporting
T.O. para. 6.6
100% of weekly
status reports
PM checklist
PM file
1. Schedule
2. Cost Control
E-8
Number of instances of contractor
impacts on cost and schedule
attributable to the contractor, impacts
not identified, and unauthorized cost
overruns.
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Table E-1. Surveillance Activities Table
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Definable Feature of Work
Reference
(Self explanatory)
Documentation of
Surveillance
Activities
Performed
QA Surveillance
Record File
PPIMS Performance
Assessment Record
(PAR) Category
Basic Performance Indicator(s)
(Product or Process being
Rated)
Method of
Surveillance
(Each Definable Feature of
Work should have at least
one corresponding metric
associated with it.)
(100%, Random
Sampling, Periodic(i.e., Weekly,
Monthly, Quarterly
etc.,)
(Objective
Evidence)
(Identify what
documentation will
be generated as
evidence that
surveillance
activities were
conducted)
(e.g. CARs in
Contract file,
Form-7
comments in PM
file, QARs in
project engineer
files, etc.)
(One or more
categories may apply,
but each definable
feature of work,
Column 1, must be
directly linked to at
least one
Performance Metric)
(To be used as the basis for
contractor ratings described in the
performance metrics when
completing the Contractor
Performance Assessment Record
(PAR) in PPIMS)
Business Relations
Meeting preparation and
professional conduct
Customer Feedback
Email, letters,
customer survey
forms
PM file
1. Quality of Product
or Service
Number of customer complaints
regarding:
2. Business Relations
1. Personnel prepared and
knowledgeable in areas of expertise.
2. Professional and ethical conduct.
Management of Key
Personnel
Project Management:
Personnel
Periodic Inspection
(Monthly, or upon
change in personnel)
Trip report, QARs,
CARs
E-9
Project Safety
Specialist or PM
file
Management of Key
Personnel and
Resources
Number of instances regarding
contractor personnel and their
qualifications for filling key
positions/functions.
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1
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E-10
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APPENDIX F
CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUEST (CAR)
F-1. General. The following includes a: (1) blank CAR form and (2) sample CAR form that has
been completed for a particular project. The sample CAR form is provided for informational
purposes only and shall be modified for project-specific needs.
Table F-1. Blank CAR Form
CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUEST
| NO. (1,2,3, etc. for the T.O.)
USACE Representative:
Date Issued:
Issued to: (Contractor)
Response Due: (Based on type of nonconformance)
Contract # and T.O. #
Project Name/Location:
Nonconformance Type (circle one): Critical
Major
Minor
Description of Condition Found:
Apparent Cause:
(The Contractor will provide the following information to the Contracting Officer and USACE PM by the “Response Due” date
above. Please contact the USACE Representative listed above if you have any questions)
Actual Cause: (Contractor will investigate and determine cause of condition reported above. Actual
cause should be stated as specifically as possible)
Action Taken to Correct Condition: (Corrective Action should address root cause, not the symptom)
Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence:
Action Taken to Monitor Effectiveness of Corrective Action: (Generate data as proof. State the
monitoring method put in place and who is responsible for reviewing data.)
Contractor Representative Signature/Title/Date Signed: (Form must be signed before returning)
F-1
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15 Jun 07
CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUEST
| NO. (1,2,3, etc. for the T.O.)
(USACE Project Team Use Only)
Review of Corrective Action:
1) Has condition improved? ___ Yes ___ No
2) Additional corrective action required? ___ Yes ___ No
Comments:
Completed form provided to Contracting Officer: (Date)
F-2
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Table F-2. Sample CAR Form
CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUEST |REQUEST NO| NO. :CEHNC-ED-CS-G-FY03_0002
Originator: Bob Selfridge
Date Issued: 31 October 2003
Issued to: I.M.Sorry of ABC Inc.
Project: Ft. Nowhere Removal Action – 40 acre additional area
CEHNC Project Manager: Dan Copeland
CEHNC Project Engineer: Alonzo Andrews
Response Due: 7 November 2003
Description of Condition Found: (As observed or reported)
Government Blind seed items were not removed during the Removal Action.
Failure FY03_0002 - 60 mm mortar buried at 1.0 foot deep in grid 67.
(Appropriate personnel, i.e. contractor PM, Safety Officer, Team Leader, etc., receiving the CAR will provide the following
information to the originator by the “Response Due” date above. Please contact the originator if you have any questions)
Actual Cause: (Appropriate personnel will investigate and determine cause of condition reported above. Actual
cause should be stated as specifically as possible).
The 60 mm mortar in this grid was located just over 1 ft off of anomaly #30. Anomaly #30 was a Rommel stake
sticking out of the ground. The photo at the bottom of this CEHNC report shows the distance between the Rommel
stake and the item. The area of concern where this item was located was heavily contaminated with ferrous
material and hot rocks. During the QA process to locate this item, it required over 3 man hours to locate the item.
Action Taken to Correct Condition: (Corrective Action should address root cause, not the symptom).
A thorough examination of the procedures resulting in the above mentioned condition was performed. The first
course of action was to determine whether or not the geophysical sensors detected the item. The site geophysicist
interpreting the geophysical data feels that the seeded item was detected, however the items proximity to the highly
ferrous Rommel stake and presence of large amounts of ferrous material caused the anomalies to merge into one
subsurface disturbance. The interpreting geophysicist selected the entire disturbance as a single anomaly. The
source of the condition was determined.
F-3
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CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUEST |REQUEST NO| NO. :CEHNC-ED-CS-G-FY03_0002
The geophysicist went
through the Task Order
data looking for similar
anomalies. These were
then looked at by the
geophysicist and the
UXOQC to determine if
additional work needed
to be done in those
locations. Six additional anomalies were found that needed further investigation.
Action Taken to Prevent Recurrence: Intrusive teams have been instructed to verify that a 3-foot
radius about the selected location has been cleared. Regardless if a large metallic surface item is present. In
addition, interpreting geophysicist has been instructed to select more than the one target location on large
subsurface anomalies. This will encourage the intrusive teams to continue their investigation until the anomaly (or
anomalies) have been uncovered.
Action Taken to Monitor Effectiveness of Corrective Action: (Generate data as proof. State the monitoring
method put in place and who is responsible for reviewing data.)
The Internal quality control personnel will work closely with the intrusive teams to verify that the preventive
recurrence actions are being applied.
Team Manager Signature/Title/Date Signed: (Form must be signed before returning)
I. M. Sorry / I. M. Sorry/ Project Manager/ 4 November 2003
(Government Use Only)
Review of Corrective Action:
1) Has condition improved? X Yes ___ No
2) Additional corrective action required? ___ Yes _X__ No
Comments:
F-4
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CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUEST |REQUEST NO| NO. :CEHNC-ED-CS-G-FY03_0002
Item
Item ID Depth
Dec
Inc
E-W
H
Grid SW*
SE*
NE*
NW*
80'8"
85'10"
64'3"
CEHNC60mm
H07
1'
67 57'
* - measured tape distances from corners of grid to item.
F-5
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F-6
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APPENDIX G
GENERIC ON-SITE QA CHECKLIST
Project Name/Contract No. _________________________________________________
Audit Date (Start): ____________________ Audit Date (End): ____________________
CHECKPOINTS:
1. Review Scope of Work (DO/TO & WP)
YES
NO
N/A
a. Objectives Clearly Identified



b. Check for Changes to WP & Up To Date



c. Proper Depth of Clearance Identified



d. Proper Target Ordnance Identified



e. Detection & Target Depth(s) Specified



f. Exclusion Zone Identified in WP



YES
NO
N/A
a. Notice to Proceed from KO



b. Approval Letter for Work Plan/SSHP



c. Approval Letter, FAA (If Required)



d.
Certificate of Grounding, Lightning
Protection (if required)



e. Explosive Permits/License (if required)



f. GFE Transfer Documentation (if required)



g.
Approval Letter, Public/Personnel
Withdraw Distance (e.g., 1 Frag in 600 sq. ft.)









YES
NO
N/A



b. Approval Letter’s (NTP, Personnel &
WP/SSHP) for Contractor Operations



c. Weekly Contractor Reports SUXOS/QC



2. Documentation Requirements
i. Dig Permits for Utilities (if required)
j. Current copy of the Work Plan on site.
Review the new contract to determine if approval
of the work plan is required. If not, then delete
the requirement to have an approval letter on site
3. CEHNC QA Files Established
a. Quality Assurance Reports
G-1
COMMENTS
COMMENTS
COMMENTS
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
(if provided)
4. Site-Specific Safety & Health Plan (SSHP)
YES
NO
N/A
a. Emergency Notification List Posted &
Available



b. Emergency Routes/Maps Available &
Issued to Each Team



c. Work Task Identified in Hazard Analysis,
Approved SSHP












g. Minimum of Two Personnel On-Site First
Aid/CPR Trained, EM 385-1-1, Section 3, Page
19, Paragraph 03.A.02



h. 16-Unit First Aid Kits or Kits Approved
by a Licensed Physician in the Ratio of one for
every 25 persons or less. EM 385-1-1. Section 3,
Page 19, Paragraph 03.A.03



YES
NO
N/A
a. Procedures Established for the Discovery
of RCWM



b. Procedures Developed for Discovery of
MEC which cannot be destroyed in place



c. Project Grid Size, Layout, Lane Width
(e.g., 5’ or Less) Established



d. Established Procedures for Changed Site
Conditions



e. Organizational Chart current and indicates
Assignment, Duties, Responsibilities to include
Geophysical Teams



f. Procedures for Reporting and Disposition
of MPPEH



g. Procedures Established for Disposal of
MEC in Populated/Sensitive Areas



h. Procedures Established for Managing,
Reporting, Venting and Disposing of munitions
debris and range-related debris.



d. MSDS(s) On-Site Approved SSHP
e. Visitors/Safety Briefing Log Current and
Updated
f. All Personnel On-Site in the Proper PPE
5. Technical Management
G-2
COMMENTS
COMMENTS
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
5. Technical Management (Continued)
YES
NO
N/A
i. Additional Task and Procedures being
Followed (e.g., PAO, Community Relations,
Weekly & Monthly Project Status Reports)



j. Procedures Established for Recording,
Reporting and Implementing Lessons Learned



k.
Limitations Posed and Ability of
Detection System(s) Chosen



l. Proper Use of Geophysical Detections
Systems Used



m. Procedures Established for Disposal of
MEC in non-populated/non-sensitive areas



YES
NO
N/A
a.
Adequate Work Space & Facilities
(Restrooms, etc.)



b. Good Housekeeping (No Fire Hazards,
Tripping Hazards, etc.)



c. Approved and Suitable Containers for
Flammable Toxic or Explosive Materials



d. Approved/Adequate Explosive Storage
Facilities



e. Fire/Emergency Exits Clear & Unbarred



f. Personnel Limits Maintained



g. Site Security Adequate



h. Toilets. EM 385-1-1, Section 2, Page 14,
Paragraph 02.B Toilets



i. Washing Facilities. EM 385-1-1, Section
2, Page 16, Paragraph 02.C Washing Facilities



6. Facilities. Reference EM 385-1-1
G-3
COMMENTS
COMMENTS
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
7.
Equipment, Reference Approved
WP/Manufacture Operators Manual
YES
NO
N/A



b. Proper Personnel Protective Equipment
(PPE) Present, Serviceable & Utilized



c. Equipment Calibrated (Last Call Date
_____ Next Call Date _______)



d.
Survey
Serviceable
a. Tools Appropriate and Serviceable
Equipment
Inspected
&



e.
Heavy Equipment Inspected
Serviceable IAW EM 385-1-1, Section 16
&



1. Are Equipped with at Least One Dry
Chemical or CO2 Fire Extinguisher-Minimum
rating of 5-BC – IAW EM 385-1-1, Section 16



f. Two Separate Means of Communications,
Radio(s) Cell Phone, Land Line(s)



g. Geophysical Equipment On-Hand &
Serviceable



YES
NO
N/A
a.
Proper Storage Containers Type 2
Magazines conforming to standards set forth in
Section 55.206 of ATFP 5400.7, AFT Explosives
Law and Regulations.



b. Placards. Each magazine will display the
placards
required
by
Department
of
Transportation (DOT) regulations in accordance
with DOD 6055.9-STD and Department of the
Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 385-64 for Hazard
Division of MEC stored in the magazine.



c.
Explosive Compatibility Groups.
Segregated into the appropriate hazard
division/storage compatibility group criteria listed
in Chapter 3, DOD 6055.9-STD.



d. Physical Security. Contractor shall
conduct and document physical security survey.
The survey is to determine if fencing or guards
are required.



e. Locks. Shall meet the standards listed in
Section 55.208 (a) (4), ATFP 5400.7.



8.
Explosive Storage
Reference EP 1110-1-18
Requirements.
G-4
COMMENTS
COMMENTS
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
8. Explosive Storage Requirements.
Reference EP 1110-1-18 (Cont’d)
YES
NO
N/A
f. A key control system will be documented
in the Work Plan, EP 1110-1-18.



g.
Lightning Protection.
Magazine
constructed of metal that has 3/16 inch steel or
thicker in accordance with National Fire
Protection Association (NFPA) 780.



h. Lightning Protection. Magazine grounded
in accordance with NFPA.



i. Lightning Protection. Magazine is located
at least 6.5 feet from the nearest fence.



j. Lightning Protection. BRAC, IRP, FUDS
and Active Installation will meet the provisions of
DOD 6055.9-STD. Army installations will also
meet the provisions of DA Pam 385-64.



k.
Fire Protection.
Extinguishers of
appropriate size (minimum 10 BC) and type will
be located in all explosives storage facilities.









YES
NO
N/A






c. Accountability Records Maintained



d. Lost/Stolen Reporting Procedures in Place



e. Final Disposition Procedures Documented



f. Key Control/Security



l. Explosive Limits Maintained. .
m. Waiver. MACOM approval for storage
of commercial of explosives on-site (if required).
9. Explosive Management Plan.
Approved WP/49 CFR
Reference
a. Signature Authority On-Hand
b.
Periodic Inventories Conducted OnSchedule
G-5
COMMENTS
COMMENTS
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
10. Transportation of MEC. Reference EP
1110-11-18. Chapter 15/49 CFR
YES
NO
N/A
a. Hazardous Waste Manifest (EPA Form
8700-22) (if required)



b. Hazard Classification of MEC IAW TB
700-2



c. Training of Transporting MEC IAW 49
CFR, Part 172 & State Applicable State
Requirements



d.
Documented
Organizational
Responsibilities for Transportation of MEC












h. Fire Fighting & First Aid Equipment on
board



i. Cargo properly segregated/blocked and
braced and in proper container



j.
Proper DOT Placards/Fire Fighting
Symbols Used



YES
NO
N/A
methodology



1. SUXOS conducted physical check prior
to sweep operations



2. Daily Safety Meeting Conducted by
SUXOS/SSHO



b.
Used
Geophysical Detection/Magnetometer



1.
Pre-Operational Checks Performed
Prior to Sweep Operations



2. Operational Condition Annotated in
Log Book



3. UXO Teams



4. Quality Control



5. Quality Assurance



e. Approved Transportation Plan
f. Pre-operational checks of vehicles being
conducted
g. All operators licensed for vehicle
11.
UXO Operational Plan,
Approved WP & EP 1110-1-18
a.
Contractor
defined in WP
following
Reference
G-6
COMMENTS
COMMENTS
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
11. UXO Operational Plan, Reference
Approved WP & EP 1110-1-18 (Cont’d)
YES
NO
N/A
c. Operational Teams Operating IAW WP



1. UXO Supervisor Conducted Physical
Check Prior to Sweep Operation



2. Pre-Sweep Operational/Safety Brief
Conducted



3.
Individual Sweep Lanes/Transects
Marked IAW WP



4.
Properly






6.
All MEC, Inert Items & Scrap
Examined by at Least Two UXO Personnel



(a)
AEDA (Range Residue) IAW
PWS/SOW and Properly Addressed in WP









e. Non-Munitions Debris Being Collected
(as required)



f. Munitions Debris
Inspected/Vented/Segregated



g. Geophysical Test Grids Appropriate and
IAW PWS/SOW



12. Disposal Operations Planned On-Site IAW
the Approved WP and 60A-1-1 31/1-1-22
YES
NO
N/A
a. Disposal Method IAW WP



b. Adequate Security for Disposal Operation



c. Disposal Notification List Available



d. All Necessary Notifications Made



e. Movement of MEC Items, or is MEC
Consolidation Feasible



f.
Protective Measures/Tamping Being
Used/Appropriate for MEC Being Destroyed



g. Limits of the Exclusion Zone Established
and are all Personnel Aware of Limits



Contacts Marked & Investigated
5. Results of Sweep Operation Recorded
7. All UXOs Clearly Marked
d. QC Operations IAW WP
G-7
COMMENTS
COMMENTS
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
12. Disposal Operations Planned On-Site IAW
the Approved WP and 60A-1-1 31/1-1-22
(Cont’d)
YES
NO
N/A



1. Misfire Procedures Properly Performed
(Electric)



2. Misfire Procedures Properly Performed
(Non-Electric)



13.
Location Survey & Mapping Plan.
Reference Contract DIDs
YES
NO
N/A
a. Professional Land Surveyor



b. Surveyors Received Safety Briefing



c. UXO Escort Provided









YES
NO
N/A



b. QC Grid/Transect Established IAW WP



c. Results of QC Checks Being Recorded



d. Pass/Fail Criteria Clearly Defined IAW
PWS/SOW



15. Vegetation Removal Reference WP/SSHP
& OSHA Req.
YES
NO
N/A
a. Vegetation Removal & Localized, if
required



b. Equipment Operation to Prevent Impact
with Possible Surface UXO



c. Cutting does not Present Impalement
Hazard



d.
UXO Personnel Monitoring Cutting
Operation



e.
UXO
Appropriately
Marked/Handled



f. Equipment Being Operated Safely & IAW



h. Disposal Procedures
d.
Grid Stake, Locations Swept with
Geophysical Equipment prior to Driving Stakes
e. Survey Notes Being Recorded
14.
Quality Control Plan.
PWS/SOW/DID(s)
Reference
a. QC Operational/Checks Being Conducted
IAW WP
Discovered
G-8
COMMENTS
COMMENTS
COMMENTS
COMMENTS
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Equipment Operators Manual/WP
16. Munition Constituents (MC) Sampling and
Analysis Plan, if required
YES
NO
N/A






c. Procedures for Collection of Samples



d. Local Carrier Location Identified



a. Key Personnel Identified
b.
Quality
Identified
Assurance
Responsibilities
G-9
COMMENTS
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
This page intentionally left blank
G-10
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
APPENDIX H
EE/CA WORK PLAN REVIEW MATRIX
H-1. General. The following is a sample EE/CA Work Plan Review Matrix but may be modified for a particular response process
(e.g., RI, RI/FS). The matrix is to identify the individual responsible for a specific discipline to help focus document reviews (e.g.,
any comments on a particular specialty should be filtered through the individual assigned/responsible for that specialty). Although the
following provides what documents individuals are responsible for, it does not preclude one from reviewing other documents and
raising questions of concern.
PDT
Member
Chapter
DC
POC*
PE**
OE
Safety
Geo
R/A
Chapter 1
Project Authorization
Purpose/Scope
WP Organization
Project Location
Site Description
Site History
Land Use
Previous Investigations
Summary of MEC Risk
R
C
H-1
Sys
Safety
Chemist
References/Special Notes
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
PDT
Member
Chapter
DC
POC*
PE**
OE
Safety
Geo
R/A
Chapter 2
Project Objectives
Project Organization
Project Personnel
Communications/Reporting
Deliverables
Schedule
Reporting
Costing/Billing
Public Relations
Subcontractor Management
Management of Field Ops
R
H-2
Sys
Safety
Chemist
References/Special Notes
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
PDT
Member
Chapter
DC
POC*
PE**
OE
Safety
Geo
Sys
Safety
Chemist
R/A
Chapter 3
Overall Approach to EE/CA
C
ID of Areas of Concern
C
GPO Plan and Report
C
Geophysical Investigation Plan
C
R
R
R
Surveys/Mapping Plans
C
GIS Plan
C
Intrusive Investigation
R
IDW Plan
R
Risk Analysis
C
Institutional Controls Analysis
C
Recurring Review Plan
C
C
H-3
References/Special Notes
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
PDT
Member
Chapter
DC
POC*
PE**
Geo
OE
Safety
C
R
R
R/A
Chapter 4
QC Plan
Chapter 5
R/A
Explosives Management Plan
C
Chapter 6
Explosives Siting Plan
Chapter 7
C
R/A
Environmental Protection Plan
Chapter 8
C
R/A
Property Management Plan
Chapter 9
C
R/A
IHF Siting Plan (RCWM)
Chapter 10
Physical Security Plan
(RCWM)
R
C
R
R
R/A
H-4
Sys
Safety
Chemist
References/Special Notes
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
PDT
Member
Chapter
DC
POC*
PE**
OE
Safety
Geo
Sys
Safety
Chemist
R/A
Chapter 11
References
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R
R/A
Appendix A
PWS/SOW
R/A
Appendix B
Site Maps
R/A
Appendix C
Local POCs
R/A
Appendix D
SSHP
R
C
R/A
Appendix E
Environmental SAP
C
R/A
Appendix F
Contractor Forms
R
R
H-5
References/Special Notes
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
PDT
Member
Chapter
DC
POC*
PE**
OE
Safety
Geo
Sys
Safety
Chemist
References/Special Notes
R/A
Appendix G
MSD Calculation Sheets
C
R/A
Appendix H
Resumes
C
R/A
Appendix I
TPP Work Sheets
C
R
R
*The DC POC has overall responsibility for the entire work plan.
**Depending on the complexity of the project, the project engineer is responsible for assuring appropriate engineering disciplines are
involved.
R – Review: PDT member responsible for reviewing and supplying comments to the MM DC POC. Coordination with the
concurring authority is recommended.
A – Approve: PDT member responsible for final approval and resolution of comments concerning designated portions of the work
plan.
C – Concur: PDT member with primary technical expertise and must provide written concurrence or non-concurrence to the MM DC
POC. Documented concurrence on CEHNC Form 7.
H-6
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
APPENDIX I
EE/CA REPORT REVIEW MATRIX
I-1.
General. The following is a sample EE/CA Report Review Matrix but may be modified for a particular response process (e.g.,
RI, RI/FS). The matrix is to identify the individual responsible for a specific discipline to help focus document reviews (e.g., any
comments on a particular specialty should be filtered through the individual assigned/responsible for that specialty). Although the
following provides what documents individuals are responsible for, it does not preclude one from reviewing other documents and
raising questions of concern. Note also that references included in this sample matrix may have been appropriate for a particular
project at the time of publication; however, these references may not be valid thereafter.
Chapter
General (Required by
DID)
PDT
Member
MM DC
POC*
PE**
OE Safety
R
R
Chemist***
MM CX
References/Special Notes
R/A
Signature of corporate
quality rep
R
Engineer certification
(FINAL)
R
Executive Summary
Geo
R/A
R
R
R
Chapter 1
Regulatory
framework/auth.
PWS/SOW, TPP worksheets
Purpose/scope
PWS/SOW, TPP worksheets
I-1
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Chapter
PDT
Member
MM DC
POC*
TPP Team (by name)
PE**
Geo
OE Safety
C
R
R
Chemist***
MM CX
References/Special Notes
TPP worksheets
Summary, public
participation
Admin record file
Other environmental
problems
R
R
Admin record file
Chapter 2
R/A
R
PWS/SOW, TPP worksheets
Chapter 3
R/A
R
PWS/SOW, TPP worksheets
Project team goals
C
R
R
Regulator/stakeholder
concerns
C
R
R
Constraints
C
R
R
ID of response alternatives
C
R
R
Project objectives
C
R
R
R
Data Quality Objectives
(DQOs)
C
R
R
R
I-2
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Chapter
Chapter 4
PDT
Member
MM DC
POC*
PE**
OE Safety
Chemist***
R/A
Analysis of historical
records
R
Interviews conducted
R
Analysis of aerial
photography
R
Other investigations
performed
R
Source/nature/extent of
MEC
C
Chapter 5
Geo
MM CX
References/Special Notes
R
Admin record file, project records
R
R
R
R/A
R
R
CSM and its development
C
MEC risk assessment
method
C
MEC risk assessment
C
Level of safety risk that
exists
C
R
R
EM 1110-1-1200
R
TPP worksheets
R
I-3
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Chapter
PDT
Member
MM DC
POC*
PE**
Geo
OE Safety
Chemist***
R/A
Chapter 6
Response alternatives
evaluation
R
Institutional Control Plan
EP 1110-1-18, para. 9-7
R
C
R
R/A
Chapter 8
Recommended alternatives
R
C
R
R
R/A
Chapter 9
R
QC methods used
C
R
R
R
QC results
C
R
R
R
Lessons learned
C
R
R
R
R/A
Appendix A
PWS/SOW
References/Special Notes
R
R/A
Chapter 7
MM CX
R
R
I-4
Field logs/reports, QARs
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Chapter
Appendix B
PDT
Member
MM DC
POC*
PE**
Geo
R/A
R
R/A
Institutional analysis and
report
Appendix E
R/A
R
R/A
Responsiveness Summary
Appendix G
Recurring Review Plan
(Draft)
R
R
Cost breakdown
Appendix F
MM CX
R
Demo activity tables
Appendix D
Chemist***
R/A
Scrap disposition
documents
Appendix C
OE Safety
R
C
R
R
R/A
R
C
R
R
I-5
References/Special Notes
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Chapter
PDT
Member
MM DC
POC*
PE**
Geo
OE Safety
Chemist***
MM CX
Terminology/definitions
correct
R
R
R
R
R
Recovered items properly
ID’d
R
R
R
Recommendations
supported
R
R
R
R
R
Data consistent throughout
R
R
R
R
R
Proper application of tools
R
R
Proper application of
Ordnance Explosives Risk
Impact Assessment
R
R
References/Special Notes
R/A
General
EP 1110-1-18, Basic Contract
R
UXO Calculator, etc., protocols
*The MM DC POC has overall responsibility for the adequacy of the report.
**Depending on the complexity of the project, the project engineer is responsible for assuring appropriate engineering disciplines are involved.
***For RCWM projects and any others where soil sampling or related issues were involved.
R – Review: PDT member responsible for reviewing and supplying comments to the MM DC POC. Coordination with the concurring authority is required.
A – Approve: PDT member responsible for final approval and resolution of comments concerning designated portions of the work plan.
C – Concur: PDT member with primary technical expertise and must provide written concurrence or non-concurrence to the MM DC POC. Document on
CEHNC Form 7.
Coordination with reviewers is required.
I-6
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
APPENDIX J
REMOVAL ACTION WORK PLAN REVIEW MATRIX
J-1.
General. The following is a sample EE/CA Report Review Matrix but may be modified for a particular response process (e.g.,
RI, RI/FS). The matrix is to identify the individual responsible for a specific discipline to help focus document reviews (e.g., any
comments on a particular specialty should be filtered through the individual assigned/responsible for that specialty). Although the
following provides what documents individuals are responsible for, it does not preclude one from reviewing other documents and
raising questions of concern. Note also that references included in this sample matrix may have been appropriate for a particular
project at the time of publication; however, these references may not be valid thereafter.
Chapter
PDT
Member
MM
DC
POC*
PE**
Geo
OE
Safety
C
R
R
R/A
Chapter 1
General Information
Site Location
Site History
Topography
Chapter 2
R/A
Technical Management Plan
Chapter 3
R/A
Explosives Management Plan
C
J-1
Sys
Safety
Chemist
References/Special Notes
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Chapter
Chapter 4
PDT
Member
MM
DC
POC*
PE**
Geo
OE
Safety
R/A
Explosives Siting Plan
Chapter 5
C
R/A
Geophysical Proveout
Plan/Report
Chapter 6
C
R/A
Geophysical Investigation
Plan
Chapter 7
Location Surveys and
Mapping Plan
R
C
R
C
R
R
R/A
J-2
Sys
Safety
Chemist
References/Special Notes
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Chapter
PDT
Member
MM
DC
POC*
PE**
Geo
OE
Safety
Sys
Safety
Chemist
R/A
Chapter 8
Work, Data, Cost
Management Plan
R
R/A
Chapter 9
Property Management Plan
C
R
R/A
Chapter 10
Quality Control Plan
C
R
R
R/A
Chapter 11
Environmental Protection
Plan
C
Chapter 12
IDW Plan
C
J-3
References/Special Notes
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Chapter
PDT
Member
MM
DC
POC*
PE**
Geo
C
R
OE
Safety
R/A
Chapter 13
Geographical Information
Systems Plans
Chapter 14
IHF Siting Plan
R
R
Physical Security Plan
R
R
Chapter 15
R/A
Chapter 16
References
R
R
R
C
R
R
R/A
Appendix A
TO Scope of Work
R/A
Appendix B
Site Maps
J-4
Sys
Safety
Chemist
References/Special Notes
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Chapter
PDT
Member
MM
DC
POC*
PE**
Geo
OE
Safety
Sys
Safety
Chemist
References/Special Notes
R/A
Appendix C
Local Points of Contact
C
R
TPP Worksheets, Meeting Minutes
R/A
Appendix D
SSHP
R
C
R/A
Appendix E
Environmental SAP
R
C
Appendix F
QC Log
R
C
Safety Mtg Attendance Log
C
Site Visitors Log
C
Safety Inspections Log
C
Daily Report of MEC
Operations
C
J-5
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
Chapter
PDT
Member
MM
DC
POC*
PE**
Geo
OE
Safety
Explosives Accountability
Forms
Sys
Safety
Chemist
References/Special Notes
C
Appendix G
MSD Calculation Sheets
C
Appendix H
Resumes
C
*The MM DC POC has overall responsibility for the entire work plan.
**Depending on the complexity of the project, the project engineer is responsible for assuring appropriate engineering disciplines are involved.
R – Review: PDT member responsible for reviewing and supplying comments to the MM DC POC. Coordination with the concurring authority is
recommended.
A – Approve: PDT member responsible for final approval and resolution of comments concerning designated portions of the work plan.
C – Concur: PDT member with primary technical expertise and must provide written concurrence or non-concurrence to the MM DC POC. Document
concurrence on CEHNC Form 7.
J-6
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
APPENDIX K
SAMPLE QUALITY ASSURANCE REPORT (QAR)
USACE ORDNANCE AND EXPLOSIVE PROJECT
QUALITY ASSURANCE REPORT
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CONTRACT WITH DELIVERY ORDER:
Contractor Name
DACA87-00-X-XXXX, Task Order # 0001,
SITE: OE Removal Action, Former Bombing and Gunnery Range – City/County, State
DATE: October XX, 2003
TELEPHONE NUMBER: XXX-XXX-XXXX
FAX NUMBER: XXX-XXX-XXXX
WEATHER: Mostly sunny, Low: 51 High: 72
USACE UXO SME: Joe Smith
GRIDS COMPLETED BY CONTRACTOR: Grids 1 & 2 were turned over for Government
QA Inspection today. Both of these grids have failed previous Government QA Inspections.
This will be the 2nd QA inspection for Grid 2, and the 3rd QA inspection for Grid 1.
QA CHECKS CONDUCTED: Observed safety briefing, intrusive operations, and demolition
operations. Performed Government QA Inspection of areas completed by contractor.
GRIDS THAT PASSED QA INSPECTION: None
CORRECTIVE ACTION REQUEST: One, for the 2 grids listed above that were turned over
for Government QA Inspection today.
CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL ON-SITE: Total Number on-site
*Bill Smith
Project Manager
Tom Smith
UXO Tech II - Tm 2
George Smith
SUXOS
*Mary Smith
UXO Tech II
Harry Smith
UXOSO
*Ruth Smith
UXO Tech I
Rick Smith
UXOQCS
Katy Smith
UXO Tech I - Tm 2
Smitty Smith
UXO Tech III - Reac
Jessica Smith
UXO Tech I - Tm 2
Jeff Smith
UXO Tech III - Tm 2
Joan Smith
UXO Tech I - Tm 2
Ron Smith
UXO Tech II - Tm 2
Jane Smith
Equip Operator – Reac
*Not On-Site Today
K-1
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:
1. UXO Tech II Mr. Smith was out sick today. UXO Tech I Mrs. Smith was not at the morning
briefing because she was ill. The SUXOS also advised me that UXO Tech I Mr. Smith would be
departing tomorrow.
2. UXO Team 2 spent the day performing investigation of “mag & flag” anomalies in Section X.
Team investigated 221 “mag & flag” anomalies between waypoint 18/17 and waypoint 12.
MEC found on the 221 “mag & flag” anomalies consisted of 2 fuzed 3” Stokes Mortars and 12
unfuzed 3” Stokes Mortars. The 2 fuzed Stokes Mortars were destroyed in place with jet
perforators inside sandbag structures and found to be sand-filled. The 12 unfuzed 3” Stokes
Mortars were transported to Range 1 for disposal and found to be sand-filled after being
exploited with jet perforators. Munitions debris found on the 221 “mag & flag” anomalies
consisted of 36 pieces of frag from 37mm, 57mm, 60mm mortars, 81mm mortars, 3” & 4”
Stokes mortars, and 75mm projectiles.
3. The Reacquisition Team used the GPS to reacquire & flag 210 dig list anomalies in Grid X
(74 flagged anomalies) and Grid 21 (136 flagged anomalies) in Area G. Contractor still awaiting
approval to use the G-858 system in Area G. A draft geophysical prove-out report addendum
has been submitted but has yet to be approved. Upon approval of the G-858, the work plan will
revision to incorporate G-858 procedures.
4. I magged and flagged QA anomalies in Grids 6-16 in the target area today. A total of 52 QA
anomalies were flagged in these 11 grids today. These anomalies will be investigated tomorrow
morning.
LESSONS LEARNED: None
DISTRIBUTION:
1-CEHNC-OE-DC (Design Center Project Manager)
1-CEHNC-OE-S (FILE)
1-CEHNC-CT
Project Engineer or Technical Manager
K-2
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
APPENDIX L
AFTER ACTION OR FINAL QUALITY ASSURANCE REPORT CONTENT
NOTE: The following is a sample Quality Assurance Report for an EE/CA but may be
modified for a particular response process (e.g., RI, RI/FS, etc.).
Quality Assurance Report
For
EE/CA (or Removal Action)
At
Former XXXX
Contract Number: 00000000
Task Order: 1111
1. Describe QA methods used (or reference where they are documented) and pass/fail criteria.
2. Summarize field QA activities performed and describe any special conditions encountered
or special circumstances.
3. Describe any constraints or problems encountered.
4. Summarize data quality assurance activities performed and describe any special conditions
encountered or special circumstances.
5. Provide a list of all Corrective Action Requests issued and describe the corrective actions
taken.
6. List/describe lessons learned.
7. Include a final statement that contract requirements were met regarding the quality of
services provided.
8. Signature of Project Engineer/Technical Manager preparing the report.
9. List supporting data/references and where they are filed.
L-1
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This page intentionally left blank.
L-2
EM 1110-1-4009
15 Jun 07
GLOSSARY
Section I
Abbreviations
2,4-DNT ...............2,4-Dinitrotoluene
2,6-DNT ...............2,6-Dinitrotoluene
2-Am-DNT...........2-Amino-4,6-Dinitrotoluene
4-Am-DNT...........4-Amino-2,6-Dinitrotoluene
2-NT.....................2-Nitrotoluene
3-NT.....................3-Nitrotoluene
4-NT.....................4-Nitrotoluene
AAPP ...................Abbreviated Accident Prevention Plan
ABP......................Agent Breakdown Product
ADR .....................Automated Date Review
AEC......................Army Environmental Center
AES ......................Atomic Emission Spectrometry
AM .......................Approval Memorandum
AM/FM ................Automated Mapping/Facilities Management
AOC .....................Area of Concern
AOI ......................Area of Interest
AOPC ..................Area of Potential Concern
AP ........................Ammonium Picrate
APP ......................Accident Prevention Plan
AR ........................Army Regulation
ARAR ..................Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirement
ARB .....................Anomaly Review Board
ASAP ...................Army Sampling and Analysis Plan
ASCII ...................American Standard Code for Information Interchange
ASR......................Archives Search Report
ASSHP .................Abbreviated Site Safety and Health Plan
BMP .....................Bit Map
BRAC...................Base Realignment and Closure
CADD ..................Computer-aided Design and Drafting
CAR .....................Corrective Action Request
CAS......................Chemical Abstracts Service
CD ........................Compact Disk
CDC .....................Contained Detonation Chamber
CDQM..................Chemical Date Quality Management
CERCLA..............Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
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CFR ......................Code of Federal Regulations
CLP ......................Contract Laboratory Program
CO ........................Contracting Officer
COE......................Corp Of Engineers
COR .....................Contracting Officer’s Representative
CRREL.................Cold Regions Research Engineering Laboratory
CSM .....................Conceptual Site Model
CSS ......................Chemical Safety Submission
CVAA ..................Cold Vapor Atomic Absorption
CWA ....................Chemical Warfare Agent
CWM....................Chemical Warfare Materiel
CX ........................Center of Expertise
DA........................Department of the Army
DA Pam................Department of the Army Pamphlet
DC ........................Design Center
DD........................Decision Document
DDESB ................Department of Defense Explosives Safety Board
DEM.....................Digital Elevation Model
DERP ...................Defense Environmental Restoration Program
DGM ....................Digital Geophysical Mapping
DGPS ...................Differential GPS
DID ......................Data Item Description
DNX.....................Hexahydro-1.3-dinitroso-5-nitro-1,3,5-triazine
DOD.....................Department of Defense
DOP......................Dilution of Precision
DOQQ ..................Digital Orthophoto Quarter-Quads
DOT .....................Department of Transportation
DQO.....................Data Quality Objective
DRU .....................Direct Reporting Unit
DSSS ....................Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum
DXF......................Drawing Interchange File
EC ........................Engineer Circular
ECBC ...................Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
EDD .....................Electronic Data Deliverable
EDMS ..................Environmental Data Management System
EDQW..................Environmental Data Quality Workgroup
EE/CA ..................Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis
EM........................Engineer Manual
EOD .....................Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EP.........................Engineer Pamphlet
EPA ......................U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
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EPP.......................Environmental Protection Plan
ER ........................Engineer Regulation
ERDC...................Engineering Research and Development Center
ESP.......................Existing Siting Plans
ESQD ...................Explosives Safety Quantity Distance
ESS.......................Explosives Safety Submission
EZ.........................Exclusion Zone
FAR......................Federal Acquisition Regulation
FATE....................Field Analytic Technologies Encyclopedia
FDEM ..................Frequency Domain Electromagnetics
FFP.......................Firm Fixed Price
FoT.......................Field of Testing
FPD ......................Flame Photometric Detection
Frag ......................UXO metallic fragments
FS .........................Feasibility Study
FSP.......................Field Sampling Plan
FUDS ...................Formerly Used Defense Site
GC ........................Gas Chromatography
GDGDS................Geospatial Data & Geospatial Data System
GDS......................Geospatial Data System
GFAA...................Graphic Furnace Atomic Adsorption
GFE ......................Government-Furnished Equipment
GFI .......................Government-Furnished Information
GIP .......................Geophysical Investigation Planning
GIS .......................Geographic Information System
GPO......................Geophysical Prove-out
GPS ......................Global Positioning System
HAZWOPER .......Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response
HDOP...................Horizontal DOP
HE ........................High Explosive
HFD......................Hazardous Fragmentation Distance
HMX ....................Octahydro-1,3,5,7-tetrazocine
HPLC ...................High Performance Liquid Chromatography
HQUSACE...........Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
HTRW..................Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive Waste
IAW......................In Accordance With
ICP .......................Inductively Coupled Plasma
IDW......................Investigation Derived Waste
IHF .......................Interim Holding Facility
INPR ....................Inventory Project Report
INS .......................Inertial Navigation Systems
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IRP .......................Installation Restoration Program
ISE........................Ion Selective Electrode
ITRC ....................Interstate Technology Regulatory Council
JPEG ....................Joint Photographic Experts Group
JPG.......................Jefferson Proving Ground
LC/MS..................Liquid Chromatography/Mass Spectromedtry
LCPM...................Live-Cycle Project Manager
LIDAR .................Light Detection and Ranging
LIS........................Land Information Systems
LTM .....................Long-Term Management
LUCs ....................Land Use Controls
MACOM ..............Major Army Command
MC .......................Munitions Constituents
MCE.....................Maximum Credible Event
MDL.....................Method Detection Limit
MEC.....................Munitions and Explosives of Concern
MFR .....................Memorandum for Record
MGE.....................Modular GIS Environment
MGFD ..................Munition with the Greatest Fragmentation Distance
MM ......................Military Munitions
MM CX................Military Munitions Center of Expertise
MM DC................Military Munitions Design Center
MMRP..................Military Munitions Response Program
MNX ....................Hexahydro-1-nitroso-3,5-dinitro-1,3,5-triazine
MPPEH ................Material Potentially Presenting an Explosive Hazard
MQO ....................Measurement Quality Objectives
MRA ....................Munitions Response Area
MRS .....................Munitions Response Site
MS........................Mass Spectrometry
MSD.....................Minimum Separation Distance
N/A.......................not applicable
NAD83.................North American Datum of 1983
NAVD88 ..............North American Vertical Datum of 1988
NC ........................Nitrocellulose
NCP......................National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan
NDGPS ................Nationwide Differential GPS
NELAP.................National Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Program
NEW ....................Net Explosive Weight
NFPA ...................National Fire Protection Association
NG........................Nitroglycerine
NPD......................Nitrogen Phosphorous Detector
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NPL ......................National Priorities List
NQ........................Nitroquanidine
OB ........................Open Burn
OD........................Open Detonation
OE ........................Ordnance and Explosives
OESS....................OE Safety Specialist
PA ........................Preliminary Assessment
PAH......................Polynuclear Aromatic Hydrocarbon
PAR......................Performance Assessment Record
Pd .........................Probability of Detection
PDF ......................Portable Document Format
PDOP ...................Position DOP
PDT ......................Project Delivery Team
PES.......................Potential Exposure Site
PETN....................Pentaerylthritol tetranitrate
PLS.......................Professional Land Surveyor
PM........................Project Manager
PMBP...................Project Management Business Process
PMP......................Project Management Plan
PP .........................Post Processing
PPE.......................Personal Protective Equipment
PPI........................Past Performance Information
PPIMS ..................Past Performance Information Management System
PQL ......................Practical Quantitation Limit
PRP ......................Potentially Responsible Party
PWS .....................Performance Work Statement
QA........................Quality Assurance
QAPP ...................Quality Assurance Project Plan
QAR .....................Quality Assurance Report
QASP ...................Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan
QC ........................Quality Control
QCP......................Quality Control Plan
Q-D ......................Quantity-Distance
QMP.....................Quality Management Plan
QSM.....................Quality Systems Manual
R&D.....................Research and Development
RAB .....................Restoration Advisory Board
RACER ................Remedial Action Cost Engineering and Requirements System
RA-O....................Remedial Action Operation
RC ........................Response Complete
RCRA...................Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
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RCWM.................Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel
RD ........................Remedial Design
RDX .....................Hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazine
REST....................Range Evaluation Software Tool
RI/FS ....................Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study
RF.........................Radio Frequency
RI..........................Remedial Investigation
RIP .......................Remedy-In-Place
RLS ......................Registered Land Surveyor
RMS .....................Root Mean Square
ROD .....................Record of Decision
RTK......................Real-Time Kinematic
RTS ......................Robotic Total Station
SAP ......................Sampling and Analysis Plan
SDSFIE ................Spatial Data Standards for Facilities, Infrastructure, and the Environment
SDTS....................Spatial Data Transfer Standard
SEDD ...................Staged Electronic Data Deliverable
SI ..........................Site Inspection
SMAP...................State Management Action Plan
SNR......................Signal to Noise Ratio
SOP ......................Standard Operating Procedure
SOW.....................Statement of Work
SPE.......................Solid-Phase Extraction
SPME ...................Solid-Phase Micro-Extraction
SR.........................Special Report
SR.........................Stationary Receivers
SSHO ...................Site Safety and Health Officer
SSHP ....................Site Safety and Health Plan
STD ......................standard
TAL......................Total Analyte List
TBC......................To Be Considered
TCLP....................Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedures
TCRA...................Time Critical Removal Action
TDEM ..................Time Domain Electromagnetics
TDOP ...................Time DOP
TIFF .....................Tagged Image File Format
TM........................Technical Manual
TNT......................Trinitrotoluene
TNX .....................Hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitroso-1,3,5-triazine
TO ........................Task Order
TP.........................Technical Paper
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TPP.......................Technical Project Planning
TR ........................Technical Report
TRW.....................Technical Review Workgroup
TSD ......................Team Separation Distance
URL......................Universal Resource Locator
USACE ................U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAESCH ...........U.S. Army Engineering and Support Center, Huntsville
USATCES............U.S. Army Technical Center for Explosives Safety
USGS ...................U.S. Geophysical Survey
USRADS..............Ultrasonic Ranging and Data System
UTM.....................Universal Transverse Mercator
UXO.....................Unexploded Ordnance
UXOQCS .............UXO Quality Control Specialist
UXOSO................UXO Safety Officer
VDOP...................Vertical DOP
WAAS..................Wide Area Augmentation System
WGS84.................World Geodetic System of 1984
WP........................White Phosphorous
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Section II
Terms
Action Memorandum
Approves time-critical removal action and concludes the engineering evaluation/cost analysis.
Provides a concise, written record of the decision to select an appropriate removal action. As
the primary decision document, it substantiates the need for a removal action, identifies the
proposed action, and explains the rationale for the removal action selected.
Active Installations
Installations under the custody and control of DOD. Includes operating installations,
installations in a standby or layaway status, and installations awaiting closure under the Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) legislation.
Active Range
A military range that is currently in service and is being regularly used for range activities (40
CFR 266.201).
Administrative Record
The body of documents that “forms the basis” for the selection of a particular response at a site.
Documents that are included are relevant documents that were relied upon in selecting the
response action as well as relevant documents that were considered but were ultimately
rejected. Until the Administrative Record is certified, it shall be referred to as the
“Administrative Record file.”
Anomaly
Any item that is seen as a subsurface irregularity after geophysical investigation. This
irregularity will deviate from the expected subsurface ferrous and non-ferrous material at a site
(i.e., pipes, power lines, etc.).
Anomaly Avoidance
Techniques employed by EOD or UXO personnel at sites with known or suspected MEC to
avoid any potential surface MEC and any subsurface anomalies. This usually occurs at mixed
hazard sites when HTRW investigations will occur prior to execution of a munitions response.
Intrusive anomaly investigation is not authorized during ordnance avoidance operations.
Anomaly Review Board (ARB)
The ARB is a technical group established to review decisions and recommendations made by
the Project Delivery Team on the detection and evaluation of subsurface anomalies. ARBs will
be used only in exceptional circumstances, such as at CWM sites.
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Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirements (ARARs)
Applicable requirements are cleanup standards, standards of control, and other substantive
environmental protection requirements promulgated under Federal or state environmental law
that specifically address a hazardous substance, pollutant, contaminant, remedial action,
location or other circumstance found at a CERCLA site. Relevant and appropriate
requirements are cleanup standards that, while not “applicable”, address situations sufficiently
similar to those encountered at a CERCLA site that their use is well suited to the particular site.
Approval Memorandum
Documents the decision to perform a removal action based on an evaluation of the NCP factors
contained in 40 CFR 300.415(b). Secures management approval and funding to conduct the
engineering evaluation/cost analysis.
Archives Search Report (ASR)
A detailed investigation to report on past MEC activities conducted on an installation. The
principal purpose of the Archives Search is to assemble historical records and available field
data, assess potential ordnance presence, and recommend follow-up actions at a DERP-FUDS.
There are four general steps in an Archives Search: records search phase, site safety and health
plan, site survey, archives search report including risk assessment.
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
Program governing the scheduled closing of Department of Defense sites. (Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1988, Public Law 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623, and the Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Act of 1990, Public Law 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808)
Biological Warfare Material (BWM)
BWM is any item configured as a munition containing an etiologic agent that is intended to
kill, seriously injure, or incapacitate a person through physiological effects; includes biological
agent identification sets. BWM can also include etiological agents that are designed to damage
or destroy crops that are intended for human consumption. (CESO Memorandum, 13 April
1998, Subject: Applicability of Biological Warfare Material and Non-Stockpile Chemical
Warfare Response Activity Interim Guidance)
Center of Expertise (CX)
A CX is a USACE organization that has been approved by HQUSACE as having a unique or
exceptional technical capability in a specialized subject area that is critical to other USACE
commands. These services may be reimbursable or centrally funded.
Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM)
An item configured as a munition containing a chemical substance that is intended to kill,
seriously injure, or incapacitate a person through its physiological effects. Also includes Vand G- series nerve agent, H- series blister agent, and lewisite in other-than-munition
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configurations. Due to their hazards, prevalence, and military-unique application, chemical
agent identification sets (CAIS) are also considered CWM. CWM does not include: riot
control agents, chemical herbicides; smoke and flame producing items; or soil, water, debris, or
other media contaminated with chemical agent.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA)
Congress enacted CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund, on 11 December 1980. This law
created a tax on the chemical and petroleum industries and provided broad Federal authority to
respond directly to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances that may endanger
public health or the environment.
Conceptual Site Model (CSM)
A description of a FUDS and its environment that is based on existing knowledge. It describes
sources of military munitions or HTRW at a property; actual, potentially complete, or
incomplete exposure pathways; current or reasonably anticipated future land use; and potential
receptors.
Construction Support
Support provided by qualified UXO personnel during construction activities at potential
Munitions Response Areas to ensure the safety of construction personnel from the harmful
effects of MEC. When a determination is made that the probability of encountering MEC is
low (e.g., current or previous land use leads to an initial determination that MEC may be
present), a minimum of a two person munitions response team will stand by in case the
construction contractor encounters suspected MEC. When a determination is made that the
probability of encountering MEC is moderate to high (current or previous land use leads to a
determination that MEC was employed or disposed of in the parcel of concern, e.g., open burn
and open detonation areas, maneuver areas, etc.), munitions response teams are required to
conduct subsurface munitions response for the known construction footprint either in
conjunction with the construction contractor or prior to construction intrusive activities. The
level of effort will be determined on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the MM CX .
Control Markers
Project control markers may consist of markers and/or benchmarks established by any federal,
state, local, or private agency with positional data within the minimum acceptable accuracy
standards prescribed by the project team.
Conventional Munitions and Explosives of Concern
The term “conventional MEC” refers to munitions and explosives of concern (see definition)
other than CWM, biological warfare material warfare material and nuclear ordnance.
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Corrective Action
The action taken to eliminate the causes of an existing nonconformity, defect, or other
undesirable situation in order to prevent recurrence. (ER 5-1-11) Note: Following through
with a corrective action is critical. In performing a corrective action, the PDT should be careful
not to simply correct the resultant symptoms of a systematic problem, but should seek to rectify
the real cause behind the problem, as well as investigate if there are other aspects of the project
that may have been affected by the systemic problem.
Corrective Action Request
The Corrective Action Request is a report documenting action to correct conditions adverse to
quality.
Customer
The customer is a party, organization, or sponsor that depends upon the professional services,
expertise, and advice of a project manager and technical personnel. Typically, the customer is
the decision maker who is funding the project and responsible for the project property, such as
the DOD agencies, and sometimes the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. The customer is
a key member of the PDT and should be encouraged to participate through the Technical
Project Planning process.
Data Quality Objective (DQO)
A DQO is a qualitative and quantitative statement developed to clarify study objectives, define
the type of data needed, and specify the tolerable levels of potential decision errors. A DQO is
used as the basis for establishing the type, quality and quantity of data needed to support the
decisions that will be made.
Decision Document
The Department of Defense has adopted the term Decision Document for the documentation of
remedial action (RA) decisions at non-National Priorities List (NPL) FUDS Properties. The
decision document shall address the following: Purpose, Site Risk, Remedial Alternatives,
Public/Community Involvement, Declaration, and Approval and Signature. A Decision
Document for sites not covered by an interagency agreement or Federal facility agreement is
still required to follow a CERCLA response. All Decision Documents will be maintained in
the FUDS Property/Project Administrative Record file. An Action Memorandum is the decision
document for a removal response action.
Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP)
Congressionally authorized in 1986, DERP promotes and coordinates efforts for the evaluation
and cleanup of contamination at Department of Defense installations and Formerly Used
Defense Sites. (10 USC 2701 et. seq.)
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Design Center (DC)
A specified USACE field office assigned a singular technical mission that is permanent and
USACE-wide in scope. The designated office is to be considered the “lead activity” in a
specialized area where capability needs to be concentrated for maximum effectiveness,
economy, and efficiency. The MM DC (in coordination with the District PM) will execute all
phases of the MMRP response project after the approval of the INPR unless the removal action
is transferred to an approved District. (ER 1110-1-8153)
Discarded Military Munitions (DMM)
Military munitions that have been abandoned without proper disposal or removed from storage
in a military magazine or other storage area for the purpose of disposal. The term does not
include unexploded ordnance, military munitions that are being held for future use or planned
disposal, or military munitions that have been properly disposed of consistent with applicable
environmental laws and regulations. (10 U.S.C. 2710(e)(2))
Engineering Evaluation/Cost Analysis (EE/CA)
An EE/CA is prepared for all non-time-critical removal actions as required by
Section 300.415(b)(4)(i) of the NCP. The goals of the EE/CA are to identify the extent of a
hazard, to identify the objectives of the removal action, and to analyze the various alternatives
that may be used to satisfy these objectives for cost, effectiveness, and implementability. (EP
75-1-3)
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)
The detection, identification, field evaluation, rendering safe, recovery, and final disposal of
unexploded ordnance or munitions.
Explosives Safety Submission (ESS)
The document which serves as the specifications for conducting work activities at the project.
The ESS details the scope of the project, the planned work activities, and potential hazards
(including the maximum credible event) and the methods for their control.
Explosive Soil
Explosive soil refers to mixtures of explosives in soil, sand, clay, or other solid media at
concentrations such that the mixture itself is explosive.
(a) The concentration of a particular explosive in soil necessary to present an explosion
hazard depends on whether the particular explosive is classified as “primary” or
“secondary.” Guidance on whether an explosive is classified as “primary” or
“secondary” can be obtained from the MM CX.
(b) Primary explosives are those extremely sensitive explosives (or mixtures thereof) that
are used in primers, detonators, and blasting caps. They are easily detonated by heat,
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sparks, impact, or friction. Examples of primary explosives include Lead Azide, Lead
Styphnate, and Mercury Fulminate.
(c) Secondary explosives are bursting and boostering explosives (i.e., they are used as the
main bursting charge or as the booster that sets off the main bursting charge).
Secondary explosives are much less sensitive than primary explosives. They are less
likely to detonate if struck or when exposed to friction or to electrical sparks. Examples
of secondary explosives include Trinitrotoluene (TNT), Composition B, and
Ammonium Picrate (Explosive D).
(d) Soil containing 10 percent or more by weight of any secondary explosive or mixture of
secondary explosives is considered “explosive soil.” This determination was based on
information provided by the USAEC as a result of studies conducted and reported in
USAEC Report AMXTH-TE-CR 86096.
(e) Soil containing propellants (as opposed to primary or secondary high explosives) may
also present explosion hazards.
Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS) Property
A FUDS is defined as a facility or site (property) that was under the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Defense and owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by the United States at
the time of actions leading to contamination by hazardous substances. By the Department of
Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) policy, the FUDS program is limited to
those real properties that were transferred from DOD control prior to 17 October 1986. FUDS
properties can be located within the 50 States, District of Columbia, Territories,
Commonwealths, and possessions of the United States.
Feasibility Study
A study undertaken to develop and evaluate alternatives for remedial action.
Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) Property
A FUDS is defined as a facility or site (property) that was under the jurisdiction of the
Secretary of Defense and owned by, leased to, or otherwise possessed by the United States at
the time of actions leading to contamination by hazardous substances. By the Department of
Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP) policy, the FUDS program is limited to
those real properties that were transferred from DoD control prior to 17 October 1986. FUDS
properties can be located within the 50 States, District of Columbia, Territories,
Commonwealths, and possessions of the United States.
FUDS Project
A FUDS Project is a unique name given to an area of an eligible FUDS property containing one
or more releases or threatened releases of a similar response nature, treated as a discrete entity
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or consolidated grouping for response purposes. This may include buildings, structures,
impoundments, landfills, storage containers, or other areas where hazardous substance are or
have come to be located, including FUDS eligible unsafe buildings or debris. Projects are
categorized by actions described under installation restoration (HTRW and CON/HTRW),
military munitions response program, or building demolition/debris removal. An eligible FUDS
Property may have more than one project.
Geographic Military Districts
Geographic Military Districts consist of 22 districts within the Geographic Military Divisions.
The Geographic Military District is the overall manager for the entire life cycle (i.e., “cradle to
grave”) for approved FUDS projects (except for PRP projects). The Geographic Military
District, through the project manager (PM), leads and facilitates the project delivery team
(PDT) towards effective project development and execution. The district is responsible for
managing project cost, schedule, and scope to ensure quality and proper coordination with
government and non-government entities. The district is also responsible for programming
funding and for upward reporting. (ER 200-3-1)
Geographic Military Division
USACE military divisions have regional responsibility for the FUDS program and consist of
seven military divisions. (ER 200-3-1)
Geophysical Techniques
Techniques utilized for the detection and measurement of buried anomalies (e.g., ferromagnetic
indicators and ground penetrating radar) to investigate the presence of munitions.
Hazardous, Toxic, and Radioactive Waste (HTRW) Activities
HTRW activities include those activities undertaken for the Environmental Protection
Agency’s Superfund program, the Defense Environmental Restoration Program (DERP),
including Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDSs), and Installation Restoration Program (IRP)
sites at active DOD facilities, HTRW actions associated with Civil Works projects, and any
other mission or non-mission work performed for others at HTRW sites.
Intentional Detonation
An intentional detonation is a planned, controlled detonation.
Interagency Agreements
These are agreements set up between EPA and the DoD component that serve as the vehicle for
remedy selection for all NPL properties when DoD is lead agency and addresses the completion
of all necessary FUDS eligible remedial responses. This includes the review of cleanup
alternatives, remedy selected, a cleanup schedule, and operation and maintenance
arrangements. States can also be party to these agreements.
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Intrusive Activity
An activity that involves or results in the penetration of the ground surface at an area known or
suspected to contain MEC. Intrusive activities can be of an investigative or removal action
nature.
Inventory Project Report (INPR)
The report resulting from the determination of FUDS eligibility. The INPR includes data as
well as a recommendation for further action and guides investigators through further site
studies. The INPR documents whether DOD is responsible for contamination at a FUDS.
Lessons Learned
Past experiences or recognized potential problems or better business practices that are captured
and shared to: (1) Prevent the recurrence of repetitive design/execution deficiency; (2) Clarify
interpretation of regulations or standards; (3) Reduce the potential for mistakes in high
risk/probability areas of concern; (4) Pass on information specific to an installation or project;
(5) Promote a good work practice that should be ingrained for repeat application; and (6)
Promote efficient and cost effective business practices.
Land Use Controls (LUCs).
Physical, legal, or administrative mechanisms that restrict the use of, or limit access to,
contaminated property to reduce risk to human health and the environment. Physical
mechanisms encompass a variety of engineered remedies to contain or reduce contamination
and physical barriers to limit access to property, such as fences or signs. The legal mechanisms
are generally the same as those used for institutional controls (ICs) as discussed in the National
Contingency Plan. ICs are a subset of LUCs and are primarily legal mechanisms imposed to
ensure the continued effectiveness of land use restrictions imposed as part of a remedial
decision. Legal mechanisms include restrictive covenants, negative easements, equitable
servitudes, and deed notices. Administrative mechanisms include notices, adopted local land
use plans and ordinances, construction permitting, or other existing land use management
systems that may be used to ensure compliance with use restrictions. (DoD Management
Guidance for the DERP)
Lead Regulatory Agency
States or tribes are generally the lead regulator for environmental investigations and response at
non-NPL FUDS. In certain circumstances, EPA may serve as lead regulator when the state or
tribe requests EPA assume the lead or when EPA chooses to exert its lead regulator role. In
cases where a non-NPL FUDS is on or affecting tribal land, the lead regulator role generally
falls to the affected tribe. Project-specific circumstances may warrant assumption of the lead
regulator role by EPA. When a FUDS is either proposed for inclusion or listed on the NPL,
EPA is the lead regulator.
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Mag & Flag
The use of geophysical equipment to survey an area in a real-time mode and mark the location
of geophysical anomalies. This method is performed without using post data processing.
Mandatory Center of Expertise (MCX)
An MCX is a USACE organization that has been approved by HQUSACE as having a unique
or exceptional technical capability in a specialized subject area that is critical to other USACE
commands. Specific mandatory services to be rendered by an MCX are identified on the CX’s
homepage at http://www.hnd.usace.army.mil/oew. These services may be reimbursable or
centrally funded. USAESCH is the MCX for the USACE.
Material Potentially Presenting an Explosive Hazard (MPPEH)
Material potentially containing explosives or munitions (e.g., munitions containers and
packaging material; munitions debris remaining after munitions use, demilitarization, or
disposal; and range-related debris); or material potentially contaminated with a high enough
concentration of explosives such that the material presents an explosive hazard (e.g.,
equipment, drainage systems, holding tanks, piping, ventilation ducts) associated with
munitions production, demilitarization or disposal operations. Excluded from MPPEH are
munitions within DOD’s established munitions management system and other hazardous items
that may present explosion hazards (e.g., gasoline cans, compressed gas cylinders) that are not
munitions and are not intended for use as munitions.
Maximum Credible Event (MCE)
The worst single event that could occur at any time, with maximum release of a chemical agent
from a munition, container, or process as a result of unintended, unplanned, or accidental
occurrence. (HQDA Interim Guidance for Biological Warfare Materiel (BWM) and NonStockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel (CWM) Response Activities)
Military Munitions
All ammunition products and components produced for or used by the U armed forces for
national defense and security, including ammunition products or components under the control
of the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard, the Department of Energy, and the National
Guard. The term includes confined gaseous, liquid, and solid propellants, explosives,
pyrotechnics, chemical and riot control agents, smokes and incendiaries, including bulk
explosives and chemical warfare agents, chemical munitions, rockets, guided and ballistic
missiles, bombs, warheads, mortar rounds, artillery ammunition, small arms ammunition,
grenades, mines, torpedoes, depth charges, cluster munitions and dispensers, demolition
charges, and devices and components thereof. The term does not include wholly inert items,
improvised explosive devices, and nuclear weapons, nuclear devices, and nuclear components,
except that the term does include non-nuclear components of nuclear devices that are managed
under the nuclear weapons program of the Department of Energy after all required sanitization
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operations under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) have been
completed. (10 U.S.C. 2710(e)(3)(A))
Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP)
The MMRP category is defined as response actions (i.e., the identification, investigation, and
remedial actions, or a combination of removal and remedial actions) to address Munitions and
Explosives of Concern (MEC) or Munitions Constituents (MC). This includes the removal of
foreign military munitions if it is incidental to the response addressing DOD military munitions
at a FUDS property. (ER 200-3-1)
Military Range
Designated land or water area set aside, managed, and used to conduct research on, develop,
test, and evaluate military munitions and explosives, other ordnance, or weapon systems, or to
train military personnel in their use and handling. Ranges include firing lines and positions,
maneuver areas, firing lanes, test pads, detonation pads, impact areas, and buffer zones with
restricted access and exclusionary areas. [Military Munitions Rule, 40 CFR. 266.201]
Munitions and Explosives of Concern (MEC)
This term, which distinguishes specific categories of military munitions that may pose unique
explosives safety risks, means:
(a) Unexploded Ordnance (UXO), as defined in 10 U.S.C. 2710 (e) (9);
(b) Discarded Military Munitions (DMM), as defined in 10 U.S.C. 2710 (e) (2), or
(c) Munitions constituents (e.g., TNT, RDX) present in high enough concentrations to pose an
explosive hazard.
Munitions Constituents (MC)
Any materials originating from unexploded ordnance, discarded military munitions, or other
military munitions, including explosive and non-explosive materials, and emission,
degradation, or breakdown elements of such ordnance or munitions. (10 U.S.C. 2710(e)(4))
Munitions Debris
Remnants of munitions (e.g., fragments, penetrators, projectiles, shell casings, links, fins)
remaining after munitions use, demilitarization, or disposal.
Munitions Response
Response actions, including investigation, removal and remedial actions to address the
explosives safety, human health, or environmental risks presented by unexploded ordnance
(UXO), discarded military munitions (DMM), or munitions constituents (MC).
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Munitions Response Area
Any area on a defense site that is known or suspected to contain UXO, DMM, or MC.
Examples include former ranges and munitions burial areas. A munitions response area is
comprised of one or more munitions response sites.
Munitions Response Site
A discrete location within a MRA that is known to require a munitions response.
National Oil and Hazardous Substance Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP)
Revised in 1990, the NCP provides the regulatory framework for responses under CERCLA.
The NCP designates the Department of Defense as the removal response authority for ordnance
and explosives hazards.
Non-Stockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel
CWM (see definition) that is not included in the chemical stockpile. Non-stockpile CWM is
divided into five categories: buried CWM, recovered chemical weapons (items recovered
during range clearing operations, from chemical burial sites, and from research and
development testing), former chemical weapon production facilities, binary chemical weapons,
and miscellaneous CWM (unfilled munitions and devices and equipment specially designed for
use directly in connection with employment of chemical weapons).
OE Safety Specialist
USACE personnel, classified as a GS-0018 Safety Specialist, and who is UXO-qualified. OE
Safety Specialists perform safety, quality assurance and MM DC functions for the Government.
The OE Safety Specialist may reside in and report to the construction field office or may reside
in the engineering/construction office within the MM DC.
Performance Based Contracts (PBC)
Performance-based contracting methods are intended to ensure that required performance
quality levels are achieved and that total payment is related to the degree that services
performed meet contract standards. Performance-based contracts: (a) Describe the
requirements in terms of results required rather than the methods of performance of the work;
(b) Use measurable performance standards (i.e., terms of quality, timeliness, quantity, etc.) and
quality assurance surveillance plans; (c) Specify procedures for reductions of fee or for
reductions to the price of a fixed-price contract when services are not performed or do not meet
contract requirements; and (d) Include performance incentives where appropriate. (Federal
Acquisition Regulations, part 37.601)
Potentially Responsible Parties (PRP)
A PRP is defined in CERCLA Section 107 as any person related to a property that is a:
• Current owner or operator.
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•
•
•
Past owner or operator at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant.
Person who arranges for disposal, treatment, or transport for disposal or treatment of
hazardous substances.
Transporter who has selected the site for the disposal of a hazardous substance.
Preliminary Assessment (PA)
The Preliminary Assessment is a limited-scope investigation that collects readily available
information about a project and its surrounding area. The PA is designed to distinguish, based
on limited data, between sites that pose little or no threat to human health and the environment
and sites that may pose a threat and require further investigation. The PA also identifies sites
requiring assessment for possible emergency response actions. If the PA results in a
recommendation for further investigation, a Site Inspection is performed. Refer to the EPA
publication Guidance for Performing Preliminary Assessments Under CERCLA, September
1991, for additional information.
Project Delivery Team (PDT)
The PDT is a multi-disciplined project team lead by the Project Manager with responsibility for
assuring that the project stays focused, first and foremost on the public interest, and on the
customer’s needs and expectations, and that all work is integrated and done in accordance with
a PMP and approved business and quality management processes. The PDT focuses on quality
project delivery, with heavy reliance on partnering and relationship development to achieve
better performance. The PDT shall consist of everyone necessary for successful development
and execution of all phases of the project. The PDT will include the customers, the PM,
technical experts within or outside the local USACE activity, specialists,
consultants/contractors, stakeholders, representatives from other Federal and state agencies, and
higher level members from Division and Headquarters who are necessary to effectively develop
and deliver the project actions. The customer is an integral part of the PDT. (ER 5-1-11)
Project Management Plan (PMP)
A living document used to define expected outcomes and guide execution and control of
project (or program) actions. Primary uses of the PMP are to facilitate communication among
participants, assign responsibilities, define assumptions, and document decisions. Establishes
baseline plans for scope, cost, schedule, safety, and quality objectives against which
performance can be measured, and to adjust these plans as actual performance dictates. The
project delivery team develops the PMP.
Project Manager (PM)
The PM is responsible for management and leadership of a project during its entire life cycle,
even when more than one USACE District or activity is involved. The PM will generally
reside at the geographic District but can be elsewhere as needed. The PM and PDT are
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responsible and accountable for ensuring the team takes effective, coordinated actions to
deliver the completed project according to the PMP. The PM manages all project resources,
information and commitments, and leads and facilitates the PDT towards effective development
and execution of project actions. (ER 5-1-11)
Past Performance Information Management System (PPIMS)
The PPIMS is the Army's central repository for the collection and utilization of Army-wide
contractor Past Performance Information (PPI). Available to authorized Government
personnel, PPIMS is used to support both the Contracting Performance Review process and
future award decisions. For further information on PPIMS go to:
https://apps.altess.army.mil/ppims/prod/ppimshp.cfm
Public Involvement Plans (PIP)
Formerly called the Community Relations Plan, the Public Involvement Plan serves as the
framework to establish a successful information exchange with the public during the
Environmental Restoration Process. The PIP follows guidelines set forth under CERCLA and
the SARA. Each PIP must be tailored to fit the individual site and situation and should also
accommodate any site-specific agreements between the U.S. Army and the EPA or state
environmental agencies. The PIP is not a static document and should be revised to reflect the
development and progress of actions at the project.
Quality
The totality of features and characteristics of a product or service that bear on its ability to meet
the stated or implied needs and expectations of the project. Quality expectations need to be
negotiated among the PDT members (which includes the customer) and are set in the Project
Management Plan. (ER 5-1-11). More specifically, the quality of a response action is measured
by how closely that response action meets the standards and expectations of the customer.
Quality Assurance (QA)
An integrated system of management activities involving planning, implementation,
assessment, reporting, and quality improvement to ensure that a process, item, or service is of
the type and quality needed to meet project requirements defined in the PMP.
Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP)
All service contracts require the development and implementation of a QASP. A QASP
describes how government personnel will evaluate and assess contractor performance. The
purpose of the QASP is to describe how project performance will be measured and assessed
against performance standards. It is based on the premise that the contractor, not the
government, is responsible for managing quality control (QC).
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Quality Control (QC)
The overall system of technical activities that measures the attributes and performance of a
process, item, or service against defined standards to verify that they meet the stated
requirements established in the PMP; operational techniques and activities that are used to
fulfill requirements for quality.
Quantity-Distance (Q-D)
The quantity of explosives material and distance separation relationships that provide defined
types of protection. These relationships are based on levels of risk considered acceptable for
the stipulated exposures and are tabulated in the appropriate Q-D tables provided in DOD
6055.9-STD. Separation distances are not absolute safe distances but are relative protective
safe distances. Greater distances than those shown in the Q-D tables will be used whenever
possible. (DOD 6055.9-STD)
Quality Management
Processes required to ensure that the actions at the project would satisfy the needs and
objectives for which it was undertaken, consisting of quality planning, quality assurance,
quality control, and quality improvement.
Quality Management Plan (QMP)
A document that describes a quality system in terms of the organizational structure, policy and
procedures, functional responsibilities of management and staff, lines of authority, and required
interfaces for those planning, implementing, documenting, and assessing all activities
conducted.
Quality System
A structured and documented management system describing the policies, objectives,
principles, organizational authority, responsibilities, accountability, and implementation plan of
an organization for ensuring quality in its work processes, products (items), and services. The
quality system provides the framework for planning, implementation, and assessing work
performed by the organization and for carrying out required QA and QC. (ER 5-1-11).
Range-Related Debris (RRD)
Debris, other than munitions debris, collected from operational ranges or from former ranges
(e.g., target debris, military munitions packaging and crating material).
Record of Decision (ROD).
The ROD is a public document that explains which alternatives will be used to clean up a
Superfund site. The ROD for sites listed on the NPL is created from information generated
during the RI/FS.
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Recovered Chemical Warfare Materiel (RCWM).
An item configured as a munition containing a chemical substance that is intended to kill,
seriously injure, or incapacitate a person through its physiological effects. Also includes Vand G- series nerve agents, H- series blister agent, and lewisite in other-than-munition
configurations. Due to their hazards, prevalence, and military-unique application, chemical
agent identification sets (CAIS) are also considered CWM. CWM does not include: riot
control agents, chemical herbicides; smoke and flame producing items; or soil, water, debris, or
other media contaminated with chemical agent. (HQDA Interim Guidance for Biological
Warfare Materiel and Non- Stockpile Chemical Warfare Materiel Response Activities). (EP 751-3)
Remedial or Remedial Action (RA)
Those actions consistent with permanent remedy taken instead of or in addition to removal
actions in the event of a release or threatened release of a hazardous substance into the
environment, to prevent or minimize the release of hazardous substances so that they do not
migrate to cause substantial danger to present or future public health, welfare or the
environment. The term includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release
as storage; confinement; perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches; clay cover;
neutralization; cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated
materials; recycling or reuse; diversion; destruction; segregation of reactive wastes; dredging or
excavations; repair or replacement of leaking containers; collection of leachate and runoff;
onsite treatment or incineration; provision of alternative water supplies; and any monitoring
reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public health, welfare and the
environment. The term includes the costs of permanent relocation of residents and businesses
and community facilities where the President determines that, alone or in combination with
other measures, such relocation is more cost-effective and environmentally preferable to the
transportation, storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition offsite of hazardous
substances, or may otherwise be necessary to protect the public health or welfare. The term
includes offsite transport and offsite storage, treatment, destruction, or secure disposition of
hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials. (DoD Management Guidance for
the DERP)
Remedial Action-Construction (RA-C)
The period during which the final remedy is being put in place. The end date signifies that the
construction is complete, all testing has been accomplished, and that the remedy will function
properly. (DoD Management Guidance for the DERP)
Remedial Action Operations (RA-O)
The period during which the remedy is in place and operating to achieve the cleanup objective
identified in the Record of Decision or equivalent agreement. Any system operation or
monitoring requirements during this time shall be termed RA-O. (DoD Management Guidance
for the DERP)
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Remedial Design (RD)
A phase of remedial action that follows the remedial investigation/feasibility study and includes
development of engineering drawings and specifications for a site cleanup.
Remedial Investigation
Process undertaken to determine the nature and extent of the problem presented by a release
which emphasizes data collection and site characterization. The remedial investigation is
generally performed concurrently and in an interdependent fashion with the feasibility study.
Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study (RI/FS)
See separate definitions for remedial investigation and feasibility study.
Remedy In Place
Designation that a final remedial action has been constructed and implemented and is operating
as planned in the remedial design. An example of a remedy in place is a pump-and-treat system
that is installed, is operating as designed, and will continue to operate until cleanup levels have
been attained. Because operation of the remedy is ongoing, the site cannot be considered
Response Complete. (DoD Management Guidance for the DERP)
Removal or Removal Action
The cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment. Such actions
may be taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment,
such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of
release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other
actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or
welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release.
The term includes, in addition, without being limited to, security fencing or other measures to
limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary evacuation and housing of
threatened individuals not otherwise provided for, action taken under section 9604(b) of this
title, and any emergency assistance which may be provided under the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act [42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.] The requirements for removal actions are
addressed in 40 CFR §§300.410 and 330.415. The three types of removals are emergency,
time-critical, and non time-critical removals. (DoD Management Guidance for the DERP)
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
Enacted in 1976, RCRA promotes the protection of health and the environment. It regulates
waste generation, treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal for facilities currently in
operation.
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Response Action
A CERCLA-authorized action involving either a short-term removal action or a long-term
removal response. This may include, but is not limited to, removing hazardous materials,
containing or treating the waste on-site, and identifying and removing the sources of ground
water contamination and halting further migration of contaminants.
Response Complete (RC).
The remedy is in place and required remedial action-operations (RA-O) have been completed.
If there is no RA-O phase, then the remedial action-construction end date will also be the RC
date. (DoD Management Guidance for the DERP)
Restoration Advisory Board (RAB)
A Restoration Advisory Board (RAB) is a forum for the discussion and exchange of
information between representatives of the Department of Defense (DoD), regulators, state and
local governments, tribal governments, and the affected community. RABs provide an
opportunity for stakeholders to have a voice and actively participate in the review of technical
documents, to review restoration progress, and to provide individual advice to decision makers
regarding restoration activities at FUDS Properties and Projects.
Site Inspection (SI)
Activities undertaken to determine whether there is a release or potential release and the nature
of associated threats. The purpose is to augment the data collected in the PA and to generate, if
necessary, sampling and other field data to determine the presence, type, distribution, density,
and location of hazardous substances or military munitions.
Stakeholder
Stakeholders include Federal, state, and local officials, tribal officials, community
organizations, property owners, and others having a personal interest or involvement or having
a monetary or commercial involvement in the FUDS Property that is to undergo a
remedial/response action.
Team Separation Distance (TSD)
The TSD is the distance the project teams will be separated during intrusive operations.
Technical Project Planning (TPP).
The process for designing data collection programs at FUDS properties. The TPP process
helps ensure that the requisite type, quality, and quantity of data are obtained to satisfy project
objectives that lead to informed decisions and project/property closeout.
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Time-Critical Removal Action (TCRA)
A TCRA is a response to a release or threat of release that poses such a risk to public health
(serious injury or death), or the environment, that clean up or stabilization actions must be
initiated within six months.
Tribes.
Federally recognized American Indian and Alaskan Native governments.
Unexploded Ordnance (UXO)
Military munitions that: (a) Have been primed, fuseds, armed, or otherwise prepared for action;
(b) Have been fired, dropped, launched, projected or placed in such a manner as to constitute a
hazard to operations, installations, personnel, or material; and (c) Remain unexploded either by
malfunction, design, or any other cause. (U.S.C. 2710 (e) (9))
Unintentional Detonation
A detonation not planned in advance.
UXO Personnel
Contractor personnel who have completed specialized military training in EOD methods and
have satisfactorily performed the EOD function while serving in the military. Various grades
and contract positions are established based on skills and experience. Check with the MM CX
for current ratings.
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