Human Factors Analyses of Operator Positions in the Operations Room of the

Human Factors Analyses of Operator Positions in the Operations Room of the
Human Factors Analyses of
Operator Positions in the
Operations Room of the
HALIFAX Class Frigate
FINAL REPORT
Curtis Coates, HFE Analyst
Bob Kobierski, Project Engineer
CMC Electronics Inc.
415 Legget Drive
Box 13330
Ottawa, Ontario
K2K 2B2
HFE Program Manager: D. McKay, (613) 592-7400 x 2522
Contract Number W7711-047914/001/TOR
Contract Scientific Authority: Dr. R. Chow and Dr. J. Crebolder
Defence R&D Canada – Toronto
Contract Report
CMC Document Number 1000-1368 DRDC Toronto CR 2006-117
25 August 2006
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Author
C. Coates, HFE Analyst
Author
R.D. Kobierski, Project Engineer
Approved by
D. McKay, HFE Program Manager
Approved for release by
Dr. R. Chow, DRDC Scientific Authority
Approved for release by
Dr. J. Crebolder, DRDC Scientific Authority
Approved for release by
D. McKay, HFE Program Manager
This report is UNCLASSIFIED
CMC Electronics Inc., Human Factors Engineering
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This project employed Hierarchical Goal Analysis (HGA) (Hendy, Beevis, Lichacz,
and Edwards, 2002) to analyze eleven operator positions in the HALIFAX Class Frigate
operations room, including: Commanding Officer (CO), Operations Room Officer (ORO),
Sensor Weapons Controller (SWC), Assistant Sensor Weapons Controller (ASWC), Track
Supervisor (TS), Electronic Warfare Supervisor (EWS), Air Raid Reporting Operator (ARRO),
Anti-Submarine Plotting Officer (ASPO), Information Management Director (IMD), Operations
Room Supervisor (ORS), and Warfare Officer. The position of Shipborne Aircraft Controller
(SAC) was added during the analysis for completeness. HGA analyzes cognitive systems from a
Perceptual Control Theory (PCT) perspective, where PCT suggests that humans operate as
perceptually-driven, goal referenced, feedback systems (Powers, 1973). HGA identifies a
hierarchy of goals and sub-goals for the analyzed system, assigns a human (or automated)
operator to each goal, and identifies a controlled variable that is perceived and controlled by the
operator to achieve the goal. HGA also captures other attributes associated with each goal in the
form of PCT tables. Based on a military role (represented by a sea denial mission) the HGA
produced 563 goals and sub-goals allocated among the 12 primary positions. Due to the matrix
type organization of the operations room the majority of goals were also assigned to secondary
positions.
Additional analyses emerged from the HGA approach: stability analysis and upward
flow analysis. Potential instabilities arise in a system when more than one operator attempts to
control the same external variable. This study found that the current doctrine and Standard
Operating Procedures (SOPs) employed in the Halifax Class Frigate operations room act to
mitigate potential instabilities identified during the analysis. The stability analysis process
would be useful during the development of future capabilities and/or the addition of new
equipment in order to identify potential instabilities. The upward flow analysis identifies
instances where one operator controls a goal that supports a goal controlled by another operator,
creating a need for upward flow of information. Link diagrams were used to capture information
flow to both the primary and secondary operators and in both the auditory and visual domains.
This analysis reveals the potential for cognitive overload in the current system and the
opportunities for reducing overload in future systems. An overwhelming demand on the
auditory channel was identified.
The HGA also led to the development of a task network in which task sequences and
interactions between positions were modelled and analyzed for scheduling conflict and
workload. Five critical task sequences, selected for their criticality and inclusion of all positions,
were simulated in the Integrated Performance Modeling Environment (IPME). IPME proved to
be an extremely effective tool for combining baseline task networks to simulate a multi-threat
scenario, however the effort involved to accomplish this was significant.
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Finally, a criticality analysis was conducted in which each goal or sub-goal was
assessed to determine activities that could pose significant risk to mission accomplishment.
Activities that approached the limits of human capabilities and skills, have safety implications,
or those that might jeopardize successful mission completion were designated as critical.
Appropriate corrective action was subsequently determined by domain experts and Subject
Matter Experts (SMEs). In many human factors analyses, such as Mission, Function, and Task
Analysis, the identification and rating of critical activities is a straightforward undertaking. The
rating of goals from the HGA was a departure from this norm. The domain experts and SMEs
charged with providing criticality ratings initially found it difficult, as a number of the higherlevel goals appeared broad. Interpretation was subsequently augmented by using attributes
captured in the PCT table as an aid to understanding the scope of the goal. The majority of
proposed solutions recommended automating displays and data entry. The integration of tactical
and command decision aids was also highly recommended.
The project confirmed that HGA was a suitable tool for the analyses of complex
predominantly ‘cognitive’ systems. In full development programs such as the procurement of a
new class of warship or the development of new Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle workstations, the
additional time available and the inherent interest in the development of new technologies (such
as multi-agent systems) makes an HGA the clear choice for conceptual phase human factors
analyses. During the conduct of the work outlined above, the techniques employed and data
produced were applied to the Halifax Modernized Command and Control System project with
excellent results. This immediate use of the project is reported under a separate cover entitled
“HALIFAX Modernized Command and Control System (HMCCS) Human-Machine Interface
Support Contract Human Engineering System Analysis Report”.
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SOMMAIRE ADMINISTRATIF
Le projet a utilisé l’analyse des objectifs hiérarchiques (AOH) (Hendy, Beevis,
Lichacz et Edwards, 2002) afin d’analyser onze fonctions d’opérateurs dans le poste des
opérations d’une frégate de classe Halifax, notamment le commandant (cmdt), l’officier du
Centre des opérations (O C Op), le contrôleur d’armes par capteur (CAP), l’assistant du
contrôleur d’armes par capteur (ACAP), le superviseur de piste (SP), le superviseur de la section
de guerre électronique (SSGE), l’opérateur des renseignements de raids aériens (ORRA),
l’officier du traçage anti-sous-marin (OTASM), le directeur de la gestion de l’information (DGI),
le superviseur du poste des opérations (SPO) et l’officier de guerre. La fonction de contrôleur
d’aéronef embarqué (CAE) a été ajoutée pendant l’analyse à des fins d’intégralité. L’AOH
analyse les systèmes cognitifs du point de vue de la théorie du contrôle perceptuel (TCP), où la
TCP indique que les humains dictent leurs opérations à l’aide de perceptions, d’objectifs et de
systèmes de rétroaction (Powers, 1973). L’AOH établit une hiérarchie d’objectifs et de sousobjectifs pour le système analysé, attribue un opérateur humain (ou de façon automatique) à
chaque objectif et détermine une variable contrôlée qui est perçue et contrôlée par l’opérateur
afin d’atteindre l’objectif. L’AOH saisit aussi d’autres attributs associés à chaque objectif sous
forme de tableaux de TCP. D’après un rôle militaire (représenté par une mission d’interdiction
des mers), l’AOH a produit 563 objectifs et sous-objectifs attribués entre les douze fonctions
principales. En raison de l’organisation du type de la matrice du poste des opérations, la majorité
des objectifs ont aussi été attribués à des fonctions secondaires.
De plus, des analyses supplémentaires ont été révélées à partir de la démarche de
l’AOH : une analyse de stabilité et une analyse ascendante. Des instabilités possibles surviennent
dans un système lorsque plus d’un opérateur tente de contrôler la même variable externe. Cette
étude a révélé que la doctrine actuelle et les instructions permanentes d’opération (IPO) utilisées
dans le poste des opérations d’une frégate de classe Halifax permettent d’atténuer les instabilités
possibles identifiées dans l’analyse. Le processus d’analyse de la stabilité serait utile pendant le
développement des capacités futures et/ou de l’ajout de nouveaux équipements afin d’identifier
des instabilités possibles. L’analyse ascendante détermine les occurrences pendant lesquelles un
opérateur contrôle un objectif qui appuie un objectif contrôlé par un autre opérateur, ce qui créé
un besoin de circulation ascendante de l’information. Des diagrammes d’enchaînement ont été
utilisés pour saisir la circulation de l’information vers l’opérateur principal et l’opérateur
secondaire dans les domaines auditifs et visuels. Cette analyse révèle la possibilité d’une
surcharge cognitive dans le système actuel ainsi que les possibilités de réduire la surcharge
cognitive future dans les systèmes. On a établi une demande écrasante sur le poste auditif.
L’AOH a aussi mené au développement d’un réseau de tâches dans lequel les
séquences et les interactions des tâches entre les fonctions ont été conçues et analysées pour
déterminer les conflits d’horaire et la charge de travail. Cinq séquences de tâches, sélectionnées
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selon leur niveau de criticité et leur inclusion de toutes les fonctions, ont été simulées dans
l’environnement intégré de modélisation des performances (EIMR). L’EIMR s’est avéré être un
outil extrêmement efficace pour combiner des réseaux de tâches de base permettant de simuler
un scénario multimenaces; toutefois, l’effort requis pour l’accomplir a été important.
En terminant, une analyse de criticité a été effectuée au cours de laquelle chaque
objectif ou sous-objectif a été évalué afin de déterminer les activités qui pourraient poser un
risque important par rapport à la réussite de la mission. Les activités qui se rapprochaient le plus
des limites des capacités et des compétences des humains (ayant des conséquences sur la
sécurité) ou celles qui pourraient mettre en péril la réussite de la mission ont été qualifiées de
critiques. Une mesure de correction appropriée a ensuite été élaborée par des experts du domaine
et des experts en la matière (EM). Dans de nombreuses analyses de facteurs humains (p. ex.,
l’analyse de la mission, de la fonction et des tâches), l’identification et l’évaluation des activités
critiques constituent une tâche simple. L’évaluation des objectifs de l’AOH était le point de
départ de la norme. Les experts du domaine et les EM qui doivent fournir des évaluations
critiques initialement ont trouvé la tâche difficile étant donné qu’un certain nombre d’objectifs
du plus haut niveau semblaient assez vastes. Des attributs saisis dans le tableau de TCP ont par la
suite été ajoutés à l’interprétation afin d’aider à comprendre la portée de l’objectif. La majorité
des solutions proposées recommandaient l’affichage automatique et la saisie de données.
L’intégration d’outils d’aide à la décision du commandement et tactique est aussi fortement
recommandée.
Le projet a permis de confirmer que l’AOH était un outil adéquat pour les analyses de
systèmes complexes principalement cognitifs. Dans le cadre de programmes de développement
complets tels que l’acquisition d’une nouvelle classe de navire de guerre ou le développement de
nouveaux postes de travail de véhicule aérien sans pilote, le temps additionnel disponible et
l’intérêt inhérent pour la mise au point de nouvelles technologies (comme les systèmes
multiagents) font de l’AOH le choix tout indiqué pour les analyses des facteurs humains à la
phase conceptuelle. Pendant l’exécution du travail susmentionné, les techniques utilisées et les
données produites ont été appliquées à la Modernisation du système de commandement et de
contrôle des Halifax avec d’excellents résultats. L’utilisation immédiate du projet est consignée
dans une autre section portant sur la Modernisation du système de commandement et de contrôle
des Halifax (MSCCH) – Rapport d’analyse de l’ergonomie – Contrat de soutien de l’interface
homme-machine.
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ABSTRACT
Results are provided for the analyses of eleven operator positions in the Halifax Class
Frigate operations room using the Hierarchical Goal Analysis (HGA) approach. Following
mission analyses, a hierarchy of goals assigned to different operators was produced. Two
follow-on analyses were conducted to identify potential instabilities in the system and
requirements for upward information flow between operators. Operational Sequence Diagrams
(OSDs) were produced for five critical task sequences and the corresponding task networks were
implemented and tested in the Integrated Performance Modeling Environment (IPME). The
final product of the project was the generation of a list of critical operations room activities
supported by proposed solutions. The report concludes HGA and IPME are suitable tools to
support the analyses of complex predominantly ‘cognitive’ systems.
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RÉSUMÉ
Les résultats sont fournis pour les analyses des onze fonctions d’opérateurs dans le
poste des opérations d’une frégate de classe Halifax à l’aide de la démarche de l’analyse des
objectifs hiérarchiques (AOH). À la suite des analyses de missions, une hiérarchie d’objectifs
assignés à divers opérateurs a été produite. Deux analyses de suivi ont été ensuite effectuées afin
d’identifier les instabilités possibles dans le système et les exigences pour la circulation
ascendante de l’information entre les opérateurs. Des diagrammes de séquence opérationnelle
(DSO) ont été produits pour des séquences de tâches critiques, et les réseaux de tâches
correspondants ont été mis en place et testés dans l’environnement intégré de modélisation des
performances (EIMR). Le produit final du projet était la production d’une liste d’activités
critiques dans le poste des opérations appuyées par des solutions proposées. Le rapport conclut
que l’AOH et l’EIMR sont des outils adéquats pour appuyer les analyses de systèmes complexes
principalement cognitifs.
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REVISION PAGE
REVISION
NUMBER
1
Revision 1
PAGES AFFECTED
DATE
iv,v, vi, vii, viii, 2.4,
2.5, 2.8, 2.10, 2.11,
2.12, 2.17, 4.2, 4.5, 5.2,
5.8, 5.9, 6.6, 6.10, 8.2,
8.3, 8.6, B.1, C.1, D.1,
E.1, E.2 E.3 F.1, G.1 –
G.80, H.1, I.1, J.1.
17 November 2006
APPROVAL
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d)
SECTION
TITLE
PAGE
1 SECTION ONE – INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................1.1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
General........................................................................................................................1.1
Objectives ...................................................................................................................1.1
Scope...........................................................................................................................1.2
Report Outline.............................................................................................................1.2
2 SECTION TWO – ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY ....................................................................2.1
2.1
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.2
2.3.3
2.4
2.4.1
2.4.2
2.4.3
2.4.4
2.5
2.5.1
2.5.2
2.5.3
2.6
2.6.1
2.6.2
2.6.3
General........................................................................................................................2.1
Hierarchical Goal Analysis.........................................................................................2.1
Goal Decomposition and Allocation.....................................................................2.2
Goal Verification ..................................................................................................2.4
IP/PCT.........................................................................................................................2.5
Detailed Methodology – PCT Data ......................................................................2.7
Detailed Methodology – Potential Instability.......................................................2.9
Detailed Methodology – Upward Information Flow ............................................2.9
Task Networks ..........................................................................................................2.10
Detailed Methodology ........................................................................................2.11
Operational Sequence Diagram Development....................................................2.11
Integrated Performance Modelling Environment ...............................................2.12
Combined Networks ...........................................................................................2.12
Critical Activities......................................................................................................2.13
Detailed Methodology ........................................................................................2.13
Domain Expert Analysis .....................................................................................2.18
Proposed Solutions .............................................................................................2.18
Subject Matter Expert Review..................................................................................2.19
First SME Session...............................................................................................2.19
Second SME Session ..........................................................................................2.19
Third SME Session .............................................................................................2.19
3 SECTION THREE – ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS.............................................................3.1
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
General........................................................................................................................3.1
Evolution of the Maritime Forces Mandate and Requirements..................................3.1
Maritime Forces Organization ..............................................................................3.1
Maritime Forces Roles and Missions....................................................................3.2
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d)
SECTION
3.2.2.1
3.2.2.2
3.2.2.3
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.1.1
3.3.1.2
3.3.1.3
3.3.1.4
3.3.1.4.1
3.3.1.4.2
3.3.1.4.3
3.3.1.5
3.3.2
3.4
TITLE
PAGE
Constabulary Role...........................................................................................3.3
Diplomatic Role ..............................................................................................3.4
Military Role...................................................................................................3.5
HALIFAX Class Frigate .............................................................................................3.6
HALIFAX Crew Organizational Structure...........................................................3.7
The Combat Department.................................................................................3.7
Operations Room Personnel, Positions and Responsibility............................3.9
Operations Room Watch Systems ................................................................3.10
Weapons Readiness States............................................................................3.12
Secured....................................................................................................3.12
Closed Up and Cleared Away.................................................................3.12
Standing-To ............................................................................................3.12
Warning Levels.............................................................................................3.13
HALIFAX Class Frigate Operations Room Layout ...........................................3.13
HALIFAX Class Frigate Composite Scenario..........................................................3.14
4 SECTION FOUR – HIERARCHICAL GOAL ANALYSIS......................................................4.15
4.1
4.2
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3
4.2.4
4.3
4.3.1
4.3.2
General......................................................................................................................4.15
Goal Analysis Results ...............................................................................................4.15
Goal Decomposition Products ............................................................................4.15
Top-Level Goals .................................................................................................4.15
First-Level Goals ................................................................................................4.15
Second-Level Goals ............................................................................................4.16
Discussion .................................................................................................................4.20
Goal Allocation...................................................................................................4.20
Usage...................................................................................................................4.22
5 SECTION FIVE – IP/PCT............................................................................................................5.1
5.1
5.2
5.2.1
5.2.2
5.3
5.3.1
5.3.2
5.4
General........................................................................................................................5.1
Perceptual control Theory...........................................................................................5.1
Results - PCT ........................................................................................................5.1
Discussion - PCT ..................................................................................................5.1
Potential Instability .....................................................................................................5.3
Results – Potential Instability ...............................................................................5.3
Discussion – Potential Instability .........................................................................5.4
Upward Information Flow ..........................................................................................5.7
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d)
SECTION
5.4.1
5.4.2
TITLE
PAGE
Results – Information Flow ..................................................................................5.7
Discussion – Information Flow.............................................................................5.9
6 SECTION SIX – TASK NETWORKS.........................................................................................6.1
6.1
6.2
6.2.1
6.2.2
6.2.3
6.2.4
6.2.5
Results.........................................................................................................................6.1
Discussion ...................................................................................................................6.2
OSD Development ................................................................................................6.2
Summary Files ......................................................................................................6.7
Single Runs – Baseline Networks.........................................................................6.8
Multi-Threat........................................................................................................6.10
IPME Output.......................................................................................................6.12
7 SECTION SEVEN – CRITICAL ACTIVITIES...........................................................................7.1
7.1
7.2
Results.........................................................................................................................7.1
Discussion ...................................................................................................................7.2
8 SECTION EIGHT – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS......................................8.1
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
8.4.1
8.4.2
8.4.3
8.5
8.6
8.7
8.8
8.9
General........................................................................................................................8.1
Environmental Analysis..............................................................................................8.1
HGA Analysis.............................................................................................................8.1
PCT Analysis ..............................................................................................................8.2
PCT Data...............................................................................................................8.2
Potential Instabilities.............................................................................................8.2
Information Flow ..................................................................................................8.3
Task Networks ............................................................................................................8.3
Critical Activities........................................................................................................8.4
Overall ........................................................................................................................8.5
HGA / PCT to Mission Function Task Analysis Comparison....................................8.5
Recommendations.......................................................................................................8.6
SECTION NINE – REFERENCES ..............................................................................................9.1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d)
LIST OF ANNEXES
ANNEX
ANNEX A
ANNEX B
ANNEX C
ANNEX D
ANNEX E
ANNEX F
ANNEX G
ANNEX H
ANNEX I
ANNEX J
ANNEX K
PAGE
PAGE
GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS...................................................A.1
HFX FRIGATE MISSION DESCRIPTION .......................................................B.1
HIERARCHICAL GOAL ANALYSIS ...............................................................C.1
IP/PCT TEMPLATES .........................................................................................D.1
OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE DIAGRAMS ..................................................... E.1
MEAN TIME PRESSURE DIAGRAMS ............................................................ F.1
IPR SUMMARY FILE ........................................................................................G.1
UPWARD INFORMATION FLOW ...................................................................H.1
POTENTIAL INSTABILITIES............................................................................ I.1
CRITICAL ACTIVITIES ANALYSIS ................................................................ J.1
SME SESSION REPORTS..................................................................................K.1
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE
Figure 2-1
Figure 2-2
Figure 2-3
Figure 2-4
Figure 2-5
Figure 2-6
Figure 3-1
Figure 3-2
Figure 3-3
Figure 3-4
Figure 3-5
Figure 4-1
Figure 4-2
Figure 4-3
Figure 4-4
TITLE
PAGE
Sample Hierarchical Goal Analysis Diagram .......................................................2.4
Example PCT Data Table......................................................................................2.6
Cooper-Harper Scale ...........................................................................................2.14
Mission Effectiveness Risk Rating Scale............................................................2.15
Human Performance Capability Rating Scale.....................................................2.16
Safety Risk Rating Scale .....................................................................................2.17
Maritime Forces Organization ..............................................................................3.2
HALIFAX Class Frigate Weapons and Sensors ...................................................3.7
HALIFAX Departmental Organization.................................................................3.8
HALIFAX Class Operations Room Organization...............................................3.10
HALIFAX Class Frigate Operations Room Crew Layout ..................................3.14
Top-Level Goal with Sub-Goals .........................................................................4.16
Sub-Goal 1 – ”I want to perceive that the current mission is received and
acknowledged” ....................................................................................................4.17
Sub-Goal 2 – “I want to perceive that predeployment preps are complete” .......4.17
Sub-Goal 3 – “I want to perceived that the ship is ready to undertake critical
operational taskings” ...........................................................................................4.18
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TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont’d)
LIST OF FIGURES (cont’d)
FIGURE
Figure 4-5
Figure 4-6
Figure 4-7
Figure 4-8
Figure 5-1
TITLE
PAGE
Sub-Goal 4 – “I want to perceive that the combat organization and resources are
managed effectively”...........................................................................................4.18
Sub-Goal 5 – “I want to perceive that an optimal level of Situational Awareness
is being maintained”............................................................................................4.19
Sub-Goal 6 – “I want to perceive that ongoing operational tasks are being
actioned effectively”............................................................................................4.19
Sub-Goal 7 – “I want to perceive that mission/action follow-up procedures are
completed”...........................................................................................................4.20
Format for Information Flow Viewer Output........................................................5.8
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE
Table 2-1
Table 2-2
Table 3-1
Table 4-1
Table 6-1
Table 6-2
Table 6-3
Table 6-4
Table 6-5
Table 6-6
Table 6-7
Table 6-8
Table 6-9
Table 6-10
Table 6-11
Table 6-12
Table 7-1
TITLE
PAGE
Sample Goal Hierarchy .........................................................................................2.2
Sample PCT Table of a Goal Assigned to the SWC .............................................2.7
HALIFAX Class Ships..........................................................................................3.6
Goal Allocation ...................................................................................................4.20
Watch Turnover.....................................................................................................6.3
Resolve ..................................................................................................................6.3
Harpoon Engagement ............................................................................................6.4
Anti-Ship Missile Defence ....................................................................................6.6
Torpedo Countermeasure ......................................................................................6.6
Watch Close-Up ....................................................................................................6.8
Resolve ..................................................................................................................6.9
ASMD ...................................................................................................................6.9
Harpoon .................................................................................................................6.9
ASW ....................................................................................................................6.10
Combined Networks............................................................................................6.10
Full Multi-Threat Simulation Results .................................................................6.11
Number of Critical Activities ................................................................................7.1
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1SECTION ONE – INTRODUCTION
1.1
GENERAL
Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) approved Command Decision
Aids Technology (COMDAT) I as a Technology Demonstration Project (TDP) in the year 2000
and it is scheduled for completion in the near future. The purpose of the project is to research
and demonstrate Multi-Source Data Fusion (MSDF) technologies and carry out human factors
studies to support upgrades to the HALIFAX Class Command and Control System (CCS) in the
areas of battle space awareness, over the first decade of the new millennium.
In order to design a command and control system that incorporates effective human
computer interfaces and decision support, the functions and tasks of key Operations Room
personnel must be identified and analyzed. Initially, the Operations Room Officer (ORO),
Sensor Weapons Controller (SWC) and Assistant Sensor Weapons Controller (ASWC) positions
were identified as the ones that would benefit most directly from the inclusion of advanced
support such as MSDF. Thus, part of the human factors input to COMDAT was a function and
task analysis of the ORO, SWC, and ASWC positions [References 1 to 3]. However, over the
course of the COMDAT project, it has been realized that MSDF will impact more directly on the
tasks of the Track Supervisor (TS), Electronic Warfare Supervisor (EWS), Air Raid Reporting
Operator (ARRO), and Anti-Submarine Plotting Operator (ASPO). In addition, it has been
decided to include an analysis of the Commanding Officer (CO), Information Management
Director (IMD), Operations Room Supervisor (ORS) and Warfare Officer positions in order to
more fully understand the information requirements of the command team.
For systems such as the command and control system of a frigate, where human
functions are predominantly “cognitive”, the method of analysis should capture this essentially
human activity. Since the analyses of the ORO, SWC, and ASWC have been carried out; DRDC
has been investigating the utility of the Hierarchical Goal Analysis (HGA) methodology that
claims to overcome the failure of traditional methods to capture important aspects of the system
specification, particularly with respect to the characteristics of the human-machine interface.
HGA is a method for performing function and task analyses under the Perceptual
Control Theory (PCT) paradigm [Reference 4]. With HGA, human activities at all levels of
abstraction are directed to satisfying a hierarchical set of goals. HGA combines conventional
function and task analysis into a unified process.
1.2
OBJECTIVES
The primary objective of the work described herein is to use HGA techniques to
conduct an analysis of the CO, IMD, ORS, Warfare Officer, TS, EWS, ARRO, and ASPO
positions that:
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a.
represents the goals and sub-goals through the range of missions carried out
by those positions in the HALIFAX Class Frigate;
b.
identifies the critical tasks of each position; and
c.
produces knowledge that can be used by both human engineers and system
designers to improve the current HALIFAX Class CCS.
A secondary objective is to conduct a re-analysis of the SWC, ASWC, and ORO
positions using the HGA methodology and to compare the two forms of analysis in terms of
outputs, recommendations, and time and effort required to complete.
1.3
SCOPE
The analyses conducted were focused on the roles of the eleven operators in the
HALIFAX Class Frigate domain listed in the Objectives section above. In addition CMC
included the Shipborne Aircraft Controller (SAC) position in the study to facilitate the analysis
of the other 11 positions.
The project employed the HGA approach to generate data and knowledge that could
be used for analysis and design of the operations room system. Specifically the project
generated a hierarchy of goals assigned to various operators, captured upward information flow,
identified potential instabilities, produced a list of critical activities (complete with proposed
solutions) and developed five critical Integrated Performance Modelling Environment (IPME)
task sequences from a top down analysis based on the HGA.
The data produced was analyzed in order to conduct research on the efficiency and
effectiveness of the methodology; follow-on analysis, such as the modelling of proposed
solutions to reduce workloads in the operations room, was beyond the scope of this project.
These analyses tools can be used for ‘what if’ modeling, however, that was not performed as part
of this project. It must be noted, however, that the Halifax Modernization Command and
Control System (HMCCS) Project is underway at the same time as this Human Factors Project
and the informational output (listed in the previous paragraph) is being analyzed and used
directly by the HMCCS team.
1.4
REPORT OUTLINE
This report consists of the following sections:
a.
Section One – Introduction. Section One provides background information,
the objectives and scope of the analysis, and a report outline.
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b.
Section Two – Analysis Methodology. Section Two provides a detailed
description of the methodology used to conduct the analysis.
c.
Section Three – Environmental Analyses. Section Three describes the
environment (the Canadian Maritime Forces and the HALIFAX Class Frigate)
and the scenario in which the analysis has been conducted.
d.
Section Four – HGA. Section Four provides an overview of the results and
discussion of results of the Hierarchical Goal Analyses.
e.
Section Five – Information Processing (IP)/PCT Analyses. Section Five
provides an overview of the results and discussion of results of the IP/PCT
analyses including the upward information flow and the potential instability.
f.
Section Six – Task Network Analysis Results. Section Six provides an
overview of the results and discussion of results of the task network analysis
using IPME in the IP/PCT mode.
g.
Section Seven – Critical Activities Analysis Results. Section Seven
provides an overview of the results of the critical activities analysis.
h.
Section Eight – Concluding Material. Section Eight presents conclusions
and recommendations from the Human Factors Engineering (HFE) analyses
of the HALIFAX Class Frigate Operations Room.
i.
Section Nine – References. Section Nine documents references used in the
report.
j.
Annexes. This report includes the following annexes:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
Annex A
Annex B
Annex C
Annex D
Annex E
Annex F
Annex G
Annex H
Annex I
Annex J
Annex K
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms;
Scenario;
Hierarchical Goal Analysis;
IP/PCT Templates;
Operational Sequence Diagrams (OSDs);
Mean Time Pressures (MTP) Diagrams;
Information Processing Report (IPR) Summary File;
Upward Information Flow;
Potential Instabilities;
Critical Activities; and
Subject Matter Expert (SME) Session Reports.
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2SECTION TWO – ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
2.1
GENERAL
This project began with an environmental analysis that provided a baseline or anchor
for all follow-on work. Naval guidance documents, doctrine, procedures and previous HFE
studies were examined to define the environment in which the operations room operators would
be expected to conduct the missions. Naval staff in NDHQ reviewed and confirmed the draft
analysis prior to finalisation. Relevant information was extracted and provided input to the
Section Three material.
This section (Section Two) provides a description of the analysis methodology that
was used to produce the four main outputs/products associated with the project – an HGA, the
IP/PCT data, task networks, and critical activity analyses.
The use of domain expertise was essential in this project. Access to SMEs was
limited, therefore the expertise of Cdr (ret’d) Greg Aikins, LCdr (ret’d) Curtis Coates, and Lt(N)
(ret’d) Julie Graveline was called upon to provide the basis of material for the goal hierarchy, the
PCT data, and the task network information. Each of the domain experts were employed, during
their naval careers, in the Halifax Class Frigate operations room or as the Commanding Officer
of a Halifax Class Frigate, in the case of Cdr (ret’d) Greg Aikins.
2.2
HIERARCHICAL GOAL ANALYSIS
The generation of a hierarchy of goals for the Halifax Class Frigate Operations Room
was an iterative process requiring domain experts and the review/approval by SMEs. It followed
the ground rules for decomposing a goal structure as described in Reference 4.
Top-, first-, and second-level goals were developed for the three overarching roles of
the ship – constabulary, diplomatic, and military. The upper-level goals and subsequent
decomposition were so similar that only the military mission HGA was further decomposed to
the lowest possible level. No bottom level was set a priori as it was found that some goals
naturally decomposed further than others. The Technical Authority, prior to continued
decomposition, reviewed the goal hierarchy developed inclusive of the second level.
After approval from the Technical Authority, domain experts decomposed the HGA
to the lowest reasonable level. Because the HGA related to an existing system the allocation
process was tentatively taking place at the same time. A goal was decomposed no further when
the PCT external variables in Reference 4 did not relate to operators external to the system being
studied. The completed goal hierarchy of the military role was presented to SMEs. They
reviewed the results for completeness and allocation.
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The goal hierarchy was subsequently revisited and modified throughout the project,
resulting in a final group of goals.
2.2.1
Goal Decomposition and Allocation
The goal decomposition process was conducted to systematically perform progressive
decomposition of HALIFAX Class Frigate Operations Room crew goals. An HGA [Reference
4] models a cognitive system consisting of one or more operators by identifying goals, at various
levels of abstraction, that the system needs to achieve. Goals are desired states to which current
states are compared. If there is an error (i.e., current state z desired state), then some action must
be taken to resolve the error. This is similar to a closed system with a feedback loop where the
system continues to adjust until it is in a neutral state. Unlike a task hierarchy, a goal hierarchy
does not specify what actions should be taken. Instead, it specifies how the end states of actions
should be assessed. Links between goals suggest possible directions where an operator may
direct attention (i.e., a series of assessments that he/she may make). Based on the mission
analysis the HALIFAX Class Frigate goals were progressively decomposed from top-level goals
down to ‘n’-level goals. The purpose of this decomposition process was to capture the
hierarchical nature of both the crew and the system goals. Two additional outcomes of the
analysis were the identification of upward information flow and the identification of potential
instabilities. The decomposition process was assisted with the use of a purpose designed
software tool - Task Architect®.
The decomposition process generated an inventory of goals in a hierarchical order
such that the association between goals and operators was captured. That is, following each toplevel goal, all related first-level goals were listed, and for each first-level goal, all the secondlevel goals associated with the first-level goals were listed, and so on through the list.
As an example of the goal hierarchy, the Table 2-1 below depicts a narrow sliver of
goals from the top-level down to the fourth. The title of the goal where the ellipsis (...) is seen is
replaced by the phrase “I want to perceive that”.
Table 2-1
Goal/Objective
(Level N)
TOP LEVEL
...the use of the sea is
denied to enemy forces
LEVEL ONE
2
...predeployment preps are
complete
Revision 1
Sample Goal Hierarchy
Influenced
(''Controlled'')
Variable
Degree to which the
enemy is denied use
of the sea
Status of
predeployment
preparations
Sub-goals/sub-objectives
(Level N-1)
Assignment
CO
CO
1
...current mission is received and
acknowledged
2
...predeployment preps are complete
2.1
...command team planning complete
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Table 2-1
Goal/Objective
(Level N)
LEVEL TWO
2.1
...command team planning
complete
Sample Goal Hierarchy
Influenced
(''Controlled'')
Variable
Status of team
planning
Sub-goals/sub-objectives
(Level N-1)
Assignment
CO
2.2
...effective liaison with TG 302.4 is
complete
2.1.1
...OPTASK messages are held and
understood
...enemy forces have been identified and
database held
2.1.2
LEVEL THREE
2.1.1
...OPTASK messages are
held and understood
LEVEL FOUR
2.1.1.1
...OPTASK EW is held
and understood
Status of specific
message(s)
Status of specific
message
ORO
SWC
2.1.1.1
...OPTASK EW is held and understood
2.1.1.2
...OPTASK COMMS is held and
understood
No lower levels in the analysis
The complete goal hierarchy is included in Annex C.
In more traditional function and task analyses the lowest level is also referred to as
the task level, wherein a task is defined as a specific human activity with a unique set of
performance characteristics, however in goal analysis, the lowest level goal is similar to a toplevel goal in that it involves a feedback loop and can be allocated to man or machine.. In this
analysis the decomposition was considered complete when the goal being considered was
satisfied without input from other operators in the system, and could be satisfied through simple
tasks such as communication and/or manipulation of a control system.
The decomposition is graphically depicted through a Hierarchical Goal Analysis
Diagram (see Figure 2-1). The goal hierarchy illustrates the logical relationships between the
various mission goals. The goal hierarchy diagrams are particularly useful for reviewing the
results of the mission decomposition with domain experts and subject matter experts. Its
graphical nature makes it easy to understand and associate with the operational environment.
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Figure 2-1
Sample Hierarchical Goal Analysis Diagram
The allocation process is simply the determination of which operator in the system is
responsible for ensuring a specific goal is completed or satisfied. This study addressed an
existing system with the objective of defining that system. The operators were assigned to those
goals they currently hold. The only exceptions were those goals allocated to the IMD. The
IMD, who was not employed in the HALIFAX Class Frigate when the project began, was
allocated goals in accordance with the IMD and Information Systems Manager (ISM) Concept
of Employment document [Reference 5].
Given the complex matrix type organization of the Operations Room the majority of
goals have both primary and secondary allocations, where the secondary ‘owner’ of the goal is
prepared to step in and assume responsibility for the goal if the primary ‘owner’ is occupied with
another warfare area or higher priority goal. During the analysis, the secondary allocation of the
goal was tracked.
Domain experts initially generated the core goal hierarchy. This was achieved in an
iterative fashion as goals were modified or moved to better define the system being analyzed.
The goal hierarchy development continued throughout the term of the project as each step of the
project required the goal hierarchy to be revisited.
2.2.2
Goal Verification
The objective of the goal verification process was to ensure each goal was assigned to
the proper primary and/or secondary operator and that the goal fell in the proper position in the
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goal hierarchy. Analysts and domain experts provided the initial hierarchical position
assignment. The higher-level goal description and allocation was confirmed by SMEs during a
visit to HMCS MONTREAL with the final lower-level goal allocation and descriptions being
verified by SMEs during a visit to HMCS WINNIPEG. Because of the size and complexity of
the goal hierarchy, the relationship of goals using only their titles was verified before the
complete underlying PCT data was added. The PCT data was completed by domain experts
between the two SME sessions. The verification process also ensured there were no sub-goals
associated with the lowest level goals.
During the first and second SME sessions (described in Subsection 2.6), the
verification process was conducted in two parts, a very structured review of the hierarchy of
goals and a less structured “where is this activity” approach. In the structured approach small
groups of operators systematically reviewed the goal hierarchy from top to bottom level goals in
a review of completeness and flow. The less structured approach had operators describe
activities they perform – associated with the military role – and challenge the domain experts to
find the goal that captured the activity. The second method provided significant value as it
reinforced the nature of a goal hierarchy to capture the complete requirements of a system. As
an example the ARRO indicated that they made numerous voice reports to augment a linked air
contact – this was found to be reflected in goal – ‘5.1.1.3.4 ...reports are made to support the
tactical air picture’. On the rare occasion that activities were described that were not captured in
the goal hierarchy, augmentation of the goal hierarchy was undertaken to better describe the
goals of the system and the specific operator.
2.3
IP/PCT
In order to model the operations room system in the IP/PCT mode IPME specific
information pertaining to each goal had to be collected. The IP/PCT model represents the
operator’s allocation of attention and human memory together with a framework for tracking the
load on the operator’s information processing system. The IP/PCT development followed
Reference 4. Using the hierarchy of goals and sub-goals from the military role, along with the
provisional allocation to an operator, domain experts discussed each goal and completed Table 2
from Reference 4 (see Figure 2-2 and Table 2-2 for samples of a PCT table). It was essential
that each goal be considered in isolation – viewing the goals holistically caused the higher-level
goals to be overwhelmingly complex – with too large a number of required inputs, outputs,
knowledge states and influenced variables. The results were reviewed by the domain experts for
consistency, to ensure the process remained constant, and then they were presented to SMEs in
SME Session Two for review and comment. Brief descriptions of the SME sessions are
presented in Subsection 2.6.
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Assigned Operator
World
Required
Knowledge States
Perceptual /
Cognitive
Processes
Ending
Conditions
Output /
Behaviour
Output
Interface
Output Declarative
Goal
Ȉ
Influenced
Variable(s) Internal
Situational
Initiating
Conditions
Influenced
Variable(s) External
Input /
Sensation
Input Interface
Input
Figure 2-2
Example PCT Data Table
The resultant data was used to generate the upward information flow analysis and the
potential instability analysis. Upward information flow looks at the operators assigned to goals
and those assigned to their supporting goals and the information which is provided by the
operator responsible for the supporting goal to the operator responsible for the upper-level goal.
Potential instability analysis looks at variables controlled by multiple operators assigned to
different goals. Both were developed in accordance with Reference 4. The results were also
used during the review of critical activities as a check against the complexity of the goals being
assumed by the SMEs.
The IP/PCT data was generated in three distinct steps – the development of
preliminary PCT information, identification of potential instabilities, and collation of upward
information flow. The detailed methodologies used for each are described below.
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Table 2-2
Sample PCT Table of a Goal Assigned to the SWC
Assigned Operator
Required Knowledge
States
Output
Goal
6.3.1.1...satisfactory
internal air threat
level maintained
Ȉ
Input
2.3.1
SWC
Perceptual/
Cognitive
Processes
Declarative:
Standard Operating
Procedures
Training and expertise
IDCRIT
Equipment Caps and
Lims
Ending
Conditions
INPUT - Vision - Air threat
Verbal encoding accounted for
INPUT - Vision Spatial Encoding,
visual pattern
recognition
INPUT - Audition Influenced
- Passive (prevariable(s) attentive)
Situational:
internal
monitoring of
Threat Status
Initiating
auditory signals Conditions
Own Force Status
INPUT - Audition Unaccounted
Permissive ROE
- Verbal
EOB
for air threat
decoding, speech
Threat axis
recognition
Equipment Status
INPUT - Memory
Own force
dispostion/composition - Verbal decoding
INPUT - Memory
- Spatial
decoding
INPUT - Memory
- Recall
OUTPUT - Voice Speech
production
OUTPUT Memory Memorization
Output/ Behaviour
World
Output
Interface
VOICE Output
Shincom MEMORY - Commit internal
to memory (LTM
and STM)
Threat Status
Input/Sensation
VISION - Central Text, dial reading
VISION - Central Pattern, spatial
relationship,
tracking, graphic
displays
AUDITION- Speech
input (incidental to
primary task)
AUDITION - Speech
input (attended to,
salient to the
primary task)
MEMORY - Recall
from memory Verbally coded
MEMORY - Recall
from memory Spatially Coded
MEMORY - Recall
from memory Complex operation
Influenced ORS
variable(s) external
Input
Interface
Audio
Message external
comms
SSD
Detailed Methodology – PCT Data
The criteria for each goal or sub-goal was compiled in accordance with Figure 2-2.
This information was elicited from domain experts using structured cognitive
walkthroughs, in which a human factors analyst “stepped-through” the entire scenario , as
presented in Annex B, with each operator, and then iteratively delved into significant portions in
more detail. Initial iterations focused on identifying goals, and sub-goals, and subsequent
iterations focused on documenting the attributes of each goal as required by the HGA:
a.
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b.
required knowledge states:
(1)
declarative: What extra-situational knowledge (e.g., operating
procedures, etc.) is required to satisfy this goal?
(2)
situational: What situational knowledge (e.g., current location of
assets, etc.) is required to satisfy this goal?
c.
Perceptual processes: How can the information required to satisfy this goal be
gathered?
d.
Cognitive process: How is the information required to satisfy this goal
synthesized and manipulated?
e.
Initiating conditions: These are states that cause the operator to inquire as to
whether the goal has been satisfied;
f.
Ending conditions: The state when the goal is completed and the operator
switches attention to another goal;
g.
Input / Sensation: These are provided by the analyst and include any visual,
auditory, kinaesthetic or cognitive input attributes associated with the goal. ;
h.
Output / Behaviour: These are provided by the analyst and include any vocal,
psychomotor or memory output attributes associated with the goal.;
i.
Input interface: The device with which the operator gathers information or is
alerted that a goal requires attention;
j.
Output interface: The devices that are driven by direct actions of the operator
– not to be confused with external variables;
k.
Influenced variable(s) – External: The devices in the real world that require
influencing to satisfy a goal; and
l.
Influenced variable(s) – Internal: The specific knowledge state(s) influenced
by the feedback loop in question. Knowledge gained while the goal is being
actioned is tracked in this variable.
The secondary ‘owner’ of the goal, introduced in Subsection 2.2.1, is not listed in the
PCT output tables, however it was captured in the goal hierarchy - Annex C. All knowledge
states, perceptual and cognitive processes will be the same regardless of who is working to
achieve the goal.
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The Technical Authority reviewed the PCT work, early in the process, to ensure
completeness.
The data was collected using the TaskArchitect® tool, easing the workload of the
domain expert and allowing for a simple method of presenting the information.
Table 2-2 above is an example of a completed PCT table of a goal assigned to the
SWC. As shown the only external variable is the ORS, therefore no potential instabilities can be
caused by this goal, however there could be a conduit clash (see Subsection 2.3.2 for a
description of a conduit clash) if the ORS is engaged when the SWC is attempting to satisfy the
goal.
2.3.2
Detailed Methodology – Potential Instability
As presented in Reference 4 “The potential for instability is obvious when two agents
are simultaneously trying to drive a variable in different directions according to incompatible
set-points or internal transformations...” As part of the goal analyses, influenced external
variables were captured and are listed in Annex D. These were found to range from the specific
equipment configurations to direction (provided to another operator). Once the goals / sub-goals
were completed a database was created and filtered, based on external variables. Because the
goal hierarchy represents a snapshot of all potential goals that could be elicited, without any
timing, all goals associated with the same external variable must be considered for potential
conflict and therefore instability.
Where the potential instabilities were conflicting information demands on a single
operator by multiple other operators and not on a specific equipment configuration, the concept
of a ‘conduit clash’ was raised. In this case, the word conduit refers to the operator who acts as a
conduit of information. These ‘conduit clashes’ occur when other operators require the
output/input from a third operator to progress their specific goal. These ‘conduit clashes’ were
not captured in the format of the external variables, however they were investigated during the
IPME Task Network analyses..
On completion of the development and classification of external variables with a
potential for instability, SMEs reviewed the analyses. The SMEs provided valuable insight into
the process and augmented the list of instability amelioration techniques (see Subsection 2.6).
2.3.3
Detailed Methodology – Upward Information Flow
The goal hierarchy developed for this project and PCT data collected were analyzed
specifically for upward information flow used to indicate the status or completion of lower-level
goals (n-1 level goals) as they relate to the eventual completion of upper-level goals (n level
goals). The type (verbal or visual), importance, and frequency of the information flow were
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captured in the analysis. This analysis was performed by domain experts and then confirmed
during SME Session 2 at HMCS WINNIPEG.
To determine a requirement for information flow the domain experts compared n-1
level goals with their associated n level goal. If the n-1 level goal was allocated to a different
operator than the n level goal there was a requirement for information flow. Information flow
communication type was captured. The domain experts also considered the secondary goal
owner, for the n level goal, and captured how information would flow to this operator in the
situation where the primary goal owner was occupied.
The analysis considered verbal and visual communications. Verbal communications
include direct reports, copying circuits or overhearing reports (be they briefings, direct reports,
or SHINCOM transmissions). Visual information flow was considered to be conveyed by an
operator reading his or her own Standard Shipboard Display (SSD), viewing another operator’s
SSD, reading a stateboard, or observing another operator’s actions.
2.4
TASK NETWORKS
Task networks are used to develop the IPME IP/PCT models. The IPME model
requires a chronological set of events in order to run the program and identify periods of operator
loading. The task network generation combined efforts from this project and previous task
analysis studies. The networks represented five critical task sequences. In those studies the task
sequences were represented as OSDs and were used to analyze information flow, however, no
modelling was performed. They are referenced here to indicate that the operational community
continues to agree that these five sequences adequately represent the most demanding periods in
a Halifax Class Frigate operations room. Domain experts examined the sequences and selected
the appropriate goals that would be required to be satisfied to complete the mission segments
represented by the sequences. Each goal and/or sub-goal was then described in a series of tasks
as OSDs. The OSDs were required as a means of allowing the domain experts to organize tasks
and allow the SMEs to confirm the task networks before they were modelled in IPME. Similar
to the task sequences, the tasks specifics – Time Required, Visual, Auditory, Cognitive, and
Psychomotor (VACP) ratings were taken from the studies at References 6 and 7. The OSDs,
representing goals and sub-goals, were combined in IPME each representing a sub-network
within a larger network.
OSD accuracy was confirmed by SMEs prior to full implementation in IPME. Goal
timings were set as a variable to allow for a probabilistic analysis of each network. Software
limitations restricted the number of runs for the larger networks to 40; for this reason all
networks were run 40 times in order to develop a standard and comparable set of results.
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2.4.1
Detailed Methodology
Five critical task sequences were selected and confirmed by the Department of
National Defence (DND) representative. These sequences were also studied in the Task
Analysis of the HALIFAX Class Sensor Weapons Controller and Assistant Sensor Weapons
Controller Positions, Mission Function and Task Analysis Report and the Task Analysis of the
HALIFAX Class Operations Room Officer Sensor Weapons Controller and Assistant Sensor
Weapons Controller positions: Mission, Function and Task Analysis Report [References 6 and
7]. The final definitions of the sequences were:
a.
watch turnover;
b.
resolve procedure including issuance of an air warning;
c.
conduct of a co-ordinated surface engagement using harpoon missiles;
d.
anti-ship missile defence against an advance surface-to-surface threat; and
e.
anti-submarine warfare to include torpedo counter measures and a close-in
attack.
The task sequences were driven by the scenario (Annex B, which was taken from
References 6 and 7) and developed by the domain experts. The sequences were then mapped
against the goal hierarchy in order to determine which goals, sub-goals, and associated feedback
loops, would be activated in order to achieve success or a suitable outcome from each task
sequence. The difference between success and a suitable outcome is dependant on the goal
being analyzed, a goal with an easily measurable result, such as “...appropriate salvo size is
selected” can be successfully achieved whereas a more ambiguous goal such as “...AAW team is
being managed effectively” may only have a suitable outcome and may never by 100%
achievable. The PCT data from each active goal was used to confirm the tasks required for each
sequence. Task information was drawn from References 6 and 7.
2.4.2
Operational Sequence Diagram Development
The goal hierarchy and the time critical task sequences described in Subsection 2.4.1
anchored the OSD development. Prior to the commitment of any tasks to a critical sequence the
goals that were active or required satisfying were identified.
As described earlier (Subsection 2.3.1), each goal must be preceded with the
expression “I want to perceive that”, which is represented by the symbol: “…”. Goals were
grouped into sub-networks, and tasks sequences were developed in chronological order to
complete each goal sub-network. These sub-networks were developed in TaskArchitect“ then
ported into the IPME development environment. Sub-networks were then built up (logically
interconnected) in IPME until the full ‘baseline’ network was developed. As a matter of
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development procedure each sub-network was run separately in IPME in order to debug any
problems. At the end of this process there were five ‘baseline’ networks representing the five
critical task sequences and these five baseline networks were graphically depicted as the OSDs
included at Annex E.
The second SME Session, at HMCS WINNIPEG, provided a review of OSDs
including confirmation of specific task parameters.
2.4.3
Integrated Performance Modelling Environment
As described in Subsection 2.4.2 the baseline networks were initially developed in
TaskArchitect“ and then transferred to IPME.
The SAC position was included in the study due to the requirement for this position
to interact with a number of the operators being studied. In modelling the operations room a
surrogate position was created to represent positions which were not identified for detailed
analysis. These included the Fire Control Supervisor, CANEWS Operator and Officer Of the
Watch (OOW), who had to carry out a number of tasks; in the IPME model the operator ‘none’
is used whereas for the OSD models the position of ‘Tactical Crew’ was used to represent these
operators. This was to ensure that tasks that were being performed by operators not part of the
study were not shed, delayed, or interrupted thereby affecting the results.
Each network was run 40 times in order to invoke the probabilistic nature of task
times. It was necessary to restrict the number to 40 as the IPME directories did not have
sufficient memory to store the output from any combined network that included the Torpedo
Counter Measure network. The Torpedo Counter Measure network was the largest model as it
covered the longest period of time and represented all internal and external communications in a
tactically complex environment.
2.4.4
Combined Networks
After the analysis of each baseline task network was completed, the complexity of
concurrent goals/task networks was investigated.
Likely combinations of networks were determined, probable worst-case timing
conflicts were assessed, and then the networks were triggered at the proper time to potentially
overload the targeted operator. Timings were determined by selecting periods in the baseline
with the greatest Mean Time Pressure for each operator and ensuring they would overlap when
run in combination.
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2.5
CRITICAL ACTIVITIES
The final deliverable was the analysis associated with critical activities. For this
project, activities were equated to goals. Had the study invoked a Mission Function and Task
Analyses methodology, activities would have been equated to tasks and functions. Previous
studies [References 6 and 7] performed critical task analyses, which were reviewed for relevance
to this project. The HGA critical rating methodology and associated criteria were devised,
reviewed with the SA and agreed upon. A modified Cooper-Harper Scale (Figure 2-3) was used.
Rating criteria for safety, mission effectiveness, and human performance capability were set on a
scale from 1 to 7. Seven levels were chosen rather than the normal 10 levels of a Cooper-Harper
Scale to ease the extensive workload required to rate all goals. Additionally the granularity
afforded by seven levels was deemed sufficient by the analysis team. The goals from the
military goal hierarchy were then analyzed by domain experts and were assigned values in
accordance with the rating scales for safety, mission effectiveness, and human performance
capability. The goals with higher values in any of the rating criteria were then further analyzed
to provide potential solutions. The domain expert results were then reviewed by SMEs.
2.5.1
Detailed Methodology
As introduced above, each activity (goal/sub-goal) was assessed for criticality in
terms of having a significant risk of affecting mission effectiveness. Rationale for the
designation and the proposed corrective action was also provided. Activities were also rated as
critical if they approach the limits of human capabilities and skills, or have safety implications.
A scoring matrix was developed in order to provide ratings to each goal/sub-goal.
From the outset the intent was to normalize across the three factors of mission effectiveness,
human performance capability, and safety. To support the domain experts in rating the
activities, the Cooper-Harper Scale [35](this information is included above) was used as a
baseline and then modified.
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Figure 2-3
Cooper-Harper Scale
The final ratings scales (Figure 2-4 to Figure 2-6) are still based on three main
questions that slot any activity into one of four main groupings. If the answer to the first
question is ‘YES’, the response leads across to a category that is a single solution with the
highest criticality rating. If the answer is ‘NO’, the scale leads up to more questions, the answers
to which can lead to two possibilities, a lower and a higher rating within each major category.
As can be seen there are a total of 7 possible ratings. As discussed previously, in order to
facilitate agreement amongst the domain experts with regard to assigning ratings, and in
consideration of the number of activities to be rated, the final number of categories was reduced
from 10 to 7.
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In considering the mission effectiveness
component how critical is the goal?
NO
Could this
goal have a
noticeable impact
on mission
effectiveness?
YES
A deeper and
more thorough
understanding
of this goal is
desirable
Mission effectiveness dependancy
on Goal completion
Domain Expert
Rating
This goal has no impact on mission
effectiveness
1
This goal has negligible impact on mission
effectiveness
2
This goal could have a noticeable, but
minor impact on mission effectiveness
3
This goal could have a noticeable, but
moderate impact on mission effectiveness
4
This goal could have a significant, and
major impact on mission effectiveness
5
This goal could have a significant, and
critical impact on mission effectiveness
6
Failure to achieve this goal could lead to
complete mission failure
7
NO
Could this
goal have a
significant impact on
mission
effectiveness?
YES
A deeper and
more thorough
understanding
of this goal is
highly desirable
NO
Could this
goal have a crucial
impact on mission
success?
YES
A deeper and
more thorough
understanding
of this goal is
essential
Goal Decisions Points
In order to determine activities that impinge on mission effectiveness, numerical value from 1 to 7 is assigned according to
the degree to which the non-completion, or incorrect completion, of a given goal would jeopardize or limit the successful
completion of the mission.
Figure 2-4
Mission Effectiveness Risk Rating Scale
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In considering the Human Performance
Capability (HPC) component, how difficult
is this goal to achieve?
HPC demands on the operator for
the selected Goal
Domain Expert
Rating
No human effort to complete this goal
1
Minimal human effort is required to
complete this goal
2
NO
Is noticeable
human effort
required to achieve
this goal?
YES
Noticeable human effort requiring
moderate operator demand and limited
attention is required to adequately
complete this goal
Noticeable human effort requiring
moderate operator demand and focused
attention is required to adequately
complete this goal
Goal HPC
Amelioration is
desirable
3
4
NO
Is significant
human effort
required to achieve
this goal?
YES
Goal HPC
Amelioration is
highly desirable
Significant human effort requiring
heightened attention is required to
adequately complete this goal
5
Significant human effort requiring intense
concentrated effort is required to
adequately complete this goal
6
Intense concentrated effort is required to
complete the goal and even then the
result is grossly inadequate
7
NO
Is the human
effort required to
achieve this goal
unachievable?
YES
Goal HPC
Amelioration is
essential
Goal Decisions Points
In order to determine activities that approach the limits of human capabilities, numerical values of 1 to 7 are to be assigned
to each goal using the above flow chart. The question being posed is: Does achievement of the goal require the operator
to undertake activities that approach or exceed Human Performance Capabilities?
Figure 2-5
Human Performance Capability Rating Scale
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In considering the safety component how
critical is this goal?
Safety dependency on Goal
completion
Domain Expert
Rating
Failure to adequately achieve this goal
has no risk of injury to crew.
1
Failure to adequately achieve this goal
has negligible risk of injury to crew.
2
Failure to adequately achieve this goal
could have a noticeable impact through
minor injury to crew.
3
Failure to adequately achieve this goal
could have a noticeable impact through
moderate of injury to crew.
4
Failure to adequately achieve this goal
could have a significant impact through
major injury to crew.
5
Failure to adequately achieve this goal
could have a significant impact through
critical injury to crew.
6
Failure to achieve this goal could have
fatal consequences.
7
NO
Could this
goal have a
noticeable safety
impact?
YES
A deeper and
more thorough
understanding
of this goal is
desirable
NO
Could this
goal have a
significant safety
impact?
YES
A deeper and
more thorough
understanding
of this goal is
highly desirable
NO
Could this
Goal have a crucial
safety impact?
YES
A deeper and
more thorough
understanding
of this goal is
essential
Goal Decisions Points
In order to determine activities that have a significant safety component, numerical values from 1 to 7 are to be assigned to
each goal according to the degree to which the non-completion, or incorrect completion, of a given goal would adversely
affect the safety of relevant personnel (e.g. own forces, friendly forces, non-participants within the mission environment,
etc).
Figure 2-6
Safety Risk Rating Scale
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2.5.2
Domain Expert Analysis
Due to the scarcity of SMEs domain experts performed the initial analysis. The draft
analysis completed by the domain experts was reviewed and commented on by SMEs. Domain
experts analyzed each activity and provided a criticality rating for mission effectiveness, human
performance capability and safety. Each activity was considered in an individual sense and not
based on how it related to other activities in the HGA. It was decided that because the subject of
the analysis was an existing system, none of the activities would have a human performance
capability rating of seven (assigning a rating of seven would indicate that specific goals of the
current operations room were not achievable). It was determined, knowing the current
operations room, that no goal had been designed to fail, meaning at no time was the outcome
“Intense concentrated effort is required to complete the goal, and even then the result is grossly
inadequate” expected. In the existing system, goals had been divided or allocated to prevent this.
As an example, if the goal had been to simultaneously conduct ASMD and defence against small
boat attack (not a requirement of the current system), it could be expected that the Human
Performance Capability (HPC) rating for the SWC would be a seven.
2.5.3
Proposed Solutions
Solutions were proposed for any activity that had a safety risk rating of 5 or greater, a
mission effectiveness risk rating of 5 or greater and a human performance capability rating of 4
or more. The reason for reducing the cut-off for the HPC rating level to 4 was an attempt to
capture the same ratio of activities for all three categories. With the HPC ratings being limited to
a maximum value of 6, as described above, it was determined that a criticality cut-off of the top
three rating points should be used for each factor.
A system of abbreviations was used to ease the description of the solutions:
N/A
NOB
SRR
MER
HPC
–
–
–
–
–
Not Applicable
Nature Of the Business – unable to affect the rating
Solution the same as the safety risk rating solution
Solution the same as the mission effectiveness risk rating solution
Solution the same as the human performance capability rating solution
The proposed solutions, listed in Annex J – Critical Activities, were provided in the
order of safety, mission effectiveness and human performance, separated by a front slash.
The results of the critical activity analysis were compared to the initial PCT data to
ensure the scope of the goal was fully understood by the domain experts and SMEs. As an
example, the required knowledge listed in the PCT data was examined to ensure the
requirements of the goal/activity were not inflated during this analysis process.
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On completion of the analysis of criticality, including proposed solutions, the results
were presented to SMEs as part of the final SME session at HMCS MONTREAL, April 2006.
The SMEs were asked to review, comment on and amend (as required) the point ratings and the
proposed solutions. The results of these reviews combined with the original domain expert
analysis are available in Annex J.
2.6
SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT REVIEW
There have been many references to the SME sessions employed during this project.
This section will provide an overview of the three sessions – essentially the where, the who, the
when, and what on each session. Prior to each session the participants were briefed on the
project and the processes involved, including HGA, IP/PCT, and OSDs. The SMEs were also
provided a forecast as to the uses of the analyses specifically the uses in the HMCCS project.
Details of each SME session are included in Annex K.
2.6.1
First SME Session
The first session was held in Halifax NS, at the Royal Artillery Park. The session
was conducted over three days, 24-26 August 2005. The combat team, including the
Commanding Officer, of HMCS MONTREAL made themselves available for the session. The
intent of the SME session was to review the HGA and PCT data, as generated by the domain
experts, by operators currently serving in the positions being analyzed. Overall the goals of the
SME session were achieved and the analysts deemed the three-day session a success.
2.6.2 Second SME Session
The second SME session was held in Esquimalt BC, in HMCS WINNIPEG. The
session was conducted over three days, 29 November-1 December 2005. The combat team,
including the Commanding Officer, of HMCS WINNIPEG made themselves available for the
session. The intent of the SME session was to review the five critical task sequences, as
generated by the domain experts, by operators currently serving in a worked-up Halifax Class
Frigate. Overall the goals of the SME session were achieved and the analysts deemed the threeday session a success.
2.6.3 Third SME Session
The third and final SME session was held in Halifax NS, in HMCS MONTREAL.
The session was conducted over two days, 4-5 April 2006. The combat team of HMCS
MONTREAL made themselves available for the session. The intent of the SME session was to
review and comment on the critical activities analyses conducted by the domain experts and to
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review and comment on the results of the IPME IP/PCT output. Overall the goals of the SME
session were achieved and the analysts deemed the two-day session a success.
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3SECTION THREE – ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
3.1
GENERAL
The results from the Environmental Analysis are summarized at a high level in this
section of the report. This section is included to allow the reader to understand the environment
in which the HALIFAX Class Frigate is required to operate in order to understand the demands
on the operators. It also describes the organizational structure in which the operators work and
provides an overview of their jobs and responsibilities.
The results of the Environmental Analysis process are summarized in the following
subsections.
a.
b.
c.
Evolution of the Maritime Forces Mandate and Requirements;
HALIFAX Class Frigate; and
HALIFAX Class Frigate Composite Scenario.
The analysis included the review of numerous documents, all of which are listed in
Section Nine. Additionally, an exhaustive examination of Occupational Speciality
Specifications was conducted to ensure the goals allocated in the HGA were indicative of the
training provided and work expected of the positions analyzed.
3.2
EVOLUTION OF THE MARITIME FORCES MANDATE AND
REQUIREMENTS
As stated in Leadmark: The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 [Reference 1] “As the military
instrument of Canada’s maritime policy, the Navy is a critical element in the national
imperatives of sovereignty, continental defence and engaged internationalism.” The HALIFAX
Class Frigate was designed and is manned to be a general-purpose ship. This role of the frigate
in support of the maritime forces mandate is integral to the design and function of the Command
and Control system.
Before describing the HALIFAX Class Frigate and examining the goals and tasks of
the Operations Room personnel, it is important to first consider the organization of Canada’s
Maritime Forces their roles and their missions.
3.2.1
Maritime Forces Organization
Canada’s naval forces are controlled and operated by two formation commanders as
shown in Figure 3-1, MARPAC in Victoria, British Columbia and MARLANT in Halifax, Nova
Scotia, while the overall Commander of the Navy, the Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS) is
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situated at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in Ottawa, Ontario. Under each of the
respective formation commanders is the commander of the fleet of surface, subsurface and
auxiliary units. This study will focus on the HALIFAX Class Frigates of which there are 12,
five situated on the West coast and seven on the East.
Figure 3-1
3.2.2
Maritime Forces Organization
Maritime Forces Roles and Missions
The 1994 Defence White Paper [Reference 2] identifies strategic-level roles for the
Canadian Forces (CF). The 2001 DPG document [Reference 3] interprets these CF roles and
provides direction for the use of the Canadian Maritime Forces. However it is from Leadmark:
The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 [Reference 1] from which the 3 basic roles, Constabulary,
Diplomatic, and Military are set. The CF document, Shaping the Future of the Canadian Forces:
A Strategy for 2020 [Reference 8], supports the view that these missions will indeed be
applicable for the foreseeable future and categorizes the roles into: Peacetime, Operations Other
Than War, Wartime Operations. The remainder of this subsection focuses on these missions and
operations that are performed by the Maritime Forces in support of the roles assigned to the
Canadian Forces. A correlation can be drawn between: Constabulary and Peacetime operations,
Diplomatic and Operations Other Than War, and Military and Wartime Operations. The
HALIFAX Class Frigate must be capable of performing and rapidly switching between all these
roles.
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3.2.2.1
Constabulary Role
In peacetime, Canada’s Maritime Forces provide the flexibility and immediate
response necessary to react to a wide range of crisis situations. The Constabulary role, as
defined in Reference 1, includes the following operations that the Maritime Forces may be
tasked with but are not limited to:
a.
Sovereignty Patrols. Maritime forces provide assistance to Other
Government Departments (OGDs) and law enforcement agencies by
identifying and providing positional data or intercepting, if required,
suspected illegal aliens or contraband smugglers before or after entering
Canadian waters.
b.
Aid to Civil Power. Provinces are able to call upon the armed forces to
maintain or restore law and order when it is beyond the power of civil
authorities to do so. The role of the Canadian Maritime Forces, in
conjunction with other elements of the Canadian Forces, is not to replace civil
power, but to assist civil authorities in re-establishing law and order.
c.
Assistance to Other Government Departments. OGDs and other levels of
Government are assisted, to enforce Canadian national sovereignty and
interest claims, and to conduct domestic operations, in areas such as fisheries
protection, drug interdiction and environmental protection.
d.
Search and Rescue (SAR). The Navy makes a vital contribution to the
maintenance and operation of Canada’s search and rescue capability.
Maritime Forces must be able to respond within 8 hours to any SAR tasking.
These taskings could vary from the rescue of ship and submarine crews at sea
to search rescue of survivors of a downed aircraft in a remote coastal area.
e.
Oceans Management. The broader regimen of inter-departmental and
interagency measures, official and otherwise, is undertaken within both
domestic and international contexts, with the aim of ensuring the regulation of
activities on, under and above the sea.
f.
Disaster Relief. Maritime Forces play a key role in responding to natural and
man-made disasters. These types of disasters may range from earthquakes,
floods and fires to aircraft disasters like the ill-fated Swiss-Air 111 crash off
the coast of Nova Scotia in 1999.
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3.2.2.2
Diplomatic Role
Maritime Forces are tasked to maintain the capability to conduct a wide range of
missions that can best be described as diplomatic. The Navy is prepared to provide the critical
first response in a transition between peacetime operations and escalating regional tensions. In
the event of a major conflict Canadian ships carry the power and the capability to establish and
hold an initial foothold to allow time for larger joint operations to ensue. For example, in cases
of loss of government control and resulting internal violence (as occurred in Rwanda in 1994) or
concerns about the possible spill-over of ongoing hostilities (as occurred in the former
Yugoslavia in 1996) the conduct of missions classified as Operations Other Than War are seen
as a means to lessen the effects of war or prevent it altogether. Diplomatic missions, as defined
in Reference 1, that the Maritime Forces may be tasked with include but are not limited to:
a.
Preventive Deployments. deployment of forces to contribute to preventing
the development of a specific crisis or conflict generally;
b.
Coercion. the use of force, or the threat of force to persuade an opponent to
adopt a certain pattern of behaviour against their wishes;
c.
Maritime Interdiction Operations (MIOs). the surveillance, interception
and, if necessary, boarding of commercial vessels to verify, re-direct or
impound their cargoes in support of the enforcement of economic sanctions;
d.
Peace Support Operations (PSOs). a generic term, describing operations
designed not to defeat an aggressor, as in the case of war, but rather to assist
diplomatic and humanitarian activities to achieve a long-term political
settlement. The five forms of peace support operations include preventive
diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and post-conflict
peace building. Often described as United Nations (UN) Chapter VI
operations;
e.
Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). an operation to relocate to
a place of safety non-combatants threatened in a foreign country;
f.
Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC). all action and measures undertaken
by a military commander which concern the relationship between a military
force and the government, civil agencies or civilian population in the areas
where the military force is stationed or employed;
g.
Symbolic Use. a form of naval diplomacy in which naval forces can be used
purely to signal a message to a specific government, while not in themselves
posing any threat to an opponent or providing significant assistance to a
friend;
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3.2.2.3
h.
Presence. the exercise of naval diplomacy in a general way involving
deployments, port visits, exercising and routine operating in areas of interest
to declare interest, reassure friends and allies, and to deter;
i.
Humanitarian Assistance (HA). activities conducted by military forces,
mostly in urgent circumstances, to relieve human suffering, especially when
local or governmental authorities are unable, or possibly unwilling, to provide
adequate aid to the population. Humanitarian aid can take the form of
protection against epidemics, provision of food aid, medical aid or assistance
in public health efforts such as re-establishing essential infrastructures, with
or without the consent of the State, if sanctioned by a UN resolution;
j.
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). steps taken by past, present or
potential adversaries to create a positive change in their security relationship
by establishing trust and reducing the risks inherent in misunderstanding or
miscalculation. Examples include agreements to prevent incidents at sea,
such as the US-USSR agreement of 1972 (eventually followed by a separate
Canada-USSR agreement of 1989), prior notification of major military
activities, inviting observers to witness exercises and, ultimately, active
cooperation; and
k.
Track Two Diplomacy. interaction among people from adversarial groups or
nations, intended to explore issues and solutions on an informal and unofficial
basis. Typically, this takes the form of academic conferences in which, for
example, military officers, government officials and academics participate as
private individuals rather than as official representatives.
Military Role
The military role or wartime operations refer to offensive and defensive combat
operations conducted inside or outside Canada, usually in concert with allies, against modern
well-equipped forces. Military role missions, as defined in Reference 1, include:
a.
Sea Control. the condition that exists when one has the freedom of action to
use an area of sea for one’s own purposes for a period of time in the
subsurface, surface and above water environments;
b.
Sea Denial. preventing an adversary from controlling a maritime area
without being able to control that area oneself;
c.
Fleet in Being. the use of options provided by the continued existence of
one’s own fleet to constrain the enemy’s options in the use of theirs; and
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d.
Maritime Power Projection. the ability to project, sustain and apply
effective military force from the sea in order to influence events on land.
As described above there are many roles the HALIFAX Class Frigate must be able to
perform. Flexibility of its crew, sensors, weapons and the command and control system is vital
to maintaining the ships’ relevance in the country’s defence strategy.
3.3
HALIFAX CLASS FRIGATE
In the 1970s, the decision was made to replace Canada’s ageing fleet of AntiSubmarine Warfare (ASW) destroyer escorts before the turn of the century. The HALIFAX
Class Frigate program and the acquisition of 12 warships (Table 3-1) starting in the early 1990s
resulted from this decision. These vessels represent the leading edge in naval technology today.
Facts and figures within this subsection are from the Navy Website at www.navy.forces.gc.ca.
Table 3-1
Name
HALIFAX
VANCOUVER
VILLE DE QUEBEC
TORONTO
REGINA
CALGARY
MONTREAL
FREDERICTON
WINNIPEG
CHARLOTTETOWN
ST. JOHN’S
OTTAWA
Displacement:
Dimensions:
Propulsion:
Crew:
Hangar:
HALIFAX Class Ships
Hull
330
331
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
Commissioned
29/06/92
23/08/93
14/7/94
29/07/93
30/9/94
12/5/95
21/7/94
10/9/94
23/6/95
9/9/95
24/6/96
28/9/96
Homeport
Halifax
Esquimalt
Halifax
Halifax
Esquimalt
Esquimalt
Halifax
Halifax
Esquimalt
Halifax
Halifax
Esquimalt
4770 tons full load
134.1 x 16.40 x 4.9 meters (444.5 x 54 x 17 feet)
1 x 8,800shp Pielstick diesel, 2 x GE LM2500 gas turbines, 47,500
shp, 2 shafts, 29+ knots
230 – including air department
one, for 1 CH-124
The HALIFAX Class carries a formidable array of weapons and sensor systems. For
hard-kill effectiveness, this class of ship is capable of carrying: 8 Harpoon Surface-to-Surface
Missiles (SSMs), 16 Sea Sparrow Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs), a 57mm gun, a 20mm
Phalanx (Gatling Gun) Close In Weapons System (CIWS), 8 x 50 cal machine guns and 24 Mk3.6
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46 torpedoes. These ships can defend themselves using soft-kill technologies such as Infrared
(IR) suppression, chaff and IR flares, a towed acoustic decoy (NIXIE), and a radar deception
device (Reprogrammable Advanced Multi-Mode Shipborne ECM System (RAMSES)). In
addition, the ship’s torpedo-carrying helicopter significantly extends its range of operational
effectiveness.
The relevant ships sensors and weapons are shown in Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2
3.3.1
HALIFAX Class Frigate Weapons and Sensors
HALIFAX Crew Organizational Structure
The normal complement of 230 personnel is organized into departments as depicted
in Figure 3-3 below.
3.3.1.1
The Combat Department
The Combat Department, consists of personnel from the Naval Electronic Sensor
Operator (NES OP), Sonar Operator (SON OP), Naval Combat Information Operator (NCI OP)
and Naval Communicator (NAV COMM) sections. The Combat Department manages and
disseminates the data from all available sensors to form the Recognized Maritime Picture
(RMP). The navigation and weather forecasting services are also functions of the Combat
Department, however they are not relevant to this study.
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Figure 3-3
HALIFAX Departmental Organization
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The officer in charge of the Combat Department is the Combat Officer. This position
is filled by either a LCdr or LT(N) qualified to assume the role of an Operations Room Officer.
The ORO position is the Combat Officer’s primary job at sea. To assist in the management of
the department the Combat Officer has a Deputy Combat Officer, who is also qualified as an
ORO, or two subordinate OROs (Weapons Officer and Operations Officer), and a Chief Petty
Officer who fills an administrative role. Each section of the Combat Department is represented
by a Divisional Officer (DO) and a Petty Officer 1st Class. The Combat Department’s four
sections are manned by the following occupational trades:
3.3.1.2
a.
NES OP. Naval Electronic Sensor Operators operate the above water warfare
sensors and countermeasures of the ship. These sensors include Canadian
Electronic Warfare System (CANEWS), AN/SRD-502, SHIELD, RAMSES
and the Separate Track and Illumination RADAR (STIRs). PO1 NES
Operations man the Above Water Warfare Director (AWWD) position.
b.
NCI OP. The NCI OP is responsible for the overall combat information flow.
They process and manage the data collected by the ship’s sensors (for
example, AN/SPS-49 and AN/SPS-505) as well as other internal and external
sources. This information is displayed at the various positions via the CCS.
PO1 NCI OP man the IMD position.
c.
SON OP. The SON OPs are responsible for the operation of the underwater
sensors and countermeasures and the data derived from their use. The active
and passive acoustic equipment they manage include the AN/SQS-510 hull
mounted SONAR, CANTASS, and Sonobuoy processing gear. PO1 Sonar
Operations man the Under Water Warfare Director (UWWD) position.
d.
NAV COMM. Naval Communicators are responsible for the management of
communications, (such as tactical voice or message traffic) incoming and
exiting the ship.
Operations Room Personnel, Positions and Responsibility
The management and dissemination of information is complex. The organization
required to complete these tasks successfully is shown in Figure 3-4. The personnel identified in
Figure 3-4 comprise the full Command and Control (C2) team in the Operations Room of the
HALIFAX Class.
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Commanding
Officer
Officer of the Watch
Warfare Officer
Operations
Room Officer
Operations Room
Communicator
Operations Room
Supervisor
Information
Management Director
Sensor Weapons
Controller
Shipborne Air
Controller
Assistant Sensor
Weapons Controller
GSSC Operator
Track Supervisor
Electronic Warfare
Supervisor
Sonar Control
Supervisor
Radar Tracker 1
ARRO
Communications
Intercept Operator
Sonobouy
Processing System
Operator
Radar Tracker 2
ASPO
Electronic Support
Measures Operator
Hull-Mounted Sonar
Operator
Fire Control
Supervisor
STIR
Operator 2
STIR
Operator 1
Figure 3-4
3.3.1.3
CANTASS
Supervisor
CANTASS
Operator 1
CANTASS
Operator 2
HALIFAX Class Operations Room Organization
Operations Room Watch Systems
The Watch and Station Bill for each section within a department details the manning
requirements for both action stations and watch systems. The normal watch system for manning
the Combat Department is the two-watch system referred to as Port and Starboard watches. The
following describes the action stations and watch systems:
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a.
Action Stations - First Degree of Readiness. The Operations Room is in its
highest state of alert with all positions manned. The remainder of the ship’s
company is manned for weapons loading, casualty clearing and damage
control. Weapons are in the “Standing-To” state to whatever policy is in
effect. All positions are manned.
b.
Two-Watch System – Port and Starboard. The ship is in its second highest
state of readiness. One half of the Combat Department is on watch while the
remainder is off watch. The watch hours are 7 hrs on then 5 hrs off and 5 hrs
on then 7 hrs off. This watch system is also known as the Second Degree of
Readiness. Depending on the weapons policy in effect ammunition may or
may not be provided to the weapons. When the ship is in the Second Degree
of Readiness and evolutions such as Replenishment at Sea or Rescue Stations
will deplete the Combat Department of on-watch operators, minimum
manning levels must be established. These levels may be required in other
degrees of readiness, and may vary as dictated by operational considerations,
ship's tasking, threat and other factors. The ORO must ensure that only
essential personnel are retained as on-watch operators. For Watch and Station
Bill planning purposes the following minimum manning levels are offered:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
ORO and Directors;
SAC – as required;
CI – 3 NCI OP;
AWW – 3 NES OP;
UWW – 3 SON OP; and
COMM – 7 NAV COMMS (includes Snr NAV COMM);
c.
Three-Watch System – Red, White and Blue. This watch system is seldom
used by the Combat Department. In the event this watch system is in effect
the Directors would not normally be manned and the ORO would be in the
Operations Room or on call, able to respond at short notice to emergency
situations.
d.
Four-Watch System – 1st Port, 2nd Port, 1st Starboard and 2nd
Starboard. Personnel stand one out of every four. When the ship is on
independent operations with a normal tempo and overall ships manning
permits the four-watch system the CO may approve its use. Although this is
the most relaxed watch system, it creates a longer workday. Personnel are
required to work from 0800 to 1600 hours (if not on watch), in addition to
standing their watches from 1600 to 0800 hours. During the four-watch
system the Operations Room is manned as required (minimum manning). The
Director positions are not manned, weapons are stood down and ammunition
is secured. Just as in the three-watch system the ORO would be in the
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Operations Room or on call, able to respond at short notice to emergency
situations.
3.3.1.4
Weapons Readiness States
There are three weapon readiness states, Secured, Closed Up and Cleared Away, and
Standing-To. These are described in greater detail in Subsections 3.3.1.4.1 to 3.3.1.4.3.
3.3.1.4.1
Secured
Secured is the normal weapon readiness state applied when there is no requirement to
man weapons. Secured state is assumed when reverting to a lower degree of readiness. Once
reporting that they are secured personnel remain in position and monitor communications until
receipt of the order “SECURE PERSONNEL”, from the Directors. Upon hearing this command
all positions will release their SHINCOM terminals and stand down.
3.3.1.4.2 Closed Up and Cleared Away
Closing Up and Clearing Away duties are carried out at the order: “ASSUME THE
1st/2nd DEGREE OF ABOVE WATER WARFARE READINESS or UNDER WATER
WARFARE READINESS”. This readiness order is normally given once the oncoming watch
has fully turned over. The on-watch personnel proceed to “Close up and Clear Away” their
positions. “Closed Up and Cleared Away” is the report passed when all positions have cleared
away their equipment and have sufficient personnel manning to respond to any expected threat.
Once all Surface and Air Weapons Systems (SAWS) positions are “Closed up and Cleared
Away” a report is made to the AWWD from the FC Sup that SAWS (which includes their
subordinate positions) is “Closed Up and Cleared Away”.
A similar report on the status of the Under Water Warfare (UWW) Team to the
UWWD is done by the Sonar Control Supervisor (SCS). When all required reports have been
received by the Directors, they in turn report to the ORO “Port or Starboard Watch” “Closed up
and Cleared Away”. At this time the required policy will be discussed with or recommended to
the ORO by the AWWD and UWWD.
3.3.1.4.3
Standing-To
Standing-To is assumed on the “Policy Order” or “Action” or “Alarm” and is
automatically assumed whenever the watch is relieved. Personnel and equipment are ready for
immediate action with appropriate ammunition provided as required by the Policy Order, unless
otherwise ordered by the Directors.
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Policy Orders are a quick and efficient means of verbally initiating Standing-To
procedures to bring the AWW or UWW armament to a level required for action or exercise. The
AWWD provides the Policy Order to the AWW Team as the UWWD does for the UWW Team:
3.3.1.5
a.
upon receipt of all appropriate closing-up and clearing-away reports; and/or
b.
whenever a policy change is required; and
c.
on receipt of all “Standing-to” reports from the AWW and UWW teams the
AWWD and UWWD respectively report to the ORO.
Warning Levels
Based on the threat in each area of warfare, Air, Surface and Subsurface are broken
down into three warning levels, referred to as White, Yellow and Red. These levels are
expressed as follows:
a.
White. the lowest posture where no hostile or threat activity exists;
b.
Yellow. a higher posture than white with a possibility that an attack may
occur; or
c.
Red. the highest level indicating there is a strong and imminent likelihood of
an attack.
These indications are normally passed by the AWWD and UWWD when they hold
the principal warfare duties of Local Anti-Air Warfare Controller (LAAWC), Anti-Air Warfare
Controller (AAWC) or the ASWC. These warnings are passed externally as part of their
Warfare SITuation REPort (SITREP) on the applicable warfare net. Warning levels are
displayed on the SSD.
3.3.2
HALIFAX Class Frigate Operations Room Layout
The layout of the HALIFAX Class Frigate Operations Room is shown in Figure 3-5.
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Figure 3-5
3.4
HALIFAX Class Frigate Operations Room Crew Layout
HALIFAX CLASS FRIGATE COMPOSITE SCENARIO
The composite scenario which formed the basis of this analysis is contained in Annex
B. The reason for using a composite scenario was twofold: first, to focus the analysis on
mission sequences that are particularly demanding from a workload perspective or are likely to
be critical to requirements definition and the eventual design of the user interface; and second, to
avoid wasting effort by analyzing functions that have already been analyzed, are unlikely to be
critical to overall system performance, or are unlikely to provide any added value. The scenario
used in this project was used in previous studies, References 6, 7 and 9. Small changes were
made to the scenario to include the Warfare Officer and IMD roles, neither of which were
included in previous studies.
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4SECTION FOUR – HIERARCHICAL GOAL ANALYSIS
4.1
GENERAL
The objective of a Hierarchical Goal Analysis is to identify the goals (and hierarchy
of goals) that must be satisfied by the system being analyzed to achieve specific mission
objectives. The missions for the HALIFAX Class Frigates – broadly defined as Constabulary,
Diplomatic, or Military – are described in Subsections 3.2.2.1, 3.2.2.2 and 3.2.2.3. The goals for
the three mission types were decomposed to the second level; however given the overlap
between all three it was decided early in the process, and agreed with by the SA, that only the
mission representing the military role would be fully decomposed and analyzed as it captured the
critical sequences being used to develop the baseline networks and captured the majority of all
operations room goals. The additional effort to decompose the constabulary and diplomatic
missions would not have generated any significant benefit. The methodology employed is
described in Subsection 2.2.
4.2
GOAL ANALYSIS RESULTS
4.2.1
Goal Decomposition Products
Hierarchical Goal Decomposition Diagrams (HGDDs) are graphical representations
of the logical relationships between the various hierarchical goals, during the performance of a
mission. Typically HGDDs are developed for top-, first- and second-level goals that are
identified from the mission analysis and consultations with SMEs. Lower-level goals are
developed using a structured database that may or may not be able to display HGDDs. This
project used Task Architect® for all goal development and was able to display all levels in
HGDDs.
4.2.2
Top-Level Goals
Top-level goals represented the overall mission (constabulary, diplomatic, or
military) as a series of individual elements performed either alone or in conjunction with other
mission elements. As described earlier, only the military mission is decomposed in the HGA
beyond the second level, the Top-level goal is: “I want to perceive that (represented as “…”) the
use of the sea is denied to enemy forces”. This goal and its sub-goals (i.e., first-level goals) are
shown in Figure 4-1.
4.2.3
First-Level Goals
The top-level goal is decomposed into first-level goals that define the sub-goals
involved in satisfying the higher-level goal. First-level goals, referred to as mission objectives,
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are still general in nature and are included according to the tactical or physical requirements
dictated by the mission scenario. The first-level goals of the HGA are shown in Figure 4-2,
along with sub-goals associated with one of these first-level goals.
4.2.4
Second-Level Goals
First-level goals are decomposed into one or more second-level goals. Typically
lower-level goals serve as an interaction with physical interface, however in this goal hierarchy
the second-level goals are still very cognitive in nature. Hierarchical goal diagrams for the first
level and second level of the military role are shown below from Figure 4-1 through Figure 4-8.
Also included in this report (Annex C) is the entire goal hierarchy for the military mission
decomposed to the lowest levels in the tabular form in accordance with Reference 4.
Figure 4-1
Top-Level Goal with Sub-Goals
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Figure 4-2
Figure 4-3
Sub-Goal 1 – “I want to perceive that the current mission is
received and acknowledged”
Sub-Goal 2 – “I want to perceive that predeployment preps are complete”
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Figure 4-4
Sub-Goal 3 – “I want to perceived that the ship is ready to
undertake critical operational taskings”
Figure 4-5
Sub-Goal 4 – “I want to perceive that the combat organization and
resources are managed effectively”
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Figure 4-6
Sub-Goal 5 – “I want to perceive that an optimal level of
Situational Awareness is being maintained”
Figure 4-7
Sub-Goal 6 – “I want to perceive that ongoing operational tasks
are being actioned effectively”
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Figure 4-8
4.3
DISCUSSION
4.3.1
Goal Allocation
Sub-Goal 7 – “I want to perceive that mission/action follow-up
procedures are completed”
The goal allocation (Annex C), as shown in Table 4-1, does not necessarily reflect the
workload on each operator. It does indicate that goal allocation is commensurate with
responsibility and experience. The exception to the rule is the Commanding Officer, who, while
he has the highest level of experience, is not a constant fixture in the operations room and cannot
be relied upon to drive the goals. This fact is reflected in that each first level goal, allocated to
the Commanding Officer, was secondarily allocated to the ORO. The ORO is the senior
operator in the operations room and is delegated certain responsibilities in the absence of the
Commanding Officer.
Table 4-1
Goal Allocation
Operator/Position
Commanding Officer
Operations Room Officer (ORO)
Sensor Weapon Controller (SWC)
Assistant Sensor Weapon Controller (ASWC)
Information Management Director (IMD)
Operations Room Supervisor (ORS)
Track Supervisor
ARRO
Primary
Allocation of
Goal
34
86
111
76
64
19
18
19
Secondary
Allocation of
Goal
70
199
66
53
14
196
40
14
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Table 4-1
Goal Allocation
Primary
Allocation of
Goal
5
24
49
52
5
Operator/Position
ASPO
Electronic Warfare Supervisor
Warfare Officer/Staff
Other
Shipborne Aircraft Controller
Secondary
Allocation of
Goal
18
22
5
0
18
Given that the HGA is a “snap shot” of the complete workings of the operations room
the more senior operators will naturally be allocated the majority of goals. The junior operators
tend to repeat goals more frequently in their day-to-day activities, so while they are as occupied
or as busy as the senior operators, they are allocated fewer unique goals.
The SWC has the most goals because as a director he/she is responsible for surface
and air picture compilation, and surface and air warfare. In a general-purpose frigate this
effectively doubles the SWC’s responsibilities in comparison to the ASWC, who is only
responsible for subsurface picture compilation and warfare.
The SCS was not identified as a position of interest in this project. Consequently the
SCS was not included in the analysis, which proved to be troublesome. This operator has
responsibilities similar to those of the EWS but in the ASW domain. In the HGA, goals
allocated to this position were listed as owned by ‘other’, however, the position was included
explicitly in the upward information flow analysis. The SCS position should have been
analyzed.
Considering that the HGA was produced for an existing system, and that the domain
experts were able to produce the goal decomposition effectively, the allocation of the goals to
operations room operators was a natural outcome of the analysis. It is worthy of note that when
the domain experts were taught how to complete the hierarchy of goals, the concept of goals
rather than functions was not immediately apparent. Following decomposition of the first goal,
the CMC team was able to revisit Reference 4 and self-critique until a good understanding of the
objectives was obtained.
Given the complex matrix type organization of the Operations Room the majority of
goals have a primary and secondary allocation, where the secondary ‘owner’ of the goal is
prepared to step in and assume responsibility for the goal if the primary ‘owner’ is occupied with
another warfare area or higher priority goal. During the subsequent analysis (specifically the
upward flow of information and critical activities), the secondary allocation of the goal was
tracked. Secondary allocation should be considered as a mandatory goal characteristic in all
complex systems.
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One of the techniques used when employing SMEs to confirm the HGA goals and
goal allocation directly assisted in developing credibility with the merits of the HGA process and
capability of the analysts. SME operators were asked to describe activities performed during the
application of their duties; these were then matched against goals. During this process, by the
second SME session, there were no occasions when an activity or specific task identified by an
SME could not be mapped against a relevant goal or sub-goal. To better support goal
development a ‘bottom-up’ review of the goal decomposition should be conducted to validate the
top-down process.
Despite the steep learning curve the HGA was eventually understood by the domain
experts and accepted as a suitable and useful analytical tool. The HGA process should be
considered for future human engineering analysis requirements.
4.3.2
Usage
The goal hierarchy was used as the basis for the upward information flow and the potential
instabilities analysis. The PCT tables, Annex D, were also used to collect goals with the same
external variables - the far right column in the table – used for potential instability analysis.
These goals, along with the allocated operator, were collected and analyzed as described in
Subsection 5.3.
By relating the goals and sub-goals, the need to transmit information upward, in order
to satisfy parent goals, was identified. This upward information flow analysis is further
described in Subsection 5.4.
The HGA provides a strong tool to be used to investigate proposed changes to the
Operations Room, as the insertion of new goals/sub-goals in the hierarchy would be intuitively
obvious to any analyst familiar with the operations room.
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5SECTION FIVE – IP/PCT
5.1
General
This section provides results and a discussion of results for the important analyses
conducted with the hierarchy of goals introduced in the previous section. The three areas of
analysis are:
a.
b.
c.
Perceptual Control Theory Analysis;
Potential Instabilities; and
Upward Information Flow.
Please refer to Subsection 2.3 for the methodology used to produce the results.
5.2
PERCEPTUAL CONTROL THEORY
5.2.1
Results - PCT
The results of the Perceptual Control Theory analysis are contained in Annex D.
Each page in the Annex contains the PCT data for a goal – they are ordered by goal number.
The goal hierarchy for the Halifax Class Frigate operations room, decomposed for the military
role, has a total of 562 goals; therefore Annex D contains 562 PCT tables. The scope of the
study (see Subsection 1.3) did not include all operations room operators; however, all upperlevel goals and most lower-level goals were included in the analysis.
5.2.2
Discussion - PCT
The resultant information compiled from the PCT analysis concurs with the intuitive
concept of hierarchical goals. The lowest level goals require the fewest knowledge states, and
have better defined initiating conditions, ending conditions, and influenced external variables.
The higher-level goals tend to require a greater number of declarative and situational knowledge
parameters, have more vague ending conditions (the goals tended to be ongoing for lengthy
periods of each scenario), and require influence of other operators and internal variables. The
higher-level goals represent the command end of the spectrum whereas the lower-level goals
require influence of individual parameters and are at the control end of the spectrum.
The collection of the PCT data was difficult due to the complexity of the type of
information being sought and the terminology used to describe it. The review of PCT data by
SMEs was also difficult. The volume of information that was required before meaningful review
could take place made the process prohibitively time consuming. The Technical Authority, fully
familiar with the PCT information requirements, was used for the review in place of the SMEs.
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The terms ‘input / sensation’ and ‘output / behaviour’ required constant review in
order for the domain experts and SMEs to define the properties correctly. The expression and
verbal anchors, although well understood by psychologists, are foreign to military operators and
throughout the project constant redefinition of the expression was necessary. This would have
been alleviated with more descriptive expressions or additional training for military individuals
more familiar with operations equipment. There was also an issue of the higher-level goals
simply being understood only as an aggregate of the sub-goals. The domain experts, on several
occasions, had to revisit goals and assess them as stand alone entities in order to properly define
their properties. In time the domain experts became comfortable with the concept and were able
to accurately and concisely complete the tables. This should be considered when planning to
conduct an HGA in the future as the domain experts and/or SMEs will require additional time to
comprehend the concepts before proceeding with PCT data collection.
The determination of the controlled variable was difficult to achieve. In Hendy et
al.’s paper [Reference 4], Table 2 does not show ‘influenced “controlled” variable’, as it is only
in Table 1. The controlled variable should be included in Table 2 – separate from the internal
and external variables already defined.
The specification of external variables was not a simple task. The first problem
facing the analysts was the definition of the actual variable. For example, in the case of data
transmission, the external variables being manipulated are the MCOIN / DWAN / COWAN
interfaces, however this was reworded to reflect an operator requiring access to the system. As a
second example the ‘Weapon Veto Panel’ is the physical manifestation of the interface, however
the variable is the enabling of weapons through the weapon veto panel, therefore the external
variable was worded to be – “Enabling of weapons through the 'Weapon Veto Panel'”. LINK 11,
the current tactical datalink used in the Halifax Class Frigate, was at first considered an external
variable and then dropped, as it is really a system that provides information – and that
information is available to all operators simultaneously – LINK 11 is a system that enhances the
SSD input interface not an external variable.
The resolution of other operators, being acted upon by the assigned operator, as
external variables was eventually concluded through the definition of conduit clashes. It was
decided that these clashes were not to be considered in the potential instability analysis, however
it was not successfully resolved as to how to effectively model or analyze the demands on other
operators in a complex multi-operator system within the current HGA structure and set of
analytical tools. As an example of this issue the ORS is required to conduct a different set of tasks
to support each of the ORO, SWC, ASWC, and SAC in order to facilitate a number of specific
goals and if each of these operators had to have the ship’s heading be in a certain direction for
each of the same goals only the ship’s heading, as an external variable, would be captured as a
potential instability. However, the ‘demand’ on the operators is only captured during the task
network analyses, which is an incomplete representation of the goal hierarchy and therefore does
not capture all potential instabilities. In a complex matrix type organization operators that directly
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support the completion of a goal should be included in the potential instability analysis. The HGA
could capture the ‘demand’ by including operators as a special category or external variable.
The PCT data, while time consuming to collect and difficult to review with SMEs,
proved to be extremely useful in subsequent analyses. It directly supported the potential
instability and upward information flow analyses through the provision of external variables,
input/output interfaces and controlled variables. It also supported the critical activities analysis
as the domain experts and SMEs were able to refer back to the PCT tables in order to judge the
levels of knowledge required, the cognitive processes involved and the interaction with the real
world expected for a specific goal.
5.3
POTENTIAL INSTABILITY
5.3.1
Results – Potential Instability
The following external variables were identified as being controlled/influenced by
more than one operator and therefore potential sources of instability in the system:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
access to message files;
maintenance of stateboards;
access to MCOIN / DWAN / COWAN;
tasking of CANEWS;
enabling of weapons through the 'Weapon Veto Panel';
ship's heading and speed;
STIR designation;
A/SPS 49 Radar control / configuration;
SG 150 Radar control / configuration;
application of CCS 330 overlays;
CANTASS employment;
machinery state - propulsion and power generation; and
communications configuration - internal and/or external.
Annex I contains tables listing the goals associated with each external variable in
conflict, the allocated operator, and domain expert’s suggestions for stable control.
During the analysis phase it was determined that a designation made during the
collection of PCT data was insufficient. Initially the configuration of radar was considered as an
external variable, however, as the analysis matured, it became obvious that the two radars are
employed to support many common and several unique goals; therefore, analysing the AN/SPS
49 and SG 150 radars individually provided more detail for the instability analysis.
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5.3.2
Discussion – Potential Instability
The current command and control structure that is in place provides a number of
mechanisms that prevent instabilities. Specific operators are dedicated to the configuration or
assignment of weapons and sensors – any other operator wishing to influence the equipment is
aware of who in the operations room is responsible for that equipment and requests any changes
through them. Overall, the number of potential instabilities was found to be low for a system as
large and complex as the operations room of a frigate.
When the analysts attempted to determine the potential instabilities inherent in the
operations room, the earlier difficulties encountered in understanding and applying aspects of
IP/PCT were re-encountered by SMEs. Despite this, the use of IP/PCT to develop a list of
potential instabilities was proven to be a sound analytical tool. This tool could be applied to
systems in development as a method of identifying design issues prior to implementation.
Not surprisingly and as determined through the analysis, the potential for instability
seemed to increase substantially in situations where responsibilities were shared amongst
multiple individuals. In future systems, the ability to create ‘soft control interfaces’ accessible to
numerous operators could create the potential for instabilities not present in the current
operations room. Future designs will need to consider this, and devise strategies that effectively
manage the risk. One approach that might be effective is to limit access to equipment controls to
the primary and secondary owner of the goal responsible for those specific settings. New
systems must not precipitate new instabilities through poor design or excessive near concurrent
control of system parameters by multiple users. As an example, a new air search radar will be
configurable through a software page, however only the operators logged onto the system as
ARRO or TS should have write access to the page, all others should have read only. During the
design of future complex naval systems, the splitting of responsibilities for equipment or sensor
settings should be restricted, if possible, to keep the responsibility with a limited number of
people, preferably the owner of the goal responsible for the relevant system settings and, as a
backup, the secondary goal owner.
A further area for potential instability can occur when individual operators are not
aware of the reasons for which systems are currently configured. In this situation, they might be
more inclined to initiate a change, unaware of other operator needs for the current
configurations. A means to avoid potential confusion over the control and configuration of
sensors would be to provide an explanation of current settings and sensor employment in the
SSD (who input settings and why). In this way, any potential confusion over the rationale and
requirement for current sensor settings could be avoided. The SSD should accommodate
information providing operators with ready access to sensor configurations and the goals that
they are currently supporting.
The operations room operators are constantly dealing with rapidly changing and
conflicting priorities (goals). This is a source of instability that requires active management in
order to avoid poor picture management and the loss of situational awareness. Current processes
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place responsibility for setting priorities with the CO and/or ORO. The ORO must be cognizant
of conflicting taskings and set warfare priority via briefings and direction to Directors, while
ensuring the concurrence of the CO. While this is currently executed primarily through verbal
interaction, there are occasions when awareness of priorities breaks down. The use of shared
situation awareness displays could help to mitigate this potential source of instability. Further,
the ORS needs to know the tactical requirements (settings) and priorities but does not have a
dedicated display because the ORS duties require the operator to roam to monitor subordinate
operators. The implementation of shared displays could assist the ORS in maintaining
awareness of the current operational picture.
The strategies for risk mitigation are numerous. Depending on the type of external
variable the proposed solution for stable control varies. The discussions below captures the
suggestions developed by domain experts and confirmed by SMEs.
To prevent operators from having to wait to read messages from a file, electronic
messages can be electronically distributed to the appropriate recipient. The electronic message
file could be developed to allow for multiple simultaneous use from the CCS work station.
The operations room should be configured to ensure visibility of stateboards to all
operators who require information. All stateboards should also be accessible on SSD by a
simple method of selection such as a touch screen. An electronic stateboard could have visual
aids for different types of information using colour/shape/etc, which would allow more
information to be displayed without losing the "information at a glance" benefit of a stateboard.
Dedicated positions should be given write privileges to their specific stateboard.
To reduce the demands on the ORO to conduct electronic chat, the use of chat should
be co-ordinated between the IMD and the ORO. To co-ordinate administrative and operational
demands on the limited chat circuits available, the ORO should control access by Heads Of
Departments and the Executive Officer to chat as required.
To preserve bandwidth availability, the IM Plan must prioritize warfare and ownship
requirements. There should be an automated visual method of indicating priority and subsequent
taskings of bandwidth intensive activities.
To best utilize sensors the ORO must be aware of potentially conflicting taskings and
set usage priorities. Proximity between the ORO and directors would assist in this – the
HMCCS layout of the operations room should take these potential instabilities into account. The
ORO must remain aware of needs for weapons – an enhanced command decision aid would
assist with this.
With respect to employment weapons and sensors, where they impact on ROE, the
SWC and ASWC could be aware of current ROE through a more effective user interface, to
prevent instabilities arising from improper use of weapons or sensors.
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The current command, control, and charge doctrine should stay intact as all demands
for ship's course or speed from the operations room must go through the CO or ORO. To avoid
instabilities of control the CO and ORO must remain collocated to prevent simultaneous control
demands. Only one of the CO or ORO should have control of ship's course and speed, and as
determined during the SME visit to HMCS WINNIPEG, in the ship the ORO is the only operator
in the operations room that passes conning orders to the OOW; therefore, in this instance, HMCS
WINNIPEG has eliminated the potential instability.
Potential instabilities resulting from coordination of Task Group and ownship
priorities has led to the recent addition in the operations room of a Warfare Officer. The
relationship between the Warfare Officer and ship's officers will have to be worked out in
advance of high intensity operations, such as those modelled in the task networks. The
relationship should then be rehearsed and refined.
CCS should lock out non-critical users. When the STIR is used in support of picture
compilation and weapon engagement goals, priority must be given to weapons engagement. The
ORO must be cognizant of conflicting taskings and set warfare priority via briefings and
direction to directors. Again the proximity of directors to one another and to the ORO reduces
this potential conflict.
The current limitation in defining and filtering lines, circles and arcs on CCS 330
causes a constant struggle to minimize their use. Greater granularity in the selection of overlays
is required to allow for individual use. A new system should have greater capacity for overlays
and the ability to preview the screen to visualize a planned overlay prior to applying an overlay.
The tactical picture compilation should take precedence over operational picture
requirements – reducing potential concurrent demands for system resources.
With respect to the ship all requests for changes to engineering state must be passed
through the ORO to the OOW and CO. A CCS page should exist that captures and reports the
machinery states.
To avoid stepping on operators communicating by SHINCOM, a visual indicator
should be added that shows that a console operator is currently on an external circuit.
To reduce the requirements for voice communications, real-time text based
communications should be increased. In addition to using this for info transfer, the use of text
alerts for operators to establish internal communications in other than urgent situations should be
considered.
A number of the suggestions appear vague – they must be considered in the context
of the external variable and goal associated with them. For complete context refer to Annex I.
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An issue that was raised and investigated was that of other operators being external
variables within the system representing a cause of instability. The term coined during the
project was ‘conduit clashes’ which was an attempt to describe the situation occurring when an
operator is engaged with satisfying one goal, while another operator requires the first operator’s
attention for completion of a second goal. It was determined that the task network analysis
would indicate when operators were overwhelmed and could not be expected to immediately
support a goal.
Grouping of multiple external variables, such as the AN/SPS 49 and SG 150 as a
radar, lead to the identification of potential stabilities that were not validated. External variables
should be identified by their most basic component. Overall the potential instability analysis
was very sound, illustrating that the Navy has adapted its doctrine and procedures in the complex
environment of the operations room to prevent many potential problems.
5.4
UPWARD INFORMATION FLOW
5.4.1
Results – Information Flow
The Upward Information Flow analysis is captured in table form in Annex H. The
results may be viewed in tabular format and also in link diagrams. The link diagrams are
formatted to be compatible with an interactive viewer application developed during the contract.
The viewer has been made available to DRDC Toronto, DRDC Atlantic and to DND. DND has
found it a useful aid for developing the HMCCS HMI source documentation. Figure 5-1
illustrates the viewer’s output.
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Figure 5-1
Format for Information Flow Viewer Output
The link diagrams show up to five ‘views’ for each top-level goal in the military
HGA, these are contained in Annex H. The link diagrams capture the information flow to both
the primary and secondary goal holder and information in the auditory and visual domains – for
each. The fifth diagram combines both owners (primary and secondary) and both domains
(auditory and visual) yielding a total information flow for that top-level goal.
The interactive view uses a series of databases that looks at total occurrences,
frequency and importance (X,Y,Z) in each combination of operator and each communication
type (e.g., primary verbal etc.) in absolute figures. A user guide has been included with the
viewer software.
As an example of the information types that can be queried from the viewer, consider
the interaction required between the SWC and ORO, considering goals where they are the
primary or secondary operators in the entire military role goal hierarchy:
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5.4.2
a.
SWC to ORO has 112 total requirements for communications of which only
59% are important (includes primary and secondary allocation);
b.
SWC to ORO has 65 communication requirements that are addressed
verbally, of which 58% are important (includes primary and secondary
allocation);
c.
SWC to ORO has 65 communication requirements that are addressed verbally
of which 23% are frequent (includes primary and secondary allocation);
d.
SWC to ORO has 38 important communication requirements that are
addressed verbally (primary allocation only); and
e.
SWC to ORO has 15 frequent communication requirements that are addressed
verbally (primary allocation only).
Discussion – Information Flow
The information flow results were initially structured in a tabular format. This had
some drawbacks, not the least of which was that the results were difficult to analyze and
understand. Further, the results generated by upward information flow analysis as prescribed in
Hendy et al.’s paper [Reference 4], were found to be potentially misleading in a complex matrix
type system such as the Halifax Class Frigate operations room. For instance, the HGA does not
capture frequency of communication. Each incident of a requirement for information to flow up
the hierarchy is a single count. In an effort to overcome these issues, an information flow viewer
was developed by CMC that could collate the results and clearly display the important aspects of
intra-crew communications.
The viewer was presented to several SMEs and a number of observations were
recorded. The more pertinent observations with respect to redesigning the operations room are:
a.
The high volume of communications between the ORO and SWC represents
the two areas of warfare the SWC is responsible for – air and surface;
b.
Given the relatively low requirement for information flow between the SWC
and ASWC, there is no requirement for them to be co-located; and
c.
The information flow viewer is a useful tool for more detailed analysis,
including assessing the following items:
(1)
determining whether a switch in communication modality makes sense
to reduce operator workload on an overloaded auditory channel;
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(2)
consideration of volume and weighting of information flow (3Dbuildings of different colours);
(3)
studying different representations of related data to enable the
information to be used for varying purposes and/or audiences;
depending on the purpose a single view may not be appropriate
whereas a variation may be more effective;
(4)
instantaneously comparing totals of all 4 types of information flow to
enable an analyst to recommend changes to communication types or
goal associations; and
(5)
using the viewer to identify communication patterns to enhance
teaming. The current operations room layout is not ideal – by
grouping operators differently (co-locating teams if appropriate) the
communication efficiency could be increased.
The ability to analyze in three dimensions (communication transmitter,
communication receiver, and volume) and select variables, such as communication type, primary
or secondary goal allocation and first-level goal association, was well received by the numerous
DND SMEs that were afforded the opportunity to view the results. The 3-D graphical
representation of the upward information flow was more effective than the traditional tabular
form of a link analysis.
Analysis of the data, through the use of the viewer, indicates that the volume of
verbal reports to the primary operator places an overwhelming demand on the auditory channel,
whereas the use of visual stimuli to support upward information flow to the primary operator is
quite limited. This issue was clearly evident from the results of the information flow analysis.
The verbal reports were secondary to the action being conducted by operators and constrained
the available auditory communication channels for tactical discussions and the downward flow
of information in the form of directions and orders. The vast majority of verbal reports could be
replaced with some type of visual indication without exceeding the usual modality. The results
of the upward information flow analysis provided several useful insights that were used to
support the redesign of the Human Machine Interface for the Halifax Class Frigate Operations
Room (HMCCS).
Another issue identified by the HGA was that the ORS provides oversight for
numerous operators, a role that requires constant movement through the operations room. The
ORS does, however, have a secondary responsibility for these goals. Without a dedicated
console, the role of the ORS as a second for several goals is currently satisfied through visual
inspection of other operators’ displays and stateboards. This is not ideal, however, to anchor the
ORS at a console would require a new method of oversight for subordinate operators. This item
was also used in the HMCCS project.
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The usefulness of the analysis with respect to the IMD position was of limited value.
Within the Navy there appears to be considerable debate and uncertainty over the role and
responsibilities for the IMD and to date, there has been insufficient practical application of the
position to establish consistent terms of reference. Each ship at present seems to have slightly
different interpretations of the IMD role. The relationship between the IMD and the remainder
of the Operations Room still needs to be refined, and hence information flow between the IMD
and the Directors could not be effectively gathered or studied.
The volume of information flow between operators and the Warfare Officer is
dependant on the support needed and provided by the ship’s team or by staff, if embarked. As
with the IMD position, this position is difficult to model accurately as each ship and squadron
staffs have unique relationships. No significant conclusions were able to be drawn with respect
to information flow involving the Warfare Officer.
Several key operators were not considered during this study, namely the SAC,
CANEWS operator, FCS, SCS and CANTASS Supervisor. Not specifically studying these
operators had an impact on the completeness of the data collected and information generated
from the information flow analysis.
A traditional link analysis contains both upward and downward information flow –
the analysis contained in this study only studied upward flow. The nature of this analysis –
being upward information only – did not consider lateral information flow, (e.g., ARRO and the
TS discussing a contact that the ARRO is analyzing in support of the SWC’s higher level goal of
maintaining a recognized tactical air picture). It also did not consider any downward flow; i.e.
direction given to ensure a goal is completed. This was discussed with the SA, and it was
postulated that the ratio of downward information flow would be proportional to the upward
information flow in most cases, and therefore only one direction was needed to draw conclusions
with respect to communication requirements. The HGA could be easily amended to provide the
data for a complete link analysis. The downward information flow could be considered as the
initiating condition in the PCT data however it would need to be explicitly defined for use in link
analysis. While upward information flow was good input to the design of the operator
workstation, lateral communications and downward communications should be added in order to
provide a complete link analysis.
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6SECTION SIX – TASK NETWORKS
6.1
RESULTS
The specific critical task sequences (watch turnover; resolve procedure including
issuance of an air warning, conduct of a co-ordinated surface engagement using harpoon
missiles, anti-ship missile defence against an advance surface-to-surface threat, and antisubmarine warfare to include torpedo counter measures and a close-in attack) were selected for
their criticality and the requirement for participation by all operators being studied. During the
SME session regarding the critical operations room sequences (see Subsection 2.6), the SMEs
reinforced the selection of the task networks as representative of the most critical sequences of
activities that operations room crews are required to deal with. At no time were the choice of
scenarios questioned and the SMEs did not recommend other scenarios to augment the five.
Given the tactical nature of the scenarios, the IMD was less involved as the position has been
envisioned as an operational support and planning resource.
The results of the IPME analysis are graphical and tabular in nature. They are
contained in Annexes as follows:
a.
b.
c.
Annex E – Operational Sequence Diagrams;
Annex F – Mean Time Pressure plots; and
Annex G – .IPR summary file.
The Operational Sequence Diagrams contained in Annex E show operator activities
and interactions for each critical sequence against a timeline.
The Mean Time Pressure plots contained in Annex F show the time pressure
experienced by each operator for the duration of the critical sequence based on a sliding one
minute window. It should be noted that in some plots, the data appears to extend off the top of
the graph. In fact, these plots have a maximum at the highest point on the y-axis and the
appearance of a cropped time pressure plot is only an artefact of the plotting routine.
The IPME results were combined into summary .IPR files. These files lists the tasks
effected by the IPME scheduler, the operator, percent of time shed, reason shed, tasks active
when shed, percent of time delayed, reason delayed, tasks active when delayed, percent of time
interrupted, reason interrupted, and tasks active when interrupted. These summary files are
contained in Annex G. The .IPR summary files provide a tabular listing of relevant results,
averaged over the 40 runs for each network. The results are fairly self-explanatory, however it
should be noted that in some cases, the value for percent shed, delayed, or interrupted can exceed
100. This occurs for ‘Receive’ tasks associated with verbal communications between the
operators when the transmission task is interrupted and resumed, thereby creating the possibility
of the same task being shed, delayed, or interrupted more than once per run.
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6.2
DISCUSSION
6.2.1
OSD Development
The OSDs were successfully developed and provided representations of the critical
operational sequences that were easily understood, on an individual basis, by SMEs. In the
multi-threat situation, the SMEs were less able to consider how the individual OSDs would
impact on one another when multiple activities from different OSDs were intertwined in time.
Comments received during the SME review session made it apparent that complete OSDs,
showing how activities from multiple critical task sequences would occur concurrently, were
required for review.
The development of OSDs was best completed on a goal-by-goal basis, that is each
goal listed in the tables below had an associated OSD; however, the SMEs preferred to see the
combined OSD. This was true for all the networks developed for this project. As an example,
the ASMD network was developed with twenty OSDs, one for each goal listed in Table 3-1, then
combined into three sub-networks: command, hardkill and softkill. All operators who reviewed
these separate sub-networks indicated a desire to see the combined network to have a sense of
what else was happening as a trigger for their contribution. The EWS wanted to know what the
SWCs were doing with hardkill to judge their actions with respect to softkill and the ORO
needed to know the status of the hard and softkill to comment on the completeness of command
sub-network.
The approach to task network analysis, based on the top-down HGA, ensured
complete development and representation of the critical task sequences. It ensured that all
operators were included in the analysis through the development and subsequent linking of subnetworks (developed from individual goals or grouping of related goals). IPME proved to be an
extremely effective tool for combining the developed sub-networks to create the baseline
networks, however the effort involved to accomplish this was significant. The initial
development of the networks in IPME required using the input interface in the IPME tool itself,
which is cumbersome, or transferring the data from a tool with a more user-friendly interface.
When it was decided to use a transfer method (from TaskArchitect® via scripting) several bugs
were discovered in the IPME application that caused the work to be corrupted once it was in
IPME. The corruption was subtle and not discovered until many sub-network files were loaded
in IPME and run together. The discovery at this point in the operation caused a great amount of
time to be wasted in the file preparation process and delayed the analysis portion of the project.
This software deficiency was rectified by DRDC – Toronto.
The tables below list the goals and sub-goals that were utilized as part of each
baseline network representing a critical task sequence. Goal Number and Title, from the goal
hierarchy, indicate the goals active in each critical task sequence. The primary operator is also
listed for reference.
6.2
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Table 6-1
Goal #
3
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.1.4
3.1.5
3.1.7
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
Watch Turnover
Goal Title
...ship is ready to undertake critical operational taskings 1st degree of readiness (ACTION STATIONS)
... explanatory Action Station briefings are conducted
... Ops Room is briefed in response to Action Stations
... AWWD team is briefed in response to Action Stations
... ASWD team is briefed in response to Action Stations
... alert crew is briefed in response to Action Stations
... OOW is briefed in response to Action Stations
... ship's company is briefed in response to Action Stations
...combat sub-teams standing to air, surface and sub
surface
...SAWS team are standing to
...UWW team is standing to
Table 6-2
Goal #
5
5.1
5.1.1
5.1.1.1
5.1.1.1.1
5.1.1.1.2
5.1.1.3
5.1.1.3.1
5.1.1.3.1.2
5.1.1.3.1.2.1
5.1.1.3.1.2.2
5.1.1.3.1.2.3
5.1.1.6
5.1.1.6.1
Allocated
Operator
CO
ORO
ORO
SWC
ASWC
SAC
ORO
ORO
ORO
SWC
ASWC
Resolve
Goal Title
Allocated
Operator
...an optimal level of Situational Awareness is being
maintained
...an accurate RMP is created and maintained
...an accurate tactical air picture is compiled
...co-ordination of/with other units is effective
...LINK management occurs to support air picture
compilation
...AAW communication net is effectively
monitored/guarded
...effective air track management
...proper identification of new air contacts
...urgent application of IDCRIT to air contacts using
RESOLVE
...reporting of geophysical details and air rules
occurs(ARRO)
...ESM is reported(EWS)
...SSD overlays are confirmed accurate(IMD)
...information is gathered through the use of warnings
...tactical procedures are known/adhered to
6.3
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CO
ORO
SWC
SWC
ARRO
SWC
ARRO
ARRO
SWC
ARRO
EWS
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ORO
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Table 6-2
Goal #
5.1.1.6.2
Goal Title
...appropriate frequencies are utilized
Table 6-3
Goal #
6
6.1
6.1.2.3
6.1.2.3.1
6.1.2.3.2
6.1.2.3.3
6.1.2.3.4
6.1.2.3.5
6.1.2.3.6
6.1.2.3.7
6.1.2.3.8
6.1.2.3.9
6.1.2.3.10
6.5
6.5.2
6.5.2.2
6.5.2.2.4
6.5.2.2.4.1
6.5.2.2.4.2
6.5.2.2.4.2.1
6.5.2.2.4.2.2
6.5.2.2.4.2.3
6.5.2.2.4.3
6.5.2.2.4.4
6.5.2.2.4.5
6.5.2.2.4.6
6.5.2.2.4.6.1
6.5.2.2.4.6.2
6.5.2.3
Resolve
Allocated
Operator
SAC
Harpoon Engagement
Goal Title
...ongoing operational tasks are being actioned effectively
...assigned warfare duties are properly executed - SCC
(Sea Combat Commander)
...effective execution of SAG procedures
...designation of target
...designation of firing units (FUs) and salvo size for each
...designation of the OTC/SCC/SAG Commander
...designation of TRU and reporting method
...designation of circuits to be employed
...designation of time-on-top
...issuance of PLAN GREYHOUND
...confirmation of receipt of order by SAG participants
...correct time check / grid lock is executed
...correct action by SAG participants
...threat is effectively countered
...surface threat is effectively countered
...TG Surface Warfare is effectively executed
...the effective execution of SAG tactics (Greyhound,
Grouse, Snipe)
...effective use of 3rd party targeting information
...pre-firing considerations are made
...flight corridor check is complete
...background shipping check is complete
...booster drop zone is clear
...appropriate salvo size is chosen
...effective TOT consideration are made
...unit reports ready for SAG action
...effective post firing reactions
...an effective post firing manoeuvre
...reckon track is generated appropriately
...all reports supporting surface warfare are made
Allocated
Operator
CO
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
CO
ORO
SWC
6.4
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SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
ARRO
ORO
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Table 6-3
Goal #
5
5.1
5.1.2
5.1.2.1
5.1.2.2.3
5.1.2.5
Harpoon Engagement
Goal Title
Allocated
Operator
...an optimal level of Situational Awareness is being
maintained
...an accurate RMP is created and maintained
...an accurate tactical surface picture is compiled
...coordination with/of other units is effective
...SSD overlays are implemented
...effective use of ESM to compile a tactical surface
picture
6.5
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ORO
SWC
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SWC
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Table 6-4
Anti-Ship Missile Defence
Goal #
Goal Title
6
6.5
6.5.1
6.5.1.1
6.5.1.1.2
6.5.1.1.2.2
6.5.1.1.2.2.1
6.5.1.1.2.2.1.1
6.5.1.1.2.2.1.2
6.5.1.1.2.2.1.3
6.5.1.1.2.2.2
6.5.1.1.2.2.2.1
6.5.1.1.2.2.2.2
6.5.1.1.2.2.3
6.5.1.1.2.3
6.5.1.1.2.3.1
6.5.1.1.2.3.2
6.5.1.1.2.3.3
6.5.1.1.2.3.4
6.5.2.2.4.6.2
...ongoing operational tasks are being actioned effectively
...threat is effectively countered
...air threat is effectively countered
...self defence is understood and executed
...appropriate ASMD is conducted - ZIPPO reactions
...effective hard kill is achieved
...VLSS/VLESSM engagement is conducted effectively
...appropriate salvo size is chosen
...appropriate salvo spacing is chosen
...appropriate range is used
...57mm engagement is conducted effectively
...appropriate salvo size is chosen
...appropriate range is used
...CIWS engagement is conducted effectively
...effective soft kill is achieved
...effective deployment of distraction chaff occurs
...effective deployment of seduction chaff / IR occurs
...jamming is appropriately utilized
...the ship is effectively manoeuvred for softkill
...reckon track is generated appropriately
Table 6-5
Goal #
6
6.1.2.4
6.1.2.4.1
6.1.2.4.2
6.1.2.4.3
6.1.2.4.4
6.1.2.4.5
6.5
6.5.3
6.5.3.1
6.5.3.1.1
Allocated
Operator
CO
CO
ORO
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
SWC
EWS
EWS
EWS
EWS
EWS
ARRO
Torpedo Countermeasure
Goal Title
...ongoing operational tasks are being actioned effectively
...effective execution of SAU procedures
...designation of target
...designation of SAU units & Cdr
...designation of circuits to be employed
...issuance of SAU plan
...SAU procedures are monitored
...threat is effectively countered
...subsurface threat is effectively countered
...self defence is understood and executed
...appropriate warnings are issued
Allocated
Operator
CO
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
Warfare Officer
CO
ORO
ASWC
ASWC
6.6
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Table 6-5
Goal #
Torpedo Countermeasure
Goal Title
6.5.3.1.2
6.5.3.1.3
6.5.3.1.3.1
6.5.3.1.3.2
6.5.3.1.3.3
6.5.3.1.4
6.5.3.2
...ASW preplans are effectively executed
...TCMs are appropriately conducted
...appropriate course/helm and speed are chosen
...NIXIE is employed appropriately
...NAEBS and/or sonobuoys are effectively utilized
...Mk46 engagement is conducted effectively
...subsurface threat is countered offensively
...effective manoeuvring to maintain contact and
6.5.3.2.1.1
prosecute
6.5.3.2.1.2
...torpedo engagement is conducted effectively
6.5.3.2.1.2.1
...correct settings applied
6.5.3.2.1.2.2
...ownship torpedo is launched
6.5.3.2.2
...SAU procedures effectively executed
6.5.3.2.2.1
...attack plans are effectively executed
6.5.3.2.2.1.1
...assigned sectors/station maintained
6.5.3.2.2.1.2
...torpedo engagement is conducted effectively
6.5.3.2.2.1.2.1 ...correct settings applied
6.5.3.2.2.1.2.2 ...ownship torpedo is launched
6.5.3.2.2.2
...search plans effectively executed
6.5.3.2.2.2.1
...assigned sectors/station maintained
6.5.3.2.2.2.2
...actions are coordinated with other units
6.5.3.2.2.3
...air assets are employed effectively
6.5.3.2.2.3.1
...helo is effectively employed to support SAU
5.1.3
...an accurate subsurface picture is compiled
5.1.3.1
...coordination of/with other units
5.1.3.2.3
...SSD overlays are implemented
5.1.3.2.3.1
...furthest oncircles are accurately plotted and maintained
6.2.2.1.1
...helo is at appropriate alert state / airborne
6.2.2
Allocated
Operator
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
SAC
ASWC
ASWC
ASWC
ASPO
ORO
Summary Files
The workload to prepare the IPME networks and ensure they ran was extensive.
Numerous scripts had to be written to increase the speed of moving data from a suitable
collection medium (in the case of this project TaskArchitect® was used) into IPME. The IPME
application could benefit from additional features that obviate the requirement to ‘customize’ the
application to accommodate the insertion of data for complex networks.
6.7
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The IPME IP/PCT scheduling effects were unable to deal with the complexities and
nuances of task interactions for every combined/multi-task run. IPME IP/PCT uses a scheduler as
the logic engine to determine which tasks are active in any operator’s queue at any time. The
IP/PCT scheduler is invoked whenever new tasks arrive or existing tasks finish. When a new task
is started the scheduler determines how the task will fit into the queues. When a task is completed
the scheduler analyses the queues to determine which tasks need to be active. The scheduler uses
a set of 8 specific rules, listed in the IPME user manual. The scheduler takes into account an
active queue, a temporary queue and a short-term memory queue. The scheduling effects of IPME
in IP/PCT mode require some modification to support a complex environment such as the
operations room. For example, a typical block report only requires approximately 30% of the
auditory attention of the recipient due to the structured nature of the report and the use of verbiage
to separate vital pieces of like information. An example of a block report follows:
During the ASMD task sequence the hard kill goal is supported by the sub-goal
“...VLSS/VLESSM engagement is conducted effectively”. This goal requires the
FCO responsible for STIR ‘A’ will make the following report, “‘A’ system, target
air missile, range 18,000 yards, bearing 045 degrees, closing” as soon as the fire
control system locks onto the inbound missile. For demonstration of the amount
of verbiage in a block report only the information in italics is critical, the
remainder is used for separation of information - enhancing intelligibility.
The addition of a task that captures the transmission and receipt of ‘block reports’ is
required. Neither IPME version 3.0.25 nor IPME/HAWK were efficient tools for analysis on the
scale conducted during this project.
6.2.3
Single Runs – Baseline Networks
With single runs, Table 6-6 to Table 6-10 indicate the number of times the IPME’s
IP/PCT task scheduler shed, delayed or interrupted a task – listed by operator.
Table 6-6
Operator
ORO
SWC
EWS
ARRO
ASPO
# Shed
2
2
2
2
1
Watch Close-Up
# Delayed
6
1
1
0
0
# Interrupted
4
2
2
2
0
Total
12
5
5
4
1
6.8
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Table 6-7
Operator
SWC
EWS
ORS
ARRO
IMD
# Shed
5
4
1
1
1
Resolve
# Delayed
2
3
5
3
2
Table 6-8
Operator
CO
ORO
SWC
EWS
ORS
TS
ARRO
ASPO
SAC
# Shed
10
21
21
21
10
1
12
1
1
Table 6-9
Operator
CO
Warfare Officer
ORO
SWC
ASWC
IMD
ORS
EWS
TS
ARRO
ASPO
SAC
# Shed
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
# Interrupted
1
4
2
4
2
Total
8
11
8
8
5
# Interrupted
2
13
15
15
6
0
14
0
0
Total
15
53
61
54
24
3
42
1
1
# Interrupted
1
1
4
0
1
1
5
1
5
1
1
1
Total
1
17
17
2
1
1
10
1
13
1
1
1
ASMD
# Delayed
3
19
25
18
8
2
16
0
0
Harpoon
# Delayed
0
16
13
2
0
0
5
0
8
0
0
0
6.9
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Table 6-10
Operator
CO
Warfare Officer
ORO
ASWC
ORS
ASPO
SAC
6.2.4
# Shed
53
9
18
63
12
37
15
ASW
# Delayed
63
14
44
70
5
15
5
# Interrupted
56
11
38
49
8
16
5
Total
172
34
100
182
25
68
25
Multi-Threat
Table 6-11 describes the combinations of task networks employed to investigate
multi-threat scenarios, showing the operator targeted, and the lag required between the triggering
of the task networks to maximize the operator’s workload.
Table 6-11
Combined Networks
Combination
Watch Close-up & Resolve
Targeted Operator
ORO
SWC
EWS
ORS
ARRO
Timing Interval
550 second delay to Resolve
500 second delay to Resolve
620 second delay to Resolve
220 second delay to Resolve
550 second delay to Resolve
ASMD & Resolve
ORO
SWC
EWS
ORS
ARRO
No delay – start simultaneously
No delay – start simultaneously
100 second delay to Resolve
No delay – start simultaneously
80 second delay to Resolve
Harpoon & Resolve
CO
Warfare Officer
ORO
SWC
ORS
TS
100 second delay to Resolve
100 second delay to Resolve
100 second delay to Resolve
100 second delay to Resolve
100 second delay to Resolve
100 second delay to Resolve
ASW & Resolve
CO
550 second delay to Resolve
6.10
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Table 6-11
Combination
Combined Networks
Targeted Operator
ORO
ORS
Timing Interval
550 second delay to Resolve
550 second delay to Resolve
Harpoon & ASMD
CO
ORO
SWC
ORS
325 second delay to ASMD
325 second delay to ASMD
325 second delay to ASMD
325 second delay to ASMD
ASW & ASMD
CO
ORO
ORS
525 second delay to ASMD
525 second delay to ASMD
525 second delay to ASMD
ASW & Harpoon
CO
Warfare Officer
ORO
ORS
No delay – start simultaneously
No delay – start simultaneously
No delay – start simultaneously
No delay – start simultaneously
ASW, Harpoon, & ASMD
All operators
Start ASW & Harpoon together –
325 second delay to ASMD
The longer network is listed first with the timing interval referring to the triggered
start time of the second or third network.
The combined networks were developed in order to stress specific operator positions.
The results are portrayed textually in the summary files and graphically in MTP plots.
It is apparent that a number of things happen when an operator is overloaded. The
number of tasks shed, delayed or interrupted increases, the instantaneous time pressure increases
and the length of delays is increased. Table 6-12 shows the marked changes in these three
parameters when the baseline networks representing the fine critical task sequences listed in
Subsection 2.4.1 are combined.
Table 6-12
Operator
CO
Warfare Officer
ORO
SWC
Full Multi-Threat Simulation Results
# Shed
86
36
106
48
# Delayed
84
62
114
35
# Interrupted
56
26
63
22
Total
226
124
283
105
6.11
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Table 6-12
Operator
ASWC
IMD
ORS
EWS
TS
ARRO
ASPO
SAC
Full Multi-Threat Simulation Results
# Shed
51
0
30
16
8
14
35
17
# Delayed
65
0
28
13
28
15
23
6
# Interrupted
44
0
30
8
27
12
15
7
Total
160
0
88
37
63
41
73
30
The torpedo counter measure network was the longest and most complicated,
therefore the tasks and operators affected in the full multi-threat environment are skewed to the
Anti-Submarine Warfare regime.
6.2.5
IPME Output
The baseline networks, once developed, debugged and approved, were easily
combined in IPME to create a simulation of a true multi-threat environment. The varying of
timings when combining networks also provided useful information. The combining of subnetworks , to create each of the five baseline networks, was managed by IPME in an extremely
efficient and effective manner.
Notwithstanding the above, the combined IPME networks could not be visually
generated as an output in the form of an OSD, thereby reducing the SMEs’ effectiveness in
reviewing the results. This was particularly apparent when reviewing combined networks such
as ASMD with an 80 or 100 second delay to a resolve being initiated. The SMEs voiced a desire
to see which tasks were in conflict in the form of an OSD not just from the .IPR summary output
files. It is highly desirable that IPME be capable of producing OSDs representative of the entire
network being analyzed to assist operators in the workload analysis and validation process.
The IPME output was somewhat limited, it took several scripts to combine the output
from the 40 runs into a useful format. Given the extensive effort to generate and run the
networks, it would be difficult to make a case that the output from IPME as it currently exists
provides an efficient means of workload analysis.
The theory of ‘Time Pressure’ was difficult for the SMEs to understand. Using the
information provided by IPME and Reference 4 the SMEs were still confused with workload or
cognitive effort. There was a requirement to remind the SMEs that the majority of the time
pressures were caused by tasks conflicting in the auditory channel and that typically an operator
6.12
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receiving a transmission would either say ‘wait I’m external’ or the operator making the report
would know that recipient would be available in short order and wait.
This situation was exacerbated by the presentation of the Mean Time Pressure data
generated by IPME, which was somewhat deceptive. The calculations used in IPME did not
provide a normalizing function to present the data on an easily understood scale, i.e. as a
percentage of available time. Due to the nature of the calculation of MTP there were occasions
when a single Instantaneous Time Pressure (ITP) skewed the output, causing the SMEs who
were reviewing the plots to focus on a single large number, and not the occasions when the MTP
was greater than one for an extended period of time. The Mean Time Pressure plots need to be
modified to prevent spiking caused by a single occurrence of an extremely large Instantaneous
Time Pressure.
6.13
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7SECTION SEVEN – CRITICAL ACTIVITIES
7.1
RESULTS
The results for the critical activities analysis are contained in Annex J. No single
operator or group of operators had a monopoly on critical activities; the percentage of an
individual’s goals that were considered critical was distributed evenly across all operators. The
CO did have the highest percentage – 91% of all CO goals were considered critical, however the
next two operators by percentage were the ASPO and EWS respectively. There was also an even
distribution by goal level – the first through lowest levels had a relatively equal ratio of goals
considered critical or non-critical. Given this the review of goals for criticality cannot be
streamlined by considering only a specific group of operators or level of goals. Each goal must
be given the same amount of consideration and analysis.
Table 7-1 indicates the number of activities determined as critical.
Table 7-1
Rating Criteria
Safety
Mission Effectiveness
Human Performance
Capability
Number of Critical Activities
Value
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Number
71
0
3
1
1
0
486
40
87
148
118
117
42
10
0
50
78
133
212
89
0
Cumulative Number
71
71
74
75*
76
76
562
40
127
275*
393
510
552
562
0
50
128
261*
473
562
562
7.1
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* The targeted number of activities for provision of solutions.
Using this selection criterion, 355 or 63% of the activities were considered for
proposed solutions.
The majority of proposed solutions put forth by the SMEs recommended automating
displays and data entry. The integration of tactical and command decision aids was also highly
recommended.
7.2
DISCUSSION
In any Human Factors analysis the rating of activities is a common task.
Traditionally tasks are rated considering such factors are vision, auditory, psychomotor,
cognitive loads while their criticality is rated using safety, mission effectiveness, efficiency,
system reliability and cost [References 6 and 7]. The tasks themselves stand-alone, are entities
onto themselves and therefore are relatively simple to rate. The rating of goals from the HGA
was a departure from this process. Because of the goal hierarchy all but the lowest level goals
require completion of subordinate goals, in order to complete the closed feedback loop discussed
earlier, the criticality of a goal required knowledge and understanding of the sub-goals. The
domain experts and SMEs charged with providing ratings initially found it difficult, as a number
of the higher-level goals are very broad in scope, such as managing resource effectively, which
created much debate in identifying a criticality rating. The abilities and performance of the
entire team had to be taken into account before providing a score.
The hierarchical nature and requirement for subordinate goals to be successfully
completed for the completion of the goal being analyzed caused the domain experts to consider if
the operator was responsible for the review of sub-goals. If so this increased the human
performance capabilities as the operator would be drawn into a supervisor role as well as
operator to complete the goal.
Due to the nature of their business, the operations room operators do not have a large
number of goals that directly affect the safety of their shipmates, other friendly units or neutrals,
relative to the total number of goals. However, the initial assigned ratings indicated differently
because some SMEs were considering poor response to enemy action as a safety hazard to the
crew. It was determined that an instance of ineffective goal accomplishment that places the
entire ship in hazard due to enemy action should be considered a mission effectiveness issue, not
a safety issue. Once this criteria was evenly applied, the domain experts and SMEs were
consistent with their application of safety ratings.
7.2
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8SECTION EIGHT – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
8.1
GENERAL
The conclusions are grouped by area of analysis. Each conclusion is associated with
a discussion point and the relevant subsection is noted.
8.2
ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS
The environmental analysis that resulted in the three top-level goals and each of those
goal’s first-level sub-goals are timeless. Besides slight terminology differences, these goals have
been consistent across navies and time, providing strong assurance that the HGA at the top and
first levels is fully reflective of the true environment (Subsection 3.2). The lower-level goals are
more closely related to the type of ship the operations room is supporting or the specific role the
ship is designed to support. As an example a ship such as the USN Ticonderoga Class Cruiser is
designed for anti-air warfare is not generally tasked with the ASW missions expected of the
Halifax Class Frigate, therefore the goals, in the Ticonderoga Class, related to AAW will be
expanded whereas the ASW goals would be reduced.
8.3
HGA ANALYSIS
The goal hierarchy for the three roles (top-level goals) down to the second-level goals
were similar enough that the decomposition of the most complex top-level goal was sufficient to
define the system. Decomposing the other two roles would not have generated any more insights
than already gained from the military role decomposition. The structure of the HGA allowed for
a side-by-side review and the confidence that this decision was not going to reduce the quality of
data generated from the project (Subsection 4.1).
Goal allocation was found to be generally commensurate with responsibility and
experience (Subsection 4.3.1).
The Sonar Control Supervisor position should have been analyzed (Subsection 4.3.1).
A ‘bottom-up’ review of the goal decomposition should be conducted to validate the
top-down process (Subsection 4.3.1).
The HGA process should be considered for future human engineering analysis
requirements (Section 4.3.2).
The HGA provides a strong tool to be used to investigate proposed changes to the
Operations Room (Subsection 4.3.2).
8.1
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8.4
PCT ANALYSIS
The conclusions in this section cover the PCT data, information flow and potential
instabilities analyses. Overall the PCT output was applicable because the activities being
analyzed were linked by a completely decomposed HGA. The learning curve was substantial for
the Human Factors Analysts to grasp the full utility of the combined HGA and PCT analysis
methodology. Having understood the paradigm, any follow-on analysis could be easily
accomplished using the methods employed in this project.
8.4.1 PCT Data
The resolution of internal, external, and controlled variables was difficult to achieve
(Subsection 5.2.2).
The PCT data, while time consuming to collect and difficult to review with SMEs,
proved to be extremely useful in subsequent analyses processes (Subsection 5.2.2).
When planning to conduct an HGA in the future, the domain experts and/or SMEs
will require additional time to comprehend the concepts before proceeding with collecting PCT
data (Subsection 5.2.2).
The ‘demand’ on the operators is only captured during the task network analyses,
which is an incomplete representation of the goal hierarchy and therefore does not capture all
potential instabilities. In a complex matrix type organization operators that directly support the
completion of a goal should be included in the potential instability analysis (Subsection 5.2.2).
8.4.2
Potential Instabilities
Overall, the number of potential instabilities was found to be low for a system as
large and complex as the operations room of a frigate (Subsection 5.3.2).
The use of IP/PCT to develop a list of potential instabilities was proven to be a sound
analytical tool (Subsection 5.3.2).
During the design of future complex naval systems, the allocation of access to or
authority for equipment or sensor controls should be restricted to the owner of the goal
responsible for the relevant system settings (Subsection 5.3.2).
The SSD should accommodate information providing operators with ready access to
sensor configurations and the goals that the sensors are currently supporting (Subsection 5.3.2).
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The use of shared situation awareness displays could help to mitigate instabilities
caused by lack of team awareness of rapidly changing and conflicting priorities or goals (Section
5.3.2).
External variables should be identified by their most basic components to prevent the
identification of invalid potential instabilities (see Subsection 5.3.2).
Overall the potential instability analysis was very sound, illustrating that the Navy
has adapted its doctrine and procedures in the complex environment of the operations room to
prevent many potential problems (Subsection 5.3.2).
8.4.3
Information Flow
The three-dimensional, graphical representation of the upward information flow was
more effective than the traditional tabular form of a link analysis (Subsection 5.4.2).
The absence of several of the operators from the HGA / PCT analysis reduced the
overall effectiveness of the upward information flow analysis (Subsection 5.4.2).
The vast majority of verbal reports could be replaced with some type of visual
indication (Subsection 5.4.22).
The role of the ORS as a back-up (secondary allocation) for several goals is currently
satisfied through visual inspection – to anchor the ORS at a console would require a new method
of oversight (Subsection 5.4.2).
The relationship between the IMD and the remainder of the Operations Room still
needs to be fleshed out. Interaction with the Directors was not considered (Subsection 5.4.2).
The volume of information flow between operators and the Warfare Officer is
dependant on the support needed and provided by the ship’s team or by staff, if embarked. This
is difficult to model accurately as each ship and squadron staffs have unique relationships
(Subsection 5.4.2).
While upward information flow was good input to the design of the operator
workstation, lateral communications and downward communications should be added in order to
provide a complete link analysis (Subsection 5.4.2).
8.5
TASK NETWORKS
The HGA supported top-down approach to task network analysis and ensured
complete development of the critical task sequences. It ensured that all operators were included
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in the analysis through the development and subsequent linking of sub-networks to create the
five baseline networks (Subsection 6.2.1).
IPME proved to be an extremely effective tool for combining the baseline networks,
once they were developed in order to facilitate the analyses of the operations room in a multithreat environment (Subsection 6.2.1).
The IPME application could benefit from additional features that obviate the
requirement to ‘customize’ the application to accommodate the insertion of data for complex
networks (Subsection 6.2.2).
Neither IPME version 3.0.25 nor IPME/HAWK were efficient tools for insertion of
the data that was required for analyses on the scale conducted during this project (Subsection
6.2.2). HAWK was very labour-intensive as an input interface and IPME was limited in
acceptable output file size.
The combining of sub-networks, representing sub-goals in support of a single critical
task sequence, was managed by IPME in an extremely efficient and effective manner.
(Subsection 6.2.5).
It is highly desirable that IPME be capable of producing OSDs representative of the
entire network being analyzed to assist operators in the workload analysis and validation process
(Subsection 6.2.5).
The number of the communication tasks being shed, delayed, or interrupted during
each run evidenced the presence of conduit clashes (Subsection 2.3.2).
The Mean Time Pressure diagrams need to be modified to prevent spiking caused by
a single occurrence of an extremely large Instantaneous Time Pressure (Subsection 6.2.5).
8.6
CRITICAL ACTIVITIES
The hierarchical goal structure requires subordinate goals to be considered when
assigning the criticality ratings. Criticality is affected by how well the operator can work around
the incompletion of subordinate goals (Subsection 7.2).
The majority of proposed solutions recommended automating displays and data entry.
The integration of tactical and command decision aids was also highly recommended
(Subsection 7.2).
The results of the initial PCT analysis need to be compared to the critical activity
analysis to ensure goal complexities are not inflated creating an excess of critical activities
(Subsection 7.2). The PCT data considered were the input and output interfaces and the required
knowledge states.
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Goal criticality is not related to operator or goal level; each goal must be given the
same amount of analysis when considering criticality (Subsection 7.1).
8.7
OVERALL
The analysis methodologies were found to be applicable to the complexities of the
Halifax Class Frigate’s operations room and would therefore be applicable to similar system
being designed or reviewed. Given the specialized knowledge required by the analysts and the
high level of effort required to complete the analysis to gain a realistic level of return HGA
would best to applied to systems with multiple operators and broad capabilities. The goal
hierarchy as the starting point is extremely scalable. The analysis could be extended to cover
new positions or new goals by a relatively simple modification to the existing analysis.
The data that was created has future applicability. The format in which the data is
presented and the tools used to collect the information lend themselves to reuse for future
projects. Future analysis of additional goals, operators, or systems could be easily added to the
existing results, and the impact with respect to upward information flow, potential instabilities,
and / or critical activities could be easily determined. This could allow an easy transition, for
example, to analysis of the operations room functions for a new ship design.
The database created was useful for the HMCCS Project. The results of the upward
information flow, potential instability, critical activities and task networking were directly
applied to the redesign of the operation workstations, operator interface and operations room
layout. The application of potential instabilities analysis results – the requirement to restrict
access to system configuration functionality – is directly applicable to HMCCS design. The
ability to add goals to the system without adding operators or to add operators without adding
goals allows the analysts to examine the change in information flow between operators and the
potential of overwhelming or reducing the workload on individuals.
The change in scope of goals, if additional sub-goals are added, may result in the
HPC rating reaching seven, making the goal untenable. A good example of this analysis would
be the addition of a land attack mission to the current scenario. This would likely overwhelm the
SWC, as they would be unable to maintain a recognized air picture, defend the ship against a
missile attack and conduct offensive operations. The analysis methodology would, however,
enable an effective options analysis to be conducted to determine means to re-allocate functions
to an effective configuration to achieve the system goals.
8.8
HGA / PCT TO MISSION FUNCTION TASK ANALYSIS COMPARISON
A comparison between the HGA / PCT methodology and the traditional Mission
Function Task Analysis methodology was conducted. This was reported on in detail in the paper
titled Applied Comparison between Hierarchical Goal Analysis and Mission, Function and Task
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Analysis. This paper will be presented at the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 50th
Annual Meeting, October 16-20, 2006.
8.9
RECOMMENDATIONS
There are a number of recommendations that have come out of this project. The
majority are related to HGA and IPME as they applied directly to this project, however there are
a couple of recommendations that relate to future work, these are presented at the end of this
section.
The controlled variable should be included in Table 2 of Reference 4, separate from
the internal and external variables that are already defined.
To identify a complete set of information requirements in a complex environment
such as an operations room, future analyses should include lateral and downward information
flow to augment the upward information flow that is conceived during the HGA process.
IPME, as a complete HFE software solution, should be improved to enable OSDs to
be produced as an output. OSDs are invaluable when reviewing analysis with SMEs and should
be readily available from IPME.
IPME requires a better presentation of Mean Time Pressure to remove spikes caused
by a single occurrence of an extremely large Instantaneous Time Pressure. The current
requirement of transferring the output files to graphing software is time consuming and can be
error prone.
IPME requires the addition of a task type that captures the transmission and receipt of
‘block reports’. In an environment such as an operations room a typical operator can hear more
than one report simultaneously. The IP/PCT scheduler be adjusted and the resultant output
analyzed to determine the effect on tasks shed, delayed and interrupted given the true abilities of
the operators.
The IPME IP/PCT mode user manual requires a more effective method of describing
Instantaneous Time Pressure in order for operators to better assess the output. The literature that
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accompanies the software requires more examples to allow a HFE not familiar with IPME to be
able to conduct analysis and apply the results to the real world.
PCT data must be reviewed prior to finalising the critical activity analysis to ensure
the requirements of the goal/activity were not inflated during this analysis process. Both the
domain experts and SMEs found it invaluable to be able to refer to the PCT data while compiling
and analysing the goals with respect to criticality.
The HGA as a Human Factors Engineering tool provides a very complete structure
for capturing the requirements of complex systems. Given that it should be considered as a
technique used in the project definition phases of large projects.
Given that the potential instability analysis was a very sound tool, prior to the
addition of any new equipment or control panel into the operations room, a potential instability
analysis should be conducted.
9DUE TO THE EQUIPMENT-INDEPENDENT NATURE OF THE HGA,
ESPECIALLY AT THE HIGHER GOAL LEVELS, IT WOULD BE A
SUITABLE TOOL FOR ANALYSES OF FUTURE MULTI-PURPOSE
SHIPS. IF THE OPERATIONS ROOM’S GOALS ARE HELD THEN IT
CAN BE USED TO LOOK AT ISSUES SURROUNDING REDUCED
MANNING AND AUTOMATION OF PROCESSES.
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SECTION NINE – REFERENCES
1.
Leadmark – The Navy’s Strategy for 2020 Dated 24 Jan 01. CMS/DMAR STRAT:
Ottawa, Canada.
2.
1994 Defence White Paper.
3.
Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) 2001.
4.
Hendy, K.C., et al., Analyzing the cognitive system from a perceptual control theory
point of view, in Cognitive Systems Engineering in Military Aviation Environments:
Avoiding Cogminutia Fragmentosa!, M.D. McNeese and M.A. Vidulich, Editors.
2002, Wright-Patterson AFB: Dayton, OH. p. 201-250.
5.
Concept of Employment, Information Management Director and Information System
Manager, CMS, dated 25 Feb 05.
6.
Langille, R. and D. Kelleher. 2002, Task Analysis of the HALIFAX Class Sensor
Weapons Controller (SWC) and Assistant Sensor Weapons Controller (ASWC)
Positions, Mission Function and Task Analysis Report, CMC Electronics Document
Number 1000-1242, 20 February 2002.
7.
Coates, C. and D. Kelleher. 2002, Task analysis of the HALIFAX Class Operations
Room Officer (ORO) Sensor Weapons Controller (SWC) and Assistant Sensor
Weapons Controller (ASWC) positions: Mission, function and task analysis report,
DRDC Toronto CR 2002-219, CMC Electronics: Ottawa, Ontario.
8.
Chief of Defence Staff (1999). Shaping the future of the Canadian Forces: A Strategy
for 2020, (June 1999). Canadian Forces: Ottawa, Canada.
9.
Coates, C. and D. Kelleher. 2002, Task analysis of the HALIFAX Class Operations
Room Officer (ORO) Sensor Weapons Controller (SWC) and Assistant Sensor
Weapons Controller (ASWC) positions: Information flow and processing analysis
report, DRDC Toronto CR 2002-220, CMC Electronics: Ottawa, Ontario.
10.
International Standards Organization. 1995, Quality management - Guidelines for
quality plans, ISO 10005, International Standards Organization.
11.
MIL-HDBK-46855A, Human Engineering Requirements for Military Systems,
Equipment and Facilities.
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12.
Matthews, M.L., Webb, D.G. and Brayant, D.I. (1999). Cognitive Task Analysis of
the HALIFAX Class Operations Room Officer, Volume 1 and Annexes. DCIEM
CR-1999-028, DCIEM CR-1999-029. Guelph, Ontario: Human Systems Inc.
13.
Matthews, M.L., Webb, R.D.G. (2000). Validation of Cognitive Task Analysis
(CTA) for HALIFAX Class ORO. DCIEM Contract Report. Guelph, Ontario:
Human Systems Inc.
14.
Boff, K.R. and Lincoln, J.E. (eds). Engineering Data Compendium: Human
Perception and Performance (7.705-7.707). Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio:
Harry G. Armstrong Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory.
15.
NASA Synthetic Vision Project, Human Factors Engineering Study, Human Factors
and Task Analysis Report, BAE SYSTEMS Document Number 3070-1701, 17 May
2000.
16.
Vice Chief of Defence Staff (2000). Strategic capability planning for the Canadian
Forces. Canadian Forces: Ottawa, Canada.
17.
Vice Chief of Defence Staff (2000). Force Planning Scenarios. Canadian Forces:
Ottawa, Canada.
18.
Canadian Forces Naval Operations School (CFNOS) Naval operations school training
publication (NOSTP 200B), 2001. Maritime Command.
19.
Maritime Command Capability Plan 1999 (MCP 99). Dated 01 December 1998.
CMS/DMAR STRAT: Ottawa, Canada.
20.
CFCD 106(D) Change 4, Maritime Tactical Instructions, CMS/CFMWC (SECRET –
CAN EYES ONLY).
21.
Naval Combat Procedural Manual (NCPM) 600 – HALIFAX Class ASW Standard
Operating Procedures - CMS/DMPOR: Ottawa, Canada (CONFIDENTIAL).
22.
Naval Combat Procedural Manual (NCPM) 603 – Drill Book for Surface Vessel
Torpedo Tubes - CMS/DMPOR: Ottawa, Canada (CONFIDENTIAL).
23.
Naval Combat Procedural Manual (NCPM) 701 HALIFAX Class AWW Drills and
Procedures Manual – CFNOS HALIFAX: Halifax, Canada.
24.
Maritime Command Qualification Standard and Plan – Maritime Surface and SubSurface 71B Operations Room Officer. Dated 07 Mar 96. CMS/CFNOS, Canada.
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25.
Maritime Command Qualification Standard and Plan – Naval Electronic Sensor
Operator MOSID 00115. Dated 13 Jun 04. CMS/DMTE, Canada.
26.
Maritime Command Qualification Standard and Plan – Underwater Warfare Director,
MARS 71B/TASOP 278. Dated 13 Mar 00. CMS/DMTE, Canada.
27.
Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure- Volume 2 Part 2 Occupational Specification for Maritime Surface and Sub-Surface Occupation. Dated
5 May 94. CMS/ DMHRR: Ottawa, Canada.
28.
Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure- Volume 2 Part 2 Occupational Specification for the Naval Electronic Sensor Operator Occupation.
Dated 13 Jul 04. CMS/ DMHRR: Ottawa, Canada.
29.
Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure- Volume 2 Part 2 Occupational Specification for the Sonar Operator Occupation. Dated 05 Oct 04.
CMS/ DMHRR: Ottawa, Canada.
30.
Canadian Forces Manual of Military Occupational Structure- Volume 2 Part 2 Occupational Specification for the Naval Combat Information Operator Occupation.
Dated 14 Dec 04. CMS/ DMHRR: Ottawa, Canada.
31.
Defence Research & Development Canada. (2000). Publication standard for
scientific and technical documents. DRDC, Ottawa, Ontario.
32.
MARCORD 46-4 Volume 3A – Weapons Keys Policy for HMC Ships.
33.
Ship Standing Orders AL6. CANSEATRAINLANT, April 2005.
34.
Defence Research and Development Canada. 2002, Publication standard for scientific
and technical documents, Defence Research and Development Canada: Ottawa, ON.
35.
Cooper, George E.; and Harper, Robert P., Jr.: The Use of Pilot Rating in the
Evaluation of Aircraft Handling Qualities. NASA TN D-5153, 1969.
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ANNEX A – GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS
AAWC. Anti-Air Warfare Controller
ARRO. Air Raid Reporting Operator. Air Raid Reporting Operator
ASPO. Anti-Submarine Plotting Operator. Anti-Submarine Plotting Officer
ASW. Anti-Submarine Warfare
ASWC. Assistant Sensor Weapons Controller. Assistant Sensor Weapons Controller
AWWD. Above Water Warfare Director
C2. Command and Control
CANEWS. Canadian Electronic Warfare System
CBM. Confidence Building Measure
CCS. Command and Control System
CF. Canadian Forces
CIMIC. Civil-Military Cooperation
CIWS. Close In Weapons System
CMS. Chief of the Maritime Staff
CO. Commanding Officer. Commanding Officer
CTA. Cognitive Task Analysis
DND. Department of National Defence
DO. Divisional Officer
DPG. Defence Planning Guidance
DRDC. Defence Research and Development Canada
EWS. Electronic Warfare Supervisor. Electronic Warfare Supervisor
. firing unit.
HA. Humanitarian Assistance
HFE. Human Factors Engineering
HGA. Hierarchical Goal Analysis. Hierarchical Goal Analysis. Hierarchical Goal Analysis
HGDD. Hierarchical Goal Decomposition Diagram
HMCCS. Halifax Modernization Command and Control System. HALIFAX Modernized
Command and Control System
HPC. Human Performance Capability
IMD. Information Management Director. Information Management Director
IP. Information Processing
IPME. Integrated Performance Modelling Environment. Integrated Performance Modeling
Environment. Integrated Performance Modeling Environment
IPR. Information Processing Report
IR. Infrared
ISM. Information Systems Manager
ITP. Instantaneous Time Pressure
LAAWC. Local Anti-Air Warfare Controller
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MIO. Maritime Interdiction Operation
MSDF. Multi-Source Data Fusion
MTP. Mean Time Pressures
NAV COMM. Naval Communicator
NCI OP. Naval Combat Information Operator
NCPM. Naval Combat Procedural Manual
NDHQ. National Defence Headquarters
NEO. Non-combatant Evacuation Operation
NES OP. Naval Electronic Sensor Operator
OGD. Other Government Department
OOW. Officer Of the Watch
ORO. Operations Room Officer. Operations Room Officer
ORS. Operations Room Supervisor. Operations Room Supervisor
OSD. Operational Sequence Diagram. Operational Sequence Diagram
PCT. Perceptual Control Theory. Perceptual Control Theory
PSO. Peace Support Operation
RAMSES. Reprogrammable Advanced Multi-Mode Shipborne ECM System
RMP. Recognized Maritime Picture
SAC. Shipborne Aircraft Controller. Shipborne Aircraft Controller
SAM. Surface-to-Air Missile
SAR. Search and Rescue
SAWS. Surface and Air Weapons System
SCS. SONAR Control Supervisor
SITREP. SITuation REPort
SME. Subject Matter Expert. Subject Matter Expert
SON OP. Sonar Operator
SOP. Standard Operating Procedure
SSD. Standard Shipboard Display
SSM. Surface-to-Surface Missile
STIR. Separate Track and Illumination RADAR
SWC. Sensor Weapons Controller. Sensor Weapons Controller
TD. Technology Demonstrator
TS. Track Supervisor. Track Supervisor
UN. United Nations
UWW. Under Water Warfare
UWWD. Under Water Warfare Director
VACP. Visual, Auditory, Cognitive, and Psychomotor
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ANNEX B – HFX FRIGATE MISSION DESCRIPTION
1000-1368 annexes final\1000-1368 Annex B Scenario.doc
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ANNEX C – HIERARCHICAL GOAL ANALYSIS
Annex C contains the completed HGA in accordance with Table 1 (illustrated below)
from Reference [4]. The goals are grouped by Level 1 Goals.
Table 1 from Hendy, K.C., et al., Analyzing the cognitive system from a perceptual
control theory point of view, in Cognitive Systems Engineering in Military Aviation
Environments: Avoiding Cogminutia Fragmentosa!, M.D. McNeese and M.A. Vidulich, Editors.
2002, Wright-Patterson AFB: Dayton, OH. p. 201-250.
Annex C Table of Contents
Level 1 Goal
...current mission is received and acknowledged
...predeployment preps are complete
...ship is ready to undertake critical operational taskings - 1st
degree of readiness (ACTION STATIONS)
...combat organization and resources are managed effectively
...an optimal level of Situational Awareness is being maintained
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C.8
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...ongoing operational tasks are being actioned effectively
...mission follow-up action is completed
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ANNEX D – IP/PCT TEMPLATES
Annex D contains the completed IP/PCT Templates in accordance with Table 5
(illustrated below) from Reference [4]. The templates are a suitable way of displaying the
cognitive and perceptual components of individual goals. The Annex is ordered by goal
corresponding to those listed in Annex C. There are occasions when the complexity of the goal
required two pages to completely capture the attributes describing the goal.
Table 5 from Hendy, K.C., et al., Analyzing the cognitive system from a perceptual control
theory point of view, in Cognitive Systems Engineering in Military Aviation Environments:
Avoiding Cogminutia Fragmentosa!, M.D. McNeese and M.A. Vidulich, Editors. 2002, WrightPatterson AFB: Dayton, OH. p. 201-250.
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ANNEX E – OPERATIONAL SEQUENCE DIAGRAMS
Operational Sequence Diagrams (OSDs) were prepared in accordance with the
guidelines in Subsection 7.1.2.10 of the Human Engineering (HE) Procedures Guide [Reference
35]. They are particularly useful for the analysis of highly complex systems, which require
much time-critical information, decision-making and action functions by multiple users. By
using symbology to indicate actions, inspections, data manipulation (transmission, reception, and
storage), time delays and decisions, OSDs show the flow of information and operator functions
throughout the system in relation to the mission timeline. Special symbols have been
incorporated into the OSDs to provide the additional information necessary for translation to a
probabilistic model. Symbols used are presented in Figure F-1.
The layout and graphic symbology used in OSDs generally follow the conventions
laid out in the HE Procedures Guide. A number of additional graphic elements have been added
to improve readability and convey the additional information available from the network
database. The following subparagraphs provide a brief summary of the OSD formats with an
explanation of deviations from the HE Procedures Guide:
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a.
Continuous Task Symbols. Continuous task symbols are used to indicate an
ongoing task, which starts either at the beginning of the segment or upon
completion of another task. Continuous tasks are indicated by a vertical
arrow pointing down from the centre of the symbol. Operations and
inspection tasks may be performed on a continuous basis. An example of a
continuous task would be the monitoring of the SHipboard INtegrated
COMmunications (SHINCOM) System by the ORO, SWC or ASWC.
b.
Flow Loopback Symbols. Tasks to be performed repeatedly (such as Hook
Track) are represented by means of an arrow from the last task in the
sequence back to the task, which starts the sequence. In order to enhance the
readability of the complex task relationships, the return symbol has been
truncated to a short loopback arrow supplemented with a text label indicating
the destination task of the loopback.
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- Flow Loopback
- Continuous task
- Operation
- Decision
- Branch
- Inspect
- Timer
- Store
- Timeline Task
Representation
- Information Transmission
- Information Reception
- Discussion
- Information Transmission and
Reception Example
- Discussion Example
Figure F-1
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c.
Elapsed Time and Temporal Displacement. OSD symbology is presented
against a time scale, which runs vertically from top to bottom. Time elapsed
during the performance of a task is represented by the vertical spacing
between successive tasks (that is, equivalent to the task completion time).
The time scale on OSDs is not necessarily continuous (partially to conserve
paper when few activities are occurring), but task interrelationships are
accurate. For example, tasks performed simultaneously are drawn beside each
other, space permitting. If a task starts chronologically after another has been
completed, regardless of whether they are related or not, it is drawn on a
lower line (row) than the first task. In this way, the logical and time-oriented
flow of tasks and information is maintained. The times (in minutes and
seconds) recorded in the left-hand column are based on estimated most likely
task completion times and are used cumulatively to determine total elapsed
time.
d.
Timer Symbols. In order to represent time gaps between successive tasks, a
timer is used (represented by a small analogue clock face). Where one task
logically follows another task after a fixed or variable time delay, the timer
symbol is drawn between the respective task symbols. Timers may also have
a variable time associated with them to reflect the randomness of the real
world.
Order of OSDs
Watch Close-up
Resolve
ASMD
Harpoon
ASW
E.5 – E.24
E.25 – E40
E.41 – E.68
E.69 – E.104
E.105 – E.164
Presentation
In this annex each OSD is presented in a format of four sheet of paper per row. The
diagram below demonstrates the format.
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...
...
...
...
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Page 41
Page 42
Page 43
Page 44
Where the time scale runs continuously down pages 1,5...41 and the operators are
listed across the tops of each page in sequence 1-to-4, 5-to-8...41-to-44.
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ANNEX F – MEAN TIME PRESSURE DIAGRAMS
The Mean Time Pressure Diagrams are graphical depictions of the mean time
pressure, as calculated by IPME IP/PCT for individual operators during specific runs.
The y-axis (vertical) of each diagram is the mean time pressure. For consistency in
presentation this has been capped at a value of two. In accordance with the time pressure theory
and value above one is an indication that tasks are in conflict and the IPME IP/PCT scheduler
has had to delay a task. Because of this the value of two was selected as a maximum value as
any number greater is not an indication of increased time pressure, just that the scheduler waited
longer in the cycle to invoke a delay.
The x-axis is the time in seconds. Each diagram also has a label listing the operator,
as a 2-letter designation (IPME restriction), and the specific run. This labelling scheme is also
used in Annex G.
2-letter designation
CO- Commanding Officer
WO – Warfare Officer
OR – Operations Room Officer (ORO)
SW – Sensor Weapon Controller (SWC)
AS – Assistant Sensor Weapon Controller (ASWC)
IM – Information Management Director (IMD)
RS – Operations Room Supervisor (ORS)
EW – Electronic Warfare Supervisor (EWS)
TS – Track Supervisor
AR – Air Raid Reporting Operator (ARRO)
SP – Anti-submarine Plotting Operator (ASPO)
Order of Diagrams
Watch Close-up Baseline
Resolve Baseline
ASMD Baseline
Harpoon Baseline
ASW Baseline
Watch Close-up & Resolve – 220 second delay
Watch Close-up & Resolve – 500 second delay
Watch Close-up & Resolve – 550 second delay
Watch Close-up & Resolve – 620 second delay
ASMD & Resolve – no delay
ASMD & Resolve – 100 second delay
ASMD & Resolve – 80 second delay
Harpoon & Resolve – 100 second delay
ASW & Resolve – 550 second delay
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F.5
F.7
F.9
F.11
F.13
F.15
F.17
F.19
F.21
F.23
F.25
F.27
F.29
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Harpoon & ASMD – 325 second delay
ASW & ASMD – 525 second delay
ASW & Harpoon – no delay
ASW & Resolve & ASMD
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F.31
F.32
F.33
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ANNEX G – IPR SUMMARY FILE
The IPR summary files contained in this Annex are generated from the output from the
IPME tool. They are a combination of the output from the 40 runs of each critical task sequence
or combination of sequences. Each file contains a list of the task that are shed, delayed or
interrupted, the operator assigned to each task, the reason for the disruption and the percentage
of time (out of the 40 runs) that the task was disrupted. A number of the smaller files also list
the other tasks that were active when the task in question was shed, delayed or interrupted.
Operator ID 2-letter designation
CO- Commanding Officer
WO – Warfare Officer
OR – Operations Room Officer (ORO)
SW – Sensor Weapon Controller (SWC)
AS – Assistant Sensor Weapon Controller (ASWC)
IM – Information Management Director (IMD)
RS – Operations Room Supervisor (ORS)
EW – Electronic Warfare Supervisor (EWS)
TS – Track Supervisor
AR – Air Raid Reporting Operator (ARRO)
SP – Anti-submarine Plotting Operator (ASPO)
Order of IPR files
Watch Close-up Baseline
Resolve Baseline
Harpoon Baseline
ASMD Baseline
ASW Baseline
Watch Close-up & Resolve - 550 second delay to Resolve
Watch Close-up & Resolve - 500 second delay to Resolve
Watch Close-up & Resolve - 620 second delay to Resolve
Watch Close-up & Resolve - 220 second delay to Resolve
ASMD & Resolve – No delay – start simultaneously
ASMD & Resolve – 100 second delay to Resolve
ASMD & Resolve – 80 second delay to Resolve
Harpoon & Resolve - 100 second delay to Resolve
ASW & Resolve - 550 second delay to Resolve
Harpoon & ASMD - 325 second delay to ASMD
ASW & ASMD - 525 second delay to ASMD
ASW & Harpoon - No delay – start simultaneously
Revision 1
G-2
G-3
G-4
G-7
G-17
G-25
G-27
G-29
G-31
G-35
G-42
G-48
G-55
G-58
G-65
G-69
G-75
G.1
© Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2006
17 Nov 06
DOC NO
1000-1368
CMC ELECTRONICS INC.
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING
ANNEX H – UPWARD INFORMATION FLOW
The upward information is presented in two formats. The first is are link diagrams
that summarize the information flow between operators by type of information. The second
format is the raw data generated from the goal hierarchy developed earlier in the project in
accordance with Table 8 from Hendy et al. reference 4.
ANNEX H – TABLE OF CONTENTS
Link Diagrams
Upward information from goal hierarchy
Revision 1
H-2
H-30
H.1
© Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2006
17 Nov 06
DOC NO
1000-1368
CMC ELECTRONICS INC.
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING
ANNEX I – POTENTIAL INSTABILITIES
Annex I contains the completed stabilities analysis templates in accordance with
Table 7 (illustrated below) from Reference [4]. The underlying information was collected from
the IP/PCT data from Annex D.
Table 7 from Hendy, K.C., et al., Analyzing the cognitive system from a perceptual control
theory point of view, in Cognitive Systems Engineering in Military Aviation Environments:
Avoiding Cogminutia Fragmentosa!, M.D. McNeese and M.A. Vidulich, Editors. 2002, WrightPatterson AFB: Dayton, OH. p. 201-250.
Annex I Table of Contents
Influenced Variable (external)
Access to Message Files
Maintenance of Stateboards
Access to MCOIN / DWAN / COWAN
Tasking of CANEWS
Enabling of weapons through the 'Weapon Veto Panel'
Ship’s heading and speed
STIR designation
SPS 49 Radar control / configuration
SG 150 Radar control / configuration
Application of CCS 330 overlays
CANTASS employment
Machinery state - propulsion and power generation
Communications configuration - internal and/or external
Revision 1
Page #
I.2
I.3
I.4
I.5
I.6
I.7
I.8
I.9
I.10
I.11
I.12
I.13
I.14
I.1
© Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2006
17 Nov 06
DOC NO
1000-1368
CMC ELECTRONICS INC.
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING
ANNEX J – CRITICAL ACTIVITIES ANALYSIS
Annex J lists the activities (goals) in order of criticality in order of Safety Risk Rating
(SRR), Mission Effectiveness Risk (MER) and Human Performance Capabilities (HPC). The
acronym NOB is Nature of the Business, which indicates that in the domain and subject matter
expert’s opinions the risk associated with the specific goal could not be mitigated, as it is part of
conducting the business associated with the operations room in a Halifax Class Frigate.
Revision 1
J.1
© Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2006
17 Nov 06
DOC NO
1000-1368
CMC ELECTRONICS INC.
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING
ANNEX K – SME SESSION REPORTS
1000-1368 annexes final\1000-1368 Annex K SME session reports\1000-1368 Annex K SME
sessions.doc
Revision 1
K.1
© Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2006
17 Nov 06
DOC NO
1000-1368
CMC ELECTRONICS INC.
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING
LIST PART 1: Internal Distribution by Centre:
2
DRDC Toronto Library file copies
2
R. Chow (SA)
2
S. McFadden
6
TOTAL LIST PART 1
LIST PART 2: External Distribution by DRDKIM
1
Defence R&D Canada
1
1
DRDKIM
DMSS 8
1
DMRS 8
1
DSTM 2
1
PM HCM/FELIX
1
CFEC/ P. Labbé
DRDC Valcartier
2459 Pie Xi Blvd North
Val-Belair, QC, G3J1X5
1
PM INCOMMANDS
1
S. Paradis
DRDC Atlantic
9 Grove Street
Dartmouth, NS, B2Y 3Z7
1
N. McCoy
1
B. McArthur
1
B. Chalmers
1
J. Crebolder (SA)
13
TOTAL LIST PART 2
19
TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED
Revision 1
K.2
© Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2006
17 Nov 06
DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA
(Security classification of the title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)
1. ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document, Organizations
for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Centre sponsoring a contractor's document, or tasking
agency, are entered in section 8.)
Publishing: DRDC
Toronto
Performing:
2. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
(Overall security classification of the document
including special warning terms if applicable.)
UNCLASSIFIED
CMC Electronics, Inc., 415 Legget Dr., Box 13330,
Ottawa, ON, K2K 2B2
Monitoring:
(NON-CONTROLLED GOODS)
DMC A
REVIEW : GCEC December 2012
Contracting:
3. TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification is indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C, R, or U) in parenthesis at
the end of the title)
Human Factors Analyses of Operator Positions in the Operations Room of the HALIFAX
Class Frigate: FINAL REPORT (U)
Analyses des facteurs humains des fonctions d’opérateurs dans le poste des opérations
d’une frégate de classe Halifax : RAPPORT FINAL (U)
4. AUTHORS (First name, middle initial and last name. If military, show rank, e.g. Maj. John E. Doe.)
Curtis Coates; Bob Kobierski
5. DATE OF PUBLICATION
(Month and year of publication of document.)
August 2007
6a NO. OF PAGES
6b. NO. OF REFS
(Total containing information, including
Annexes, Appendices, etc.)
1081
(Total cited in document.)
35
7. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (The category of the document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of document,
e.g. interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.)
Contract Report
8. SPONSORING ACTIVITY (The names of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development í include address.)
Sponsoring:
Tasking:
9a. PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable
research and development project or grant under which the document was
written. Please specify whether project or grant.)
11bg
10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (The official
9b. CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under which
the document was written.)
W7711í047914/001/TOR
10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers under which
document number by which the document is identified by the originating
activity. This number must be unique to this document)
may be assigned this document either by the originator or by the
sponsor.)
DRDC Toronto CR 2006í117
CMC Document Number 1000í1368
11. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (Any limitations on the dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification.)
UNLIMITED
12. DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (Any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the Document
Availability (11), However, when further distribution (beyond the audience specified in (11) is possible, a wider announcement audience may be selected.))
UNLIMITED
DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA
(Security classification of the title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)
13. ABSTRACT (A brief and factual summary of the document. It may also appear elsewhere in the body of the document itself. It is highly desirable that the abstract
of classified documents be unclassified. Each paragraph of the abstract shall begin with an indication of the security classification of the information in the paragraph
(unless the document itself is unclassified) represented as (S), (C), (R), or (U). It is not necessary to include here abstracts in both official languages unless the text is
bilingual.)
(U) Results are provided for the analyses of eleven operator positions in the Halifax Class
Frigate operations room using the Hierarchical Goal Analysis (HGA) approach. Following
mission analyses, a hierarchy of goals assigned to different operators was produced. Two
followíon analyses were conducted to identify potential instabilities in the system and
requirements for upward information flow between operators. Operational Sequence
Diagrams (OSDs) were produced for five critical task sequences and the corresponding
task networks were implemented and tested in the Integrated Performance Modeling
Environment (IPME). The final product of the project was the generation of a list of critical
operations room activities
supported by proposed solutions. The report concludes HGA and IPME are suitable tools
to support the analyses of complex predominantly ‘cognitive’ systems.
(U) Les résultats sont fournis pour les analyses des onze fonctions d’opérateurs dans le poste
des opérations d’une frégate de classe Halifax à l’aide de la démarche de l’analyse des
objectifs hiérarchiques (AOH). À la suite des analyses de missions, une hiérarchie
d’objectifs assignés à divers opérateurs a été produite. Deux analyses de suivi ont été
ensuite effectuées afin d’identifier les instabilités possibles dans le système et les
exigences pour la circulation ascendante de l’information entre les opérateurs. Des
diagrammes de séquence opérationnelle (DSO) ont été produits pour des séquences de
tâches critiques, et les réseaux de tâches correspondants ont été mis en place et testés
dans l’environnement intégré de modélisation des performances (EIMR). Le produit final
du projet était la production d’une liste d’activités critiques dans le poste des opérations
appuyées par des solutions proposées. Le rapport conclut que l’AOH et l’EIMR sont des
outils adéquats pour appuyer les analyses de systèmes complexes principalement
cognitifs.
14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in
cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name,
military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g. Thesaurus of
Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each
should be indicated as with the title.)
(U) Hierarchical Goal Analysis (HGA), task network simulation, IPME, Command and Control,
Human Systems Integration (HSI)
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