Capability Based Planning Pilot Project

Capability Based Planning Pilot Project
Capability Based Planning Pilot Project
A report on academic and research partnership opportunities relevant to intelligence
and security initiatives
Krista C. Simonds
Scientific Authority
Sheldon Dickie
DRDC Centre for Security Science
The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not necessarily have the
approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.
Defence R&D Canada – CSS
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
February 2011
Capability Based Planning Pilot Project
A report on academic and research partnership opportunities relevant to
intelligence and security initiatives
Krista C. Simonds
The scientific or technical validity of this Contract Report is entirely the responsibility of the Contractor and the contents do not
necessarily have the approval or endorsement of Defence R&D Canada.
Defence R&D Canada – CSS
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
February 2011
Principal Author
Original signed by Krista C. Simonds
Krista C. Simonds
4C Success Inc.
with
The Associates Group of Companies
Approved by
Original signed by Sheldon Dickie
Sheldon Dickie
DRDC CSS Responder Capability Analyst
Approved for release by
Original signed by Mark Williamson
Mark Williamson
DRDC CSS Document Review Panel Chair
© Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, as represented by the Minister of National Defence, 2011
© Sa Majesté la Reine (en droit du Canada), telle que représentée par le ministre de la Défense nationale,
2011
Abstract ……..
The Centre for Security Science (CSS) represents a joint endeavour between Defence Research
and Development Canada (DRDC) and Public Safety Canada. The Centre is part of the
Government of Canada’s approach to address national public safety and security objectives; its
goal being to deliver timely and relevant Science and Technology (S&T) research in support of an
all-hazards approach to natural and accidental disasters, and terrorist and criminal acts. Toward
this objective, the Centre seeks to engage academia, together with government, industry
scientists, and responder communities, in collaborative partnerships from the early stages of any
research initiative. The intent is not only to develop S&T tools, but to also contribute timely and
relevant recommendations for public policy and public management consideration.
This Contract Report presents the findings of work conducted in support of the Capability Based
Planning Pilot Project lead by the CSS Forensics Portfolio Manager. Specifically, the report
identifies potential partnership opportunities with academic researchers that share a common
interest and expertise pertaining to issues of intelligence and security; offers global findings
relevant to development of a Canadian approach to Intelligence Fusion Centres; and, provides
insights relevant to development of a national chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and
explosives resilience strategy.
Résumé ….....
Le Centre des sciences pour la sécurité (CSS) est le résultat d’une entente de coopération entre
Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) et Sécurité publique Canada. Le
Centre constitue une des mesures prises par le gouvernement du Canada pour atteindre les
objectifs nationaux en matière de sécurité publique, son but étant de réaliser en temps opportun
des recherches et pertinentes en matière de science et de technologie (S et T) à l’appui d’une
approche tous risques visant à contrer des catastrophes d’origine naturelle ou accidentelle ainsi
que des actes terroristes et criminels. Pour atteindre cet objectif, le Centre entend mettre à
contribution les universitaires, de même que les scientifiques du gouvernement et de l’industrie,
ainsi que les communautés des intervenants, dans le cadre de partenariats de collaboration dès le
début de tout projet de recherche. Le but visé est non seulement de développer des outils S et T,
mais aussi de formuler des recommandations opportunes et pertinentes à l’intention des
responsables de la politique officielle et de la gestion publique.
Le présent rapport de contrat fait état des conclusions du travail effectué à l’appui du Projet pilote
de planification axée sur les capacités, qui est dirigé par le gestionnaire du portefeuille judiciaire
du CSS. Plus particulièrement, le rapport détermine les possibilités de partenariat avec des
chercheurs universitaires qui, comme nous, ont de l’intérêt et de l’expertise concernant les
questions relatives au renseignement et à la sécurité. Il formule aussi des conclusions globales
concernant l’élaboration d’une approche canadienne pour les centres de fusion des
renseignements ainsi que des observations sur l’élaboration d’une stratégie nationale de résilience
en cas d’incident liés aux dispositifs chimiques, biologiques, radiologique, nucléaires et explosifs.
Executive summary
Capability Based Planning Pilot Project: A report on academic and
research partnership opportunities relevant to intelligence and security
initiatives
The Centre for Security Science Capability Based Planning Pilot Project represents a
fundamental component in support of Canadian preparedness for response to terrorism
and other hazards. The Pilot Project seeks not only to develop and validate a variety of
S&T tools and Capability Based Planning processes in support of Government of Canada
public safety and security objectives, it is also concerned with the question of how S&T
research initiatives may inform public policy and public management decision-making.
Identifying and facilitating partnership opportunities and innovative thinking through
collaborative government/academic research initiatives is recognized to be a significant
element toward successful achievement of the Centre’s mandate and goals. This Contract
Report presents the findings of work performed in support of these objectives.
To date, work on the Academic and Research Institute Database has identified
opportunities for research partnerships with a number of individual academics having
expertise of relevance to current CSS initiatives. Most notably, the database project has
identified a potential research partnership with the University of Ottawa’s National
President’s Dialogue which seeks to champion a more collaborative relationship between
government and academia on public policy development in such areas a Foreign Affairs
and security. While the database provides valuable insight into the current base of
Canadian expertise pertaining to intelligence and security studies, the academic and
research community is continually changing and growing; as such, the database
represents a snapshot in time which will require periodic updates to remain accurate and
current.
This Contract Report also offers global findings relevant to the CSS initiative to develop
a Canadian approach to Intelligence Fusion Centres. In particular, attention is given to the
functional relationship of Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres within a Capability Based
Planning security framework, as well as to structural and procedural challenges that will
require further consideration. The findings indicate that Canadian Intelligence Fusion
Centres represent a key enabler in support of a public safety and security decision-making
and governance structure. However, there are several considerations that are critical to
the efficacy and success of such an initiative. Specifically, attention should not only be
given to the development and validation of tools and processes, but also to: the social and
political context within which such a process is developed and effected; ensure that key
stakeholder communities and public managers are actively engaged; and give
consideration to how linkages can be forged between strategic planning processes,
information-seeking, and performance measurement. Partnerships with Social Sciences
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DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
academic communities offer the necessary research expertise of relevance to the
questions of how to align tools, processes and governance structures to the social,
economic, political and legislative realities unique to Canada’s public policy and public
management context.
A third component of this Contract Report provides the global findings of research work
conducted in support of the Capability Based Planning Pilot Project and its involvement
in initiatives toward development of a national chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
and explosives resilience strategy. Review of the draft document Canada’s National
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) Resilience
Strategy, Version 7, dated 6 March 2009, indicates that future iterations of the Strategy
would benefit from closer alignment and consistency with other National-level policy
documents in the area of public safety and security. The efficacy of the Strategy will also
be affected by how well the policy’s conceptual framework is able to integrate Capability
Based Planning tools and processes toward meeting the practical realities of public safety
and security associated with CBRNE events. Partnerships with social sciences academic
research communities can offer critical insights of benefit to the development of such a
multi-jurisdictional, multi-agency policy framework.
Sommaire .....
Projet pilote de planification axée sur les capacités : Rapport sur
les possibilités de partenariat avec des universitaires et des
chercheurs pour des projets relatifs au renseignement et à la
sécurité
Le Projet pilote de planification axée sur les capacités du Centre de sciences pour la
sécurité constitue un élément fondamental à l’appui de la préparation du Canada à
intervenir en cas d’acte terroriste ou d’autre situation de menace. Le projet pilote vise non
seulement à développer et à valider divers outils S et T ainsi que des processus de
planification axée sur les capacités à l’appui des objectifs du gouvernement du Canada en
matière de sécurité publique, mai aussi il traite de la question visant à déterminer la façon
dont les projets de recherche S et T pourraient documenter la prise de décision en
politique officielle et en gestion publique. Il est reconnu que la détermination et la
facilitation des possibilités de partenariat et de la pensée novatrice grâce des projets de
recherche menées conjointement par le gouvernement et les universités constituent un
élément important pour le succès du mandat et des objectifs du Centre. Le présent rapport
de contrat porte sur les conclusions d’un travail réalisé à l’appui de ces objectifs.
À ce jour, l’étude de la base de données sur les établissements universitaires et de
recherche a permis de déterminer des possibilités de partenariat avec un certain nombre
d’universitaires ayant l’expertise requise pour des projets actuels du CSS. Plus
particulièrement, l’étude de la base de données a permis de déterminer une possibilité de
partenariat avec le Dialogue national des recteurs de l’Université d’Ottawa, qui vise à
promouvoir des relations de collaboration plus étroites entre le gouvernement et les
universités pour l’élaboration d’une politique officielle dans des domaines tels que les
affaires étrangères et la sécurité. Bien que la base de données donne une bonne idée de
l’expertise disponible au Canada en ce qui concerne les études en matière de
renseignement et de sécurité, la communauté des chercheurs et des universitaires change
et croit continuellement. La base de données constitue donc un instantané d’une situation
à un moment donné, et elle doit être mise à jour périodiquement pour rester complète et
utile.
Le rapport de contrat présente aussi des conclusions globales concernant l’élaboration d’une
approche canadienne pour les centres de fusion des renseignements. Une attention particulière est
accordée aux relations fonctionnelles des centres canadiens de fusion du renseignement dans un
cadre de sécurité relatif à la planification axée sur les capacités, ainsi qu’aux problèmes
structuraux et procéduraux nécessitant un examen plus approfondi. Les conclusions indiquent que
les centres canadiens de fusion du renseignement constituent un atout clé à l’appui de la prise de
décision et de la structure de gouvernance en matière de sécurité publique. Cependant, il y a de
nombreux facteurs qui sont essentiels pour l’efficacité et le succès d’une telle initiative. Ainsi, il
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DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
faut non seulement accorder l’attention au développement et à la validation des outils et des
processus, mais aussi : prêter attention au contexte social et politique dans lequel ce processus est
développé et mis en œuvre; veiller à ce que les communautés intervenantes clés et les
gestionnaires publiques y participent activement; examiner la façon dont on peut établir des liens
entre les processus de planification stratégique, la collecte de renseignements et la mesure du
rendement. Les partenariats avec des universitaires œuvrant dans le domaine des sciences sociales
offrent l’expertise de recherche requise pour le questions liées à l’harmonisation des outils, des
processus et des structures de gouvernance avec les réalités sociales, économiques, politiques et
législatives propres au contexte canadien de politique officielle et de gestion publique.
Le troisième élément du rapport de contrat comporte des conclusions globales d’un
travail de recherche effectué à l’appui du Projet pilote de planification axée sur les
capacités et sur sa contribution aux initiatives visant l’élaboration d’une stratégie
nationale de résilience en cas d’incidents liés aux dispositifs chimiques, biologiques,
radiologiques, nucléaires et explosifs. L’examen de l’ébauche de la Stratégie canadienne
de résilience en cas d’incidents liés aux dispositifs chimiques, biologiques, radiologiques,
nucléaires et explosifs (CBRNE) [septième version] datée du 6 mars 2009, indique que
les nouvelles versions de la Stratégie gagneraient à avoir plus de concordance et de
cohérence avec les autres documents de politique portant sur la sécurité publique.
L’efficacité de la Stratégie reposera aussi sur la façon dont le cadre conceptuel de la
politique pourra intégrer des outils et processus de planification axée sur les capacités en
vue de s’adapter aux réalités pratiques de sécurité publique liées aux incidents CBRNE.
Les partenariats avec les chercheurs universitaires en sciences sociales peuvent aussi
donner un éclairage essentiel sur les avantages d’élaborer ce cadre stratégique
plurigouvernemental et pluriorganisationnel.
Table of contents
Abstract …….. ................................................................................................................................. i
Résumé …..... ................................................................................................................................... i
Executive summary ......................................................................................................................... ii
Sommaire ....................................................................................................................................... iv
Table of contents ............................................................................................................................ vi
1
Introduction............................................................................................................................... 1
1.1
Background.................................................................................................................... 1
1.2
Aim ................................................................................................................................ 1
2
Academic and Research Institute Database .............................................................................. 2
2.1
Format ........................................................................................................................... 2
2.2
Description of Tables .................................................................................................... 3
Summary of Database ............................................................................................................... 4
3.1
Global Findings ............................................................................................................. 4
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 6
3
4
5
Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres – Considerations .......................................................... 7
5.1
The Capability Based Planning Security Framework.................................................... 7
5.2
Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres ........................................................................... 9
6
7
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 14
Developing Canada’s National Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and
Explosives Resilience Strategy – Considerations ................................................................... 15
7.1
Introduction and Background ...................................................................................... 15
7.2
Foundational Principles and Elements ........................................................................ 16
7.3
Assumptions ................................................................................................................ 17
7.4
Strategic Objective ...................................................................................................... 18
7.5
Implementation ............................................................................................................ 19
8 Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 20
Annexes List of Annexes............................................................................................................... 21
Selected Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 23
List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms ..................................................................... 28
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DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
1
Introduction
1.1
Background
Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC), Centre for Security Science (CSS)
is engaged in several initiatives in support of Canadian preparedness and response to
terrorism and other hazards. The Capability Based Planning Pilot Project, lead by the
CSS Forensics Portfolio Manager, is one such initiative which seeks to develop and
validate a variety of Science and Technology (S&T) tools as part of an iterative process
toward an integrated and sustainable all-hazard risk assessment and management process.
A main deliverable from the Pilot Project will be the development and validation of a
Canadian National Incident Management System (CNIMS). Other aspects of the Pilot
Project will examine how concepts such as Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres and risk
assessment results may be most effectively used to shape capability and capacity
decision-making across the emergency response spectrum, responder communities, and
for policy and program development at non-federal levels. The Pilot Project also
provides support to Public Safety Canada’s multi-jurisdictional collaborative initiative
toward development of a national chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and
explosives resilience strategy.
1.2
Aim
The aim of this Contract Report is to document the global findings of research work
conducted in support of the Capability Based Planning Pilot Project. The report
addresses three specific areas of focus: Development of an initial database of Canadian
academic research institutes, academics, and academic courses, specific to intelligence
and security studies of relevance to the Centres’ mandate and objectives; offers global
findings relevant to development of a Canadian approach to Intelligence Fusion Centres;
and, provides insights relevant to development of a national chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear and explosives resilience strategy.
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
1
2
Academic and Research Institute Database
This section covers the format of the electronic database of Canadian academic and
research institutes that have been identified as sharing a common interest and expertise in
intelligence and security studies of relevance to the Centres’ mandate and objectives. In a
limited number of instances, Centres of Expertise, Academics and Courses of more
general relevance to CSS Capability Based Planning Project initiatives are also identified;
these have been included in the Database with appropriate annotations.
The information contained in the Database is the result of a detailed review that was
conducted across ninety-four Canadian universities and university colleges, including
their associated academic research centres and institutes. The information reflected in the
Database is drawn from the official public website of the respective academic and
research institutes. A review of Canadian community college programs was not within
the scope of this Contract Report.
2.1
Format
The data contained in the Canadian Academic and Research Institute Database is found in
three separate Excel Tables, (an electronic copy of the Database accompanies this report):
1. Centres of Expertise – Provides details pertaining to academic and research
institutes with an expertise in intelligence, security and defence related studies
identified for consideration in support of the Capability Based Planning Pilot
Project. The data contained in this table is provided in Annex A.
2. Centres of Expertise Academics – Identifies and provides details pertaining to the
academics across Canada that have developed an expertise relating to, or relevant
to CSS intelligence and security related initiatives. The data contained in this table
is provided in Annex B.
3. Academic Courses – Identifies and provides details of academic courses in the
area of intelligence and security studies of specific relevance to CSS initiatives.
The data contained in this table is provided in Annex C.
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DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
2.2
Description of Tables
The Academic and Research Institute Database utilizes a generic DRDC CSS Database
template and format. Use of the common template facilitates the merging of information
between complementary data banks, when appropriate to do so, and allows for expansion
and/or updates of the database over time. The format of Table 1 includes the following
information categories: Academic Institute; Research Objectives; Relevant Research
Programs; Primary Point(s) of Contact; Contact Information; and, Website. Table 2
contains information categories pertaining to: Academic Institute and Department;
Academic Researcher Contact Information; Relevant Area(s) of Specialty. Table 3
contains the information categories: Academic Institute and Department; and, Relevant
Courses.
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
3
3
Summary of Database
The Database has been developed to identify Canadian academic and research institutes
that share a common interest and expertise in intelligence and security matters. The
immediate objective is to facilitate future research partnerships and engagement of
academic resources in direct support of the Centre’s Capability Based Planning Pilot
Project, in particular the initiative to develop a Canadian approach to Intelligence Fusion
Centres.
To date, the Database has assisted with the identification of several Academic Centres of
Excellence with a depth of expertise and research activities that complement DRDC CSS
program initiatives. Most notably, the database project has identified a potential research
partnership with the University of Ottawa’s National President’s Dialogue which seeks to
champion a more collaborative relationship between government and academia on public
policy development in such areas a Foreign Affairs and security.
3.1
Global Findings
The review of Canadian universities and university colleges identified twenty-six
academic research centres and institutes that present potential research partnership
opportunities of relevance to the CSS mandate and objectives. Twelve of these Centres
of Expertise are affiliated with and receive funding through the Department of National
Defence (DND) Security and Defence Forum, which is mandated to develop a domestic
competence and national interest in defence issues of current and future relevance to
Canadian Security. Seven non-DND funded Centres of Expertise are identified as
having particular relevance for CSS intelligence and security related initiatives: The
Canadian Centre of Intelligence and Security Studies – Carleton University; Human
Security Report Project – Simon Fraser University; Centre International de Criminology
Comparée - Université de Montréal; La Chaire de recherché du Canada sur les Conflits
Identitaires et le Terrorisme - Université Laval; The International Centre for Criminal
Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy - University of British Columbia; The Trudeau
Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies – University of Toronto; and, The Jack and Mae
Nathanson Centre on Transnational Human Rights, Crime and Security – York
University.
In addition, forty-three institutions offer one or more academic experts specific to
intelligence and security, and/or studies of relevance to the CSS mandate and objectives.
Eighteen primary academic institutions were identified as centres of expertise with
respect to academic research capacity: University of Ottawa (28); Royal Military College
of Canada (19); Carleton University (19); York University (17); Dalhousie University
(17); Queen’s University (14); Université Laval (12); University of Alberta (10);
University of Calgary (9); Simon Fraser University (9); Wilfred Laurier University (9);
Université de Montréal (8); McGill University (7); Concordia University (7); University
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DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
of British Columbia (7); University of Toronto (7); University of Manitoba (6); and,
University of Windsor (6). The remaining twenty-five institutions respectively offer five
or fewer academic experts in the desired areas of study.
Finally, the review conducted of relevant courses offered across Canadian universities
and university colleges, found that forty-two institutions offer one or more courses
specific to intelligence and security, and/or studies of relevance to the CSS mandate and
objectives. Of those, five academic institutions are identified as primary centres of
expertise with respect to course capacity: University of Ottawa (55); Royal Military
College of Canada (32); Queen’s University (14); Carleton University (13); and,
Université de Montréal (7). The remaining thirty-seven institutions respectively offer
five or fewer courses in the desired areas of study.
Notwithstanding the opportunities that concentrations of academic research capability
and capacity offer, a word of caution is in order. Valuable expertise can also be found
resident in many of the smaller institutions as well, and as such these should not be
ignored when considering which academics, and/or which institutions, to engage in
support of CSS objectives and initiatives. The Database presents the means by which to
identify individual academics and/or institutions best suited to meet particular research
requirements in the area of intelligence, security and related areas of Emergency
Management.
While an assessment of capability and capacity gaps associated with current intelligence,
security and emergency management studies was not within the scope of this Contract
Report, it is worthwhile to note that while the US has well over 100 different Colleges
and Universities that focus on Homeland Security and Emergency Management
(McCreight 2009, 1; Blanchard 2006), Canada has only four at the university level, and
these primarily focus on issues relating to natural and accidental events. 1 If universities
are to address capability and capacity requirements of relevance to an all-hazards
approach to public safety and security, educational programs will need to incorporate
curriculum to also address the imperatives associated with terrorism. Further research in
this area is recommended. 2
1
University programs offered at the undergraduate and Master’s level include: Applied Disaster
and Emergency Studies – Brandon University; Program in Disaster and Emergency Management – York
University; Disaster Recovery Studies – Canadian Mennonite University; and, Conflict and Disaster
Management Program – Royal Roads University.
2
Future research should seek to identify and assess capability and capacity gaps in higher
education relevant to public safety and security, including questions relating to: educational standards; core
curriculum; program availability; the balance between education, training, and skills development; and,
finding consensus across academic disciplines on how “security” should be defined.
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
5
4
Conclusion
The Academic and Research Institute Database has been developed as a source of
information to facilitate engagement of academic institutes, individual academic
researchers, and/or those with specialized expertise, in the area of intelligence and
security. This community of researchers is continually growing; as such the database
represents a work in progress that will require periodic updates to remain accurate and
current.
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DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
5
Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres – Considerations
This section delineates the global findings of research work conducted in support of the
Capability Based Planning Pilot Project specific to the CSS initiative to develop a
Canadian approach to Intelligence Fusion Centres. The research work found in this
Contract Report is independent of work currently being conducted by the CSS Project
Management Lead for Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres. The scope of work
associated with this Contract Report gives consideration to the functional relationship of
Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres within a Capability Based Planning security
framework. As such, this section provides an overview of the Capability Based Planning
security framework concept, its essential components, the relevance of CSS initiatives
generally in support of such a framework, and in particular the importance of Intelligence
Fusion Centres within this construct. This section will also identify structural and
procedural challenges which require further consideration toward development and
implementation of Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres within a Capability Based
Planning security framework.
Information and key issues identified by this study result from the review and assessment
of: Capability Based Planning documentation; a number of DRDC research initiatives
conducted during the period from 2003 to 2009, including work performed in support of
the DRDC CSS First Responder Workshop (Calgary) 31 October to 01 November 2007;
as well as, relevant policies, programs, legislation, mandated authorities, selected
publications, reports and procedural manuals.
5.1
The Capability Based Planning Security Framework
Capability Based Planning has been a recognized process methodology for defence and
security strategic level planning and management since 2000, when it was adopted by the
Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces for the purpose of generating an endto-end force development framework. More recently, since 2007, DRDC CSS, in
collaboration with Public Safety Canada, has taken a leading role in shaping, developing
and implementing a Capability Based Planning framework that is also relevant to meeting
the broader public safety and security objectives of the Government of Canada.
Specifically, what Capability Based Planning offers is a strategically coherent political
decision-making and governance framework that provides a mission analysis framework,
modern management principles, and analytical practices that optimize outputs for
mitigating national security risk. Particularly valuable is how the framework facilitates
both the opportunity to recognize and shape top-down imperatives with bottom-up
realities in a coherent manner; allows multi-agencies and multi-tiered stakeholder
communities to identify capabilities, capacities, and a means of aligning resources with
common objectives in a collaborative and coordinated manner; and, provides the context
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
7
within which the necessary networks may be developed that recognize, promote and
integrate a multi-disciplinary approach to meet public safety and security challenges.
The essential components of Capability Based Planning include: appropriate high level
policy guidance; an assessment of the threat; a set of scenarios that reflect policy and the
threat environment; a capability taxonomy to guide capability development; a set of
actionable capability goals; an inventory of current and planned capabilities; a rigorous
and justifiable capability gap assessment that leads to research and development
priorities; a capability engineering process to develop solutions to priority gaps; and, a
balance of investment analysis to determine funded capability solutions. The primary
thrust of CSS initiatives in recent years has been toward the development and validation
of tools and processes associated with these foundational components that are necessary
for a fully functioning Capability Based Planning security framework. The work
performed to date has seen considerable progress toward establishment of such enablers
as: an integrated and sustainable all-hazard risk assessment and management process; a
Canadian National Incident Management System; a Capability Management &
Engineering process; a set of scenarios with sufficient detail and flexibility to guide
capability development; and, a capability taxonomy, to name but a few. In addition,
initiatives undertaken by the Capability Based Planning Pilot Project have also
contributed to a number of key Capability Based Planning activity areas that support a
collaborative and coordinated decision-making and governance structure. Of particular
note are the benefits associated with the identification and development of academic
partnership opportunities that contribute to building capability and capacity in relevant
Canadian science, social science, and S&T communities across jurisdictions; the
engagement of first responders in the identification and development of initiatives toward
relevant technologies and processes; and networking efforts that establish and leverage
the expertise of non-traditional partners across jurisdictions.
Canada’s efforts toward a Capability Based Planning security framework have also
benefited from the insights and lessons learned obtained from similar initiatives
undertaken in countries, such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and the
United Kingdom. However, application of such information within the Canadian context
nevertheless poses its own set of challenges. While the fundamental principles 3 of
Capability Based Planning remain the same across domains, knowledge transfer from one
political and legislative venue to another always requires some measure of adaptation. 4
3
The fundamental principles of Capability Based Planning are to: assure preparedness, flexibility
and adaptability by considering and developing a broad range of security-related missions and scenarios;
facilitate the promotion of joint perspectives, objectives, planning and programming activities across multijurisdictions and agencies; use of risk as a strategic measure of effectiveness; and, to promote a systemcentric focus rather than a platform-centric one.
4
Academic literature in the research area of policy transfer offers useful insights for consideration;
authors of particular note are included in the Bibliography.
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Consequently, initiatives that seek to incorporate and/or build on complementary bodies
of work found in other venues must ensure that the Capability Based Planning tools and
processes are appropriately aligned with the unique strategic, operational and tactical
requirements of the particular nation for which it is intended to be used. It is in this area
that partnerships with Social Sciences academic communities offer significant value,
given that they bring research expertise of relevance to the question of how to align tools,
processes and governance structures to address the social, economic, political and
legislative realities that are unique to Canada.
Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres 5
5.2
Intelligence Fusion Centres within a Capability Based Planning security framework
provide an essential component toward mapping the Canadian law enforcement, public
safety, and security problem space. Not only do they provide the information necessary
to understand and address the broad and complex reality that constitutes emergency
management, but such Centres also offer a number of advantages toward establishing
coherence and cohesion across government jurisdictions in how information and
intelligence is gathered, shared, and applied. Specifically, such Centres provide both a
mechanism and a process with which to identify, prevent, monitor, and respond to the
broad spectrum of natural and accidental disasters, and terrorist and criminal acts. Within
a Capability Based Planning framework, Intelligence Fusion Centres facilitate a riskbased, information-driven consequence management system that enables resource
prioritization and decision-making, operational effectiveness, and comprehensive data
oversight. There are however, a number of key considerations that are critical to the
efficacy and success of such a construct: the social and political context within which
such a process is developed and effected; whether key stakeholder communities and
public managers are actively engaged; and whether consideration is given to how
linkages can be forged between strategic planning processes, information-seeking, and
performance measurement (Simonds 2009). 6
The successful development and implementation of Intelligence Fusion Centres requires
strong leadership at all levels of government that is committed and supportive of an open
and collaborative approach across all the relevant stakeholder communities, including
5
How Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres will ultimately be defined remains an open question.
For the purposes of this Contract Report, Intelligence Fusion Centres are understood to be inclusive of
information gathered across the law enforcement, public safety, and security spectrum; this is consistent
with both the all-hazards approach to public safety and security in Canada, as well as with the model
developed by the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S. Department of Justice’s Global Justice Information
Sharing Initiative, and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
6
Academic literature that expands on these themes is available in the research field of
performance management and accountability. Authors of particular relevance have been included in the
Bibliography.
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
9
those resident in the private sector. Lessons learned from the American experience with
Intelligence Fusion Centres indicate that an inclusive approach is an essential component
to ensure the efficacy of the process. 7 In this regard, those who contribute to the
Canadian process should include: experts from both the academic and professional
communities; law enforcement practitioners representing federal, provincial/territorial,
and municipal jurisdictional levels; public safety, and private sector representatives.
To ensure that Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres are able to provide the essential
degree of strategic perspective and leadership, the development and implementation of
such Centres will require that the mandate, purpose, role, and governance structure of
each functional level (tactical, operational and strategic), is clearly defined in relation to
its role within a Capability Based Planning security framework. As such, separate from
the day-to-day intelligence and security function that Intelligence Fusion Centres
contribute to, careful thought must be given to how the information gathered by these
Centres will be applied within an analytical framework that will facilitate strategically
coherent mid and long range political decision-making in support of Government of
Canada national public safety and security objectives. In this regard, publications by the
U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, as well as
insights gained from the American experience with Intelligence Fusion Centres represent
a useful start point for CSS initiatives; however a word of caution is nevertheless
warranted. In the area of public safety and security, sustainable capability development is
faced with a number of systemic challenges related to financial, jurisdictional, and
legislative constraints that are unique to the Canadian political context; it will be
important to take these into consideration when developing the Canadian Intelligence
Fusion Centre concept.
When establishing a governance structure for Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres, a
number of questions will require attention; of particular note are those pertaining to
public policies and legislation that will govern and guide the mandate, authority,
responsibilities, and accountabilities of such Centres. 8 For instance:
x
How will the Anti-terrorism Act Bill C-36, and the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service Act, influence the structure and activities of such Centres?
x
How will Canadian privacy laws, access to information laws, and associated
intelligence and security legislation influence the mechanics and the interface
7
Global findings are captured in the joint publication of the U.S. Department of Justice, the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, and the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, titled Fusion Center Guidelines Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence
in a New Era, 2008.
8
The list of questions identified is not exhaustive; rather they are intended to provide some insight
into the scope of governance issues that should be considered.
10
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
between federal databases, and provincial/territorial, municipal, and private sector
databases?
x
Under what legislative authority and policy guidelines will Intelligence Fusion
Centre information be gathered, analyzed, shared, used, or disclosed?
x
To what jurisdiction and agency will Intelligence Fusion Centres, and any
subordinate Working Groups, be accountable?
x
What accountability and oversight/compliance framework will be used for the
appropriate safe guarding of shared information with agencies or shareholders that
have not traditionally been included in information and intelligence gathering
processes?
x
How will the reporting hierarchy be structured to ensure an appropriate flow of
information and guidance that is responsive to decision-making requirements at
the tactical, operational and strategic level?
x
How will the necessary oversight of the capability development process across
decision-making levels be effected?
Canada’s public policy, public management, and governance structures are significantly
different from those of the US and it will be necessary to consider how the multijurisdictional nature of Intelligence Fusion Centres can best be aligned with the political
realities of Canada’s Federal Constitutional and fiscal framework. While these are
particularly sensitive issues, the social sciences academic community is well suited for
engagement on these types of questions. They offer the expertise necessary to review
and map relevant Intelligence Fusion Centre concepts and components in relation to
Canadian public policy, processes, and standards, and can also provide critical insights
relevant to accountability and consequence management.
In a similar vein, the social sciences are also well suited to consider capacity issues
associated with current political, fiscal and human resources constraints. Capacity issues
as they relate to a sustainable governance structure for Intelligence Fusion Centres should
not be underestimated within the Canadian context. Examination of such issues must
critically assess the number, location, level, and scope of responsibility of Intelligence
Fusion Centres. The knowledge resident in the social sciences can contribute to an
understanding of where opportunities exist within the Canadian context to streamline the
American Intelligence Fusion Centre concept, ensure that unnecessary redundancies are
avoided, and that fiscal and human resource capacity realities are addressed. In this
regard, work toward an Intelligence Fusion Centre would benefit from an option analysis
that considers the feasibility and benefits associated with co-location of Intelligence
Fusion Centres with currently existing Operations Centres, or possibly with Regional
Joint Task Forces (RJTF). Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres must be seen by senior
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
11
decision-makers as credible, not only in terms of effectiveness and responsiveness, but
also from a business-case perspective. As such, wherever possible, initiatives toward the
development of Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres should seek to build upon and
incorporate existing procedures, standards, and processes so as to avoid redundancies, as
well as overly bureaucratic or resource intensive processes.
For Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres to achieve their mandate in relation to
Capability Based Planning it will be important to establish which stakeholders and
subject matter experts will be included as part of the consultation process and what
measure of decision-making authority each will have, particularly as it relates to
processes that determine:
x
key indicators for what information is gathered;
x
the criteria by which information will be analyzed and applied;
x
the performance measurement criteria used to track progress in addressing
identified capability gaps;
x
the process by which resource implications are identified, coordinated,
deconflicted, and/or leveraged;
x
how capability analysis, conclusions and prioritization proposals will be captured
for presentation to senior-level decision-makers; and,
x
how and who will provide advice to senior-level decision-makers on the potential
impact of intelligence and security related initiatives across capability areas and
jurisdictions.
Notwithstanding the challenges, within a Capability Based Planning security framework
Intelligence Fusion Centres can play an essential role in the process to determine the
health of targeted capability areas, define existing capability deficiencies and trends,
indicate developing deficiencies, and establish Horizon targets for mitigating
deficiencies. 9 In this role, Intelligence Fusion Centres can contribute to sustainable
strategic, operational and tactical level decision-making that enables senior-leadership to
establish capability priorities based on:
x
The relative importance of the requirement;
9
Capability Based Planning with Horizon targets enables planning, development, and
implementation that align capability requirements with fiscal realities; for example, Horizon 1 (1 to 5
years), Horizon 2 (5 to 15 years), and Horizon 3 (10 to 30 years).
12
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
x
The applicability of the proposed solution across stakeholder communities and/or
jurisdictions;
x
The technical feasibility of the proposed solution;
x
The level of risk/impact of the proposed solution;
x
The level of interoperability to be achieved across stakeholder communities
and/or jurisdictions; and,
x
The interdependencies across stakeholder communities and/or jurisdictions.
CSS initiatives toward development and implementation of a fully functioning Capability
Based Planning security framework are of direct relevance to meeting Government of
Canada public safety and security objectives. Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres, in
combination with other foundational components, such as an integrated and sustainable
all-hazard risk assessment and management process, and CNIMS, are key enablers that
address not only the imperatives and responsibilities delineated in Securing an Open
Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (2004) and the Emergency Management Act
(2007), but also the gaps and priorities identified by the Auditor General of Canada
(2005; 2009), and the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence
(2004; 2008). Specifically, the S&T tools and processes currently under development,
when implemented and applied within a Capability Based Planning framework, will
provide the necessary decision-making and governance structure for government officials
to execute their responsibilities to establish, monitor, and subsequently assess relevant
policies, programs and emergency management plans. In addition, the collaboration and
coordination inherent to processes such as Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres and
Capability Based Planning represent a vital component toward promoting and achieving a
common approach to emergency management. Such initiatives contribute not only to the
development of a common understanding of capability and capacity requirements across
jurisdictions, first responder communities, and non-traditional partners, but also facilitate
constructive dialogue to address challenges associated with standards, education and
training, and protection of critical infrastructure.
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
13
6
Conclusion
Since 2007, DRDC CSS, in collaboration with Public Safety Canada, has taken a leading
role in shaping, developing and implementing a Capability Based Planning framework in
support of meeting the broader public safety and security objectives of the Government of
Canada. Capability Based Planning offers a strategically coherent political decisionmaking and governance framework that provides a mission analysis framework, modern
management principles, and analytical practices that optimize outputs for mitigating
national security risk. Development of Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres represents
one of several foundational components toward a fully functioning Capability Based
Planning security framework. Intelligence Fusion Centres play a pivotal role in the
Capability Based Planning process by providing information seminal to the analysis
process of the security environment. Specifically, Intelligence Fusion Centres facilitate
the desired national perspective on matters of law enforcement, public safety and security
through the collaborative networks and synergies that are established as part of the
information gathering and analysis process. Assessments from this process are integral
for the analysis, identification, and prioritization of capability requirements. The process
informs decision-makers on capability performance in relation to strategic goals, which
consequently contributes to the establishment of priorities for more effective risk
management and response, capability prioritization, and resource allocation. In addition,
assessments from this process contribute to the identification of research and
development requirements for more effective and accelerated delivery of technology to
first responder communities and other operational authorities.
Considerations that are critical to the efficacy and success of Intelligence Fusion Centres
within a fully functioning Capability Based Planning security framework include not only
the development and validation of tools and processes, but also: the social and political
context within which such a process is developed and effected; whether key stakeholder
communities and public managers are actively engaged; and whether consideration is
given to how linkages can be forged between strategic planning processes, informationseeking, and performance measurement. The social sciences academic community offers
the expertise and critical insight relevant for an understanding of how to most effectively
develop, implement, and sustain, Intelligence Fusion Centres and a Capability Based
Planning security framework within the Canadian public policy and public management
context.
14
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
7
Developing Canada’s National Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives Resilience Strategy
– Considerations
This section provides the global findings of research work conducted in support of the
Capability Based Planning Pilot Project and its involvement in initiatives toward
development of a national chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives
resilience strategy.
Information and key insights identified by this Contract Report result from the review and
assessment of selected academic and professional practitioner publications, government
reports, policy documents, and procedural manuals, including a review of the draft
document Canada’s National Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and
Explosives (CBRNE) Resilience Strategy, Version 7, dated 6 March 2009. The format
and content of this section is structured so as to assist the development, alignment and
consistency of future iterations of the draft strategy document with similar National-level
policy documents in the area of public safety and security.
7.1
Introduction and Background
The well-being, public safety and security of both individuals and communities can be
profoundly affected by extreme events, whether they are the result of natural hazards,
accidental disasters, or intentional acts. A community can quickly become overwhelmed
and other jurisdictions impacted, when roles, responsibilities, and resources (human,
physical, and financial) have not been considered within the context of a comprehensive
emergency preparedness and response system. Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) events, particularly those resulting from intentional
acts such as terrorism, pose unique challenges for emergency preparedness, incident
management, and the development and sustainment of appropriate community-level
capabilities and capacity. Canada’s National CBRNE Resilience Strategy (“the
Strategy”), once finalized, will provide the conceptual framework toward meeting the
practical realities of public safety and security associated with CBRNE events.
Specifically, the Strategy is intended to establish the principles and elements of a
comprehensive integrated decision-making framework that will provide a context for
leadership and coordination through Federal/Provincial/Territorial emergency
management systems relevant to CBRNE events.
Implementing a successful strategy for CBRNE resilience requires the combined and
coordinated efforts of many organizations across the various levels of government, the
private sector, and international partners. 10 While Public Safety and Emergency
10
Primary strategic coordination and governing bodies responsible to guide and implement the
CBRNE Strategy of the Government of Canada are detailed in The Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
15
Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) has the lead responsibility to coordinate and implement
the Government of Canada’s CBRNE Strategy and all activities related to the Federal
jurisdiction, it is the Standing Forum of Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency
Management (SOREM), and the SOREM CBRNE Working Group, which is mandated to
provide the necessary guidance, advice and recommendations in support of a National
framework for CBRNE resilience across Federal, Provincial and Territorial jurisdictions.
Within this context, the articulation of Canada’s National CBRNE Resilience Strategy
will build upon the commitment and collaborative efforts of Federal/Provincial/Territorial
governments since 2004 toward a harmonized emergency management system.
Consistent with the strategic policy context established by An Emergency Management
Framework for Canada, development and implementation of a document such as
Canada’s National CBRNE Resilience Strategy will both recognize and respect
provincial and territorial jurisdiction, as well as existing laws and plans specific to each
government’s jurisdictional requirements. The Strategy, once completed, will reflect
input from: SOREM and its related Working Group(s); Federal, Provincial and Territorial
government officials; first responders; national association representatives; and,
community stakeholders. All partners in this process have a mandate and key role in the
promotion and delivery of coordinated mitigation, preparation, response and recovery
activities in support of Canadian resiliency to extreme and/or complex CBRNE events.
7.2
Foundational Principles and Elements
Comprehensive emergency management of CBRNE events entails a balanced, proactive,
and integrated all-hazards approach that considers all four phases of emergency
management including: mitigation/prevention; preparedness; response and recovery.
Development of Canada’s National CBRNE Resilience Strategy is predicated on the
principles and common elements of emergency management jointly developed by the
responsible Federal/Provincial/Territorial Ministers in An Emergency Management
Framework for Canada. Specifically, these principles as applied to the Strategy would
include:
x
A responsibility and accountability framework that reflects the shared and multijurisdictional nature of emergency management in Canada;
x
A proactive, integrated and comprehensive approach to CBRNE events;
x
An emergency management system that is based on inclusive and collaborative
partnerships;
Nuclear Strategy of the Government of Canada, 2005; Canada’s National Disaster Mitigation Strategy,
2008; and the, Standing Forum of Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management Terms of
Reference, 2005.
16
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
x
Coherency of action based on collaboration, shared expectations, and clearly
defined roles, responsibilities, authorities, capabilities and capacities as they
relate to CBRNE;
x
An all-hazards, risk-based approach that will inform decision-making for
sustainable capability and capacity development consistent with multijurisdictional CBRNE needs and objectives;
x
A focus on building sustainable resilience to CBRNE events within and across
communities, governments, and social systems;
x
A clear CBRNE-related communications strategy, structure and process relevant
to each of the four emergency management phases; and,
x
A commitment to continuous improvement of Canada’s National CBRNE
Resilience Strategy, its structures and processes through tangible incremental
and/or transformational change that is integral to CBRNE-related emergency
management functions and practices.
Development, implementation and continuous improvement to Canada’s National
CBRNE Resilience Strategy is recognized as a long-term commitment toward sustainable
resilience of Canadian communities to extreme and/or complex CBRNE events.
Development of the Strategy is the initial step toward addressing the gaps, challenges and
opportunities related to maintaining an acceptable level of CBRNE resilience as
identified by such collaborative forums as the Roundtable on Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives (CBRNE) Terrorism: Progress, Challenges &
Priorities for Action, held in 2007, as well as the Federal/Provincial/Territorial subworking group on CBRNE which convened early in 2008.
7.3
Assumptions
In order for mandated CBRNE partners and stakeholders to deliver coordinated
mitigation, preparation, response and recovery activities, a common set of principles and
elements is essential for the effective and efficient use of available resources. Similarly,
roles, responsibilities, training, and resources (human, physical and financial) must be
clearly defined and developed such that multi-jurisdictional requirements are
acknowledged and respected within a coherent, coordinated emergency management
system.
A successful CBRNE emergency management system must be capable to plan for and
address immediate, medium and long-term consequences that are associated with extreme
and/or complex events. Consideration of the four main phases of emergency
management, namely, mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery are understood as
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
17
fundamental for achievement of a comprehensive system and the attainment of multijurisdictional strategic objectives within an ongoing quality improvement cycle.
Recognizing that no single agency across the various levels of government, the private
sector, and international partners possess the authority and/or expertise to act unilaterally
when faced with extreme and/or complex CBRNE events, it is intended that this Strategy
will provide the pan-Canadian and trans-jurisdictional framework within which to
consider physical, population, social and organizational imperatives. As such, for the
principles, elements and expected outcomes to be applied effectively across jurisdictions,
the scope of the ideas and activities of the Strategy must be scalable to meet the reality of
diverse needs, requirements and risk tolerance for CBRNE resilience.
7.4
Strategic Objective
In order to meet the desired end-state of a comprehensive emergency management system
of Canadian resiliency to extreme and/or complex CBRNE events, it is intended that
Canada’s National CBRNE Resilience Strategy will represent the conceptual framework
to
provide
a
context
for
leadership
and
coordination
through
Federal/Provincial/Territorial emergency management systems. Core elements in support
of such an objective include:
18
x
Identify structures, mechanisms and processes that promote and facilitate
coordinated multi-jurisdictional multi-agency leadership, and visionary policy and
program development relevant to CBRNE emergency management;
x
Work in collaboration with relevant specialist communities of practice to promote
the development and implementation of consistent pan-Canadian all-hazard risk
assessment methodologies;
x
Work in collaboration with relevant subject matter experts and multi-jurisdictional
representatives to promote the development and implementation of pan-Canadian
Capabilities Based Planning structures, mechanisms and processes that facilitate
decision-making for sustainable CBRNE capabilities and capacity, giving
consideration to the principles of integrated concepts of operation and functional
interoperability;
x
Assess and provide advice, support, guidance and recommendations relative to
sustainable interoperable CBRNE resource requirements (human, physical,
financial and training) as identified by a Capabilities Based Planning process; and,
x
Identify and develop CBRNE-related information, knowledge management and
communications management structures, mechanisms and processes relevant to
each of the four emergency management phases.
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
7.5
Implementation
Successful development and implementation of a pan-Canadian and trans-jurisdictional
national CBRNE strategy is dependent upon strong leadership and coordination in the
following areas 11:
x
The development and implementation of a comprehensive pan-Canadian
framework that supports consistent and inter-operable approaches to meet the
challenges of extreme and/or complex CBRNE events. Inter-operable approaches
include consideration of multi-agency coordination challenges related to health,
social, physical and economic consequences, as well as requirements that result
from incidents relating to criminal activities;
x
Development of knowledge management processes that incorporate best practices,
timely and accurate information, and subject-matter expertise as an integral
component of the framework. Key enablers include the ongoing collaboration
with the Science and Technology community in support of consistent all-hazards
risk assessment methodologies, Capability Based Planning processes, a Canadian
National Incident Management System, and the potential offered by Intelligence
Fusion Centres, and partnerships with relevant academic research communities
toward sustainable public safety and security strategic planning processes;
x
Development of standardized frameworks, protocols and guidelines that foster a
national CBRNE resilience strategy while still recognizing jurisdictional
differences and priorities; and,
x
Identification and enhancement of existing mechanisms and processes that
facilitate relevant resourcing, accountability and networking.
Development of Canada’s National CBRNE Resilience Strategy requires not only careful
consideration and delineation of the scope and flexibility of the conceptual framework
across jurisdictions, but will also need to facilitate and promote a common understanding
and approach in support of a comprehensive emergency management system for
Canadian resiliency to extreme intentional and unintentional CBRNE events within the
broader all-hazards risk assessment and management context. CSS initiatives offer
important tools of direct relevance to the practical considerations of how Canada’s
National CBRNE Resilience Strategy can effectively meet its strategic, operational and
tactical level objectives. As such, close collaboration and coordination across initiatives
is essential to ensure appropriate alignment of tools, processes, and policies.
11
These recommendations are consistent with findings and recommendations from the October
2001 Special Task Force on Emergency Preparedness and Response, the 2003 Naylor Report on SARS, and
the 2004 National Framework for Health Emergency Management Guideline for Program Development.
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
19
8
Conclusion
Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosives events, particularly those
resulting from intentional acts such as terrorism, pose unique challenges for emergency
preparedness, incident management, and the development and sustainment of appropriate
community-level capabilities and capacity. A successful emergency management system
must be capable to plan for and address immediate, medium and long-term consequences
that are associated with such extreme and/or complex events. Development of a national
CBRNE resilience strategy is intended to provide the necessary conceptual framework
toward meeting the practical realities of public safety and security associated with
CBRNE events. Preliminary work on the Strategy represents an important step toward
defining roles and responsibilities in support of a comprehensive, risk-driven, multijurisdictional decision-making emergency management framework. However, review of
the draft document Canada’s National Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and
Explosives (CBRNE) Resilience Strategy, Version 7, dated 6 March 2009, indicates that
future iterations of the Strategy would benefit from closer alignment and consistency with
National-level policy documents in the area of public safety and security. Also of
importance will be an alignment of tools and processes with the policy. CSS initiatives,
such as the Capability Based Planning Pilot Project, CNIMS, initiatives for the
development of Canadian Intelligence Fusion Centres, and efforts to establish
partnerships with relevant academic research communities toward sustainable public
safety and security strategic planning processes, are all directly relevant to the efficacy of
the Strategy.
20
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
Annexes List of Annexes 12
Annex A Centres of Expertise
Annex B Centres of Expertise Academics
Annex C Academic Courses
12
Annexes found in attached PDFs
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
21
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22
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
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—. "Capability Based Planning Pilot Project: A report on partnership opportunities and
the sustainability of emergency response across non-federal levels." Contract Report
prepared for Defence R&D Canada Centre for Security Science. 2009.
Simonds, K., D. Byrne, and L. Kerzner. "Sustain Canadian Joint Task List (CJTL)
Assessment Framework: Overview and Analysis." Department of National Defence Director General Strategic Planning. 2005.
Smith, P. "On the unintended consequences of publishing performance data in the public
sector." International Journal of Public Administration 18 (1995): 277-310.
Speers, Kimberley. "Performance measurement in the Government of Alberta." Revue
gouvernance 2.1 (2005): 58-76.
Statutes of Canada. "Anti-Terrorism Act." Department of Justice Canada, 2001.
—. "Emergency Management Act." Department of Justice Canada, June 2007.
—. "Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act." Department of Justice Canada, 1985.
26
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
The Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Emergency
Preparedness in Canada. Second Session, Thirty-ninth Parliament,Vols 1-4. Ottawa:
Canada, 2008.
—. National Emergencies: Canada's Fragile Front Lines - An Upgrade Strategy. Ottawa:
Senate of Canada, 2004.
US Department of Homeland Security. "Intelligence and Information Sharing Initiative:
Homeland Security Intelligence & Information Fusion." April 2005.
US Department of Justice. "Baseline Capabilities for State and Major Urban Area Fusion
Centres - A Supplement to the Fusion Centre Guidelines." September 2008.
—. "Fusion Centre Guidelines - Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in
a New Era." 2008.
—. "The National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan." October 2003.
US House of Representatives. "Giving a Voice to Open Source Stakeholders: A Survey
of State, Local & Tribal Law Enforcement." September 2008.
—. "The State of Homeland Security." An Annual Report Card on the Department of
Homeland Security. 2007.
van Thiel, Sandra, and Frans L. Leew. "The performance paradox in the public sector."
Public Performance & Mangement Review 25.3 (2002): 267-281.
Wake Carroll, B. "Some Obstacles to Measuring Results." Optimum 30.1 (2000).
Yang, Kaifen, and Marc Holzer. "The performance-trust link: implications for
performance measurement." Public Administration Review 66.1 (2006): 114-126.
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
27
List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms
CBRNE
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives
CNIMS
Canadian National Incident Management System
CSS
Centre for Security Science
DRDC
Defence Research and Development Canada
DND
Department of National Defence
PSEPC
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
RJTF
Regional Joint Task Force
SOREM
Senior Officials Responsible for Emergency Management
S&T
Science and Technology
28
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA
(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall document is classified)
1.
ORIGINATOR (The name and address of the organization preparing the document.
Organizations for whom the document was prepared, e.g. Centre sponsoring a
contractor's report, or tasking agency, are entered in section 8.)
4C Success Inc. with The Associates Group of Companies
222 Somerset Street West, Suite 700, Ottawa, K2P 2G3
3.
2.
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
UNCLASSIFIED
121&RQWUROOHG*RRGV
'0&$
5HYLHZ*&(&-XQH
TITLE (The complete document title as indicated on the title page. Its classification should be indicated by the appropriate abbreviation (S, C or U)
in parentheses after the title.)
Capability Based Planning Pilot Project: A report on academic and research partnership opportunities
relevant to intelligence and security initiatives
4.
AUTHORS (last name, followed by initials – ranks, titles, etc. not to be used)
Simonds, K.C.
5.
DATE OF PUBLICATION
(Month and year of publication of document.)
6a.
NO. OF PAGES
6b.
(Total containing information,
including Annexes, Appendices,
etc.)
NO. OF REFS
(Total cited in document.)
February 2011
7.
DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (The category of the document, e.g. technical report, technical note or memorandum. If appropriate, enter the type of report, e.g.
interim, progress, summary, annual or final. Give the inclusive dates when a specific reporting period is covered.)
Contract Report
8.
SPONSORING ACTIVITY (The name of the department project office or laboratory sponsoring the research and development – include address.)
Centre for Security Science
Defence R&D Canada
222 Nepean St. 11th Floor
Ottawa, ON Canada K1A 0K2
9a.
PROJECT OR GRANT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable research and
development project or grant number under which the document
was written. Please specify whether project or grant.)
10a. ORIGINATOR'S DOCUMENT NUMBER (The official document
number by which the document is identified by the originating
activity. This number must be unique to this document.)
9b.
CONTRACT NO. (If appropriate, the applicable number under
which the document was written.)
10b. OTHER DOCUMENT NO(s). (Any other numbers which may be
assigned this document either by the originator or by the sponsor.)
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
11.
DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY (Any limitations on further dissemination of the document, other than those imposed by security classification.)
Unclassified , Unlimited
12.
DOCUMENT ANNOUNCEMENT (Any limitation to the bibliographic announcement of this document. This will normally correspond to the
Document Availability (11). However, where further distribution (beyond the audience specified in (11) is possible, a wider announcement
audience may be selected.))
Unlimited
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
13.
ABSTRACT
The Centre for Security Science (CSS) represents a joint endeavour between Defence Research
and Development Canada (DRDC) and Public Safety Canada. The Centre is part of the
Government of Canada’s approach to address national public safety and security objectives; its
goal being to deliver timely and relevant Science and Technology (S&T) research in support of
an all-hazards approach to natural and accidental disasters, and terrorist and criminal acts.
Toward this objective, the Centre seeks to engage academia, together with government, industry
scientists, and responder communities, in collaborative partnerships from the early stages of any
research initiative. The intent is not only to develop S&T tools, but to also contribute timely and
relevant recommendations for public policy and public management consideration.
This Contract Report presents the findings of work conducted in support of the Capability
Based Planning Pilot Project lead by the CSS Forensics Portfolio Manager. Specifically, the
report identifies potential partnership opportunities with academic researchers that share a
common interest and expertise pertaining to issues of intelligence and security; offers global
findings relevant to development of a Canadian approach to Intelligence Fusion Centres; and,
provides insights relevant to development of a national chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear and explosives resilience strategy.
Le Centre des sciences pour la sécurité (CSS) est le résultat d’une entente de coopération entre
Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada (RDDC) et Sécurité publique
Canada. Le Centre constitue une des mesures prises par le gouvernement du Canada
pour atteindre les objectifs nationaux en matière de sécurité publique, son but étant de
réaliser en temps opportun des recherches et pertinentes en matière de science et de
technologie (S et T) à l’appui d’une approche tous risques visant à contrer des
catastrophes d’origine naturelle ou accidentelle ainsi que des actes terroristes et
criminels. Pour atteindre cet objectif, le Centre entend mettre à contribution les
universitaires, de même que les scientifiques du gouvernement et de l’industrie, ainsi
que les communautés des intervenants, dans le cadre de partenariats de collaboration
dès le début de tout projet de recherche. Le but visé est non seulement de développer
des outils S et T, mais aussi de formuler des recommandations opportunes et pertinentes
à l’intention des responsables de la politique officielle et de la gestion publique.
Le présent rapport de contrat fait état des conclusions du travail effectué à l’appui du
Projet pilote de planification axée sur les capacités, qui est dirigé par le gestionnaire du
portefeuille judiciaire du CSS. Plus particulièrement, le rapport détermine les
possibilités de partenariat avec des chercheurs universitaires qui, comme nous, ont de
l’intérêt et de l’expertise concernant les questions relatives au renseignement et à la
sécurité. Il formule aussi des conclusions globales concernant l’élaboration d’une
approche canadienne pour les centres de fusion des renseignements ainsi que des
observations sur l’élaboration d’une stratégie nationale de résilience en cas d’incident
liés aux dispositifs chimiques, biologiques, radiologique, nucléaires et explosifs.
DRDC CSS CR 2011-xx
14.
KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS
Capability Based Planning, Intelligence and Security, Academic and Research Partnership
Opportunities; Intelligence Fusion Centres; CBRNE Resilience Strategy
DRDC CSS CR 2011-07
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